

individual inscriptions. In order to find out about these and other details, one has, then, to browse through the relevant chapters. This, however, may not necessarily be a bad idea.

To its credit, this book is notable for its overall lack of errors. I did observe some, however. On p.119 we find *Egatius* instead of *Egnatius*, and there are some misspelt names in the bibliography (e.g. “Ceccioni” instead of Cecconi, p. 392). I observed a mistaken interpretation of *CIL* VIII 11115 on p. 139 n. 507, where the honorand, a man of equestrian rank, is said to be the *patruus* of the two dedicators calling themselves imperial freedmen (*Augg. lib[er]t[i]*). That would be an unusual scenario; but what we read (in l.11) is in fact not *patruo* (dative) but *patrui* (nominative), and the two freedmen are the uncles of the equestrian honorand, said to be *domo Ro[ma]*. As he is called L. Septimius Malchio Fortun[a]tus, one can surely conclude that his father, the brother of the freedmen, had also been an imperial freedman, namely a freedman of Septimius Severus and Caracalla and that we have here another instance of an imperial freedman’s son attaining equestrian rank. There are also some details I wondered about, such as the point of the observation on the *clientes* on p. 146 (“der Rang der *clientes* war offenbar immer deutlich niedriger als der des *patronus*”) and the use of the term “*vorchristlich*”, which I think normally refers to the centuries before Constantine, in (apparently) referring to the period BC (p. 186). But these are, relatively speaking, trifles, and I can thus conclude by congratulating the author on the one hand and by presenting my excuses for the delay of this review on the other.

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*Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity*. Edited by ANDREA FALCON. Brill’s Companions to Classical Reception 7. Brill, Leiden 2016. ISBN 978-90-04-26647-6. XV, 512 pp. EUR 182.

Andrea Falcon has edited a fine companion on the reception of Aristotle in antiquity. To my knowledge, this topic has not been previously studied in a single comprehensive collection. Besides, there are areas such as the early Christian reception in which not much earlier research has been done thus far. That is why the companion is and will be an important source for anyone who wishes to form a conception of the breadth and depth of Aristotle’s impact on his successors and critics. Furthermore, since Aristotle, together with Plato, was a figure who could not be easily overlooked by any serious philosopher of the time (or any time), a study of his reception gives a valuable overview of most of ancient philosophy.

In the Introduction, Falcon outlines the main lines of reception, making cautious qualifications based on the present contributions. He notes, for instance, that even if Aristotle did not play a major role in the Hellenistic era, the Epicureans and the Stoics benefitted from his thought much more than F. H. Sandbach conceded. There was a change in the first century BC, when an interest in Aristotle's thinking and works arose not only within Peripatetic circles, but also outside them. This was the time when Andronicus of Rhodes produced the putative edition or rather a catalogue of Aristotle's works, including the school books that were not intended for the general public, and which we nowadays know as the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. This was also the time when the engagement with Aristotle took the form of writing philosophical commentaries, a style in which much of the philosophy was done ever since antiquity (and even beyond that up to the present). As Falcon reminds the reader, Alexander of Aphrodisias was the most influential commentator. His commentaries were very much read even among Platonists. What the Platonists shared with Alexander was his selective engagement with Aristotle. Like Alexander, they more or less overlooked Aristotle's biology. Galen was a notable exception. Unlike Alexander, many Platonists such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius appropriated and incorporated certain Aristotelian ideas into a Platonist framework. Alcinoüs can perhaps be singled out because he appropriated the whole of Peripatetic logic and attributed it to Plato. However, as Falcon emphasizes, none of the aforementioned Platonists applied Aristotelian thought in a uniform way. That is why each philosopher requires consideration in his own right, as is done in the present companion.

