E. CIRCULATION OF PROPERTY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

In addition to providing the basis of subsistence, property also has functions in creating and reproducing social relations.[1] In a pastoral society the domestic animals are principally means which are manipulated in a number of ways to facilitate social intercourse. In Chapter D, the role of domestic animals was considered from the viewpoint of subsistence and economy. Here I shall analyze the role of economic transactions within the society and with groups outside from the perspective of social relations.

The analysis of these exchange patterns has been a major subject of economic anthropology[2], and it has been possible to analyze the interdependence of the mode of economy and the socio-political structure of the society.[3]

There is evidence to support the view that the role of property in communal Gemeinschaft-type societies is sometimes radically different from that in societies fully engaged in a monetary economy (Bradby 1975).[4]

Although the Parakuyo society is to quite a large extent involved in a nation-wide and also global economic system, nevertheless it is ideologically a subsistence economy where values are measured in numbers of domestic animals rather than in terms of money. Furthermore, there is a lively awareness of the value of a gift and its implications.[5] The study of exchange patterns in various societies has yielded extremely interesting results.[6] What seems to be a common result of these studies is that there can be found a set of 'ground rules', or rules of exchange, underlying various forms of material transactions.[7]

There are a number of factors influencing the forms and directions of material transactions. For Lévi-Strauss (1969a:75; 1874a:113), they are psychological in kind[8] and based on the structure of human perception. Yet, at the same time, they are culturally constituted.

27. INTRASOCIETAL CIRCULATION

There are several occasions where transfer of property (normally livestock) occurs in Parakuyo society. As it was made clear above in the theoretical section, the transfer of property is generally a two-directional operation, so that a material transfer is balanced by a material or non-material counter-transfer. It is important to note that material and social exchange are interlocked in such a way that material transfers can be utilized for social goals and vice versa. This is exemplified in the well known institutions of kula, potlatch, and Big-Man fiests, where quantities of property are distributed, or even destroyed, in order to gain prestige (Rubel & Rosman 1978; Gregory 1980).

In Parakuyo society accumulation of wealth is not structurally determined, and therefore the development of economic stratification is constrained. Material transfers are symmetric rather than asymmetric in form. Using other concepts, the forms of socio-economic exchange are essentially egalitarian, and no structural class formation within the society can be identified (Galaty 1981:70-71).

Marriage transactions

Economically and socially the most significant transactions in Parakuyo society are those connected with marriage. Of the four possible types of marriage transactions - bridewealth, dowry, dower and groomwealth[9] - bridewealth is virtually the only type that has been applied. Because the amount of bridewealth among Parakuyo has been extremely large, and because there are contradictory trends within the society affecting the amount of bridewealth, I shall treat this subject in some detail. However, this is no place for any kind of generalization.

The proposition that a high bridewealth index is associated with a patrilineal descent system and virilocal residence combined with an emphasis on polygyny, is well substantiated by African ethnographic

evidence (Goody 1973). On the other hand, bridewealth is usually absent or non-significant in matrilineal and bilateral societies (Comaroff 1980b:16). As to the areal distribution of bridewealth and dowry, the former predominates in Africa, while the latter is virtually absent in Africa and occurs primarily in Europe and Asia (Goody 1973:22-23).[10]

Bridewealth and dowry are by no means substitutes for one another. In fact, both forms of prestation can occur together, although one is predominant. Taking the example of Parakuyo, in legal terms, bridewealth is talked about as the sole form of marriage prestations. Yet the bride may receive several cattle from her father as a dowry in case her groom is incapable of providing enough cattle for the new home.[11] It is also a common practice that the bride prepares and takes a set of new calebashes and other household utensils with her to the new home. Yet it is only bridewealth which is legally talked about as a form of marriage prestation.

Goody has explained the very different functions of bridewealth and dowry by pointing out that while the former involves transfer of property from the groom's lineage to that of the bride, thus being a form of exchange, the latter is an act of inheritance where female inheritance rights are recognized. Or, greatly exaggerating the distinction, in bridewealth the woman is paid for and in dowry she is paid off (Goody 1973:47).

Comaroff has pointed out that the jural approach has obscured significant socio-cultural variations in the constitution of marriage, while in actual fact many societies, such as the Tshidi, emphasize the perpetuation of ambiguity in marital relations rather than its elimination (Comaroff 1980a:19, 170). Very broad comparisons may similarly hide significant interrelations within single societies as the results of the marriage transactions in sixty African societies show (Ogbu 1978). The only significant common nominator in these societies, as Ogbu concludes, is that the primary function of bridewealth transactions is the legitimation of marriage (1978:258). However, comparisons of bridewealth transactions between societies with structural and cultural similarities are useful.

To start with, I would like to pose the question of the size of bridewealth compared with the average amount of property within a society. Is it true, as Goody suggests, that bridewealth transactions fluctuate in relation to the cattle population, so that increase of livestock means higher bridewealth prestations (Goody 1973:12)? Or is the other view correct, as some cases seem to suggest, that in societies where cattle are of little economic significance the bridewealth tends to be high, and vice versa (Jacobs 1965a:149, Turton 1980a:77)?

