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A S P E C T S   O F   S P I N O Z A ' S   L A T I N I T Y

I i r o   K a j a n t o

During the seventeenth century, Latin was beginning to be superseded by the modern languages in philosophical literature. To quote the greatest names, although Fr. Bacon wrote his chief works in Latin, his more popular books were in English; Descartes' most famous work, Discours de la méthode, was in French but the more scholarly Meditationes and Principia philosophiae in Latin; Hobbes wrote both in Latin and in English, but his English output was larger than the Latin one; however, he translated his major work, Leviathan, into Latin, to make it more widely known on the continent; Leibniz, though his native language was German, composed his main works in French: towards the end of the seventeenth century, French was establishing itself as the lingua franca of European culture.

To the above list of philosophers who increasingly turned to the vernaculars, one great exception exists, Spinoza, who wrote almost exclusively in Latin.[1] This was due to a variety of reasons. The most important of them may have been the fact that his mother tongue, Portuguese,[2] was little known in Europe and of no use in the learned world. Hence he had to resort to Latin, which still in the seventeenth century was the vehicle of ordinary learned discourse. Again, Spinoza's philosophy was revolutionary in many respects, not least as regards religion. He might have been embroiled in conflicts with the authorities more than he actually was if his religious ideas

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1 A few minor works were in Dutch.
2 Freudenthal 310.

had been accessible to the general public.[3]

Although the study of Spinoza's Latinity has not been entirely
neglected, his knowledge of the language has been differently ap-
praised. Land gave him particularly poor marks,[4] whereas Leopold
came to the conclusion that Spinoza's knowledge of Latin was ad-
equate to his purposes and his obvious mistakes due more to neg-
ligence than to ignorance; his contemporaries were no better adepts
in the language.[5]

Since the turn of the century, when these papers were written,
Neo-Latin scholarship has made considerable progress.[6] Moreover,
the papers merely described a few of the more salient unclassical
constructions in Spinoza, omitting their linguistic analysis. Further,
the all-important vocabulary received none or cursory attention. For
these reasons, a fresh appraisal of Spinoza's Latinity may be useful.

In the present study, I shall not discuss all the possible
unclassical features in Spinoza's Latin. Instead, I have set about
to elucidate Spinoza's position in philosophical Neo-Latin. To this
purpose, I have compared his Latinity with that of his two famous
predecessors, Descartes and Hobbes. I have not, however, scrutinized
their whole Latin work. Descartes' Meditationes and Hobbes' De cive,
two works which were certainly known to Spinoza, have been analyzed
for comparison. Further, I have tried to deal with the relevant prob-
lems within the framework of the whole Neo-Latin, which can be
characterized as the Latinity which emerged from the blend of clas-

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3 Freudenthal 239. Cf. Descartes, Meditationes 14: he decided to pub-
  lish his ideas about God and the human nature in Latin because they were
  so novel *ut non utile putarim ipsam in gallico, et passim ab omnibus le-*
  gendo scripto fusius docere, ne debiliora etiam ingenia credere possent
  eam (scil., *viam*) *sibi esse ingrediendam.* For the use of Latin as a safe-
  guard against the spread of 'subversive' ideas, see Olschki 64; 66sq.
4 'Over de utgiven en den text der Ethica van Spinoza' (Verslagen
  en Mededeelingen der Kon. Akad. v. Wet., Afd. Lett. II 11, 4sqq.).
  The work has been unobtainable, but Land's conclusions have been
  reported by Leopold 1, fns. 1-2.
5 Cf. especially his summary on p. 23. A briefer evaluation in Freu-
  denthal 208-214 and in S. von Dunin-Borkovski, Der junge Spinoza[2]
  (1938) 470sq.
6 Cf. especially J. IJsewijn, Companion to Neo-Latin Studies (1977).

sical Latin, revived by the humanists, with medieval Latin. The
language was purged from some of the more offensive barbarisms of
medieval Latin. On the whole, however, the humanist attempt to
restore Latin to its pristine purity and elegance failed. This was
most evident in the vocabulary. Clearly it was not possible to dis-
pense with the new terms and new meanings coined to express all
the new things and ideas in life and culture. Even in grammar,
especially in syntax, unclassical constructions survived, not be-
cause these constructions would have been indispensable but because
of the fact that knowledge of classical syntax was still insufficient.[7]
In fact, most of the unclassicisms in Neo-Latin grammar are explain-
able as carry-overs from medieval Latin, which had largely inherited
them from the Vulgarized Late Latin.[8]

        In orthography and morphology, deviations from classical norms
were of minor importance. There were some medieval orthographical
survivals, *-ae-* for *-e-*, for instance *caeterum* passim; *faemina* E 167,
21; *laevia* E 82,27; sometimes *-oe-* for *-e-*, e.g. *foemina* E 272,3;
-y- for *-i-*, e.g. *stylus* EP 63,22; *-ci-* for *-ti-*, e.g. *pronunciatio*
TP 107,9; *-ti-* for *-ci-*, e.g. *fictitia* E 129,22; *-th-* for *-ct-*, e.g.
authoritas, author passim; *-ch-* for *-c-*, e.g. *charitas* TP 97,29;
there was uncertainty in gemination, e.g. *sumum* EP 18,18; *connexis*
E 59,13. These forms were common in humanist Latin, though Spinoza's
own Vossius already recommended correct spellings.[9] Morphology
shows only one recurrent irregularity, inconsistency in the ablative
singular of comparatives, which sometimes ended in *-i*, for instance,
majori E 166,6; 12; 17, but *majore* 165,13; *luculentiori* TP 116,13;
mediocri E 225,1. Contemporary grammar, however, did not proscribe

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7 Cf. Benner/Tengström 80.
8 For a discussion of these problems, see my 'Notes on the Language
  in the Latin Epitaphs of Renaissance Rome', Journal of Neo-Latin
  Studies (1979) 167-186.
9 Vossius, De arte grammatica I 148 *femina non foemina;* 149 *patri-
  cius non patritius;* 151 *silva non sylva.* The book was found in
  Spinoza's library, A.J. Servaas van Rooijen, La bibliothèque de
  Bénédict Spinoza (1888) 153. For Neo-Latin, cf. Benner/Tengström 69sq.

the forms in -i.[10] A blunder like *vulgus qui* TP 114,25 is too oc-
casional to mean anything; cf. *vulgus quod* TP 115,6. A more intrigu-
ing construction is *una loca Scripturae aliis accomodare* TP 148,23,
an anomalous plural of the Late Latin phrase *unus - alius*,[11] pos-
sibly due to the influence of the vernacular.

Unclassical Latinity was always most noticeable in syntax
and vocabulary. I shall first analyze a few select aspects of
Spinoza's syntax.

1.   S y n t a x

1.1. *Quod* instead of *accusativus cum infinitivo*

The one conspicuous unclassical feature in Spinoza's syntax
is no doubt the frequency of *quod* after *verba sentiendi et dicendi*.
Moreover, there was little consistency in his use of the alternative
constructions. The same expression, even on the same page, was con-
strued now classically, now unclassically, e.g. *certum est quod...*
imputanda sunt P 295,19, but five lines later *certum est id ex eo*
oriri; again, *patet quod sit* INT 15,7; *iterum patet quod...sit* 15,9,
but *rursum patet neminem posse scire* 15,12. Classical and unclassical
construction could coexist in the same sentence, e.g. *a ratione*
alienum esset statuere Deum...accommodavisse ac quod Deus...accommo-
daverit TP 64,22; *Cum itaque Scriptura narrat terram...sterilem esse*
aut quod caeci ex fide sanabantur TP 91,15. One may, however, note
a minor difference. In these and many other similar cases, the clas-
sical *A.c.I.* preceded the *quod-*clause. Spinoza thus began with the
classical construction but then changed to *quod* possibly because he
felt a sentence consisting of more than one *A.c.I.* to be unduly mo-
notonous. Again, he often replaced a classical *A.c.I.* dependent upon
another *A.c.I.* by a *quod*-clause, e.g. *Neque hic necesse esse puto*

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10 Vossius, Grammatica Latina 47sq. The ending -i, though unclassical,
      became increasingly frequent in Late Latin, Neue-Wagener, Formen-
      lehre der lateinischen Sprache II[3] (1892) 265sqq.
11 L.H.S. II 182.

monere quod Scriptura, quando ait... (22 words) *loquatur* EP 327,17, where the *quod*-clause, which includes still one *A.c.I.*, would have been rather intricate if he had construed it as a classical *A.c.I.* governed by *monere*.

