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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON PAY FOR ATHENIAN MILITARY FORCES AT POTIDAEA (432–430/29 B.C.) AND IN SICILY (415–413 B.C.)

STEPHEN O'CONNOR

In a work on pay and provisioning that has been constantly cited since its publication as the authoritative treatment of these subjects,¹ W. K. Pritchett argued that the standard rate of pay for Athenian hoplites and sailors in the late fifth century was three obols per day.² His argument can be summarized as follows. Pritchett noted (correctly) that Thucydides used the terms *μισθός* and *τροφή* synonymously for payments to soldiers and sailors.³ He concluded from this that, in the fifth century at least, *μισθός* and *τροφή* were meant for the purchase of rations only: "[j]ust as dikastic pay was for maintenance, so the stratiotic pay made to citizens in the fifth century was for purchase of rations".⁴ This conclusion—or rather, assumption—provided the grounds for the next step in Pritchett's hypothesis: since dikasts (from 425) received a *μισθός* for their service of three obols per day for their maintenance, soldiers should have needed no more

¹ See, e.g., Kallet-Marx 1993, 10 n.29, 120 n.30, 133 n.64; Tritle 2010, 64–65 n.39; Rhodes 2013, 206 n.23; and further at n.22 below.

² Pritchett 1971. Although the view that three obols was the standard rate of pay for Athenian military forces in the period of the Peloponnesian War has a long history (see Böckh 1886, 344; Schultheß 1932, 2085; Gomme 1956, 275–76), Pritchett has been the only scholar to construct a fully developed argument for this view.

³ Pritchett 1971, 3–6, esp. 4–5 for argument and examples; and see Loomis 1998, 33 n.6 for additional instances in Thucydides of *μισθός* and *τροφή* referring to the same payment. See also Loomis 1998, 56 for a summation of Pritchett's argument.

⁴ Pritchett 1971, 6. Cook (1990, 78) follows Pritchett expressly on this point. See also Pritchett 1971, 27 (cf. *ibid.* 40): "[i]n military economics, the concept of any pay except for sustenance was primarily a development of the period after the Peloponnesian War and of mercenary service".

for their daily maintenance.⁵ Thus—and this was the climax of the argument—the customary daily rate of pay in the late fifth century for Athenian forces, from which men on campaign had to buy their food, was three obols.⁶

To defend these claims, Pritchett had to explain away the several mentions in Thucydides of a rate of pay of one drachma a day to Athenian soldiers and sailors during the Peloponnesian War—Thucydides five times explicitly mentions this rate being paid between 432 and 413, as opposed to his sole mention of a rate of three obols per day being paid in or around 412⁷—since this was an amount that was twice what dikasts received in Athens in the same years for their daily maintenance.⁸ Pritchett attempted to do this by asserting that the higher rate of one drachma per day was necessary because of the exceptional circumstances of some Athenians overseas expeditions. He stated that "a special rate obtained [at Potidaea, as it did] later for those dispatched to Syracuse", since "... as we are explicitly told about the expedition to Syracuse, trophe [sic] was going to be difficult to obtain and a higher rate [of pay] was in order [at Potidaea]".⁹ He developed this point further by asserting that the higher rate of pay "given on protracted overseas campaigns at Potidaea and Syracuse must reflect, in part, unusual conditions in procuring food when abroad".¹⁰ By "unusual conditions", Pritchett meant inflated food prices in markets offered to soldiers and sailors, as can be seen by the references he cited to support his point: Xen., *An.* 1,5,6; 3,2,21; and Arist., [*Oec.*] 2,2,7, 1347a32–1347b2.¹¹

⁵ Pritchett 1971, 23.

⁶ Pritchett 1971, 16–17.

⁷ Loomis 1998, 56. See also Thuc. 6,8,1: the Egestaeans' offer of sixty talents to pay for one month's service by sixty Athenian triremes predicated on each trireme's two hundred crew members being paid at a rate of one drachma per day.

⁸ See Loomis 1998, 16–17 for sources for dikasts' pay in Athens in the late fifth century; cf. Rhodes 1981, 338–340. A complicating factor for Pritchett's argument—and one that he does not mention—is that dikast pay was meant not just for the dikast, but for his family as well. Cf. Markle 1985, 277, and see esp. Ar., *Vesp.* 300–1: out of a pittance a member of the chorus has to get a meal for a family of three: "ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦδέ με τοῦ μισθορίου / τρίτον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἄλφιτα δεῖ καὶ ζύλα κῶψον".

⁹ Pritchett 1971, 16.

¹⁰ Pritchett 1971, 23.

¹¹ Pritchett 1971, 23–24. At (1971, 23) Pritchett has *Anab.* 3.2.2 and [Aristotle] *Oec.* 2.2.7.1347a; that he is, however, referring to *An.* 3,2,21 and *Oec.* 2,2,7, 1347a32–1347b2 is clear from his description of the passages.

