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INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN XENOPHON AND PLATO?

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The problems of intertextuality in Greek literature are notoriously difficult. A case in point is the old Isocrates vs. Plato controversy which has not been satisfactorily resolved.[1] In recent years, Xenophon's and Plato's mutual relations have not attracted much attention. The facts are far from clear, however, and were already discussed in antiquity.[2]

A direct textual relationship is fairly certain in the cases of the two *Apologies* and the two *Symposia*, though the questions of priority are still partly open. Plato seems to have published his *Apology* before Xenophon wrote his.[3] As for the *Symposia*, I have argued elsewhere[4] that Plato used Xenophon's dialogue as one of his models, except for Xenophon's Chapter 8 which relies on Plato. Very reluctantly, I would accept the possibility of a sole common source for Xenophon (1–7) and Plato. Copies of both *Symposia* are likely to have circulated among the Athenians. Like all Xenophon's writings, Plato's *Symposium* is written for a larger audience than

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[1] Some observations on this in H. Thesleff, *Arctos* 31 (1997) 162 f. and (in Swedish) in Ø. Andersen (red.), *Dannelse, humanitas, paideia*, Oslo 1999, 197–214. Cf. also F. Roscalla, *Athenaeum* 86 (1998) 109–132.

[2] Gell. *NA* 14.3.

[3] See, e.g., A.-H. Chroust, *Socrates, Man and Myth*, London 1957, 39. Xenophon's *Apology* (an essay in the style of the *Memorabilia*), like *M* I 1–2, takes a stand on what was then known about Socrates' defense; this seems to have included Plato's *Apology* which was certainly published as a set of logographic speeches. In *M* I 2, Xenophon directs his defense against the pamphlet of Polycrates which seems to have been written later than Plato's *Ap*; cf. H. Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology* (Comm. Hum. Litt. 70), Helsinki 1982, 32 f.

[4] In *BICS* 25 (1978) 157–170. I was then too confident about the literacy of the period. But G. Danzig (in letters) has provided additional support for my arguments.

Plato normally addressed with his dialogues.[5] Furthermore, according to Gellius, Plato commented on the *Cyrupaedia* in the *Laws* (III 694c). This, too, seems reasonable: Plato may have taken some interest in this romance because Xenophon had used in it ideas taken from Plato's Utopia, the early version of the *Republic*.[6]

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The case of the *Memorabilia* (here *M*) is more complicated but of considerable general interest.[7] It is well known that Xenophon's collection abounds in themes, names, ideas, and points which also occur in Plato's dialogues. Though no synopsis of all the parallels seems to have been made, several scholars have listed and discussed various details.[8] No proofs of the intertextual relationships have been offered, however. Sometimes the apparent makeshift of assuming common sources rather than direct quotation has been, loosely, accepted. Few have considered the priority of Xenophon as a serious solution.[9] More often the priority of Plato is silently assumed or taken for granted. It is believed that Xenophon, of course, freely used the ideas that he took from Plato's writings, projected them onto his

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[5] H. Thesleff, "Plato and His Public", in B. Amden et al. (eds.), *Noctes Atticae ... presented to J. Mejer*, Copenhagen 2002, 289–301.

[6] This is how I interpret Gell. 14.3; Thesleff (above n. 1), 1997, 150 ff. Danzig (above n. 4) suggests that several passages in *Lg* refer to the *Cyrup*. Somewhat similarly, the introductory sections of *Timaeus* may somehow allude to Isocrates' *Busiris* (cf. above n. 1).

[7] The other writings of Xenophon are practically irrelevant here. The *Oeconomicus* operates with some well-known Socratic topics; but, for instance, the musings on questioning as teaching, 19.14–19, are certainly not taken from any particular Platonic dialogue. The *Hiero*, like *Agesilaus*, belongs to the 4th-century discussion of rulership without any clear reference to Plato.

[8] Scattered notes and references, of varying weight, in, e.g., K. Joël, *Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates* I–II:1–2, Berlin 1893–1901, Chroust (above n. 3), H. R. Breitenbach, *RE* IX A 2 (1967), 1569–2051.

[9] Especially Antisthenes, and also Aeschines of Sphettus, have been proposed as common (written) sources. The impact of Antisthenes was very much debated after Joël's books (above n. 8); see references in G. Giannantoni, *Socraticorum Reliquiae*, Napoli 1990^2, III 193 ff. After Joël, notably Chroust (above n. 3) 101–134 has collected additional indications of Xenophon's dependence on Antisthenes. The importance of oral information does not seem to have been seriously discussed (but cf., e.g., R. G. Tanner, *Prudentia* 18 [1986] 31–37). Xenophon as a source for Plato very occasionally occurs among the rich speculations of Joël (cf. above n. 8), also *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie* I, Tübingen 1921, 378.

own memories of Socratic discussions, and presented them in an easily palpable form for his own readers.

