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***PARTICIPIUM CONIUNCTUM* – SYNTACTIC DEFINITIONS OF THE PARTICIPLE IN ANCIENT GRAMMARS**

TOIVO VILJAMAA

In ancient Greek and Roman grammars the participle is usually granted the third place in the canonical system of eight parts of speech. The classification was not without controversies. The participle is a kind of noun-verb hybrid participating both in verbal and nominal characteristics. As the usual definition runs, for instance, in the grammarian Diomedes (fourth cent. A.D.): *Participium est pars orationis dicta, quod duarum partium quae sunt eximiae in toto sermone, verbi et nominis, vim participet* (GL 4,401,11–12), and in the *Technē* of Dionysius Thrax: Μετοχή ἐστὶ λέξις μετέχουσα τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδιότητος. Παρέπεται δὲ αὐτῇ ταυτὰ ἃ καὶ τῷ ῥήματι δίχα προσώπων τε καὶ ἐγκλίσεων (GG 1:1,60,1–3).¹

The history of the participle in the *ars grammatica* is obscure. The earliest reliable text which deals with the system of eight parts of speech is that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus from the end of the first century B.C. But it is just the participle with which he hesitates. He notes (comp. 2; p.7,10–11) that some authors separated participles from common nouns (*prosēgoria*), but on the other hand, on another occasion (ep. Amm. II,7; p. 428,7–9) he refers to a participial form with the term *rhēma*. The conclusion is evident. In about the middle of the first century B.C. there was no agreement between the grammarians whether the participle should be classed sepa-

¹ This article is a modified version of the paper read at the VII International Conference on the History of Linguistics (Oxford, 12th–17th Sept. 1996). I would like thank professors Dirk M. Schenkeveld and W. Keith Percival for useful comments. For translations and commentaries of Dionysius Thrax, J. Lallot, *La grammaire de Denys le Thrace*, Paris 1989, and A. Kemp, "The Tekhne grammatike of Dionysius Thrax", *Historiographia Linguistica* 13 (1986) 343–363.

rately or with the noun or the verb.² Instead, we have no reason to doubt Priscian's statement, that it was the grammarian Tryphon (at the beginning of the first century A.D.) who separated the participle and was then eagerly supported by Apollonius Dyscolus (about one century later):³

Quaesitum est tamen, an bene separaverint id ab aliis partibus grammatici et primus Trypho, quem Apollonius quoque sequitur, maximus auctor artis grammaticae (15,1; GL 2,548,4–7).

The discussion about the status of the participle must be connected with that stage in the development of the grammatical art when the morphological criterion of case inflection and non-case inflection began to be used to define the two basic classes, noun and verb. And more generally, it is the stage when the grammarians searched for inflectional patterns and accordingly separated parts of speech mainly in terms of inflection. More philosophically oriented grammarians who tried to build a rational system then added notional criteria to describe the parts in terms of sentence-structure.⁴ Inflectional considerations are apparent in the usual definitions of the participle. It is similar to the noun because it is inflected by case, and resembles the verb because it has different forms in different tenses.⁵ The morphologi-

² See Dirk M. Schenkeveld, "Linguistic Theories in the Rhetorical Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus", *Glotta* 61 (1983) 67–94, and "The Linguistic Contents of Dionysius' *Παραγγέλματα*", *The Henry Sweet Society Studies in the History of Linguistics* 1 (1995) 43. Dionysius of Halicarnassus probably meant that the Stoics distinguished the participle as a sub-species of the *prosēgoria*. – The participle is classed separately in the *Technē* ascribed to Dionysius Thrax, but certainly also for this reason, the *Technē* should be dated later than in the second century B.C. when Dionysius lived.

³ Tryphon is mainly known from Apollonius Dyscolus. A commentator of Dionysius' *Technē* (schol. Marc. in Dion. Thr., GG 1:3,356,7 ff.) presents him as an ardent critic of Stoic definitions.

⁴ On grammarians who turned to logic for their syntactical concepts, Anneli Luhtala, *On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic*, Diss. Helsinki 1997.