In short historical perspective it would seem that the suggestion of Goody would hold true in Parakuyo society. The ethnographic records show, that while in the late 1950s bridewealth consisted of about 40 heifers[12], some honey, blankets and occasional services of the groom (Beidelman 1960:275), during my field period in 1975-76 it was told not to be rare to transfer 50-60 heifers and additional gifts, and records of Rigby give figures of up to 80 cattle and Tshs 10.000 together with smaller gifts (1980:45). From records of the cattle population it can be concluded that also the amount of cattle has increased at the same time as bridewealth has achieved formidable dimensions.

However, to explain the growth of bridewealth by the increase of cattle is too simplistic. It sounds puzzling that in societies with closely related cultural backgrounds the size of bridewealth is dramatically lower. The Pastoral Maasai, who are said to be solely dependent on livestock (Jacobs 1965c:108-10), had a bridewealth of four cattle (an ideal symbolic number), one sheep and some honey in the 1960s. In 1983 I was told in Naperera that at least in the Kisongo Maasai area the number of bridewealth cattle had increased from this ideal number to at least 20 or more and that the increasing trend continued. The Samburu transferred six to eight heads of large stock at the time of being married and individual animals later (Spencer 1965:69-70). In regard to cattle population per capita the Samburu and Pastoral Maasai are very similar to the Parakuyo; yet the amount of bridewealth is drastically different.

In addition to the Pastoral Maasai and Samburu, also the pastoral Herero of South West Africa count among societies with substantial cattle

holdings and minimal bridewealth payments. It is ideally one ox, one heifer and four sheep for women not previously married, but the sheep are often substituted by one additional heifer (Gibson 1968:632).

In contrast to the above, there are a number of societies with high bridewealth and small livestock holdings. The Mursi of Southwestern Ethiopia (Turton 1980a:70-72), the Nuer of Sudan (Evans-Pritchard 1940), and the Jie and Turkana of Kenya (Gulliver 1958) are examples of societies with very high bridewealth[13], although the man/cattle ratio is low and varies between 1:1 to 1:4 (Jacobs 1965a:149).

There is ethnographic evidence to prove that bridewealth has variant functions in different societies. There are indications that in societies with a low cattle population and high bridewealth, the transactions serve for more than in societies with minimal bridewealth. Among the Mursi, for example, the bridewealth transactions not only compensate the loss of a girl; they also reinforce social relations within the recipient kin, because the bride's father, although he receives all the cattle, has to distribute the majority of the cattle among his kin (Turton 1980a:70-75). Correspondingly, a man intending to marry may expect assistance from his kin in collecting the bridewealth. The network of transactions is so wide, that "almost all transactions in cattle have, directly or indirectly, to do with bridewealth, this being by far the most significant economic transaction in which any Mursi ever engages" (Turton 1980a:73).

Compared with this, the function of bridewealth among the Pastoral Maasai, Samburu, and Herero is essentially symbolic, rather a token than an economically significant transaction (Gibson 1968:637-39). In these societies, bridewealth is not a means of competing for wives, although the scarcity of eligible women in polygynous societies is a fact.

Although bridewealth among the Parakuyo has raised enormously, I do not see that it would have yet taken a structurally different form from that of the Pastoral Maasai, with whom they are closely related. There are no rules of distribution of bridewealth, and therefore the distribu-

tion of these cattle cannot serve as a 'definition of kin' (Turton 1980a). The bride's father may keep virtually all the cattle if he wishes, and often he recirculates them for marrying a new wife. But signs pointing to the Mursi-type redistribution of the received cattle among the close kin are visible.[14]

How are these great differences then to be explained? We have to keep in mind, first of all, that high bridewealth among the Parakuyo is quite a recent phenomenon, and, as the oral records maintain, a few decades earlier it was quite comparable with that of the Pastoral Maasai. As late as in the 1960s a practice of four heifers was still found, and as a result of pressure it was increased to eight heifers, which is also a symbolically even number.[15] The increase of bridewealth is apparently related to a shortage of eligible girls. The competition for girls is said to have become more tense than it used to be, although some competition must have always occurred.

The increase of bridewealth may be seen as an indication of conflicting interests and trends. The ideal of many elders is to construct kraals with houses on both gate posts, and therefore marry several wives. It used to be possible to fulfil this ideal for a majority of men, but it required the postponement of first marriage of men to the average age of over 30 years, and also marrying from other ethnic groups. The competition for girls was principally between members of one generation, and the young men were excluded from the scene. During the times of insecurity and frequent cattle raiding it was necessary for the safety of the society to keep the warriors in good bodily shape, ready for defence, and free from marital duties. When the dangerous and prestigious raids have become virtually impossible, the role of warriors has radically changed. Because the maintenance of security is no more as essential as before, the warriors have begun to marry only a few years after having been recruited into the warrior age-grade.[16] This means intensified competition for girls and it has changed into competition between generations. In this combat, if on equal terms in competition, the youngsters would probably surpass the elders, particularly if the girls would have the power to decide. The most powerful weapon the elders have at hand is property. By offering a bridewealth big enough

to beat the young competitors, the elders still often emerge as winners. An aftermath of a girl's initiation ritual is regularly the competition of suitors, and a man with the best offer in terms of bridewealth cattle has a strong hold on the girl, when the decision is made.