This would appear to be a good general explanation if we can be sure that Xenophon knew the relevant Platonic dialogues and thought it worth while to interpret and use them according to his own ends. These are, however, very crucial premises.

As a matter of fact it is quite probable that Xenophon did not know all, or even most, of Plato's dialogues in the form that we have them. Disregarding the chronological problems, I have argued elsewhere[10] that Plato normally addressed very select audiences who did not make copies of the text. Most of his dialogues were not publicly available. If this is so, the likelihood of Xenophon's possessing such texts diminishes. But there are many additional difficulties.

Taking a closer look at Xenophon's alleged quotations from Plato, we may note at first two general, somewhat curious facts. Though many of the persons Xenophon introduces as Socrates' interlocutors are known from Plato's dialogues, they are almost never discussing the same themes as in Plato. And again, where the themes or points are the same or similar, they are usually peripheral in Plato, or mentioned in passing by him: the central arguments in Plato's dialogues are (apart from the *Apology* and *Symposium*) almost never taken up by Xenophon. If Xenophon had just reshuffled Plato's material to make his own pieces look more personal, we should perhaps expect him to have taken account of some of the central ideas too.

To take just one example. In *M* I 4 Socrates protreptically (as is pointed out, 1) persuades Aristodemus, who is known to despise religion, that the universe is created by a benevolent, caring δαιμόνιον. In this chapter, Aristodemus ὁ Μικρός (2, cf. Pl. *Smp* 173b), and the notion of a cosmic δαιμόνιον, and the mention of reproductive ἔρως (7), may suggest to us Plato's *Symposium*, which is otherwise very remote here. The idea of a Creator, a σοφὸς δημιουργός as Aristodemus admits (7, cf. 9), and the reference to elements that compose the human body (8), may at first remind us of the *Timaeus*, though one may wonder at Xenophon's superficial interpretation of Plato's Timaeus' Demiurge as a conventional Super-God, a King of All; the *Politicus* (270a, 273b, etc.) has a more playful tone. Or, as has been sometimes suggested, would Xenophon rather be thinking of a passage in *Philebus* (28a–30d) where Socrates argues for the cosmic

[10] See above, n. 5.

dominance of Noῦς? For a start (28c), Plato's Socrates somewhat playfully adduces the common opinion of "all wise men" (supposedly including Anaxagoras) that νοῦς ἐστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς. Protarchos agrees (28e). Then Plato's Socrates proceeds as follows: the four elements, and the earlier discussed principles of πέρας and ἄπειρον, which contribute to the composition of the bodies of individuals and the universe, need the soul (ψυχή 30a) as a "cause" to make them function in the right order and proportions (αἰτία ... κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα 30c5); and since wisdom and νοῦς belong to the soul (30c9), it is indeed correct to say that νοῦς is ultimately the leader of all. Possibly the argument is here to some extent built on the *Timaeus*, but the notion of a cause is emphasized. Xenophon's Socrates wants Aristodemus to see that his individual faculty of reason (φρόνιμον) must originate in the universe where the elements, just as in the human body, are combined and kept in order (συνήρμοσται) by invisible νοῦς (8, also ψυχή 9). The very brief argument appears as one shortened from a cosmological exposition which Xenophon need not have looked for in the difficult *Philebus* where it is embedded in very different issues. Among the four elements, Plato's Socrates focusses on fire which forms a natural bridge to the intellect. Xenophon's Socrates mentions only earth and water (ὑγρόν), but refers to the enormous quantity of these in the surrounding world (τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρα; cf. *Phlb* 29c on cosmic fire: πλῆθεί τε θαυμαστόν ...). Here the ἄπειρα directly evokes the *Philebus* where ἄπειρον is a key concept (14e, 16e ff.). On the other hand, this term is common enough in Presocratic philosophy of nature,[11] especially in Pythagoreanism (which provided Plato with the πέρας / ἄπειρον contrast), so it is likely to have been widely current in that sort of argument which both Plato and Xenophon use. The similarities are indeed likely to come from common sources. An additional difficulty with the assumption of *Philebus* as Xenophon's source is, of course, chronology: the tenor of the *M*, notably the first books, points to the early fourth century discussion of the impact of Socrates, instead of the 350s or later when *Philebus* was written.[12]

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[11] See the Wortindex in *DK* III. A pre-Platonic source for *M* I 4, and its cognate *M* IV 3, has sometimes been taken into consideration; references in Breitenbach (above n. 8) 1829 f.

[12] Nobody today would give an early date to *Phlb*. For the dating of *M*, see below, n. 23.

The following pages will be devoted to an analysis of two chapters in the fourth book of *M* where similar clusters of Platonic reminiscences may seem to occur.

M IV 2 presents Socrates discussing with Euthydemus (who often occurs in *M*) the uselessness of book-learning and the need for self-knowledge for a person who is intent on a political career. This Euthydemus is not the erist, but the Socratic (son of Diocles, cf. I 2.29, etc., Pl. *Smp* 222b; apparently not the "brother of Lysias", *R* I 328b). In general, this piece may recall *Alcibiades I* or *Theages*; and the criticism of empty learning may remind us of *Hippias Minor* and *Hippias Maior*.

