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CLOUDS I: STEPS TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION

HAROLD TARRANT

Preamble

I suspect that there may be an unstated prejudice against the view that the original (423 B.C.) version of *Clouds* was sufficiently different from our play to justify independent study. Some who accept the notion of a revision assume without argument that the revision found very little to revise. I single out K.J. Reckford's bold statement of his belief: 'The play that we have is mostly identical with the play performed in 423 B.C.'[1] This type of speculation, represented as established fact, can be worse than the type which it tries to discourage. Similarly Don Fowler suggests that the extant play is a reading version.[2] If he meant a reading version of a play already substantially revised, I should not object; but I suspect that he means a reading version of *Clouds* I, revised only to suit the needs of readers. In that case what features of the play make it any easier for reading than the text of the performed version? And why was the original version ever preserved as a distinct entity, so that it assumed a different identity in the minds of those who, centuries later, referred to 'Former Clouds' and 'Second Clouds'? Either the reading version alone would have survived, or there

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[1] Aristophanes' Old and New Comedy I, Chapel Hill/London 1987, 394. Reckford appears to feel that the quality of the present play is evidence that it is identical with the performed play. The opposite view would seem to me more logical.

[2] 'Taplin on Cocks', CQ 39 (1989) 257.

would be cross-contamination which eliminated the differences.

In order to approach the question of the first *Clouds* sensibly, one must keep in mind the piece of evidence which purports to tell us the principal differences between the two plays. This is the 'Hypothesis' usually numbered VI but numbered I by Dover: 'This is the same as the previous play, but it has been revised in parts (διεσκεύασται... ἐπὶ μέρους) as if the poet was keen to re-stage it but had no longer done this for some reason or other. Overall there has been revision in almost every part... For some things have been cut, some woven in; it has been transformed both in the order and in the change of characters. But some parts have got revision in their entirety...; for example the parabasis has been changed, and where the just argument talks to the unjust, and finally where the school of Socrates is burnt.'[3]

We are invited, then, to think of a minimum of three sections of the play as being new in their entirety, and the remainder as having been subject to a reworking of materials which seemingly involved their order in the overall structure of the play, and the allocation of lines to speakers. These are circumstances in which we are entitled to talk about differences in plot and not just in material – circumstances which make it legitimate to envisage that some speakers in *Clouds* II may not have figured in *Clouds* I, while others may have figured there but not in the later play. Such differences should be expected to have become substantial at some stage. I shall argue that they come chiefly after line 775 of thereabouts in the extant play. The extant parabasis makes it fairly clear that the first five hundred lines of the play had been largely the same;[4] equally the remaining part uses devices which the parabasis says were not part of

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[3] For useful discussion of this hypothesis see Aristophanes: *Clouds*, ed. K.J. Dover, Oxford 1968, lxxx-xcviii.

[4] It refers to the present play (ταύτην, 522; ἥδε = κωμωδία, 534) as having been presented before and failed. It also mentions several comic devices which were not employed in that play, but which will be employed in the present play after the parabasis. See here in general T.K. Hubbard, 'Parabatic Self-Criticism and the two Versions of Aristophanes' *Clouds*', C.Ant. 5 (1986) 182–197, who is able to show how particular parts of the parabasis make reference to a specific version, but who admits (193) that Aristophanes is "shifting back and forth between references to each version of the *Clouds* and never making it altogether explicit which version is under discussion at any given point." This would have been a difficult accomplishment if the pre-parabasis scenes had been substantially altered.

the (original) play,[5] as Aristophanes crammed the rest with success-formulae plagiarized from other comedians.[6]

Whatever the degree of failure of the first play, whether it was beaten by two exceptionally good rivals or whether it just did not amuse the audience sufficiently, it is quite clear from the parabasis of our version (518–526) and from the parabasis of the *Wasps* (1043–50) that Aristophanes was dissatisfied with the reaction to it. In those circumstances he is unlikely to have contemplated putting on roughly the same play a second time unless he could expect the mood of the audience to have been radically different. Another argument for extensive revision is that much of the humour relies on this being the first time that the play is presented; the twists and turns of the plot are never so amusing if one knows that they are coming, and Old Comedy's reliance on the unexpected made it unsuitable for presentation twice to the same audience in the same form. A revised play might leave the plot unchanged, while matters of detail are greatly improved. That kind of revision would not have appealed to an Athenian audience, but more importantly Aristophanes' own perception of the first play is that the material had been good: possibly a little too clever for his audience.[7] His confidence in the first version's ἔπη is evident at line 544. Certainly he may have infused his clever material with a little more vulgar humour, but he was not interested in a mere debasing of his play which pandered to popular tastes. Moreover he appears to have felt that his play had remained 'on course' and 'out

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[5] See lines 537–43. The ideal opportunity for a special phallus occurs at 734; for mockery of personal characteristics at 1237–8; for open violence, here involving goad rather than staff at 1297–1300; the incendiary conclusion at 1490–1505 does precisely what 543 had denied; and while there is no evidence that a κόρδαξ was danced, the whole point of its obscenity is the prominence afforded to the gaping anus: – we certainly hear much about that at 1083ff, and we may see something of it at 1102–4. Hubbard (190) assumes that Strepsiades himself would have danced this dance at such points as 439–56 and 1201–13. I strongly suspect that one case of the dance would have been enough.

[6] A fitting reaction perhaps to their alleged plagiarism of his own tricks (547–59). On plagiarism see now the article of Malcolm Heath referred to in n. 25.

[7] Nu. 521–2 ὡς ὑμᾶς ἡγούμενος εἶναι θεατὰς δεξιοὺς καὶ ταύτην σοφώτατ' ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κωμῳδιῶν, 535 σοφοῖς; V. 1044 καινοτάταις... διανοίαις, 1047 μὴ πώποτ' ἀμείνον' ἔπη τούτων κωμῳδικὰ μηδέν ἀκοῦσαι, 1049 παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς.

in front' at some time, and that at some such stage it had 'crashed';[8] this 'crash' was due to the failure of the audience to recognize the playwright's point, as *Wasps* 1048 (μὴ γνοῦσι) and 1046 (ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ γνῶναι) show. My paper will point towards an attempt in the revision to keep the play on the desired course after line 774.

