

ARCTOS

ACTA PHILOLOGICA FENNICA

VOL. X

HELSINKI 1976 HELSINGFORS

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THE DATE OF THE PSEUDO-PLATONIC HIPPIAS MAJOR

Holger Thesleff

In this paper I shall argue that the Greater Hippias (Hp.Ma.) was written in the late 360ies or early 350ies by a pupil of Plato as a specimen of a Socratic trend in the Academy.

It is reasonable to start from the hypothesis that Hp.Ma. was not written by Plato. An extensive series of arguments against Platonic authorship have been accumulated notably by Horneffer 1895, Bruns 1896 (347—349), Röllig 1900, Pohlenz 1913 (123—128) and 1931, Wilamowitz II 1919 (325 n.1, 327 f.), Tarrant 1920, 1927, 1928 and 1938 (168—170), Geffcken II 1934 (181 f., Anm. 154—156), Moreau 1941, Pavlu 1941, Gauss I/2 1954 (14, 207 f.), III/2 1961 (129 f.), Horn 1964, and Thesleff 1967 (13, 47 n.2, 156). See the references at the end of this paper. — A post-script note: see also Haag 1973.

As usual with such chains of circumstantial evidence, the indications found are of varying reliability, and none is even remotely conclusive in isolation. However, the following points which the defenders of the authenticity (below) have not been able to refute, have considerable force if put together:

(1) There is no contemporary or nearly contemporary evidence suggesting that Hp.Ma. is authentic; for Aristotle, see below (4).

(2) The dialogue is constructed as an aporetic search for αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, without any notice taken of the 'enthusiastic' aspects of καλόν normally implied by Plato; cf. Ion, Phdr., Smp., R. (also Ap. 22c, Ly. 216cd).

(3) Besides his καλόν theme, the author is much concerned with giving historical information about Hippias and other sophists. In this respect he seems to have over-emphasized some trends occurring in Grg., Hp.Mi. and Prt.

(4) Why should Plato have written two dialogues with Hippias as the chief interlocutor of Socrates (Hp.Mi. is likely to be genuine, and Aristotle Met. V 1025a7 quotes it simply as "Hippias" without reference to the author as he often does with Plato's genuine dialogues)? And why should Plato, who always picked out his characters very carefully, have chosen Hippias for a discussion of τὸ καλόν? On the other hand we happen to know that Plato's pupils sometimes named their dialogues after Plato's dialogues (Geffcken II 182).

(5) The general inconsistency of the plan is remarkable. Phdr. offers a remote parallel in this respect, but it is written with a poetic brio of a different kind. Yet the author of Hp.Ma. possesses considerable literary skill (cf. 10).

(6) The dialogue seems to combine various disparate ideas and

devices taken from different Platonic works or the Academic milieu. The definitions of *καλόν* successively proposed (287e, 289e, 291de, 293e, 295c, 295e, 296e, 298a, 303e) are loosely attached to each other.

(7) In spite of this 'aporetic' structure and its 'Socratic' mannerisms, the dialogue includes a number of doctrinal points, or reflections of such points, which rather belong to Plato's mature philosophy. It is true that this argument, as such, is particularly elusive (cf. e.g. the hints at the theory of Forms in the 'aporetic' and seemingly 'early' Euthphr., and the recent discussion of Plato's oral doctrine). But as Horn and others have shown, the author of Hp.Ma. operates with the 'later' features in a peculiarly superficial manner (cf. 2).

(8) The stupidity of Hippias is exaggerated beyond what Plato can be fairly credited with even in his wilder moods.

(9) The curious anonymous 'Third Man' in the discussion, Socrates' 'inner opponent' (286c ff., cf. 298b, 304d), is without close parallels in the genuine works, but there are germs for this device in Cri. (50a ff.), Grg. (451a ff.), and elsewhere, and in the *δαυμόνιον* of Socrates.

(10) In many ways, the author is rather a pedant.

(11) The fluent and, at times, vividly colloquial style approximates to Plato's 'early' manner; in fact this is anomalous considering point 7. But there are also obvious exaggerations in the stylistic characterization of Socrates and Hippias, and even the anonymous speaker; and occasionally, on the other hand, there occur terms or idioms that betray a mid-4th century origin. See especially the controversy between Tarrant and Grube, and Pavlu (58 f.), Horn (91); according to the rather dubious stylometry of von Arnim Hp.Ma. would come between Smp. and Phd. (see Friedländer II³ 97), i.e. in Plato's mature phase. Tarrant's verdict holds good (1920.323): "The little work is distinctly clever, lively and interesting; the style is uneven in merit; the vocabulary is unusual and, I think, significant".