1 Euthydemus (ὁ καλός, cf. the opening of *HpMa*) has, in order to acquire wisdom (σοφία), collected writings (γράμματα) of prominent poets and sophists. Cf. the introductory sections in *HpMi* and *HpMa*.

2–7 A bantering opening by Socrates on whether great leaders (such as Themistocles) have had teachers, as craftsmen have. This is a Socratic topos used several times by Plato (cf. e.g. *Grg* 503b–e, *Men* 93e–94e, *AlcI* 106d–109b, *Virt* 376c–378b, *Thg* 122e–125a). Nothing suggests an intertextual relationship.

8 Socrates is now alone with Euthydemus. Cf. *Clit* 406a10, *AlcI* 118b5, a point elaborated in *Smp* 218bc (cf. *Thg* 130e). Xenophon wants to emphasize the personal character of Socrates' teaching. This is a Socratic topos, certainly not taken from any particular Platonic dialogue.

8–9 Socrates comments on Euthydemus' collecting of texts: it is admirable that you prefer σοφία to wealth! Socrates uses the same phrase as in *HpMa* 291e, νὴ τὴν Ἥραν ἄγαμαί γέ σου, where he, with exuberant irony, praises Hippias' kindly, εὐνοϊκῶς, helping him to give a third definition of τὸ καλόν. The adverb is hapax in the Platonic corpus, but Xenophon uses it, and in fact twice, in connection with ἄγαμαι in *M* II 6.33–34, in a context where Socrates is discussing friendship with Critobulus. Apparently, the latter combination is a 4th century colloquial idiom referring to a friendly attitude, and Socrates' approach to Euthydemus is pointedly friendly. The νὴ τὴν Ἥραν oath is relatively common in both Xenophon and Plato as a more emotional variant of νὴ Δία.[13] The fact that Hippias is both a mock-σοφός and a rich man, a fact emphasized at the beginning of *HpMa*, seems to make a specific point of contact between *M* IV 2 and *HpMa*. There are significant differences, however. Note in particular the following: whereas Plato's Socrates normally, as in *HpMa*, keeps an ironical distance from what people call σοφία, Xenophon's attitude to it is neutral or laudatory (even Socrates possesses it, 3); it is the acquisition from books of the σοφία (or ἀρετή or τέχνη, 11)

[13] The νὴ τὴν Ἥραν is not specifically a women's oath, as *LSJ* s.v. Ἥρα claim.

required for leadership that his Socrates mocks. *HpMa* does not after all strike one as a very likely source for this idea or the idioms used. The opposite relation might, in theory, seem more natural.

9–11 Euthydemus does not wish to become that kind of craftsman or specialist whose wisdom (or excellence) can be learned from books, but a political leader. Socrates comments: so you want the finest ἀρετή which is called βασιλικὴ τέχνη. The examples given of "technical" specialists include doctors, architects, geometricians "like Theodorus", astronomers, and rhapsodists. Theodorus' name may suggest the *Politicus* (rather than *Theaetetus*, since we are here concerned with the art of politics); but since he is not profiled as a mathematician in *Plt*, it is more probable that Xenophon adduces him because he occurred in Socratic traditions as a mathematician whom Socrates knew. The case of the rhapsodists is more interesting. Rhapsodists who know all Homeric epics by heart but are nevertheless stupid themselves, as Euthydemus adds of his own accord, automatically make us think of the *Ion*; there, at the end, Socrates in fact plays with the thought of rhapsodists as generals because they seem to "know everything" though they can only rely on a Homeric text and some doubtful inspiration. Xenophon's rhapsodists are simply stupid, not inspired. A Socratic topos, noted in passing by Xenophon but elaborated in the *Ion*, is again the best explanation. – Then, however, there is the "Kingly Art" which presents us with a curious dilemma. Plato refers to this "art" in the central section of his *Euthydemus* (!), in the digressional comments on what Clinias is supposed to have said (291b–292c); and the Kingly Art occurs frequently in the *Politicus* both as a τέχνη and as an ἐπιστήμη (cf. 259b, 296b, 300e, etc.).[14] In another passage in *M*, II 1.17–18, the Kingly Art is suddenly introduced by Socrates' interlocutor who is here Aristippus. He remarks, speaking of happiness, that Socrates seems to consider this art as happiness (ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι), in spite of the fact that even a king may suffer pain; Socrates answers by referring to free choice. This latter passage would at first seem to reflect Plato's *Euthd* where the discussion had touched on happiness in relation to the Kingly Art; but Socrates' standpoint is distinctly aporetic there, so Aristippus' remark must have another source (and Plato's Philosopher-King is out of the question). At *M* IV 2.11, however, the issue is about power and influence and being useful to the city: a good king must benefit the entire society, as Socrates says in *M* III 2.2, and as the Elean Stranger argues in *Plt*. This was a topic discussed among the Socratics; we know that Antisthenes treated it besides Xenophon and Plato.[15] An intertextual

[14] At 259c combined with οἰκονομική, as in Xenophon (11). Cf. further *Amat* 138bc and *Alc I* 120a–124b where the Persian king figures.