I. Insects in intercourse

I begin with a passage which demonstrates significant differences from the present play. A fascinating fragment of *Clouds* I (= fr. 393 PCG) predicts that two persons will lie like two small, winged, gnat-like insects receiving sexual intercourse:

κείσεσθον ὥσπερ πηνίω βινουμένω.[9]

The line is said by Photius and Suidas to mock 'the ones with Chaerephon' (τοὺς περὶ Χαιρεφῶντα) for their frail, skinny bodies. The lexicographers assume that the πηνίω symbolize this fragility. The fragment predicts an unhealthy and undignified future for a pair of characters, only one of whom could be Chaerephon. In the extant version Chaerephon is barely distinguishable from Socrates for the most part – perhaps his second in command; but he never has a recognizable speaking part.[10] Dover, however, speculates with good reason that he may have had a part in the original version. Lines 104, 144–58, and 503–4 prepare his appearance;[11] this fragment is further evidence. Chaerephon and not

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[8] V. 1050: εἰ παρελαύνων τοὺς ἀντιπάλους τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ξυνέτριψεν.

[9] The variant κινουμένω would not necessarily change the meaning, and is probably inferior, especially as κείσεσθον implies an absence of motion.

[10] That is not to say that he couldn't have been visually identifiable as one of the two students who are perishing along with Socrates at the end of the work. Sommerstein attributes to him 1497, 99, and 1505 on the grounds that he remains within the school at all costs. If 1497 belongs to him, that agrees with Aristophanes' depiction of him as a thief in fr. 295 PCG. But if he does make such an appearance, the humour of it would be dependent upon his earlier part in *Clouds* I.

[11] Olympiodorus considers Chaerephon's part in 'the comedy' worth recalling, and refers to him

Socrates is seen as the object of mockery.

Chaerephon had two features which confirm his relevance: (i) he had a poor physique (cf. 503), and (ii) he was the school's entomologist: the man who knows the trail of a flea (831, cf. 149–152), and who seeks Socrates' help over whether gnats buzz at the front end or the rear (156). The gnat-like insect, which went by the name πήνιον and was similar to the ἔμπις or κώνωψ,[12] would indeed have had a most unimpressive body. Abuse of Chaerephon could employ this unflattering entomological analogy with great effect, blending it with an obscene threat. The first word predicts that 'they shall lie', surely using the verb in the sense applicable to the battle-field (LSJ I 3) or the wrestling ring (LSJ I 6; cf. line 126): they shall lie after a wound or a fall. Moths do not exactly 'lie' when copulating, nor do looper caterpillars lie when moving. 'Lie' indicates the situation of defeat. The pair will be defeated, reduced to the status of one of the undignified insects which Chaerephon studies, and be sexually abused by the victors.

It is hard to see how the line could mock Chaerephon's physique if he were not (as tradition supposed) one of those being threatened; but the only other character with whom he could form a pair is Socrates. This does not happen in the extant version, where, of twenty-one lines in which the dual is used, there are only seven in which it refers to a pair of *dramatis personae*, always the two Arguments.[13] At some point in *Clouds* I Chaerephon had formed the same kind of pair with somebody – Socrates surely – as the two Arguments had formed. But a threat like this against Socrates and Chaerephon would scarcely be interpreted as mockery of 'Chaerephon's crowd' unless he had been a prominent character. In these circumstances alone an interpreter might be led by the suggestion of enfeebled, insect-like physique to see Chaerephon as the chief object of the ridicule.

Somebody, then, is predicting that, in a prefigured contest with himself,

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as a philosopher, presumably on the strength of Clouds-derived traditions (In Gorg. proem, section 3, 2.21–22 Westerink).

[12] Speusippus (fr. 11 Tarán = 20 Isnardi Parente) in Suidas and Photius s.v.

[13] Lines 113, 114, 244, 882, 886, 949, 1336. Other duals occur at 31, 362, 394, 411, 483, 506, 529, 946, 967, 980, 983, 1060, 1189, 1223. At 529 the dual refers to the twin heroes of *Banqueters*.

Socrates and Chaerephon will be soundly and humiliatingly defeated. It is likely that the pair are about to play a role analogous to that of two contrasting Logoi. The insult is in the style of a rude and confident Strepsiades – the kind of remark one would expect him to make if threatened with a contest against the twin weapons of the School. Strepsiades is thus their opponent. Could he be about to confront the leaders of the School in argument?

II. Which version did Plato know?

The works of Plato probably offer significant evidence for *Clouds* I. It is logical that they should be primarily concerned with the performed play, which had helped to earn Socrates his unfavourable reputation with the Athenian public. Often, of course, the features of the play which concerned Plato must have been common to both versions: the association with primitive astronomy and geophysics, and with making the weaker argument seem stronger.[14] With Xenophon too there ought to be a presumption that the original version is in mind (particularly in the *Symposium* which has a dramatic date of 421 B.C.), though he mostly makes use of features which would have been common to both.[15]

At *Phaedo* 99b Plato satirically refers to two theories about the earth-heaven relationship. One makes a whirl (δίνη) the cause of the earth's central stability, and the other places an earth like a kneading-trough (κάρδοπος) upon a base of air.[16] It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Plato is alluding to *Clouds*, because Dinos and Kardope are both nouns which have had their

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14 See Ap. 17b and 19bc, where ἐωρᾶτε confirms that Plato has the performance of the play in mind.

15 See X. Symp. 6.6–8 (cf. 7.2) and Oec. 11.3 (cf. 18); the presence here of ἀερομετρεῖν may indicate that Xenophon does indeed have the lost version in mind.

16 Plato evidently sees something paradoxical about the rapid motion of the whirl being the cause OF REST, for at 101b1–2 he finds it a τέρας that something small should be that by which something else is big (cf. Tht. 199d– ignorance caused by knowledge). It is perhaps also paradoxical to require a stable base of air for an earth which is the home of constant kneading-processes.

terminations 'corrected' by Socrates in the extant version.[17] Both feature prominently, the former at 380–1, 828 and 1471, the latter at 669–76, 788 and 1248–58. In fact the only gender-adjusted words with comparable prominence are ἀλέκτωρ and ἀλεκτρύαινα.[18] J.Burnet, when commenting on the *Phaedo*,[19] seeing no relation between the two words in *Clouds*, was actually led to emend καρδόπῳ to καρδοπίῳ (kneading-trough cover); but the kneading-trough image seems particularly appropriate for describing an earth *qua* receptacle of the push and pull of compression and rarefaction which characterize the universe in Anaximenes (A5–7DK) and Diogenes of Apollonia (A1, A5). Both these thinkers rested their broad earth on a bed of air (Anaximenes A20, Diogenes A16a), and may even have postulated a slightly concave earth. For Anaximenes has the heavenly bodies passing to the side of the earth, not underneath it, and holds that they are hidden by higher parts of the earth (A7); while Diogenes is said by his namesake the Laertian (D.L. 9.57 = A1DK) to have postulated a 'rounded earth, supported in the middle' (γῆν στρογγύλην, ἠρεισμένην ἐν τῷ μέσῳ). The term στρογγύλην does not of course have to mean a spherical earth (cf. Anaximander A11), and if supported by air in the middle(!) the curvature referred to could well be that of a slightly concave disc.[20]

We should therefore realise that the kneading-trough image was suited to the cosmological ideas of the early physicists most alluded to in *Clouds*, and try to establish some link between Dinos and Kardope other than the linguistic one, such as might have prompted Plato to allude to them together. One notes that the physical representation of a Dinos which has graced Strepsiades' home instead of a Herm (1472–80) was, like a kneading-trough, an earthenware object, evidently

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17 That the gender-correction of Dine to Dinos was not original to Aristophanes, being present also in the later Presocratics (since Leukippus A1DK) does not prevent the audience from seeing it as similar.