The companion is divided into three parts: the Hellenistic reception of Aristotle, the post-Hellenistic engagement with Aristotle, and Aristotle in late antiquity. The post-Hellenistic engagement is further divided into two sections: the Peripatetic tradition and beyond the Peripatetic tradition. In the Introduction, Falcon raises some problems concerning this periodisation and justifies his divisions. All that he says is reasonable, but in the end, the divisions are merely signposts for the reader who browses the contents of the companion. None of the individual chapters is based on the periodisation, because each of them is much more limited in its range than any of the suggested divisions and constitutes a self-standing contribution to the topic. Eleven chapters focus on one or two philosophers, and the rest outline either a single philosophical school in some time, such as Peripatetic ethics in the First Century (by Georgia Tsouni), or a group of philosophers or a phenomenon construed by some other criteria, such as the ancient biographical tradition (by Tiziano Dorandi), *Aristoteles Latinus* (by Christophe Erismann), and early Christian philosophers (by George Karamanolis).

The companion consists of 23 chapters. In the following, I will look more closely into some chapters, choosing one or two from each part of the companion. My intention is to make some observations from the point of view of an Aristotle specialist. I should like to emphasise that my

choice of the chapters is not based on any judgment on their relative value in the companion. I only wish to give some idea of the diversity of the papers.

David Lefebvre introduces the reader to Aristotle's immediate successors in the Peripatetic school. Lefebvre begins by making some critical observations on earlier views about the alleged "decline" of the school: the lack of an overall approach, the narrow focus on historical and empirical research, and the increasingly naturalistic, materialistic, and mechanistic commitments. He singles out for more detailed consideration five philosophers: Theophrastus of Eresus, Strato of Lampsacus, Lyco of Troas, Aristo of Ceos, and Critolaus of Phaselis. The first two receive a proper discussion, whereas the latter three are treated, understandably, very briefly, with some observations on the titles of their works, and on the descriptions of their views in later authors. That Lefebvre focuses on Theophrastus and Strato is well justified, considering the evidence that we have on these thinkers. He points out that Theophrastus is the only successor to Aristotle whose work testifies to a "global research project" (p. 17). Indeed, Theophrastus extended Aristotle's research programme in many areas, including botany and logic. Lefebvre divides Theophrastus' work into three large blocks: (i) physics, logic, botanical treatises; (ii) history of physical doctrines in *Physical Opinions*, (iii) *Metaphysics*. Lefebvre makes interesting remarks about each, but I failed to see why he did not treat logic separately and with more emphasis. Even if he mentions Theophrastus' contributions to hypothetical syllogistic and modal logic in a footnote, that is, to my mind, disproportionate to a two-page discussion of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, which is characterised as a "farewell address to metaphysical studies" (p. 20). However, I found the discussion of Strato and the impact of the loss of Aristotle's library to the school very illuminating.

Myrto Hatzimichali discusses Andronicus of Rhodes and the construction of the Aristotelian Corpus. Hatzimichali introduces the reader to a well-known ancient story about the loss and rediscovery of Aristotle's works that we find in Strabo's *Geography* 13.1.54 and Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* 26. She then sets the story in context, ancient and modern scholarship alike, focusing on the role of Andronicus of Rhodes. In agreement with earlier scholarship, she argues that there is no evidence that Andronicus pursued textual criticism. Instead, Andronicus' contribution was to organize the corpus and to discuss questions of authenticity. The way in which he organized the corpus proved to be very influential and is in evidence still today, even if most of his successors were not convinced about his argument that the *De interpretatione* and Chapters 10–15 of the *Categories* were not authentic. In the course of the discussion, Hatzimichali makes several interesting observations about Andronicus' work, including his impact on the perception of what is the "essential Aristotle" (p. 93), namely the esoteric or acroamatic writings that constitute the Corpus as we know it today.