[15] Cf. R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, Diss. Uppsala 1948, 195 ff.; Chroust (above n. 3) 155–162; further references in Giannantoni (above n. 9) III 191, 259 ff. Note also Xenophon's *Hiero* and *Agesilaus*, and Isocrates' Cyprian Essays and *Busiris*. Both

relationship between Xenophon's passages and the Platonic dialogues is again very unlikely. But: is it mere coincidence that the Kingly Art is mentioned both in the dialogue with Euthydemus the Socratic and in a dialogue named after Euthydemus the erist? I would suggest that there existed Socratic (oral?) traditions about young Euthydemus, Socrates' friend, looking for a teacher of political σοφία, as many of Plato's characters do, and indeed for teachers of βασιλικὴ τέχνη. Xenophon developed the tradition in his own way. Plato, in his *Euthd*, transformed Euthydemus the Socratic into Critobulus in the frame for his story about Socrates' encounter with the erist of the same name. Such a play with names would be typically Platonic.

11–18 This section brings us back to issues connected with Hippias the sophist. Does Euthydemus know what is right (δικαιοσύνη, δίκαιος)? Socrates' reasoning here recalls *Dissoi Logoi* ch. 3 which may be a summary of a lecture by Hippias.[16] Faint reflections of the same points and arguments can be found in Platonic dialogues (e.g., *R* I–II, *Clit*, *AlcI* 111a ff., *Just* 374b ff.), but obviously Xenophon's source here is not Plato; cf. on *M* IV 4, below.

18–20 Is voluntary deception better than involuntary? This piece of apparent sophistry corresponds to one of the basic themes in *Hippias Minor* (especially 370c ff., 372c ff.) where Socrates professes aporia. There the idea of δικαιοσύνη as a δύναμις or an ἐπιστήμη is, in passing, introduced towards the end (375d). Since δικαιοσύνη is in the foreground in Xenophon and his Socrates makes only a relatively brief reference to the sophism of deceiving, a direct connection between Plato and Xenophon is not particularly probable.

21–23 One who knows the truth does not speak differently about the same thing (μηδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν), as slaves do. This point may recall Socrates' πλανᾶσθαι in *HpMi* 372de, 3766bc, but it is in fact a common Socratic theme, quoted with allusion to Hippias at *M* IV 4.6, where we may prefer to think of *HpMa* (see below).

24–40 The rest of the chapter has a protreptic bent that may generally bring to mind *AlcI* (or again *Euthd*), but has no close parallels with Plato.

Aeschines and Antisthenes have been considered as sources for *M* IV 2.9–11, see Breitenbach (above n. 8) 1827; K. Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 40), Stuttgart 1959, 77 ff. argues strongly for Aeschines. Plato seems to have secondarily added the notion of a Philosopher-King to his *R*; cf. Thesleff (above n. 1), 1997, 166.

[16] M. Pohlenz, *Aus Platos Werdezeit*, Berlin 1913, 72 ff. Antisthenes may well have been the intermediate source. He has often been found lurking behind the *HpMi*; cf. e.g. A. Patzer, *Antisthenes der Sokratiker*, Diss. Heidelberg 1970, 173 ff., Thesleff (above n. 3) 221.

M IV 4 has Socrates discussing justice and lawfulness with Hippias the sophist. The choice of partner looks odd at first sight. Apparently Xenophon follows a tradition concerning this encounter (cf. below, on 5). But does Xenophon follow the Platonic version(s) of it?

1–4 Introductory praise of Socrates who always obeyed the laws. Here the same issues are loosely reflected as in Plato's *Apology* and the *Crito*, and also elsewhere in Xenophon, e.g., *M* I 1–2.

5 Socrates often spoke about law-abidingness. I (Xenophon) know (οἶδα) that he once discussed τὸ δίκαιον with Hippias, as follows (τοιάδε). Hippias had come to Athens after a long time (διὰ χρόνου, cf. below), and listened to Socrates who explained to some people how peculiar it is that there are teachers of all crafts and specialities, but not of justice. This is a common Socratic topos; cf., e.g., *Clit*, *Thg*, *AlcI* 124d ff., *Prt* 311b–e.

6 Hippias, jestingly: You are still saying the same as I heard from you a long time ago (πάλαι ποτέ). Socrates: It is more interesting (δεινότερον) that I not only say the same, but also speak about the same things (τὰ αὐτὰ, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν); but probably you who are so learned (πολυμαθής, the same idea in *HpMi* and *HpMa*, though Plato does not use the word except in *Lg* and *Amat*) never say the same about the same (a variation of a Socratic topos, cf. below). Hippias: Naturally, I always try to say something new (καινόν τι).