18 661–7 and 848–53: in this case one would also have supposed some link with the original version, with the defeated Right perhaps being referred to as an ἀλεκτρύαινα. If Right had originally been ithyphallic like the calyx-crater cocks (see below, n. 54), there would seem to have been a great opportunity for the gender-change term.

19 Plato's *Phaedo*, Oxford 1911, ad loc.

20 This may be difficult to reconcile with A57DK, which postulates a tilt of the disc towards the south.

a round earthenware object in some way representing the heavens. That means that it should have resembled the choker (πνιγεύς) identified with the Socratic heaven at 95–7.[21] The Dinos is depicted as a hemispherical cover, and represents the heaven as in Plato; could the Kardope have been depicted as a large dish, representing the earth as in Plato? In that case both the heaven and the earth would be represented by familiar utensils employed in bread-making. The Dinos may have featured prominently in Astronomia, while Kardope provided the centre-piece of Geometria (201–2).[22] As a huge kneading trough it could have received a generous portion of barley from Strepsiades, had he carried out his promise at 669.

But none of this is explicit is *Clouds* II, and as that play had never been performed, Plato cannot have made the connexions purely from a reading of the text. If we are to give an adequate explanation of Plato's combined allusion to Dinos and Kardope in the *Phaedo,* we need to suppose that either the text or the presentation of *Clouds* I had brought out the connexions more clearly.

There are in the corpus three occasions when ἀδολέσχης follows μετεωρολόγος or something similar:

	μετεωρολόγοι καὶ ἀδολέσχαι τινές	(Crat. 401b)
	μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν	(Plt. 299b)
	μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην	(Rep. 488e–9a)
also:	ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας	(Phdr. 270a)
and:	μετεωρολέσχας (after λεγομένους)	(Rep. 489c)

All this would seem to point to Plato's alluding regularly to the term μετεωρολέσχης, ascribed by the scholiast on *Peace* 92 to *Clouds* (fr. 386), but not found in our version. The scholiast would not have any strong claim to be believed but for the fact that Plato clearly has just this comic coinage in the forefront of his mind.[23]

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[21] Thinkers whom Dover finds relevant here are Hippon, Meton and (once again) Diogenes of Apollonia.

[22] It may even have been identical with the γῆς περίοδος (206).

[23] The present play of course uses comparable coinages: στενολεσχεῖν (320), μετεωροφέναξ (332), μετεωροσοφιστής (360).

The *Euthydemus* is particularly rich in allusions to *Clouds*, as has often been noted. But which version has so influenced Plato here? I propose to show that Plato seems not to have been influenced by material exclusive to the revised version. In my view this is more prevalent in lines 770–end (excluding the father-beating scene) as well as the Eupolidean section of the parabasis. I present below a list of those Aristophanic lines which Rogers and Hawtrey appear to consider significant in this context:[24]

Rogers	Hawtrey	cf. Euthd.
98–9		272ab, unscrupulous word-fights
"		304c, teaching for cash
	102	283c, ἀλαζών
	126	277d, wrestling metaphor
138		296a, request for pardon of ignorance
	143	277de, mysteries
205		303d, 'demotic' teaching
227	227	296b, ἀλλ' εἴπερ
	254	277d, the θρόνωσις
332		271c, Thurii
	364	277e, attitude to Prodicus
	398	287b, Cronus/Cronia
439–42	439–42	285cd, flaying for a wine skin
	453f	285cd, flagellation of pupil
	476	302c, προδιδάσκειν
629		295d, σκαιός
	646	283a, ἄγροικος
655		295d, σκαιός
658–91		288a, word-quibbling
	660	283e, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι
	790	295d, σκαιός
915	915	287b, ἀρχαῖος
929	929	295c, Κρόνος
	1008	276d, ψιθυρίζω
1202 (?)		298a, λίθος
1468	1468	302b, Ζεὺς πατρῷος

[24] See R.S.W. Hawtrey, A Commentary on Plato's Euthydemus, Philadelphia 1981; B.B. Rogers, The Clouds of Aristophanes, London 1916, xxvii–xxviii.

There are about three points of similarity between the *Euthydemus* and the first 770 lines of our play to every one in the latter half – in other words the possible allusions are concentrated in that portion of the play which we have presumed to be less thoroughly revised. Furthermore the parallel with line 790 simply involves the word σκαιός, found earlier at 629 and 655;[25] the material at 915 and 929 has parallels at 1468 and 398 respectively;[26] the metaphorical use of ψιθυρίζω at 1008 cannot have inspired its natural use at Euthd. 276d; the stone-metaphor at 1202 is unlikely to be related to Euthd. 298a; and 1468 concludes the father-beating scene, which I presume to have been present in the first play. Indeed a further point of contact between that scene and the *Euthydemus* is to be found in the 'demonstration' that Ctesippus beats his 'father' at 298e9–10.

Plato alludes almost exclusively to aspects of the play likely to have been present in *Clouds* I too: thus there are good reasons for supposing that he was drawing primarily on the original version of *Clouds*, both in the *Euthydemus* and elsewhere.

III. Corrupted quotation or fragment?

I next discuss the alternative version of *Clouds* 412–7 known from Diogenes Laertius 2.27. I shall argue that this text is extremely difficult to explain in terms of deliberate tampering by an ardent admirer of Socrates: (i) because several individual discrepancies cannot be the result of such a process; (ii) because these

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25 It can be argued that that 790 is particularly relevant as the use of the term is coupled with the refusal to continue with Strepsiades as a pupil. But it is Connus who threatens to reject Socrates at 295d, so it is perhaps more likely that Plato is alluding again to Ameipsias' *Connus* than to either version of the *Clouds*. If I then had to regard the expulsion of Strepsiades in *Clouds* II as plagiarism of Ameipsias, this would agree well with the findings of Malcolm Heath, 'Aristophanes and his Rivals', Greece and Rome 37 (1990) 143–158, particularly 150–3 concerning plagiarism charges in Cratinus, Eupolis, and Aristophanes.