Loomis, in the only major study dedicated to payments to soldiers and sailors in classical Athens to have appeared since Pritchett's work on military pay, made several criticisms of Pritchett's work as part of a larger argument that one drachma per day was the regular rate of pay for Athenian military forces in the late fifth century (until 412 or so).¹² Loomis agreed with Pritchett that *μισθός* and *τροφή* were synonymous in Thucydides but came to a different conclusion from this observation: for Loomis, both represented "gross pay", i.e. ration-money plus pay.¹³ Loomis cited three points in support of his conclusion, and against Pritchett. Firstly, he pointed out that "there is no affirmative reason why *μισθός*/*τροφή* should be ration-money alone".¹⁴ Secondly, Thucydides' use of the word *μισθός* for mercenary pay implied that *μισθός* was for more than just ration-money, since mercenaries were unlikely to serve merely for subsistence. Thirdly, since other payments for daily maintenance in Athens ranged from one to three obols, then *μισθός* or *τροφή* of one drachma must have covered and exceeded the daily cost of rations. Against Pritchett's argument that food costs may have been higher in Potidaea or Sicily, Loomis argued that: "[t]hat is possible, but the opposite is at least as likely: in the countryside, closer to the source of supply (e.g., in Sicily), food might have been cheaper than in the city".¹⁵

Kallet, however, in a study of the usage of *μισθός* and *τροφή* in book 8 of Thucydides,¹⁶ in which she argued that Thucydides used *trophe* in a restricted sense, "as a kind of subcategory of *misthos*", in order to characterize the "hand-to-mouth existence" of the Spartans in book 8,¹⁷ pointed out that Loomis' arguments against Pritchett were not entirely dispositive.¹⁸ She accepted Loomis'

¹² Loomis 1998, 33–36 and 55–56.

¹³ "Gross pay" quoted from Loomis 1998, 34.

¹⁴ Loomis 1998, 34: "[W]ithout actually saying so, Pritchett seemed to assume that *τροφή* was the ancestor of *σιτηρέσιον*, i.e., he seemed intuitively to give weight to its narrower meaning of "food" rather than to its broader meaning of "means of support", but this is not necessary and indeed, given the fact that *τροφή* is used synonymously with *μισθός*, the broader meaning arguably is *more* likely".

¹⁵ Loomis 1998, 35–36.

¹⁶ Kallet 2001, 295–308.

¹⁷ Kallet 2001, 298.

¹⁸ Kallet (2001, 296) states, as a justification for taking up this subject again, that "[t]he very

point about μισθός and mercenary pay as valid, "though it is not clear that, while [it is] a reasonable assumption, [it] is a necessary one".¹⁹ But Kallet's main challenge to Loomis concerned the point that pay of one drachma must have exceeded the daily cost of maintenance: she argued that "we cannot be certain that the procurement of food in the field was not more expensive, requiring a higher monetary allotment"²⁰ and that Loomis' response to Pritchett that food should have been in fact cheaper at Potidaea and Syracuse did not seem to her "to carry the necessary weight, since one could easily imagine that the market value may have increased prices given the necessity of the demand".²¹

There is therefore an impasse between Loomis and Pritchett, the two most thorough treatments ever published of the rates of pay of Athenian military forces in the late fifth century, an impasse caused primarily by disagreement over whether or not exceptionally high food prices expected in the markets during Athenian campaigns at Potidaea and in Sicily caused the payment of a higher rate of pay for these campaigns, and whose existence can be seen in the continuing hesitation of several major scholars to choose between a rate of pay of three obols and one drachma in recent discussions of Athenian military pay and state expenditures.²² Is there a way to get out of this impasse? This arti-

fact that Pritchett and Loomis, while agreeing on the synonymy of *trophe* and *misthos*, arrive at opposite conclusions about their meaning, should alert us to the problematic nature of the evidence of Thucydides, and the difficulty of forcing his terminology into strict synonyms with a consistent meaning, whether 'ration-money' or 'full pay'. As will be shown in this article, however, Pritchett's treatment can be demonstrated to be certainly incorrect on this topic, and Loomis' to be certainly right.

¹⁹ Kallet 2001, 296.

²⁰ Kallet 2001, 296.

²¹ Kallet 2001, 296 n.4.

²² Kallet's objections to Loomis were one of the reasons she did not accept one drachma per day as a standard rate of pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers during the first decades of the Peloponnesian War: see 2001, 53 and n.115 (with n.53 below). See also Samons 2000, 89 n.27 (cf. 93, 207, 208, 306): hesitation, caused by Pritchett's arguments, over whether the normal rate of Athenian pay before 412 was three obols or one drachma (but see Samons 2000, 235 and n.87: one drachma rate "probable" rate of pay in late fifth century). See, too, Raflaub 2007, 99 and 120 n.9 citing both Loomis and Pritchett for the view that men on-board Athenian triremes were paid between three obols and one drachma per day. See also n.1 for other recent works on fifth century Athenian military finance citing Pritchett's work as an authority on Athenian military pay. In light of these works, it can be seen that Pritchard (2012, 40) was incorrect to state that, after Loomis' work, "[t]he case may