⁵ Prisc. 2,18; GL 2,55,10–11 *Participium autem iure separatur a verbo, quod et casus habet, quibus caret verbum, et genera ad similitudinem nominum*; and 11,5; GL 2,551,4 ff. *Itaque cum et verbi quaedam sua prohibent hoc esse nomen, id est tempora et significationes, et nominis propria prohibent esse verbum, id est genera et casus ... mansit participium medium inter nomen et verbum.*

cal principle is particularly prominent in Varro, who seems to be the first to clearly distinguish the class of participial forms. Varro distinguishes four categories of words inflected by nature: one of them is the Latin present participle:

Dividitur oratio secundum naturam in quattuor partis: in eam quae habet casus et quae habet tempora et quae habet neutrum et in qua est utrumque. has vocant quidam appellandi, dicendi, adminiculandi, iungendi (ling. 8,44; cf. 10,17).

The Varronian categories of naming, saying, supporting, and joining correspond approximately to nouns, verbs, adverbs ending in *-ē*, and participles. Though the categories are distinguished morphologically, their names imply not only notional but also syntactical considerations.⁶ As examples for the class of *'iungendi'* Varro mentions the present participles *docens* and *faciens* (ling. 10,17). This is also the doctrine to which Priscian refers: *quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationis, cetera vero adminicula vel iuncturas earum* (11,6; GL 2,551,18–20).

The participle, as defined by grammarians, may be a hybrid and its status obscure, but in the use of language – and particularly in ancient Greek and Latin – the form is not unimportant. On the contrary. Both Greek and Latin are rich in participles. Of course there are differences in use: Greek has past active and present passive forms, which are missing in Latin – except some forms of deponent verbs; Greek uses participial forms of the copula 'to be', Latin normally does not. On the other hand, in Latin past passive participles are incorporated in the inflectional tense system of verbs.

Participles or similar forms derived from verbal roots are also conceptually important.⁷ The importance is evidenced by Priscian, who often notes

⁶ Cf. Daniel J. Taylor, *Declinatio: A Study of the Linguistic Theory of Marcus Terentius Varro*, Amsterdam 1974, 81–85, and Fred W. Householder, "History of Linguistics in the Classical Period", *HL* 16 (1989) 136–138.

⁷ *Quid enim est alius pars orationis nisi vox indicans mentis conceptum, id est cogitationem?* (Priscian 11,7; GL 2,552,1–2). To illustrate the general cognitive import of them, I only need mention the ambiguous English phrase "flying planes", one of the semantic ambiguities made famous by Noam Chomsky. See J. Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*, Cambridge 1986, 249–253.

their usefulness and indeed the necessity of using them for the correct completion of thoughts in linguistic expression. The cognitive aspect in this connection simply means that the *homo loquens* conceives in his mind the complexity of the real world; things, events and actions are interconnected with each other in many ways. Accordingly, we cannot express our thoughts only by enumerating, as it were, states, events, and actions one after another. The participle seems to be a useful tool – and in Greek and Latin, as Priscian states, a necessary means – for expressing these interconnections between simple statements. This being so, for instance, in Homer’s *Odyssey* in a phrase like *Τηλέμαχος πεπνυμένος ἀντίον ἠΰδα*, the participle is necessary and useful for connecting two ideas, but difficult to explain in grammatical terms which are suitable only for analysing simple sentences: “The wise Telemachus answered” or “Telemachus gave a wise answer”? Or both? Naturally this kind of phrase must have occupied the minds of ancient philosophers and grammarians, and they still continue to occupy the minds of modern linguists.⁸

The idea of a *pars iungendi* (above Varro, *ling.* 8,44 and 10,17) is implicit in the theory of the Stoics, who are usually mentioned by Priscian as theorists of language. They could not decide whether the participle is a subclass of nouns or of verbs (*nomen verbale* or *modus verbi casualis*).⁹

Stoici enim quomodo articulum et pronomen unam partem orationis accipiebant, infinitum articulum vocantes, quem grammatici articulum, eique adiungentes etiam infinita nomina vel relativa..., sic igitur supra dicti philosophi etiam participium aiebant appellationem esse reciprocam, id est ἀντανάκλαστον προηγορίαν, hoc modo: 'legens est lector' et 'lector legens', ... vel nomen verbale vel modum verbi casualem (11,1; GL 2,548,7 ff.).