26 But note that it is almost certain that the arguments, cocks or not, exchanged abuse in the first version too. Several ideas at 891–933 could have been used in both versions, and Pheidippides' remark at 1330 must be preceded by a similar remark from Wrong to have any effect. I see no difficulty in believing that Wrong had called Right ἀρχαῖος (cf. Euthd. 295c) and Κρόνος (cf. Euthd. 287b) in the first version, and believe that the anti-Euripidean remarks at 921–5 would have been in place there.

lines in the extant play would not have attracted the attention of such a person; (iii) because the biographic tradition did not in fact need so laudatory a passage in order to make its point, since it aimed only to show that the comedians unwittingly praised Socrates' ways; and (iv) because ΣV416 is better explained by the scholiast's familiarity with an earlier version than by his having commented originally on a text partially (but not completely) contaminated by the allegedly deliberate corruption within the Socratic lives.

In cases where two versions of an ancient work are known to have existed, and passages are attributed to it which do not accord with the extant version, it is necessary to assume that those passages belong to the lost alternative version unless powerful reasons for doubting this can be adduced. This principle applies both in the case of material which is completely absent from the extant version, and where it is present in a significantly different form.

I do not believe that the principle has been followed in the case of lines attributed to the *Clouds* by Diogenes Laertius (2.27), which are related to, but significantly different from, lines 412–17 of the extant play. Furthermore, I believe that the passage can be made sense of in the context of *Clouds* I, and that, if they were accepted as part of that original version, they would offer us assistance towards an interesting and effective reconstruction of the play. They have been excluded from consideration largely because Dover,[27] who must take much of the credit for establishing that two versions had existed, was able to explain away the differences to everybody's apparent satisfaction without recourse to *Clouds* I. It was appropriate enough when arguing for two versions to discard any alternative readings believed otherwise explicable, but now that two versions of the play are normally accepted, one should return to the question and ask whether the lines are more likely to have arisen by corruption of the extant text or from the earlier version.

The two versions are as follows:

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[27] Dover xci–xcii.

ὦ τῆς μεγάλης ἐπιθυμήσας σοφίας ἄνθρωπε παρ' ἡμῶν,
ὡς εὐδαίμων ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι γενήσει
εἰ μνήμων εἶ καὶ φροντιστής, καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἔνεστιν
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μὴ κάμνεις μήθ' ἑστὼς μήτε βαδίζων,
μήτε ῥιγῶν ἄχθει λίαν, μήτ' ἀριστᾶν ἐπιθυμεῖς,
οἴνου τ' ἀπέχει καὶ γυμνασίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνοήτων,
καὶ βέλτιστον τοῦτο νομίζεις, ὅπερ εἰκὸς δεξιὸν ἄνδρα,
νικᾶν πράττων καὶ βουλεύων καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ πολεμίζων.
(*Clouds* 412–19)

ὦ τῆς μεγάλης ἐπιθυμήσας σοφίας ἄνθρωπε δικαίως,
ὡς εὐδαίμων παρ' Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι διάζῃς·
εἶ γὰρ μνήμων καὶ φροντιστής, καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἔνεστιν
ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ κοὔτε τι κάμνεις οὔθ' ἑστὼς οὔτε βαδίζων
οὔτε ῥιγῶν ἄχθει λίαν οὔτ' ἀριστᾶν ἐπιθυμεῖς
οἴνου τ' ἀπέχει κἀδηφαγίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνοήτων.
(D.L. 2.27: κοὔτε τι, *forte* κοὐκέτι)

It should immediately be obvious that there are several differences, not all of which can be attributed to the motivations of those transmitting the text. I list them here:

	Clouds II	D.L.
(i)	παρ' ἡμῶν	δικαίως
(ii)	ἐν	παρ'
(iii)	γενήσει	διάζῃς (or διάξεις, Cobet)
(iv)	εἰ μνήμων εἶ	εἶ γὰρ μνήμων
(v)	ψυχῇ	γνώμῃ
(vi)	μή κτλ.	οὐ κτλ. (with extra τι, or read οὐκέτι)
(vii)	καὶ γυμνασίων	κἀδηφαγίας
(viii)	Clouds to Strepsiades	Clouds (?) to Socrates (??)

Let us take these changes one by one; we may assume for the moment that Diogenes' version is a corruption, stemming either from wilful alteration of the text designed to show Socrates in a good light or from a lapse of memory. We see that (i) is not a change that a would-be eulogist of Socrates would have to

make, but one which he might make.[28] Likewise it could have taken place through the desire to supplement one's inaccurate memory of the passage. (ii) is irrelevant to the eulogizer's aims, while (iii) is a logical alteration for him to have made, for it might seem desirable to remove the implication that Socrates is not yet εὐδαίμων. However, it is scarcely a necessary one, because of Greek reluctance to call a man εὐδαίμων before he is dead. If one were to replace γενήσει with another future, διάξεις,[29] implying that Socrates does not yet lead a life which is εὐδαίμων, one is left with no great alteration of sense at all. (iv) changes a promise of blessedness conditional upon one's becoming a quick-witted ascetic into a similar promise based upon the fact that one has now been transformed into one (note my οὐκέτι). It is the most fundamental change, and it entails that the negatives (vi) should be changed. Alteration (v) gives only the slightest shift of emphasis; as such it can hardly have been deliberate. Moreover it is most unlikely that any Socratic who wished these lines to constitute a reference to Socrates' own qualities would have altered the very familiar Socratic term, ψυχή, referring to that part of the self to whose care Socratic philosophy was directed;[30] still less would he have chosen to alter it to γνώμη, for this is clearly not a Socratic term for any intellectual organ or faculty.[31] It might, however, have followed from a lapse of memory. As for (vii), there is a world of difference between the avoidance of 'gymnastics' and the avoidance of over-eating. Over-eating seems a natural thing to be avoided in this context, while the avoidance of gymnastics proper is not associated with Socrates' personal type of asceticism, not even by Aristophanes. It is unexpected, and it

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[28] There might be some slight desire to remove the contextual reference supplied by παρ' ἡμῶν. The Clouds are fooling themselves if they think that Strepsiades desires wisdom 'from them', so that this element is not entirely satisfactory in our play.

[29] Cobet: less attractive at first sight is the manuscript reading of Diogenes in F and P where διαζῇς is read. But this verb is well attested in Ar. (Av. 1434, Pl. 906), which is more than can be said for διάγω in this sense without βίον.

[30] E.g. Ap. 29d–30b, Charm. 156e, Phd. 107c; X. Mem. 1.2.4; Isoc. c.Soph. 8.