cle will demonstrate that there is. In reacting to Pritchett, Loomis did not provide a strong rebuttal to the argument that unusually high prices caused the one drachma rate at Potidaea and in Sicily; he neither examined the passages from Thucydides (3,17,3–4; 6,22) on which Pritchett's arguments were based nor the detail of Pritchett's arguments about these texts (nor did Kallet in reacting to Loomis).²³ This article will do this work, in order to demonstrate that there is no textual basis for Pritchett's argument that Athenian soldiers and sailors received a higher than usual rate of one drachma per day as compensation for expected higher than usual prices during their campaigns at Potidaea and in Sicily²⁴—and therefore that we should accept Loomis' arguments, based on the weight of the Thucydidean evidence, that one drachma per day was the usual rate of pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers in the late fifth century.²⁵

Pritchett argued that there was explicit support for his argument for an extraordinarily high rate of pay given to the men of the Sicilian expedition "in the speech of Nikias (Thucydides 6,22) in which he states that it will not be every city which can receive the expedition and continues: "τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν ἐτοιμάσασθαι καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἐτέροις γίνεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ χρήματα

now be closed that the daily pay for Athenian sailors and hoplites was 1 dr. per day between 433/2 and 412/11".

²³ From this point on, all text references will be to Thucydides, unless otherwise indicated.

²⁴ Marinovic (1988, 168) and Rawlings (2007, 118, 170) follow Pritchett explicitly on this point; see also Markle (1985, 276) following Pritchett on three obols being the standard rate of pay for fifth century Athenian military forces. In addition, Marinovic and Rawlings, as well as Markle (1985, 277) and Dalby (1992, 25 n.66), follow Pritchett in taking 6,22 as evidence that soldiers and sailors on campaign were regularly charged extortionate prices for their food by cities and traders.

²⁵ I note here that Gallo, in his important study of Athenian state pay in the fifth and fourth centuries, had already argued against the idea that special conditions on campaign abroad led to a higher rate of pay of one drachma per day in the late fifth century (1987, 36–40). The main point of Gallo's argument was that it was not the pay of one drachma per day at Potidaea and for the Sicilian expedition that was the exceptional feature of these campaigns, but the payment of this standard rate of pay to an exceptional amount of men for an exceptional amount of time. This is a valid and valuable point, but I aim to demonstrate in this article that one can go further than this, especially since Gallo did not argue specifically against the point crucial to Pritchett's argument that the one drachma per day rate was given to men on Athenian overseas campaigns in the expectation that they would find extraordinarily high prices in the markets they bought their food in while operating abroad.

αὐτόθεν ὡς πλείστα ἔχειν".²⁶ Simply put, however, Pritchett misread this part of 6,22. In this section of his speech to the assembly on the preparations required for the Sicilian expedition, Nicias requested that the expedition bring its own grain from Athens in merchant ships, together with bakers requisitioned from the mills there, in order that, if the expedition was detained (on its voyage to and around Sicily) by bad weather, it might have provisions, "for it is not every city that will be able to receive a force as large as ours", "(πολλὴ γὰρ οὐσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι)". That is, Nicias did see a potential problem for the provisioning of the expedition on its voyage to Sicily because of its size—but he requested the dispatch of supply ships with the expedition to solve this problem, not money.

Moreover, consideration of Nicias' speech to the assembly as an entirety shows conclusively that he did not consider inflated prices in markets a possible difficulty for the expedition to Sicily. At 6,22, Nicias outlined the special requirements in men and materiel necessary to meet the particular strengths of the Sicilian Greeks, which he had described at 6,20,3–4. Thus, to counteract the hoplites of the Sicilian cities, the Athenians would need to bring hoplites in large numbers; to neutralize the Sicilians' superiority in cavalry, they would need to bring many archers and slingers. The request for supply ships was one of two measures Nicias demanded to meet the Sicilian cities' advantage over the expedition from Athens in grain supplies: the other was for a great superiority in triremes, to provide security for the ships carrying grain to the expedition from nearby friendly states once it had established itself in Sicily. Nicias' final demands were those quoted by Pritchett above: "we must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not to be dependent on others"—and to counter the other major resource of the Sicilian Greeks (especially Selinus and Syracuse) he had mentioned at 6,20,4 namely their sizeable monetary resources—"and above all we must take with us from home as much money as

²⁶ 6,22: "We must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from home as much money as possible". (This translation, and all others of Thucydides in this article, is taken from Crawley.) See Pritchett 1971, 23 for the quoted passage; see 1971, 16 for this passage "explicitly" indicating that the men on the expedition were to receive higher rates of pay on account of the difficulties of procuring food on campaign. See also Cook 1990, 76 who states of the Sicilian expedition (without citing any ancient evidence) that "the Athenians were also concerned about the availability of provisions [for the expedition], and thus by implication about their cost".

possible, as the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way".²⁷ Nicias thus explicitly and markedly separated off the problem of the required money for the force from his proposed solutions to the problems of acquiring sufficient grain for the force by including the issue of money under *τά τε ἄλλα*—all those other things apart from men, ships, and grain that the expedition would need to achieve success in Sicily. At 6,22, in other words, there is no connection made between availability or resources of grain and money (just as there is not in Nicias' description of the resources of the Sicilian Greeks at 6,20,3–4): they are treated as separate problems, to be dealt with in different ways. There is therefore no evidence in Nicias' speech that he considered unusually high prices in the markets in which the Athenians would be buying their provisions as a potential difficulty for the expedition to Sicily, and no suggestion in his demands for the expedition that a higher rate of pay would be necessary for the members of the expedition to make allowance for the problem of unusually high prices during the campaign.