7–8 Socrates: Do you try different answers about things you know, such as how many letters there are in my name, or what is 2×5? (Probably a Socratic topos; for the first example, cf. *AlcI* 113a, *Tht* 207e–208a, for the second, *Tht* 204bc, and more loosely *R* I 337a–d, *HpMa* 285e). Hippias: No, the same answer; but I can now say things that nobody can contradict about justice (τὸ δίκαιον; cf. *HpMa* 286b where he is prepared to give a new speech on πάμπολλα νόμιμα; for ἀντειπεῖν, cf. below). Socrates: By Hera (cf. *HpMa* 287a and above, on *M* IV 2.8–9), a great discovery, if you can stop people from contradicting (ἀντιλέγεσθαι, cf. below) each other about what is right (τὰ δίκαια)!

9 Hippias: But you must first tell me your own opinion about justice (τὸ δίκαιον) and stop teasing others (cf. *R* I 336c ff., and especially *Clit*).

10–12 Socrates: I have shown it by my actions, and I claim that lawfulness is justice (τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον, cf. below).

12–18 Discussion of this; lengthy argument by Socrates (nothing specifically Platonic; cf. below).

18–25 Socrates argues: the gods have given us unwritten laws to follow (a common theme with reflections in some Platonic dialogues, too; cf. below).

The Platonic parallels to the above issues can be conveniently discussed under four headings: (a) Socrates' encounter with Hippias the sophist; (b) the opening phrase διὰ χρόνου; (c) Hippias' preparedness to give a new account of what is right; and (d) the idea of contradiction.

(a) Apart from this chapter, Hippias is mentioned only once by Xenophon, in his *Symposium* 4.6.2. There Socrates intimates that Antisthenes "the Procurer" has perhaps brought together Callias and Hippias from whom Callias has learned the technique of memorizing so that he never forgets whatever καλόν he has seen. This may point to some connection with *Hippias Maior*, where Hippias (called ὁ καλός at the opening),[17] the specialist in many branches including τὸ μνημονικόν (285e10), turns out to be incapable of defining τὸ καλόν. Xenophon does not deal with τὸ κάλον in *M* IV 4, but there are other curious parallels with *HpMa* in this chapter. However, let us first note the possibility that it was Antisthenes who introduced Hippias as an interlocutor of Socrates.

It has been argued[18] that a section in Dio Chrysostomus' *Third Discourse on Kingship* (III 25–42), which appears to freely reflect Xenophon's *M* IV 4, in fact derives from Antisthenes. Dio claims (27) that he is himself "always speaking the same" about what is expected from a good ruler, and he then goes on to report a discussion between Hippias of Elis and Socrates about justice (note especially the combination of νομίμως καὶ δικαίως 39, for which see below). The report has, as in Xenophon and *HpMa*, the opening phrase διὰ χρόνου (below) which Dio interprets, apparently misunderstanding his source, as if Hippias had been listening to Socrates "for some time". The notion of "always speaking the same" is a well-known Socratic topos used with several variations by Plato, in *Grg* 490e–491b in connection with τὸ δίκαιον.[19] Xenophon, like Dio, emphasizes the repetition of the contents, not the form, of what is said. The "Cynic" tenor of the topos would suit Antisthenes (cf. also *M* IV 2.21,

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[17] Cf. Euthydemus at *M* IV 2.1, above. Joël (above n. 8), II:2, 1101–1106, argued in detail for Antisthenes' *Protrepticus* as the common source of Xenophon and Plato. Cf. above, n. 9. See now also D. Nails, *The People of Plato*, Indianapolis 2002.

[18] References in S. R. Slings, *Plato: Clitophon*, Cambridge 1999, 90–98; note especially Joël (above n. 8) I:1, 391 ff., Chroust (above n. 3) 59.

[19] Cf. L. Rossetti, *RSC* 22 (1974) 424 ff., H. Thesleff, *Studies in Plato's Two-Level Model* (Comm. Hum. Litt. 113), Helsinki 1999, 24. Note also Hippias' reaction in *HpMa* 304ab.

above), and Antisthenes is known to have reflected on the problem of justice and also, very probably, on the Ideal Ruler.[20]

The question is involved with the problem of whether Dio knew and was prepared to use writings by the "Proto-Cynic" Antisthenes. Dio's *Discourse* XIII (especially 14–28), a protreptic speech, may be a case in point. It is sometimes believed that the τὶς (14), whom Dio here quotes almost verbatim, is in fact Antisthenes and not the very similar Platonic *Clitophon* (which does indeed sound Antisthenean). S. R. Slings, however, has recently argued[21] that Dio quotes *Clit* with minor changes and alterations.

