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THE LIVING SOUL  
A Study of the Meaning of the Word  
*nəfəš* in the Old Testament  
Hebrew Language

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## PREFACE

The initiative for the present study was provided by the publication of MIRIAM SELIGSON'S work, «The Meaning of *npš mt* in the Old Testament» in 1951, when my teacher, Professor Aarre Lauha asked me to review the book for the Finnish periodical, *Teologinen Aikakauskirja*. Finding that in most of the important points the work was in complete disagreement with my own views, I felt it necessary to go more deeply into the subject than is customary in a review. After completing the review towards the end of the same year, I continued with the study in the time that my main study and my professional duties allowed. After going through various phases, work on the study was virtually completed in 1955. Since the publication of the review already mentioned, my views have changed on some important points as a result of closer examination of the material.

The study also included the NT material on the subject, but for various reasons this part of the work must remain unpublished; I hope that an opportunity to publish it will present itself in the future.

At different stages my manuscript was read, either wholly or in part, by the late Professor A. F. Puukko, Professors Lauha and Aimo T. Nikolainen, Armas Salonen and Dr. Jussi Aro of the University of Helsinki, Dean L. P. Tapaninen of Oulu, and Professor A. R. Johnson of Cardiff, as also by the *grand seigneur* of this field who has graciously accepted the dedication of this book. His work, «Israel I—II» proved especially helpful in the classification of the material. To the others I am also most grateful for advice and criticism received, but regret that it was not always possible to follow it.

My thanks are due to the Finnish Oriental Society for accepting this part of the work as one of its publications.

I should like to extend my gratitude to those friends who have given me practical assistance of various kinds but who wish to remain anonymous, and not least to my wife, without whose loving care and tirelessness this book would never have come into existence.

Et ante omnia: laus et gloria Deo viventi et vivificenti, iuste cum omnibus agenti et acturo in aeternum.

Tornio, Thurevik, January 28th, 1958.

A. MURTONEN

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## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Method.

The scope of this study is materially philological, in the first place semasiological, its purpose being to find out the meaning or meanings in which the word *nəfəš* is used in the language of the Hebrew Old Testament. Special attention is paid to the use of this word as a religious term. Accordingly, the writer does not try to define the content of the OT conception of soul, but only to describe the above-mentioned linguistic usage and the ideas presupposed by it, as far as the latter is needed to explain the linguistic usage. As such it will, however, create the only really objective basis for the study of the conception mentioned, also, if the attempt is to succeed.

When studying the use of the word *nəfəš* in the OT Hebrew, we must proceed from *all* the passages where the word *nəfəš* appears, and from them *alone*; other passages may be taken into account only so far as they help to understand the use of the word in them. Regarding the passages where the word is specially dealt with we must be careful to study, whether the information given in them is in accordance with the general use, and if it is not, whether it has later influenced this usage and how far. The neighbourhood of the OT is left out of account, also, as far as there do not appear phrases which contain this word in the OT borrowed form the cognate languages. The linguistic usage is studied as such, without asking whether the expressions are archaic or figurative or not, and regarding the method used in the study it must be observed that it is not purely nor even in the first place historical or chronological, but psychological. The historical background presupposed by it does appear — best in the last chapter —, but in the first place attention is directed to the inner understanding of the Bible from its own

world of ideas.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with this principle, all kinds of textual emendations are avoided as far as possible, and Biblical passages are translated from the original text as literally as possible, where not stated otherwise. As a rule, such a translation is enough to make the sense of the word *נֶפֶשׁ* in its respective context clear, so that not many additional words are needed for its interpretation, even if there are remarkable exceptions.

The reader will ask now, what are the reasons of these methods? And why not to proceed further and to study the conception of the soul in the OT on the basis laid through this study?

It is universally known that during the course of the study of the OT innumerable errors have been made by means of bringing foreign conceptions from outside the Bible and reading them into the text in spite of the clear statements in it. One among the most frequently represented is the very conception of the soul of the OT.<sup>2</sup> Even among the most recent scholars who have studied this subject the by far commonest opinion is that the primary or a very important secondary meaning of this word is one which cannot be attested with any certainty neither in the OT nor outside it.<sup>3</sup> The reason for this has been that the starting point has been taken from the etymology of the word, which again has been derived by the help of the real or reputed equivalents of the word in the cognate languages, as can be seen in the works mentioned in the preceding notes. That the results arrived at by this method are not reliable is strongly suggested by the fact that all of them contain at least one link which cannot be attested with certainty in any Semitic language, and have to declare more or less large number of the OT attestations of this word to represent an archaic, »stiffened», or figurative usage.<sup>4</sup> The only means to guard himself against such dangers seemed to the present writer to follow the method described above and to start from the whole material of the OT. All the passages in question were therefore carefully examined and divided into the following classes according to various formal and material aspects. Some additional divisions were considered, also, but the ones used seemed to the writer to be the only ones sufficiently guarded against misinterpretations.<sup>5</sup> The formal aspects



being the most neutral in character it seemed best to begin with the division according to them, the rest following in the natural order, the etymology as the last, in connection with a kind of summary.

A consequence of the method is that the exposition of the results bears the character of deduction. The selection of a few passages as typical examples from which the starting point could be derived would, in face of what is stated above, be quite arbitrary and against the writer's chief principle. On the other hand, it were quite impossible to treat every passage or even a considerable part of them from every aspect, however short the treatment might be. The only way, therefore, seemed to be the one followed below. Since it concerns only the exposition of results, it might not much harm the matter itself.

Admittedly, the study bears the character of an uncompleted one, when viewed from the aspect of its material contents. Therefore the question, why not to proceed to study the OT conception of soul has some justification. However, as we have seen above, in such a case it would be necessary to take into account a.o. the corresponding conception in the cognate languages, which again presupposes a detailed study, which could be regarded reliable, of the subject in each of these languages. As far as the present writer knows and can judge, there are no such studies at present. Consequently, these conceptions should be studied first, and this demands a special study for each of them.

## 2. Statistics.

The word *naefæſ* appears in the OT 754 times in all. In the Authorised Version the word *soul* appears as the equivalent 475 times, which makes 63.00 per cent of the total number. The corresponding figures of the word *life* are 120 and 15.92. The remaining 21 per cent are made up of the following words: (*any*) *person* 26 times, the reflexive pronoun 20 times, *heart* 16 times, *mind* 15 times, *creature* 10 times, the personal pronoun 9 times, *dead* 5 times, *body*, *dead body*, *pleasure* each 4 times, *desire*, *will* (noun), *any* each 3 times, *man*, *thing*, *beast*, *appetite*, *ghost*, *lust* each twice, and *every man*,

*mortally, the death of . . . persons, fish, greed-, hearty, deadly, so would . . . have it, own, will (verb), breath* each once. In 14 cases it has remained without any direct equivalent.

The frequent use of *soul* as the rendering of *nəfəš* by the AV seems to be a Hebraism perhaps under the influence of the LXX, which uses the word *ψυχή* as its rendering almost invariably. There are only a few real variants, 41 in number at most, and even in some cases of them it is well possible that LXX have had a different text before them. The pronominal use (15—16 times) is the most important; it appears in various books from Numbers to Esther. The use of *ἔμπνεον* in Josh x 28. 30. 35. 37. 39, xi 11 of living beings in general, and of *ἀνήρ* in Gn xiv 21, Pr xvi 26, xxviii 25 (and 2 K xii 5?) of men specially, as well as of the proper name David in 1 S xxiii 15, perhaps also of *σώματα* in Gn xxxvi 6 may be compared with it. Some relation to *nəfəš* denoting a part of the body may be discovered in *χείρες* Ps xli 3, Pr xiii 4, *βραχίονος* Jer li 14, *κεφάλης* Is xliii 4, *καταπίοι* («throat») Pr xxiii 7, perhaps also *δακτυλίωνος* Is iii 20?, to the same appearing as the seat of emotions etc. in *ἐλπίδα* Dt xxiv 15, *ἔστεναξα* Job xxx 25 (at the same time pronominal), and in *ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις ἐστίν* Pr xiii 4, while the remains, viz. *ἐλευθέραν* Dt xxi 14, *πτῶσιν* Ez xxxii 10, *ἀπόλεια* Job xi 20, and *ἐν αἰτία φόρον* Pr xxviii 17, are probably free renderings of MT. In many cases, however, this is anything but certain. In all the other cases, where the LXX have not had a different text before them or a lacuna in the text, *ψυχή* is invariably used, whatever the actual meaning of *nəfəš* may have been, from «corpse» and «throat» up to the finest mental and spiritual meanings. Whether this is to be interpreted as a mechanical procedure, indicating that the old translators have no more understood the proper character of the word *nəfəš*, or that they were fully familiar with it up to the finest details and therefore used *ψυχή* as its rendering, does not belong to the scope of this study.

Further statistics are given in the respective connections. A general survey of all the passages containing the word *nəfəš*, divided into the various classes is appended to the end.

## FIRST CHAPTER

*Næfæš* in relation to its possessor and to its contents.

When studying the OT passages in which the word *næfæš* appears, we find that in most cases it means its possessor described as living and/or acting, while in a number of passages it seems to represent its possessor as such, without further qualifications. In some passages still, it seems to mean only a part of its normal sphere, viz. either that which is important for the preservation of its life or that in which its action is concentrated, in some further passages the action itself. In a few passages its sphere is too vague to be exactly determined, and in one case its relation to its context is quite uncertain. We examine the different groups in order according to their size.

1. *Næfæš* denoting the living and acting being of its possessor.

Among the 754 OT passages in which the word *næfæš* appears there are about 487 or 64.6 per cent in which it is used to mean the living and acting being of its possessor or, in other words, its possessor as living and acting. This figure, as indeed all the others, is considered only from our (i.e., linguistic) point of view, and even so it is inexact, because the border line between this group and groups 2 and 3 is partly rather uncertain (cf. e.g.p. 16). We endeavour as far as possible to select examples from books written at different periods.

Almost all or 485 passages counted in this group deal with God or man; in ten cases animals seem to be included.

a. *God and man.*<sup>1</sup>

Gn xii 13 we read: »... and my soul<sup>1b</sup> will live because of thee» which is paraphrased by ARV: »... that my life may be spared on your account». The preceding passage shows that Abraham means himself: »... they will kill me...», but in the language *nəfəš* is subject, »to live» predicate. Life being the basic function of the soul, this passage must be counted in this group. Soul, from this point of view, being man's living being, man is living only as long as his soul remains living. Moffatt is thus quite correctly paraphrasing Gn xxxvii 21: »... we must not kill him outright», where the literal translation would run: »... let us not strike him upon soul», i.e., so that the blow will reach the sustainer of his life and thus finish his life.<sup>1c</sup> On the other hand, the life of a soul can continue even after the death of its possessor, as is seen e.g. 1 S ii 33: »But (any) man I shall not cut off from my altar, so that I would consume thy eyes and pine away thy soul, and all the increase of thy house will die as (grown-up) men». The passage is somewhat difficult, but so much is clear in any case that according to the MT Eli's soul is thought to continue its existence in his offspring.<sup>2</sup>

On the other side, soul is the acting being of a man. Action may be — in the modern<sup>3</sup> sense of the word — either psychical or corporeal. The statement that the soul is the subject of emotions and animal instincts, but never of physical actions<sup>4</sup> seems to have some justification, because every action is at least preceded by an action of the nerve system, and it is easy to suppose that the subject is quietly changed when the action is turned to be corporeal. Action being in question, however, man and his soul are often identified even formally in the linguistic usage: *našši 'iwwīlā* *ballaylā*<sup>h</sup> Is xxvi 9: »My soul I have desired thee by night...» Formally *našši* is subject, but the predicate is in the 1st pers. sg. Not formal, but material identification is made e.g. Ez xviii 19—20: »... surely *he* shall live. The *soul* that sins — that shall die...», cf. v. 21: »... surely *he* shall live — *he* shall not die». That the soul in these passages is not identified with man as such, but only as far

as the action is in question, is proved by v. 4: »Behold, all the souls — *mine* they are: as the soul of the father, so the soul of the son — *mine* they are. The soul that sins — *it* shall die». As long as the soul in itself, only as a mere being, is concerned, it is clearly differentiated from its possessor, but when existence is converted into action, the difference between them is abolished. Consequently, we can say: when a man acts, it is his soul that acts. Nowhere in the OT do we find a statement that man's body sins — it is his soul that sins. Further we find that the soul eats: Lv vii 27: »Any soul that eats any blood . . .», loathes: Nm xxi 5: ». . . our soul loathes this contemptible bread» (this, however, belongs to the fourth class), has desire: Mic vii 1: ». . . no first-ripe fig that my soul desires», is in despair: Ps xlii 7: ». . . my soul is despairing upon me», and praises the LORD: Ps cxlvi 1: »Praise, my soul, the LORD!»<sup>5</sup> Soul is thus the subject of man's action and life, and, consequently, the actor itself even materially.

Acting soul being thus identified with acting man a question arises, viz., on what grounds can the distinction between cases in which the soul is identified with its possessor and those where this is not the case be made. The answer is that in the cases where soul appears acting material distinction can be made only if the context enables it while the linguistic usage everywhere makes *soul* subject.

#### b. Other living beings.

This group contains only one OT passage, viz. Gn i 30. It runs: »And to the whole of the wild animals of the earth and to all the fowl of the heaven and to the whole of those that are crawling upon the earth, in which there is living soul, (I give) all the green growth for food . . .» AV has *life* for *living soul*, which gives the correct sense, because it means the sustainer of the life of these beings. The word *næfæš* is used in this passage, because »all the green growth» mentioned in the same connection is intended just for the preservation of *næfæš* and that all living beings have thus similar right to it.<sup>6</sup> *Næfæš* is the connecting link common to all of them.

*c. Lifeless objects.*

The only passage belonging to this group is Is iii 20, and even this is uncertain. Among other decorative objects used by the daughters of Jerusalem there are mentioned »houses of the soul» which may mean scent-bottles or perfume boxes, as Moffatt and ARV translate.<sup>7</sup> In that case, it may be a question of small bottles of alabaster, gold, silver, and ivory. They were used for the preservation of perfumes.<sup>8</sup> Their »acting being» was perfume, from which odour issued. Considering that every living being has its own odour, also, and that the smell coming from the bottles may often have been rather strong, it was not far from regarding the smell as an indication of the action of a soul really »living» in the bottle;<sup>9</sup> cf. the section dealing with the soul of a dead, also.<sup>10</sup>

2. *Nəfəš* denoting its possessor as a mere being.

The number of the OT passages in which *nəfəš* appears meaning its possessor as a mere being without further qualifications is about 127. The great majority of these passages, 115 in all, deals with God or men, while in the remaining 12 cases other living beings are meant.

*a. God and man.*

Gn ii 7 runs: »Then the LORD of Godship<sup>11</sup> formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul». The passage is often regarded as the *locus classicus* of the anthropology of the OT and of the whole Bible<sup>12</sup>, but it is hardly in accordance with the facts. *Nəfəš* is here identified with man in himself, although action is not in question<sup>13</sup>, and the word is more exactly defined by means of the word »living», which is surprising in this connection for two reasons: 1) the passage is the only one in the whole OT in which this attribute, which also

elsewhere very rarely appears connected with the word *nəfæš* (cf. section b), is used to describe man's nature as soul; 2) as this study might show, life is something so characteristic of soul and just of soul that a conception as »lifeless soul» (which is not the same as the soul of a dead, cf. the second chapter) is impossible. Is iii 20 (perfume boxes) is no real exception, as the preceding section shows. In that passage the sphere of *nəfæš* is only reduced to one direction, as in this case to another. For the sphere of *nəfæš* is in no case enlarged when the word is used to mean man as a mere being without further qualifications, but reduced. An illustrative example is 1 S ii 33 in which Eli's kinsmen are reckoned with as belonging to his soul. Nm xvi 1—35 teaches us, what this means in practice: Korah, Dathan, and Abiram had sinned against the LORD, but even their wives, »big and small children» (v. 27), their lodgings and all their goods (v. 32) were destroyed. Obviously all of these were included in their soul.<sup>14</sup>

Other examples of this class: Pr xxviii 17 deals with man who is oppressed » *in the blood of a soul*», i.e., who has killed somebody and so fallen into blood-guilt.<sup>15</sup> Soul is thus identified with man. Another soul of a similar type, but containing apparently several persons we meet in Gn xii 5, where we are told that Abram took Sarai and Lot and all their goods and in addition that *soul* that they had »made» in Haran. Moffatt's interpretation: »... the serfs... acquired...» may be correct, except that »slaves» would be more exact.<sup>16</sup> A similar case is met with in Gn xiv 21, where the king of Sodom says to Abram: »Give me the *soul* (ARV: »persons») and the goods take for yourself»,<sup>17</sup> Gn xlvi 26: »All that *soul* that came to Jacob into Egypt... was 66 (persons)», Jer xliii 6: »... and all that *soul* that Nebuzar-adan, the captain of the bodyguard, had left with Gedaliah, the son of Ahikam...».<sup>18</sup> It is clear that the soul that is left to a man's care must be of another nature than that »soul of the whole flesh» which is cared for by the LORD, and the interpretation of the versions: »every person» is proved correct by the context. The collective sense of the original text, however, is destroyed.

This meaning has its origin probably in the conception »slave = soul» (Gn xii 5, Lv xxii 11<sup>19</sup>, etc.; perhaps even in the latter passage, at least potentially, more than one person is in question). As we saw in paragraph 1., above all action is characteristic of the soul, even so that acting soul and acting man are not distinguished from one another at all. A slave is similarly looked upon particularly from the view-point of action, because slaves are normally acquired just in order to be used as labour power. The equation »slave = soul» was thus very easily formed<sup>20</sup>, and because slave was regarded as an individual in a still lower grade than other men; thus the meaning »soul = person in itself» was quite as easily deduced from this meaning, because both were lacking any individual characteristics.

*b. Other living beings.*

This group is composed of the following OT passages: Gn i 20: »Let the waters swarm with swarms of living soul . . .», v. 21: »And God created . . . the whole crawling, living soul with which the waters swarm . . .», v. 24: »Let the earth bring forth living soul according to its (*not* their) kind: cattle and creeping things . . .», ii 19: ». . . and all which the man called 'living soul', so was its name» (the passage is very difficult to interpret;<sup>21</sup> the original text is possibly not correct), ix 10: »And with all the living soul that is with you consisting of fowl, of cattle, and of all of the living animals of the earth . . .», v. 12: ». . . and between all the living soul that is with you . . .», v. 15: ». . . and between all the living soul consisting of all flesh . . .», v. 16: ». . . and between all the living soul consisting of all flesh that is upon the earth», Lv xi 10: ». . . and out of all the living soul that is in the waters . . .», v. 46: »This is the law for the cattle and the fowl and all of the living soul that is crawling in the waters, and for all the soul that is swarming upon the earth», Ez xlvi 9: ». . . all the living soul that swarm . . .», and Lv xxiv 18: ». . . and he who slays a soul of cattle . . .»

It may seem incorrect that these passages in which *nəfəš* appears



without exception in connection with an attribute and often even acting, are placed in this class in which soul is stated to mean its possessor as such without any further qualifications. As a matter of fact, however, it is just the attribute which compels us to place them here, for it shows that the soul is no more conceived in its proper meaning, living by its nature, and it is the soul thus qualified that acts, and not soul in itself. For argumentation see below.

The passages, except the last one, which is left out of account for a moment, contain two striking common peculiarities: first, in all the cases the word *soul* is accompanied by the attribute »living», which appears in connection with the word *soul* only in one case (cf. p. 14 sq.), when it is a question of man, and in addition to all of these only Gn i 30 (cf. p. 13). The only exception Lv xi 46b is only apparent: the attribute is not repeated, because it stands in the beginning of the passage in the same connection. Secondly: in all of the passages it is probably a case of a soul consisting of more than one being or a so-called collective soul (cf. the fourth chapter). In ten cases this meaning is the only one possible, in Gn ii 19 the individual interpretation is possible grammatically, but even there hardly materially (presupposing that the above translation is correct). Further, it should be observed that in addition to these there are only few, probably young passages in which soul is connected with other beings than man, and even of these only 2 belong to the group in which soul appears in its fundamental meaning »the living and acting being of its possessor» (cf. I: 1: b-c). The last passage, again, uses the word *nafeš* as in connection with numerals.