Some linguistic details seem still worth commenting on, as examples of such oddities as Tarrant refers to:

287a *ἀντίληψις* (*ἀντιλαμβάνομαι*) "objection", is rare in this sense, and the two other occurrences in the Platonic Corpus (Phd. 87a, Sph. 241b, neither of them early) may imply specific points. Sounds like Academic sophistication.

288d *συρφετός* of a person, "one of the mob, boor", is hapax before the Roman age; Plato uses it twice (Grg. 489c, Tht. 152c) in the usual metaphorical sense "mob" (cf. Tarrant 1920.328). Has the author of Hp.Ma. misunderstood Plato's use of this word (in fact the contents of the Tht. passage are somewhat similar — and note the fact that Tht. is not an early dialogue)? Or should he be quoting a comedy (below, p. 113f.)?

290a *τετυφωμένος* "crazy", not Platonic. Grube (1926.139) has

not seen the point that the use of the Pass. Perf. of this verb seems to be a mid-4th century idiom (cf. LSJ).

290e μέρμερος πάνυ "quite baneful" or "very troublesome" (probably ass. with μερμηρύζω as it is answering ἀμαθής), referring to Socrates' 'opponent' (like συρφετός, above). μέρμερος belongs to high poetry. Applying it playfully to a colloquial context (cf. Plutarch Mor. 988a) perhaps would not be entirely un-Platonic (as Wilamowitz II 325 n. 1 asserts), cf. e.g. Prt. 315c Τάνταλον εἰσεῦδον, R II 374e ἠράμεθα; but the preceding catachresis of συρφετός makes the reader suspect that the author has tried to create a Socratic (or Platonic) hyperbole. Grube (1926. 138) wrongly minimizes the relevance of this word. Friedländer (II³ 298 n.1) thinks that the author (Plato) here plays with a quotation; he may be right (below, p. 113f.).

291e εὐνοῖκῶς not used by Plato. The occurrences of the adjective and adverb listed in LSJ suggest that the word was fashionable in Attic between, say, 370 B.C. and Menander (who does not have it).

295a ἄ μὴ μέγα λέγε, un-Platonic. ἄ must be regarded as a poeticism (see LSJ), and the purpose and effect are approximately similar to μέρμερος 290e.

295b στέργω meaning "to be content" is rare and apparently solemn in tone; Plato has the verb in this sense only once, in a law (Lg. VIII 849e). The use in Isocrates Ep.2 (344 B.C.) and Demosthenes (see LSJ, III) may indicate a mid-4th century fashion.

301b διανεκῆ σώματα will be discussed below (p. 113) together with the assumption of Tarrant that the author utilizes contemporary comic diction.

303e ἀσυνέστατα ... τῶν ἡδονῶν (referring to τὸ δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδύ) "the most innocent pleasures". Rather similar to Lg. II 670d which is the only passage in Plato where this adjective occurs. Probably it reflects a current Academic discussion of hedonism. Note also the fact that ἀσυνήσις is particularly common in medical texts; this will be of some interest below.

Those scholars who have in recent years defended the authenticity of Hp.Ma., or accepted it as genuine without discussion, apparently have not taken account of the whole of the evidence. Especially the linguistic arguments of Tarrant (which have not been essentially weakened by the criticism of Grube) have escaped the notice of many writers on the subject.

Geffcken divides the earlier defenders (until ca. 1930) roughly in two groups: those who explain the peculiarities of the dialogue by assuming that Plato is still very young, and those who interpret the contents as implying mature philosophy in spite of the seemingly careless form (Geffcken II Anm. 155 f.; add to his references Verdamm 1917.201f., Ritter 1922.285—290, 1923.869 Nachtrag, Grube 1926 and 1929, Diès 1929, Stefanini I 125 n.1). The former position has been

altogether abandoned now; there is too much in the dialogue to suggest a date after, say, 390 B.C. The latter position has been taken, among others, by Leisegang 1950 (2384—2386, with doubts), Ross 1951 (3 f.), Soreth 1953, Gigon 1955 (with slight doubts and an extensive discussion of the methodical aspect), Capelle 1956 (dating Hp.Ma. after Phd.), Hoerber 1964, Malcolm 1968, and Friedländer (II³ 1964. 97—107, 298—300, where further references). I have not seen Teloh 1972, but to judge from the Abstract he is inclined to accept the view of the last-mentioned scholars.