⁸ Schol. Vat. in Dion. Thr. (GG 1:3, 215,30–31) in fact says: τῆς δὲ μετοχῆς μετουσία· μετουσία δὲ ἐστὶ κοινωμία δύο πραγμάτων. For an explanation in cognitive grammar, R.W. Langacker, *Concept, Image, and Symbol. The Cognitive Basis of Grammar*, Berlin & New York, 1990, 78–100.

⁹ The double nature is also reflected in the distinction made by Roman grammarians between gerunds and participles. See M. Baratin, *La naissance de la syntaxe à Rome*, Paris 1989, 144–146.

In the passage quoted we can see that the Stoics were inclined to group participles with common nouns, calling them reciprocal appellatives. The Stoics, however, did not define words in terms of formal criteria but with reference to propositional logic and semantics. Thus a reciprocal appellative could be something like a word reflecting a quality of the substance referred to in the predication, that is, the referent remains the same, and the participle is therefore reciprocal, for instance in a phrase like *Priscianus intellegens – scribit*. But I will not go further into the Stoic semantics, all the more because Apollonius and Priscian did not accept their definition, though they seem to follow them in adapting abstract meaning relations, like existence (substance), identity and difference, to syntactic analysis.¹⁰

Priscian's chapter on the participle (lib. XI; GL 2,548–576) is the most extensive discussion which we have on the subject from the ancient grammars.¹¹ Apparently, it is based on Apollonius Dyscolus, whose book on the participle (περὶ μετοχῆς), however, has not survived, and his doctrine must be reconstructed from Priscian's book and from numerous other passages where both Apollonius and Priscian refer to the use of participles, particularly in connection with the discussions of pronouns and sentence structure.¹²

There seem to be two main reasons why participles attract Priscian's attention: first, the difficulty of their definition; secondly, their frequent use in both Greek and Latin. The latter makes one think that participles are

¹⁰ J. Pinborg, "Classical Antiquity: Greece", *Current Trends in Linguistics* 13.1 (1975) 99–101 and 116–117.

¹¹ Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae* (about 500 A.D.) is the largest grammatical handbook surviving to us from classical antiquity; it is also the most influential in Medieval and Renaissance times; see Robins, "Priscian and the Context of his Age". *L'héritage des grammairiens Latins de l'antiquité aux lumières*, éd. Irène Rosier (Paris 1988), 49–55; cf. R. Amacker, "L'argumentation pragmatique chez Priscien: 'personne' et 'déixis'", *HL* 17 (1990) 269–291. Priscian's model is, as he himself says, Apollonius Dyscolus' Greek grammar. Although Apollonius' grammar is based on interpretation of Greek, and ultimately on Homeric linguistics and philology (cf. T. Viljamaa, "Paradosis and *Synetheia*. Language Study in Classical Antiquity", *Acta Ant. Hung.* 36 (1995) 167–174) Priscian adapts it to Latin and accordingly is forced to pay attention not only to apparent differences between Greek and Latin but also to the Roman grammatical tradition.

¹² For the reconstruction of Apollonius' περὶ μετοχῆς, Schneider, *GG* 2:3,122–129.

particularly useful for composing well-formed expressions. Despite the fact that Priscian was aware of the morphological problems connected with participles – problems of derivation, adjectival use of participles, differences between Greek and Latin – and of their use in the passive perfect forms, he, however, in his syntax and in his exposition of the status of the participle mainly uses examples of the present participle and of its predicative use (of the type *ego Priscianus scribo intellegens*, 17,153; GL 3,183,5).