[31] Here one must note that among works of Plato which are not clearly late the term is used in the singular only nine times; twice when the *Cratylus* discusses the term; once at Rep. 476a5, where a precise Platonic use is proposed; one in a quotation from Pindar (Rep. 331a9), and otherwise only in the expression γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* the term γνώμη is likewise not used by Socrates of an organ or faculty.

will receive some kind of explanation below. Anybody wilfully emending the text to make it eulogize Socrates would have had to alter the reference to gymnastics; memory-lapse again seems not a likely explanation of the difference.

The problem with regarding Diogenes' lines as a corruption of the extant text is that it is difficult to see how our text ever came to be viewed as throwing light on the nature of Socrates himself. Besides the fact that the person addressed has not yet acquired the qualities needed, neither abstinence from wine nor abstinence from gymnastics were traditionally associated with Socrates, let alone the desire for victories in political speaking and eristic debates (418–9). The *Symposia* of Plato (176c, 220a, 223cd) and Xenophon are testimony to Socrates' willingness to join in all aspects of the festive occasion. I do not have to argue that their picture of Socrates was the correct one, for it would certainly have been preferred by those supporters of Socrates who selected this passage as suitable biographic material. The asceticism implied by 417–9, unlike the powers of physical and mental endurance mentioned at 415–6,[32] seems distinctly non-Socratic. Admittedly the inmates of the φροντιστήριον can hardly be said to indulge themselves, but this is mostly through lack of resources or meanness (cf. 835–7). Abstinence from gymnastic, if that is to be taken literally,[33] is linked with Wrong's education rather than with that of the school as a whole; the gymnasia were an accustomed haunt of Socrates. Finally, the context in which this speech of the chorus is set, from 408 to 426, makes it unambiguous that it is Strepsiades who is expected to acquire these qualities.

There is thus a problem of devising reasons why any predecessor of Diogenes should have so convinced himself that lines 412–7 are evidence for the

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[32] That agrees well with the story of Socrates' exploits in the Thracian winter at Pl. Symp. 219e–220d, where he endures extreme cold both on the march and when standing meditating for a day, and misses his meal as a result (c8). Indeed some such tale as this is needed to explain how a man can be said to need to STAND untiringly, as at 415.

[33] It is the view of A.H. Sommerstein, Aristophanes *Clouds*, Warminster 1982, 183, that 'gymnastics' is unexpectedly substituted for sexual activity etc. But the term does not require any clever explanation in the present play, where Wrong's pupils (unlike Right's, 1002) neglect the wrestling schools (1054) and their physique in general (1015), as did the school's inmates at 184–6. It is noteworthy that Alcibiades is said to have encouraged a fashion of neglecting the wrestling-schools (Ps.-Andoc. 4.39). Might other supposed pupils of Socrates have been expected to shun them?

life of Socrates that he would either emend the passage considerably in order to agree better with his picture of Socrates or allow it to change so much in his memory that its tones of mild mockery became a remarkable eulogy of Socrates. Let us therefore examine what Dover thinks has happened, so that we may consider this problem in the context of the prevailing view. He believes that the doctored extract has simply been taken from our play and 'altered by someone whose moral earnestness exceeded his feeling for poetry, sense of humour, and historical scruples'. I take it that the Dover thesis requires that Diogenes' lines have been brought about by deliberate alteration either of the similar lines in our play or of identical lines, similarly used, in *Clouds* I. Two problems with this view have been considered: (a) that an ardent adherent of Socrates is unlikely to have noticed these lines as potential material for illustrating his view of the philosopher, or even for emending so as to illustrate that view; and (b) he would alter the text only in ways which are directly relevant to his project of having them supply a description of his hero Socrates; he would not have made alterations (i), (ii) and (v); he would probably not have made (iii) either. Dover's theory of deliberate alteration needs to be combined with an additional explanation of corruptions (such as memory lapse) if it is to have any plausibility.

There is also a third difficulty. Diogenes introduces the passage with the following words:

> τοῦτο (Socrates' plain-living habits leading to a God-like life with minimal desires) δ' ἐνέσται καὶ παρὰ τῶν κωμῳδοποιῶν λαβεῖν, οἳ λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτοὺς δι' ὧν σκώπτουσιν ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν·

A biographer must have selected lines which appeared to him to illustrate a Socratic type of plain-living, such that the comedian was unwittingly praising Socrates for it (though ridiculing him in a wider context). The expected combination of (i) gentle mockery and (ii) recognition of some admirable qualities is found in the quotation from Ameipsias which follows as further evidence. But the lines which we meet in Diogenes, if deemed to be addressed to Socrates, would surely constitute generous and intentional praise. The biographical tradition would never have forged so laudatory a passage from 412–7, if it did not intend to show Aristophanes' genuine admiration for

Socrates. The reader may object that somebody had attached these laudatory lines, whatever their origin, to the weak claim that comedians unwittingly praise Socrates. Such an objection unnecessarily assumes that the words were then seen as addressing Socrates himself; but even if they had been addressed to some other product of a Socratic education they were relevant to the biographers' thesis. The poets are summoned to testify to the quasi-divine qualities of Socrates' hardy and frugal life.[34] The quotation suggests a recognizably Socratic life-style, and sees it as a source of blessedness for the one who adopts it. Later, when its context had been forgotten, the quotation is naturally taken to be addressed to Socrates himself.

Other evidence which Dover has to explain is Σ V416: τὸ μὴ ἀντὶ τῆς οὐ. The phrase εἶ γὰρ μνήμων, he supposes, is remembered from the doctored text [more plausible if Dover had believed that a text had been doctored before it came to the attention of the biographers];[35] it is added as a variant of the true text of 414 (a), and subsequently it replaced the real text in one branch of the manuscript tradition (b). A scholiast notes then that grammar requires the other negative in 415–16 (c), and his comment is transferred to an unadulterated manuscript (d). An equally plausible and simpler explanation can be given, namely that a scribe familiar with *Clouds* I had noted that the text at 415–16 employed a different negative from another text which he had seen; he may well have realised that this was a consequence of the different construction in 414, though not commenting upon the alternative text at that point. Dover's story is no less likely than that Aristophanes had included a plain and unsatirical eulogy of Socrates in the performed version, but there are alternatives to be considered.

One must ask, then, whether the lines had been part of *Clouds* I as they stand, but addressed to somebody who had completed his Socratic education. In that case the lines would be humorous in so far as they attach recognizable Socratic qualities to somebody who presumably did not have them before; had this person been Strepsiades, then they would have been particularly funny in so far as he would have become, like Philocleon in the *Wasps*, the reverse of his

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[34] καὶ ἐλαχίστων δεόμενος ἔγγιστα εἶναι θεῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἐνέσται καὶ παρὰ τῶν κωμῳδοποιῶν λαβεῖν,...