As for Potidaea, Pritchett stated that the (supposedly) especially high rate of pay given to the Athenian forces who besieged this city could be explained (by "reasonable inference"²⁸ from the conditions on the expedition to Syracuse) by the expectation of high prices being charged to Athenian soldiers and sailors for their food during the siege. As I have just demonstrated, however, there is no evidence that the Athenians were concerned that their forces on the expedition to Sicily would have to pay inflated prices for their food. There is also no evidence that Athenian concern about high prices abroad caused them to grant their forces at Potidaea an especially high rate of pay.

Pritchett's view on this matter was based on C. F. Smith's commentary on 3,17,3–4, which questioned the authenticity of this passage:²⁹

In section 3, after the sent. *καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπανήλωσε μετὰ Ποτειδαίας*, the absence of any mention of

²⁷ The Egestaeans had promised money for the expedition on its arrival in Sicily (6,6,2; 6,8,1–2), but Nicias had already voiced his suspicions about their ability to provide this money in his first speech to the assembly (6,12,1). These suspicions are borne out at 6,46.

²⁸ Pritchett 1971, 16.

²⁹ Quoted at Pritchett 1971, 15–16. Note that the section of 3,17 after the clause in Greek quoted by Smith is, in fact, 3,17,4.

the 4,000 hoplites and 3,000 cavalry of Hagnon and Cleopompus (ii.58), can be explained only on a rather improbable assumption, unless the chapter be ascribed to an interpolator. It must be assumed that the 4,000 hoplites were not δίδραχμοι, but received less pay, and that in explanation of the great expenses occasioned by Potidaea especial stress was laid upon the high pay of two of the armies fitted out for the recapture of the city.

Following Smith's line of reasoning here, Pritchett agreed that one could explain the lack of mention of the force under Hagnon and Cleopompus at 3,17,3–4 and thus take this passage as genuine only by assuming that Hagnon and Cleopompus's force was not paid at the same unusually high rate that the forces participating in the blockade of Potidaea were.³⁰ Pritchett made this assumption and attributed the special rate of pay given to the hoplites participating in the siege of Potidaea to the difficulty of obtaining food there, that is, to the high food prices being charged in the market in the Athenian camp at Potidaea.³¹ There is, however, another, much simpler explanation for the absence of a mention of Hagnon and Cleopompus's force in Thucydides' accounting of the expenses of the Potidaea campaign at 3,17,4: the fact that it took only a minimal part in the operations at Potidaea and therefore did not contribute in any significant way to the huge expense of the siege of that city. A brief overview of the campaign will establish this.³²

³⁰ Pritchett 1971, 16. For a cogent defense of the authenticity of 3,17,4 and its placement at 3,17,4, based on an analysis of the passage's function within the surrounding narrative context, see Kallet-Marx 1993, 130–134.

³¹ Pritchett did not actually state this in so many words, but that this is what he meant is clear from his discussion at 1971, 16, 23–24: see again p. 108.

³² Here I develop a point made by Gomme 1956, 275 on 3,17,4: "[e]dd. note that no mention is made of Hagnon's force of 4,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry (2,56,2, 2,58,1) that made the unsuccessful attempt to take Poteidaia by storm. This was a short campaign and hardly counted as part of the siege of Poteidaia". Detailed argumentation for this point is still necessary here, however, for two reasons: firstly, because many recent studies have followed the later work of Pritchett on pay (and thus his assumption that no mention is made of Hagnon's force at 3,17,4 because it was paid at a lower rate than the original forces sent out to Potidaea); and secondly, because Gomme, in his treatment of 3,17,4, also mistakenly assumed that the rate of pay for the hoplites at Potidaea was especially high, though not for the same reason as Pritchett: see nn.43, 46 below.

At 3,17,3–4, Thucydides narrates that:

καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπανήλωσε μετὰ Ποτειδαίας. Τὴν τε γὰρ Ποτειδαίαν δίδραχμοὶ ὀπλίται ἐφρούρουσαν (αὐτῷ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρετῆι δραχμὴν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας), τρισχίλιοι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι, ὧν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διεπολιόρησαν, ἑξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι μετὰ Φορμίωνος, οἱ προαπῆλον· νῆές τε αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν μισθὸν ἔφερον, τὰ μὲν οὖν χρήματα οὕτως ὑπανηλώθη τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ νῆες τοσαῦται δὴ πλεῖσται ἐπληρώθησαν.

it was this,³³ with Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues— [4] Potidaea being blockaded by a force of hoplites (each drawing two drachmas a day, one for himself and another for his slave-attendant), which amounted to three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it was over; and the ships being all paid at the same rate. In this way [Athens'] money was wasted at first; and this was the largest number of ships ever manned by her.