Semantic and syntactic criteria prevail already in the beginning of the book on the participle, where Priscian, following his master Apollonius, emphasizes the meaning of the proper place of the participle in the order of the parts of speech. It is positioned third after the noun and the verb because its function in the complete sentence (*oratio perfecta*) presupposes the existence of two main classes and on the other hand other minor classes are not necessary for its existence.¹³ The article and the pronoun come next to the participle in the order of the parts. Thus their syntax is also discussed by Apollonius and Priscian in connection with appellatives and participles. As noted before, the Stoics differed from the grammarians in that they grouped participles into the class of appellatives; and also in regard to articles and pronouns – Priscian notes – they behaved similarly (*quomodo articulum et pronomen unam partem orationis accipiebant, infinitum articulum vocantes, ... sic etiam participium aiebant appellationem esse reciprocam*, 11,1; GL 2,548,7 ff.). Priscian, however, does not make the comparison only to hint at a peculiar Stoic behaviour, but he wants to remind the reader that there is a real linguistic affinity between articles and participles. When the Stoics defined the concepts of substance, identity, and existence, they did so using as examples Greek expressions with appellatives and participles. Here Apollonius and Priscian follow the Stoic argumentation. Apollonius discusses the matter at length (synt. 1,105 ff.; GG 2:2,87,20 ff.). He gives, for instance, the following Greek examples, in which the combinations of the article and the participle have different interpretations (synt. 1,111; GG 2:2,94,10 ff.):

¹³ Prisc. 11,1–14; GL 2,548,1 ff. *Qui tertio loco participium posuerunt, rectius fecisse videntur, cum enim nomen et verbum primum et secundum tenuerunt locum, participium, quod ex utroque nascitur, sequentem iure exigit.* The just order is based on the logic of substantial and accidental nature of the entities. Cf. F. Charpin, "La notion de phrase: l'héritage des accines", *L'héritage des grammairiens Latins de l'antiquité aux lumières* (Paris 1988), 63–64.

ὁ δειπνήσας παῖς κοιμάσθω "Let the boy who has dined go to bed".
ὁ παῖς δειπνήσας κοιμάσθω "Let the boy go to bed after dining".

In the former the article is indefinite (i.e. it has a generic meaning), and the participle behaves like an adjectival noun;¹⁴ in the latter the article is interpreted anaphorically, and the participle is joined with the predicate-verb in two ways: temporally ("having dined", "after dinner") according to the tense-form of the participle,¹⁵ and referentially with the concept of person (πρόσωπον) which is indicated by the personal ending of the verb and marked by the nominative case of the participle. As we see this use of the participle would correspond to the Latin *participium coniunctum*, and accordingly, because Latin lacks the article, it will be of great interest to Priscian and other Latin grammarians.¹⁶

The Stoic doctrine about the article, *arthron*, which signifies the mere existence of a substance, either definite (ὀρισμένον) or indefinite (ἀοριστῶδες),¹⁷ is fundamental for understanding Priscian's discussion of the deficient morphology of Latin:

In quibus quia praeteritum deficit, loco participii verbo utimur et nomine infinito, ut 'qui amavit', ὅς φίλησεν, id est ὁ φιλήσας. quomodo enim loco verbi participium accipitur necessitatis causa cum verbo substantivo, sic etiam, ubi participium deficit, necessario verbum in-

¹⁴ Cf. Prisc. 11,13; GL 2,556,6 ff. *nec mirum ad formam adiectivorum haec dirigi, cum paene vim habeant participia quoque nominum adiectivorum; accidentia enim propriis vel appellativis nominibus significant, velut illa, ut 'bonus homo'. 'scribens homo'.*

¹⁵ Cf. Prisc. 11,3, GL 2,549,27 ff. *Participia vero actionem vel passionem aliquam in diverso fieri tempore demonstrant, non tempus ipsum per se.*

¹⁶ For the definition of *participium coniunctum* ("das bezügliche Partizip", "adverbiales Partizip", "prädikatives Attribut") in modern handbooks of Latin grammar, Kühner-Stegmann, I 744 ff., and particularly A. Scherer, *Handbuch der lateinischen Syntax* (1975) 193–195.