How have the Pastoral Maasai and Samburu then avoided the inflation of bridewealth? They have the same comparatively safe life situation as the Parakuyo. Frustrated warriors tend to marry earlier, and in addition, the absence of deaths in war and fighting makes the male/female ratio still worse for men. The Samburu, at least, have maintained a strong gerontocratic control, where young men are suppressed by the elders through periodic **ilmugit** rituals and kept unmarried for a longer period than among the Parakuyo. Also the fathers tend to recruit their sons into an age-set three sets below, and not into the next-but-one set below as among the Parakuyo. This means delayed recruitment and also a higher age for the first marriage (Spencer 1976:156-57, 165).

The low bridewealth of the Pastoral Maasai meets apparently similar demands for raising as in other societies reviewed. That it has been low until recently shows the rigour of the society in refraining from increases. The bridewealth at least in the Kisongo Maasai area has already multiplied in recent years, and logically it should continue to do so as long as polygyny is a preferred form of marriage and competition for girls is solved by means of bridewealth.

Transactions in case of divorce

It is in accordance with the dynamic character of Parakuyo society that the divorce rate is exceptionally low. Usually it is said that divorce does not exist at all, but in practice there are cases where a wife has left her husband. These cases, however, are very few, and I did not come across any.[17] On the other hand, no cases were reported where a husband would have divorced his wife.

A case of divorce is not a matter of the husband and wife and their kinsfolk only. It concerns the whole of society, and a big meeting

(enkiguena) chaired by the headman (olaiguenani) of the husband's age-set is assembled to settle the issue. Childlessness is a misfortune, but it is not a reason to divorce a wife; it is not at least a 'custom' to do so. Divorce cases have usually been initiated by the wives, either because of dissatisfaction with life with her husband, or because of a new lover.[18]

Divorce concerns also the transfer of bridewealth, where the following rough rules are followed: If the wife is childless, all the bridewealth has to be returned to the husband. In case she has given birth to one or two children, more than half of the bridewealth is returned. If she has given birth to four or more children, none of the bridewealth is returned. The children will stay with the father irrespective of their age. Even if the wife is pregnant at the moment of divorce, the child will belong to the father.

The order of returning bridewealth is not necessarily reverse to the initial transfer. Although the bride's father had distributed the received heifers among his kin, in case of his daughter's divorce he is supposed to return the bridewealth himself without the assistance of his kins-people. But if the divorce takes place soon after marrying and the heifers distributed to the kin are still available, the wife's father may ask them to return what they had received.

It may also happen, that if the wife's father does not have the cattle to return, he may ask the husband to wait until the divorced wife will marry again, and the cattle thus received will pass directly to her former husband.

Although the husband, whose wife is seeking divorce, had collected the bridewealth partly from his kin, in case of divorce he is not expected to distribute the received cattle to them. This is well understandable, because he is likely to use them to marry a wife instead of the divorced one.

There may be several reasons for the low divorce rate. It could be argued that when bridewealth is considerably high, it stabilizes marriages.

This need not necessarily be true, because also the Pastoral Maasai with low bridewealth have a low divorce rate (Jacobs 1970). But high bridewealth may still have an effect of reinforcing marriage, because material transactions involved in marrying and divorcing are considerable and troublesome to accomplish. A further reason for a low divorce rate is said to be the practice of clitoridectomy. The women are 'tamed' prior to marriage, so that they are not tempted into illegitimate love affairs, as is said to happen in the neighbouring societies which do not practise clitoridectomy.[19]

Probably the most important factor in preventing divorces is the strong social control of the society with heavy moral and economic sanctions. The society does not readily accept divorce, and by no means does it allow the divorced wife to be married to an **olmeeki**, a non-Maasai. Therefore, the sanctions of the society will reach the divorced wife also in her new marriage, because she will be a member of the same society as before.

The function of bridewealth

To sum up, the character of bridewealth among the Pastoral Maasai, Samburu, and Parakuyo is essentially the same, although its size varies enormously. It is a symbolic legitimation of marriage regardless of the number of cattle given. Although the size of bridewealth among the Parakuyo is numerically close to that of the Mursi and Nuer, it is still functionally closer to Pastoral Maasai usage. The Parakuyo do not utilize bridewealth in regulating internal kin relations through its further redistribution in an orderly way. In face of the rapid rise of bridewealth, the Parakuyo have been forced to ask the help of kin in acquiring a sufficient amount of cattle for marriage, and the receiver is often persuaded to redistribute some of the heifers to close male kin. There are no rules for it, however.

That the ideal of bridewealth among the Parakuyo is still far less than the actual practice is seen in the corporal decision made in 1979 to lower the maximum bridewealth to 22 heifers, which in itself is a

compromise between opposing trends, but apparently corresponds to the present socio-economic situation.