We may thus conclude the supposition made above that the addition of the attribute »living» to the word *nafeš* shows the meaning of the latter to be considerably altered from the original, to be correct. Consequently, it seems probable that the term *soul* was not originally used of animals. The conclusion is corroborated by the small number of such cases, as also by the circumstance that there is only one case, Gn i 30 — and even that is called into question<sup>22</sup> —, in which *soul* in its main meaning is connected with animals, while those in which it means animals as mere beings

total eleven. The change in meaning may be conceived as having its starting point in slaves, who even they were not regarded as men in the full sense of the word, and being transferred first to domestic animals which in a certain sense (as the property of the housefather) were equated with slaves, and then to all kinds of animals. On the other hand, the analogy formed by the conception of living and acting common to both men and animals without doubt facilitated the shift of the meaning. The same analogy may have caused the existence of the few examples with which we shall become acquainted in the following paragraphs.<sup>23</sup>

3. *Næfæš* denoting that part of the being which is important for its life or action.

This class is divided in two smaller groups: 1) those in which *næfæš* means something important for the preservation of its possessor's life, and 2) those in which it is used to mean the centre of its action. We treat them differently, beginning with life as the basic function of the soul.

*a. Substance or object important for life.*

The last paragraph made us acquainted with cases in which *soul* was used to mean the subject of man's existence in a more narrow sense of the word or man in himself. In this section we have to deal with cases in which *soul* means the subject of man's life in a more narrow sense or a substance or object important for his life. Animals are often — at least — included. The number of the passages falling within this group is, however, small, all of them being rather late. They are:

- 1) Gn ix 4: »Only flesh with its soul, its blood, ye shall not eat»,  
 2) Lv xvii 11: »For the soul of the flesh is in the blood . . .» 3) ib.:  
 ». . . for it is the blood that atones by means of the soul», 4—5) Lv  
 xvii 14: »For the soul of all flesh is its blood . . .» (*bis*), 6—7) Dt

xii 23: »... for the blood is the soul, and thou shalt not eat the soul with the flesh», 8) Dt xxiv 6: »Nobody shall take mill or an upper millstone in pledge, for he would take soul in pledge», and 9—10) 1 Ch xi 19: »... Should I drink the blood of these men, their souls, for at the risk of their souls they brought it».

In nine cases out of these ten the soul is thus identified or combined with blood. All of them, except 1 Ch, are included in the legal texts of the Pentateuch, and every time the writer has considered it necessary to remark, sometimes even to explain more particularly, that and why the soul is blood or in blood. To judge from this, it seems probable that the equation »soul = blood» was by no means common among the children of Israel, but rather a result of learned meditation.<sup>25</sup> The remaining passage (Dt xxiv 6) is not a real equation, but a parable.<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, we can establish that the meaning of *naʿfaʿš* has not shifted very much in this direction.

#### *b. Centre of action.*

This group is considerably larger than the preceding one. It contains about 69 OT passages in all. Its origin could theoretically be derived from the second class by means of the supposition that having been reduced to mean the being in itself the meaning of *naʿfaʿš* would have been reduced further to mean only a certain part of it, especially because just the action is characteristic of the soul. The supposition is nevertheless improbable, because any derived meaning has scarcely come so independent that another one still appearing frequently could have been derived from it, and because in the great majority of the cases a centre of purely psychological action (in the modern sense<sup>28</sup>) is in question. Neither is that supposition necessary, because even this meaning can very well be derived from the main meaning directly, without the mediation of other derived meanings, but paying attention in the first place to the action in question. It is thus a parallel phenomenon to the two preceding types, and has gained a considerable position in linguistic usage, because action is a more concrete conception than life.

The centre of action that in different times is identified with the soul, varies according to the quality of the action.<sup>29</sup> Judg xviii 25 Micah is warned not to provoke the Danites who are *mârê náfæš* »bitter of soul»: *soul* means here apparently that which is called mind (or temperament) by us.<sup>30</sup> Similar cases we find in 1 S xxii 2, 2 S xvii 8, Is xix 10, etc. The same meaning appears further to be used when man's relation to God is in question, e.g. Ps lxxxvi 4: »Gladden the soul of thy servant, for to thee, O Lord, my soul I lift up», probably also Ps xxiii 3<sup>31</sup>, further xciv 19 etc.

Another soul of a more »materialistic» type is found in Is lviii 11, of which it is stated that it will be satisfied in scorched land, and that soul is situated somewhere between living and lifeless beings which appears in Is v 14: ». . . Sheol has enlarged its soul (Moffatt: »gapes greedily») . . .»<sup>32</sup> and which is used as a symbol in Hab ii 5: ». . . man is arrogant . . . he who has enlarged as Sheol his soul . . .» It is not a matter of a single man, but of the Chaldeans. Finally, Pr xiv 10 seems to form a class by itself: »Heart is aware of the bitterness of its soul . . .», which is correctly interpreted by the versions: ». . . its own bitterness . . .» Strictly formally it would thus belong to the second class, in fact, however, to this, because heart is no independent being.<sup>32b</sup> The conception »soul of the heart» might be an expression of the younger individualistic manner of thinking aroused shortly before and during the exile, but even so it must have been strange to the Israelitic way of thinking, which was not used to classifying the parts of body in detail, and therefore it has remained an isolated phenomenon.

#### 4. *Náfæš* denoting the contents of soul.

This class is almost as large as the preceding one: about 61 OT passages are included in it. It is more easily distinguished from the other classes than the third, because the limit is uncertain only between these two classes. From the first class it is rather clearly distinguished, although this meaning is without doubt derived from the main meaning without any mediation and is the reflection of

the latter. According to the main meaning the most important characteristic of the soul is that it acts. In the passages belonging to the fourth class, on the contrary, it is characteristic of the action that it is the soul. Job xxiv 12 we read: »From out of the city men groan, and the soul of the pierced cries for help . . .»<sup>33</sup>, 1 S i 15 Hannah says: ». . . but I poured out my soul before the LORD». At the first glance it may seem as if *næfæš* here would refer to tears<sup>34</sup>, but so roughly materialistic an interpretation has no support elsewhere in the OT. Moreover, Hannah says: »my soul», and not: »out of my soul»<sup>34b</sup>, as she would say, if she meant tears. As a matter of fact, Hannah's word is inversely proportional to Job's word. The soul of the pierced is crying because of the pain and suffering that are pining them; Hannah also is crying because of the suffering and grief that fill her soul, but in this case the grief itself is called soul, because that is the action that fills her soul, to which her soul is concentrated. As we see, the step from the main meaning is not long; the leap from the principle of life to tears<sup>35</sup> is much longer.

The class is divided in two groups according to the factors by which the soul is caused, but the division is in most cases very uncertain.

*a. Caused by psychical factors.*

Hannah's sorrow was in the first place caused by a psychical factor, viz. by the disgrace caused by her sterility. The same type appears a.o. in Pr xiii 2 which states that the soul of the treacherous is violence, which in practice means that the desire for doing violence fills their soul.

Another, rather vague type appears a.o. in Lam i 16: ». . . comforter that should relieve my soul is far from me . . .» (AV). Literal translation would run: ». . . comforter, who would return my soul . . .» The speaker is Zion (cf. v. 15), accordingly *næfæš* must be interpreted symbolically. Perhaps it means the happy life in the town before its destruction, if we may take the picture so literally<sup>36</sup>. Ps xxxv 25 is quite as undetermined: »Let them not say in their heart:

'Aha, our soul!'. . .» The last words express obviously malignant delight, as AV interprets quite correctly: »Ah, so would we have it . . .»<sup>37</sup> Further: 1 S xx 4: »Whatever thou wilt say thy soul (to be), that I shall do for thee», which, however, could be translated also: »What thy soul will say, that . . .», in which case this passage would belong to the third class.<sup>38</sup> The same type seems further to be represented even by such a word as 2 K ix 15: »If that be your soul, let nobody escape . . .»<sup>39</sup>, while Gn xxiii 8, which is closely related to it, belongs to the third class: »If that be with your soul that I shall bury . . .»<sup>40</sup>

*b. Caused by material factors.*

Is lvi 11 says of the watchmen of Israel: »And these dogs are fierce of soul — they do not know satiety . . .» The picture presupposes that *naefæš* here means something characteristic of dogs which are so devouring that they do not seem to become satisfied at all, in this case obviously appetite, as ARV translates<sup>41</sup>. Again, the continuation shows that the soul of Israel's watchmen even without this parable derives from quite material factors: ». . . all of them have turned to their own way, every one to his gain, one and all. 'Come ye, I will fetch wine, and we will fill ourselves with strong drink, and to-morrow will be like this, even incomparably great!« Self-interest and craving for drink, these are the two components that form the soul of Israel's watchmen. If the word *naefæš* were used in its main meaning, we should say that they fill their soul.

Pr xii 10 belongs formally to the same type: »Righteous man is knowing the soul of his cattle . . .», but this is no parable, but an animal soul belonging to this group is really in question. The meaning seems to be that the righteous man takes care of the needs of his cattle, cf. the end of the verse: ». . . but the heart (literally: »intestines») of the wicked is cruel».<sup>42</sup> In the passage there is nothing exceptional. Animals need food quite as much as men, and when the contents of a man's soul, in this case hunger, began to be called the soul itself, it is no wonder that the same name was applied to

animals' hunger and other needs also. Corresponding statements of men are e.g. Pr xvi 26: »A worker's soul works for him, for his mouth urges him on»<sup>43</sup>, xxiii 2: ». . . put a knife to thy throat, if thou art a possessor of soul (= given to appetite;<sup>44</sup> AV, ARV)», Lam i 11: »They give their treasures for food to return soul». In the last passage *nəfæš* can also mean strength or vital power, in which case it would belong to the third class, but the context makes our interpretation more natural.<sup>45</sup> In Eccl we often find this and related meaning, e.g. vi 7: »All the labour of man is for his mouth, but in spite of that the soul will not be filled».

Job xli 13 may also belong to this group. The word *nəfæš* seems to mean »breath» there.<sup>46</sup> The LORD says of Leviathan: »His soul devours coals, and a flame goes out of his mouth». As we know, breathing is due to a material factor, viz. the need of oxygen important for life, and even though Israelites did not know that, they surely regarded the cause of the breathing as material.

##### 5. U n c e r t a i n   c a s e s .

In this paragraph we are dealing with cases which contain no or at least no clear indication of what kind the soul appearing in the passages in question is thought to be. The cases are very few; thus it is possible to treat all of them in detail. They are:

1) Ez xxii 25 the LORD says of the (false) prophets that they eat soul (AV: »souls», ARV: »human lives», but the original text has *one* soul). In the first place it could be imagined to mean the vital power or principle in man which is the presupposition of every successful action and even of life, in which case it would belong to the first class, but the continuation: ». . . they have taken treasure and precious things . . . » points rather to objects important for living and so to the third class. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the strength of the prophets is in the first place of a spiritual kind, wherefore »the eating of soul» could possibly mean that the false prophets through their deceitful prophecies have lulled the people into a false sense of security, the treasures being their reward

for such a prophesying, in which case we should get into the fourth class, near the modern conception of soul.<sup>47</sup>

Another passage is 1 K xix 2 where Jezebel is swearing to Elijah: »So may gods do (to me) and so continue (if it will not happen) that at this time to-morrow I shall put thy soul as the soul of (any) one of them» (of Baal's prophets that Elijah had killed). In this case the second class is nearest, but the first class is quite as possible (in the meaning »life» = AV, or considering Elijah's action as a prophet). The linguistic expression, in any case, is vague. Job xvi 4 is rather similar: ». . . if your soul were in my soul's stead . . .» The alternatives are: second class (= ARV)<sup>48</sup>, the third (concentrating to the body), the fourth (in the meaning »state of mind»), and even the first (considering his children, possessions, and former activity).

Ps lvii 7 is also vague: »A net they set for my steps: it thrust down my soul . . .» The context suggests in the first place the second class, but the first is quite as possible, particularly because »the net» must apparently be interpreted symbolically (cf. p. 54, also), and even the fourth (*naefæš* meaning the desire of living).<sup>49</sup>

The last and most vague OT passage which is placed in this group is Is iii 9: ». . . Woe to their soul! for they have brought evil upon themselves». At the first glance the second class seems self-evident — so ARV and Moffatt<sup>50</sup> —, but if we suppose that their punishment, also, will be like Sodom's, the first class is more probable. On the other hand, however, the woe might be cried out because of their foolishness, which in that case would be called their soul, and it would lead us to the fourth class. At last, actually we do not know the quality of the evil that is threatening them, and because the woe may refer to it, the soul in this passage can belong to any class.

## 6. GLOSS.

At last, there is one passage in which the relation of the word *naefæš* to its context is quite obscure, if we do not regard it as a



gloss, viz. Lv xvii 14 *b<sup>e</sup>nařšô*.<sup>51</sup> If we do not take this word into account, the translation runs: »For the soul of all flesh is its blood; therefore . . .» Its insertion seems to have happened in order to bring the passage into accordance with the v. 11, this word being intended to be understood in the same sense as *bannařæř* there (cf. AV), but because of the first *nařæř* at the top of the passage the sense is made quite confuse. All the other explanations known to me are grammatically impossible<sup>52</sup>. There are many other passages in which the word *nařæř* is regarded as a similar gloss, also, e.g. Gn ii 19<sup>53</sup>, but in them this supposition is unnecessary.

## SECOND CHAPTER

### *Nəfəš* living and dying.

Having examined and described the various relations in which *nəfəš* appears to be to its possessor in the language of the OT, we now turn to study its functions, viz. life and action, and because life as the basic function is the presupposition of action, we begin with the former.

Ancient Israelites knew very well the fact that every living being must die. »Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return». »For the living know that they shall die» (Ecl ix 5). Since the soul represents beings just as living, the necessary conclusion is that souls die. This circumstance, on the other hand, led so far that although life is something characteristic of soul, so that a soul without life cannot exist (the exception Is iii 20 is apparent, cf. I: 1: c), *nəfəš* sometimes was provided with the attribute »living». We have seen (I: 2: b) that this happened — with one exception — only when animals were in question and that, on the other hand, the attribute was added almost always when animals were described as souls. When studying these passages — including Gn ii 7 in which man the only time is called »living soul» — from various aspects we find that in all of them the life is either given or taken off and that God himself is either acting or commanding all in them.

Job xii 10 states that the soul of all living is in the hand of the LORD. This statement as background helps us to understand the passages mentioned above. At first we must recall some passages illuminating this problem. Hezekiah says Is xxxviii 18—19: »For Sheol does not thank thee, nor does death praise thee, those that go down to pit do not wait for thy faithfulness. The living, the

living, he thanks thee, as I do to-day . . . » Similarly Ps cxv 17—18: »The dead do not praise Yah, neither do any that go down to silence. But *we* shall bless Yah from now and to eternity . . . » It seems from these passages that the living are particularly attached to God. Not that his power would not reach the dead and death: ». . . if I would make Sheol my bed, behold: thou (art even there)» (Ps cxxxix 8), »Though they dig into Sheol, from there my hand will take them . . . » (Am ix 2). The LORD is thus omnipotent according to the conception of the OT already<sup>1</sup>, but in conformity with the ancient Israelitic — and generally Semitic — way of thinking his omnipotence is conceived as actual, and not as potential, i.e., his omnipotence is — at least in the first place — not expressed in what he *can* do, but in what he actually *does*. It is, accordingly, in no wise exceptional that the LORD often is called soul (Jer v 9.29 etc.);<sup>2</sup> on the other hand, this also suggests that the name soul, when applied to man, is not primarily substantial, but functional. Consequently, the above citations show only the principle according to which the LORD acts. It means that all living beings are quite particularly under his care<sup>3</sup>, and because life and soul are inseparably joined together, it further means that a being — man or animal — as a soul belongs to the immediate sphere of the LORD's power and action. Therefore the blood, also, which on account of its necessity for the preservation of the life is soul in a more narrow sense of the word, belongs entirely to the LORD; man must not eat it: »Only flesh with its soul, its blood, ye shall not eat» (Gn ix 4); »Ye shall not eat the blood of any flesh, for the soul of all flesh is its blood; anybody eating it shall be cut off» (Lv xvii 14).<sup>4</sup> Further, punishment is threatening him who against the LORD's will destroys living souls by means of shedding blood: »Another exception: your blood, for your souls I shall avenge: from the hand of all (living =) beasts I shall demand it, and from the hand of man; from the hand of (any) man I shall demand his brother, the soul of man» (Gn ix 5).<sup>5</sup> We may conclude that when the living of souls is stressed, the stress is laid upon their immediate relation to the LORD.

Seen from the aspect of life the souls are divided in two groups differing considerably from each other, viz. those in which the soul is identified with its possessor, and those in which it means the living being of its possessor. We began exceptionally with the former group, because after its treatment it is here much easier to understand the argumentation in the treatment of the latter group, it being based upon the results arrived at in the former.

1. *Næfæš* denoting its possessor as a mere being.

The living state of the human soul is expressly stressed, as we have seen, only in Gn ii 7 in connection with man's creation, i.e. attaching to the principle according to which the living state of animal souls is stressed, also. But man is attached to God more closely than animals, which is expressed by stating that man is »the image of God»: »And God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him . . .» (Gn i 27), which even that might have to be understood functionally: as the God rules over the whole creation, so man has dominion over this visible world (cf. v. 28, Ps viii 6 sqq., etc.).<sup>6</sup> Therefore man is put into an exceptional position even in this respect: »Whoever sheds the blood of man, through man his blood shall be shed, for in the image of God he made man» (Gn ix 6). This word shows clearly the difference between man and animals and the higher position of the former: man is permitted to shed the blood of any animal under certain conditions, though he must not eat it, but even the shedding of human blood is forbidden at the risk of the same fate. Considering the conception of »the image of God» we can understand the reason of this prohibition more exactly: an attack against man, the image of God, can in a certain sense be co-ordinated with an attack against God himself.<sup>7</sup>

Usually the living state of human soul is presupposed as self-evident, and there are numerous passages in which it is expressed

indirectly. Most of them belong formally to the first class, but materially to the second because the soul obviously represents an individual. So Gn xii 13; cf. the preceding verse and p. 12; the same applies to Benhadad's request 1 K xx 32: »May my soul live». Properly this class may be represented by Pr iii 21.22: ». . . keep sound wisdom and discretion, and they will be life for thy soul . . . » Wisdom and discretion are normally personal qualities that cannot be inherited, at least not considerably; accordingly, the translation ». . . they will be life for *thee* . . . » would render the sense correctly.<sup>8</sup>

We have established already that it is quite natural that the soul dies. In the OT the word *nəfəš* appears expressly in this connection 46 times. In the versions — older as well as new ones — it is usually rendered in these cases by the words »dead», »body», a pronoun, or something like that. In the following we give some characteristic examples:

Lv xxii 4 states that any priest who touches anything that is unclean through the contact with a *soul* will be unclean until the evening. AV and ARV translate *nəfəš* here »dead». But how can *nəfəš*, the usual meaning of which is »the living being of man», have acquired the meaning »dead»? It should be observed, that the Bible nowhere speaks of a dead soul. The *death of a soul* and the *soul of a dead* are spoken of, but never a *dead soul*. With other words, the soul is, according to the ancient Israelitic conception, able to die, but the result is not a dead soul, but the soul of a dead. This makes it probable that when *nəfəš* appears meaning »dead», an abbreviation is in question, the longer equivalent of which is just »the soul of a dead», *nəfəš met*. Most complete this expression appears Nm xix 13: »Whoever touches a dead, the soul of the man that *is dying* . . . » AV translates: ». . . who is dead . . . », ARV: ». . . who has died . . . », but the Hebrew text has the imperfect *yāmūt* »dies, is dying». This, I believe, gives us the solution of the riddle. Apparently the dying man, even after he had ceased to breathe, was not regarded as altogether dead; it should be kept in mind that even the participle *met* can mean »dying» as well as »dead». Apparently the dying was conceived as a more or less long process during which

man was still called *næfæš* on account of the »life» or action which took place in his corpse; perhaps even the smell departing from the corpse had some influence on the matter (cf. I: 1: c).<sup>9</sup>

It was possible to use the abbreviation, because man (and many animals) only when dying was in such a state that touching him normally caused uncleanness. Thus everybody understood without further explanations what the expression »unclean through a soul» meant. Similarly, the translation »body» is correct; as Johs. Pedersen says, *the body is the soul in its outward form, its form of manifestation of full value*,<sup>10</sup> and in this case it is just the body the touching of which makes unclean.<sup>11</sup> Consequently, we can say that in these cases soul is = body, or perhaps more appropriately — considering the functional nature of the soul — that the *body represents soul* in them.<sup>12</sup>

Nm xxxv 9 sqq. cities of refuge are ordered for those that without intention have killed a soul, and Josh xx we read how this commandment is carried into effect. The context shows clearly that *soul* here, also, means man as an individual being (cf., e.g., Nm xxxv 16 sqq.); AV and ARV translate accordingly: »person». Balaam's wish Nm xxiii 10: »May my soul die the death of the upright . . .»<sup>13</sup> shall apparently be interpreted in accordance with this, particularly since the following verse which is in parallelism with this, supports this interpretation in every respect: ». . . may my end be like his».<sup>14</sup> The same category is further represented by Pr xxviii 17 which speaks of man who is oppressed because of the blood of a soul, i.e., because he has killed somebody, as also by other passages in which the blood of souls is mentioned, Jer ii 34 etc.