The problem is not easily solved. Dio also has other passages that might operate with Socratic sources other than Xenophon or Plato (e.g. LIV, LV 23, LX 10, LXX), and Antisthenes is here a very likely candidate. At least one is warned not to automatically take *HpMa* as one of Xenophon's sources. We saw above that both *HpMi* and *HpMa* may suggest themselves as sources for *M* IV 2, but with even less probability than *HpMa* does for *M* IV 4. Again the question of chronology arises. Those who consider *HpMa* a post-Platonic writing[22] would presumably opt for Antisthenes as a common source. Or would they suggest Xenophon as providing material for *HpMa*?[23]

(b) An encounter opening with the phrase διὰ χρόνου occurs in several Platonic dialogues (cf. *R* I 328bc, *Euthd* 273c, *Chrm* 153a, and similar ideas in the openings of *Grg*, *Ion*, *Prt*, *Smp*, and *Prm*); this is clearly a traditional topos. Xenophon (*M* IV 4.5) has ἀφικόμενος, *HpMa* has ἡμῖν κατῆρας (Dio, as we saw, interprets it differently). The point in *HpMa* is οὐ σχολή

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[20] Above, on IV 2.9–11 and n. 15.

[21] Above, n. 18. Cf. also Breitenbach (above n. 8) 1831.

[22] Among them Kahn; cf. Thesleff (above n. 3) 226–228 where I argued for placing *HpMa*, as a semi-authentic dialogue, in the mid-4th century.

[23] The dating of the various books and chapters of *M* is very uncertain, to say the least. É. Delebeque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Études et Commentaires 25), Paris 1957, is not reliable; some further suggestions in Breitenbach (above n. 8); V. J. Gray, *The Framing of Socrates* (Hermes Einzelschriften 79), Stuttgart 1998, argues for the relative independence of Xenophon. There existed a tradition that Xenophon was the first to publish Socrates' "talks" (τὰ λεγόμενα), DL 2.48. In fact there is much in *M* to point to the first decades of the 4th century; see especially H. von Arnim, *Xenophons Memorabilien und Apologie des Sokrates* (K. Danske Vid. Selsk., Hist.-filol. Meddelelser VIII 1), København 1923. The conventional datings depend to a considerable extent on the alleged chronology of Platonic dialogues, taken as Xenophon's models.

(Hippias is a very busy man); in Xenophon it is the fact that Socrates keeps "saying the same" over the years. The latter topos (cf. above) is not prominent in *HpMa*. Thus διὰ χρόνου is not a direct sign of Xenophon having *HpMa* in mind, though it may be felt as more natural in Socrates' greeting in *HpMa* than as the narrator's comment in Xenophon.

(c) In Xenophon, Hippias offers a new (7 νῦν, cf. 6 καινόν τι) speech on τὸ δίκαιον; in *HpMa*, he is prepared to speak on ἐπιτηδεύματα καλά (cf. Pl. *Smp* 210c), including νόμιμα (286ab, cf. *Grg* 474de, 488de). Hippias' preparedness to lecture must have been a well-known topos (cf., e.g., *Prt* 337c ff., 347ab, Clem. *Strom*. 6.15, DK 86 B 6). In Xenophon (7–8), his point is that the speech cannot be contradicted. In *HpMa* this is not his point from the start, though the question of ἀντίληψις is soon raised (cf. below, (d)). In Xenophon, Hippias is easily convinced by Socrates (18) that τὸ νόμιμον and τὸ δίκαιον are the same; in *HpMa*, he does not see the irony in connection with νόμιμον which was introduced as a preparatory sub-theme (284b), probably with reference to his claim elsewhere (cf. *Prt* 337d) that νόμος is a tyrant.

The connections between τὸ νόμιμον and τὸ δίκαιον, and their possible identification, were widely discussed in Athens, though Plato's Socrates, of course, never claims that they mean the same.[24] The analysis of what is νόμιμον in Sparta, in *HpMa* 284c–285b, is playfully ironical. It is hard to see how it could have inspired Xenophon to make Hippias and Socrates agree on τὸ νόμιμον as δίκαιον. In my view, *HpMa* represents a clear advance from the position of Xenophon (or his source), rather than vice versa (which would imply that Xenophon had read his Plato with almost stupid carelessness).

(d) In fact it seems that Antisthenes' notoriously problematic view of "contradiction" somehow lies behind both accounts, Xenophon's and Plato's (or whoever finished the *HpMa*). The οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν was a familiar Antisthenean dictum (Arist. *Top*. 104b19–21, etc.); and yet he was always prone to produce counter-arguments. Some of his speeches (or dialogues)

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[24] Cf. M. C. Stokes, *Plato's Socratic Conversations*, Baltimore 1986, 5 ff. Rather, it corresponds to the "common opinion" in Athens; cf., e.g., the Athenian Laws at *Cri* 53c, Glaukon at *R* II 359e, Protagoras at *Prt* 327ab, the Athenian at *Lg* VII 801e. Similarly *Cyrup* I 3.17.