The first three thousand hoplites (together with many allies of the Athenians) were sent to Potidaea in the summer of 432 (1,61,4 (cf. 1,57,6; 1,61,1)). They succeeded in building a wall which shut off Potidaea from the rest of the Chalcidide, but were not enough in number both to garrison this first wall and simultaneously build another wall on the Pallene peninsula in order to completely enclose Potidaea with siege-works (1,64,1). Hence, later in the same summer, sixteen hundred hoplites, under the generalship of Phormio, were sent from Athens, who, after arriving at the Pallene peninsula and ravaging some of the country there (1,64,2), completed the wall shutting off Potidaea from the rest of the peninsula (1,64,3). From this point on, Potidaea was fully under a siege "which was prosecuted vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, where a

³³ By "this", Thucydides was referring to 3,17,2 and his mention there of one hundred ships guarding Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and another hundred sailing around the Peloponnese. See pp. 118–119 for further discussion of these ships.

fleet blockaded it".³⁴ All of the ships blockading Potidaea drew the same pay, according to Thucydides (3,17,4), as the hoplites manning the siege-works—that is, one drachma per day.³⁵

When the investment of Potidaea was complete, Phormio took his troops and ravaged Chalcidide and Bottiaea (and captured some cities in these regions) (1,65,3). In the summer of 431, Thucydides narrates that Phormio joined forces with Perdiccas against the Chalcidians (2,29,6). At 2,31,2, however, when Thucydides is enumerating the forces of the Athenians in the field in the autumn of 431, he only lists three thousand hoplites at Potidaea, which must be the original force of three thousand sent in 432 (1,61,4);³⁶ while, at 2.58.2, describing the situation at Potidaea in the summer of 430, and particularly the effects of the plague among the Athenian forces stationed there, Thucydides states that Phormio and his sixteen hundred men were no longer in the Chalcidide and thus had escaped the plague. We should therefore most probably assume, then,³⁷ that Phormio and his men returned to Athens soon after the campaign against the Chalcidians in the summer of 431 described at 2,29,6 (and this is why Thucydides states at 3,17,4 that they went away before the siege was over), and that Thucydides mentioned them at 2,58,2 only to distinguish them from the men exposed to the plague at Potidaea.³⁸ For in the summer of 430, Hagnon and Cleopompus had been sent from Athens with a force of four thousand hoplites, three hundred cavalry, and one hundred and fifty ships (2,56,2; 2,58,1) to Potidaea to help bring a quick end to the siege there (which, by this stage, had dragged on for two years). But they brought the plague from Athens with them, so that it even broke out amongst the soldiers of the first expedition (2,58,2) (it is at this point that Thucydides mentions that Phormio and his men were no longer in the Chalcidide), so that Hagnon had to take his forces back to Athens, having lost one thousand and fifty out of his four thousand hoplites, after only forty days of

³⁴ 1,64,3: "καὶ οὕτως ἤδη κατὰ κράτος ἡ Ποτεΐδαια ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐπολιορκεῖτο καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐφορμούσαις".

³⁵ 3,17,3: "νήες τε αἰ πάσαι τὸν αὐτὸν μισθὸν ἔφερον". See Loomis 1998, 39 n.28: all commentators on this passage agreeing on taking νήες as metonymy for the sailors and these sailors (since they had no slave-attendants) being paid one drachma per day.

³⁶ Gomme 1956, 93.

³⁷ Following Rhodes 1988, 215; see also Fantasia (2003, 351) holding the same view.

³⁸ Rhodes 1988, 236.

campaigning (2,58,3). The original forces stayed on, continuing to man the siege until, finally, in the winter of 430/29, the Potidaeans surrendered (2,70).

In his description of the failed campaign of Hagnon (and Cleopompus), Thucydides twice contrasts their forces with the soldiers of the first expedition whom Thucydides specifies as "τοὺς προτέρους στρατιώτας" (2,58,2) and "οἱ δὲ πρότεροι στρατιῶται" (2,58,3). These latter were the soldiers who had been prosecuting the siege since 432.³⁹ They eventually spent two and a half years in all at Potidaea. The fleet mentioned at 1,64,3 presumably spent the same amount of time blockading Potidaea (see again 3,17,4). Phormio and his men played a key role in completing the siege-works around the city and spent at least one year in the general area of operations.⁴⁰ If we return to 3,17,4, then, we can now see why Hagnon and Cleopompus' forces are not mentioned there. Contra Smith and Pritchett, the lack of mention of Hagnon and Cleopompus and the forces they commanded at 3,17,4 does not imply "that those who participated in the siege were the only ones who were paid at a rate higher than usual".⁴¹ They are not mentioned by Thucydides, rather, because they played such a very small role in the operations at Potidaea—they participated in the siege for only forty out of its nine hundred days or so—and therefore the amounts paid to them—in contrast to the pay given to the first three thousand hoplites sent to Potidaea in 432, the sixteen hundred hoplites sent out under Phormio in that year, and the triremes which completed the blockade of the city by sea—contributed very little to the exhaustion of Athenian financial resources that is the focus of 3,17, and which the Potidaea campaign played a major role in bringing about. The fact that the force sent out from Athens in 430 under Hagnon and Cleopompus is not included in Thucydides' reckoning up of the major expenses of the siege of Potidaea is therefore in no way an indication that the pay for any force employed during the siege was unusually high on account of unusually high prices in the