Job's word vii 15 is very illuminative and concrete: »Therefore my soul would choose strangling . . .» At the first glance it might seem as if soul here could mean »neck, throat»<sup>15</sup>, but the word »choose» makes it impossible. Apparently man as a bodily being is meant.<sup>16</sup> Ez xxii 27, also<sup>17</sup>, seems to have *næfæš* in this meaning, when the LORD says of Israel's princes that they »shed blood, destroy souls to get dishonest gain», similarly xvii 17: ». . . to cut off many souls», but in xiii 19 the spiritual meaning seems to be prevalent (cf. p. 55 sq.).<sup>18</sup>

2. *Næfæš* denoting the living being of its possessor.

The conception »living and dying soul» becomes considerably more interesting and at the first glance contradictory in itself when *næfæš* appears — seen in the aspect of life — in its normal meaning »the living being of its possessor» or »its possessor as a living being». The contradiction would be inevitable, if the Bible would with the word »death» mean what we — at least in the everyday use — mean with that word, viz. that death would be the contrast of life, and accordingly the absolute end of the latter. When speaking so we mean the so-called bodily death which might be best defined by the statement that the human body in it ceases to live and to act. Because body is the soul's form of manifestation of full value and necessary for the existence of the soul — without that soul would never have existed, Gn ii 7 —, we have reason enough to say that bodily death is at the same time the death of the soul. The same is meant by the words in Dt xix 11: ». . . and smites him in the soul, so that he dies . . .» The text speaks no more of the striking of a *man* so that he dies. It is a man who is struck, but *he is not struck as a mere man, but as a soul*, a living being. The stroke has hit his soul; in consequence thereof he dies, and *therefore his death is the death of a soul*. It must be kept in mind that the conception »the living and acting being of man» must not be conceived too spiritually. It comprises even and above all the human body through which man chiefly acts.

But there are passages in the OT which show that a man's existence as an individual being was not finished at death. 1 S xxviii 7 sqq. tells us that Saul receives information from Samuel at En-Dor through a *ba'alat 'ôb*, »mistress of revenant». However the story might be interpreted in other respects, in any case it shows that according to the OT conception a man's individual existence continues after his death.<sup>20</sup> As a proof of the commonness of this belief we quote Dt xviii 10.11: »There shall not be found among thee . . . who asks revenant, nor a wizard, nor a necromancer».

1 S xxviii 3 also tells that Saul had driven the mediums and wizards out of the country. These — and other — passages show that among the people there were persons who — in spite of the prohibitions — practised this kind of sorcery, and accordingly others who used their services, which again indicates that they believed the existence of men to continue after their death, and because in no OT passage (not even Eccl iii 19, cf. v. 21, nor Ps xlix 21, cf. v. 15.20) this belief is expressly denied — only the consultation of the dead is forbidden —, we have reason enough to suppose that it is the opinion of the whole OT, also. Moreover, 1 S xxviii 15.20 presupposes that the writer really believed Samuel to have arisen, and not only that Saul or the medium believed so.

A further question, however, is still left: is the form of existence in which the dead are of such a kind that it can be called life? With other words: does the existence of the *soul* continue after death according to the Bible? As we know, the residence of the dead is in the OT commonly called *š'ól*. This word, which may mean »a hollow, cavity, pit»<sup>21</sup>, means sometimes a single grave, sometimes the whole of all the graves or the »underworld», to judge from the context. This is by no means exceptional in the language of the OT; as a parallel we may mention such a word as *'eš*, which sometimes means a single tree (e.g. Gn ii 17), sometimes the whole of several, or of all the, trees (e.g. Gn i 11, iii 8). Modern man who does not live in the world of ideas of the OT has a difficult task when trying to understand how the graves the location of which sometimes was very far from one another could form an organic whole in which real unity was thought to exist, because modern man is used to the individual way of thinking. The Bible, however, does not think individually, but collectively, as the ancient Semites in general. All the words that can be used as names of species are potentially collective, i.e. they can mean as well a single individual as a whole of several individuals without changing their outward form, e.g. *'âdâm*, *bâqâr*, *zera'*, *nafeš*, *'eš*, and so *š'ól*, also. Arabic *plurales fracti* are a kind of parallel, also.<sup>22</sup> This linguistic usage would be inexplicable, if it had not a correspondence in the world of ideas:



According to the same principle the graves were conceived as an organic whole, which united all the single graves with one another in some way which was perhaps not quite exactly defined.<sup>23</sup>

Ez xxxii 18 sqq. seems to give us a detailed account of this »kingdom of the dead«. It seems as if there were some kind of action there, since v. 21 states: »The mighty of the heroes will speak of him from the midst of Sheol . . .», but it must be observed that a parable is in question, and even as such the situation is quite exceptional. He who enters Sheol is Egypt, and the mighty ones among the heroes already dwelling in Sheol are Assyria, Elam, Meshech and Tubal, Edom etc., countries and kingdoms altogether. Accordingly their speech shall be understood so that when Egypt sees destruction coming, it understands that its fate will be the same as that of those other mighty countries, and in any case the exceptional character of the situation prevents us from using this passage to describe the state of the dead. The same applies to Is xiv 9 sqq. in which the descent of the king of Babel to Sheol is described. That the description is a parable the purpose of which is to illustrate the powerfulness of Babel's destruction is best proved by the v. 8: »Even cypresses rejoice at thee, the cedars of Lebanon: 'since thou hast lied down, the woodcutter is not coming up against us'». Nobody might state that the prophet has meant literally just that. Moreover, the situation is even here described as exceptional, to judge from v. 9: »Sheol there beneath is stirred up *for thee* . . . it arouses *refâ'im* (= »the faint, feeble«<sup>24</sup>) *for thee* . . .» Babel's destruction is so remarkable an event that even the dead must be awakened to behold it.<sup>25</sup>

From Is xiv 9 sqq. we can, however, draw a conclusion concerning the normal condition among the dead. Since this parable describes the awakening of the dead as exceptional, the greater reason we have to suppose that normally they are thought to be in the state of unconsciousness or sleeping, as it usually is expressed. Other OT passages in which the state of the dead is spoken of, corroborate this conclusion. E.g. Is xxxviii 18: »For Sheol does not thank thee, nor does death praise thee . . .», Ps vi 6: »For in death there is not

thy remembrance, in Sheol who thanks thee?», lxxxviii 11—13: »Dost thou work wonder to the dead? or do *r<sup>e</sup>fâ'îm* rise up (and) praise thee? Selah. Is thy mercy told in the grave, thy faithfulness in destruction? is thy wonderfulness made known in darkness, or thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness?» The questions are obviously rhetorical. In Ps cxv 17 the actual condition is stated directly again: »The dead do not praise Yah, nor anybody who is going down to silence». The last word describes picturesquely the condition among the dead: it is dominated by *silence*.<sup>27</sup>

Consequently, it seems that we cannot regard the state of the dead in Sheol as real life. That the opinion of the ancient Israelites was the same is shown by the fact that the dead in Sheol are never called souls in the OT.<sup>28</sup> As a matter of fact, the most usual name of the inhabitants of Sheol, *r<sup>e</sup>fâ'îm*, seems to be quite opposite to the word *naefæš*, since the latter implicitly expresses that its possessor has vital and acting power, while the former are »deprived of power». The conclusion is that according to the opinion of the OT the soul did not continue its life — or existence, which for the soul is the same as life — in Sheol after the death.

According to the OT, however, there are still other forms of man's continued existence after the death. In the preceding paragraph some passages were studied in which the soul of a dead man was mentioned, cf. e.g. Nm xix 11. The continuation of the existence of this kind does not last long, but it is nevertheless remarkable, because it seems to have some kind of connection with the following form of the continuation of the soul's life, the most important among them.

The existence of the soul was thought to continue in man's offspring. The starting point for this opinion was apparently the conception of the soul of a society (on which cf. the fourth chapter) the existence of which continued through generations. The shift toward the individual soul was without doubt facilitated by the very usual personification of various societies. Best known of them might be the personification of the people of Israel in its ancestor Jacob, cf. e.g. Jer xxx 10: »And thou, do not fear, my servant Jacob,

(is) the saying of the LORD, nor be dismayed, Israel, for behold: I am saving thee from afar and thy seed from the land of their captivity. And Jacob will return and have quiet and ease, and there will be nobody disturbing».<sup>29</sup> The clearest passage concerning an individual soul is the above-mentioned 1 S ii 33: »But (every) man of thine I shall not cut off from my altar, so that I would consume thy eyes and pine away thy soul . . . » The known formula of oath »As thy soul lives . . . » may have a relation to this, also. ARV translates usually: »As you live . . . » (cf. 1 S i 26; xvii 55, however: »As your soul lives . . . »), but the translation is inexact, as is shown by 2 S xi 11: »As thou livest, and as thy soul lives . . . » The parallelism in such a statement as this might be excluded, except that even that is not quite the same as tautology, so that the meaning in each half would be identical. Therefore it was so important for the ancient Israelites to get children, and especially sons: their souls continued their existence in them. This is quite parallel with the continuation of the existence of the soul of the nation, which was quite impossible in another way.

The continuation of the existence of the soul was, however, only conditional. Referring to a passage which will be studied a little later we set the thesis that different action presupposes a different soul. Consequently, if the son *in some respect* acted otherwise than his father, he *in that respect* represented another soul. Further: since man as a soul is above all in relation to God (cf. p. 27), who in addition is he who determines man's life and death, man's relation to God is decisive for the continuation of his soul's existence. If the son and the father are in a similar relation to God, their fate is similar, but if their relation is different, their fate is different also: »For I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and the fourth generation, to those that hate me, but keeping my promises to thousands (of generations), to those that love me and keep my commandments» (Dt v 9—10). The child is responsible for his father's iniquity, if he has not made repentance, since he in that case belongs to the same soul as his father (cf. Nm xvi, also) — naturally acting

in the same way —, and the LORD does not say: »The *man*», but: »The *soul* that sins — it shall die.»<sup>30</sup>

We have now arrived at that OT passage which treats the life and death of a soul more thoroughly than any other, viz. the 18 th chapter of the Book of Ezekiel. Verses 2—4 are the theme of the whole chapter; the rest are explanations and applications. The theme runs: »What's the matter with you? Ye are using this proverb about the land of Israel saying: 'Fathers ate sour grapes, but the teeth of the children are set on edge' — as I live, (is) the saying of Lord, the LORD, ye shall no more use this proverb about Israel. Behold: all the souls — *mine* they are: as the soul of the father, so the soul of the son — *mine* they are. The soul that sins — *it* shall die». At the first glance it may seem as if the prophet were polemizing against Dt v 9—10 mentioned above<sup>31</sup>, but as a matter of fact he is polemizing against a public opinion which had understood that passage quite superficially — as the scorers so often do. They had taken only the first words of it: »I . . . am visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children . . .» omitting the end: »to those that hate me, but etc.» If the children hate the LORD, they are participating in their fathers' iniquity, suffering thus because of their own iniquity, also. But because the Bible is realistic, it states what is true: if the fathers hate the LORD, they accustom their children to their own iniquity from the early childhood; thus the children's iniquity is often »inherited» from the fathers and, consequently, children must suffer because of fathers' iniquity. But it is not necessary: if they repent and begin to love the LORD, they are saved. We need only to glance at the deuteronomistic history to realize that the haters and the lovers do not mean different groups, but both represent the entire nation — at most the contrast between the northern Israel and Judah can come into question, and even so both must have been thought to play both roles. Consequently, in reality Ez xviii represents the same standpoint as this word.<sup>32</sup> The verses 20—24 give a detailed interpretation which needs no explanations.

Ez xviii represents, however, a more individual conception of

the human soul than Dt v. In the latter, as we saw, both haters and lovers still mean the entire nation, as in the mock-word fathers and sons. Ezekiel, on the contrary, speaks of individuals. This comes from, and is a sign of, the fact that Ezekiel is standing on the threshold of a new period during which individuals begin to receive attention more than formerly. First beginnings of the doctrine of individual salvation begin to appear. From early times, it is true, Israel was waiting for »the day of the LORD» at which the LORD was expected to interfere in the course of history in a decisive way. We do not know how early this belief has originated, but an indication of it seems to be contained already in the proclamation of the earliest »book prophet» Amos, see e.g. v 18—20: »Woe to you that desire the day of the LORD! Why would ye have the day of the LORD? It is darkness and not light — as if a man would flee before a lion and a bear would fall upon him — or if he would come home and lean his hand against the wall, and a serpent would bite him. Is not the day of the LORD darkness, and not light? and gloom, with no brightness in it?» Last times some scholars have supposed that Amos would speak of an equally supposed feast of the LORD's ascension to the throne which would have been celebrated every autumn.<sup>33</sup> The context seems to support such a supposition, but the feast in question is not mentioned in the Bible, and even if we take for granted that it was celebrated at Amos' time, Amos would be very childish, if he would compare a cultic feast with a struggle against lion and bear. Whatever his hearers might have thought, obviously Amos had in mind the LORD's decisive interference in the course of history.<sup>34</sup> Considering the fact that Amos' words apparently were spoken during a feast it seems possible that the hearers, also, had something like that in mind, because they waited for a »day of the LORD» different from the usual feasts.

During the period before the exile, however, salvation was apparently conceived to concern rather the whole nation than single individuals. Even Amos adheres to this way of thinking, for that »somebody» which is fleeing before lion and met by bear represents the whole nation.<sup>35</sup> Abraham was told by the LORD: ». . . in thee

all the *families* of the earth will be blessed» (Gn xii 3)<sup>36</sup>, and even in the proclamation of the so-called Second Isaiah: »... hear ye, that your soul may live . . .» (lv 3) the soul of the *nation* is in question. As long as the resurrection of the dead did not belong to the revealed word of God, it was not possible to think that every man who had lived upon the earth could individually reach salvation. That Messianic kingdom which was expected (cf. Is ix 1—6, xi, xii, etc.) was accessible to the individual only through his offspring living at that time (cf. e.g. Jer xxx 7—11 and xxiii 5—6 = xxxiii 15—16), as far as the hope of the salvation was even in such a grade thought of in detail.

Is liii 10—12 may be the oldest passage in which the resurrection of an individual human being is foretold, cf. lii 13—15.<sup>37</sup> Even there it is apparently considered as exceptional. The start was made, however, and Is xxvi 19, Dan xii 2 we find the doctrine of resurrection in a more developed shape already. Apparently particular and scarce in words though they are, nevertheless they indicate that an existence of man after his death of another kind than that in Sheol was doubtless known during the OT period. The latter was too negative in character that a positive doctrine of the eternal life could have been based upon it, and it is significant that the term »life» is never used of the state of the dead in Sheol. That it is the human *soul* which will be participant in the eternal salvation is stated in Ps xlix 16: »But God will redeem my soul from the hand of Sheol, for he will take me (to him; probably an allusion to Gn v 24) . . .», though it is not clear how the redemption is thought to happen (for details see p. 55). Having established this we have reached the threshold of the NT time in this point.

### THIRD CHAPTER

*Næfæš* active and passive.

Action is, as we have established in various connections, the most important characteristic of the soul. When speaking so, we have quietly included the negative action or that in which the soul appears as the object of the action in question. In this chapter we shall study *næfæš* just in this respect. The action is tentatively divided in two classes, viz. purely psychical and also corporeal. We begin with the former, because even corporeal action always is preceded by some kind of psychical action, and, accordingly, the results arrived at in the treatment of the latter can be used when discussing the former.

#### 1. *Næfæš* active and passive only psychically.

This class, again, is tentatively divided in two parts: 1) the immediate causes of the action being purely psychical<sup>1</sup>, i.e., not belonging to such material or animal needs which cause hunger, thirst, etc., or coming from bodily sufferings, as wounds or like that, and 2) the action being caused by other (mostly material or bodily) factors. The former group is best to begin with, on grounds similar to those given ten lines above.

##### *a. Causes purely psychical.*

Nm xxi 4 AV tells: »And they journeyed from mount Hor by the way of the Red sea, to compass the land of Edom: and the soul of the people was much discouraged because of the way». The last

clause runs literally translated as follows: »... but the soul of the people was shortened in relation to the way». *Næfaš* means here apparently the courage or patience of the people or their state of mind in general, and the writer establishes that it was too »short» in relation to the long way.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, hunger, thirst, or exhaustion cannot come into question as the actions of the soul, but only as its causes, which are thus psychological. The last factors are, however, in this and similar cases material and »earthly».

Is xxvi 8 introduces another type of soul the character of which is considerably more mental and spiritual than of the preceding one: »... thy (sc. God's) name and thy recalling, (it is) the desire of the soul». In this passage — which with many others overthrows a statement concerning the character of the soul often repeated<sup>3</sup> — *næfaš* appears in that purely religious meaning in which we are accustomed to think of the soul. This meaning might be developed on the ground of the conception that man is soul especially in his relation to God, though the purely religious meaning is considerably more narrow than that. Other similar passages: Ps xlii 2—3: »... my soul longs for thee, O God. My soul thirsts for God...», lxii 2: »Towards God alone my soul is turned silent...», similarly v. 6 — in these cases Schwab's explanation is quite impossible; silence is something quite different from enthusiasm<sup>4</sup> —, further lxiii 2.6.9, etc. As we see, this type is very common especially in the Psalms. This is natural, because this so-to-say »pious» type of soul best can express itself just in such products of the mind as the Psalms. On the other side, because the Psalms apparently have been the most used book of the OT in the Christian church, the frequent appearance of this type just in them — beside the NT — has without doubt caused the dominating position of this type in our world of ideas.

A third type is met in the lamentation about Tyre, Ez xxvii 31: »... gird themselves with sacks and weep for thee in bitterness of soul a bitter wailing». Bitterness is described as the action in which the soul is concentrated, it being due to the report of the sudden and thorough destruction of Tyre. Ez xxxvi 5 belongs form-



ally to the same type, but the contents are different: »... they have given my land to themselves as an inheritance with the joy of the whole heart (and) with the scorn of soul<sup>5</sup>. . . » Most cases of the religious type of the soul belong formally to this type, also.

In the types treated above the action of the soul is concentrated either in itself or to God. The soul can, however, have influence on its surroundings purely psychically, also.<sup>6</sup> Such a case is found e.g. in Gn xxvii 4 (cf. v. 25): »... that my soul may bless thee before I die». Though the blessing is accompanied by some bodily actions (cf. below), the main influence is of a purely psychical kind. In and through the blessing the blessed one gets the power to reach the end which is set him in the words accompanying the blessing, if not at that moment, so at any rate in the future.<sup>7</sup> The power must not be conceived roughly materially as some kind of »fluidum», for it comes from that the soul of the blessing one is transferred to the blessed one, i.e. the latter receives the whole power and authority — only in the limits set up by the words — to act in the name — and place — of the former.<sup>8</sup> Therefore the blessing was usually given shortly before the death, when the bodily ability to act of the blessing one was weakened and its total extinction was possible at any time<sup>9</sup>, and therefore the unlimited blessing was irrevocable (cf. v. 33 end). The ability of the blessed one to reach the end given to him in the words depended in the first place on the powerfulness of the blessing soul.<sup>10</sup>

Nm xxvii 18sq. shows that a corresponding ceremony was attached to the ordination of the leader of the people<sup>11</sup>, cf. 1 S xvi 1,13, and the same seems to be the signification of the ordination of the priests, Lv viii (cf. v. 12 with 1 S xvi 13). Nm xxvii 16—17 teaches that the real actor was not he who officiated, but the LORD himself, »the God of the spirits of all flesh» (v. 16). It means that the LORD in this way set up a vicar to lead his people. The laying of hands upon the ordinand is often attached to the ceremony; it seems to signify the consecration of the person in question to the LORD, cf. the same rite in connection with the slaughtering of the sacrificial animals in Lv i 4, iii 2 etc., the meaning of which is interpreted:

». . . so it will be accepted for him to make atonement for him». The sense is even here obviously the same: the animal suffers (= acts negatively) for its owner, the needed ability being transferred through the rite mentioned. In connection with the ceremony the ordinand receives the Spirit of the LORD, if he had not the Spirit before (1 S xvi 13, Nm xxvii 18), which apparently corresponds to the transfer of the power in connection with the blessing given by a man.

