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STRATEGIES OF RECONCILIATION IN CICERO'S PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LIFE*

GABRIEL EVANGELOU

During the last few decades of the late Roman republic, personal ambition and the competition for *imperium* led to constant clashes between Rome's leading men.¹ Thus, war, civil strife, and violence defined the 1st c. BC. These conflicts are well attested in literature and, while Roman and Greek historians chiefly discuss the main events that took place, Cicero's letters constitute a unique source because of the insight that they provide into conversations behind the scenes and into the thought process in his and many of his fellow politicians' decision making. At the same time, his correspondence with men, such as Lentulus Spinther and Atticus, provides information not only about these conflicts, but also about the methods of reconciliation that they employed to reconcile with persons with whom they had quarrelled.² The letters reveal that while some efforts for reconciliation were

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¹ As Sallust has famously noted, *ambitio multos mortalis falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore aliud in lingua promptum habere, amicitias inimicitiasque non ex re sed ex commodo aestumare, magisque voltum quam ingenium bonum habere* (*Catil.* 10,5).

² Some of the most notable studies of reconciliation in the ancient world include K. A. Raafaub (ed.), *War and Peace in the Ancient World*, Malden – Oxford 2007; E. P. Moloney – M. S. Williams, *Peace and Reconciliation in the Classical World*, London – New York 2017. Nonetheless, the scholarship on reconciliation between individuals in the ancient world has been remarkably limited. Konstan has examined forgiveness and emotions related to reconciliation, including *Pity Transformed*, London 2001; “Pity and power”, in R. Sternberg (ed.), *Pity in Ancient Athenian Life and Letters*, Cambridge 2005, 48–66; “Clemency as a virtue”, *Classical Philology* 100 (2005), 337–46; “War and reconciliation in Greek literature”, in K. A. Raafaub (ed.), *War and Peace in the Ancient World*, Malden – Oxford

genuine and resulted in proper restoration of relations, in some other cases a reconciliation was forced upon them by a third person without an actual desire between the former enemies to restore their relations. This paper will look at Cicero's efforts to reconcile first with his closest friend, Atticus, then with a man from his public life, Crassus, and finally with someone whom he ostensibly regarded as both a friend and an ally, Pompey. Its main aim is to identify and analyse the main rhetorical strategies of reconciliation that Cicero opted to use in all three cases and thus to reevaluate the kind of relationship that the orator developed with each man.

In March 58 Cicero was forced to make an impossible decision. He could either risk his life by remaining in Rome and fighting against Clodius and his men or flee from Rome as an exile, thus also putting himself at risk during his journey to Sicily (and eventually to Thessalonica), after Clodius amended his bill.³ In the end, he decided to follow his friends' advice and leave Rome, being under the impression that the matter could be resolved in three days (*ad Q. fr.* 1,4,4).⁴ In his letters to Quintus, Terentia, and Atticus Cicero appears to be a broken man who is devastated by the turn of events. His exile had cost him everything, not only his *dignitas*⁵ and his prominent position in Roman politics, but, perhaps more importantly, his family, his friends and even himself.⁶ As Tempest rightly points out, Cicero assigns the blame to many persons, including himself, but also to Atticus.⁷

2007, 191–205; “Assuaging rage: remorse, repentance, and forgiveness in the classical world”, *Phoenix* 62 (2008), 243–54; *Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea*, Cambridge 2010, and as a co-editor with C. Griswold, *Ancient Forgiveness*, Cambridge 2012. The study of the attested efforts for reconciliation between non-fictional characters remains largely unexplored.

³ Cicero's exile constitutes one of the most well studied areas of his life, likely because of the impact that it had on his career and even on his emotional and mental state. Studies of his banishment include Smith 1896; Ciaceri 1941, 59–70; Shackleton Bailey 1971, 64–72; Seager 1979, 103–13; Mitchell 1991, 127–43; Fuhrmann 1992, 89–95; Kelly 2006, 110–25; Cohen 2007, 109–28; Bellemore 2008, 100–20; Tempest 2011, 113–24; Williams 2013, 53–72; Marsh 2014, 37–59.

⁴ Bellemore (2008, 104) observes that Cicero was rather optimistic initially when he left Rome (*Att.* 3,7,2).

⁵ Hall (1996, 24–27) provides an excellent discussion of aristocratic *dignitas*.

⁶ Narducci 1997, 56–59.

⁷ Tempest 2011, 122. Shackleton Bailey (1971, 70) and Welch (1996, 458–60) also note that Cicero viewed Atticus as partly responsible for his banishment.

Despite his constant protestations about his calamity and his expressed contemplation of suicide,⁸ his letters to Atticus arguably show a man who has not lost his will to live. From the very first extant letter that he sends to Atticus in March 58, one thing is clear: his life is in danger and there is no one more capable of helping him arrive safely at his destination than Atticus. He states that he needs Atticus to overtake him as soon as he possibly could so that *tuo tuorumque praesidio uteremur* (*Att.* 3,1). His urgent need of Atticus' help is further stressed through the repetition of the request. Cicero not only begs (*oro*) Atticus to join him, but he emphatically notes that he needs to act *statim*. In the next letter, he displays a significantly different tone. He informs Atticus that if he joins him, he will be able to make plans for his entire flight from Rome. What is striking, however, is the way that he phrases his following statement: he claims that *si id non feceris, mirabor; sed confido te esse facturum* (*Att.* 3,3). He implicitly suggests that he knew Atticus well enough to feel certain that he would not refuse to grant his request and, if he were to do so, such a decision would be completely out of character. Cicero's doubt over whether Atticus will in fact join him becomes even more apparent in the following letter that he sends him just a few days later. He reiterates that, if Atticus joins him, he will be able to make a plan, but he also

⁸ Cicero's sincerity in the statements that he makes in his public works and letters to his allies has been heavily questioned in scholarship, whereas the period of his exile and his claims to his loved ones tend to be taken at face value. As a result, a number of assertions can be found in studies of his banishment, especially in regards to his remarks about his condition and his contemplation of suicide. As Cohen (2007, 110) observes, "authors attempt to apply modern psychological terminology based on the letters he wrote during this period". May (2002, 11) sees in Cicero's letters to Atticus "an unseemly yet understandable mood of depression that led him even to contemplate suicide". Treggiari (2007, 57) notes that Cicero considered suicide and afterwards regretted having changed his mind. Grebe (2011, 436) asserts that "Cicero wanted Terentia to be with him in exile and he desired to die in her arms". Dugan (2014, 13, 14) argues that Cicero had "suicidal impulses" and that "he was driven to contemplate self-destruction". However, the fact that Cicero informs Atticus (*Att.* 3,3; 3,7,2), Terentia (*fam.* 14,4,1), and Quintus (*ad Q. fr.* 1,3,5) that he has contemplated suicide does not necessarily mean that he was seriously considering ending his life, since his remarks could have been typical of the exaggeration found in his extant letters from exile. Similar level of exaggeration can be found in Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* and have been pointed out repeatedly by scholars, including Lozovan (1959, 364), Goold (1983, 101), Helzle (1989, 190), Richmond (1995, 102, 104 n.17, 120), and Grebe (2010, 495 n. 20). Specifically, on suicide in Cicero and Ovid, see Nagle 1980, 33–35. In contrast, some scholars have exercised greater caution in their analysis of Cicero's letters from exile. Hutchinson (1998, 35) argues that Cicero's claim that Atticus dissuaded him from taking his life should not be taken literally and Robinson (1994, 475 n.1) simply reports that Cicero "expresses the wish that he had committed suicide".

acknowledges that the journey will be *molestum* (*Att.* 3,2). He explicitly states that without Atticus he is not safe to travel to Brundisium. Atticus' presence was thus paramount to Cicero's safety.