[35] In fact it appears from p. 154 that he believes that Diogenes' biographic source had altered the text.

previous self. Since no such transformation is achieved in *Clouds* II, it is immediately obvious why Aristophanes should have altered it in order to make it into a conditional promise before reusing it. It is likewise clear why δικαίως had to be changed too (to the colourless παρ' ἡμῶν), prompting in turn the alteration of παρ' to ἐν in the following line, and ψυχῇ for γνώμῃ might have been prompted by an increased awareness of what Socrates' philosophy was concerned with.[36] The substitution of abstention from gymnastics for abstention from greed παρὰ προσδοκίαν would be amply justified by the need to vary material and introduce new jokes in any second performance.

One additional point must here be made. Lines 412–9 do not fit well into their present context in our play. One has to credit the Clouds with omniscience if they are to know that Strepsiades is seeking great wisdom from them. He does not say he wants anything from them until 429, and indeed the audience would have hitherto supposed that Strepsiades' requests are sought from Socrates and his *logoi*. Though the three lines which follow 412–9 do so quite naturally, line 423 does not follow 422 very convincingly, but would have followed very well straight after the section on meteorological theology (365–411). By contrast, lines 412–422 do not have anything to do with 365–411, and the possibility that they have been squeezed in here (with alterations, because they could no longer be used later) is very attractive.[37]

If these lines seem not perfectly designed for their present context in *Clouds* II, then it is likely that they had originally appeared in some other context in *Clouds* I, and were subsequently adapted. If they appeared in a different context there, it is equally possible that they appeared with certain textual differences; different readings will suit different contexts. It is highly probable that Diogenes preserves evidence of the text of the early version.

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[36] This assumes that Socrates had now become the moral philosopher familiar to us. If there was a stage in which his interests were those of the Presocratics, then the term γνώμη might then have been used: cf. Heraclitus B41, 78; Anaxagoras B12; Democritus B11 etc.

[37] A feeling that the lines are ill-placed has led to a transposition being suggested, whereby 423–6 would precede line 412 (F.V. Fritzsche, De Fabulis ab Aristophane retractatis, Rostock 1851, 6–7); but how did lines become misplaced originally? I owe this reference to a referee.

IV. Could Strepsiades have 'graduated'?

There is no certainty that Strepsiades will not complete studies with Socrates until line 778, hence he might have done so in another version. The main provision must be that somehow Pheidippides had learnt wrong argument in that version too, since 1417b is attested for *Clouds* I (fr. 378); I shall address this in due course.[38]

Lines addressed to a new graduate of the φροντιστήριον and remarking upon his new self will concentrate on the features which are substantially different. Lines 1171b–1177 of the revised play demonstrate this. The first thing which strikes Strepsiades is his son's pasty complexion, something which he had so dreaded acquiring before (119–120, cf. 103); next his mean and argumentative, not to say litigious, look. But the passages of Diogenes highlights (1) the quality of memory and then (2) the interest in φροντίσματα. Next (3) it goes on to the mind's ability to steel itself and (4) to the body's powers of endurance. Indifference to food (5) and (6) avoidance of excess of food, drink etc. follow after that. The play as we have it does not suggest that this can be comment as to how Pheidippides has changed; certainly he was no φροντιστής early in the play, but there was nothing wrong with his memory or physique, nor was he represented as having any vices of indulgence other than those connected with horse-racing.

On the other hand Strepsiades was obviously deficient in mental powers, particularly memory (129–30, 484–5, 628–31, 785–90); he has little ability to concentrate (723f); he is unable to resist the assaults of mere bed-bugs (707ff), and we certainly do not think of him as either physically or mentally hardy. Finally he has a tendency to over-indulge himself (386–91). The graduate addressed contrasts little with Pheidippides, but sharply with the original Strepsiades. Thus, in my view, the lines are only likely to belong to *Clouds* I if they were addressed to Strepsiades as he graduated from Socrates' Academy.

There is nothing intrinsically problematic about the notion that Strepsiades did complete his studies. He has learnt quite a bit from his experiences in the

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[38] I deal below (n. 57) with the problem of 1196–1200 (attested for *Clouds* I, but without mention of speakers, at Athenaeus 171b).

φροντιστήριον even in the present play, as can be seen from the way in which he practises φροντίσματα on Pheidippides and the two creditors. We do not have to see him as learning the kind of thing that Pheidippides learnt from Right and Wrong, because the agon, as indicated by the hypothesis, was radically different in the first play, and was probably presented in the form of a word-fight between two competing cocks.[39] It is possible that a representation of this scene has come down to us.[40] Moreover Strepsiades was half way to success by line 773 of the present play.

Again it should be noticed that Strepsiades' apparent defects, as exhibited in the earlier part of the play where revisions must have been fewest, could be compared with certain traits of Socrates himself.[41] His misunderstandings of that intellectual reflects as badly on the outlandishness and obscurity of his language and researches as it does upon the pupil. Woodbury found something to

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[39] Here I follow Dover xc–xciii; admittedly he does not insist that the arguments were presented as fighting-cocks in the original, but his findings here have been supported lately by Oliver Taplin, PCPhS 33 (1987) 92–104, and Don Fowler in CQ 39 (1989) 257–9; and I reject Hubbard's view (loc. cit. 187, n. 19) that ΣVE889 is attributable to mere scholastic speculation: the text at the opening of the extant agon rules out anything but self-mobile humans. Also I note that Pheidippides' imitation of cocks at 1430 is probably connected with his having witnessed Right and Wrong as cock-like birds in combat. Even Hubbard, however, acknowledges that the present agon is fundamentally new material.

[40] See Taplin, PCPhS 33 (1987) 92–104; his attribution of the scene on the J. Paul Getty Museum calyx-crater 82. AE 63 to the agon of *Clouds* I is in some ways attractive; we apparently see two satyr-like, cock-like birds arguing; fighting cocks come in PAIRS as here, and may not be chorus-members in spite of the presence of the aulos-player, whose presence might symbolize an otherwise unrepresented chorus – how else might the painter indicate the presence of CLOUDS? J.R. Green sees the birds as chorus-figures from Aristophanes Birds (Greek Vases in the J. Paul Getty Museum 3 [1985] 95–118). His study of the text of Birds shows that similar costume was worn, but other bird-vases discussed by him there also present TWO birds (London B509, Berlin F1830); the birds here seem to be adopting a pugnatious stance, and the aulos-player stands squarely between the two apparent combatants rather than leading them.