¹⁷ In the Stoic *arthron*-class, definite articles (ὀρισμένον = personal, reflexive and possessive) were distinguished from indefinite (ἀοριστῶδες = articles, interrogative and indefinite pronouns); cf. Pinborg, *op. cit.* 99.

finito nomini substantivo iunctum participii officio fungitur (11,25; GL 2,564,28 ff.).¹⁸

The passage is a graphic illustration of the way in which Priscian adapts Apollonius' Greek grammar to Latin, which lacks not only certain participial forms but also the article. The missing forms of the participle can be replaced by relative clauses, e.g. *qui amavit, qui amatur*, in which the pronoun is defined by Priscian as an *infinitum nomen substantivum*, "noun denoting indefinite substance".

But to grammarians the participle was not a *pars appellandi* (cf. Varro). In contrast to the Stoic semantics Priscian, following Apollonius, emphasizes the verbal character and syntactical behaviour of participles. The difference between a nominal and a participle is demonstrated by the verbal syntax of the participle: the participle follows the concord or agreement typical of verbs (*verborum consequentia*). Participles have their natural origin in verbs, they are always derived from verbs, and in the sentence structure they are used in place of verbs (*Participium est igitur pars orationis, quae pro verbo accipitur, ex quo et derivatur naturaliter*, 11,8; GL 2,552,18 ff.). The argument about the derivational nature of participles was usually employed to make a formal distinction between deverbatives and denominatives, for instance, between 'amatus' (participle) and 'togatus' (noun),¹⁹ but Priscian emphasizes the syntactical consequences of the deri-

¹⁸ Cf. also 11,25; GL 2,565,4 ff.: *In praesenti autem deficit, pro quo similiter verbum cum praedicto nomine proferimus dicentes 'qui amatur', ὃς φιλεῖται pro ὁ φιλούμενος. ex quo quoque ostenditur significatio participii, quod tam nominis quam verbi vim obtinet, quod et hoc pro illis et illa pro hoc ponuntur. dicimus enim 'legens est, qui legit' et 'qui legit, est legens'.*

¹⁹ Prisc. 8,90; GL 2,441,13–16 *participia sine verbis esse non possunt. si qua igitur videantur sine verbis formam habere participiorum, nomina sunt dicenda...: e.g. 'togatus, galeatus'.* Cf. Apoll. Dysc. synt. 4,45; GG 2:2,471,10 ff, Diomedes, GL 4,402,23 ff. Other formal criteria to distinguish between participles and adjectival nouns were: participles do not accept prefixes but they inherit them from verbs, and participles cannot have comparative and superlative forms. See, e.g. Prisc. 3,2; GL 2,48,21–22 *sed quando comparantur participia, transeunt in nominum significationem*; 11,31; GL 2,568,15 ff. In Roman grammatical tradition, since Varro, the classification of the participle was considered to be a problem of etymology or morphology; therefore the discussion of the participial forms usually concerned the concepts of imposition and derivation.

vation.²⁰ In terms of syntax, participles are 'transformations' (μεταλήψεις) from verbs into case-inflected words needed in order to obtain the correct construction.

*Participium etiam opportune post verbum ponitur, ex quo et nascitur, ..., quod necessario translationes verborum fiebant in casuales figuras cum generibus, quae eis accidunt, cum verba non possent consequentiam sui praesentare, ut etiam per obliquos casus adiungi possent et sine coniunctione consociari (17,18; GL 3,119,12–16).*²¹

The *consequentia verborum* ('correct construction' or 'correct syntax of verbs') simply means that case-forms should be selected correctly in agreement with verbs (and participles). Firstly there must be a nominative case to which the person indicated by the personal ending of the verb refers ('*legens doceo*'), and secondly there must be the correct oblique case, if there are more than one person (*persona*) involved in the predicated situation (*pragma*) (e.g. '*docentem audio*', '*illo docente didici*');:

Igitur participium inventum est, ut nominativus quidem sine coniunctione proferatur cum alio verbo, ut 'legens doceo' pro 'lego et doceo', quae compositio intransitiva est, hoc est ipsam in se manere ostendit personam, obliqui vero casus participiorum ad hoc sunt utiles, quod non solum sine coniunctione proferuntur cum obliquis casibus nominum, sed etiam ad alias transeunt personas, ut ... 'docentem audio' et 'illo docente didici'... (11,12; GL 2,554,28 ff.).