There is still additional evidence to support the view that high bridewealth is not institutionally constituted. There is a possibility that a man with difficulties in obtaining a sufficient number of cattle for bridewealth, may be totally exempted from it or the required amount is reduced, by agreeing to work in the kraal of the bride's father for some time. Paying bridewealth through service is, however, economically disdained, and it is the last resort after attempts to pay in cattle have failed.[20]

If there is competition for girls and if it is decided to use the economic veapon in bargaining, it will be difficult to reduce the bridewealth to the merely symbolic level. On the other hand, as it has been pointed out, a substantial bridewealth is an effective means of distributing wealth evenly within the society (Turton 1980a:82; Goody 1973:18, 47) and therefore it reduces socio-economic stratification.[21] The competition for girls and increased bridewealth has also had the effect that not few men have acquired wives from other acceptable groups (i.e. those practising clitoridectomy), with a much reduced bridewealth, thus alleviating competition. The development of bridewealth rates also shows that the Parakuyo society has been able to adapt quickly to the new situation, and there are signs that the continued rise in bridewealth may change its function so that it will be used also for reinforcing kin relations through the practice of redistribution of received bridewealth as well as through collective responsibility in collecting bridewealth. These modifications do not, however, endanger the existing structures of the society, because marriage payments are reciprocal transactions within the society itself. The possibility of marrying from the neighbouring Bantu groups with reduced bridewealth is reduced by the prohibition of marrying from groups which do not practise clitoridectomy.

Viewed on a higher theoretical (paradigmatic) level, the marriage transactions can be taken as a realization of the universal principle of reciprocity, where, in the last resort, women are exchanged for women.

On the phenomenological level it appears as if women were exchanged for cattle and other commodities. With respect to the wider implications of bridewealth, e.g. its recirculation within the society, it can be seen that bridewealth is a medium of exchange, where the prime object of exchange is the woman, not goods or animals.[22] It is essential for the continuity of the society to exchange women over kin lines. The Parakuyo do not practise direct sister exchange, neither do they have chain structures of the wife giver/wife taker type or any other prescribed form of circulation of women[23] except the prohibition of sub-clan endogamous marriages. In these conditions the bridewealth is transferred, not as an equalizer of the value of the bride, but as a token, which, as Comaroff (1980b:29) puts it, "represents a **symbolic** currency by means of which the (indirect) exchange of women may be ordered and the principle of reciprocity realized" (my emphasis).

Bridewealth can be economically insignificant, as it used to be among the Pastoral Maasai and Herero, or more substantial as with the Mursi and Parakuyo, but it is still a token, although in some societies it may also have functions of reinforcing kin relations. Irrespective of surface variations, marriage exchanges are realizations of the paradigmatic principle of reciprocity, which is one of the basic properties of human existence.

Other prestations

In addition to substantial bridewealth, and nominal dowry, the Parakuyo have also a system of accumulating the property of the wife. As the girls do not inherit in a patrilineal society, the bride does not bring property with her from her father's home, except personal belongings, such as clothes, decorations, calebashes etc. It is the duty of the groom to provide her with a herd of cattle immediately after moving to the husband's kraal. The ideal number of cattle given to the bride by her husband is eight, i.e. four doubled. This is the number given of these transfers in discussions, although in practice the number of cattle normally is much higher. In fact it varies according to the developmental phase of the husband's family, his wealth, the characteristics of the bride etc.[24]

The formation of the bride's herd is a ritual activity, which follows formal ritual rules. After the initiation rituals have been completed and the girl has recovered from the operation, she is ready to be taken to her husband. After a substantial amount of bridewealth has been transferred, a large ox (**olkiteng le'ntomono**), provided by the groom, is slaughtered at the bride's kraal to celebrate the departure of the bride, and neighbours are invited to the feast. Thereafter the bride is escorted to her new home in a formal ritual procession. During this journey she is supposed to acquire the bulk of the herd from her husband and his close kin. It takes the following ritual formula.

The bride is expected to move to her new home very slowly and quietly, without saying a word during the whole journey. She is also expected to stop now and then, and every stop signifies her willingness to acquire one more cow into her herd. The ideal number of stops is eight, but it tends to be much higher depending on the size of her husband's herd.[25]

Quiet bargaining is applied also to the modern conditions of transport in hired cars. Whenever a car is available, it is prestigious to hire one. This involves modifications in the procession, but the essential functions are still the same. Instead of frequent stopping of the car en route to the new home, the necessary stops are placed in situations before and after the journey. The bride may stop several times before entering the car, she may refuse leaving it, she may refuse entering the kraal gate and she may stop before the house entrance. After entering the house she may refuse going further. She may refuse sitting on the bed, talking to people, tending the cattle, sweeping the house, milking the cows, eating food, sharing the same blanket with her husband etc.

In order to keep count of the promised cattle, she has prepared a rope, and with each stop she ties a knot in it. Finally the rope may have 30-40 knots, each signifying a cow.