Interestingly, Atticus neither agrees to meet him nor does he refuse to comply with Cicero's request (*te non habemus... nec scribis quam ad diem te exspectemus*, *Att.* 3,7,1). He seems to have hedged because he was unwilling to risk his life even for one of his most intimate friends.⁹ The more time passes without Atticus committing to joining him at a certain date, the more Cicero's frustration and disappointment intensify, leading up to his open conflict with Atticus in his letter from 17 August 58. But before sending this letter, Cicero continues his efforts to persuade Atticus to join him, to no avail.¹⁰ A strain in their relationship can be observed from 29 April when Cicero starts making accusations against the persons who were responsible for his banishment (*Att.* 3,7,1,2). He complains not so much about men like Clodius, who were clearly his enemies, but the persons whom he trusted and considered his closest friends. At first, he refrains from naming the persons whom he is referring to, with the exception of Hortensius (*Att.* 3,9,1–2). However, it appears that Atticus suspected that some of Cicero's ire was directed towards Atticus himself and attempted to discover who those envious friends were.

On 17 August Cicero clearly adopts a disgruntled tone in his indignant letter to Atticus,¹¹ which is extremely rare in their surviving correspondence.¹² He

⁹ The sheer number of letters that Cicero exchanged with Atticus suggests a strong bond of personal *amicitia* between them and, according to Miller (1914, 53), "the frequency of letters sometimes constituted a test of a real friendship". The language that Nepos uses in reference to Atticus' friendship with Cicero and with Brutus, at first sight, may give the impression that Atticus considered Brutus a closer friend, since he refers to Atticus' friendship with Cicero as *intima familiaritas* and Brutus as Atticus' *amicissimus* (*Cic.* 9,3). However, later on, Nepos tries to defend Atticus for his relationship with Antony and uses the same terminology to describe Atticus' friendship with Brutus (*propter intimam familiaritatem Ciceronis*, *Cic.* 10,1). Therefore, *familiaritas* and *amicitia* appear to be used interchangeably. Horsfall (1989, 104) following Hellegouarc'h (1963, 68–71) makes a similar observation about *familiaritas*.

¹⁰ For a more extensive discussion of Cicero's efforts to persuade Atticus to join him during his exile, see Evangelou 2019, 155–61.

¹¹ Stockton (1971, 190) criticises Cicero for his remarks during his banishment and argues that he acts like "a petulant and emotionally self-indulgent child".

¹² Another exception can be found in a letter from May 44 in which Cicero seems to have found Atticus' suggestion to follow Epicurus' example and keep away from politics insulting (*Epicuri*

directly confronts Atticus and makes several severe accusations against him (*Att.* 3,15,4). First, he reproaches him for the advice that he gave him to leave Rome. He suggests that Atticus is more responsible for his condition than anyone else, because throughout their friendship there was no other person whom he considered wiser than Atticus, even himself.¹³ Had Atticus not consistently provided valuable counsel, he would not have been so easily persuaded by his friend's words. He reiterates that he would have preferred an honourable death than the current wretchedness of his exile. The second accusation is even more serious. He argues that even though Atticus clearly cared about him -hence the fact that he cried when Cicero was being exiled- he, nonetheless "looked on and remained silent" (*inspectante et tacente te*, *Att.* 3,15,7). He also stresses that, before he left Rome, he felt *proditus* (*Att.* 3,15,7),¹⁴ and Atticus' inaction in his greatest time of need made him realise that he had overestimated the strength of their bond.

Their *amicitia* was evidently in crisis. Atticus had breached Cicero's trust and Cicero seemingly could no longer view Atticus as an astute and reliable friend. Through his inaction, Atticus had managed to damage Cicero's perception of their *amicitia* also by refraining from accompanying him during his perilous journey into exile. Between March and August, Cicero actively concealed his disappointment in Atticus by limiting his disapproval of his stance towards him to mere insinuations.¹⁵ The fact that he finally reveals to Atticus how disappointed

mentionem facis et audes dicere μή πολιτεύεσθαι?, *Att.* 14,20,5). Gilbert (2015, 100) also addresses Cicero's remark, but detects "annoyance" in Cicero's tone rather than offence or indignation over Atticus' advice.

¹³ For a discussion of the information and advice that Atticus consistently provided Cicero, see Citroni Marchetti 2000, 195–204.

¹⁴ Interestingly, Cicero does not directly accuse Atticus of having betrayed him, as he does not appear to have had an intention to clash with his friend, who would understandably take great offence at such an accusation. Nevertheless, he phrases his description of his state of mind before his exile in such a way that Atticus can see on his own how he played a major part in Cicero feeling deserted by his friends, especially considering that the phrase *ego proditus, inductus, coniectus in fraudem omnia mea praesidia neglexi* appears directly after his accusation of Atticus of not offering him wise advice that could have saved him (*Att.* 3,15,7).

¹⁵ *iniuriam et scelus non tam inimicorum meorum quam invidorum* (*Att.* 3,7,2); *cuius enim scelere impulsus et proditi simus iam profecto vides; atque utinam ante vidisses neque totum animum tuum maerori mecum simul dedisses!* (*Att.* 3,8,4), *nos non inimici sed invidi perdidierunt* (*Att.* 3,9,2); *nisi intra parietes meos de mea pernicie consilia inirentur* (*Att.* 3,10,2); *ego iis quibus meam salutem carissimam esse arbitrabar, inimicissimis crudelissimisque usus sum!* (*Att.* 3,10,2).

he was with his conduct and, more importantly, that he held him responsible for his exile because of his advice to leave Rome, means that the dynamics of their friendship immediately changed. Nevertheless, Cicero suggests that there is still hope for reconciliation. Despite the apparent rift between them, Atticus can prove to Cicero that his affection for him was as strong as Cicero always believed. In order to rectify the situation and restore Cicero's faith in him, Atticus needs to follow the instructions that Cicero provides for him in this very letter. With the use of the imperative (*erige, iuva, fac*, *Att.* 3,15,7) he asks Atticus to provide him clear accounts of the events taking place in Rome, to use his influence by communicating with the persons who could aid the efforts for his recall to Rome and to do everything in his power to have him restored. If, through Atticus' efforts, Cicero managed to return to Rome, their relationship would also be properly restored and any doubt over Atticus' devotion to him would be erased. The full restoration of their relationship does not appear to have happened immediately. The letters from September and October 58 indicate that Cicero had still not forgiven Atticus for his counsel (*Att.* 3,19,3; 3,20,1). The last extant letter from his correspondence from exile reveals that in early February 57 Cicero and Atticus had made plans to meet (*Att.* 3,27). Then their correspondence breaks off until 10 September when Cicero has returned to Rome and sends Atticus an exceedingly affectionate letter (*Att.* 3,27). Whether or not they did in fact meet,¹⁶ the language that Cicero uses in his letter suggests that their bond had been fully repaired and Cicero's affection for Atticus was as strong as it had ever been.