bear the subtitle ἀντιλογικός.[25] Xenophon lets his Hippias, always prepared to present new points, promise a speech on τὸ δίκαιον which cannot be contradicted (ἀντειπεῖν, ἀντιλέγοντες 7–8) by Socrates or anybody else; but in the end, he accepts without objection (τἀναντία 18) Socrates' view of τὸ δίκαιον as τὸ νόμιμον. In *HpMa*, the sophist at first accepts, without objection (ἐναντιοῦσθαι 285b), Socrates' musings on τὸ νόμιμον, and then (286a) proposes to present his own speech on fine and lawful behaviour (καλὰ, νόμιμα). Socrates grabs at the notion of καλόν and introduces his "alter ego", an aggressive dissector (ὑβριστικῶς, ἀναμαχούμενος, etc.). Hippias is confident that his view of what is καλόν cannot be contradicted, but Socrates (or his "friend") goes on objecting (287a ἀντιλαμβάνωμαι, ἀντιλήψεων, cf. 286e, 287b ἐξελέγχειν, etc.). It has sometimes been noted that this "second Socrates" has something of Antisthenes in him.[26] The long discussion ends in an aporia (304b–e) very similar to the conclusion of *HpMi*. The tenor of the discussion in *HpMa*, however, is very much more sophisticated than in Xenophon; I also find it difficult to conceive that Xenophon had turned a pointedly destructive elenchus of Hippias' views of τὸ καλόν into a rhetorical argument about τὸ νόμιμον (especially 15–17) which Hippias quietly accepts. What the two pieces have in common, as far as "contradiction" is concerned, is Hippias' vague acceptance, explicitly without objection (ἐναντιοῦσθαι, τἀναντία), of Socrates' argument about τὸ νόμιμον, and Hippias' assertion that his own view cannot be contradicted (ἀντειπεῖν, ἀντιλέγειν in Xenophon, ἐξελέγχειν, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι in *HpMa*). The use in *HpMa* of ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (ἀντίληψις), in the sense of "objecting", "attacking", seems to be a Platonic idiom.[27] In *HpMa*, however, Hippias is brought to accept (without objection) that the Spartans do not always obey the laws (285b), whereas in Xenophon the argument which Hippias accepts (without objection) starts with Socrates' claim that the Spartans do obey the laws (15). In *HpMa*, Hippias' assertion that his view cannot be refuted comes after his acceptance of Socrates' position, whereas in Xenophon he makes his own claim first and then accepts Socrates'. Xenophon has a slide from δίκαιον to νόμιμον without any mention of

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[25] References to the dictum in Giannantoni (above n. 9) III, N 35 and 38. Among others, H. D. Rankin, *Anthisthenes Sokratikos*, Amsterdam 1986, 47 ff., 74, argues that Prodicus is the ultimate source of the dictum.

[26] See, e.g., Thesleff (above n. 3) 227 f.

[27] It may or may not have Antisthenean roots; it is notably frequent in *HpMa*.

καλόν, whereas in *HpMa* the καλόν brings with it the subtheme of νόμιμον without any mention of δίκαιον. Is there an intertextual relationship? Plato (or one of his associates) could have amused himself by picking up Xenophon's Hippias' concessions to the νόμιμον position, and by developing Hippias' assurance of never being refuted into a series of ἀντιλήψεις by Socrates' alter ego. The cases of the *Symposia* and the *Cyrupaedia* tend to indicate that Plato and Platonists did sometimes read Xenophon. However, Xenophon's brief accounts sound as if he is using earlier, more detailed sources. Yet the *HpMa* does not seem to be likely as a source. Can we expect Xenophon, if he knew *HpMa*, to have just picked up single items of the issues of νόμιμον and contradiction without reflecting on the contexts and on Plato's points and aporias? And if so, he must have realized that other people had also seen the *HpMa* and had perhaps studied it less naively than he did.

A very reasonable alternative is, again, to assume the existence of a common source, a Socratic (perhaps oral rather than written) tradition about Socrates discussing with Hippias the sophist about νόμιμον and δίκαιον and ψεύδεσθαι (cf. *HpMi* and *M* IV 2.11–20) or contradiction. The role of Antisthenes here is an interesting open question.

The other points of alleged contact occur more sporadically.[28] I trust they would not substantially alter the above picture.

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Neither Xenophon nor Plato had motivations to quote current texts verbatim. Xenophon the historian tried to reconstruct the personality of Socrates the teacher from his own recollections, and from oral and, probably, literary sources, but for apologetic, panegyrical and moralistic ends. Plato the philosopher and literary artist presented his own thinking, partly as Socrates'. Xenophon can perhaps be expected to have profited from such Platonic material as suited his picture. Plato hardly needed to consult Xenophon for profit or polemics, though he may have playfully transformed Xenophontic material that he happened to come across (witness the *Symposium*).