The verb of the *quod*-clause was indiscriminately in the indicative or in the subjunctive, e.g. *apparet quod...non possumus* E 52,1; *nolumus tamen negare quod Deus...praescripserit* TP 45,19; *Narratur... quod...scripsit* TP 122,24 but *narrat...quod...scripserit* TP 145,16. The indicative and the subjunctive alternate even in the same sentence, *Legimus in Veteri Testamento quod...praedicatum ivit ac simul quod...missus est et quod...revelatum fuerit* TP 153,34.

Clearly *quod* instead of *A.c.I.* was an unclassical feature. Originating in the Vulgar Latin, and occasionally found in the classical age and during the early Empire, it became more frequent in Late Latin, especially in the early Christian authors.[12] But even in later authors, for instance in Victor Vitensis, *A.c.I.* still predominated.[13] Moreover, in the latest period *quia*, and to a lesser degree *quoniam*, successfully competed with *quod* in frequency.[14] In medieval Latin, which in all essentials carried on the traditions of Late Latin, *quia* and *quod* in place of *A.c.I.* were extremely common.[15] In Neo-Latin, too, *quod*-clauses survived, even in masters of the language, such as Melanchton.[16] In the standard Neo-Latin grammars *A.c.I.*, like many other syntactical constructions, was inadequately treated. Although Vossius, for instance, discussed the construction, he does not appear to have known that it was employed after *verba sentiendi et dicendi*. Moreover, he quotes from Plautus, Cicero, Livy, Seneca and Pliny the Younger passages in which *quod* corresponds to an *A.c.I.*; rather lamely he warns against the imprudent use of

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12 L.H.S. II 576.
13 Pitkäranta 89.
14 L.H.S. II 577.
15 Norberg 98.
16 Kluge 21.

quod.[17] In another passage, however, Vossius counselled the sub-
junctive in dependent *quod*-clauses.[18] Spinoza, who put the verb
of his *quod*-clauses now in the indicative, now in the subjunctive,
either did not remember, or did not care for, the rule.

Latin grammar as taught in the seventeenth century thus al-
lowed some latitude in the use of *quod* in place of the *A.c.I.* Ob-
viously violations of the insufficiently known classical rules did
not appear as anomalous then as they do now, after all the work
done on the Latin syntax.[19] It seems often to have depended upon
an author's own study of, and ability to imitate classical usage,
whether or not the *A.c.I.* was correctly used. Among the major phi-
losophers of the seventeenth century, Spinoza certainly was the
most negligent one as regards the Latin syntax. In Descartes' Me-
ditationes, I have encounterd only two unclassical *quod*-clauses.
In one, *quod* precedes the governing phrase, *Nam quod ego sim qui
dubitem, qui intelligam, qui velim, tam manifestum est, ut* (50);
the sentence would have been awkward if construed with an *A.c.I.*
In the other, the governing word is a noun, *nulla suspicio...quod
mihi unquam per sensus illapsae sint* (116). The paucity of the un-
classical *quod*-constructions in Descartes is not due to chance. His
Latin, no less than his French, was particularly elegant, no doubt
because of the fact that he had enjoyed excellent classical ed-
ucation at a Jesuit college.[20] Hobbes possessed a thorough ground-
ing in Latin after having studied the classics at the university
of Oxford; he even composed Latin poems. It is thus no wonder that
his De cive should show few instances of unclassical *quod*. Yet they
are not wholly absent. As a matter of fact, the relative frequency
of unclassical *quod* is greater in his book than in Descartes' Me-

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17 Grammatica Latina 62 *Sed haec rara sunt, nec pueritiae passim, ac
    temere, imitanda;* De arte grammativa VII 80 *Etsi vero nonnullis
    haec, per quod enunciata, Latinis auribus non convenire videantur.*
18 Grammatica Latina 90.
19 Cf. Benner/Tengström 80.
20 Ch. Adams, Descartes, sa vie, son oeuvre (1937) 12sq.: Descartes
    spent eight years at Collège de la Flèche of the Jesuits.

ditationes, e.g. *Quod lex naturae facilis observatu sit, declarat Christus* (208); *Quod autem ii...sint quodque...delectentur...manifestum est* (293). In both cases, the *quod*-clause preceded the governing phrase, a construction which might have been felt to be lighter than the classical one with an *A.c.I.* There are, however, other constructions, too, *dici posset quod Deum coleret* (347); *nunciatum esset quod prophetarent* (363). For all that, the number of the cases is much smaller than in Spinoza. Moreover, Hobbes always put the verb in the subjunctive.

Another unclassical usage of *quod* in Spinoza may be recorded here. In Late and medieval Latin, *quod* was often used instead of *ut consecutivum*.[21] In Spinoza, examples of this usage occur, especially in the frequent logical phrase *sequitur quod*, where the classical syntax would have required *sequitur ut*, cf. E 190,19; 204,20, etc. The classical construction e.g. E 213,10; 26; on the same page, *hinc sequitur hominem...esse*, 213,31, which is a classical construction, too (in Cicero).

1.2. The mood in subordinate interrogative clauses

Contemporary grammar let the learner almost completely down as regards the mood in subordinate clauses.[22] I shall illustrate Spinoza's usages by analyzing the mood in his subordinate interrogative clauses. Obviously he had little guidance on this aspect of grammar. Vossius does not discuss complex sentences at all. At most, he had brief remarks on the mood in clauses governed by a particular conjunction, such as *quod* (see above). The rules governing the mood in subordinate clauses could only be learnt from a keen study of approved classical authors.

In classical Latin, however, the mood in dependent interrogative clauses was not always the same. For later learners of Latin, it was significant that the indicative existed in early colloquial speech,

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21 L.H.S. II 581sq.; J. Svennung, Untersuchungen zu Palladius und
   zur lateinischen Fach- und Volksprache (1935) 506.
22 Cf. Benner/Tengström 81sq.

in Plautus and Terence,[23] the authors which were much used in
teaching Latin. Although the subjunctive was later established as
the classical norm, the indicative still occurred, e.g. in Catullus,
Vitruvius, Petronius, Pliny the Elder. In Late Latin, the indicative became
increasingly common, many authors preferring it to the classical
subjunctive.[24] In medieval Latin, as far as can be gathered from the
scanty treatment of the subject, the indicative must have been very
frequent.[25]

Contemporary grammars giving none or at most vague rules con-
cerning the mood in subordinate clauses, and usage in the great clas-
sical authors being far from uniform, it is no wonder that the Neo-
Latin authors should often have chosen a mood that was incorrect
from the 'Ciceronian' point of view. Naturally, the more one was
versed in good classical authors, and the finer ear he had fór
linguistic details, the better Latin did he write. Spinoza, however,
does not seem to have belonged to these people. In his Latin, the
indicative is conspicuously common. Here is only a selection of
instances:

> *concipimus quid...potest* E 294,6
>
> *intelligimus qua in re...consistit* E 303,2
>
> *non video quomodo...satisfactum fuit* TP 18,33
>
> *nescio vero quo ivit* EP 163,19
>
> *Quod autem addis, an...constituendi sunt* E 278,5.

Moreover, Spinoza's usage was inconsistent in that the classical
subjunctive could alternate with the unclassical indicative, even
in the same passage, e.g. *Deinde neque etiam scimus, qua occasione,*
neque quo tempore hi libri...scripti fuerunt. Nescimus praeterea,
in quorum manus libri omnes inciderint, neque...repertae sint, nec
denique an non...fuerint TP 109,23. In cases like this, it is evi-
dent that the writer had not paused to consider whether the mood
chosen by him was the correct one. And unlike some *quod*-constructions,

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23 L.H.S. II 537sq.
24 Ibid. 538sq.
25 Norberg 98.

the unclassical indicative does not appear to have served any stylistic purposes.

In this respect, Descartes and Hobbes did considerably better. In Descartes' Meditationes, there are few indicatives in subordinate interrogative clauses, *Superest tantum ut examinem qua ratione ideam istam a Deo accepi* (92); *attendendo utrum ego perfectius, evidentiusque percipiebam* (56). In Hobbes' De cive, a larger volume than Meditationes, the cases are correspondingly more numerous, e.g. *Vidimus quo modo cives...obligarunt se... Videndum porro est, quibus modis fieri potest ut* (247). Even he, with all his classical schooling, could be inconsistent in the very same passage, *prius determinatur quid faciendum est...* (11 words) *...quid vero faciendum sit, determinatur post* (315), where the only difference is in the position of the governing verb. Another example, *sciunt quidem quid reges imperant...* (3 words) *...utrum vero id, quod imperant, sit contra imperata Dei necne, id nesciunt* (415). Here, too, the governing verb was differently placed. I do not, however, think that anything but chance dictated the choice of the subjunctive in the cases in which the subordinate clause preceded the governing verb.