Ps cxxxviii 3 seems to represent the same thing from the point of view of the receiver: »In the day I cried, thou didst answer me, thou emboldenedst me — in my soul there is strength (now)».

The passages in which the LORD speaks of his soul belong in a way to their own special class, e.g. Lv xxvi 11 where he gives the promise that if the Israelites will follow his commandments, »I shall set my dwelling-place in your midst, and my soul will not abhor you». Because the God of the Bible is above all living and acting, he is soul in any respect, and when he promises that he will not — on certain conditions— abhor the Israelites, there is no question of emotions, but of the circumstance that he will not leave them to depend on their own resources, or to the mercy of their enemies, as the contents of the chapter best show. The contrast, expressed in v. 30: if the Israelites will not hear the LORD nor observe his commandments, »my soul will abhor you», shall be interpreted accordingly.

The last type of this group appears in Pr ii 10: ». . . wisdom comes into thy heart, and knowledge will be pleasant for thy soul». It is one of those — even if few — passages which show the statement that *nəfəš* never can mean the subject of thinking, meditation, consciousness, and of other higher mental actions<sup>12</sup>, to be wrong, at least seen from the aspect of the linguistic usage. The soul appears here passive, it is true, but even so presupposing some kind of real action. *Nəfəš* as the subject of active thinking appears a.o. in Ps xxxiv 3: »Because of the LORD my soul praises itself . . .», cf. the corresponding exhortation: »Bless, my soul, the LORD . . .» That the Bible so infrequently mentions the soul as the subject of higher

mental activity is due to the circumstance that the Bible so rarely speaks of such kind of activity. Even in the wisdom literature, where we best could expect to meet such utterances, intellectual activity is very infrequently alluded to. The OT wisdom is practical in character, and the basic principle reads: »The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy is understanding» (Pr ix 10).<sup>13</sup> Other passages in which *næfæš* appears performing intellectual activity are e.g. Dt xi 18: »Therefore ye shall set up these my words in your heart and in your soul . . .», Jer xxxvii 9: ». . . Do not deceive your souls saying: 'The Chaldeans will surely depart from against us' . . .», Esth iv 13: »Do not think in thy soul that thou wilt escape . . .», Pr xix 2: »Even in the lack of knowledge soul is not good . . .»<sup>14</sup>

*b. Causes mainly material.*

This group forms a kind of transition between the former and the following one. It is often regarded as the representative of the primary meaning of the word *næfæš*.<sup>15</sup> The action itself is — even in the modern sense of the word <sup>16</sup> — psychical, as in the preceding group, wherefore it seems most appropriate to join it with that, but it is attached to the following one, also, in so far as the immediate cause of the action is material or corporeal. Examples:

Is lvi 11: »And these dogs are fierce of soul — they do not know satiety . . .» As we saw above (I: 4: b), the soul of the dogs in this passage is hunger.<sup>17</sup> Hunger, again, is caused by the need for nourishment of the body, i.e. by a bodily factor. Another passage like this is Pr xii 10: »Righteous man is knowing the soul of his cattle . . .»<sup>18</sup> (cf. I: 4: b), xxiii 2: ». . . put a knife to thy throat, if thou art a possessor of soul . . .»<sup>19</sup> (cf. I: 4: b), Mic vii 1: ». . . no first-ripe fig that my soul desires» (formally belonging to the first class). Etc.

Pr xxviii 25 represents another type: »Man of large soul stirs up strife . . .» This passage cannot mean hunger, for the attribute »large» does not fit together with it, but probably greed in general (so ARV).<sup>20</sup> The same type appears further e.g. in Eccl vi 7.9: »All

the labour of man is for his mouth, but in spite of that the soul will not be filled . . . Better the sight of eyes than the wandering of soul . . . » (= better that which is seen by the eyes than that for which one has desire but which is not in sight). The statement that the »soul» will not be filled indicates that a larger and longer continuing desire than hunger is in question. (Obs! even in Is lvi 11 hunger is used only as a parable). The same thing from the other side appears in Pr xiii 19: »A desire fulfilled is sweet to soul . . . » Here *nəfæš* means the actor and not the action itself.

Ex xv 9 we find a new type of soul again. The enemy says: » . . . my soul will be filled with them . . . » The soul may mean revengefulness — considering the harm caused to the Egyptians by the Israelites — or the desire to kill and spoil in general.<sup>21</sup> The same type is further represented by Ez xvi 27: » . . . and I gave thee into the soul of thy haters, the daughters of the Philistines . . . » Here *nəfæš* probably does not mean revengefulness, but rage in general; the former seems to be meant in 1 S xxiii 20: » . . . according to all desire of thy soul, O king, to come down, come down, and our part is to deliver him into the hand of the king». 2 S iii 21, 1 K xi 37 describe the greed for power as an action of the soul: » . . . that thou mayest reign over all that thy soul desires . . . » The thirst for killing and spoiling are due to rather material factors, and even though the revengefulness in 1 S xxiii 20 apparently is caused by psychical reasons — suffered offence, with the fear of total downfall — we have treated it in this connection, because it is closely related to the former ones and can come from material reasons — e.g. actual downfall — as well, except that its primary cause always is material.

The passages also in which sexual love appears as the action of the soul may be best placed among this group. Gn xxxiv 3.8: » . . . his soul cleft to Dinah . . . his soul is attached to your daughter . . . » Even though the causes of sexual love are not purely material-bodily, either, the latter play the most important role in it, and therefore it is best situated here.

Fear may also belong to this group, though its immediate cause

is not always corporeal. An example: Gn xlii 21: »... we saw the distress of his soul...»<sup>22</sup>

It is uncertain, whether Jer xxxiv 16 should be placed in this group, also. The prophet is blaming the nobility of Jerusalem for their double-dealing, because they had returned their (male and female) slaves into slavery again when the danger had apparently passed over, having earlier, when the danger was threatening, »sent (them) free to their soul». Supposed that »to their soul» means = »to go, where they wish», as seems most probable<sup>23</sup>, the cause of the action is the freedom just received, i.e., outward conditions, while the action itself is psychical, and in that case the passage belongs to this group. Other similar passages: Dt xxi 14: »... so thou shalt send her to her soul; verily thou shalt not sell her...» — here the contrast clearly indicates the meaning of *næfæš* to be »free will» (so AV, ARV) —, cf. also 1 S ii 35: »And I shall raise up for myself a faithful priest; he shall act according to what is in my heart and in my soul...», Ps cv 22: »To bind his princes according to his soul...», though these passages no more belong to this group, the cause of the action being not material; further Gn xxiii 8, 2 K ix 15 (cf. I: 4: a). They also bear witness against the statement that *næfæš* never appears as the subject of »higher mental actions», for the classification of will among affects and desires — even under the misleading rubric of »wish»<sup>24</sup> — is by no means well grounded.

## 2. *Næfæš* active and passive even corporeally.

It has been stated<sup>25</sup> that *næfæš* never appears as the subject of physical actions as far as the whole person is concerned. As regards the linguistic usage, however, the statement is obviously wrong, as we shall see in this paragraph, and it might be consequent to suppose that the language reproduces the actual conceptions, at least as far as cogent reasons for the contrary opinion have not been presented, as the case is here.<sup>26</sup>

The first type in the former class, as some others also, already indicated that *næfæš* eats and drinks. That is explicitly stated a.o.

in Lv vii 27: »Every soul that eats any blood . . .», cf. Ex xii 16: » . . . only that which is eaten by each soul . . .», further Pr xxv 25: »(As) cold water to a fainted soul . . .», xxvii 7: »A sated soul treads down honey, but a hungry soul regards all bitter as sweet». Anywhere else, where eating is spoken of in the OT, the subject of eating or drinking appears to be man — or other being — as a whole, where not his soul; and not his mouth, throat, stomach or like that. Therefore it seems quite indisputably clear that the soul even in these passages represents man as a whole, and because eating without doubt is a physical action, they alone are sufficient to prove the above-mentioned statement incorrect. For the postulate that the real subject is another than the grammatical one — eventually a »mysterious potency» housing in the latter — there is no objective ground, and if we should apply the thesis that *nəfəš* sometimes is used in the pronominal sense to these cases<sup>27</sup> it would mean only that we are giving another name to the same matter, because *nəfəš* in most cases actually represents the man as a whole — only seen from a certain aspect.

Diseases, distresses, and other sufferings often loosen the firmness of the soul, as is stated e.g. in Lv xxvi 16: » . . . I shall appoint over you a mighty terror, consumption, and the inflammation that consume eyes and cause soul to languish . . .»<sup>28</sup> In this connection it might be interesting to recall, also, that the name of the dead *rəfā'im* seems to mean »strengthless, languished» (cf. p. 34). Another passage related to this is Job xxiv 12: » . . . the soul of the pierced cries for help . . .» »The soul of the pierced» means here all the pierced seen from the aspect that they are pierced, cf. the first part of the passage: »From the city men groan . . .»<sup>29</sup>. The crying is the soul's crying, since it comes »from the bottom of heart». Passive in the largest sense of the word *nəfəš* appears Nm xxxi 35: »And the human soul, from the women that had not become acquainted with the lying with male . . .» They are contrasted not only with animals, but also with the men that had died, and the last words are perhaps still stressing the word *nəfəš*: their living potency was totally intact.

A similar type is perhaps represented by Jer xxxviii 16: »As the LORD lives who has made us this soul, I shall not kill thee . . .» ARV translates: ». . . who made our souls . . .», but the translation is impossible both grammatically and regarding the meaning. The word *lânû* »to us» is not connected with the following, but with the preceding words;<sup>30</sup> as for the meaning, would not the LORD have made the entire man? Moreover, the word *naēæš* appears in the original text in the singular. The translation: ». . . to us this soul . . .» is grammatically the only one possible.<sup>31</sup> As regards the contents, only the fourth class can come into question. To judge from the context, *naēæš* may here mean the totality of man's existence and action in his environment. Accordingly the statement may have to be understood so that the LORD has created both inner and outward presuppositions for that, and in that case »for us this life» might be best as a free interpretation.

The soul that sins is both numerically most frequent and largest regarding the contents among the types belonging to this group. In the modern versions it comes rarely into appearance, but in AV almost regularly. The *locus classicus*, which is mentioned twice in the preceding already, is Ez xviii 4: »Behold: all the souls — mine they are; . . . The soul that sins — it shall die». In the continuation there is described how the soul can sin: ». . . has eaten upon the mountains (where strange cults were practised), has defiled his neighbour's wife, has oppressed afflicted and poor, has committed robbery, will not return pledge, and has lifted up his eyes to the stone gods — has committed abomination —, has lent for interest, and taken increase . . .» (v. 11—13). This might be enough to show that it was the whole personality of man that sinned according to the ancient Israelitic conception, the body included.<sup>32</sup> Further examples: Lv v 1—2: »If a soul sins so that he has heard a public adjuration and though he is a witness, whether he has seen or come to know (the matter), yet does not declare, he shall bear his iniquity. Or a soul that touches any unclean thing . . .», v 15: »If a soul commits a breach of faith sinning unwittingly in the holy things of the LORD . . .» This group comprises further the passages where the

eating of blood is dealt with, because it was forbidden, similarly e.g. Lv xvii 15: »And any soul that eats that which has died by itself, or that which is torn (by beasts) . . .». To sum up: it is the soul that sins, not the body nor any part of the body. In the whole OT there is no passage where the body or its part or any other than the soul or man in himself would appear sinning. The body is only the medium through and in which the soul is acting. Other passages belonging to this type: Lv vii 18.20, xx 6, Nm xv 30, xix 22 etc. etc.

The soul, however, does not sin only. It performs actions pleasant to the LORD, also. Lv ii 1 ordains: »If a soul will bring a gift, a cereal offering to the LORD . . .» This requires bodily action, also. Nm xxx contains a law for those that make a promise to the LORD or bind themselves to something which is against their soul. The last expression (*'āsar 'issār 'al nafšó*) is difficult to translate literally<sup>33</sup>, but the meaning is clear: man promises to restrict himself from something which he normally does and which pleases him (e.g. from the drinking of wine). With other words, a Nazirite promise of limited scope and duration is in question. On the other hand, the interchange of *nafeš* with the personal pronoun indicates that even in these passages the former means the whole personality of man. The promise meant a partial return to the condition which had been dominating in the earlier environment of the Israelites, in the wilderness, which as a whole without doubt was morally higher than the life in the land of Canaan. Accordingly, even the statement that *nafeš* nowhere appears as the subject of moral action<sup>34</sup> is incorrect, even if *nafeš* is not the formal subject in these passages. Other passages which speak against this statement are e.g. those in which the people is told to follow the LORD's commandments from all their soul, as Dt x 12, xxvi 16, 2 K xxiii 3, etc.<sup>35</sup>, further e.g. Lam iii 25: »The LORD is good to those that wait for him, to the soul that seeks him». The whole OT shows that the »seeking of the LORD» presupposed moral action, also, and that the LORD was surely not good to an impenitent evil-doer. Similarly Gn xlix 5—6: »Their swords are weapons of violence — my soul may not come into their council . . .», Jer v 9.29, ix 8: »Should I not punish



for these things . . . , should my soul not avenge itself?» (the speaker is the LORD), indirectly also Hab ii 4: »Behold, its soul is heedless, not upright . . . », and Job xxxii 2: ». . . he regarded his soul more righteous than God». The interpretation of Hab ii 4 is disputed, but the above rendering makes more justice to the verbal form (perfect) than the supposition that the prophet is speaking of future events.<sup>36</sup>

Other types of soul showing or presupposing bodily action are: Pr xiii 2: ». . . the soul of the treacherous is violence», where soul is identified with the action, though the latter is of a bodily kind. The desire for violence might have served as the basis for this equation.<sup>37</sup> Job xi 20: ». . . and their hope is a blow of soul», i.e., probably not death, because the text seems to mean the present condition (cf. the preceding pf. *'ābad*), but a sigh coming from the bottom of heart.<sup>38</sup> Jer iv 19, one of the passages where (in ktib) the verb is in the 1st pers. sg., though the subject is *naʿfaš* (cf. p. 12): ». . . for the sound of trumpet my soul has heard . . . » presupposes equally that the soul has the sense of hearing and, consequently, body at disposal, even though the outward hearing is not in question. Ps cxx 6: »Very long my soul has dwelt with him who hates peace» seems to identify soul with man in itself. SS vi 12: »I was not aware — my soul put me (to) the chariots of my noble kinsman» is a real riddle. The original text is apparently somewhat corrupt in the end of the line, but if we following our principle do not undertake any emendations, the passage belongs to those that best illustrate the fact that though the soul represents man as a whole, the man in himself, substantially taken, is not identical with the soul, but the latter must be understood functionally (cf. p. 27): the person in himself is not aware of what his soul is doing. It may still be pointed out that this conclusion is based upon that part of the passage which is normally not regarded as corrupt. Nm xix 18 gives instruction concerning the method of the purification of the tent which is defiled because of a case of death: »Then a clean man shall take hyssop, and dip it in the water, and sprinkle upon the tent . . . and upon the souls that are there . . . » Here the soul, obviously identical with an individual,

appears passive. Similarly Jer xlv 7: »... Why are ye doing a great calamity to your souls...?» The context shows the menacing calamity to be of a material and bodily kind.

These examples may be enough to show that *næfæš* does appear as the subject of physical actions even when the whole person is concerned. As a matter of fact, these cases form the necessary basis for the group in which *næfæš* means its possessor as a mere being, seen from the physical side, as in connection with numerals etc. Moreover, no cogent reason has been presented, why *næfæš* could be the subject of psychical actions concerning as well the whole man as a part of him, but of physical actions only as far as a part of the body is in question.

### 3. *Næfæš* purely acting or partially as the object of action.

The principle of classification used in this and in the following paragraph may seem artificial, but that is not the case. The rubrics are chosen only for practical reasons, viz. because it is the shortest way to express a characteristic common to all the souls belonging to these groups. The principle of the classification itself is religious.

The group comprises all the souls treated in the two preceding paragraphs. Therefore we consider it unnecessary to study them here in detail. Only a short summary from the religious point of view is given.

In this connection we have no interest in the circumstances that the soul eats, drinks, is hungry, tired, sick, cries etc. They are all natural consequences of the fact that the whole man is soul. But as we have established above (cf. p. 35), *man is soul above all in his relation to God*. From this aspect it is most important, if the soul in its action is in accordance with God's will, i.e., whether it sins or performs actions pleasing God.

When studying all the passages in which soul is described as sinning, we see that all of them lead to the same end: the relation between God and soul is broken. If intentional sins are in question,

the final result is the death of the soul: »The soul that sins — it shall die» (Ez xviii 4.20), ». . . everybody that makes any of these abominations shall be cut off, (all) the souls that act (so) from among their people» (Lv xviii 29, cf. the context). But if the transgression has happened »by accident», without intentional purpose to break the commandment of the LORD, it is possible to get the relation corrected by means of bringing a prescribed offering to the LORD (iv-v etc.).

As we see, soul's own action or suffering is everywhere in question. The soul sins thereby breaking its relation to God and either dies in consequence thereof or restores its relation to the former condition by means of bringing a prescribed offering to God. If we could apply the systematic terminology of the Christian theology to the OT without any alterations, we should say that all of this belongs to the sphere of Christian ethics or the life in faith, as also other works pleasing God, as his praise, spontaneous offerings, the afflicting of himself (Nazirite promise), etc. On the other hand, in no passage belonging to this group the salvation of the soul is in question, which is due to the circumstance that the salvation is a matter concerning the whole soul.

4. *Næfæš* totally as the object of action,  
sometimes even its performer.

The types of which this group is composed are very various in character. To begin with more »material» souls, Ex xxi 23 ordains: »But if any mischief happens, then thou shalt give soul for soul». In the example related in the preceding passage, which serves as an introduction to this and the following passages, a situation is described in which struggling men hurt a pregnant woman so that a miscarriage follows, while the continuation runs: ». . . eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burnt for burnt, wound for wound, stripe for stripe». The presupposed injuries are all bodily, and the worst ones are mentioned first, then the less important ones. To judge from this, as also from the situation, the word *næfæš* means

here life, as in so many other passages. The loss of life is the most fateful consequence which can follow a bodily injury. The corresponding commandment concerning animals is given Lv xxiv 18. Further cf. Dt xix 21 etc. (tens of passages).

The soul appearing in Lv xxii 11 is still more »material»: »But if a priest buys a soul, an acquisition of his silver . . .» It is clear that the soul here means a slave<sup>39</sup>, i.e. man in himself. The same meaning forms the background in Dt xxiv 7: »If a man is found to have stolen a soul out of his brethren, the children of Israel . . .» (= ». . . one of his brethren . . .»; ARV). Similarly Gn xii 5: ». . . the soul that they had made . . .» (= ». . . slaves that they had acquired . . .»), xiv 21: »Give me the soul (= men), but the goods take for thyself», Ex xii 15.19 etc. etc.: ». . . that soul shall be cut off . . .» (in this case, however, the family and property of the culprit was included in his soul, see Nm xvi, Josh vii 24—25), Ps cv 18: ». . . his soul got into iron . . .» (= he was laid in iron; AV), etc.

At least most of the passages in which *næfæš* appears sought (in mortal sense) or chased belong to this group, also, as 1 S xxii 23: ». . . he who seeks my soul, he seeks thy soul . . .», in which *næfæš*, again, means life, as well as 1 K xix 10.14: ». . . and they seek my soul to take it». A contrary case in which *næfæš*, however, belongs to the same type, is represented by the passages in which soul is protected or regarded precious, as 2 K i 14: ». . . but now, may my soul be precious in thy eyes», Is xxxviii 17: ». . . but thou lovedst my soul (so far as to preserve it) from the pit of destruction . . .», etc. An exceptional case: Ps cxx 2: ». . . deliver my soul from deceitful lips . . .» The thought is near that *næfæš* here could mean name or reputation. The shift would, however, be too long and the case the only one, wherefore it might be best to suppose that *næfæš* here means man in himself, as a member of the society (cf. v. 6).