While an appeal to *amicitia* appears to have been an effective method to reconcile in private relationships, there were clearly different expectations in the efforts for reconciliation between men with an active public life.¹⁷ Cicero's relationship with Crassus never showed any signs of genuine deference or affection.¹⁸ On the contrary, based on reports found in Sallust (*Catil.* 48,9),

¹⁶ Shackleton Bailey (1999 vol.1, 283 n.2) argues that, despite Cicero's last extant letter to Atticus before his return to Rome giving the impression that they met during his exile, the fact that Cicero expresses a fervent desire to see Atticus and embrace him indicates that, in the end, they failed to meet.

¹⁷ Spielvogel (1993) provides an insightful discussion of the significance of *amicitia* in Cicero's relationship with his fellow-politicians.

¹⁸ In fact, as Shackleton Bailey (1980, 129) points out, their conflicts were often public. This is also attested by Cicero in his attack against Antony (*Phil.* 2,7). On Cicero's opposition to Crassus in 65 and 63, see Ward 1972.

Plutarch (*Cic.* 15,3), Dio Cassius (37,31,1; 39,10), and in Cicero's public works,¹⁹ their association was challenging and based to a great extent on fear.²⁰ Even though they supported and praised one another publicly in the Senate²¹ and Crassus was willing to defend Cicero in a trial before he fled from Rome (Dio Cass. 38,17,3),²² he constantly negatively affected Cicero's relationship with Caesar and Pompey²³ and any positive references to Crassus in Cicero's correspondence with Atticus are extremely rare and not pertinent to his character.²⁴ Crassus' close association with Clodius and the fact that he used bribery to help with Clodius' acquittal in the *Bona Dea* trial (*Att.* 1,16,5–6)²⁵ exacerbated the tensions between them.²⁶

¹⁹ *off.* 1.109; 3,75. Pugh (1981, 243–46) argues that an attack against Crassus can also be observed in Cicero's sixth *Stoic Paradox*.

²⁰ Gruen 1995, 68. A prime example would be his statement to his wife during his exile that *Crassum tamen metuo* (*fam.* 14,2,2). According to Rowland (1966, 222–23), Crassus, along with Clodius, was one of the “real enemies” who posed a threat to Cicero's life. There is also evidence of a book that Cicero was preparing about his consulship, entitled *De consiliis suis*, in which he attacks, among other men, Crassus. For a list of references to the book and a brief discussion of its content, see Lintott 1968, 205 n.3. Further discussions of Cicero's memoirs can be found in Marshall 1974, 806–7 and Pugh 1981, 3, 8, 9, 79, 101, 245–46.

²¹ *Att.* 1,14,3; Plut. *Cic.* 25,2. However, as Marshalls (1976, 134) observes, in his letter to Atticus (*Att.* 1,16,5) it is revealed that he was not flattered by Crassus' public display of reverence, hence his severe censure of him (*Nosti Calvum... o di boni, rem perditam!*).

²² Parrish (1977, 631) notes that Crassus attempted to have a cordial relationship not only with Cicero (*Att.* 1.14.3–4), but also with Quintus (*ad Q. fr.* 1,3,7; 2,7,2). On Crassus' motives behind his public eulogy of Cicero, see Parrish 1973, 370.

²³ e.g. *Att.* 2,22,5.

²⁴ *Att.* 1,14,3; 1,16,5–6; 1,17,9; 1,18,6; 2,3,4; 2,4,2; 2,5,2; 2,21,4; 2,22,5; 3,15,1; 3,23,5; 4,11,1; 4,13,1; 4,16,3; 13,19,4. In October 44 he claims that he did not make personal attacks against Crassus, despite his serious disputes with him on political matters (*Phil.* 2,7).

²⁵ Gruen (1995, 68 n.80) stresses that Crassus used his fortune by offering loans without interest (Plut. *Crass.* 3,1) to men in need as an effective means to oblige them. Marsh (1932, 172–78) explores Crassus' association with Clodius and concludes that Clodius became a tool first for Crassus and then for Pompey between 58–56 and 53–52 respectively. The view of Clodius as Crassus' tool can also be found in Marshall 1974, 805. Conversely, Lintott (1968, 190, 198) notes that Clodius and his mobs aided Crassus' and Pompey's efforts to secure the consulship in the elections of 56, after Pompey's reconciliation with Clodius and Crassus, but argues against the view of Clodius as a mere tool of the triumvirs and sees him as a man with “an independent cast of mind”. Crassus' alliance with Clodius in 58 is also confirmed by Pompey in 56 (*ad Q. fr.* 2,3,4).

²⁶ Marshall (1976, 115, 134) asserts that Crassus was the person who desired the most Cicero's

After the conference at Luca, Pompey put considerable pressure²⁷ on Cicero to reconcile with several prominent persons, including Crassus,²⁸ Gabinius, and Vatinius.²⁹ Cicero's letter to Lentulus Spinther in December 54 (*fam.* 1,9) provides some much-needed context to the letter that he sent to Crassus at the beginning of the year. It suggests that Cicero's relationship with Crassus was at least somewhat cordial³⁰ until Crassus defended Gabinius and then insulted Cicero, even though Cicero was willing to put aside all the times that Crassus had wronged him (*fam.* 1,9,20). Perhaps the most important piece of information that it provides is that the reconciliation between them had already taken place over dinner³¹ that they had at Crassipes' house.³² It follows that the letter that he sent to Crassus – likely in January 54 – was not written to reconcile their differences,³³ but rather so that the news of their reconciliation could reach a wider audience and to ratify their reconciliation.³⁴ This is confirmed towards the end of the letter when Cicero states explicitly that *has litteras ... foederis habituras esse vim, non epistulae*.³⁵

banishment from Rome and the one who set it in motion. Brunt (1965, 9, 18) rejects the assertion found in Plutarch (*Cic.* 33,5) and Dio (39,9) that Cicero had to reconcile with Crassus publicly after his return from exile by arguing that it was unnecessary because the two men had not quarrelled until after the conference at Luca.

²⁷ In his letter to Lentulus Spinther Cicero attempts to justify his decision to reconcile with men like Crassus by stressing his affection for Pompey as well as his inability to oppose his wishes *honeste* (*fam.* 1,8,2–4).

²⁸ Cadoux (1956, 156) sees Crassus as Pompey's main rival between 83 and 53. Their rivalry is also attested in Plutarch (*Pomp.* 22–23) who depicts Crassus as envious of Pompey's success (*Crass.* 6,4–5; 6,7).

²⁹ Marshall (1976, 129) notes the difficult position that Cicero had found himself in, having to defend men whom he had attacked publicly.

³⁰ Parrish (1973, 371) argues against this view by examining Cicero's negative remarks about Crassus.

³¹ Simpson 1938, 533. A brief mention of Cicero's dinner with Crassus can also be found in Plut. *Cic.* 26,1 and of Crassus' departure from Rome in *div.* 1,29.

³² Clark (1991, 28–38) examines whether Tullia was betrothed but never married to Crassipes.

³³ Marshall (1974, 804) rejects the possibility that Cicero was truly interested in reconciling with Crassus or in cultivating a friendship with him.

³⁴ Hall 1996, 21. A similar intention can be found in Cicero's letter to Appius Claudius in which he states that *benevolentior tibi quam fui nilo sum factus, diligentior ad declarandam benevolentiam multo* (*fam.* 3,12,4).