³⁹ Cf. 3,17,4 where the three thousand men sent out from Athens in 432 are referred to as "οἱ πρῶτοι".

⁴⁰ Gomme (1956, 165) believed it possible that they could have stayed till the early summer of 430.

⁴¹ Pritchett 1971, 16.

camp market there⁴² (and therefore we do not, contra Pritchett (and Smith), have to postulate these higher prices and pay to 'save' the authenticity of 3,17).⁴³

There is therefore no foundation for Pritchett's arguments that the one drachma per day rate paid to the soldiers and sailors on the Potidaean campaign, and to the members of the Sicilian expedition, was set by the Athenian state in the expectation that these men would find high prices in the markets they provisioned in during these campaigns. And it is possible, in fact, to go further than this and adduce explicit evidence from Thucydides that the one drachma rate was a regular rate and not paid as a result of special conditions (in markets) on prolonged overseas campaigns. Firstly, to return to 3,17,4, and to develop a point made by Luigi Gallo, Thucydides in this passage, in reckoning up the enormous burden the Athenians' campaigning in the first years of the Peloponnesian War had placed on their state finances, stated that the ships were being "all paid at the same rate" ("νήες τε αἰ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν μισθὸν ἔφερον"). As

⁴² Note that there is a major problem in the logic of Pritchett's argument that Hagnon and Cleopompus' force were paid at a lower rate than the original forces sent out to Potidaea: there is no reason (and none given by Pritchett) why the forces under Hagnon and Cleopompus should not have faced the same supposed difficulties in obtaining food at Potidaea, i.e. the same supposedly high prices charged in the market for the besiegers, as the original force sent out; therefore, following Pritchett's logic, the forces sent out in the summer of 430 should have been paid at the same rate as the original force to take account of the unchanged conditions at Potidaea, and therefore should have been mentioned by Thucydides at 3,17,4 (where they are not, of course).

⁴³ Gomme (1956, 275) stated that the two drachmas given to hoplites at Potidaea were "clearly a special rate" paid because of the special hardships experienced by the Athenian forces besieging Potidaea. The conditions facing the Athenians undertaking the siege of Potidaea do seem to have been particularly harsh: see Pl., *Symp.* 220a–d and esp. 2,70,2 (the only indication of the hardships of the siege in Thucydides' description of it): "οἱ δὲ προσεδέξαντο, ὁρῶντες μὲν τῆς στρατιάς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειμερινῷ, ἀνηλωκίας δὲ ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δισχίλια τάλαντα ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν", "[the generals] accepted [the proposals of the Potidaeans for surrender], seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides which the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege". Note here, however, that the use of "μὲν" and "δὲ" here distinguishes between the two different reasons for the Athenian generals' acceptance of the Potidaeans' proposals: that is, the fact of the especially harsh conditions facing the men is not related to the expense of the siege; on the contrary, it is, in fact, differentiated from the expense of the siege as a reason for the Athenians' acceptance of the Potidaean proposals. Moreover, as Gallo noted (see again n.25), for Thucydides, it is the payment of the one drachma rate for such a long time and for so many men that is exceptional about this campaign, not the rate itself. See also the next paragraph.

Andrewes noted,⁴⁴ Thucydides was referring here to the total expenses of all the ships that he had mentioned at 3,17 in discussing the drain on the Athenian treasury. Thus, the ships mentioned at 3,17,4 should be taken to include both those that blockaded Potidaea as well as all of those mentioned at 3,17,2—and therefore that the one drachma per day rate was not only being paid to the hoplites and trireme crews at Potidaea, but also to all the crews of the triremes Thucydides had mentioned at 3,17,2, of which one hundred were sailing around the Peloponnese, and another hundred were guarding Attica, Euboea, and Salamis. As Gallo has pointed out, since one drachma per day was being paid not only to trireme crews operating around the Peloponnese and Potidaea, but also to crews operating around or near Attica in the first years of the war,⁴⁵ this rate cannot have been determined by the expected exigencies of extended campaigning abroad.⁴⁶

A second passage discussing Athenian financial difficulties later in the war confirms the point. In the summer of 413, thirteen hundred Thracian peltasts arrived in Athens in order to sail with Demosthenes to Sicily to reinforce the Athenian expedition there (7.27.1). Having reached Athens too late to join with Demosthenes, the Athenians decided to send the Thracians home, as they were receiving a drachma per day, and therefore to continue paying to employ them seemed too expensive ("πολυτελές") in light of the Deceleian War (7.27.2).⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Andrewes 1981, 97.