[41] Socrates had also had a tendency to misunderstand people's answers in a rather obvious 'concrete' manner, e.g. Gorg. 488d–489e, 490ac, de, Ap. 26e–27a. His odd responses to answers received could seem obstructive, even boorish. He too displays ἀγροικία, Gorg. 461c, 462e, 509a, Ap. 32d, Tht. 146e, and εὐήθεια, Rep. I 336c, 343d, Meno 75c, Euthd. 279a, Hp. Ma. 289e, 301cd.

commend in the workings of Strepsiades' brain.[42] He has a kind of uncultured ingenuity, however bad a pupil he makes, and one should ask whether Socrates would have been more successful as a student. We find him doubting his potential as a student (of sophistry as of music) in the *Euthydemus* (272c).[43] He also reports that Connus, his music teacher, had become angry with him because of his aversion to compliant behaviour, and begun to neglect him because of his ignorance (ὡς ἀμάθους ὄντος, 295d5). He has been a sufficient impediment to Connus to earn the poor man the title of γεροντοδιδάσκαλος (272c5), a likely comic coinage from Ameipsias' play *Connus,*[44] which, like *Clouds*, appeared in 423 B.C. and involved Socrates. Could Ameipsias have been depicting Socrates as too old to be taught at the same time as Aristophanes was so depicting Strepsiades? Socrates was in fact about 46; Strepsiades perhaps in his fifties.

Strepsiades' age was not such as to prevent him from learning enough to be dangerous. Furthermore Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have only acquired their sophistic skills in old age (*Euthd.* 272b), 'Socrates' thinks that he ought to be able to do likewise (ibid.), and indeed anybody can rapidly learn their 'skills' (304bc).[45] Not only Euthydemus but Socrates too could easily be imitated by others (*Apology* 23c2–d2). If we had only the first half of *Clouds* II, we should be expecting Strepsiades to graduate from the φροντιστήριον, and we should scarcely consider the possibility that Pheidippides might do so.[46] Indeed it is out

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42 L.G. Woodbury, 'Strepsiades' Understanding: Five Notes on the *Clouds*', Phoenix 34 (1980) 108–127.

43 This work is particularly important in that "Parody leads in turn to imitation and allusion; and Plato's most dramatic and comic dialogue is probably richest in allusion to Aristophanes. ...most of the references to surviving plays are to the *Clouds*." R.S.W. Hawtrey 34. B.B. Rogers also made much of the similarities Strepsiades and Plato's Socrates.

44 See R.S.W. Hawtrey 46.

45 Cf. Ctesippus' successful imitation of them at 300d7–9.

46 I have argued in 'Alcibiades in Aristophanes' *Clouds* I and II', Ancient History: Resources for Teachers 19 (1989) 13–20, that Pheidippides is represented in the second version as an Alcibiades-type more obviously than he could have been in the initial version, and that this is particularly evident in the material leading up to the agon, where what in my view is a lambdacism at 870–3 [mimicked no doubt by an οὐκ ἐς κόλακας (sic) from Strepsiades, recalling V. 44–46] makes the connexion quite specific. My connexion between *Clouds* and Alcibiades followed M. Vickers 'Lambdacism at Ar. *Clouds* 1381–2', LCM 12.9 (1987) 143, who revives the view of J.W. Süvern, Ueber Aristophanes *Wolken*, Berlin 1826, with an interesting twist. More

of character that Pheidippides should have ever have agreed to study at the φροντιστήριον in the extant play; I can scarcely claim that the change is so abrupt as to pass beyond the limits of Old Comedy, but it certainly presents problems for modern productions of the work.[47]

V. The other plot

Let us examine, then, the consequences of supposing that Diogenes' version of 412–7 were part of the original play, and that Strepsiades had himself graduated from the φροντιστήριον. Clearly he would not have needed to plead once again with his son to come and study. Pheidippides would not have been required to give in weakly where he had resisted steadfastly before. Clearly Strepsiades can be expected to have used more actual arguments and less abuse and violence to dismiss creditors who came his way. However, we must still see the consequences of Strepsiades' learning, and Pheidippides must also acquire some skills in argument: for 1417, from the heart of the father-beating scene is attested for *Clouds* I too.[48]

Who Pheidippides learnt from is not difficult to guess, for at 1430, after the son has appealed to cocks' willingness to fight their fathers, the father asks him why he does not sit on a perch and eat dung,[49] if he imitates cocks in everything. The joke and its reply are rather tame in the present version; but if we follow the scholion on 889, and accept that (in the first version)[50] the arguments were brought on caged like fighting birds, then we realise that

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circumspect is R.F. Moonton Jr., 'Aristophanes on Alcibiades', GRBS 29 (1988) 346–7.

47 I am grateful to Stephen. Fennell, who, like myself, has played the role, for confirming my feelings on this point.

48 *Clouds* I fr. 378 Kock (= Schol. Plat. 465 Bekker, not listed as a fragment in PCG), cf. Nu. 1417; note from X. Mem. 1.2.49 how Socrates had been said to have encouraged father-beating. It is likely that his defamers had the performed version of clouds in mind.

49 The presence of the 'perch' motif in the extant version at 226 according to ΣR (and cf. Pollux 10.156 on 869??) may be another indication that fighting cocks had perched in the agon of *Clouds* I.

50 I follow ideas present in Dover xc–xciii and others, see above n. 39.

Strepsiades' remark would have had much more point. Pheidippides would not merely have been appealing to the behaviour of cocks; he would have been imitating it.

So Pheidippides, it seems, had been present while the Arguments were in action. Did they leave the school to confront Strepsiades at his home? Or did Pheidippides visit the school himself? What could have brought him to seek them out now that his father was no longer desperate that he should study? It is enough, I believe, that the Arguments should have been fighting birds. Cocks would certainly have appealed to the young Pheidippides; for cocks, like quails, dogs and horses, are animals of which a prize specimen was much coveted by pretentious young men at Athens;[51] they were also associated with manliness.[52] At 108–9 the ultimate inducement for Pheidippides to enter the school would have been the 'pheasants of Leogoras'. Even that was not inducement enough, but the fantastic Argument-Birds of the Socratic school might have been. Thus the depiction of the arguments as birds solves the problem of how the disdainful Pheidippides might ever stoop to give ear to sophistic argument.

So Pheidippides listens, and in doing so learns. He is thus, as in the extant play, in a position to repay Strepsiades for his shameful treatment of creditors. I find no reason, however, to suspect that the creditor-scenes in the extant play belonged also to *Clouds* I; they are rather too buffoonish, depicting a man who had failed his course, not passed it. Furthermore, though the school was not burnt down in that version, Strepsiades needed somehow to give its members their deserts. A debate with the φροντισταὶ over payment of fees offered the best opportunities for humour. It could have provided a context for the accusation from Strepsiades that Socrates had composed Euripides' tragedies for him (fr. 392 PCG) a joke which would prepare the way for Pheidippides to defend

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51 See for instance Plato Lys. 211e (all four) or Hp. Ma. (omits dogs). Note that Alcibiades, who has much in common with Pheidippides, was interested not only in horses and horse-racing, but also in dogs [he bought a fine one for 70 minae, and removed the tail; Plut. Alc. 9.1] and quails [he is most grateful to somebody who recovered a prize quail; ibid. 10.1–2]. Note how the literal meaning of 108–9 of the extant play ("I certainly would not, not even if you gave me the 'pheasants' that Leogoras breeds") is quite acceptable if we have any reason to assume that Pheidippides, like other young men of his sort, is fond of prize game-birds.