³⁵ Brunt (1965, 6) stresses the significance of *foedus* in Cicero's letter and notes that, even though

Cicero's letter to Crassus (*fam.* 5,8) is well-crafted from beginning to end.³⁶ It encompasses most, though not all, of the main strategies of reconciliation that Cicero and his contemporaries used to restore their relations with men from politics or to make their reconciliation public. The content of the letter indicates that it was written with wide circulation in mind, hence the fact that all of the points that he raises relate to their relationship and to their reconciliation without any references to practical matters. His primary goals seem to be to remove any doubt from the readers' mind over his devotion to Crassus and to stress the strength of their *amicitia*. The repetitions of *studium* and *amicitia* are likely used to serve this purpose, i.e. to showcase his commitment to promoting Crassus' interests and to establish their relationship as a meaningful *amicitia*.

Throughout the letter, Cicero appears to be at pains to rewrite history, while also giving verisimilitude to his version of events. Instead of pretending that there had never been any disagreements between them, he opts to acknowledge repeatedly that they had, in fact, several fallouts throughout their association. However, he gives the impression that they were misunderstandings by attributing them to persons whom he does not name,³⁷ but refers to as *pestes*³⁸ *hominum* (*fam.* 5,8,1–2).³⁹ Through this particularly vague and evasive claim,

a large number of friendships between men in politics were not sincere, "Treaties were ratified by solemn oaths and to break them was perjury". Hall (1996, 21, 31) also discusses the use of *foedus* in *fam.* 8,5 and argues that the distinctive politeness in Cicero's language along with the length of the letter and its emphasis on Cicero's pledge to protect Crassus' *dignitas* elevates this document from a mere letter of reconciliation to a *foedus*. On the use of *foedus* in Roman alliances, see also the extensive discussion of Gladhill (2016, esp. 103, 111–15) as well as Hall (2009, 74–75, 228 n. 139), who compares Cicero's profession of loyalty in the letter to Crassus with a similar statement that he makes in his letter to Brutus (*volo enim testimonium hoc tibi videri potius quam epistulam, ad Brut.* 1,1,1). He notes that Cicero's pledges are even stronger in the letter to Crassus.

³⁶ For further discussions of Cicero's letter of reconciliation with Crassus, see Brunt 1965, 9; Parrish 1973, 371; 1977, 628; Marshall 1976, 114, 134; Hall 1996, 19, 21, 30–32 n.46; Gladhill 2016, 114.

³⁷ Hall (2009, 73) also observes Cicero's diplomacy in his letter to Crassus by noting the lack of reference to specific persons who were supposedly responsible for the frictions between them.

³⁸ Interestingly, the noun *pestis* is used twice in *De amicitia* to refer to flatterers and to those who are interested in the acquisition of wealth (*amic.* 34, 91).

³⁹ Cicero uses similar language in his letters of reconciliation to Appius Claudius. He refers to persons who spread rumours against Appius in an attempt to influence Cicero's opinion of him as *malevoli homines* (*fam.* 3,6,4). The difference between the two claims, however, is that in the case of Appius, they fail to alter Cicero's perception of him because they were *ignari meae constantiae* (*fam.* 3,6,4).

he refrains from attacking anyone specifically, but, more importantly, from admitting that their conflicts were the result of their disapproval of each other's character, actions, and decisions and, at times, of their contempt for one another. He attempts to downplay them even further, since, as Hall points out, "Crassus is politely invited to indulge in the fiction that" these fallouts were *non tam re quam suspicione* and *falsa et inania* (*fam.* 5,8,3).⁴⁰ Remarkably, flattery is mostly absent from the letter, as all the positive comments that he makes about Crassus revolve around their relationship and not around Crassus' character, with the exception of his praise of Crassus' *liberalitas* (*fam.* 5,8,3), which is a distinctive feature of *amicitia*.⁴¹ In contrast, he does not hesitate to praise Crassus' wife and sons with positive remarks about their character (*fam.* 5,8,2, 4).

In his efforts to present their relationship as an *amicitia* that stood the test of time, he resorts to making several even more unsubstantiated claims.⁴² Through a series of remarks about their *amicitia*, he adds a private dimension to it by insisting that it was not a mere political alliance, but a proper, personal friendship, because of Cicero's desire from the very beginning of their association to be close friends. Not only does he consciously refer to it as an *amicitia* three times, but he also uses the superlative form when he refers to Crassus twice as *amicissimus*.⁴³ Perhaps the least believable claim that he makes in his letter is about the existence of *fides* between them.⁴⁴ Cicero's letters to Atticus indubitably attest that he could not possibly have trusted a person who constantly criticised him and whom he admitted to have feared. After all, if *fides* did exist between them, the unnamed persons who led to their fallouts would not have been successful at creating a rift between them. The exaggeration in his remarks is also evident in the use of adverbs, such as *semper* (*fam.* 5,8,3) and *numquam/ne umquam* (*fam.* 5,8,1, 2). By arguing that he never worked more zealously for any cause than

⁴⁰ Hall 2009, 74.

⁴¹ Verboven 2011, 409, 411.

⁴² This is hardly unusual in Cicero's letters to prominent Romans, since, as Powell (1990, 22) observes, "Cicero professes warm personal feelings for those whom he privately distrusts or despises".

⁴³ It is worth stressing, though, that, as Parrish (1973, 371) notes, Cicero does not make specific references to their *amicitia*, as he chooses to use vague language to describe their association over the years.

⁴⁴ *ut florentissimis tuis rebus mea perspici posset et memoria nostrae voluntatis et amicitiae fides* (*fam.* 5,8,2).

Crassus, he implies that Crassus had been his closest ally and someone whom he was willing to help even more than himself. Similarly, by claiming that he never stopped endeavouring to contribute to Crassus' advancement, he arguably presents himself as a magnanimous friend, who, even during their conflicts, had continued to use his influence to benefit Crassus. Likely in an attempt to prevent his critics from accusing him of *inconstantia* (*fam.* 5,8,5) for his sudden and active support of Crassus, he argues that by protecting Crassus' *dignitas* during his absence, he is also securing his own reputation, thus suggesting -once again- a steadfast alliance with him. Despite the clear insincerity in the statements that he makes about the nature of their association throughout the years,⁴⁵ it is important to bear in mind that, as Hall has demonstrated, such remarks were expected between them, since they constituted "regular features of aristocratic correspondence" and "epistolary conventions" that Cicero could not possibly ignore.⁴⁶

The dual nature of their association (*coniunctionem amicitiamque, fam.* 5,8,3) is further illustrated through his references to those who can verify the validity of his claims. These do not only include Crassus' friends, "the Consuls and many of the Consulars" (*fam.* 5,8,3), but also Crassus' sons (*fam.* 5,8,2, 4). He refers to them twice in the letter and emphasises his unwavering support of them and the quasi-familial bond that he has developed especially with Publius.⁴⁷ The reference to Crassus' family reinforces the view of an *amicitia* between them that is not purely political and thus could not easily dissolve, as associations between other political allies did. Notably, he places equal emphasis on the public dimension of their *amicitia*. He begins by stating that Crassus' people are aware of and can confirm the zeal that he has displayed in his efforts to support him (*fam.* 5,8,1). Later on, he also adds the *civitas* as well as "the Senate and the

⁴⁵ Shackleton Bailey (1998, 117) compares Cicero's letter to Crassus with his letter to Antony (*Att.* 14,13B) and argues that it is equally "hypocritically effusive". Similarly, Williams (2012, 236–37) refers to Cicero's letter to Antony as "graciously worded but just as calculating" as Antony's.