⁴⁵ There is some controversy over whether these ships were operating in 428 or 431 or 430 (see, e.g., Hornblower 1991, 400–401; Kallet-Marx 1993, 150–151), but the point here holds regardless of which precise year the ships referred to at 3,17,2 were sailing in.

⁴⁶ Gallo 1987, 38 n.51 (arguing against Gomme's view that hoplite pay on the Potidaean campaign was paid at a specially high rate as compensation for the "special hardships" of the campaign): "[p]artendo dal suo presupposto di un carattere eccezionale della paga di 1 dracma, legata, a suo parere, alle particolari condizioni determinate dall'assedio di Potidea, il Gomme, di conseguenza, non riusciva a spiegarsi perché tale paga fosse versata, secondo quanto dice Tucidide, ai marinai di tutte le navi ateniesi, e finiva perciò per considerare questo elemento come una delle non poche difficoltà offerte dal passo (276): una difficoltà che, in realtà, non sussiste affatto se si accetta la tesi del carattere standard della dracma giornaliera".

⁴⁷ 7.27.2: "οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὕστερον ἦκον, διεννοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θράκην ἀποπέμπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλεμον αὐτοὺς πολυτελές ἐφαίνετο· δραχμὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας ἕκαστος ἐλάμβανεν" ("[s]ince they had come too late, the Athenians determined to send them back to Thrace, from where they had come; to keep them, in view of the Deceleian war, seemed too expensive, for each of them was being paid a drachma a day"). See

As Loomis notes, Thucydides' use of the imperfect ("ἐλάμβανεν") to describe the Thracians' receipt of their pay shows that each of them had been actually drawing one drachma per day during their stay in Athens.⁴⁸ Since the Thracians were actually being paid one drachma per day in Athens (before any deployment to Sicily), this rate cannot have been set because of an expectation of high prices on a lengthy overseas campaign; rather, this passage clearly shows that one drachma per man per day was the usual rate of pay at this time for military forces employed by the Athenian state.⁴⁹

To conclude: ascertaining how much Athenian soldiers and sailors were paid per day in the late fifth century is crucial for any attempt to reconstruct Athenian military and naval costs and therefore Athenian state expenditures in this period.⁵⁰ This article has demonstrated that, contra Pritchett, there is no evidence to support the assertion that the one drachma per day rate of pay attested several times in Thucydides for late fifth century Athenian military forces was paid to them to compensate for higher than usual food costs on overseas

Hornblower 2008, 589 (with n.49 below) for the translation of the second sentence quoted here.

⁴⁸ Loomis 1998, 44; contra Marinovic (1987, 168) who believed they were sent home before receiving any pay in Athens. Loomis did not draw any conclusions from this passage on the issue of food prices and pay rates.

⁴⁹ Gallo (1987, 40) made a similar point but took 7.27.2 to mean that the Athenians were thinking of using the peltasts for military operations in the Deceleian war and therefore that this passage demonstrated a pay rate of one drachma per day for operations in Attica, therefore demonstrating that the one drachma per day rate was not paid solely for overseas expeditions. Thucydides at 7.27.2 states, rather, that the Thracian peltasts were considered too expensive because of (and not for) the Deceleian campaign: see Hornblower's (2008, 589, following Classen/Steup 1966 ad loc.) translation of 7.27.2, "τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλεμον αὐτοὺς πολυτελεῖς ἐφαίνετο": "it seemed too expensive to retain them, in view of the war from Dekeleia". As Hornblower remarks, "Th. is introducing the Dekeleia theme as the explanation for the financially straitened state in which the Athenians now were; he is not stating a contemplated alternative use to which the Thracians might have been put".

⁵⁰ I note here that all mentions of the one drachma rate by Thucydides (as well as his one mention of the three obol rate) come within discussions of state expenditures and unambiguously describe pay given to sailors and soldiers by the Athenian state. See esp. 6.31,3 ("τοῦ μὲν δημοσίου δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας τῷ ναύτῃ ἕκαστῳ δίδόντος... τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ") and 6.31,5 ("τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου μισθοῦ") on the pay given to members of the Sicilian expedition. This is the reason why ascertaining the true rate of pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers is so important for our understanding of Athenian military and state spending. On the separate issue of bonuses paid privately to some sailors on top of their state pay, see n.53 below.

campaigns of long duration—and that there is positive evidence that the one drachma rate was paid to Athenian forces regardless of the location or length of campaigns. Pritchett's view that three obols per man per day was the normal rate of pay for fifth century Athenian sailors and soldiers must therefore be discarded.⁵¹ There is thus no longer any impediment to accepting Loomis' position that the regular rate of pay for Athenian soldiers and sailors in the late fifth century was one drachma per day, at least from 432, when Thucydides' description of the expenses of the Potidaean campaign gives us our first explicit evidence for Athenian military rates of pay.⁵²