1.3. The shifted perfect passive

My third example of Spinoza's unclassical syntax concerns the shifted perfect, the type of *laudatus fui, fueram*. In classical Latin, the shifted pluperfect already existed, although it did not become common until Late Latin.[26] On the other hand, the shifted perfect passive was much less frequent. Sporadic examples occur in a few writers of the Imperial age, but by real significance the shifted perfect came in the very latest period, in the seventh century, in Fredegar.[27] In Victor Vitensis, for instance, this type of the perfect passive does not exist.[28] Moreover, the shifted forms were

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26 L.H.S. II 320sq.; Pitkäranta 75; M. Leumann, Part. perf. pass. mit fui im späteren Latein, Glotta 11 (1921) 192-194.
27 L.H.S. II 324; Leumann, op.cit. 193.
28 Pitkäranta 75.

usually found in subordinate, rarely in main clauses.[29]

In Neo-Latin, the difference between the shifted and unshifted perfect and pluperfect had been obliterated. Vossius lays down the rule: *Praeteritum perfectum, et plusquamperfectum circumloquimur per participium, et verbum substantivum, ut amatum sum, vel fui: amatus eram, vel fueram.*[30]

Spinoza was accordingly not restrained by any rules of school grammar in his use of the unclassical shifted forms. There is a considerable number of examples of the shifted pluperfect passive, *pro ratione opinionum, quibus fuerant imbuti* TP 30,8; *qui tum sine miraculis imperium...adepti fuerant* TP 49,25. The subjunctive was also represented, e.g. *etsi aliis verbis aut alia lingua scripta fuisset* TP 165,9. The shifted pluperfect, as stated, was not as unclassical as the shifted perfect. In Spinoza, the latter was equally common, e.g.

> *corpora externa, a quibus corpus humanum semel affectum fuit*
> E 105,2
> *nempe Magis...revelata fuit Christi nativitas* TP 32,33.

In the subjunctive,

> *quas amplexi fuerint* TP 35,15
> *quamvis aliis linguis vulgati fuerint* TP 100,6.

In the future,

> *Si corpus humanum...affectum fuerit...statim...recordabitur*
> E 106,22.

The subjunctive and the future of the perfect passive occurred in Victor Vitensis though the simple shifted perfect did not.[31] In Neo-Latin, all differences between the perfect and the pluperfect had thus been abolished. Finally, the shifted perfect infinitive was also found, eg. *Hebraeos prophetas...a Deo missos fuisse* TP 51,6 *credendum id a sacrilegis hominibus...adjectum fuisse* TP 91,26. Spinoza's usual inconsistency as regards syntax is illustrated by the passages where both the shifted and the unshifted forms occur, e.g. *linguae, qua libri Scripturae scripti fuerunt*, but 5 lines

29 Leumann, op.cit. 193.
30 Grammatica Latina 97.
31 Pitkäranta 75.

later *librorum Veteris Testamenti, qui hac lingua scripti sunt* TP
99,36. Again, *scripti fuerunt* TP 109,25, but *repertae sint* 109,27.

Although Spinoza made ample use of the unclassical shifted
forms, his contemporaries could not find them in any way anomalous,
Neo-Latin grammar treating the shifted and the unshifted construc-
tions as interchangeable. Descartes' and Hobbes' Latin also proves
that shifted perfect passives were tolerated. In fact, this is
precisely the one unclassical feature most often encountered in
Descartes' otherwise grammatically elegant Latin, e.g. *fuerint
inventae* (6); *fuerunt objecta* (20); *fuisse delusum* (34); *fuerit
visum* (34). Similarly in Hobbes, *facta fuerint* (234); *factus fuit*
(294); *salutatum fuisse* (423).

1.4. Unclassical constructions of the gerund and gerundive

One of the most salient peculiarities of the medieval Latin
syntax was the extensive use of the ablatives of the gerund in place
of the present participles to express concomitance.[32] Though the
usage occasionally occurred in Livy and Vitruvius, it became general
only since the 3rd century.[33] It is accordingly an unclassical con-
struction.

Neo-Latin grammars, Vossius and others, ignored this use of
the gerund.[34] In learning Latin, Spinoza was probably not warned
against the construction. The frequency of the ablatives of the
gerund in his Latin is in fact remarkable; he favoured the gerund
in other constructions, too (p. 79). There is any number of examples,

> e.g. *mens hanc rem postea imaginando, affectu laetitiae, vel
> tristitiae afficiatur* E 152,13
>
> *Aharon ea...Pharaoni interpretando, personam agit prophetae*
> TP 15,14.
>
> *ut nullius momenti parum curando* EP 9,10.

32 Norberg 25.
33 L.H.S. II 380; Pitkäranta 85; P. Aalto, Untersuchungen über das
    lateinische Gerundium und Gerundivum (1949) 69sq.
34 Benner/Tengström 76.

The ablative was also common in one of his pet phrases, *more humano loquendo* P 293,33; *poëtice loquendo* TP 26,16; *in tertia persona loquendo* TP 121,12, etc.

More scrupulous Neo-Latin writers had certainly noted that the construction was unclassical. In Descartes' Meditationes, I have found only a few passages in which the ablative of the gerund does duty for the classical present participle, e.g. *pergamusque deinceps, attendendo utrum ego...percipiebam* (56), where, incidentally, another unclassical feature, the indicative in a subordinate clause, occurs; *id potius crederem de iis quae sentire mihi videor vigilando* (138). I have not included here a case where the ablative had an instrumental connotation.[35] The ablatives were equally rare in Hobbes, *Sequitur hinc subditos Abrahami ipsi obediendo peccare non potuisse* (355), though the connotation may be instrumental; *philosophice loquendo* (321); *Ut pergamus jam, ductum sequendo Scripturae Sacrae* (356), etc.

Another unclassical construction in Spinoza was the gerundive joined to *venire*, e.g. *venit hic notandum* E 129,29 and 210,7, the former followed by an *A.c.I.*, the latter by a *quod*-clause; *quae jam hic veniunt consideranda* TP 109,30; *Quae hic primum examinanda venit* TP 112,15. Clearly *venire* in this construction served as a synonym of *esse*, cf. *Quae...notanda sunt* E 253,26; *hic obiter notandum est quod* INT 20,17; inconsistently, *venit etiam notandum quod* TP 121,17, but ten lines later, *notandum quod*. A few examples of *venire* as a substitute for *esse* exist in Late Latin.[36] However, as far as I know, only a sporadic example from Plautus shows *venire* joined to a gerundive.[37] I have not found similar cases in Descartes or Hobbes.

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35 *meque solum alloquendo, et penitius inspiciendo, meipsum paulatim mihi magis notum et familiarem reddere conabor* (60).
36 E. Löfstedt, Lateinisch-griechisch und lateinisch-romanisch, Studia Neophilologica 11 (1938/39) 180sqq.; K.-Å. Mossberg, Studia Sidoniana (diss., Uppsala 1934) 69sq.
37 Mil. 891 *quom venit vobis faciundum utrumque*, quoted in L.H.S. II 372.

1.5. Unclassical uses of prepositions

In the syntax of prepositions, Spinoza sometimes deviates from the classical patterns. For instance, *invicem* is governed by a preposition, *ab invicem* P 345,19; *ad invicem* E 101,1; *contra invicem* TP 211,4; *erga invicem* E 263,24; *in invicem* TP 8,3. These forms originated in Late Latin, especially in translations as Latin equivalents of the Greek ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, etc.[38] Again, Spinoza used the partitive *de* more freely than was allowed by the classical syntax, e.g. *de mea felicitate etiam est operam dare* INT 8,29; *id enim est de natura substantiae quod* E 52,5; *de eadem participamus* TP 176,7. That *de* gained ground in Late Latin is a well-known fact.[39] The classical *uxorem ducere* is replaced by *in uxorem ducere* in TP 144,16 and elsewhere. This usage of *in* was chiefly found in Christian authors as a Hebraism.[40] Finally, *commentarii supra hunc librum* TP 144,17 is doubly unclassical, *supra* instead of *super*, and in this function governing an accusative.[41]

1.6. The substantival infinitive

In contrast to the Greek articular infinitive, the Latin infinitive was in general not treated as a noun in classical authors. But in philosophical literature, where Greek influence was noticeable, and in more colloquial speech, the Greek infinitive was occasionally imitated by qualifying it with a pronoun, *hoc*, *illud*, *ipsum*, or with the possessives, and by governing it with the prepositions *inter* and *praeter*. These constructions were, however, still felt to be un-Latin. In Late Latin, especially since Augustine, the use of the infinitive as a noun greatly gained in frequency. The infinitive could be governed by any preposition and qualified by adjectival attributes.[42]

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38 L.H.S. II 177.
39 Pitkäranta 46sqq.
40 L.H.S. II 275; in Hobbes, *salutatum fuisse in regem* (423).
41 L.H.S. II 251, 281.
42 Ed. Wölfflin, Der substantivische Infinitiv, Arch. Lat. Lex. Gramm. 3 (1886) 70-91.