However, what Platonic texts did Xenophon know at the time when he composed his *Memorabilia*? And was he careful enough to pick out from them only what he felt to be truly Socratic, or did he naively add Platonic

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[28] E.g., *M* II 6.28 / *Chrm, Ly*; *M* III 1.1 / *Euthd* 271d and *La*; *M* III 5.13–17 / *Mx*; III 7.1–9 / *Chrm*.

ideas?

On the first question: We cannot now be confident about the early date of Plato's "Socratic" dialogues,[29] or about the relatively late date of the main body of the *Memorabilia* since its dating is largely based on the alleged Platonic reminiscences.[30] On the second question: Xenophon knew, of course, that Plato wrote dialogues. But even if he had seen the text of some – which is not so certain, if they were normally read from a unique manuscript to select audiences, as I have argued[31] – he is likely to have realized that Plato's Socrates was not his Socrates. And why should he then have bothered to look for the "truly Socratic" in them, or just for commonplaces, if such information was available to him elsewhere?

We have seen that many of the points of contact between Xenophon's and Plato's dialogues are in fact Socratic topoi that Xenophon did not need to extract from Plato. Indeed, most of the parallels are likely to have been current Socratic traditions that either or both authors changed for their own purposes. I have not found a single item that Xenophon clearly took from a Platonic dialogue. Nor does Xenophon use Plato's literary devices, or Plato's ambiguities, or Plato's playfulness or irony, all of which could have added positively to his picture of Socrates as a friendly advisor to all kinds of people. It is true that the jesting tenor of his *Symposium* (though hardly taken from Plato)[32] does not suit his own style. More important is the fact that Xenophon does not normally use, even if they had fitted into his picture, any of the philosophical issues, attitudes, or points, to which Plato gives particular weight.

I said "normally". Interestingly enough, towards the end of the *Memorabilia*, in book IV, chapters 6–7, there occur a number of points that seem to bring Xenophon's Socrates closer to Plato's. The first turns up just at the end of chapter 5 (12): Socrates, Xenophon says, recommended a "coming together" (συνιόντας) and a διαλέγεσθαι κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα as the best way to become good, happy and prominent men, able to use dialectic (διαλεκτικωτάτους). The teaching recommended here may reflect the

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[29] See e.g. Ch. H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, Cambridge 1996, 1 ff. and the references in Thesleff (above n. 19) 2.

[30] See above, n. 23.

[31] See above, n. 5.

[32] Rather from Antisthenes, according to the extensive arguments of Joël (above n. 8) II:2, 912 ff.; also Chroust (above n. 3) 148. Cf. above, n. 4.

methods of Plato's Academy, though the points are certainly not taken from a particular Platonic writing (such as *R* VII or *Plt*). Chapter 6, then, illustrates by pieces of dialogue with Euthydemus how Socrates made his associates (τοὺς συνόντας) "dialecticians" (διαλεκτικωτέρους, 1). Together with them, he searched for defitions of things (τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, διωρίζετο, 1). The examples given are εὐσέβεια, οἱ δίκαιοι, σοφία, τἀγαθόν, τὸ καλόν, and ἀνδρία (2–11). The "definitions" are reached by simple constructive questioning, rather in the manner of the Platonic *Virt* and *Just*. Though some details may recall passages in Plato (especially in the case of ἀνδρία), the pieces do not at all echo Platonic dialogues but rather some elementary oral training on the periphery of the Academy. There follows (12) a brief note on Socrates' classification of polities, which could be an Academic synopsis of what is said in *R* VIII–IX (cf. *Plt* 291c–292b) and *Lg* III. The chapter ends (13–15) with a curious demonstration of how Socrates used to meet counter-arguments (εἰ ... τις ... περί του ἀντιλέγοι): he brought the discussion back (ἐπανῆγεν) to the basics (ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν) on which both could agree; and he tended himself to argue from generally accepted opinions (διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), like Homer's Odysseus (!). Here the ὑπόθεσις and the ἐπανάγειν[33] may somehow reflect Academic ideas. Chapter 7 points out that Socrates wanted his listeners to concern themselves with such subjects as geometry, astronomy, and cosmology only insofar as they are useful in ordinary life; researching into them is totally useless. This could be an indirect criticism of some Academic activities.

The last chapter of the *Memorabilia*, IV 8, returns to the circumstances of the death of Socrates. I can find nothing here that Xenophon could have taken from the *Phaedo* (or even the *Crito*).

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Thus, I would answer the question of my rubric negatively – excepting the cases of the *Apologias*, the *Symposia*, and the *Cyrupaedia*. On the whole, both authors use, independently, Socratic traditions to which Antisthenes had almost certainly somehow contributed. But the above evidence also hints that Plato, more manifestly than Xenophon, tended to manipulate the traditions for his own ends.

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[33] Cf. ἐπανάγειν in *Lg* XII 949b, *Ep7* 325a, and Aristotle's ἐπαγωγή. The reference to Odysseus, again, decidedly suggests Antisthenes; cf. Giannantoni (above n. 9) III N 26.