Galen is well known for his admiration and development of Hippocrates and Plato, but R. J. Hankinson shows that this applies to Aristotle, too. He discusses Galen's debts to Aristotle and his

divergences from him in four areas: logic and demonstration, physics and metaphysics, physiology and embryology, and psychology. Hankinson shows that Galen's understanding of scientific demonstration is predominantly Aristotelian, but there is one thing in which Galen proceeds even further, namely relational inferences (e.g.  $A = B$ ,  $B = C$ , therefore  $A = C$ ), which are not treated in categorical syllogistic. According to Hankinson, Galen's elemental physics is based on Aristotle's, and so is his distinction between active and passive potentialities, even if Galen criticises Aristotle's definition of time as being inconsistent. Galen also rejects Aristotle's view that every generated thing is destroyed at some time. Furthermore, Hankinson points out that Galen rejects some key ideas in Aristotle's physiology, embryology and psychology, for instance, his claims that the gall-bladder is a useless residual, that the female does not supply form to the foetus, and that the main function of the brain is cooling. The overview that Hankinson gives is impressive. As a reader, I would have expected to be told briefly why Galen considers the soul to be undiscoverable (p. 253), because that would have helped to understand the contrast between Galen's and Aristotle's methodologies in the study of nature. Hankinson has discussed the matter extensively elsewhere. In the present chapter, he says nothing about Galen's efforts in textual criticism, but Hatzimichali (p. 97) discusses this aspect of Galen's work. A cross-reference to Hatzimichali would have been helpful to those readers who might not otherwise read her chapter.

Plotinus criticizes Aristotle's thought extensively, but it is not entirely clear which Aristotle he is in fact criticizing, and what he makes of the Peripatetic views that he does not reject outright. In the past fifty years, many scholars have based their responses to these questions on a careful study of *Enneads* 6.1–3 (*On the genera of being*). However, Sara Magrin questions this approach and argues that since Plotinus approaches Aristotle's views in different ways in different contexts, one should not try to give a systematic interpretation of Plotinus' reception of Aristotle's doctrines. Instead, she suggests, one should make an attempt to see how Plotinus pursues his philosophical study. Magrin argues that it is because of his philosophical method that Plotinus is engaged with Aristotle's philosophy. In fact, Magrin suggests that Plotinus shares Aristotle's method as it is presented in *Metaphysics* 3.1 and commented on in detail by Alexander of Aphrodisias (*In Metaph.* 171.14–172.2). The method is the analysis of *aporiai*, which requires the examination of different philosophical opinions on the subject matter under investigation. Given that, Magrin argues, Plotinus is interested in studying Aristotle's views because his method requires him to consider relevant views, including Aristotle's. That means, for instance, that Plotinus did not primarily wish to show that the problems that are inherent in Aristotle's views can be resolved within his own Platonist framework. There is no doubt that this interpretation will raise discussion among Plotinus specialists. What I found somewhat puzzling was the way in which Magrin contrasted Plotinus with Aristotle and Alexander. She says: "Aristotle does say that an *aporia* is like a knot and that one needs to know what this knot is in order to be able to

untie it, but neither he nor Alexander in his commentary [on *Metaphysics*] ever suggests that, even if the *aporia* remains unsolved, the mere knowledge of what is problematic in it is useful. This is Plotinus' own view, and it is, of course, quintessentially Socratic, for it is the view that one needs to know that one does not know in order to have any hope of attaining some positive knowledge." (p. 274). Magrin may be right about the value of unsolved *aporiai* for Aristotle and Alexander. However, I was wondering if Aristotle and Alexander could possibly agree that knowledge of one's own lack of knowledge is a starting point of any inquiry. Even if the two do not conceptualize the starting point of inquiry in terms of the knowledge of lack of knowledge, they agree that we start with one type of knowledge, namely knowledge of facts, and proceed to another type of knowledge, namely knowledge of the causes of those facts. That implies that in the beginning we do not know the causes, and we realize that we do not know them, or else we do not start the inquiry.