In Spinoza's Neo-Latin, the substantival infinitive was not
that rare, e.g. *ideam...non modum cogitandi esse, nempe ipsum intel-
ligere* E 124,10, 'understanding'. In most cases, the infinitive
treated as a noun was *esse*, 'existence'. Though *esse* was first used
as a noun in Augustine,[43] it was especially in scholastic Latin that
esse, usually qualified by an adjective, became an important term.[44]
As will be shown in the section on vocabulary, later philosophers
could not entirely dispense with the philosophical terminology
created by the Schoolmen. In Descartes' Meditationes, we encounter
esse actuale sive formale, esse objectivum, esse potentiale (86).
That the term was lacking in Hobbes' De cive was merely due to the
subject matter of the book, not to the author's particular antipathy
to the scholastic terminology. In Spinoza, we find *esse formale* E
88,15; *actuale esse* E 94,14; *finitum esse, infinitum (esse)* E 49,19.

From a linguistic point of view, a few passages merit attention.
In accordance with the practice established in Late Latin, Spinoza
governs his infinitives with prepositions, *Deus non tantum est causa
rerum secundum fieri, ut ajunt, sed etiam secundum esse* E 93,24,
by which he explains the terms *essentia* and *existentia*. Again, in
discussing the instinct of self-preservation, Spinoza qualifies the
infinitive with a possessive pronoun, *suum esse*, 'one's own being',
e.g. P 278,18; 23, and governs it with a preposition, *in suo esse
perseverare* P 271,23.

In scholastic Latin, a gerund had been created from *esse*. The
form was, however, felt to be unclassical. Spinoza uses it twice, but in
both passages takes distance from it, *(ut termino scholastico utar)
Deum esse causam essendi rerum* E 67,19: *infinitam existendi, sive,
invita latinitate, essendi fruitionem* EP 55,2. Curiously, Descartes
had adopted the term (Meditationes 74).

The constructions discussed do not deviate from Late Latin
usages. There is, however, a singular construction to which I have

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43 Wölfflin, op.cit. 90.
44 Blaise, ML s.v. *esse*; Prantl 3,422; 4,300; Eucken 68.

so far not found any parallels but which cannot be ascribed to
Spinoza since it was used by one of his correspondents. This is
a hybrid formation created by joining the Greek article τό to the
Latin infinitive. These forms occur especially in his letters, *Et
propterea Deus non magis est causa* τοῦ *illius* (i.e., a blind man) *non
videre, quam* τοῦ *non videre lapidis* EP 128,28.[45] In this particular
case the hybrid form made it possible to contrast, in a concise
form, the inability of both of the blind man and of the stone to
see, the point of argument here. In the same letter, still one
similar expression occurs, τὸ *affirmare sequitur* EP 130,5. In other
letters, *perfectionem in* τῷ *esse, et imperfectionem in privatione*
τοῦ *esse consistere*, EP 184,32.[46] In the same letter, *quod* τὸ *esse
perfecte exprimit* 185,31. One case occurs in INT 15,23 *methodus non
est ipsum ratiocinari ad intelligendum causas rerum, et multo minus
est* τὸ *intelligere causas rerum.* Here the Latin pronoun (*ipsum ra-
tiocinari*) and the Greek article are in exactly the same syntactical
position. This suggests that the use of the Greek article was little
but linguistic affectation. In the first quotation, however, using
a Latin pronoun would have led to an awkward expression, *ipsius il-
lius.

The hybrid substantivized infinitive was also found in the
letter of Nicholas Steno, a former pupil and later adversary, sent
from Florence, where we find τὸ *velle*, EP 293,27.

★ ★ ★

The constructions analyzed here suggest that Spinoza deviated
from the classical syntax more than did his two predecessors, Descartes
and Hobbes. Though it may be unfair to take him to task for violating
grammatical rules - his own Vossius supplied scanty advice for con-

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45 This letter, No. xxi, was originally written in Dutch but trans-
    lated into Latin by Spinoza himself in preparing the edition of
    his correspondance, cf. the editor's note on p. 398.
46 This letter, No. xxxvi, was also originally in Dutch but translated
    by Spinoza into Latin, see the editor's note on p. 407.

struing complex sentences - in some cases, for instance in the mood
of the *quod*-clauses, Spinoza went beyond what was permitted by con-
temporary grammar. Spinoza's poorer performance as regards the Latin
syntax in comparison with Descartes and Hobbes may be imputable to
the fact that his classical education was less comprehensive than
that of Descartes and Hobbes. Spinoza first completed his Jewish
education until he entered the school of van den Ende to learn
Latin.[47] In all probability, he did not read the Latin classics
long enough to acquire a complete mastery of classical diction.
Due to the shortcomings of contemporary Latin grammar, one could
learn the niceties of the classical syntax only by hard reading
of the *auctores probati*.[48]

2.   V o c a b u l a r y

If Spinoza's Latin strikes the modern reader as moderately
unclassical, this is due to his vocabulary even more than to his
syntax. Though some of the unclassical features in the syntax were
frequent - especially *quod* instead of the *A.c.I.* - these did not
stand out to the extent that did all the words which were not found
in the classical vocabulary of Latin.

The general reasons for the occurrence of unclassical words
in Neo-Latin have been referred to on p. 51. It was not possible
to write about all the new things and ideas which the historical
development had brought out without new terms to express them.[49]
Extreme Ciceronians remained a small minority. Even in the general
vocabulary, many of the new words coined in post-classical Latin
were too useful to be sacrified for a cult of Cicero.

In discussing Spinoza's vocabulary, I have thought it advisable
to treat as classical all the Latin writers antedating Apuleius. Since

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47 Freudenthal 36 sqq.
48 Benner/Tengström 84sq.
49 Cf. Olschki 69sq.

Terence, for instance, was widely read in schools, ordinary Neo-Latin writers scarcely felt his expressions to be unclassical. The same must hold good for Tacitus, Quintilianus, Seneca, and the other great authors of the Imperial age.

The unclassical words are dividable into three chronological groups. The first comprises late Antiquity from Apuleius to Boethius. The importance of this period for the Latin vocabulary is enormous. The language was enriched by a great number of Christian, theological, theologico-political terms. The second great period is the medieval. Unshackled by classicizing and Ciceronian restrictions, medieval writers created a multitude of new words and terms. Scholastic philosophy was one of the most fertile producers of new terms. But in the general vocabulary, too, medieval coinages were numerous. The third formative period of the Latin vocabulary was the humanist or Neo-Latin. Though some of the more unclassical medieval formations were discarded, and though the classicizing temper of the age put some restrictions upon the coining of new words, it was in particular the evolution of the modern sciences that called for a considerable number of new words and terms.[50]

As regards the principles of word-formation, three classes can be distinguished. Firstly, the new words could be neologisms, in most cases derivatives of old words, e.g. *albedo* 'whiteness' EP 9,13, first found in Apuleius (from *albus*, TLL I 1488); *contingentia* 'chance' P 278,36, coined by Boethius from the verb *contingere* (TLL IV 712); *formalitas* 'essential character' INT 32,22, derived from *formalis*;[51] *theologaster* TP 218,18, a derogatory word coined by Luther (OED s.v.). A new coinage is, e.g., *crucibulum* 'crucible', EP 17,4, recorded in Latham a. 1215.

An important category were older words which had acquired a new meaning, usually a theological or philosophical one, e.g. *objectum* E 88,25. This word, which in classical Latin denoted 'accusations' (used only in the plural), obtained the current meaning of 'object'

50 Cf. Benner/Tengström 51sqq.
51 The word was coined by Duns Scotus, Prantl 3,220sq.; Eucken 68.

in scholastic philosophy (Blaise ML; Latham c. a. 1286).Again, *lens*
EP 232,6, in classical Latin 'lentil', had lent its name to the
new optical instrument because of the similarity of the shape (cf.
OED s.v.).