Considering all these cases it is no wonder that the soul in two passages of the OT is described as an independent being which departs from the human body at the moment of the death, viz. Gn xxxv 18 and 1 K xvii 21—22. The former runs: »And it happened, when her soul was going out — for she died — . . .» In this case it

would be possible to suppose that »her soul» would mean herself, while the death would be euphemistically called »departure», as in our days so often. The words »for she died» would be a gloss to explain the expression because of its rarity. The metaphor used is not, however, only rare, but — interpreted as above — even incompatible with the conception of death in the OT. When describing phenomena and events in nature the Bible remains steadily on the ground of actual observations, so even here. The ancient Israelites were realistic enough to establish that when dying man is going nowhere. He ceases to move and to breathe, and then he is »collected to his people», i.e., he is put into the old family grave where his corpse lies immovable.<sup>40</sup> At the same time the deceased is delivered to Sheol, since, as we have established before (p. 32), Sheol is the totality in which all the graves are included.

1 K xvii 21—22 even this possibility is excluded. The passage runs: »O LORD, my God, let the soul of this child come into his inner again . . . and the soul of the child returned into his inner». The boy and his soul are clearly distinguished from one another. But even so the conception of the soul in these passages — Gn xxxv 18 included — has nothing exceptional in itself. It means simply life, the basis of living — in the functional sense — and of action, as in almost two hundreds of passages of the OT.<sup>41</sup> Only the way in which it is spoken of seems odd. But if we look at the matter more carefully, we shall see that even it contains nothing extraordinary. In the OT there are innumerable passages in which impersonal, even abstract beings and conceptions are described as if they had been personal beings, e.g. God's word (cf. *bat qôl* in the later Judaism), the name of the LORD, wisdom, night, day, the tribes of Israel (cf., e.g., Judg v), foreign nations, even the limbs of the human body (in the NT, it is true, but written by an Israelite, 1 Cor xii), blood (Ps xciv 21), etc. Out of these the word and the name of the LORD are hypostatized from God, the limbs of the human body and the blood from man. Why could not the soul equally well be hypostatized from man? Only the circumstance that it happens so infrequently causes it to seem odd, which

circumstance again comes from the fact that the conception of the soul was too near to the conception of man (in himself) that its lasting independent existence would have been possible from Israelitic presuppositions.<sup>42</sup> In any case it seems certain that when »departing» the soul at the same time ceases to exist, because in no passage of the OT a soul existing separately from the body is mentioned.

From the point of view expressed in the rubric of the paragraph, however, the passages are most important in which the salvation (deliverance, redemption) of the soul is spoken of. As we can expect on the ground of the passages treated above, in many passages it means the preservation of life. So e.g. 1 K i 12 where Nathan gives Bathsheba the promise that following his orders she will save both her own soul and the soul of her son Solomon. The development of the matter shows that he was right: the defeated Adonijah had to give his life for his defeat. Other similar passages: Jer xx 13, Gn xix 19, xxxii 30 (in the background the thought: nobody can remain alive having seen the face of God, see Ex xxxiii 20, Judg xiii 22), further Ex xxi 30, formally even Ex xxx 12<sup>43</sup>, though it in practice meant only the capitulation; 1 K xix 3, Am ii 14.15, etc.

A kind of transition between this and the purely religious conception of the salvation of the soul might be found in Is xliv 20: »He is dealing with ashes . . . he will not save his soul . . .» The prophet might have had in mind the entering into the Messianic kingdom the coming of which he expected in the near future.<sup>44</sup> The same *might* be case in Jer li 6.45<sup>45</sup> (cf. l 19—20), perhaps also Ez xviii 27, xxxiii 9 (and iii 19.21).

Purely religious conception of the salvation of the soul we, at last, may find in Ps cxli 8: ». . . in thee I trust; do not abandon my soul».<sup>46</sup> Even here it cannot be conclusively proved, but the tone of the psalm makes it probable that this interpretation is correct, cf. vv. 3—5; the Psalmist does not fear outward dangers that could threaten him from the side of the wicked, but that these could seduce him to sin together with them. The traps, snares, and nets (v. 9—10) would, accordingly, be interpreted symbolically,

and the verb *'al t'ar* according to its primary meaning »to lay bare»: »do not abandon» (cf. AV: »leave not . . . destitute»).

Is xliii 4 the soul of the people of Israel appears with this meaning: »Since thou art precious in my eyes, art honourable, and I love thee, I shall give man (= mankind<sup>47</sup>) for thee, and nations for thy soul». It is a fact that the prophet expected the Messianic or salvation time to appear soon after; see, e.g., chapter lv. It was to be preceded by the judgment of the nations which was to begin in Babel and to continue in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Seba (xliii 3). Leaving the enumeration of single countries and peoples the prophet in v. 4 includes all the mankind into the same circle. The heathens being thus judged Israel would get opportunity to enjoy the fruits of the salvation. Another matter is that the judgment did not happen so quickly or so totally as the prophet expected.

In the Psalm xlix the belief that there is another, eternal life after the death assumes, as far as the present writer is able to judge, clearer shape in expression than anywhere else in the OT.<sup>48</sup> *Næfæš* in the meaning in question appears in v. 9: »For the ransom of their soul is costly, and it will be lacking for ever . . .» The continuation shows, wherefore the ransom should be paid: ». . . that he would live continually for ever, would not see the pit (= Sheol)». In the following passages there is described in detail how all the men must die. V. 12 shows that the offspring is not included in the soul, but in the name, which conception, however, is rather near to the OT conception of the soul.<sup>49</sup> The v. 14, however, gives a limitation: »This is their way that have a foolish confidence, and after them of those that are delighted in their speech».<sup>50</sup> V. 16 states as the contrary to this: »But God will redeem my soul from the hand of Sheol, for he will take me (to him) . . .» As the whole contents of the Psalm show, the recovering from an illness or an escape from some other danger of life cannot be in question, nor the continuation of temporal life.<sup>51</sup>

Religious interpretation may be the correct one even in Ez xiii 18—20. All the chapter deals with the religious situation among the Jews that were still in Jerusalem, and the prophets, less still

prophetesses, hardly had any opportunity or even desire to kill men, nor is their equipment — as far as the meaning of the words is clear — quite proper for such a purpose. The killing of the souls which is dealt with here, may mean the same as v. 22: »Because ye have disheartened the righteous falsely, though I have not made him worried . . .», while the keeping alive of souls that should not live might correspond to the end of the passage: ». . . have strengthened the hands of the wicked, that he would not return from his evil way and live». <sup>52</sup> Accordingly, the soul seems to be in connection with the way of action, and not with the persons; when the way of action is changed, the acting man has become a new soul. The hunting of souls seems to mean that the false prophetesses seduce Israelites to follow themselves, their deliverance, again, that the LORD through the true prophet will reveal their error to them and save them from its consequences. <sup>53</sup>

Consequently, we can establish that the formal division mentioned in the beginning of the preceding paragraph is corresponded by the division in the contents: when the religious action of the soul is in question, the soul is either purely acting or partly the object of the action, also, while in the passages in which the salvation of the soul in the religious sense is in question the soul in its totality is the object of the action, and not at all its performer. Only when another kind of the salvation of the soul is in question, man can appear acting, but in the religious sense only as an instrument (cf. above).



## FOURTH CHAPTER

### Individual and collective *nəfæš*.

In the OT numerous passages appear in which the word *nəfæš* obviously is used to mean a group composed of more than one being. The exact number of these passages is not possible to determine, because the context does not always give information on this point, and the soul often appears as *potentially* collective, i.e., it may alternatively mean either one or more than one being. A soul comprising more than one being we call collective, and the number of passages in which *nəfæš* appears either purely in this sense or so that the collective meaning is at least predominating is not less than 180, but perhaps considerably more. Most of these cases deal with man.

#### 1. God and man.

When studying the individual soul as a contrary to the collective soul it is best to begin with the cases in which *nəfæš* appears in the plural. In those cases, namely, it is fairly sure that the soul is thought of as belonging to an individual; otherwise the soul of the whole group would appear in the singular. So especially in the cases in which the souls mentioned are apparently similar in character. In the OT this type is rather infrequent. Examples:

Jer xxiv 19: »... but we are doing a great calamity upon our souls», Ez xiii 18: »... other souls ye hunt to the loss of my people, other souls ye keep alive to your benefit», Ps lxxii 13: »... and the souls of the poor he will save», xcvi 10: »... preserving the souls of his pious...» Passages in which *nəfæš* appears in the plural are

50 in number in the whole OT, the oldest examples the age of which is determinable with some certainty appearing in the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel. In the Book of Psalms only the two examples cited above are to be found.<sup>1</sup> It is possible that in all the passages in which *nəfəš* appears in the plural similar souls are meant, although this cannot be proved everywhere, e.g. Pr xiv 25: »A truthful witness is a deliverer of souls . . .», since the character of the souls is not determined, at least they are similar in the respect that all of them are delivered. A more uncertain example is Ez xviii 4: »Behold, all the souls — mine they are . . .», because the souls immediately thereafter are divided into different classes.

There are numerous other passages in which we can conclude with quite or almost absolute certainty that the soul means an individual, so above all the passages in which a certain soul is in question, e.g. 2 S xix 6 when Joab says to David: ». . . who have saved thy soul . . .», 1 K xvii 21: ». . . let the soul of this child return into his inner», further the many passages in the Psalms in which the Psalmist speaks of his own soul and which are to be interpreted individually, though the interpretation in many passages is uncertain<sup>2</sup>, further such cases as Lv v 15: »If a soul commits a breach of faith . . .», Nm xix 11: »He who touches a dead of any soul of man . . .», though in these cases the soul in a certain sense is potentially collective, because the commandment can be applied to a larger group as well.

A third group, which interests us particularly in this connection, is made up out of such souls that in a certain sense form a transition between individual and collective souls. Lv v 15 and Nm xix 11 were already mentioned as a kind of such a transition, but the collective sense is in them very lightly represented. Another similar case is that in which the Psalmist speaks in the name of the whole congregation, e.g. Ps civ 1.35: »Bless, my soul, the LORD». In this group the collective and the individual sense go, so-to-say, hand in hand, without blending together in the sense we now mean. They cover ideally each other, but without organic connection. Such a connection, on the contrary, is found in the passage 1 S ii 33 cited above (p. 12). The soul is, in a sense, individual, because it is

Eli's, but at the same time collective, because Eli's offspring is included in it, also. Not in the sense that the latter would not have had their individual souls, but in the respect that they were Eli's offspring and discharged the same duties as he, i.e., the duties of a priest, they belonged to the same soul as Eli. On this ground we can determine the most important characteristic of a collective soul: within its limits the unity of being and of action is dominating, i.e., all individuals belonging to it *act in one and the same spirit*. It is easy to recognize that the same applies to any individual soul. Consequently, this is *the most important characteristic of any soul*.

Examples illustrating the matter could be presented almost infinitely. We give only a few which at the same time are closely connected with the subject of the chapter. Josh x 39 tells us how Joshua and the Israelites occupied Debir and »devoted to destruction every soul that was there». *Næfæš* means here any living being, but it is characteristic of the OT way of thinking and linguistic usage that the word translated by the word »every» properly means »the whole, totality», so that we could translate as well: ». . . all the soul that was there». The inhabitants of Debir formed one soul, the character of which, however, is almost purely existential: they were one soul in the respect that they were at Debir at the time Joshua conquered it. The action of the soul is purely passive here: all of them encountered with the same fate, were destroyed.

Job xxiv 12 states: ». . . the soul of the pierced cries for help . . . » The substantial characteristic of the soul is that (all) the individuals belonging to it are pierced, the functional one that they cry. It is easy to recognize that the action is due to the state of the being: they are crying, because they are pierced. Similarly in the preceding example: they were destroyed, because they were at Debir. The same applies to all the other cases: *the action of the soul is always due to its state of being and in accordance with it*. Accordingly, simulation is not properly action of the soul except in the sense that it is an indication of the falseness of the soul in question.

Very illustrative an example of a collective soul is Nm xvi which

is partly discussed already earlier (p. 15). We do not take up the question whether it is composed of more than one source, because it has no influence upon this matter; in any case it can be, and actually has been, understood as a coherent story.<sup>3</sup> It contains a description of a revolt against Moses and Aaron by Korah, Dathan, Abiram, and two hundred and fifty other »princes of the assembly». First the LORD threatens all the congregation with destruction (v. 21), but influenced by the prayer of Moses and Aaron he revokes his menace. It is sufficient, however, to show that all the congregation in this connection is conceived as one soul or functional unity: the transgression of a few men (or even of one man) is an indication of the iniquity dwelling in the whole congregation; with other words, the whole congregation is guilty, if one of its members commits a trespass. Similar examples there are elsewhere in the OT, also, cf., e.g., Josh vii, 2 S xxiv. In giving up his intention the LORD, however, does not alter old customs nor is introducing any individual principle into use: from the oldest times (cf. Gn iv, 1 S xiv) it was usual either to kill the transgressor or to banish him. This corresponds to the principle very often expressed in the Pentateuch, especially in Leviticus and Deuteronomy: »Thou shalt put off the evil from among thee».

An example of what can be called the gradations of the soul follows. When transferring the responsibility from the whole congregation to Korah, Dathan, and Abiram the LORD, however, includes their wives, »their children, and their little ones» (v. 27), »all the men that belonged to Korah and all the(ir) goods» in their souls (cf. p. 15).<sup>4</sup> The same principle appears expressed in Dt v 9: ». . . For I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of fathers upon children until the third and fourth generation, to those that hate me». The will of the father was dominating in the family, therefore the whole family belonged to the same soul as the father. The boy was able to cease with the way of action of the father having grown old enough, at least after the father's death (cf. Ez xviii), but as long as he was depending on father's will, he belonged to the same soul as the latter. Afterwards he belonged to it only

as far as and in the extent he followed the father's way of action (cf. p. 36).

The most comprehensive type of the collective soul appearing in the OT is the soul of a country or of a nation. It appears, e.g., in Is xv 4: »... Therefore the armed men of Moab cry aloud, its soul quivers». As the first clause indicates, the soul of Moab means here its army, which again is due to the circumstance that Moab in the chapter is described as making war; accordingly, its soul is viewed from the aspect of war.<sup>5</sup> Another passage, where the soul is viewed from the aspect of its general character, grants us a glance into the soul of the Chaldeans, viz. Hab ii 4: »... its soul is proud, not straight (= upright)...»<sup>6</sup>

In the religious sense the soul of a nation in the OT always appears meaning the people of Israel, e.g. Lv xxvi 15: »... if your soul will abhor my ordinances...», Dt xi 18: »Therefore set ye up these my words in your heart and in your soul...», Is lv 3: »... hear ye, so your soul will live...», etc.

## 2. Other beings.

In this paragraph we are dealing with two different types of the soul. Both appear in Gn i already. Examples: i 20: »Let the waters swarm with living soul...», i 21: »... the whole crawling, living soul that the waters swarm...», i 24: »Let the earth bring forth living soul...», i 30: »... in which there is living soul...» In the first three passages AV translates *nəfəš* with the word »creature» (sg.), while ARV uses the plural. The latter, though substantially correct, does not indicate the idea of the writer clearly enough. He did not think God to have created so and so many individual animals, but the animals as species or rather as classes. When speaking of the animals as souls, he means a whole class paying no attention to the question, how many individual animals belong to it. The only important point is that they in their own way are characteristic of the whole class.<sup>7</sup> The same type is met with certainty in Gn ix 10. 12. 15. 16.

The other type appears only in Gn i 30, where the word *nəfəš* is used to mean the maintainer of life (AV »life» for the whole expression *nəfəš ḥayyāh*). It means that the soul is here seen from the aspect of life only, which is indicated by the context also. *Nəfəš*, accordingly, appears here in a reduced meaning: every living being is soul on the mere ground that it lives. The supposition of a »mysterious potency», however, even in this case<sup>8</sup> is unnecessary, for in every living being there are outward characteristics which distinguish it from a lifeless object.

## FIFTH CHAPTER

Etymology and the development resulting in the different shades of the meaning.

In the introduction we already referred to some attempts to explain the origin and eventual development of the word *nəfəš*, but since the subject proper of this study is to find out in which meaning(s) the word is used in the OT, it was not possible to discuss this problem there in detail. Otherwise there would have been a danger that the result arrived at could have led to another disposition of the material than that which is presented above as a result of as objective an examination of the material as possible. Neither was it possible to place such an etymological analysis anywhere in the middle of the preceding part of the study, because the latter as an organic whole which treats one and the same material from different aspects would have been injured by it. Its location at the end of the book might be best possible even because its second paragraph forms a kind of summary of what is stated above, accordingly helping the reader in getting a coherent picture of the whole subject, while the discussion of the etymology on account of its universal character is a natural introduction to the discussion of the development of the meaning of the word.

### 1. Etymology.

Many different suggestions are proposed regarding the origin and the primary meaning of the word *nəfəš*. During the last and still in the beginning of this century the opinion was dominating that it is deverbally derived from root *npš* which in Hebrew appears

in Nif'al with the meaning »to rest, recreate» = »to breathe, fetch a breath». From this meaning of the verbal root Saalschütz<sup>1</sup> derived the meaning »ability or power to breathe = the living potency observable by senses» for the substantive *nəfəš*. As a support for his supposition he mentions the root *gw'* which according to him means »to blow out (soul)», which is surely wrong.<sup>2</sup> Lichtenstein<sup>3</sup> and Schwab<sup>4</sup>, starting from the same basis, suppose the original meaning of *nəfəš* to be more concrete; the latter gives the most exact definition: »the breath flowing out of the mouth and the nose». Since, however, the interpretation of both Is iii 20 and Job xli 13 is uncertain, he establishes that the meaning »breath» cannot be attested, considering, however, that its existence (during the OT times?) is ascertained by means of the following indirect evidence: Nif'al *yinnəfəš* »to take breath»; »the blowing out of *nəfəš*» = death Jer xv 9, Job xi 20, xxxi 39, the late Hebrew *nəfəš* »taking breath, breathing», Syriac *nəfəš* »to take breath, breathe», Akkadian *napištu* »life», Arabic *nafasa* »to blow, take breath». From this primary meaning Schwab derived three main meanings: 1) the subject or sustainer of the physical life<sup>5</sup>, 2) the subject and sustainer of every kind of wish and desire<sup>6</sup>, 3) the sustainer of the life of emotions and affects.<sup>7</sup> Lichtenstein, again, derived from the primary meaning »breath» the two main functions: 1) the vital power, 2) passions<sup>8</sup>, beside which there appeared afterwards a third: 3) person, »the I» (»a kind of *pars pro toto*»).<sup>9</sup>

Until that time *nəfəš* was commonly regarded as deverbal. In the year 1920, however, Paul Dhorme<sup>10</sup> referring to Akkadian proposed the suggestion that in some passages of the OT it would mean a part of the body, viz. throat or/and neck. In this case the derivation of the word from a verbal root can hardly come into question. Five years after Dürr<sup>11</sup> believed himself able to prove that this meaning appears in many tens of passages in the OT stating in addition that it is the primary meaning of the word. He also regarded the Akkadian *napištu* as his strongest support. The word is generally regarded to appear in this meaning. Most younger scholars have followed Dhorme and Dürr in this respect, e.g. v. Soden<sup>12</sup>, Rüsche<sup>13</sup>,



and A. R. Johnson.<sup>14</sup> Rüsche supposes the meaning of *nafæš* to have developed in the following way: neck, throat > breathing > life, »breath-soul» > (life) in blood (= blood fume) > blood.<sup>15</sup> Johnson<sup>16</sup> constructs the following development: throat > breath, breathing > life > person, self > living being > dead being, corpse. As an additional evidence for the meaning »breath, breathing» Johnson mentions the Arabic *nafasun* which has this meaning.<sup>17</sup>

Miriam Seligson<sup>18</sup> criticizes these theories in the following way: »Regarding the Semitic languages the word NPŠ may never have meant 'breath'. In Ugaritic, Gordon does not give *npš* in this sense.<sup>19</sup> Muss-Arnolt in his dictionary gives instances for the various ways of using *napištu*, but though he also suggests the sense 'breath' for it, he presents no example of the word used in this sense.<sup>20</sup> Delitzsch, in his turn, makes no mention at all of 'breath' in this connection.<sup>21</sup> According to Conti Rossini, in South-Arabic, *np/fs* does not seem to take the sense 'breath'.<sup>22</sup> The Arabic word for 'breath' is *nafasun*. The word for 'soul' is *nafsun*. The verb *nafasa* from this root is denominated and *nafasun* takes the same form as inf. I of it.<sup>23</sup> After all, however, even S. states that »the development 'breath' > 'soul' may be the correct one», though it cannot be proved, and in historical times »NPŠ is *always*<sup>24</sup> used in the sense given below» (= 'mysterious potency', 'the principle of life'<sup>25</sup>).