The main point shared by these latter defenders, however they may disagree between themselves in details, is that the ontology and the supposed 'foreshadowings' or actual symptoms of the Theory of Forms in Hp.Ma. seem to form a link, even a missing link, between the 'early' dialogues including Euthphr., and Plato's 'mature' phase as represented by Phd., Smp. and R. For instance, Hp.Ma. operates with εἶδος (298d, cf. ἀποβλέποντες 299de) and πάθος / οὐσία (300b, 301b-e, 302c) like Euthphr. (5d, 6de where ἀποβλέπων, 11a); with αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν and προσγύγνεσθαι (286d, 288a, 289d, 292c, cf. 303a) like Smp. (211d), Phd. (100d), R. (V 476b), etc.; and with φαύλεσθαι / εἶναυ (294a-e) like R (X 596e). Grube (1926.142) is clearly wrong in stating that "there is not a single metaphysical expression in the Hp.Ma. that goes beyond what is ordinarily found in the other early dialogues" (similarly Diès 1929). Most modern defenders agree that Hp.Ma. is fairly advanced in its doctrinal contents, though Plato apparently has not yet 'reached' the level of R.

Against this kind of argument it can be objected, from a general point of view, that whatever one thinks of Plato's oral teaching, it is highly unlikely that he would have stated in his written works always his entire and up-to-date opinion of the matters under discussion; Plato usually did not write down 'all that he knew'. This is one of the reasons why the reconstruction of a linear 'development' of Plato's thought is such a precarious task, as has been very often pointed out since the days of Lutoslawski, Raeder and von Arnim. And it should be noted by implication that arguing the authenticity of a dialogue principally from its apparent place on a hypothetical 'line of Platonic development' of some doctrinal details, is a rather flagrant begging of the question.

As a matter of fact most of the arguments produced by the last defenders can be easily refuted (see e.g. Horn passim and Malcolm 1968.194 n.12 against Soreth). Even Friedländer's defense, however brilliant and learned (as in the case of Alc. I), is curiously inconclusive and failing in vital points such as linguistic matters. Some of his points are as difficult to refute as to prove. Is Hp.Ma. 297b (τὸ καλὸν ἀσάκτιον ἀγαθόν, which is τὸ ἔκγονον, and the ἐν πατρός τινος ἰδέα εἶναυ τὸ καλὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, all aporetically rejected of course) a 'foreshadowing' of the central section of R (VI 506d—

507b, 508bc), as Friedländer asserts (II³ 103), or a 'reminiscence' of it, as Tarrant (1928.69) thinks? Only if it is otherwise probable that Hp.Ma. is later than R VI, can it be safely said that the author of Hp.Ma. is not likely to have inserted this play with the relation between καλόν and ἀγαθόν, and πατήρ and ἔκγονος, and ἰδέα, if he had not had the well-known passage of R in his mind and expected his readers to remember it — though I would venture to assume this even if I had not been convinced that Hp.Ma. is later. The same perhaps applies to the καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα and νόμοι in Hp.Ma. (286b, 294c, 295d, 298 b-d, etc.) as compared with Smp. 210c (cf. 211c), but here of course Grg. 474de should also be taken into account (below, p. 113); Friedländer (II³ 99, 101, 104, 107) has not done this.

Capelle (1956) produces more convincing arguments for dating Hp.Ma. after Phd., than for its authenticity. — Hoerber, who otherwise follows Grube, makes some observations on the structure of the argument in Hp.Ma. which he finds very Platonic (contrary to e.g. Pohlenz 1931.303); to my mind he has proved at most that the author was acquainted with Plato's principles of composition (though he evidently did not care about the principle of 'central culmination', cf. Thesleff 1967.156). — The main argument of Malcolm is that the various approaches to καλόν in Hp.Ma. seem to imply a theory of the 'degrees of reality' which is not quite on the level of Smp. 210e—211b (this would confirm Friedländer's view of the relation between these two dialogues): the aspects 'beautiful in one respect, ugly in another', and 'beautiful here, ugly there' are lacking. Here again it can be objected that the author of Hp.Ma. may well have known the 'full' theory though he did not bother to be dogmatic.