The husband himself is supposed to provide those eight cows, which are customarily prescribed to be given. The morning after the bride's arrival to her new home the husband points out the cows to be entrusted to the new wife with a freshly cut **esiteti** branch (Ficus natalensis),

whereas the wife unties the corresponding number of knots in her rope. But in fact the wife often receives a multiple amount of the prescribed number. A part of these 'extra' cows is provided by the husband himself, but also the kin of the husband normally contributes. The husband's father, mother, brothers, and all of the grown-up male inhabitants of the kraal, whether kinsmen or not, are supposed to provide a beast each. In addition, the husband's possible senior wives and the wives of other males residing in the kraal have to provide a beast each. That all the wives really contribute is secured by the rule, that the wives are not allowed to address one another by the ordinary names. Instead they use names which indicate the nature of donation, like **pabungai** (the giver of a bull), **pantawuo** (the giver of a heifer), **paashe** (the giver of a female calf) etc. It is not only that these names in addressing are prestigious, they are the only alternative, and this only ensures that each mature woman in the kraal has contributed a cow.[26]

How many cattle is a new wife actually entitled to acquire for herself? The share of others is more or less fixed, but that of her husband is subject to bargaining, and she is often advised by her kin how to proceed. The husband may be unable to give all the cattle even within a year, and the knots in the rope indicate the balance due. The day all the knots have been untied is a day of celebration and the wife may have anything from eight to 40 cattle in her custody.

How is the wife going to use the cattle which have been entrusted to her care? It has often been claimed that women in a pastoralist society do not have personal possessions. The cattle given to her comprise her 'allotted herd' (Jacobs 1970; Spencer 1965:53), which is in her use, and the produce of which belongs to her and her dependents (Rigby 1980: 63).[27]

The cattle allocated to the wife are still the legal property of her husband. How little this actually means, however, is exemplified by the custom, that the bride's father, brother, or any of their friends may come and ask one or more cows allotted to her without necessarily having to return them.[28] She cannot, of course, give them without discussing first with her husband, but informal persuasion is often effec-

tive, and the wife may in fact give out cattle allocated to her.

The court cases where a Parakuyo is accused of a severe offence, such as homicide, have become occasions, where communal responsibility is evoked. They still think that national jurisdiction should not extend within the Parakuyo society, and therefore the cases where the Parakuyo only are involved should be 'bought off' from the court by bribing the officials. Therefore, if the wife's relatives ask for cattle from her allotted herd in order to collect money enough for bribing the officials, her husband cannot refuse from giving.[29]

After receiving this initial herd there is a considerably long period before she can expect more cattle. I have information of only one institutionally fixed situation where she is entitled to receive a significant number of cattle. It is the **erikoto o'lkerra** ritual[30], which takes place immediately prior to her eldest child's initiation. This ritual has several characteristics common with 'marriage rituals', and when translated into Swahili they use the term **ndoa** (marrying). With a similar ritual method as described above, she is supposed to acquire eight cattle and perhaps one goat. The wife who, for ritual purposes, has been returned to her maternal home, proceeds with frequent stops towards her husband's home, each stop signifying a cow she desires. The number of cattle promised to her is now considerably lower, and probably does not exceed the ideal eight. The ritual itself signifies a status elevation of the mother, but it functions also as an institutionalized means of supplementing her herd, after she has given a number of cattle to her children in various phases of their development.

Although the 'allotted herd' of the wife is not likely to increase for a number of years after marriage, except through natural increase, the mother will get several cattle into her use if she bears children. There is a rule that none of the near relatives are allowed to see the child until they have given a cow each to the child.[31] This group includes the father, the father's father and mother, the mother's father and mother, the mother's brothers, even the father's best friend.

The sex of the animal given by the father has to be that of the child. Only after a week from birth the child is taken out by her mother, and the animal given by the father is ritually pointed to by the mother with an esiteti-branch (Ficus natalensis) and shown to the baby. It is this beast (a bull or heifer) which the child will learn to know to be his in a special sense. The child, particularly the male one, can get additional cattle within a few years. When the male child grows to the age (3-4 years) that he is conscious of his 'property', he can ask for more cattle, and is normally given 10-20 cattle mainly by his father. The mother may advise the child to behave in a way that the father cannot refuse.

Although the cattle, and sometimes sheep and goats, are given to each of the children and they aretheir 'property', they are factually given to the care of the mother. She milks them together with the other animals of her herd as if they were hers.

The animals given to a daughter are in a different position than those given to a son. Those of the former are given to her care, and when she marries, the animals are returned to her father. The animals of the son are his real property, although he is not allowed to decide on their use until he has married and fathered two or three children.[32] He may ask his father to give permission to sell some of his cattle, and eventually use the money for trading for cattle, but still he has to return the money to his father, who may give him some amount for his personal use.

28. INTERSOCIETAL CIRCULATION

Space here does not permit a detailed analysis of intersocietal relations and of the material transactions attached to their maintenance. They are very important, however, and increasing attention has been paid to relations between pastoralists and their neighbours.[33] In spite of claims of their solitary independence, they in fact have always maintained intersocietal relations with agriculturalists and hunters simply because the pure pastoralist economy does not produce all the commodities the society needs. Even the famed pure pastoral diet (Jacobs 1975:407-09) is more and ideal than a fact (Schneider 1979:61-65).

Despite the significant rate of interchange between the Parakuyo and their neighbours, intersocietal circulation is very different from that within the society. The material needs in the present stage of development are rather limited, and therefore the need of cash is limited. The Parakuyo invest in livestock, and whatever they need from outside the society they buy with cash or exchange for livestock products, but not usually for the livestock itself. The principal way of acquiring cash is through selling cattle, goats and sheep in the local monthly auction. Another way of earning cash is through buying cattle inland, as far as the Dodoma area, and selling them on coastal markets. This is particularly the business of warriors, who often are in bad need of cash and cattle to be able to marry and establish a family.