Finally, words could be borrowed from other languages, espe-
cially from Greek, e.g. *aenigmatice* TP 28,26, adopted in Late Latin
(TLL I 987) or *homogeneus* EP 65,2, from the Greek όμογενής, recorded
in Blaise ML as a scholastic term, in Latham firstly a. 1200.

2.1. The philosophical terminology

In Spinoza, however, it is naturally the vocabulary of philo-
sophical discourse that is of prime importance. Latin philosophical
terminology had been created partly by Cicero and the other classical
philosophical writers, partly by the Christian Fathers, especially
Augustine and Boethius. The contribution of the Schoolmen was of
course very great.[52] One of the terms defined and differentiated by
them has already been discussed, *esse* 'existence'.

The scholastic terminology had great importance for Spinoza.
In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of the Schoolmen still
dominated the academes in the Netherlands. Spinoza, too, had obtained
a thorough grounding in this philosophy.[53] Together with their philo-
sophy, he also inherited their terminology.[54] However, like most Neo-
Latin writers, Spinoza recoiled from the more barbarous medieval
coinages, such as *quidditas, haecceitas, incompossibilitas, perseitas*
(from *per se*), etc.[55] Because the vocabulary of the scholastic philo-
sophy was heavily larded with expressions inherited from the Christian
writers of late Antiquity, the vocabulary of the Fathers was also con-
spicuous in Spinoza.

For the following discussions, a few clarifications are requisite.

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52 For the history of the Latin philosophical terminology, cf. Eucken 48sqq.
53 Freudenthal 46; 116sq.
54 Cf. Eucken 95: "Äusserlich angesehen ist das Meiste, das als Spi-
   noza eigentümlich erscheint, aus der Scholastik entlehnt".
55 According to Eucken 68, the first word came from the Latin trans-
   lation of Aricenna whereas the latter three were due to Duns Scotus.

Firstly, since no concordance to Spinoza exists, I have collected
the material by reading and excerpting his Latin works. I cannot
naturally vouch for the completeness of my lists. I hope, however,
that the omissions are not too serious. Secondly, I have ignored
Spinoza's Cartesian textbooks because they only repeated Cartesian
ideas and also because these books were not finished by Spinoza
himself.[56]

Again, it is to be noted that from a linguistic point of
view, a term could be soundly classical though used in a new sense.
Thus the watchword of Cartesian and Spinozian epistemology, *clare
et distincte*, is composed of good classical words. A similar case
is *causa sui*, another pivotal Spinozian term.[57] Words of this type
have been excluded. The evolution of the meaning of a term is a
philosophical, not a philological issue.

The philosophical terminology will be presented in three groups.
Words which belong to the classical vocabulary of Latin, deriving
from Cicero, Seneca, etc., are excluded. For considerations of space,
I shall only list but not discuss the terms which were of Late Latin,
i.e. chiefly Christian origin. For the history of the words, TLL,
Blaise DAC and ML as well as Prantl and Eucken, may be consulted.
Scholastic and Neo-Latin terms will be analyzed in greater detail.

In principle, only one example of each term will be recorded.

Philosophical terms of Late Latin

actu opp. to *potentia, affirmativus, animositas, arbitralis, assertio,
atheus, certitudo, consistentia, contingentia, contingens, contra-
dictorius, creabilis, eminenter, ens* and *non-ens, essentialis, es-
sentialiter, extensio, figuralis, formaliter, idealis, illatio, im-
perfectio, inconceptibilis, indemonstrabilis, indeterminabilis, indi-
viduum, intellectualis, particularis, particulariter, perceptibilis, phae-*

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56 Cf. EP 63, letter xiii.
57 The first *definitio* of Ethica, *Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus
    essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest
    concipi, nisi existens.*

nomena, phantasticus, ponere, i.e. 'to assume', *possibilitas, praeordinatio proportionale, proportionalitas, proportionatus, reminiscentia, resistentia, sensatio, speculatio, speculativus, spiritualiter, spontaneus, subjectum, sufficientia, theoria, theoricus.*

Scholastic terms

abstractum E 135,23; only the adjective *abstractus* existed in Late Latin, TLL I 203; Blaise ML.

actualitas E 62,20 'realm of fact'; according to Eucken 68, the word first occurred in the Latin version of Aricenna.

adaequatus E 85,3 *idea adaequata;* P 276,13 *adaequate;* Blaise ML.

adjectivare INT 35,34; recorded only in Latham a. 1427.

attributum E 45,17; Blaise ML: since Aquinas.

deducere 'to deduce' E 287,15; in classical Latin only in a concrete sense. According to Eucken 57, Boethius used *deductio* as an equivalent to the Greek ἀπαγωγή; Blaise ML; Latham c. a. 1332.

duratio E 257,17; Blaise ML; Latham a. 1267.

finalis E 207,3 *causa finalis.* The word was certainly found as a philosophical term in Late Latin but pertained to moral philosophy, cf. TLL VI.1 767,50 Spectat ad illum perfectionis gradum, quem 'finem' vocant philosophi. According to Eucken 65, the word was first found in its current meaning in Abalaird.

formalitas, see p. 65.

idealiter EP 78,1. The adjective *idealis* occurred in Late Latin only in Martianus Capella (TLL VII.7, 179); Eucken 68 ascribes the adjective to Albertus Magnus; Blaise ML; Latham c. a. 1270.

ideatum 'the object of an idea' E 47,1. Blaise ML: since Aquinas.

immanens EP 307,5 *Deum enim rerum omnium causam immanentem, ut ajunt, non vero transeuntem statuo.* In the meaning of 'indwelling the universe', Blaise ML; Latham c. a. 1300; Spinoza's 'ut ajunt' qualifies the word as a scholastic term.

infallibilis E 59,10 *qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt.* There is one doubtful example in TLL VII.1., 1336,78 (probably *infalsabilis*) Blaise DAC: in Beda.

intentionalis 'mental', in a contemptuous assault upon the Scholastics, EP 261,33 *qui qualitates occultas, species intentionales, formas substantiales, ac mille alias nugas commenti sunt*. Blaise ML; Eucken 68 note 2; the term *forma substantialis*, 'constitutive element of a substance', ascribed by Eucken 64 to Eriugena Scottus.

intentum 'purpose, intention' TP 174,5; Blaise ML; Latham a. 1267.

intuitiva E 122,16 *scientia intuitiva*, the specific Spinozian term for the knowledge of the highest kind. The adjective *intuitivus* is recorded in Blaise ML from the XIII c., in Latham c. a. 1300; Prantl 3,332 quotes *notitia intuitiva intellectiva* from Ockham.

literaliter EP 328,8, opp. to *allegorice*. In Late Latin only the adjective *litteralis* existed (TLL VII.2, 1529); Blaise ML; Latham, the VIII c.

modaliter E 59,34, opp. to *realiter*, 'pertaining to the modes', in the specific Spinozian sense. Prantl 2,157 quotes *modalis* from the age of Abalaird; Latham records *modaliter* c. a. 1164.

naturare E 71,5, in the important Spinozian terms *natura naturans, naturata*, originating in Aquinas: Blaise ML.

nullitas EP 58,15; Blaise ML; Latham a. 1292.

objective 'existing as idea or representation in the mind without independent existence' E 63,19; Prantl 3,208: due to Duns Scotus.

objectum see p. 65.

partialitas 'partiality, favourable bias' E 136,16; *partialis* occurs in Gregory the Great (Georges) but the adverb is medieval, Blaise ML.

permanentia EP 266,7; Blaise ML; Latham: the IX c.

praeconceptus TP 35,22, *praeconceptae opiniones*; Blaise ML.

praemissa E 300,11. In classical Latin, the word had the meaning of 'first-fruits' (Georges). Blaise DAC registers the verb *praemittere*, 'dire comme prémisses' from Ambrosius; Prantl 2,309 attributes the word to the Latin version of Al Farabi.

realitas E 51,23; *realia* 135,23; *realiter* 52,2. Eucken 68 ascribes *realitas* to Duns Scotus; Latham registers the adjective

realis c. a. 1218; Blaise DAC records only one example of *realiter*, but it is probably spurious; Eucken 65 quotes *realiter* from Abalaird, in Latham c. a. 1080.

  reflexivus   INT 26,29 *methodumque* (scil., *diximus*) *cognitionem esse reflexivam*, i.e. 'the knowledge which the mind has of itself and its operations'; the adjective was medieval, Blaise ML.

  requisitum   INT 35,21 *necessarium requisitum definitionis*; Blaise ML; Latham the XIII c.

  respective TP 83,32 *respective ad hominum opiniones*; Blaise ML records the word as a scholastic term; Latham c. a. 1260; Eucken 69 ascribes *respectivus* to Lully.

  substantialis see s.v. *intentionalis*.

  super/- supranaturalis   E 81,14; TP 113,4. Blaise DAC quotes one example of *supernaturalis* from the VI c.; according to Eucken 63, the word was due to Eriugena Scottus. The form *supranaturalis*, frequent in Spinoza, is not recorded in dictionaries.

  supponere 'to suppose' TP 9,10. The new meaning of this old verb is due to the Schoolmen, Blaise ML, Latham a. 1244.

  suppositum 'hypothesis' EP 183,23; Prantl 3,209: found in Duns Scotus.

  transcendentalis   E 120,28, a scholastic term designating notions which cannot be subsumed under the Aristotelian categories; Prantl 3,245.

  volitio   E 72,23; Blaise ML; Latham c. a. 1300.