Thus in Priscian's grammar the formal duality of the participle, its being a case-inflected verb, is a reflection of its syntactical behaviour, and indeed, its existence is a necessary condition (*necessario*, ἀναγκάτως) for making syntactically correct sentences (cf. schol. in Dion. Thr. GG 1:3,415,29 ff.). Priscian says that the participle retains the syntax both of verbs and nouns

²⁰ If a derivative does not follow the verbal syntax it will not be a participle but a noun, for instance, *amans illum* (participle) but *amans illius* (noun); Prisc. 11,4–5; GL 2,550,4 ff., Apoll. Dysc. synt. 3,190; GG 2:2,432,20 ff.

²¹ Here Priscian translates Apollonius Dyscolus almost word for word: synt. 1,21; GG 2:2,23,8 ff. Cf. schol. Heliodori in Dion. Thr., GG 1:3,77,4 ff.

(*participia tam nominum quam verborum sibi defendunt structuram*, 17,92; GL 3,159,13 ff.):

a) it is a case-form replacing the verb (*loco verbi*) to fill the structural requirements of the verb, to refer to the subject-person (‘*ambulans cogito*’), and to take an object-complement (‘*laudans te*’).²²

b) it is a verbal replacing the noun with the verb (*loco nominis cum verbo*) to fill the structural requirements of the noun, to agree in the nominative case with the subject-part of the sentence (‘*Virgilius scribens floret*’) or to agree in an oblique case with the complement attached to the predicate-part (‘*video miserantem*’).²³

Both structures are interpreted in relation to the predicate-verb (cf. 17,26; GL 3,124,9–10 *loco verborum sumitur et cum verbis adsumitur*). In this connection Priscian uses quite consistently the terms ‘person’, ‘intransitive’, and ‘transitive’ (*persona; compositio intransitiva, compositio transitiva*).²⁴ The terms, which are names for syntactical categories, result from the observation of Greek and Latin morphology (verbs are inflected in person and nouns in case) and from the analysis of the semantic content of expressions (state of affairs, *pragma*, involving the existence of one or more participants).²⁵ The notion of person reflects the concord of the verb with the noun in the subject position, or in Priscian’s words, it is the mere demonstration of the existence of the person indicated by the verb (*substantiae demonstratio*).²⁶ Furthermore, it is not only a notion describing the

²² *Et verborum quidem constructionem servant, quando vel absoluta vel transitiva sunt ad alia casualia, quibus ad consequentiam verbi coniunguntur: absoluta, ut ... ‘ambulans cogito; ... transitiva ... ut ‘laudans te’.*

²³ *Secundum nomen autem participia construuntur, quod, quemadmodum verba vel intransitive cum nominativo vel transitive cum obliquis nominum ponuntur, sic etiam cum participiis intransitive, ut ‘Virgilius scribens floret’ ..., transitive, ut... ‘video miserantem’...*

²⁴ See particularly the passage quoted 11,12; GL 2,554,28 ff. The only exception is 17,93; GL 3,159,17, where he employs the traditional term of verb semantics *absolutum* instead of *intransitivum*.

²⁵ Cf. schol. in Dion. Thr. GG 1:3,255,22–23: τὰ γὰρ ῥήματα τὸ πρῶγμα σημαίνουσι καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον μετεilahφὸς τοῦ πρῶγματος.