⁴⁶ Hall 2009, 74, 75. He (1996, 22–23, 30–31) examines the question of Cicero's sincerity in his letter to Crassus and argues that it is unimportant not only to the reader, but also to Crassus himself. Similarly, Miller (1914, 46) points out that "extravagant flattery" was the result of the politeness that was expected between Roman aristocrats. Williams (2012, 219) suggests that Cicero's letters to his political allies should be examined as a performance rather than be taken at face value.

⁴⁷ On Cicero's relationship with Publius, see also Brunt 1965, 9; Parrish 1973, 371; Marshall 1976, 114; Syme 1980, 405; Wilcox 2012, 33.

People of Rome” (*fam.* 5,8,2). It follows that even though Cicero’s commitment to Crassus is already public knowledge, the letter that he sends him, which will undoubtedly be circulated, can be regarded as an official written confirmation of the claims that he has made publicly (*fam.* 5,8,5). Should Cicero refrain from protecting Crassus’ standing and reputation, he will be criticised and accused of *inconstantia*.⁴⁸ To complete his reconciliation with Crassus, he reiterates the support that he is already providing him, he makes pledges of support, and proves the strength of their bond of *amicitia* by offering his influence, his counsel and his services to Crassus and all of his people, even his friends and his clients (*fam.* 5,8,5). Their reconciliation was evidently superficial, as revealed in his private correspondence with Atticus in November 55,⁴⁹ in which he refers to Crassus as *hominem nequam* (*Att.* 4,13,2.),⁵⁰ thus suggesting that, despite their efforts to reconcile in public, Cicero’s perception of Crassus and his disdain for him remained unchanged in private.⁵¹

Evidently, while in his efforts to reconcile with Atticus Cicero addressed directly his grievances with his friend, in his reconciliation with Crassus he does not appear to have had the same luxury. He was acutely aware that he was not discussing a matter with an equal, but with one of Rome’s most powerful men, whose coalition with Pompey and Caesar made Crassus all the more dangerous to him. As the discussion that follows will demonstrate, his reconciliation with Pompey was equally problematic, as he was unable to speak frankly with him because of the stark difference between the political power that Pompey and Cicero held.

Cicero’s relationship with Pompey over the years⁵² *prima facie* was in accord with the ideal *amicitia*, as found in his philosophical treatise, *De amicitia*,

⁴⁸ Hall (1996, 32 n.46) raises a similar point.

⁴⁹ Marshall (1974, 805) argues that the fact that Cicero makes this remark in private and specifically to Atticus suggests that he was expressing his genuine emotions towards Crassus. Hall (1996, 21) also examines Cicero’s contradictory remarks and the hypocrisy that he displays in the two letters, but also stresses the necessity and the expectation of such effusions between Roman politicians.

⁵⁰ Notably, Cicero uses the same expression in reference to his bitter enemy, Antony, in *Phil.* 2,77.

⁵¹ Pugh (1981, 3) stresses the striking discrepancies between Cicero’s positive references to Crassus in public and his attacks against him in his private correspondence, as well as his public works after his death. He concludes that Cicero “heartily detested him”.

⁵² For an extensive discussion of Cicero’s association with Pompey from 80 to 63 BC, see Ward 1970a; 1970b; Williams 2013, 6–50.

i.e. a relationship that is not formed and maintained simply because it is mutually beneficial, but because of the good will and affection that exist between two persons as well as their common views on all matters (*amic.* 20).⁵³ The fact that he does not praise Pompey only publicly but also in his letters to Atticus, who acted as Cicero's confidant,⁵⁴ gives the impression that, unlike his clearly insincere remarks about Crassus in his letter of reconciliation, his *amicitia* with Pompey was indeed not strictly political.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, his correspondence also reveals that throughout their association, Pompey was not the kind of person on whom he could rely in a time of need. This lack of *fides* between them and Pompey's betrayal in pivotal moments of his life suggest that he could not have genuinely regarded him as a friend. Because of his inability to express his disappointment in Pompey, his attempts to reconcile with him did not involve an honest conversation, similar to the remarks that he makes in his letter to Atticus (*Att.* 3,15). He thus had to sidestep his issues with Pompey and to pretend both publicly and privately that he had not found Pompey's behaviour unacceptable or ever hurtful.

The first indication for Cicero that he had overestimated his ties with Pompey can be traced to 62. After Cicero's controversial decision to have the five Catilinarian conspirators executed without a trial, despite the fact that they were Roman citizens, Cicero's action met with ungenerous scrutiny and was even

⁵³ Even though, as Powell (1990, 22–23) observes, in most extant sources *amicitia* is used in reference to alliances rather than personal friendships, it needs to be stressed that the term was used as a rhetorical ploy in order to portray one's relationship with an ally as a more intimate relationship than it truly was.

⁵⁴ Claassen (1996, 230) states that Atticus had become Cicero's "non-judgemental auditor". On Atticus being Cicero's confidant, see Glucker 1988, 51; Hall 2009, 24; MacGillvray 2012, 158. Williams (2012, 231–32) notes that, based on Cicero's letters to Atticus, the reader is given the impression that Atticus was indeed Cicero's closest friend, but stresses that nowhere in his entire correspondence can a reference to a "best friend" be found. Shackleton Bailey (1998, 107, 118) argues that Atticus was not simply a man with whom Cicero developed a life-long friendship, but also his one and only true friend. While Cicero's extant letters to Atticus do suggest such a unique bond between the two men, it does not necessarily follow, as Fuhrmann (1992, 151) has argued, that Cicero was completely sincere with him. Elder and Mullen (2019, 160–62) rightly point out that the study of Nepos' biography of Atticus suggests that their friendship was not unique for Atticus.

⁵⁵ Williams (2012, 234) argues that Cicero's relationship with Pompey was the kind of *ambitosae fucosaeque amicitiae* that he mentions in a letter to Atticus, i.e. a "political friendship".

condemned by many of his fellow politicians, including Caesar.⁵⁶ Because of his close association with Pompey, he seems to have been under the impression that he could procure his support either in public or even in a pseudo-private letter.⁵⁷ However, Pompey initially refused to make such a public declaration.⁵⁸ Cicero was understandably displeased with Pompey's decision, but even though he clearly desired to express his frustration to Pompey, he knew that he had to be careful not to offend him, as his political career relied heavily on his alliance with Pompey. Thus, in the short letter that he sent Pompey in April 62, he adopts a courteous tone in an attempt to express his disappointment. He begins his letter by praising Pompey as the beacon of hope for peace in the republic while also implicitly attacking Caesar and Crassus.⁵⁹ He then directly addresses the letter that he received from Pompey, in which, to Cicero's surprise, Pompey refrained from displaying his friendly sentiments towards him. Even though Cicero notes that receiving Pompey's letter gave him pleasure, clear signs of reasonable fear over the state of their association can be detected. The fact that Pompey had reconciled with Crassus and Caesar (*tuos veteres hostis, novos amicos, fam. 5,7,1*) seems to have alarmed Cicero who interpreted the lack of affection in Pompey's letter as indication that he was in danger of losing Pompey both as an ally and as a friend (*si te mea summa erga te studia parum mihi adiunxerint, fam. 5,7,1*).