Geo Widengren, in his turn, criticizes Seligson's statements:<sup>26</sup> »P. 49 the author says that '*napšāti* cannot stand for 'throat'. One person cannot have many throats'. Nor can he have many heads, but nevertheless we read . . . *rēšē<sup>meš</sup>-ia šu-uk-ki*<sup>27</sup>, JRAS 1929, p. 764: 2 . . . But clearly *aban kišādi*, stone of the neck, *kunuk kišādi*, seal of the neck, and *kunuk napišti* are synonymous expressions . . .

»P. 57 a well-known passage in Ugaritic literature is quoted and translated as follows:

Verily thou shalt go down to the mercy of the God Mōt. I\* AB I 6—7.

»If we, contrary to the author's method, also quote the second half of the distich we shall find a synonym of *npš* used, namely

*mhmrt*, and will have no difficulty in accepting Gordon's translation, *Ugaritic Literature*, p. 38:

Thou shalt go down into the throat of the God Mot,  
Yea into the *gullet* of El's Beloved, the Hero . . .

»That indeed Ba'al descends into the gullet of Mōt cannot be doubted, because it is explicitly stated col. II 4: *bph yrd* . . .

»Let us add that the author when arguing that Arabic *nafs*, 'soul', cannot be explained from *nafas*, 'breath', has completely forgotten (of course) to adduce Syriac *nʿfeš*, *elnʿfeš*, 'to breathe', as compared with *nafšā*. We should indeed also compare Accad. *napāšu*, 'be wide', 'breathe freely', and *nappašu*, *nanpašu*, 'airhole', as well as *nipšu* and the already mentioned *napišu*, both 'breath', with *napištu*, 'soul'. Of special interest is the fact that we find a word *napuštu* (evidently meaning 'breath'), a form constructed like *napištu* . . .

»Of course we should in this connection draw attention to the well-known name of a demon, *nakās napišti*, 'cutter of of life' (*sic*), where the original meaning of 'cutting of of the throat' (*sic*) may be said to be still transparent». Thus far Widengren.

Having thus marshalled the data presented thus far in connection with the most remarkable attempts to solve the problem, we shall first ask, whether the word *nafəš* is derived from a verbal root or we should regard it as belonging to the so-called primitive nouns. We shall first see, what the lexica of some Semitic languages teach of the use of the verbal root *npš* compared with the meanings of the noun *napš/napiš(tu)*, in addition to the data presented above.

In Akkadian the verb *napāšu* is stated to mean »to be/become wide», »to be/get copious/-ly», including the derived conjugations, while the substantive *napištu* has the meaning »throat, neck», »life», »life of man», »livelihood», »self», »person». <sup>28</sup> In Hebrew the verb appears three times in Nif'al with the meaning »to rest, recreate», which *can* be derived from a meaning »to breathe freely»; the meanings of the substantive cf. above. In Ugaritic the verb does not appear at all, while the substantive *npš* has the meanings »soul», »appetite», »person», »throat». <sup>29</sup> In Arabic *nafasa* means »to smite a.o. with (the evil eye)», *nafisa* »to be tenacious of», »to judge a.o. to be unworthy

of), etc. (like that), *nafusa* »to be precious, in request», *naffasa* »to console, cheer a.o.», *nāfasa* »to sigh for, aspirate a th.», *'anfasa* »to please a.o.», *tanaffasa* »to breathe, respire», »to become long (day», »to shine (dawn)», »to be cracked (bow)», »to sprinkle (water: wave)», *tanāfasa* »to desire a th. eagerly», »to quarrel about a th.», while the substantive *nafsun* has the meanings »soul, vital principle», »blood», »evil eye», »spirit», »person, individual», »self of a man or thing», »intention, desire», »pride», »scorn», »appetite», »stomach». <sup>30</sup>

A detailed examination may be unnecessary. The above material, added to the fact that the (Proto-Semitic) *napš*, *napiš(tu)* <sup>31</sup> in all the Semitic languages appears in the common meaning »soul, vital principle», may be enough to show that if at a time, perhaps (pre-) Proto-Semitic times there has been a verb from which this substantive is derived, it has totally fallen into oblivion, so varying and differing from the above-mentioned common meaning of the substantive are all the verbal forms attached to this root in historical times, as far as they appear at all. Consequently, we may consider it to be proved that the substantive *nəfəš* is not deverbal, wherefore the older etymologies do not come into question. Similarly Widengren's demand that the Syriac *nəfəš* etc. should be taken into consideration, is unjustifiable.

Likewise Widengren's demand that the meaning of other nouns of different types, even if derived from the same root, should be taken into consideration when the primary meaning of the word *nəfəš* is determined, is unjustifiable. One word cannot be derived from many different prototypes, less still many words of different types from one and the same prototype (in principle, of course), and if the meaning of the words of different types differs from the meaning of that word which both formally and in meaning best corresponds to *nəfəš*, there is more reason to leave them out of account. Accordingly, Seligson's omission of *nafasun* is methodically quite justified and the only correct way of proceeding. Neither have Jer xv 9, Job xi 20, xxxi 39 any influence on this question. Even if the »blowing out of *nəfəš*» in them would mean death, it is no proof of that *nəfəš* in them is = breath. It may very well mean

the vital power in general. Moreover, to judge from the context, in Jer xv 9 *nəfəš* may be subject, the »blowing» being caused by sorrow, which makes this interpretation possible even in the other two passages (cf. also p. 49). Only the Akkadian *napiš(tu)*, which is apparently an older form of the prototype *napš* presupposed by the other languages,<sup>32</sup> must be taken into consideration when the primary meaning of the latter is sought.

Is this primary meaning »throat, neck», as we saw above so many scholars to have supposed? It seems undeniable that *kunuk kišādi* is = *kunuk napišti* and that, accordingly, *napištu* here appears in the meaning of »neck». Further, in the cuneiform literature there are other passages that Seligson has not taken into consideration, in which *napištu* appears meaning without doubt a part of the body, probably neck.<sup>33</sup> Widengren's reference to the demon named *nakās napišti* may be justified, also, and his argumentation for the meaning of »throat» or »gullet» for the Ugaritic *npš* is quite undeniable. This meaning appears in the OT, also, at least in Is v 14, Hab ii 5, even if in a symbolical sense.

The fact that *nəfəš* has this meaning does not, however, mean that it is the primary one. Indeed, its supposed great age seems to be made probable by the fact that it is very concrete, but the meaning »corpse», which is surely very late, is quite as concrete. Moreover, many other circumstances seem to witness against its primitiveness. Firstly: it is attested only in Akkadian, Ugaritic, and Hebrew, and even in them it is somehow ambiguous and disputed (cf. below). Secondly: other meanings cannot be derived from it without difficulties. As a transition to the main meaning »soul» the meaning »breath, breathing» has been postulated, but, as Schwab<sup>34</sup>, Seligson<sup>35</sup>, and Johnson<sup>36</sup> themselves state, this meaning cannot be attested. If we can find another possible reconstruction of the development of the meaning without any postulated links in it, it would have a certain grade of preference.

The main meaning is, in any case, »soul, vital principle». It appears in all the Semitic languages. Therefore we can state without hesitation that it is a very old meaning, also. All the other meanings

can unforcedly be derived from it, if we do not define »the vital principle» as a »mysterious potency», but adhere to Pedersen's definition in the sense he himself interprets it:<sup>37</sup> »It is not the object of the narrator (in Gn ii 7) to analyse the elements of man, but to represent his essential character. The basis of its essence was the fragile corporeal substance, but by the breath of God it was transformed and became a *nephesh*, a soul. It is not said that man was supplied with a *nephesh* . . . Such as he is, *man*, in his total essence, is a soul».<sup>38</sup>

We have found during the course of our study of the passages in which the word *nəfəš* appears in its main meaning — from this point of view — to be »the living and/or acting being of its possessor» or »its possessor described as living and acting», in which the body, substantially seen, is the most important factor. This is in agreement with Pedersen's view, and interpreted in this way it is concrete enough, also, to be the primary meaning of the word. From the conception of *'ādām*, man, it differs, except in the respect that it can be used of animals etc. also, above all through its functional character: it means, functionally expressed, man seen from the aspect of life and action, or, substantially expressed, living and acting man; cf., e.g., Nm xxxi 35 (see p. 46).

All the secondary meanings can be derived from this primary<sup>38b</sup> one: 1) living and acting being > being in itself (obs. even in this case the being in question is apparently always presupposed to be, though not described as, somehow living), 2) living being > something of vital importance (an object or substance important for life, as e.g. blood, hand-mill), 3) acting being > a centre of the action of the being (a part of the body in which the action is concentrated, as heart = mind, throat), 4) acting being > the action of the being (will, wish, desire, rage, etc., perhaps even breath). It is no wonder, then, if *nəfəš* etc. sometimes means even neck, throat, or other organs in that region<sup>39</sup>, since the two actions very important for the preservation of life and of the acting ability, viz. eating and breathing, took place through them, nor even if it sometimes referred to breathing which is of vital importance to every living being.

On the other hand, if the meaning »throat» would be the primary one, it were difficult to understand, how *napištu* could have shifted to mean even the face or single parts of it, as it sometimes seems to do.<sup>40</sup> The plural *napišūti*, in the singular meaning, also, is easier to understand, if it means a totality containing more than one single organ. Seligson, however, misses the mark when contending: »... *napištu* is never the word for a particular part of the body, but for the potency acting in this part».<sup>41</sup> As far as I understand, the very opposite is true. *Napištu* or *næfæš* never means a »mysterious potency», but it can mean a part of the body in which the action of the being is concentrated, just on account of this concentration.<sup>42</sup> Similarly even such meanings as »the evil eye» and »stomach» are naturally explained: the former was regarded as a centre or means of an action dangerous for life, while the latter served, except as the melting-pot of the nourishment, which even that is of vital importance, according to the primitive conception even as the seat of many emotions and affects.

## 2. Historical development.

The difference between the conceptions of *næfæš* and *'ādām* appears clearly even in another respect. The individual can be differentiated from the latter at any time, but not from the former: it is possible to say *bæn-'ādām*, but never *\*bæn-næfæš*. Accordingly, the conception of *næfæš* is extremely collective, and it seems indeed that the collective soul as a concrete, functional unity is older than the individual soul. In order to illustrate the matter we give a short historic-sociological survey, as far as it is possible on the ground of the material at disposal.<sup>43</sup>

The Old Testament, archeology, a.o. sources tell us that the people of Israel and their ancestors before their settlement in the land of Canaan dwelt rather long in the steppe bordered by the desert of Northern Arabia, partly perhaps in the desert itself. They led a nomadic life, including occasional wars of a predatory character. Some glances into the nature of this life we can still get from stories

of the wandering in the wilderness, of Cain and Abel, of Lamech, etc., and from the Book of Judges, of the time when »there was no king in Israel, and everybody did that which was right in his own eyes«, further from some other passages in the oldest historical books.

The largest known community was normally a tribe (*maṭṭæ<sup>h</sup>*, *šēbæṭ*) which was divided into families (*mišpāḥā<sup>h</sup>*) and further into smaller families or houses (*bēt-’āb*). The limits between these communities were, however, vague: sometimes a family comprised only one house larger than normally, while sometimes, on the contrary, a strong family acted as an independent tribe. Coalitions between different tribes were formed rarely and only for certain purposes, as for war (cf. Judg i, v) or on religious grounds (the covenant of the twelve tribes of Israel).

In the tribe certain laws or properly customs were dominating, probably of the kind as those contained in the so-called Book of Covenant, Ex xxi-xxiii (even they are called *mišpāṭīm*, xxi 1). They were regarded as given by god or gods<sup>44</sup> — a nomadic tribe had presumably without exception only one god —, and the chief of the tribe was the representant of the god (cf. p. 41 sq.).<sup>45</sup> His authority was unlimited in theory, but in practice it was limited through those old customs and laws (cf. on the one side Josh i 16—18, but v. 8 on the other, further 1 S viii 11—17, Gn xxxiv 7, etc.), except the hinders and restrictions often appearing from the side of the chiefs of families and houses and from the other mighty men (cf. Gn xxxiv 30—31, Nm xvi, 2 S iii 39). When speaking of a mental-functional community of this kind the ancient Israelites used the word *nəfəš*, soul (cf. Gn xiv 21, xlvi 27, even xii 5, etc.).<sup>46</sup> It did not mean that all the members of the community would have acted in the same way up to every single detail. In the soul there were gradations (cf. p. 60). The influence of the collective soul comprising the whole tribe reached to the matters ordered by the chief or by the old customs and laws (cf. p. 59 sq.). If all the members of the tribe acted according to these factors, in the tribe there was *šālôm* which is usually translated by the word »peace«, but the sphere of which is considerably larger than what we usually

understand by that word, viz. a condition which is perfect in a certain sense, without any discrepancies and disturbances, but full of action.<sup>47</sup> If a member of the tribe transgressed against these laws, he placed himself outside them getting at the same time outside that collective soul, and if the transgression was of fatal kind, he was destroyed (cf., except the laws; e.g. Josh i 18, vii 24—26) or driven away (cf. Gn iv, 1 S xxvi 19, etc.). If he was a strong, leading or royal soul, he was often able to form another community around himself (cf. Cain, David) or to ascend to a leading position in another one (cf. Joseph, Moses, Jeroboam), but usually he was ruined.<sup>48</sup> The fall was partly due even to the fact that when transgressing the laws or the will of the chief the member of the tribe usually acted against even his own conception of right (cf. Josh vii 20, 1 S xxiv 6, etc.) inflicting so a crack upon his own soul, also (cf. e.g. 1 S xxiv 11—14). Such a soul was cursed (cf. Gn xxvii 29 etc.), i.e. it was lacking the presuppositions needed for successful action.<sup>49</sup> Alone in the steppe exposed to all its dangers such a soul, which bore the seed of destruction in itself, was rapidly ruined.

Family and house were presumably collective souls of a smaller size but of about the same construction, acting in the limits of the tribe. A detailed study is not possible because of the lack of first-hand material, but a good example of the mixed type house-family can be found e.g. in David's family history and the fight of the succession to the throne after him in 2 S xi-xx, 1 K i-ii.

The larger a collective soul was, the less deepness it had, i.e., the more smaller unities and individuals belonged to it, the less it regulated their mutual relations, at least as far as »profane souls» were in question, if such a term can be used of the ancient Semites. A soul of a nation of this type is mentioned only once in the proper functional sense (Is xv 4) in connection with war; another one, in the first place essential, gives even that only one rather superficial a characteristic (Hab ii 4). Other »profane» collective souls appearing in the OT we have studied above.

The origin of the individual type of the soul seems to be in connection with the migration to the cultured land. As a living being the individual soul could be stated to have existed from the



very first, but even so it would not have been purely individual in character, for as a living being even every individual man is potentially collective, because he represents the whole mankind (cf. Gn ii 7 and p. 58 sq.). The first individual soul we meet is Cain, regarding whom it must be observed that he is a farmer, and his offspring represents the cultural land, also, except that he rapidly formed a family around himself. The patriarchs lived in the cultural land, also, though leading a nomadic life, and Joseph was, beside a nursling of cultural land, even a leading or royal soul. Moreover, collective features are attached to him, also, because he represents the tribe(s) of Ephraim (and of Manasseh). The first individual soul which is quite free from collective features is Moses, after him Samuel, then other prophets. Moses and Samuel, however, are also typical leading souls, especially the former: they form a community, in which they have the leading position. First Elijah seems to lack even that. His origin is unknown, he lives alone in woodland and mountains, only a little before his departure from the earth, which even that is covered with an unusual mysterious wrapping, he takes a pupil who becomes his successor. The first among the literary prophets, Amos, has many characteristics of an individual soul, also. He comes from the unknown, performs his task, and disappears again. Scarcely he has continued his ministry.<sup>50</sup>

In his *proclamation*, however, even Amos shows no marks of the formation of an individual conception of the soul. The words are directed to the whole people, though sometimes the king, the High Priest Amaziah, or the nobility of Samaria is especially mentioned, because they form the centre of the national soul. Even »the remnant of Joseph» (v 15) means the whole kingdom.<sup>51</sup> In spite of that it was on the top of its outward power, the prophet saw its inner rottenness. Only a brilliant surface was left from the old, healthy, and strong tribe of Joseph. The destruction was so unavoidable that the prophet doubted whether an eventual reform could lead to permanent results. Quite so happened, also: after some thirty years Northern Israel was wiped off from the chronicles of the history of the divine salvation.

In the South it happened otherwise. There Isaiah's proclamation

shows that development toward a more individual conception of soul — and at the same time of the doctrine of salvation — has actually taken place. No matter how vi 13 may be interpreted, the name of the boy Shear-jashub is left in any case, and that the conception of the remnant is individually conceived, is indicated by x 19: »And the remnant of the wood of his forest will be a little number — a lad will write them down», though it is stated of Assyria. Once broken through, this idea developed more and more in detail, and in Ezekiel — as well as in Jeremiah — we meet quite individual conception of soul in a certain sense: »The soul that sins — it shall die». »The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him». The circumstance that the word *nəfəš* first appears in the plural in the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, as far as the age of the writings can be determined with some certainty, is the linguistic expression of this new idea (cf. p. 58). Different individuals, even though their action or fate would be similar, begin to be regarded as different souls.

It was stated that the conception of soul is individual — but in reality it is anything but individual. Only the collective soul to which the individual souls belong changes its shape. Thus far the people of Israel as a whole was regarded as God's people. The individual stood or fell with the people. But since the nation as a whole had not been able to stand before the LORD and it was threatened with destruction, in the salvation history a remarkable change took place: the place of the people was taken from one side by the individual, from the other by the whole mankind. These apparently quite contrary extremities are united in the conception »man as a species», since an individual represents the whole species as well as all the beings belonging to it. The application of the term *nəfəš* to animals belongs to this stage of the development, also: as we have seen (p. 61), when animals are spoken of as souls, species or classes of animals are meant. But the spirit of the individuality breaks walls to another direction, also. Various forms of the life and action of the soul were recognized already from the earliest times; now their individual sources and other factors having influence

upon them begin to be analyzed, also, and the term *naʿfæš* is sometimes applied to them: blood, livelihood, etc. »Throat, gullet» can, however, be an inheritance from the old Canaanite (?), since this meaning appears in Ugaritic already.

The place of the people of Israel is occupied by the »righteous», i.e. those that follow the Law. The original intention was, admittedly, that the people as a whole would have followed it, but when it did not do so, the sphere was widened to comprise all the peoples. Allusions pointing to that direction are found already in the first chapters of Amos, but nobody before the so-called Second Isaiah (toward the end of exile, Is xl-lv) has expressed it quite clearly. »It is too light to thee in face of that thou art my servant to rise up the tribes of Jacob and to restore the preserved of Israel. Therefore I shall appoint thee the light of nations, to be my salvation to the end of the earth» (xlix 6).

The reality, however, did not correspond to this program. The missionary work of the Jews among the heathens had rather limited results. The main reason was that the spirit of the individuality grew too strong, gaining ground even where it should not have happened: the stress was laid upon the outward observation of the individual commandments of the Law. Those that tried to keep the Law, were admittedly joined with one another, but because the unity was only an outward one, we can call them a collective soul only in the political sense, but not in the religious meaning. In this sense they were only a group of individual souls. During this period the religious individual soul develops itself up to that »perfection» in which we meet it in the known parable of the Pharisee and publican: »God, I thank thee that *I* am not like *the other men* . . .!» The same type is represented in the OT in Ps lxxxvi 2: »Preserve my soul for I am pious . . .!» The matter is not at all influenced by the question, whether the soul is really pious or hypocritical. The stress is laid upon its individuality, through which it separates itself from its environment. As the former, collective type of the soul, so even this individual type is preserved until the end of the Biblical period, to be changed still afterwards into its distortion in the doctrine

of the immortality of the soul, which as a matter of fact is only a form of the pristine doctrine of the reincarnation of the souls and at the same time its basis.<sup>52</sup>

To sum up: the primary meaning of *næfæš*, »the living and acting being of its possessor» is carried through the whole OT as the most important one with some a little narrower off-shoots in the section of action. Its character, primarily extremely collective, preserves this collective feature until the end (there appears no *\*bæn-næfæš*), but the spirit of individuality finds another way of expression (the plural) gaining ground rapidly and expressing itself in some reduced secondary meanings, also, but these remain infrequent in appearance.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

### Introduction.

<sup>1</sup> With other words, our method is historical only as far as it is needed to get the material worked out of the texts and realistically interpreted, and chronological only in so far as some particular development of the meaning of the word *nəfəš* is studied in view of its eventual consequences later on. It is psychological in so far as the means of interpretation are, in the first place, sought in the Israelites' manner of conception such as it appears in the linguistic usage of the Hebrew OT, and in the neighbouring languages only secondarily, if the primary means of interpretation have proved insufficient. Above all, however, it must be kept in mind that our study builds only upon *linguistic facts*. The results of the historical and of the theological research of the OT are used only where passages are met which cannot be cleared up without them, and even there only as auxiliary means.