As no extensive analysis of the relations between the Parakuyo and other ethnic groups has been carried out, the following notes are based mainly on general observations and nonsystematized case materials of ethnographic records.

The main items which have to be bought from the general market are the rich decorations of multicoloured beads and wire. Although the initial production costs of plastic beads and spiral wires of aluminium, copper and brass are reasonable, the local prices of these items are

Picture 11. Preparation of women's wire decorations for a ritual. Made of copper, brass or aluminium, these decorations symbolize the Parakuyo women's identity. Without these they do not feel themselves appropriately dressed.

Picture 12. Women have an important past in many rituals. For example, in initiation rituals they dance and sing a number of songs which are in fact prayers to Enkai, the giver of life, fertility and success.

multiplied. For example, a spiral arm wire costed Tsh 800 - 1 000 in 1982, and beads for a girl's belt still more. With these prices the value of a woman's decorations alone was easily over Tsh 10 000, excluding the value of work needed for their preparation. Those who benefit from the sales of these decorations are the government with high import taxes and the traders who bring them from Moshi and Arusha.

For the Parakuyo these are important cultural symbols for communicating ethnic identity, and they seem to be very marked in conditions, where they are a minority among ethnic groups of very different origin. The high prices that they have to pay for the decorations have not prevented them from using them. On the other hand, they are not yet so expensive that they could be used as symbols of communicating social and economic stratification. They are symbols that at the same time combine the Parakuyo and separate them from other ethnic groups.

Lesser amounts of cash are needed for scarce clothing, which is nowadays more commonly than before bought from shops. If it was in the late 1950s that the women generally wore skin garments (Beidelman 1961b:540), they in these days use blue cloth in everyday wear, and decorated skin garments are reserved for rituals and other festivities. Men also buy plain cloth and, if cloth of a favoured colour is not available, they colour it with either red ochre or black dye. Still the need for cash for clothing is considerably low.

Other items to be bought are spears, swords, axes, cooking pots, knives, bicycles, watches, radios, lamps, torches etc., all of which require comparatively little cash compared with the potential invested in livestock. In spite of several attempts of the government to persuade the Parakuyo to settle and build permanent houses, they have not been willing to do so, and the reasons for refusal are quite obvious. The mode of economy is still transhumant[34], not primarily because of drought, but because of very unreliable conditions of cattle disease control, particularly of animal trypanosomiasis distributed by a number of tsetse fly species (Glossina spp.). This is one of the dominant reasons for the low capital investment rate of the pastoralists so far.

The proximity of other ethnic groups has had, from the women's point of view, fortunate consequences. Much of the work which was earlier a duty of the Parakuyo women is done by hired labour. House building, collecting firewood, carrying water, all of them traditionally tasks of women, are done by Bantu neighbours whenever the economic conditions allow it. The services are paid in cash or in milk and meat. This has alleviated considerably the otherwise heavy work load of women.

Another area where a hired work force is used extensively is cultivation. Partly because of government persuasion and partly on their own initiative, many Parakuyo have a piece of land under cultivation, but only a few Parakuyo hoe themselves. This is normally carried out through hiring others specialized in cultivation. The reluctance of cultivating with their own hands derives from the cultural values and the classification of people, where they themselves belong to the group of pastoralists, for whom cultivation is an alien task. The agriculturalists use the opportunity to earn cash by working on the plots appointed to the pastoralists. This makes it possible to the agriculturalists to earn cash also during the hoeing season and not only after harvesting. The Parakuyo have a possibility to regular cash earnings once a month through livestock sales, and a considerable amount of cash is recirculated to the agriculturalists through various channels, hired work being one of them.

The fields of the Parakuyo produce, however, only a fraction of the grain needed, and much of it has to be bought. The broadest channel which drains cash from the hands of the Parakuyo elders is alcohol. During the time of my first field period in 1975-76, there was a formidable beer 'industry' in Lugoba, with more than 20 barrels of 200 litres each fermenting local beer, and in adjacent villages the same in minor quantities. The place in Lugoba attracted crowds of people every afternoon, and Parakuyo elders were among the enthusiastic visitors, until the place, called 'Umoja wa Mataifa' (United Nations) because of its multiethnic base of visitors, was closed in 1977 due to its 'nonproductive functions'. Since then the brewing business has moved into the bush and spirits have become more common. It is the view of many people that closing the government controlled brewing station, where individuals could

get brewing rights by paying fees, has not eliminated the alcohol problem. They have moved from using the mild **pombe** to the use of **bongo**, in production of which distilling equipment is needed.

From the Parakuyo viewpoint, this change has made them use more bottled beer in licenced bars in Lugoba, the price of which has tripled within four years. The sharp rise in prices has had the effect that the consumption of drinks is concentrated to the few days after livestock auctions, during which the vast majority of the cash earned moves into the hands of the bar owners and brewers (cf. Beidelman 1961b:541).