The closer Pompey's association with Caesar and Crassus became, the weaker Cicero's *amicitia* with Pompey was rendered. Cicero was aware that if Pompey had to choose between aligning himself with Cicero or with persons who

⁵⁶ Sall. *Catil.* 51,8,15–43; Plut. *Caes.* 7,7–8,1; *Cic.* 21,1–5; Suet. *Iul.* 14,1; App. *B Civ.* 2,6; Dio Cass. 36,1–2.

⁵⁷ *in tuis litteris... gratulationem expectavi (fam. 5,7,3)*. Miller (1914, 69) rightly observes that Cicero and his contemporaries did not expect complete privacy in their letter exchange, hence Cicero's reaction when he learned that Caesar had revealed to others the content of Cicero's letter to him (*Att.* 8,2,1; 9,9,1). Steel (2005, 59), while discussing Cicero's letter to Pompey, raises a similar point by arguing convincingly that it is inconsequential whether or not the letter would be read solely by Pompey, since it was a "formal and public piece of writing". The "semi-public nature" of the letters between Roman aristocrats is also stressed by Hall (1996, 32; 2009, 25).

⁵⁸ Williams (2013, 56) detects jealousy in Cicero's letter to Pompey and notes that, despite the fact that Pompey eventually praised Cicero in the Senate, Cicero was not pleased, as he reveals to Atticus that he did not consider Pompey's public praise as genuine (*Att.* 1,13,4).

⁵⁹ Shackleton Bailey 2001, 51 n.5.

exerted much greater influence in politics,⁶⁰ he would choose the latter. Since Cicero had clashed with these men, in order to secure his alliance with Pompey, he had to strive to restore his relations with him. This letter, thus, constitutes a conscious effort for Cicero to be – once again – in Pompey's good graces. His attempt to achieve that is twofold: first he reminds him of their common goals vis-à-vis the republic (*res publica nos inter nos conciliatura coniuncturaque sit, fam. 5,7,1*) and then he ends the letter by expressing a desire to be both his ally and his friend. He refers to Pompey as *multo maiori quam Africanus (fam. 5,7,3)* and himself as *non multo minorem quam Laelium (fam. 5,7,3)*.⁶¹ The examples that he provides and his tone betray a clear intention to flatter Pompey⁶² and thus to earn back his *gratia*.⁶³

Nonetheless, a notable difference can be observed between the way that he addresses his issues with Crassus and with Pompey in his letters to them. While he pretends that Crassus himself never offended him, in his letter to Pompey he reveals that he did experience disappointment when he noticed that Pompey had omitted any congratulatory remarks about the achievements of his consulship (*fam. 5,7,3*). One plausible explanation could be found in his own claim that he is comfortable speaking so openly (*aperte*) to Pompey because of their relationship (*sicut... nostra amicitia postulat, fam. 5,7,3*). However, another factor that should be borne in mind is his political standing in each case. In 62, despite the severe censure under which he had come from many of his fellow politicians,⁶⁴ the fact that he reveals to Pompey that he had expected him to congratulate him suggests that he felt confident about everything that he had accomplished as a consul.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Cadoux (1956, 158) considers Crassus the “leading man” of the triumvirate in the beginning of their coalition. On Crassus' prominent position in Roman politics, see also Plut. *Cic.* 15,1. A more detailed discussion can be found in Gruen 1995, 66–73.

⁶¹ Hall (2009, 245 n.51) observes that Cicero pays a similar compliment to Dolabella in 44, when Dolabella was a consul, by imagining him as king Agamemnon and himself as his consultant, Nestor (*Att.* 14,17A,2).

⁶² In his discussion of Cicero's letter to Pompey, Williams (2012, 235) refers to Cicero's comparison between Pompey and himself with Africanus and Laelius respectively as “skilful flattery”.

⁶³ Verboven (2011), provides an excellent discussion of the intricacies of *amicitia* and (pp. 408–9) stresses the sense of obligation that *gratia* tended to entail.

⁶⁴ Steel 2005, 8.

⁶⁵ However, as Tempest (2011, 116) points out, Cicero's need for validation through congratulatory remarks further irritated Pompey who disapproved of his tendency for self-praise.

Conversely, in 54, after having experienced the dangers that opposition to the triumvirs posed to his life when he was exiled in 58⁶⁶ and after the decisions that they made at the conference of Luca in 56, he was powerless to display any resistance to most of their demands. Therefore, he decided to yield and to avoid any direct confrontation with them.

Pompey's trustworthiness was put to the test once again in a significantly more serious matter. When Cicero's political enemy, Clodius, began to threaten him, Pompey reassured Cicero that he had nothing to fear.⁶⁷ In fact, Pompey claimed that if Clodius were to hurt Cicero in any way, such an action would seriously damage Pompey's own reputation for being partly responsible for Clodius' transfer to the plebs (*Att.* 2,22,2). After speaking *vehementer* to Clodius and Appius about their behaviour towards Cicero and stressing his *amicitia* with Cicero, the brothers promised that they would respect Pompey's wishes. Nevertheless, Cicero was not completely convinced that Pompey's efforts to protect him were as successful as Pompey believed, since Cicero was informed that even after his promise to Pompey, Clodius continued making disparaging remarks about him. More importantly, Cicero notes in his letter to Atticus that even though Pompey claimed that he had this conversation with Clodius, there were no witnesses who could confirm Pompey's report. The fact that Cicero does not immediately accept Pompey's claim as fact is indicative of his reservations over Pompey's commitment to Cicero's safety. As the events that followed attest, he had every reason to remain doubtful.

Despite Pompey's assurances, when Clodius' threats materialised and Cicero's life was in immediate danger, Pompey betrayed Cicero by refusing to protect him, thus leaving him no choice but to flee from Rome. Evidently, between the life of a professed *amicus* and his attachment to Caesar and Crassus, Pompey opted for the security and the aggrandizement that his former enemies could provide him. Cicero found himself defenceless and, even when Atticus, Quintus, and Terentia sent him letters with reports of positive developments in

⁶⁶ Usher 2008, 70. It is worth noting that the treatment that Cicero received from the triumvirate differed considerably from one member to another. Rowland (1966, 222 n.25) provides a comprehensive list of references to the efforts that Pompey and Caesar developed to protect Cicero from Clodius.

⁶⁷ Marshall (1976, 113) attributes Cicero's inability to avoid his banishment to his conviction that a prominent man such as himself could not possibly be exiled and to his misplaced trust in Pompey because of his strong bond with him.

the efforts for his restoration to Rome, he repeatedly refused to entertain any hope.⁶⁸ In addition to his remonstrances about his treacherous friends, whom he does not name, he targets Pompey specifically and chastises him in a letter that he sent to Quintus in August 58. He claims that the experience of the sudden desertion of Pompey contributed to his mental state (*ad Q. fr.* 1,4,4). His distrust in Pompey is exemplified in his correspondence with Atticus and Terentia. In July 58, in response to Atticus' letter, in which Atticus informed him about Pompey's interest in helping with his recall to Rome, he remains doubtful and stresses to Atticus that *plenus sum expectatione de Pompeio, quidnam de nobis velit aut ostendat* (*Att.* 3,14,1).⁶⁹ Pompey's words had lost their value for Cicero, since there was no guarantee that he would follow through in this particular occasion and thus endanger his alliance with Caesar and Crassus. Similarly, in October 58 he notes in a letter to Terentia that he is still not convinced that Pompey wishes to support him (*fam.* 14,2,1). Therefore, only if Pompey's actions were to follow his words would he begin to consider him an ally.⁷⁰

On 4 September 57, largely as a result of Pompey's efforts (*p. red. in sen.* 29–30; *p. red. ad Quir.* 16–17; *dom.* 30; *fam.* 3,10,10), Cicero returned triumphant to Rome.⁷¹ He immediately delivered two speeches, both on 5 September, one before the Senate and, shortly after, a second before the People (*ad quirites*). In both speeches he seizes the opportunity to attack many of the persons responsible for his exile and his belated recall to Rome, including the consuls of 58, Gabinius

⁶⁸ For Cicero's references to his lack of hope for restoration to Rome, see Evangelou forthcoming, n.25; *Att.* 9,10,3; 10,1,3; 11,1,1; 11,19,1; *ad Q. fr.* 1,4,5; *fam.* 14,4,5.