²⁶ Prisc. 17,78; GL 3,152,13–14. For him person is not a deictic category, although he uses the word *demonstratio*. Cf. Amacker, op. cit. For the grammarians’ hesitation

observable variation in personal endings (e.g. *laudo, laudas, laudat*), but also a notion describing the observable syntactic variation in the sentence with respect to the verb and the 'substances' involved in the state or action:

Ideo autem repertum est participium, quod nomini verbum adiungitur, sed non aliter, nisi sit nominativus casus ei personae adiunctus (11,8; GL 2,552,21 ff.); Participia inventa sunt, ut quod deest verbis, id est casus, compleant coniuncta nominibus (11,9; GL 2,553,7 ff.).

Priscian then, following Apollonius' theory of πρόσωπον and μετάβασις, utilizes the formal variation of cases and the syntactic variation to say that constructions are either 'transitive' or 'intransitive', that they show a 'change of person' or not:

Non solum per obliquos casus est utile participium, sed etiam per nominativum. diversa enim verba absque coniunctione adiungere non potes, ut 'lego disco' vel 'doceo discis' non est dicendum, sed 'lego et disco' et 'doceo et discis': nam hoc proprium est tam transitivorum quam intransitivorum; participium autem si proferas pro aliquo verbo et adiungas ei verbum, bene sine coniunctione proferas, ut 'legens disco' pro 'lego et disco' et 'docente me discis' pro 'doceo et discis' (11,9; GL 2,553,12 ff.)²⁷

Priscian makes a good use of the notion of *persona* and of the observation of Latin morphology to maintain the 'raison d'être' of the participle. It is a *pars coniungendi* supplying, as it were, the need for connectives in complex expressions. It must be used when it is necessary to conjoin two statements with the same subject (e.g. '*legens disco*' pro '*lego et disco*'). It must be

between morphological and semantic definitions, see E. Hovdhaugen, "Genera verborum quot sunt? Observations on the Roman Grammatical Tradition", HL 13 (1986) 308–316.

²⁷ Cf. also 11,8; GL 2,553,1 ff. *Cum igitur sunt intransitiva, quia non possunt obliqui casus his adiungi, loco verbi subit participium, ut 'bonus homo loquebatur', 'boni hominis loquentis orationem audivi', 'bono homini loquenti dedi', 'bonum hominem loquentem audivi', 'bono homine loquente delectatus sum'.*

attached to the verb when it is necessary to conjoin two statements with different subjects (e.g. *'docente me discis' pro 'doceo et discis'*).²⁸

Priscian's discussion of the syntax of the participle shows that the concept of *oratio perfecta* (well-formed sentence corresponding to a complete thought) does not mean only simple sentences or statements but it also takes account of complex sentences. Although he paraphrases participial constructions as two clauses, he does not thereby suggest that they have the same meaning. On the contrary, he emphasizes that there are cases where the use of a participle is 'natural', 'useful', and 'necessary'.²⁹ The 'transformation' of the verb into the participle does not follow from the structure where two clauses are connected with a conjunction but the transformation into the participle comes from the verb and from the necessity to express a complex thought. Priscian adapted Apollonius' Greek grammar to Latin; particularly its theory of the complete sentence and of the concord between the main constituents of the sentence seems to have been useful for explaining the syntactic behaviour of participles. But he did not make the adaptation without considering the obvious differences between Greek and Latin. The observation of peculiarities of classical Latin, and also of the Latin grammatical tradition, caused him to lay emphasis on the nature of the participle as a *pars coniungendi*, and on that ground to reserve a special place for the participle in the order of the parts of speech. Later, the commentators of Priscian in the Middle Ages were more interested in explaining semantic qualities of verbs (active, passive, absolute etc.) than syntax. Thus the need for a separate listing of the participle was no longer motivated.

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²⁸ For Priscian's syntax, Baratin, op. cit. 471–474.

²⁹ Cf. schol. in Dion. Thr., GG 1:3,77,4 ff. καλῶς ἢ φύσις ἐπινόησε τοῖς ῥήμασι τὴν μετοχήν.