<div align="center">Neo-Latin philosophical terms</div>

  In contrast to the terms inherited from Christian Antiquity and from the Scholastics, Neo-Latin philosophical coinages were few. Moreover, none of them denoted the central concepts of Spinozian philosophy.

  acquiescentia   E 183,1, *philautia, vel aqcuiescentia in se*; cf. 196,22. The word is unknown to all Latin dictionaries; OED s.v. acquiescency, "as if ad(aptation of) L(atin) *acquiescentia, a. 1654". Though the authors of OED did not know it, at least in Spinoza the

Latin word actually occurred.

atheismus TP 30,4. Cicero had *atheus* in the Greek form; as a Latin word it appeared in Christian authors; Blaise ML quotes *atheismus* from Francis Bacon; Latham a. 1620; OED refers to the French word athéisme from the 16th century.

deista EP 220,3. According to Robert a French word coined in the XVI c.; unrecorded in Latin dictionaries.

implicantia 'contradiction' EP 53,15, unknown in Latin dictionaries. OED s.v. implicancy "ad(aptation of) L(atin) type *implicantia, a 1638." Eucken 68 quotes *implicare contradictionem* from Aquinas.

involvere, frequent, e.g. E 85,22 *Hominis essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam*, 'to include as a necessary consequence'. Eucken 96 quotes the word as an example of unclear expressions in Spinoza. This connotation is unknown to Latin dictionaries. According to OED, the English form of the word was used in this sense a. 1646.

oppugnantia 'contrast' E 114,25; not recorded in Latin dictionaries; OED quotes oppugnancy from a. 1606.

pathema 'passion' E 203,29; a Greek loan-word; Latham a. 1620.

scepticismus E 82,36; unknown to Latin dictionaries but according to OED a Neo-Latin coinage.

theocratia TP 206,17; a Greek loan-word not found in Latin dictionaries; OED registers the English form of the word a. 1622.

The terms which could have been coined by Spinoza himself were, then, extremely few. Moreover, though a word has not been recorded elsewhere, it is not self-evident that it should be ascribed to Spinoza. Our knowledge of the Neo-Latin vocabulary is very insufficient. In contrast to the fertility of the schoolmen, linguistic innovation was thus exiguous in Spinoza. But as stated, reinterpreting existing terms was for him more important than coining new ones.

2.2. The scientific terminology

The difference between scientific and philosophical terms is often impalpable. Especially in the Middle Ages, the underdeveloped

sciences were scarcely felt to be very distinct from philosophy.
Since the Renaissance, however, the sciences became increasingly
important and differentiated. As a consequence of their evolution
and expansion, their terminology also proliferated. In fact, the
basic vocabulary of the modern sciences was to a considerable degree
created in this period. And because the bulk of the scientific writ-
ing was still in Latin, the scientific terms were Latin or Greek.

Spinoza wrote occasionally about scientific problems. It is
mostly in his correspondence that he deals with the sciences. The
most important of the relevant letters is epistola vi continens an-
notationes in librum nobilissimi viri Robert Boyle de Nitro, Flui-
ditate, et Firmitate. In this, as well as in some other connections,
Spinoza employed a few scientific terms, chiefly relating to chemis-
try and optics.

alcalisatus 'alkaline' EP 26,14 (about Boyle). Latham records
amnis alcalisatus a. 1652.

alcalum EP 27,14 (about Boyle); an Arabic word; Latham a.
1215.

asterismus 'constellation' TP 135,30; a Greek loan-word; Latham
a. 1620; OED records the English form of the word a. 1598.

chartaceus 'of paper' EP 23,14 (about Boyle); the word, derived
from a Greek loan-word, first occurred in Digesta (TLL III 1000).

chylus 'juice' EP 30,5 (about Boyle); TLL III 1034: a rare
Greek loan-word found after the mid third century A.D.

chymicus 'chemist' EP 24,13 (about Boyle) and 29,13, the ad-
jective. Medieval Latin dictionaries record *chymica* or *chimica* as
a variant of *alchimia* (Blaise ML; MLW; Latham); none of them has
chymicus as a noun. The Greek term χυμεία, χημεία 'the art of al-
loying metals' reached medieval Latin in the Arabic form *al-*.

cineres clavellati 'potash' EP 65,16 (another letter concerning
Boyle); classical Latin *clavellus* was a synonym of *verruca*, 'wart';
Latham a. 1250.

crystallisare EP 17,3 (about Boyle); a denominative formed from
the Greek loan-word *crystallum*, not recorded in Latin dictionaries;

OED refers to the corresponding French verb, a. 1598.

dioptrica 'science of refraction' EP 186,17; the word, derived from τὰ διοπτρικά is registered in Latham a. 1648.

effervescentia 'effervescency' EP 67,35; not recorded in any Latin dictionary.

filtratus EP 23,8 (about Boyle) *crystallos nitri defaecati, sive filtrati*, a past participle. TLL VI.1. 760 lists only *filtrum* 'centones'; Latham records *filtratio* a. 1652; the corresponding verb is listed only in the meaning of 'to line with felt'.

fluiditas, in the title of the letter about Boyle (see above); not recorded in Latin dictionaries; Robert records fluidité a. 1565.

heterogeneus EP 16,11 (about Boyle); a Greek term adopted by the scholastics, Blaise ML; Latham a. 1200.

homogeneus see p. 66.

incidentia 'incidence of light-rays' E 99,21; TLL VII.1, 897 records the word as a rhetorical term, 'circumstantia'; in the present sense, Latham a. 1240.

inflammabilis EP 19,12 (about Boyle); a medieval coinage, Latham c. a. 1227.

lapideitas 'quality of being a stone' E 129,26; a medieval word, Latham a. 1250.

lens see p. 66.

lixiviosus EP 17,2 (about Boyle), *sal lixiviosum* 'of lye'; this variant of the adjective is unknown; TLL VII.2, 1551 has *lixiv(i)us*.

microscopium EP 252,21; a new word composed of Greek roots; Latham records the word a. 1662, OED has the English form a. 1656.

molecula EP 27,10 (about Boyle); not recorded in Latin dictionaries; a diminutive of *moles*, 'a small structure'; according to Eucken 86, the word was a coinage of Gassendi (1592-1655).

pandochus EP 232,6 (to Leibniz), *lentes illae, quas pandochas vocas* (scil., Leibniz); the word is unknown to Latin dictionaries as well as to OED and Robert; obviously a Greek loan-word, cf. πανδόκος 'all-receiving'.

parallelipedum EP 24,12 (about Boyle), a geometrical figure; a Greek loan-word first occurring in Boethius (Georges).

peripheria EP 33,12 (about Boyle); a Greek word found in Martianus Capella (Georges).

porus EP 18,3 (about Boyle) *poros, sive meatus habent*; the Greek word, found in Ambrosius and Isidorus, is explained by the corresponding Latin word.

reflexio TP 89,28; in the meaning of 'reflexion of light', Latham a. 1250.

refractio 'refraction of light' TP 89,28; this meaning recorded in Latham a. 1267.

retrogradatio TP 36,20 *retrogradatio solis*; a late word found in Martianus Capella and Isidorus (Georges).

sal tartarum 'tartar from wine lees' EP 65,16 (about Boyle); a medieval word, Latham c. a. 1200.

stiriola 'icicle' EP 21,11 (about Boyle); a diminutive of *stiria* not documented elsewhere.

telescopium EP 187,1; a Greek neologism, Latham a. 1686; cf. OED s.v. "ad(aptation of) It(alian) telescopio or mod(ern) L(atin) telescopium, the former used by Galilei 1611, the latter by Porta in Italy and by Kepler 1613".