What is said above does not concern all the Parakuyo. There are also those who absolutely refrain from using any alcoholic drinks, except in rituals, where honey beer (brewed by the Parakuyo themselves) has specific ritual functions. It is clearly recognized by the Parakuyo, that alcohol is a problem to many elders. The warriors are supposed to abstain from using alcohol, although this rule is not strict any more. The Parakuyo women do not use, to my knowledge, alcoholic drinks at all. One never sees them in bars or around **pombe** shops. The elders say as an explanation that they do not want their women to behave as indecently as the **Ilmeek**. Therefore, the women are not allowed to stay in those places, although they regularly visit other shops and 'hotels', which do not have licences to sell beer. Neither are any Parakuyo girls found among the prostitutes of the bars.

The Parakuyo are unwilling to invest in building permanent houses or in anything that is not easily movable. Neither are they willing to invest in anything which would endanger the continuity of their culture. It has not been wise to invest in houses, for example, because periodic moves have been a necessity until recent years, and chances to improve the situation in the near future are minimal. Under these conditions, the only reasonable object of investment is cattle.[35] Therefore, it is understandable that they are not too eager to earn money, or to aquire modern cattle which could increase the milk production. Sedentarization is one of the basic problems to be solved until any improvement in house building, household economy, education etc. is possible (Hurskainen 1983: 34-35). The question of sedentarization is linked with such services as

availability of medicine for controlling livestock diseases, clearing tsetse-free pastures, and the reliability of the water supply. None of these problems have been solved to the extent that permanent settling in the village would have been possible. With joint efforts of the pastoralists and the government it has been possible to tackle these problems, but not yet with sufficient success. The role of research is here essential, carried out in close cooperation with planners of different levels, and with the villagers themselves.

NOTES to Chapter E

1 See e.g. Mauss 1967, **passim**; Liep 1979; Rubel & Rosman 1975. The significance of circulation of stock in maintaining dominant social relationships has been observed also in societies, where agriculture is dominant in the process of production, as the case of the agro-pastoral system in nineteenth-century Burundi indicates; Botte 1979.

2 This branch of anthropology has realized that the theoretical concepts of the conventional economics are inadequate in the analysis of the economic processes and organizations of the less advanced societies. Dalton (1969, 1978), Rubel & Rosman (1975, 1976, 1978), Meillassoux (1972), Schneider (1974b), and Sahlins (1965, 1969), to mention a few prominent ones, have recently contributed to the theoretical development of economic anthropology. What must be considered as a special credit to these studies is an attempt to use and create concepts fitting to the subject, rather than use only categories of the Western economic theories (Dalton 1969:63-65; 1978:140-55). These writings reflect a holistic view of the society, where material transactions are only one form of creating, maintaining or reinforcing social relations, which are so central in societies based on organic solidarity. The holistic view also brings the economic anthropology to terms with the rest of anthropology, and therefore its questions are relevant also to this study.

3 A classic example of the processes produced by a single tribal system is the Kachin society if Highland Burma. Leach (1954) has shown how the society oscillates between egalitarian **gumlao**-type forms and stratified **gumsa** hierarchies. This pendulum-like movement is generated by the internal properties of the socio-political system and by the physical constraints of the natural environment.

4 The transfer from natural economies to capitalist modes of production implies inevitably the destruction of the old modes. Transition from one mode to another is not a continuum, although temporarily both modes may exist simultaneously. They are essentially different, and therefore the capitalist penetration causes transformation or even destruction of the natural economies; Bradby 1975:127, 137-40. This is inevitable since the change means a shift from production for self-maintenance to production for an external market; Meillassoux 1972:102; Godelier 1975, 1978.

5 The Maori have the concept of **hau**, the 'spirit' of a thing, which is attached to the gift given and which follows the thing to all its holders. Some kind of animated substance is postulated to be attached to gift objects, and this substance requires the circulation of the thing and ultimately the return to its original holder on the sanctions of illness or death of its holder; Mauss 1967:8-10.

6 Rosman & Rubel 1978; Liep 1979; Gregory 1980. Rosman and Rubel have attempted to develop the quite crude concept of 'the system of total prestations' proposed by Mauss by placing emphasis on the concept of structure. They found, for example, that in New Guinea societies one or two structures of exchange underlie the exchanges of valuables, pigs, yams and women; Rosman & Rubel 1978:106. Gregory found that in Papuan societies the interclan rivalries motivated the gift-giving with the purpose of ranking clans and men, and that money did not necessarily destroy the exchange systems. It can be utilized in gift-exchange and commodity exchange; Gregory 1980:647-49; Pastner 1971.

7 Ino Rossi has summarized Lévi-Strauss' conception of exchange: "... (1) the notions of exchange, reciprocity, and structure of reciprocity are the central explanatory notions of Lévi-Strauss' kinship theory and (2) they are based on Lévi-Strauss' conception of the dialectic working of mind; this theoretical framework (3) is consistent, if not a corollary, of his scientific framework and (4) presupposes the analysis of historical factors rather than their rejection..." Rossi 1974a:110.

8 The psychological character of Lévi-Strauss' inferences is seen in his notion that three general mental structures are common to mankind: the need of a rule as a rule, reciprocity as integration of the 'self-other' opposition, and the synthetic nature of the gift; Lévi-Strauss 1969a:84.

9 **Bridewealth** consists of material transactions from the bridegroom or his kin to the kin of the bride. **Dowry** is the material property brought to the conjugal union by the bride, while **dower** is the property brought to that union by the bridegroom. **Groomwealth** is the property transfer from the bride's kin to that of the bridegroom. However, only **bridewealth** and **dowry** have a wide distribution, and the former is particularly common in Africa; Spiro 1975:89-90.