⁶⁹ Marsh (1932, 172) asserts that Pompey's personal *amicitia* with Cicero influenced his decision to work on his restoration. Luibheid (1970, 91) makes an equally unconvincing claim by referring to Pompey as "a man whom Cicero counted as a close friend".

⁷⁰ As Sanders (1932, 68) points out, his correspondence from exile reveals that, despite having been betrayed by Pompey, his hopes for restoration to Rome still rested on Pompey (*Att.* 3,8,3; 3,13; 3,15,1; *fam.* 14,1,2; 14,2,2).

⁷¹ *p. red. in sen.* 9,24; 10,25; 11,28; *Sest.* 22; *Att.* 4,1,4–5. Following Cicero's remarks in his letter to Atticus, May (1988, 89) states that Cicero's return to Rome was "glorious" and MacKendrick (1995, 128) that "All the towns en route made holiday in his honour". However, Nicholson (1992, 23) suggests that Cicero's claim in his letter to Atticus (*Att.* 4,1,4–5) is misleading considering that he chose to return at a time when the streets of Rome would already be crowded because of the celebration of the *Ludi Romani*.

and Piso,⁷² as well as to express his gratitude to those who contributed the most to his restoration. While he thanks the senators for supporting him unanimously (*p. red. in sen.* 5–6, 29; *p. red. ad Quir.* 17) and Quintus for committing to his brother's cause to such an extent that he endangered his own life (Plut. *Cic.* 33,3; *Sest.* 76), he focuses chiefly on Pompey as the great ally who faced great risks while championing Cicero's cause and gathering enough support to procure his recall (*dom.* 30). He speaks highly of Pompey in all of his *post reditum* speeches, including *De domo sua*,⁷³ in which he emphatically notes the strength of their *amicitia* with the use of the rhetorical overstatement *quod enim par amicitiae consularis fuit umquam in hac civitate coniunctius quam fuimus inter nos ego et Cn. Pompeius?* (*dom.* 27), thus implicitly suggesting a bond that surpassed even the one that Laelius shared with Africanus. His *amicitia* with Pompey becomes one of the focal points of the speeches,⁷⁴ likely in an effort to establish himself as Pompey's *amicissimus* (*p. red. in sen.* 29–30), i.e. a close ally and a dear friend (*privato amico*, *p. red. ad Quir.* 16). The public dimension of their *amicitia* guaranteed that Cicero's enemies would not dare attack a man whom Pompey publicly referred to as his *alter ego*.⁷⁵

The reconciliation process between Cicero and Pompey had already begun when Pompey succeeded in effecting Cicero's return to Rome. On his part, Cicero had to convince both the public and Pompey himself that the events surrounding his banishment had not damaged their *amicitia*. On the contrary, based on Cicero's claims, they had ostensibly consolidated it. Through his actions Pompey proved to be an invaluable ally and thus Cicero owed him not only gratitude (*possum ego satis in Cn. Pompeium umquam gratus videri?*, *p. red. in sen.* 29) but even an enormous debt that he had to repay (*tantum debeo, quantum hominem homini debere vix fas est*, *p. red. ad Quir.* 17). In order to restore their relationship fully, in addition to bolstering Pompey's prestige by extolling him publicly for his virtues, his great achievements, and the fame that he had earned

⁷² Marshall (1976, 133 n.6) notes that Cicero was unable to speak frankly in his *post reditum* speeches about the role that the triumvirs played in his exile.

⁷³ Stroh (2004, 314) notes that Cicero has been criticised for the excessive self-praise in *De domo sua*. For a more detailed discussion of *De Domo sua*, see Usher 2008, 72–77 and MacKendrick 1995, 157–76.

⁷⁴ *p. red. in sen.* 30; *p. red. ad Quir.* 16; *dom.* 27, 28.

⁷⁵ *me principem nominavit et ad omnia me alterum se fore dixit* (*Att.* 4,1,7).

(*p. red. in sen.* 5; *p. red. ad Quir.* 16; *dom.* 27–28) and supporting his command of the grain supplies for five years (*Att.* 4,1,7), he had to provide a believable explanation as to why Pompey did not prevent his exile in March 58. Instead of attempting to find excuses for Pompey, he opts to follow a strategy also found in his letter to Crassus; he blames for their short fallout other persons, whom he conveniently does not name (*dom.* 28):

Hanc nostram coniunctionem, hanc conspirationem in re publica bene gerenda, hanc iucundissimam vitae atque officiorum omnium societatem certi homines fictis sermonibus et falsis criminibus diremerunt, cum iidem illum, ut me metueret, me caveret, monerent, iidem apud me mihi illum uni esse inimicissimum dicerent, ut neque ego ab illo quae mihi petenda essent satis audaciter petere possem neque ille tot suspicionibus certorum hominum et scelere exulceratus quae meum tempus postularet satis prolixè mihi polliceretur. Data merces est erroris mei magna, pontifices, ut me non solum pigeat stultitiae meae, sed etiam pudeat: qui, cum me non repentinum aliquod tempus meum, sed veteres multo ante suscepti et provisi labores cum viro fortissimo et clarissimo coniunxissent, sim passus a tali amicitia distrahi neque intellexerim quibus aut ut apertis inimicis obsisterem aut ut insidiosis amicis non crederem.

Notably, he refers to the men who caused the frictions in his *amicitia* with Pompey as *certi homines*. Even though in his letter to Crassus he uses equally vague language in reference to those responsible for his several conflicts with Crassus,⁷⁶ the situation in which he found himself in each case is only ostensibly similar. His correspondence with Atticus suggests that in his letter to Crassus he had to pretend that their conflict was caused by the interference of other persons, as his enmity towards Crassus was not the result of a third party, but of their strong disagreements and their incongruous beliefs.⁷⁷ In contrast, his claim about Pompey must have been more genuine, since he does appear to have believed that Crassus and especially Caesar played a decisive role in Pompey's decision to allow Clodius to have him exiled.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, he was fully aware that he could not attack either one of them publicly. By assigning blame to some unnamed persons, whose baseless accusations against Cicero influenced

⁷⁶ Hall 2009, 73.

⁷⁷ Their mutual animosity is further explored in Brunt 1965, 9, 18 n.6 and Marshall 1976, 113–15.

⁷⁸ Bellemore (2008, 102) argues that Clodius did not intend to force Cicero into exile, but to have him tried for the execution of the five conspirators.

Pompey's perception of him, and by assuming some responsibility for the state of their *amicitia* in 58, he absolves Pompey of any blame for his decision to refrain from protecting him for fear of displeasing the other members of the triumvirate (*Att.* 10,4,3). In order to reconcile with Pompey, he is forced to bend the truth and state that it was his own *error* and his lack of trust in Pompey that pushed Pompey away from him, thereby weakening their bond of *amicitia*.