Whereas more than half of the unclassical philosophical terms occurring in Spinoza had been inherited from the Christian Fathers, only a few of the scientific terms were of Late Latin origin. Further, in contrast to the paucity of the Neo-Latin philosophical terms, Neo-Latin scientific terms were much more numerous. This no doubt reflects the respective importance of philosophy and the sciences in late Antiquity and in the early Modern Age. It is worth noting, too, that whereas almost all philosophical terms were Latin, half of the scientific terms, at least in Spinoza, were Greek. This is no place to discuss the reasons for this significant difference.

2.3. The general vocabulary

Though the general vocabulary is of less historical interest

than the philosophical and scientific terminology, many linguistic features are worth notice. One of them is the use of common classical words in new meanings. Benner/Tengström 60 have already commented upon the medieval sense neologisms of *medium* 'means' and *concernere* 'concern', both in general use in Neo-Latin despite the fact that they had been proscribed by 'Ciceronians'. These words were common in Spinoza, too, e.g. P 274,12; 283,30. Some other classical words also occurred in new meanings. In Spinoza, the most conspicuous of them is *dari* as a synonym of *esse*, and *teneri* as a synonym of *debere*, e.g. *in statu naturali non dari peccatum* P 282,14; *In rerum natura nullum datur contingens* E 70,17. This usage is foreshadowed in Late Latin: TLL V.1, 1690,33 quotes Tertullian, nat. 1,16 *datum sit post mortem deos fieri* as a synonym of *sinere*; Blaise DAC defines the relevant connotation as "on peut, il est naturel = εἰκὸς δέ". In Spinoza, *dari* was nothing but a synonym of *esse*, without connotations. This meaning of *dari* has not been registered in any of the dictionaries of medieval or Neo-Latin. On the other hand, *teneri* as an equivalent of *debere* is recorded in Latham c. a. 1163 as well as in Blaise ML. In Spinoza, the usage was frequent, e.g. TP 190,19; 23.

A number of words and phrases are worth notice for other reasons. Classical reminiscences were conspicuous in many passages; lifting expressions from classical authors was a time-honoured and recommended practice. In Spinoza, borrowing from Terence was particularly heavy. But since the subject has been treated almost exhaustively before,[58] I shall not go into the matter here. We may, however, note that Spinoza occasionally misconstrued a reminiscence; *animam egerit*, 'breathed out his spirit' TP 124,25 is a phrase unknown in classical Latin but may have been due to a misunderstanding of Seneca, epist. 54,2 *animam egerere*.

A few words appeared in an irregular form. In INT 21,7 Spinoza compared the earth to *medium pomum auriacum in scutella*; the word *auriacum* occurs only in Blaise ML as a variant of *aurichalcum*, 'brass'.

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58 Leopold 24sqq.

Again, the singular *automa spirituale* INT 32,25 as a shortened form
of *automatum*, though not recorded in Latin dictionaries, must have
been in some use in this period since OED mentions the word as "er-
roneous sg. of automata" a. 1625. Further, *repraesentamen* 'symbol'
TP 62,13 is recorded only in OED a. 1677 in the meaning of 'product
of representation'. Sometimes an irregular form may be explicable as
a simple error. EP 18,2 has *confricta* instead of *confracta*. Finally,
scripta 'letter' as a feminine is unknown, *Postrema...tua...scripta
...pervenit*; in the next sentence, *ea* (scil., *scripta*) *affecit*, etc.,
EP 76,7.

A great many of the general words occurring in Spinoza were
of Late Latin origin. I shall here give only a selection of examples.
In Late Latin, simple verbs were often replaced by new ones coined
with one or more prefixes; representatives of this group in Spinoza
are, e.g., *adinvenio* EP 245,6 (cf. TLL I 688) and *subintelligere* TP
169,7 (cf. Blaise DAC). Adjectival derivatives in *-bilis* were also
frequent in Late Latin; in Spinoza, e.g. *communicabilis* INT 5,13
(cf. TLL III 1952); *irreconciliabilis* TP 101,13 (cf. TLL VII.2: only
in Hegesippus). Derivatives in *-alis* are represented e.g. by *funda-
mentalis* TP 165,25 (cf. TLL VI.1, 1550: rare). Diminutives were also
popular in Late Latin, in Spinoza e.g. *praefatiuncula* EP 63,22, a
word found only in Hieronymus and some other late authors (Georges).
A late compound is *beneplacitum* TP 177,32 (cf. TLL II 1891). Again,
with the conversion of the West to Christianity, great numbers of
Greek words and terms were adopted into Latin; these words were be-
queathed to Medieval Latinity and hence to Neo-Latin. As examples
of these words in Spinoza we may quote *hypocrisis* TP 71,14 (cf. TLL
VI.3, 3154: since Itala); *idololatra* TP 161.3 (cf. TLL VII.1, 223);
paragraphus TP 141,1, found only in Isidorus (Georges); *syndicus* P
332,12 (Georges: in Digesta).

General words of medieval origin were much fewer. There are
derivatives from older words, such as *brutalis* TP 73,25 (cf. Blaise
ML and Latham a. 1180); *independens* P 277,35 (Blaise ML and Latham
c. a. 730); *proaemialis* EP 28,7 (scil., *proe-*), coined from the Greek

loan-word *proemium* (Latham a. 1344); *totalis* TP 147,17 (Blaise ML
and Latham c. a. 1170); nouns, e.g. *castrametatio* TP 122,15; TLL II
543 records the verb *castrametor* (Blaise ML and Latham c. a. 1470);
dictionarium TP 106,19 (Latham a. 1250 *-rius*); *doctoratus* TP 156,27
(Blaise ML and Latham a. 1311); *officiarius* P 299,16 (Blaise ML and
Latham c. 1090); *subalternatio* TP 108,29, derived from the Late Latin
subalternus (Latham a. 870). A few words have special interest. Thus
dictamen, frequent in Spinoza, e.g. P 283,4, was found only in an
African inscription (TLL V.1, 997); because the inscription cannot
possibly have been known in the Middle Ages, the word must have been
recoined in medieval Latin (Blaise ML). Again, *oeconomia* P 298,22,
'family management', had its primary Greek meaning restored in me-
dieval Latin (Blaise ML); classical Latin used the word as a liter-
ary term, 'proper disposition'.

A number of words were Neo-Latin neologisms. Due to the scant
work so far done on the Neo-Latin vocabulary, not all of the words
have been registered in dictionaries.

foraminulum EP 22,6 (about Boyle); an unknown diminutive of
foramen.

oenopola 'ale-house keeper' P 330,25; a Greek word, οἰνοπώλης;
Georges records *oenopolium* from Plautus, otherwise unknown.

punctista 'one who holds the vowel-points in the Hebrew Scrip-
tures to be authoritative' TP 108,5; unknown; the above definition
is from OED, which records the word a. 1859; coined by Spinoza?

paragogicus TP 139,4 *literae paragogicae*; the adjective from
Late Latin *paragoge*, lengthening of a word', a Greek loan-word; un-
known in Latin dictionaries, but cf. OED s.v. paragogic: "ad(aptation
of) mod(ern) L(atin) *paragogicus*."

phraseologia TP 106,27; unrecorded in Latin dictionaries, but
according to OED coined a. 1558 from Greek roots.

tabellio EP 234,1 (to Leibniz). All the dictionaries, from
Georges to Latham, know the word only in the meaning of 'notary';
this meaning is recorded in OED, too, for the obsolete 'tabellion'.
In the Spinozian passage, however, the word undoubtedly denotes 'post-

man': since the man named by Leibniz as a possible carrier of letters was not available, Spinoza remarks, *cogor hanc* (scil., letter) *tabellioni ordinario tradere.*

theologaster see p. 65.

typographus EP 73,18, the well-known Neo-Latin word for 'printer' coined from Greek roots, Latham a. 1518.

vacatio 'service' P 317,2; the corresponding verb, found in the same passages, denoted 'to serve' in classical Latin.