<sup>2</sup> cf. Seligson, *The Meaning of npš mt in the Old Testament*, p. 45: »This leads the author — according to the conception of his time — to say 'and man became a npš hyh', although this means the active power in man which enlivens him» (the conception of the OT time is by the author admitted to be contrary to her opinion, but this does not matter for her; italics by me); similarly HkAT ad Gn ii 7, cf. further, e.g., Dussaud, *Syria XVI/1935*, p. 268sqq., who takes the conception from the general history of religion; Heidel, *The Gilgamesh Epic and OT Parallels* (1949), whose conception is the popular one in our days, see, e.g., p. 143; in another way Franz Delitzsch in his work *System der biblischen Psychologie* (1855) which shows very perceptibly the impossibility of his view; Fr. Sperl, *ZRps II/1908*, p. 147, gives a good description of the nature of this work: »... nicht einfach erhebt, was als biblische Anschauung vorliegt, sondern über die biblische Anschauung hinausgeht. Man wird bei ihm bisweilen geradezu an ein gnostisches Weiterspinnen biblischer Gedanken erinnert».

<sup>3</sup> viz., »breath»; cf. Seligson, *op. cit.* p. 22; Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual* p. 11; earlier Briggs, *JBL XVI/1897*, p. 17, 29 sq., and already Carus, *Psychologie der Hebräer* (1809) p. 38; further cf. the works mentioned in the last chapter, section Etymology, and in the notes to it.

<sup>4</sup> cf. Schwab, *Der Begriff der nefes*, especially p. 3—7, and in general the works mentioned in the preceding notes.

<sup>5</sup> e.g. the differentiation of living and dying *næfæš* into respective types was rejected, since death is only a phase of life; moreover, there is no dead *næfæš*. The distinction between human and animal *næfæš* was introduced only as a subdivision since, because of Gn ii 7, there is no formal characteristic by which they could be distinguished from one another into totally different types. The distinction of a religious type of *næfæš*, suggested also by Prof. Dr. Nikolainen (privately) suffers from the same defect: purely formal characteristics are totally lacking, wherefore it would be necessary to seek support in theological conceptions; as an inferior type, the distinction of which is based upon the principle of a generally similar context, it is quite useful and appears often in this treatise.

### THE FIRST CHAPTER

<sup>1</sup> The passages dealing with God and man are treated together to spare space, since even the conception of God as soul seems to be induced *ex analogia hominis* (cf. p. 27).

<sup>1b</sup> To avoid miscomprehensions we still stress that in this treatise the meaning of the word «soul» is not the one given in the dictionaries of the English language, but that of *næfæš* in the OT, if not expressly stated otherwise.

<sup>1c</sup> cf. Ges-K 117 *ll*, and Dt xxii 26.

<sup>2</sup> cf. KHcAT ad loc., further, e.g., Jer xxx 10 and Bab. Talmud Ta'anith 5b; Saalschütz, ZHT VII: 4, p. 20 sq. Most, among them ICC, emend adhering more or less closely to LXX.

<sup>3</sup> Psychological action in the modern sense is used in this study to denote, except the intellectual, emotional and volitional life, even the expressions of animal needs and affects.

<sup>4</sup> Seligson, op.cit. p. 36 (considering the rubric of the paragraph). The statement of S. that in the bodily actions it is the body which acts has, however, no basis in the OT, wherefore she perhaps does not state directly that the body is the subject. A third, some kind of «higher I» in addition to *næfæš* and *bášâr* is, however, purely speculative philosophical construction, which would lead very far from the Biblical world of ideas.

<sup>5</sup> It is very difficult to understand, how «a mysterious potency» could perform such actions; furthermore, according to Seligson, ib., just «in the language» *næfæš* is not the subject of physical actions.

<sup>6</sup> cf. ICC ad loc.: «animating principle», and HkAT, which translates: *næfæš* = «Odem». Another possibility: Schwab, op.cit. p. 19, supposes that

there appears here as also in Gn ix 15.16 the so-called *b<sup>e</sup> essentiae* (= »was alles n. ch. ist«), on which cf. Ges-K 119 *i*.

<sup>7</sup> Similarly ICC and ATD.

<sup>8</sup> cf. HbAT I Reihe 1 col. 436sq., or Saarisalo, Raamatun sanakirja<sup>2</sup>, col. 402.

<sup>9</sup> The passage is difficult, cf. commentaries and Schwab, op.cit. p. 19 sq.; HkAT omits these words.

<sup>10</sup> and Seligson, op.cit. p. 90.

<sup>11</sup> As I have demonstrated in my work »A Philological and Literary Treatise on the OT Divine Names«, the original meaning of the composition *YHWH* <sup>ʿ</sup>*lohîm* was probably »the Lord of gods«. In later times, when the monotheism was well established, the composition may be understood in the sense above, <sup>ʿ</sup>*lohîm* alone meaning »deity, Godship«. The *κείνος ὁ θεός* of the LXX expresses essentially the same.

<sup>12</sup> cf., e.g., Delitzsch, op. cit. p.55, Lichtenstein, Das Wort *npš* p. 106, Grüneisen, Ahnenkultus p. 34 sq., Nikolainen, Ihminen evankeliumien valossa p. 18.

<sup>13</sup> cf. HkAT ad loc.; this commentary, however, tries to combine with this idea the opinion that the »breath of life« became an independent being in man, against which see ICC ad loc. Cf. also Lichtenstein, op.cit. p. 29.

<sup>14</sup> cf. Pedersen, Israel I—II p. 202 sqq.

<sup>15</sup> cf. HbAT ad loc.; that this commentary regards the oppression as a mere compunction of conscience — which is proved incorrect by the latter part of the verse, cf. ICC, also — has no influence upon this matter. Schwab, op.cit. p. 23, translates: »...belastet mit Blut einer Seele«.

<sup>16</sup> cf., e.g., HkAT ad loc. (uses also the plural without even trying to explain the singular of the original text): even Schwab, op. cit. p. 3, only establishes the fact that the word is used in collective sense. In general we must establish that all the earlier students of the subject — with the possible exception of Johnson, see The Vitality of Individual, p. 25 n. 1; his works mentioned there have not been accessible to the present writer — have passed by the use of the word in different numbers without seeing in it any special problem. Cf. the fourth chapter and p. 16 sq.

<sup>17</sup> HkAT: »Menschen«, referring to the former passage.

<sup>18</sup> HbAT: »Leute«.

<sup>19</sup> cf. Seligson, op.cit. p. 39.

<sup>20</sup> cf. Schwab, op.cit. p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> cf., e.g., Yahuda, The Language of the Pentateuch I, p. 149 sq., and HkAT ad loc.; ICC strikes out the words *nəfəš hayyā<sup>h</sup>*, and Becker, Het Begrip nefesj, p. 94, takes the words »als verduidelijkende appositie«. Perhaps it refers to Adam (v. 7)? Obs. all the other passages belong to the Priestly Code (and to the ideologically cognate Ez).

<sup>22</sup> See n. 6.

<sup>23</sup> cf. Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 17sq., 27, who, however, does not pay any attention to the exceptional character of animal souls.

<sup>25</sup> Similarly HkAT ad Gn ix 4; cf., also, ATD *ib.*; moreover, since all the passages mentioned are rather late, the idea might have been borrowed from neighbouring peoples among whom it may have been common (cf., e.g., v. Kremer, SbWA CXX: 3, p. 39 and *passim*). Cf. also Staples, AJSL XLIV p. 175. Lichtenstein's supposition (*op.cit.* p. 25) that *næfæš* originally would have meant just the blood is, accordingly, the very opposite of the actual state of the matter.

<sup>26</sup> cf. HkAT and ICC ad loc.

<sup>28</sup> cf. the note 3.

<sup>29</sup> cf. Seligson, *op.cit.* p. 50. S. makes, however, a mistake when supposing that *napištu* does not mean the parts of body with which it is in connection, but the potency acting in those parts. Though the Akkadian conception of *napištu* may be somewhat different from the Hebrew *næfæš*, the supposition that parts of body are actually called by this name because of the «potency» acting through them may better be in accordance with the actual linguistic usage; cf. p. 70.

<sup>30</sup> ICC: «men of acrid temper», HkAT: «erbitterten Männer».

<sup>31</sup> cf. HkAT and ATD ad loc. HbAT interpretes *næfæš* = «Gaumen, Kehle» on which cf. p. 68; or = «mich» (= Kissane) which can be correct. ICC: «the seat of the appetites and desires» which is too limited in the light of the context.

<sup>32</sup> i.e., throat. This interpretation is in any case more concrete and perceptible than, e.g., that of HkAT which referring to xxix 8 translates: «sinnliche Begierde» (cf. ICC: «appetite»); Becker, *op.cit.* p. 34, also regards the translation «de muil» more suitable in Hab ii 5, cf., however, Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 12 n. 8. ICC ad Hab ii 5 supposes it to quote Isaiah, which is an ingenious conceit, but hardly anything more.

<sup>32b</sup> ICC interprets heart to be = man, but no positive evidence is given, and linguistically, in any case, *leb* is subject.

<sup>33</sup> This interpretation seems to us best, against the supposition of Schwab (*op.cit.* p. 23) a.o. that *næfæš* here would mean blood, on which cf. p. 19 with n. 25; cf. Becker, *op.cit.* p. 47. The matter is not essentially altered even if we read «dying» for «men» in the first part of the verse; cf. ATD ad loc.

<sup>34</sup> Seligson, *op.cit.* p. 30. Cf. Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 23 n. 4.

<sup>34b</sup> which would be in Hebrew: *me'et nafši* or: *minnafši*.

<sup>35</sup> presupposed by Seligson considering her conception of soul, cf. *op.cit.* p. 32sq.

<sup>36</sup> cf. Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 13.



<sup>37</sup> Similarly Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 12; ICC, Kissane, and ATD *ad loc.*; further HkAT referring to lxxviii 18 and Pr xiii 4; HbAT is able to find even here the »original» meaning of *næfæš* = »throat, neck», on which cf. p. 68, and Becker, *op.cit.* p. 121sq.

<sup>38</sup> cf. KHcAT *ad loc.* (»was begehrt deine Seele»), and ICC, which emends according to LXX (perhaps without reason; the *ἐπιθυμεί* of LXX may be a free rendering of MT).

<sup>39</sup> cf. Schwab, *op.cit.* 12, and HkAT: »wenn ihr denn wollt». Accordingly, an emendation is unnecessary (so ICC and Becker, *op.cit.* p. 32, also).

<sup>40</sup> cf. ICC and HkAT *ad loc.*

<sup>41</sup> Similarly Buhl and Kissane *ad loc.*; cf. Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 11sq. who, however, translates more generally: »Gier», as also HkAT, KHcAT referring to v 14, xxix 8.

<sup>42</sup> Similarly Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 27, ICC, and HbAT *ad loc.*

<sup>43</sup> cf. Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 11sq.; similarly ICC, and HbAT *ad loc.* which refers to Eccl vi 7, x 3, and to the Jewish proverb: »The stomach carries the feet».

<sup>44</sup> cf. Schwab *ib.*, and ICC: »a man of great appetite»; similarly Seligson, *op.cit.* p. 66sq, though the connection with the possessed by jinnees in Morocco seems somewhat far-fetched.

<sup>45</sup> cf. HbAT: »das Leben zu fristen»; similarly Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 13. Seligson, *op.cit.* p. 24, interprets the passage more strongly: »restore life . . .», but the context speaks against this.

<sup>46</sup> About this passage there has been much discussion (cf., e.g., Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 20 with n. 2, and Johnson, *op.cit.* p. 11 n. 2), but this interpretation corresponds to the text best such as it is, without emendations; cf. ICC, ATD, and Becker, *op.cit.* p. 6.

<sup>47</sup> (cf. n. 3) HbAT: »Lebende Menschen sogen sie aus» reading »princes» for »prophets»; similarly HkAT and ICC. The emendation (according to LXX) is well grounded, but attaching to our principle mentioned in the Introduction we do not follow it, since the text can be understood even without it quite well.

<sup>48</sup> Similarly HbAT; as a translation it is actually best, since an exact translation would demand a long paraphrase to be easily understood.

<sup>49</sup> The text is perhaps slightly corrupt, cf. HbAT and HkAT *ad loc.*, but necessary this supposition is not, if we suppose the subject of *kāfaf* to be unexpressed.

<sup>50</sup> Similarly Buhl and HkAT.

<sup>51</sup> The word is lacking in LXX, Pesh, and Vulg.

<sup>52</sup> Delitzsch, *op.cit.*: »Seele alles Fleisches ist sein in seiner Seele wesendes Blut» (p. 197) makes this word an attribute, which would be unique in the

OT. Becker, op.cit. p. 11, separates the first cadence as a special unity (until *R<sup>e</sup>b<sup>i</sup>ā<sup>c</sup>*), and translates then: »...zijn bloéd telt voor zijn leven» finding, accordingly, even here *b<sup>e</sup> essentiae*. In such a case, however, *R<sup>e</sup>b<sup>i</sup>ā<sup>c</sup>* would stand for a full stop, which is, as far as I understand, extremely improbable, and the strength of *S<sup>e</sup>goltā<sup>2</sup>* would be lesser than its. Accordingly, the accentuation does not support B.'s interpretation, as he states. Moreover, the first cadence is deprived of its natural meaning; either a copula must be added — as B. quietly does (*hinne<sup>h</sup>* post *kī* or like that) — or the only grammatically possible meaning would be: »For soul is the whole of flesh» or, if we delete *Maqqef*, »for the soul of all is flesh!» After all, it is impossible to say with certainty, whether the suffix refers to the word *dāmó* or to *bāsār*.

<sup>53</sup> cf. Yahuda, op.cit. p. 149, HkAT ad loc., and Seligson, op.cit. p. 44.

## THE SECOND CHAPTER

<sup>1</sup> cf. HbAT ad Am ix 2 (where, however, the presentation is dominated by the evolutionistic principle).

<sup>2</sup> Earlier students (cf., e.g., Schwab, op.cit. p. 4) were compelled to suppose in these cases that *næfæš* is used as a mere equivalent of the personal pronoun or generally *ex analogia hominis*.

<sup>3</sup> cf. Mk xii 27par. This is, also, the link connecting Jesus' word to the quoted OT passage without need to suppose that he used it in a sense essentially different from the original one (as e.g. HbNT does ad loc.). Cf. Nikolainen, Der Auferstehungsglauben II, p. 34sq.

<sup>4</sup> cf. Rüsche, Blut, Leben und Seele, p. 323, 330sqq.; Schwab, op. cit. p.23.

<sup>5</sup> cf. HkAT ad Gn ix 4—6; when considering the matter from this point of view it seems possible that even in Acts xv 20.29, xxi 25 the shedding of human blood might have been originally included in the »blood» beside the eating or drinking of the animal blood, because the source can hardly have been any other than Gn ix 4sqq. (as may be known, in the later Judaism during Christian era the so-called Noachian Law was regarded to concern the heathens also, but not the Sinaitic one); even the Western, purely ethical interpretation is easier to understand, if the ethical moment originally was better represented than in the avoiding of harlotry alone. By the way, even in our days the drinking of *human* blood is regarded more horribly than a »mere» murder.

<sup>6</sup> cf. HkAT ad loc.: man is »der kleine Gott der Welt»; the double expression stresses the importance of the matter; the view of ICC is essentially the same, in spite of polemics, which are due to the artificial distinction between man's state and his power of action. That the »image of God» in man would mean »the physico-ethical character» or the spirituality of the latter

(cf., e.g., Delitzsch, op.cit. p. 46sq.), is a purely philosophical postulate; in the light of Gn ix 6, cf. Jm iii 9, man remained to be the image of God after the fall as well as before it without any limitations or losses. Moreover, according to the Bible man, such as he is, *is* (and not: contains) the image of God.

<sup>7</sup> cf. Delitzsch, op.cit. p. 195sq.

<sup>8</sup> Similarly ICC and HbAT ad loc.

<sup>9</sup> cf. Seligson, op.cit. p. 90, also.

<sup>10</sup> op.cit. p. 125.

<sup>11</sup> cf. Grüneisen, op.cit. p. 46sq. Seligson's objections (op.cit. p. 81) fall short together with her supposition that *næfæš* (*ha*)*hayyāh* would be = *vis vitalis* (cf. p. 68 sq.).

<sup>12</sup> This fact caused much headache to the earlier commentators; the result was either that they supposed *næfæš* to have meant originally a ghost in these cases (or the «soul» of the dead), cf., e.g., KHcAT ad Nm vi 6, being, however, not able to give any grounds for their statement, or they presented a far-fetched parallel (as *npš* = funeral monument) leaving the matter itself without any explanation, cf. ICC ad Nm v 2 (philol. note). (As a matter of fact, the name *npš* for a funeral monument may be a last outcome of the use of this term of all that remains of man after his death, primarily of his corpse; the tombstone was last to keep a man «living» in the remembrance of posterity.) Schwab, op.cit. p. 47sq., is right in holding realistically fast to the fact that *næfæš* clearly means the corpse, but even his supposition that this meaning would have originated from the pronominal use of the word (cf. Becker, op.cit. p. 77sq., also), does not explain the matter satisfactorily, since the conception of the soul always presupposes some kind of life or action (cf. p. 26).

<sup>13</sup> cf. ICC ad loc., and ad v 2.

<sup>14</sup> The passage belongs to those which prove the doctrine of the immortality of the soul to be wrong even in the case that eternal death be supposed to be meant in all the passages where the dying of the soul is mentioned, and immortality limited to concern bodily death, since eternal death does not meet the upright. Consequently, even bodily death is in any case a death of the soul.

<sup>15</sup> cf. Dürr, ZAW XLIII/1925, p. 262sq. (e.g. Gn xlii 21).

<sup>16</sup> cf. HbAT ad loc.

<sup>17</sup> The passage is somewhat vague; HbAT translates: «Leben vernichten»; LXX omit these words.

<sup>18</sup> Similarly HbAT ad loc.; cf. ICC, also.

<sup>20</sup> A detailed commentary is given in KHcAT ad loc.

<sup>21</sup> So already Redslob, ZHT VIII: 2, p. 9sq. His method is admittedly

anything but scientific, but the result may in any case be correct, since ' and ' interchange now and then (cf. Gês-B sub ', 'âfâr = 'efær = epru Amarna, šâ'âh = šâ'âh Gn xxiv 2), and the meaning is excellent; the etymology from šâ'âh proposed by Köhler, TZ II p. 71sq. has the weakness that the (rare) suffix -l has meliorative character, like the Akkadian -innu, with which it is in direct connection in qarsol = qursinnu, beside which a shift in the meaning must be supposed; the proposition of Albright and Baumgartner, TZ II p. 233sq., is not better, the correspondence of a Hebrew l to an Akkadian r not being attested, since šegal can very well be derived from the root šgl (the derivation of the latter from the former has the weakness that the leap from »queen-consort» to »ravis» is rather long); or should we perhaps suppose a contamination of šu'āru with š'l at an early time? (cf., e.g., t<sup>e</sup>hôm, which cannot be a direct loan from Akkadian, either, since the feminine ending is lacking, but has a clear connection with Tiamat). But even this is improbable, since the primary form of š'ól has been \*š'i'āl, as is indicated by the Sam. form šīyyûla = š'ólāh (in phonetic notes to be published in P. Kahle's Cairo Geniza<sup>2</sup>; in Sam. Hebrew i regularly preserves its colour, while ũ is turned into ä).

<sup>22</sup> cf. Barth, Nominalbildung, p. 419sq.

<sup>23</sup> cf. Stade, Bibl. Theol. I p. 183sq., and Beer, D. bibl. Hades p. 16 n.1, who have reached the threshold of this recognition, but have not crossed it; positively Pedersen, op.cit. p. 360sq., and Jantzen, TLz LXXVIII col. 695sq.

<sup>24</sup> cf. Rhode, ZHT X: 4 p. 13, and Dillmann, Handbuch p. 393.

<sup>25</sup> cf. HkAT ad Is xiv 9sq., while Buhl ib., and HbAT ad Ez xxxii 17sq. take the matter more individually and literally, the latter seeking parallels even from the modern Western poetry. The evidence presented by Schwab, op.cit. p. 49sq., for the existence of a real »kingdom of the dead» is accordingly annulled.