I would add here that there is no evidence to suggest, as some scholars have done, that the one drachma rate was a higher rate of pay offered only to some ranks or members of Athenian ships' crews, with some rowers receiving less (that is, three obols a day):⁵³ higher rates of pay were restricted to officers in

⁵¹ As must Pritchett's claim that payments to Athenian military forces in the fifth century were meant solely for rations. Since no other scholar has fully articulated an argument for the three obols per man per day position, discarding Pritchett's arguments means that reconstructions of Athenian annual naval budgets (see, e.g., French 1972, 5 and n.12 and Unz 1985, 24 n.13) and calculations of fifth century Athenian fleet costs (see, e.g., Finley 1983, 49, 51; Hölkeskamp 1997, 531) (cf. Wallace (1974, 41) expressly following Pritchett for a three obol rate, and using this rate to check the reliability of Herodotus' account of Themistocles' bribery of Adeimantos at Artemision (Hdt. 8.4–6)) which use the three obol per man per day rate must now be discarded, too (or, at least, revised).

⁵² See Loomis 1998, 39–40. It is very probable, but not certain, that Athenian sailors on the campaign to Corcyra in 433 were also paid one drachma per day: see Loomis 1998, 39. I note here that other scholars have argued that one drachma per man per day was the standard late fifth century Athenian military pay rate: see esp. Gallo 1987, 36–45; see also, e.g., Dover 1970, 293; Andrewes 1981, 97–98; Hornblower 2008, 386, 887–88. See, too, taking the one drachma view without presenting argumentation, e.g., Tänzer 1912, 73; Jones 1957, 32, 142 n.54; Morrison – Williams 1968, 258–59; Rhodes 1981, 306; Morrison – Coates – Rankov 2000, 119 (though they state at 2000, 118 that this was a high rate in 415); van Wees 2004, 238. But, as can be seen from the fact that some scholars have continued to use the three obol rate, and others still hesitate between the three obol and one drachma rate (see Gabrielsen 1994, 111 and 2007, 258 for another important scholar in recent work not choosing definitively between three obols and one drachma), none of these previous works has definitively settled the issue. It has been the aim of this article to demonstrate that Loomis' work, the most thorough presentation of the evidence and developed argument for the one drachma view, and the most detailed argument to date against Pritchett's argument, needed buttressing in order to finally close the question of fifth century Athenian military pay rates – and to have provided that buttressing.

⁵³ See Jordan 1975, 113–115 distinguishing between a normal rate of one drachma per day for the

infantry and cavalry forces (both at Athens and elsewhere),⁵⁴ while non-officer members of Athenian infantry forces received the same pay as sailors employed by the Athenians. Again, this pay was, at least for the first two decades of the Peloponnesian War, if not earlier, one drachma per man per day. It would only be in or around 412, in fact, in the straitened circumstances after the disaster of the Sicilian expedition and the beginning of the Ionian War, that the Athenians' concern about their state finances would cause them to reduce their standard rate of pay for soldiers and sailors from one drachma to three obols per day.⁵⁵

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nautai and 3 obols a day for the *hyperesia* of a ship; this view, however, is based on a misreading of 6,31,3 (which does not suggest, contra Jordan 1975, 113, that the *hyperesia* received less than a drachma per day: see Loomis 1998, 56 n.100) and a misunderstanding of the term *hyperesia* (which did not, contra Jordan 1975, 240–263, consist of slaves and freedmen: see Morrison 1984, esp. 49, 50, 52; see also Gallo 1987, 39 and n.54, 45 and n. 69 for other criticisms of Jordan's arguments; cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 248 n. 2 for other work contradicting Jordan on this point). Contra Kallet 2001, 53 ("daily rates of pay likely fluctuated in accordance with the situation and the rank of the crew") and 53 n.115 (there was in fifth century Athens no "standard wage independent of rank and status") (cf. similar views at Rawlings 2007, 115–116), 6,31,3 does not represent evidence for different rates of pay for different sections of trireme crews, but simply the common practice of the payment of inducements to some men (on top of their state pay) by trierarchs to attract better quality crews: see Gabrielsen 1994, 121–122 for discussion and examples. Rosivach's contention (1985, 52–53) that the one drachma rate was for "year-round" sailors while the three obol rate was for "seasonal" sailors misses the points that the two rates are never simultaneously attested, and that the three obol rate is explicitly described as being caused by financial difficulties (see last sentence of main text above); in addition, he can cite no evidence to substantiate his notion. Note, finally, that all calculations by contemporary authors in the classical period of state pay for Athenian trireme crews proceed on the basis of equal pay for each of the two hundred crew members (Morrison 1984, 55), demonstrating that there was equal pay for all members of Athenian trireme crews.

⁵⁴ See last note *fin.* on the equal pay of trireme crews; see Burrer 2008, 79–80 for infantry forces.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Gallo 1987, 40–44; Loomis 1998, 44–45; van Wees 2004, 238 and n.30.

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