In comparison with Descartes and Hobbes, Spinoza's vocabulary is not much more unclassical. Neither Descartes nor Hobbes could forgo the scholastic terminology. Although Descartes in principle tried to discard the expressions of the Schoolmen,[59] many important terms survived in his works.[60] Hobbes' De cive, being a political work, does not employ scholastic terms in a comparable number. However, on occasion he resorted to them.[61] In Descartes and Hobbes, terms and words inherited from Late Latin were still more numerous.[62] Moreover, in Hobbes we encounter a number of Neo-Latin neologisms.[63]

The philosophical and general vocabulary, such as it exists in the three great philosophers of the seventeenth century, was accordingly far from strictly classical and 'Ciceronian'. Late Latin contribution was especially important, but scholastic terms and general words coined in Medieval Latin were numerous, too. Neo-Latin neologisms also occurred, especially in the scientific terminology.

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59 Cf. Eucken 87 for Descartes' avoidance of scholastic terms.
60 For instance, *essendi modus* (74); *facultas cognoscitiva* (128); *falsitas materialis* (78); *formalis conceptus* (140); *realitas actualis sive formalis* (72); *realitas objectiva* (26).
61 For instance, *commutativa, distributiva justitia* (184); *conditionale* (329); *imperceptibiliter* (305); *infallibilis* (382); *infallibilitas* (413).
62 In Descartes, e.g. *aequivocatio* (16); *conformis* (66); *imperfectio* (36); *incorruptibilis* (24); *intellectio* (28); *materialis* (22); *superaedificare* (30); in Hobbes, e.g. *aequipollens* (179); *apparenter* (220); *doctrinalis* (381); *memorativa* (344); *nocumentum* (160); *praefiguratio* (392); *uniformitas, uniformiter* (345).
63 *Pactitia* (more correctly *pacticia*, 213), adjective derived from *pactus; institutivus* (216) as a synonym of *politicus* (Latham a. 1620); *ergastulus* (250) 'a man confined to *ergastulum*', unknown; *lestrica sive praedatoria* (307); an unknown Greek loan-word.

3. S t y l e

Spinoza's Latin style has not been much discussed. Apart
from the general remarks that his style was concise and clear,[64]
and that his rhetorical metaphors were few,[65] there is no systematic
analysis. In these passages I can only illustrate a few select as-
pects of Spinoza's style.

Writing in a language not his own, and moreover in one that
he had studied less than, e.g., Descartes and Hobbes, Spinoza could
not fully develop his stylistic potentialities. He sometimes deplores
the paucity of his Latin vocabulary, *si forte (ut soleo propter ver-
borum penuriam)aliquid obscure posui* EP 36,8. Yet for all handicaps,
he succeeded in expressing his ideas *clare et distincte*.

Spinoza usually wrote complex, often long sentences consisting
of main and subordinate clauses. Conforming to the general character
of humanist Latin, the guiding principle of his sentence pattern was
subordination, not parataxis.[66] He had some structural preferences,
e.g. we often encounter in him long sentences held together by a
chain of the gerunds, e.g. TP 209,19-28; the sentence, which enumer-
ates the prerogatives of an absolute ruler, includes eight genitives
of the gerund, e.g. *haberet...ius Deum...consulendi...authoritatem
leges instituendi et abrogandi...legatos mittendi*, etc. A sentence
of this type, admittedly, may strike one as monotonous. Another pec-
uliarity of Spinoza's style was hyperbaton, e.g. *pauca, quae accepe-
rant aut invenerant, bona* TP 118,2; sometimes these were rather
violent, e.g. *odio intensissimo...* (9 words)...*propagando* TP 97,30;
argumentis... (6 words)...*falsis* EP 209,17. These stylistic peculiar-
ities were, however, found in Descartes and Hobbes,[67] too, which sug-
gests that they were common property in this period.

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64 Leopold 35-37; Freudenthal 211sq.
65 S. Hampshire, Spinoza (Penguin 1976 = 1951) 139.
66 Cf. Kluge 36.
67 A chain of the gerunds, Hobbes 328: eight gerunds; hyperbaton, e.g.
   Descartes 146 *varia circa meum corpus alia corpora; in corpore,
   exempli gratia, calido,* but they are not as violent as in Spinoza.

Although Spinoza's Latin was in general simple and unadorned, he could on occasion employ the usual rhetorical devices. Instruction in *constructio figurata* (Vossius) was inseparable from the teaching of Latin. The age-old rhetorical figures could unawares creep into one's Latin. These figures occurred in Spinoza, too, anapher, *non contentiones, non odia, non iram, non dolos* TP 190,32; chiasm, e.g. *aut spem praemii aut poenae metum* EP 209,4; litotes, e.g. *rem non ingratam neque inutilem* TP 7,24; pleonasm, e.g. *inexpectatum et praeter opinionem* TP 47,24; figura etymologica, e.g. *a sacrilegis hominibus Sacris Literis adjectum* TP 91,25; rhetorical questions, e.g. TP 8,24; interjections, *proh dolor* TP 30,1; *nescio hercle* TP 36,32, etc. There are passages which smack of rhetorical embellishment, e.g. *postquam rerum cognitionem acquisivimus et scientiae praestantiam gustavimus* TP 68,4 or his praise of Amsterdam, *in hac enim florentissima republica et urbe praestantissima* TP 246,2, distinguished by tautology and chiasm.

On the whole, however, Spinoza was economical in the use of the technical devices of rhetoric. In this, his style represented the anti-rhetorical learned Latin of the seventeenth century.[68]

Apart from the formal aspects of style, a more intriguing problem concerns the use of similes and metaphors. The philosophers of the seventeenth century did not disdain to illustrate their ideas by similes and metaphors drawn from nature, from human life, etc.[69] Descartes' predilection for similes is well-known.[70] In Hobbes, similes were also common.[71]

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68 For this style, see Benner/Tengström 91.
69 For similes in humanist Latin, cf. Kluge 54.
70 In his Discours de la méthode, e.g. p. 42; 49 bis; 65; 95; 99 ter (livre de poche); for the borrowing of Cartesian similes, see Benner/Tengström 96sq.
71 E.g. his illustrates the idea of limited freedom by *ut qui iter faciens sepibus et maceriis, ne vineas et segetes viae vicinas conterat, hinc et inde cohibetur* (259); government spies are compared to *aranearum telis, quae, extensae undiquaque subtilissimis filis, motus externos ipsis intus in cavernulis suis residentibus significant* (301); a man who wants to explore the mysteries of faith is compared to a sick man *qui pilulas salubres, sed amaras, vult prius mandere, quam in stomachum demittere; ex quo fit ut statim revomantur, quae, alioqui devoratae eum sanassent* (420).

Similes and metaphors illustrate Spinoza's argumentation, too.[72] Apart from the longer illustrations, his chief work, Ethica, has a number of similes, e.g. *ideas igitur veluti picturas in tabula mutas aspiciunt* 132, scil., people who thought that ideas came only from sense-perception; the common simile of truth as compared to day-light is happily employed in *sicut lux seipsam, et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est* 124,15; we should not envy the outstanding qualities of a man any more than *arboribus altitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem* 184,14, all this being due to a law of nature; we are agitated by contrary emotions *perinde ut maris undae, a contrariis ventis agitatae* 189,5; *pudor* is a useful quality in so far as it teaches a man to live honestly *sicut dolor, qui eatenus bonus dicitur, quatenus indicat, partem laesam nondum esse putrefactam* 253,30. There are brief metaphors, e.g. *altas in mentibus egit radices* 79,13, scil., superstition. He was especially fond of the enlarged metaphor *luce m e r i d i a n a clarius* 74,2; TP 122,6, etc. The metaphor, in this form, was unknown in classical literature.

Similes and metaphors occurred in Spinoza's other works, too, even in the strictly scientific letter concerning Boyle's theories, *eodem modo ac globus tormentarius, cum arenae aut luto impingit* EP 19,6, which illustrates a chemical process. The simile could be very short, e.g. *menti innata et quasi inscripta* TP 69,7 or *quasi proles aut fructus intellectus* TP 62,15. As an example of an effective metaphor we may quote *argumenta...ex scriniis rationis desumpta* TP 253, 6 or *ipsam Scripturam negare et novam ex proprio cerebro cudere* TP 123,16.

Although Spinoza, in accordance with his philosophical principles and the stylistic ideals of the scientific Latin of the age, wrote in sober style *clare et distincte*, he did not shrink from the devices of a more literary style to impress his ideas upon the reader. However, it goes without saying that Spinoza made a restricted use

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72 Cf. Freudenthal 214.

of them. In contemporary literary style, they were much more usual.
Thus in the letters of Spinoza's friend Oldenburg, which in other
respects, too, were marked by a more classicizing and elegant Latin-
ity, we encounter a relatively high number of similes and metaphors.[73]

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