<sup>27</sup> cf. HkAT and HbAT ad Ps lxxxviii 11—13.

<sup>28</sup> cf. Schwab, op.cit. p. 50sq.

<sup>29</sup> cf. Saalschütz, ZHT VII: 4 p. 20 sq. with n. 22.

<sup>30</sup> Earlier interpreters, governed by the evolutionistic principle and therefore regarding Ezekiel and Jeremiah as an antithesis of individual religiosity against the earlier collectivism have not observed this difference, but identified man and his soul without further consideration, cf., e.g., HbAT ad Ez xviii 4. Against this opinion cf. the following, and Becker, op.cit. p. 58sq. (»Persoon is hier nog onderscheiden van zijn bezitter»).

<sup>31</sup> cf., e.g., Lippert, Seelencult p. 180.

<sup>32</sup> cf. Köhler, Theologie des AT:s p. 150, who, however, does not use the key he has found. If God is merciful even to the offspring of those that love

him, how not to themselves? The key of the riddle is the great influence of the environment upon those that continually live in it, often generation after generation through the centuries. »Society makes one like itself» (a Finnish proverb) especially in the negative sense (cf. 1 Cor xv 33), and — *m<sup>e</sup>uwwât lo' yâkal litqon* (Eccl i 15).

<sup>33</sup> In the first place the Scandinavian school, cf. especially Mowinckel, *Psalmenstudien* II. Cf. ATD 14, p. 35 sq., also.

<sup>34</sup> cf. Maag, *Text, Wortschatz und Begriffswelt des Buches Amos*, p. 246sqq., and especially ICC ad loc.; similarly HbAT and ATD ad loc.

<sup>35</sup> A proverbial parable is in question (Prof. Lauha's remark, cf. ATD ad loc.); this, however, does not alter the matter in any wise, since Amos has applied the parable here. Cf. HbAT ad loc., also.

<sup>36</sup> That this interpretation (which is in accordance with all the ancient versions) is the correct one (and not, as most recent commentators following the Rabbis suppose — cf., e.g., ICC and HkAT ad loc. —: »... through thee all the families of the earth wish blessing to themselves», i.e., when wishing the greatest possible blessing for themselves they wish such a happiness which was given to Abraham and his posterity) is shown by many stories in Genesis already, e.g. how the LORD blessed Laban on account of Jacob, Potiphar because of Joseph, etc.; such stories are explanations of the text given here. Further cf. ATD ad loc.

<sup>37</sup> cf. especially Kissane ad loc. Even there the interpretation is in some points uncertain, since the text seems to have become somewhat corrupt very early, cf. the commentaries. On the whole question of the resurrection in the OT cf. Nikolainen, *Der Auferstehungsglauben* I, p. 96—147.

### THE THIRD CHAPTER

<sup>1</sup> cf. n. 3 to the first chapter. We stress the word »immediate»; the secondary causes (or causes of the causes) may be due to outward circumstances, also.

<sup>2</sup> cf. ICC ad loc. and Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 15, 20, 72.

<sup>3</sup> viz. that the soul does not appear as the subject of the so-called higher mental or moral actions, including also and especially in this connection his relation to God, cf., e.g., Schwab, *op.cit.* p. 31sqq. The statement that »wo von einem Verlangen der Seele nach Gott die Rede ist (iwwâh Js 26: 8), von einem Erheben der Seele zu Gott. . . wird nefeš gesetzt als Sitz des Begehrens und der einschlägigen Affekte» (p. 32) would have power as evidence only in the case that the subject of man's relation to God would be some mysterious »higher I» lacking all the normal human characteristics — and how could the word »soul» in such a case ever have acquired its modern religious sense?

<sup>4</sup> *op.cit.* p. 32. Even the postulate following thereafter: »Zu beachten ist,

dass bei den meisten der angeführten Stellen *nəfəš* poetisch-emphatisch betont ist, also in einer der des Pronomens angenäherten Bedeutung verstanden wird» is anything but proved. What is »poetisch-emphatische Betonung»?

<sup>5</sup> ICC: »despite»; HbAT: »Leidenschaft».

<sup>6</sup> cf. Delitzsch, op.cit. p. 271 sq., and especially Pedersen, op.cit. p. 142sqq.

<sup>7</sup> e.g. in this case the fulfilment of the blessing did not happen until the history of the people of Israel in the land of Canaan.

<sup>8</sup> cf. v. 29: 'or<sup>e</sup>rā<sup>h</sup>kā 'ārūr ūm<sup>e</sup>bār<sup>a</sup>kā<sup>h</sup>kā bārūk. It implies that whatever the blessed one will say or do, the blessing one will consent, otherwise even he himself will be 'ārūr.

<sup>9</sup> cf. ICC ad loc., and HkAT ad v. 2: the blessing was to be given on the day of death, of which Isaac, however, was unaware, as the text states.

<sup>10</sup> The state of the blessing soul at the moment of blessing belonged to this, also, except that it had influence on the contents of the blessing; therefore there is nothing surprising in that Isaac took a delicate meal before it (as HkAT states ad loc.); cf. ICC and Puukko ad loc.

<sup>11</sup> cf. ICC ad loc.

<sup>12</sup> e.g. Schwab, op.cit. p. 30sq., Dürr, op.cit. p. 269.

<sup>13</sup> cf. HbAT I Reihe 16, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Further passages like these see Schwab ib. He denies their power as evidence when trying to distinguish *nəfəš*, *rū<sup>h</sup>*, and *leb* from one another, but must establish, that even his explanation suits only »fast alle»; moreover, his list is incomplete, as is seen above. All of his errors seem, however, to come from one and the same source, viz., that even for him the soul in its proper meaning is an »sinnerlicher Prinzip» (p. 32), and not the being as a whole.

<sup>15</sup> So Briggs, Schwab, Lichtenstein, etc.

<sup>16</sup> cf. n. 3 to the first chapter.

<sup>17</sup> cf. Schwab, op.cit. p. 27.

<sup>18</sup> cf. ICC and HbAT ad loc. (refers to x 3, also), and Schwab, op. cit. p. 27.

<sup>19</sup> cf. p. 81 n. 44.

<sup>20</sup> Similarly ICC and HbAT.

<sup>21</sup> So Becker, op.cit. p. 31; when compelled to send Israel away after many years of exploitation a vacuum was created in its soul, which it now desired to fill again. The other alternative is represented by HbAT ad loc., a.o.

<sup>22</sup> cf. Schwab, op.cit. p. 13sq. Dürr, op.cit. p. 266, sees even here the meaning »neck, throat» which, however, here means going farther away from the primary meaning than the interpretation proposed here, since fear only secondarily can appear as a distress in the throat, and in the light of the context no concrete strangling can be in question.

<sup>23</sup> cf. Johnson, op.cit. p. 19; similarly HbAT ad loc. The other alternative: »as free persons».

<sup>24</sup> So Schwab, op.cit. p. 11sq.

<sup>25</sup> Seligson, op.cit. p. 36.

<sup>26</sup> We call attention to S.'s words: »*In the language . . .*» We need not go farther than the *first* chapter of the Bible to prove her statement wrong: v. 20: . . . *yīšr<sup>e</sup>šû hammayim šæræš næfæš hayyâ<sup>h</sup> . . .*, v. 21: . . . *kâl-næfæš hahayyâ<sup>h</sup> hâromæšæt . . .* Where is here mentioned the »body that moved»? On the contrary, just *næfæš* stands as the subject of creeping and crawling.

<sup>27</sup> cf. Schwab, op.cit. p. 3.

<sup>28</sup> cf. HkAT: »Leben» which, however, is impersonal.

<sup>29</sup> cf. p. 59.

<sup>30</sup> cf. Johnson, op.cit. p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> Similarly HbAT; cf. Schwab, op.cit. p. 11 n. 3, also.

<sup>32</sup> against Seligson, cf. p. 45 with n. 26.

<sup>33</sup> cf. ICC ad xxx 2: »subjects himself to some pledge of abstinence».

<sup>34</sup> cf. Schwab and Dürr (cf. n. 3).

<sup>35</sup> Schwab's objection (op.cit. p. 33) that »die genannte Zusammensetzung ist ein archaischer, erstarrter Ausdruck, aus dem die ursprüngliche Bedeutung der beiden Bestandteile *nefš* und *lēb* nicht mehr mit Sicherheit herauszustellen ist» has a *contradictio in adiecto*. If the expression is archaistic, the original meaning of the word *næfæš* appears in it with greater probability than in later connections. As a matter of fact, the sentence in question seems to be so-called »Steigerungsformel», where the preceding conception is included in the following one.

<sup>36</sup> as supposed by Schwab, op.cit. p. 30.

<sup>37</sup> ICC translates: »desire» (= HbAT: »Begierde») which is materially the same.

<sup>38</sup> This is supported by the context in Jer xv 9, where the corresponding verbal expression appears, cf. Ges-B *sub vocibus*, also. Otherwise Schwab, op.cit. p. 20, etc.

<sup>39</sup> cf. Seligson, op.cit. p. 39, HkAT ad loc., etc.

<sup>40</sup> cf. Stade, op.cit. I p. 184sq., Schwab, op.cit. p. 49, and Pedersen, op.cit. p. 388sq.

<sup>41</sup> HkAT ad 1 K xvii 21–22 translates accordingly: »Leben», similarly ATD ad Gn xxxv 18. ICC ad 1 K xvii 21: *npš* is the aura enveloping the person.

<sup>42</sup> cf. Johnson, op.cit. p. 13sq.; even Staples, op.cit. p. 150, who regards it possible that »the wording may be a circumlocution for the *nephesh* dying, as it does in Num. 23: 10».

<sup>43</sup> cf. HbAT and HkAT ad loc.

<sup>44</sup> cf., however, HkAT ad loc.

<sup>45</sup> cf. HbAT ad li 46.

<sup>46</sup> Otherwise HkAT ad loc. (*næfæš* = blood), cf. ATD, also.

<sup>47</sup> *'ādām* is here collective, thus denoting man as species or the whole mankind (cf. Ugaritic, where Gordon gives for *adm* only this meaning); cf. Kissane ad loc.

<sup>48</sup> Similarly HbAT ad loc.; cf. ATD ad loc., and Stade, op.cit. II p. 119sq.; also Nikolainen, *Der Auferstehungsglauben* I p. 124.

<sup>49</sup> cf. Pedersen, op.cit. p. 186sqq.

<sup>50</sup> *pæ<sup>h</sup>* = speech is common in later Hebrew, see the dictionaries.

<sup>51</sup> Similarly HbAT ad loc.; otherwise Kissane; ICC regards v. 16 as an interpolation.

<sup>52</sup> cf. HbAT ad loc.; »falsehood» may be magical in character, cf. ICC ad loc.

<sup>53</sup> cf. Schwab, op.cit. p. 38sqq., who, however, owing to his general view interprets the *næfæš* itself in a more »profane» way.

#### THE FOURTH CHAPTER

<sup>1</sup> This fact seems to support the opinion that the Psalter as a whole is relatively old.

<sup>2</sup> cf., e.g., ATD 14, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> cf., e.g., Pedersen, op.cit. III—IV p. 215sqq.; also ICC ad loc.

<sup>4</sup> cf. Pedersen, op.cit. I—II, p. 69: »Til Mandens Sjæl hører hans Udseende, hans Stemme, hans Huds mere eller mindre behaarede Karakter, hans Lugt. Og dertil kommer hans Maade at handle paa, alt hvad han har gjort, *alt som hører med til ham* (italics by me). Alt dette tilsammen udgør hans Sjæl».

<sup>5</sup> A difficult passage to the earlier commentators; cf., e.g., Buhl ad loc.; ICC emends, even Schwab lets the passage without discussion from this point of view, as also Johnson and Seligson.

<sup>6</sup> cf. p. 72.

<sup>7</sup> cf. Johnson, op.cit. p. 23, especially n. 2.

<sup>8</sup> cf. Seligson, op.cit. p. 47sqq.

#### THE FIFTH CHAPTER

<sup>1</sup> ZHT VII: 3, p. 29sq.

<sup>2</sup> The verb is intransitive; cf. Arab. *ġā'a* »to starve», etc.

<sup>3</sup> op.cit. p. 26sqq.

<sup>4</sup> op.cit. p. 19sqq.

<sup>5</sup> op.cit. p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> op.cit. p. 11.



<sup>7</sup> op.cit. p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> op.cit. p. 30.

<sup>9</sup> op.cit. p. 57.

<sup>10</sup> L'emploi métaphorique des noms de parties du corps, p. 92.

<sup>11</sup> op.cit. p. 262—269.

<sup>12</sup> ZAW LIII, p. 291sq.

<sup>13</sup> op.cit. p. 311sqq.

<sup>14</sup> op.cit. p. 9.

<sup>15</sup> op.cit. p. 340.

<sup>16</sup> op.cit. p. 9sqq.

<sup>17</sup> op.cit. p. 11.

<sup>18</sup> op.cit. p. 22.

<sup>19</sup> CGI (= Comprehensive Glossary), *sub voce*. (This and the following references until number 23 included are Seligson's.)

<sup>20</sup> AEDH (= Assyrisch-Englisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch), *sub voce*.

<sup>21</sup> AH (= Assyrisches Handwörterbuch), *sub voce*.

<sup>22</sup> ChAG (= Chrestomathia arabica meridionalis epigraphica edita et glossario instructa), *sub voce*.

<sup>23</sup> AEL (= E. W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon), *sub voce*.

<sup>24</sup> op.cit. p. 22sq.

<sup>25</sup> An exact definition of this conception is not given. According to the statement p. 23, it is to be conceived as material, which added to the conception of »mysterious potency» gives a kind of »fluidum» as the result.

<sup>26</sup> VT IV p. 98sqq.

<sup>27</sup> *sic* Widengren and Mullo-Weir in JRAS (for *šū-uq-qi*, according to Prof. Salonen).

<sup>28</sup> according to Bezold, Bab. -Ass. Glossar.

<sup>29</sup> according to Gordon, UHB III.

<sup>30</sup> according to Belot, Vocabulaire Arabe-Française, and Hava, Arabic-English Dictionary.

<sup>31</sup> cf. Brockelmann, Grundriss I p. 337.

<sup>32</sup> cf. *ib.*

<sup>33</sup> See Kraus, Texte zur babylonischen Physiognomatik no. 50 l. 18; Denefeld, Babylonisch-Assyrische Geburts-Omina, p. 117 l. 14 (= K 216 R. 14), and p. 129 l. 14 (= K 3697 and K 4124, l. 14), further Labat, Traité akkadien. . . , pl. XIV l. 62, XIX—XX l. 30—34, XXIX l. 7. XLV l. 8 (= AO 6681, AO 6679, Sm 232, AO 6678, resp.) To these works my attention was called by my friend Mr. Jussi Aro, Ph. D.

<sup>34</sup> op.cit. p. 20.

<sup>35</sup> op.cit. p. 22.

<sup>36</sup> op.cit. p. 11 with n. 2.

<sup>37</sup> op.cit. I—II p. 67.

<sup>38</sup> »Sjæl er Mennesket helt og holdent».

<sup>38b</sup> In this connection it must be remarked that the word »primary» should be understood rather in the sense of »central» than of »original», since the study is based almost exclusively upon OT material. To assure that the meaning is original a thorough investigation of the material of all the Semitic languages would be needed.

<sup>39</sup> The situation of *napištu* is not always determinable with certainty, and it may appear even side by side with *kišādu*, with apparently different meaning (ears, face or like that); cf. Seligson, op. cit. p. 48sq. In AO 6681 l. 62 (cf. n. 33) pl. and sg. appear side by side; Labat translates pl. with »gorge», sg. with »gosier».

<sup>40</sup> cf. the prec. note.

<sup>41</sup> op.cit. p. 50.

<sup>42</sup> cf. Pedersen, op.cit. I—II p. 125sq. The phrase *šim nafšo b<sup>e</sup>kappō* (Jdg xii 3 etc., cf. Ps cxix 109) illustrates this shift. Development to the opposite direction supposed by Lichtenstein (op. cit. p. 36 sq.) is psychologically difficult to understand.

<sup>43</sup> The survey is based, beside the OT, mainly upon Pedersen, op.cit. II; cf. also Smith, Lectures on the Religion of Semites.

<sup>44</sup> cf., except OT, the introduction of Hammurabi's law, etc.

<sup>45</sup> cf., e.g., Gadd, Ideas of Divine Rule p. 33sq.

<sup>46</sup> cf., e.g., Pedersen, op.cit. I—II p. 205sq., and the general tendency in the OT to describe all kinds of communities etc. as descending from one progenitor.

<sup>47</sup> cf. Pedersen ib. for details.

<sup>48</sup> cf. Pedersen, op.cit. I—II p. 344.

<sup>49</sup> cf. Pedersen, op.cit. I—II p. 341sq.

<sup>50</sup> cf. HbAT, Amos, Einleitung.

<sup>51</sup> This appears from the wording and context, cf. ICC and ATD ad loc., otherwise HbAT, which connects it with the passages of Isaiah mentioned below.

<sup>52</sup> cf. Delitzsch, op.cit. p. 411.

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LXX: see Septuaginta.

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Pesh = Biblia sacra juxta versionem simplicem quae dicitur Pschitta. Beryti  
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Septuaginta id est Vetus Testamentum Graece iuxta LXX interpretes edidit  
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- BUHL, Fr., Jesaja. Kjøbenhavn 1894.
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- HbNT = Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, hrsg. v. G. Bornkamm.  
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III: 1: Das Buch Jesaja v. B. Duhm. Göttingen 1892.

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Abbreviations not explained above:

JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.

JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.

NT = New Testament.

OT = Old Testament.

par = and the parallel passages (in the other gospels).

SbWA = Sitzungsberichte Wiener Akademie, Phil.-hist. Classe.

TLz = Theologische Literaturzeitung.

VT = Vetus Testamentum.

ZAW = Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.

ZHT = Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie.

ZRps = Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie.

The abbreviations of the names of Biblical books will be explained by the following indexes. Other abbreviations may be intelligible without explanation.

## THE APPEARANCE OF THE WORD *NÆFÆŠ* IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

divided into various classes and types described above.

(Explanation of the symbols: I—IV refer to the various classes described in the first chapter, a-c to their sub-divisions; ^ = living; ˇ = dying; > = active; < = passive; ' = individual; ( = potentially collective; ° = collective; .. = higher mental or moral action; \* = religious. The lack of any of the symbols Ia^>' or their respective counterparts shows that the classification is uncertain.)

Gn i 20 IIb<sup>°</sup> i 21 IIb<sup>°</sup> i 24 IIb<sup>°</sup> i 30 Ib<sup>°</sup> ii 7 IIa^( ii 19 IIb<sup>°</sup> ix 4 IIIa( ix 5a IIa<' ix 5b Ia<' ix 10 IIb<sup>°</sup> ix 12 IIb<sup>°</sup> ix 15 IIb<sup>°</sup> ix 16 IIb<sup>°</sup> xii 5 IIa<° xii 13 Ia'' xiv 21 IIa° xvii 14 IIa<ˇ( xix 17 Ia<' xix 19 IIa<ˇ( xix 20 IIa^( xxiii 8 IIIb>° xxvii 4 Ia>' xxvii 19 Ia>' xxvii 25 Ia>' xxvii 31 Ia>' xxxii 31 IIa<' xxxiv 3 IIIb>' xxxiv 8 IIIb>' xxxv 18 Ia'' xxxvi 6 IIa<' xxxvii 21 Ia'' xlii 21 IIIb<' xlv 30a Ia<' xlv 30b Ia>' xlvi 15 IIa° xlvi 18 IIa° xlvi 22 IIa° xlvi 25 IIa° xlvi 26ab IIa° xlvi 27ab IIa° xlix 6 IIIb>..

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The distribution of the appearance in the various parts and books of the OT is, accordingly:

a) the Five Books of Moses 205 times: Gn 43, Ex 17, Lv 60, Nm 50, Dt 35 times.

b) the Former Prophets 115 times: Josh 16, Judg 10, 1 S 34, 2S 17, 1 K 23, 2K 15 times.

c) the Latter Prophets 157 times: Is 34, Jer 62, Ez 42, the Twelve Prophets 19 (Hos 2, Am 3, Jon 5, Mic 3, Hab 3, Hag 1, Zech 2) times.

d) the Hagiographs 277 times: Ps 144, Job 35, Pr 56, the Five Scrolls 33 (Ruth 1, SS 7, Eecl 7, Lam 12, Esth 6), 1 Ch 5, 2 Ch 4 times.

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