52 See Don Fowler, CQ 39 (1989) 258.

Euripides later (1377–8).

This is where Chaerephon is required. Socrates' school had to be seen employing the twin weapons of Right and Wrong. This could most effectively be achieved by having two separate characters play contrasting parts, as in the *Euthydemus*. Socrates might choose Right; Chaerephon, represented in comedy (Ar. fr. 295 PCG etc.) as a thief and con-man, would take Wrong. When first challenged with a contest against the twin pillars of the School, Strepsiades might well have predicted that they would come off looking like raped gnats. But the rudeness was accompanied not by violence (parabasis, line 541), for the play relied on its clever words (ibid. 544, 522). Strepsiades simply beat the sophists at their own game, out-arguing them like the unjust pupil of Protagoras.[53]

Strepsiades' triumph is short-lived. Like Plato's ignoble cock (Tht. 164c), he crows too early over his sophistic opponents. He has a victory celebration,[54] in the course of which he falls out with his son (perhaps for reasons similar to those given at 1354–79),[55] receives a beating and is quite unable to argue against his son's amoral stance. The Clouds themselves finally depart in anger, presumably because their heroes have been overthrown by an upstart,[56] who plays 'Agoracritus' to Socrates' 'Cleon'. There is no need for any further action against the φροντιστήριον, since they have already suffered from a dose of their own medicine.

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53 The theme of the unjust or ungrateful pupil, who turns what he has learnt against those who taught it, is alluded to by Plato (Euthd. 304a, Gorg. 519cd), and Isocrates (c.Soph. 5–6). The anecdotes go back to the environment of fifth century rhetoric or sophistic; for Protagoras see D.L. 9.55, Quint. 3.1.10, Apul. Flor. 18.

54 Note that at 1354 the chorus are supposed to know that Strepsiades and Pheidippides have been feasting. Is this a relic of the first version, for much has intervened since a feast was foreshadowed at 1212–13?

55 It is likely that Strepsiades's dislike for Euripides had earlier been indicated in a remark suggesting that Socrates was the evil genius behind Euripides' clever language (fr. 392 PCG).

56 See fr. 394 PCG: the angry departure for Parnes by way of Lycabettus is reminiscent of the entry of the Clouds from Parnes at 323.

Conclusion

Such a reconstruction is offered as a possible one. It tries to take account of such evidence as there is, resorting as little as possible to attempts to discredit that evidence.[57] Much more debate is required before we can feel even moderately confident in reconstructing *Clouds* I; in anticipation of such debate, I refrain from drawing bold conclusions. I do not believe that there can be much doubt as to Chaerephon's greater importance in the first version, and I do not believe that the Socratic tradition can have failed to devote most of its attention to the performed play of 423 B.C. Unfortunately, it is seldom possible to recognize any allusions to parts of that version which have been excised from the revision.

Plato's *Euthydemus* in particular may contain hitherto unsuspected parallels with the first version. In a sense both the comedy and the dialogue explore the consequences of Socrates' association with contrasting sophistic arguments. Both animate those arguments. Plato uses the Isocrates-like figure of 304d ff to raise Aristophanic doubts about the wisdom of Socrates' willingness to toy with them. As in Aristophanes, Socrates has no control over these figures. Nor does he have any control over his young ally Ctesippus who tries to beat the arguments at their own game. As in Aristophanes grave worries surface about how others will use these arguments once they have heard them; there is even a suggestion that the fee should be taken before the arguments are handed over (304ab).

The theme of the unjust pupil[58] here makes its most obvious appearance in

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[57] It may seem that I have neglected the testimony of Athenaeus (Deipn. 171c) to the effect that lines 1196–1200 belonged in the original play. There we see a confident Pheidippides, who has clearly learnt the arts of the φροντιστήριον, setting Strepsiades' mind at ease concerning his debts, and assuring him that the legal process for the recovery of debts is flawed. If spoken by the same speakers as in the extant version these lines suggest that Pheidippides, but not Strepsiades, has learnt something significant from Socrates' school. Athenaeus, however, gives no indication of the speakers of these parts. In fact the whole of 1178–1200 might equally have formed part of Socrates' teaching to Strepsiades at an earlier stage of the play, perhaps as early as line 242, just after Strepsiades has revealed that he is beset by debts. Relocation of lines, with their re-allocation to speakers, seems to have been a feature of the revision to judge from the hypothesis quoted above.

[58] The relevance of this theme to *Clouds* is suggested by E. Howald, ἀέναοι νεφέλαι, Jahresbericht des Philologischen Vereins 10 (1922) 38ff, and is found attractive by Dover xciii,

Plato. In its developed form the theme postulates two kinds of argument, (i) from what is legally valid, and (ii) from what is valid by agreement, both of which are employed by teacher and by pupil, with victory going to the latter. In a sense the theme features in the extant *Clouds* when the School in burnt down, though its significance is diminished by the failure of the pupil to employ the teacher's own weapons in overcoming him. If the School received its deserts in *Clouds* I too, as it surely must have done, then this was by some other means. There was no better means to repay the follies of Socrates and Chaerephon than by forensic sophistry[59] from the recesses of their own school.[60]

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n. 2 (whose reference on p. lxxxiii I assume to be wrong).

[59] If this had been the case, then one puzzling feature of the extant play is solved. The Arguments are contrasted regularly both in terms of their putative strength (ἥττων, κρείττων) and in respect of the one's being just (900), the other unjust (116 etc.). The contrast between the justness of the one and the injustice of the other is not evident in the present play; nor are they operating in a legal environment which they are seen as belonging to. It is likely that they functioned in some quasi-legal tussle in the original, the environment that the early parts of the play had clearly been setting for them. The only person against whom the School is likely to have used the Arguments in quasi-legal fashion is Strepsiades. And the only case that the School is likely to have brought against the Strepsiades is one resulting from his chronic problem of bad debts.

[60] I have a number of people whom I ought to be thanking for their help with this paper, but especially Paul A. Vander Waerdt and David Konstan who have recently visited my institution. And I should particularly like to express my thanks for those who invited me to talk on this theme at the University of Helsinki in January 1991.