10 No convincing evidence has been presented to explain why bridewealth is most intensely distributed in Africa and rare in Eurasia. One can only point to the fact that these differences are of great historical depth rooted into a tradition, as the old written documents in India indicate. They view the bridewealth as bride-purchase; Tambiah 1973:68.

11 UTA 1982/13.1./A10.

12 Heifers are highly valued because they have a high productive and reproductive potential. They are the valuables of the society, and therefore fit for circulation. The use of pigs as a means of circulation in some Melanesian and Indonesian societies is analoguous with this; see LiPuma 1979:41.

13 In these societies the size of bridewealth is 15 - 50 head of cattle and additional small stock if such are raised by the society concerned.

14 UTA 1982/13.1./A6-7.

15 UTA 1982/13.1./B9-10.

16 In a survey carried out in 1983 it was found that 28 members of the warrior age-set (**Iltareto**, formerly **Ilmakaa**) in the Lugoba pastoral economic area were married. Unfortunately the survey did not indicate how many warriors were unmarried. At the same time there were 27 **Ilmedoti** elders and 21 **Ilkidotu** elders. By comparing these figures it can be estimated that well over half, probably 3/4, of the warriors were married in 1983; Hurskainen 1983:27-29.

17 No quantitative survey of divorce cases among the Parakuyo is available. This information is based on nonsystematic discussions on marriage. The most informative was the discussion with Paulo Chaparisi on 13.1.1982 concerning transfers of property within the society, where transfers connected with divorce were included. Divorce is clearly not one of the acute problems of the society.

18 Information concerning divorce and transactions connected with it was obtained primarily through discussions with Paulo Chaparisi; UTA 1982/13.1./B8-9.

19 This is certainly not the only function of clitoridectomy, although the only explanation given to me in discussions. It is also obviously a mark of ethnic identity, a permanent feature which distinguishes 'our' group from 'others'. In this respect clitoridectomy, as well as circumcision, fall also into the category of symbols.

20 UTA 1982/13.1./A5-6.

21 Kressel, however, pursues the hypothesis that a high bridewealth, and particularly the great differences in the size of bridewealth within a society, are bound up with deepening social differentiation, whereas the rich ones demand very high bridewealth payments, which the poor ones cannot meet; Kressel 1977:449.

22 There are societies, such as the Zande, who use spears as means of bridewealth. The passing over of spears and hence the strengthening of affinal relations may be a lifelong process; Evans-Pritchard 1970:121.

23 Black reports of the Gilyak, who had a system where the group of wife-givers was formed of the old settlers in the area and the newcomers belonged to the group of wife-takers. She argues, contrary to the interpretation of Lévi-Strauss, that the wife-givers were regarded superior to the wife-takers, and not the other way round; Black 1972:1245-47.

24 UTAf 1976/04/10-13.

25 In one occasion where the size of bridewealth was 60 head of cattle and additional gifts, up to 10 cattle were promised to the bride when she entered her husband's kraal. During subsequent days she reportedly received more cattle; Utaf 1976/05/10-13. The silent bargaining between the bride and groom may continue until the bride has received up to 30-40 head of cattle; UTA 1982/13.1./A9.

26 The practice of the Samburu seems very similar to the one described above. The number of cattle allocated to the bride varies from 15 to 50 depending on the wealth of the groom. Preparedness to open the cattle gate signifies that she is satisfied with the herd given. Also the other wives of the husband and his close kinsmen are expected to contribute a beast each, and reciprocal titles of address between the giver and receiver are applied; see also Spencer 1965:54.

27 Referring to Jacobs, Rigby discusses 'wedding gifts' which a man marrying for the first time may receive from his agnatic and matrilateral kin. When he simultaneously talks about 8-9 head of cattle and some small stock, which a bride receives from her groom as a nucleus of her milking herd, there are grounds to doubt that part of the 'wedding gifts' belong in fact to the category of the bride's 'allotted herd'. This is at least the Parakuyo usage, and logical thinking would lead to a conclusion that a man has to allocate the majority of the milking cows to his wives, because he does not milk himself. What kinds of animals actually belong to the husband's 'residual herd' (Spencer 1965:53) is unclear to me.

28 UTA 1982/13.1./A10.

29 UTA 1982/13.1./A10-11.

30 The information on the **erikoto o'lkerra** ritual is derived from discussions with Keke Loita (UTAf 1976/08/1-3), observation of such a ritual (UTAf 1976/08/15-23, 34-41), and discussions with Magogo Keke (UTAf 1976/08/74-75). The Kisongo Maasai have also this ritual with the same timing and functions; UTAf 1983/16.1./13.

31 UTA 1982/13.1./A1-3.

32 UTA 1982/13.1./A4.

33 Berntsen 1976; Gulliver 1968:431-56; Beidelman 1960, 1961b:546.

34 For the terms 'transhumant' and 'transhumance' see e.g. Cohen 1974:138-39.

35 Only the village chairman had built a permanent house in the village area, as an example to the others, but he had not yet succeeded in convincing the others to do the same.