After his return from exile, the dynamics of his *amicitia* with Pompey had irrevocably changed. Cicero could no longer treat Pompey as an equal or to express to Pompey his disappointment in him, only to embrace the support and protection that Pompey was willing to offer him. Pompey was speaking from a position of strength, whereas Cicero needed to recover from the blow that he had suffered as an exile.⁷⁹ On the surface, their reconciliation was indeed successful. After all, they remained allies until 49 when Cicero chose to support him over Caesar instead of granting Caesar's request to remain neutral (*Att.* 10,8b,1).⁸⁰ Almost a decade later, in his letters to Atticus he notes that he has not forgotten his debt to Pompey and claims that his decision to side with him was influenced by their *amicitia* (*Att.* 7,12,3).⁸¹ Based on these remarks alone it would follow that the fact that they never addressed Pompey's betrayal in 58, but chose to support one another and pretend that it never happened, proved to be an efficacious method of reconciliation.

Nevertheless, in 49 Cicero also makes two references to Pompey's reaction to his exile that paint a distinctively different picture. In February, he enumerates the grave mistakes that Pompey made throughout his political career, including the part that he played in Clodius' *translatio ad plebem* by being present as Augur in Clodius' adoption which enabled Clodius to become a tribune and to draft the

⁷⁹ Nisbet 1961, xvi has been amply quoted for arguing that Cicero's "exile was a disaster from which he never recovered, politically or psychologically".

⁸⁰ See also *Att.* 10,1,2; 10,1A.

⁸¹ Because of the ambiguity of the term, it is impossible to state with absolute certainty, when Cicero uses the term *amicitia*, if it refers only to a political alliance or also to a more personal relationship. In this particular instance, considering his disparaging remarks about Pompey in 49 in his letters to Atticus, with whom he felt a sense of security to speak frankly, it would appear that it is used to refer solely to his political alliance with him. Cohen (2007, 113) rejects the possibility that Cicero saw Pompey as "the lesser of two evils" and attributes his decision to side with Pompey to the gratitude that he owed him for his return from exile.

bills of Cicero's exile (*Att.* 8,3,3).⁸² More importantly, he accuses Pompey that he displayed zeal to help him only after he was exiled instead of trying to prevent his banishment in the first place (*ille restituendi mei quam retinendi studiosior*, *Att.* 8,3,3). A similar -and perhaps even more serious- charge against Pompey can be found in a letter from April in which his language appears to be emotionally charged. He reminds Atticus that Pompey was the person *qui nos sibi quondam ad pedes stratos ne sublevabat quidem* (*Att.* 10,4,3). His remark indicates that the indifference that Pompey displayed towards him and the humiliation that he suffered while begging for Pompey's support in supplication was an experience for which he resented Pompey, despite maintaining a seemingly strong alliance with him after his return in 57. In the same letter, he dismisses the excuse that Pompey used to justify his decision, i.e. that he did not fight against Clodius because he was unable to disregard Caesar's wishes (*Att.* 10,4,3).⁸³ Unsurprisingly, when Pompey was vulnerable and required Cicero's support against Caesar, Cicero only half-heartedly agreed to join him, after spending considerable time discussing his options with Atticus and condemning Pompey's past and current actions and decisions. Therefore, the events of 49 brought to the surface Cicero's underlying issue with Pompey that he had decided to sidestep in order to renew his alliance with him. Nevertheless, to a large extent, it did achieve its purpose; it enabled both men to enjoy the benefits of their *amicitia* which, on a superficial level, was restored both publicly and in Pompey's eyes.

Evidently, Cicero's reconciliation with Atticus, Crassus, and Pompey, i.e. persons from his private and public life, differs considerably. In the public sphere, his reconciliation with Crassus was forced by Pompey and, to an extent, by Caesar.⁸⁴ It had already taken place before the composition of the letter and, likely, before their dinner at Crassipes' place. His letter to Crassus constitutes a public declaration that is meant to please the triumvirate and protect him from accusations of *inconstancia*. Therefore, their reconciliation is effected through the

⁸² On Pompey's and Caesar's role in Clodius' adoption that allowed him to be elected a tribune, see also Shackleton Bailey 1991, 1.

⁸³ In 56 he had already hinted at Pompey's inability to be a loyal friend at his greatest time of need in *Pro Sestio*. In his speech he rejects Clodius' claim that he had Pompey's approval to have him exiled, but also refers to Pompey as *nunc et, quoad licuit, amicissimo* (*Sest.* 39). Seager (1979, 104) notes that Pompey's support of Clodius was essentially a decision that Pompey made to sacrifice Cicero for his own political advancement.

⁸⁴ Marshall 1976, 114.

intervention of Pompey who acts as mediator, through mutual public support and praise, and through the composition of a letter in which Cicero uses exaggeration and makes unfounded claims about the existence of a personal *amicitia* between them. Additionally, he pretends that their conflict was never serious, he shifts the blame for their fallout to other persons who remain unnamed, he refers to current provision of services, and he makes pledges of services. Despite the need to argue repeatedly that his relationship with Crassus was more than a political alliance, his entire correspondence reveals that they never formed a personal *amicitia*, neither did they trust each other enough to consider one another a reliable ally. In contrast, the letters that Cicero sent to Atticus appear to have played a vital role in their eventual reconciliation. Unlike his letter to Crassus, in his correspondence with Atticus, he addresses his disappointment in him, he stresses the damage that Atticus' stance towards him had caused to Cicero's perception of their friendship -thus appealing to their mutual love and affection- and he explains to him how he needs to act in order to restore their relationship. Atticus seems to comply with his requests, he regains Cicero's complete trust in him, and their *amicitia* is properly and fully restored to its state before Cicero's banishment.

His efforts to restore his *amicitia* with Pompey display some striking similarities with his methods of reconciliation both with Atticus and Crassus. While in 62 he is able to express his disappointment in Pompey -as he did in 58 in his letter to Atticus- in order to have Pompey's trust in him restored, in 57 he treats him as he would treat any political ally or enemy with whom he desired to resolve their differences. He follows the same strategy that he adopted with Crassus by praising Pompey in his public speeches, by supporting him in his political career, and by shifting the blame of their temporarily damaged *amicitia* to other unnamed persons. His desire to reconcile with Pompey was so intense that he even pretends that it was partly because of his actions that a rift was created between himself and Pompey. These strategies of reconciliation and their efficacy suggest that in Cicero's time they differed based on the type of relationship that existed between the two parties. In private, friends and equals could address their issues and repair their *amicitia* by making up for the harm they had caused each other, whereas in public, pretence and exaggeration were expected and became an integral part of the reconciliation process. Between politicians, such as Cicero, Crassus, and Pompey, a private resolution of a conflict

was insufficient for the reconciliation to be complete. They had to convince the public that their disagreements were caused by others, as they always supported, respected and loved one another, hence why the dual nature of their *amicitia* as a strong alliance and a private friendship is invariably and emphatically stressed. Despite the commonly held belief that Cicero considered Pompey a friend, the way in which he chose to restore his *amicitia* with him and especially the lack of forthrightness between them after his return from exile indicate that he could not have genuinely considered Pompey anything but a powerful ally to whom he was internally indebted.

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