Unlike his master Plotinus, Porphyry had a tendency to see Plato and Aristotle in harmony, a view which became popular, though not universal, among late ancient commentators (exceptions include Themistius and Philoponus). Riccardo Chiaradonna does not deny this general picture, but considers it too simple. In his contribution, he focuses on Porphyry as a first Platonist commentator on the *Categories*. Additionally, he makes observations on his other writings, such as the *Life of Plotinus* and *Isagoge*, and compares and contrasts his philosophical approach with those of Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus. In opposition to Jonathan Barnes and Sten Ebbesen, Chiaradonna argues that Porphyry's logic, as outlined in the extant short question-and-answer commentary on the *Categories* and the *Isagoge*, is not independent from ontological commitments (p. 325). According to Chiaradonna, Porphyry considered the *Categories* chiefly as a work of semantics, but also took it to supply a correct account of sensible beings. This is, then, how Aristotle's work provided a starting point for the study of logic and metaphysics which, however, has to be supplemented by a Platonist approach to intelligible beings. Chiaradonna finishes his chapter by considering the sources and impact of Porphyry's reconciliatory interests, for the former especially Ammonius Saccas, and for the latter Hierocles of Alexandria. He convincingly considers plausible Heinrich Dörrie's hypothesis that Porphyry's lost book on the agreement between Plato and Aristotle is a major source for Hierocles' account of Ammonius' teaching in a lost treatise *On Providence* that is partly preserved in Photius (pp. 332–33).

To conclude, I think that the companion as a whole is a substantial addition to literature on Aristotle's reception. Due to the subject matter, each chapter requires some basic knowledge of the Aristotelian corpus and the philosophers discussed. That is why the companion is most useful for advanced students who wish to acquaint themselves with the topic as a whole or some part of it. It is likely that many readers will want to use the companion selectively. That is possible because each chapter is independent of the others, and the companion includes a general index and an *index*

*locorum*. In the Introduction, the editor passes the following judgment: “In my view, the value of any companion, including this one, lies in its capacity not only to collect and synthesize existing scholarship but also to open new avenues of research and to show what remains to be done in a field of study” (p. IX). As a reader, I can agree with this judgment in general and in this particular case.

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FRANCESCO MASSA: *Tra la vigna e la croce. Dioniso nei discorsi letterari e figurativi cristiani (II–IV secolo)*. Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 47. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2014. ISBN 978-3-515-10631-3. 325 pp. EUR 62.

This monograph by the Italian scholar Francesco Massa (henceforth F.M.) represents the result of his PhD thesis, discussed at the École Pratique des Hautes Études de Paris and at the Fondazione San Carlo di Modena. The focus is on the Greek god Dionysus – not merely the deity related to vines and wine, but above all the deity of cosmic dynamism – and his variegated connections to Jesus Christ. The similarities between Dionysus and Christ have been pointed out by Christian and Pagan writers from the first centuries onward: they were both born from a supreme god and were bearers of crucial innovations in life and in religion. They were also both killed violently and were then reborn and raised to heaven. Dionysus was, moreover, also – so to speak – *unus et trinus*, if we think of Nonnus of Panopolis’ *Dionysiaca*, in which Zagreus, Dionysus and Iacchus/Bacchus appear. The latter, from which derives the verb *bakkhéuo*, is often related to Maenadism and its rituals, as for example E.R. Dodds, HThR 33.3 (1940), 155–176 notes. There are also similarities with other ancient gods or heroes, such as Asclepius and Herakles. F.M. retraces the information not only at the level of literary sources, but also at the level of figurative representations, offering a complete sketch of the issues. His field of investigation is limited to the period from the II to the IV century AD, but he often wanders with ease among other historical periods, taking the reader on a journey of cultural mediation.

In taking a general look at the work’s structure, we will for practical reasons follow its order. I agree with what Nicole Belayche points out in the preface (pp. 5–7) that the great merit of the author is the attention he gives to a very variegated problem without using outdated functional oppositions, such as the dichotomy between Paganism and Christianity. Instead he chooses a new path for research based on the communication channels between these two subjects. Their great similarity – we no doubt anticipate this – is wine (along with its uses and values), while the two crucial matters of the study are the contacts between these two possibly competing cults and their definitions of