Probably because of the authority of Friedländer and earlier believers in the authenticity of Hp.Ma. such as Grube and Diès and Schaerer, there are still scholars who without discussion take it to be a genuine work of Plato, thus Bröcker 1964, Ilting 1965, Gadamer 1968, Boder 1973, Findlay 1974.

I shall not ask the sceptical reader to make up his mind at this stage. However, whether we accept that Hp.Ma. was not written by Plato himself, or we suspect that it may be an authentic work after all, it is important to face the question of its date and environment.

Among the dialogues normally regarded as authentic, the closest parallel in form and matter is Euthphr. But there is no agreement as to the date of Euthphr. According to the orthodox view it is rather early (e.g. Friedländer II³ 75), but some would put it in the environment of Grg. and Men., which to most scholars would mean the 380ies (thus e.g. Gomperz II 293 f., Maier 1913. 126—128, Pohlenz 1921.12, Stefanini I 148 n.1, Stark 1952, Kapp 1968.65—67, 107 f.). If the Euthphr. is dated even later than this (or declared spurious),

there is little left to connect Hp.Ma. with Plato's early period. I shall not discuss the date of the former dialogue in this paper, but I should like to point out that it really is a problem.

Those who take Hp.Ma. to be spurious either assume that it was composed by a pupil of Plato after the Phd. period, say, in or after the 370ies (this is the view shared by e.g. Horneffer, Tarrant and Horn), or suggest the time of Aristotle (e.g. Geffcken II Anm. 156 n.216), or even the end of the 4th century (e.g. Pavlu 1941). To the last-mentioned view it can be reasonably objected (with Apelt) that the theme would have lost its interest by then. A date in the second or third quarter of the 4th century is easier to accept but, if argued independently, it would afford an additional indication against Platonic authorship: the genuine works later than and including Phd. and R (except book I) are all manifestly coloured by Plato's typical late style features, the 'onkos', of which Hp.Ma. shows no traces whatsoever (unless the poeticisms are regarded as an imitator's device); see Thesleff 1967.77—80, 156, 172.

Now, an important piece of chronological evidence seems to have been almost entirely overlooked so far. Answering Hippias' first reluctant attempt at defining καλόν (287e) — ἔστι γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, εὖ ἴσθι, εἰ δεῦ τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, παρθένος καλῆ καλόν — Socrates remarks: Καλῶς γε, ὃ Ἰππία, νῆ τὸν κύνα, καὶ εὐδόξως ἀπεκρίνω . . . ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, . . . οὐ μὴ ἐλεγχθῶ; To which Hippias replies assuringly: Πῶς γὰρ ἂν . . . ἐλεγχθεύης, ὃ γε πᾶσιν δοκεῖ. . . ; This will require a lengthy scrutiny.

The remark of Socrates is linguistically overdone, as many passages are in this dialogue. Καλῶς is of course to the point, ironically (cf. Euthphr. 7a). Νῆ τὸν κύνα usually accompanies ideas that Socrates finds amusing or interesting, in authentic and spurious dialogues alike (Hoerber 1963); here the contrast imparted by the the dog is amusing in itself. But why εὐδόξως? There is no parallel for the use of this adjective or adverb in the sense of "praiseworthy" or "excellent". When Herodotus (VII 99) tells us that Artemisia's ships were, next to those of the Sidonians, the εὐδοξόταται in the Persian fleet, he probably means that they had "the greatest reputation" (LJS's "'crack' ships" is hardly correct). Among the current adjectives meaning "famous" or the like (εὐκλής, ὀνομαστός, λαμπρός, περὶ-, διαβόητος, πολυθρύλητος, ἔνδοξος, εὐδόκιμος, ἐπιφανής, ἐπίσημος, περίβλεπτος, etc.), I can think of none except λαμπρός that would tend to be used idiomatically in the sense of "splendid, good" (cf. colloquial English *famous*), but here the original sense of "brilliant" operates on both sides. Tarrant who noticed that there is something peculiar with εὐδόξως thought that it might be a colloquialism; this was doubted by Grube (1926.139, 1929.375) who

suggested that the author (Plato) may be playing with Hippias' fondness of adverbs (but, after all, Socrates is speaking here and at 219e *μεγαλεῖως*, which Grube adduced as a parallel!).

Let us, however, face the possibility (apparently not noticed before; I am indebted to Jaakko Frösén for this observation) that *εὐδόξως* somehow represents, or perhaps even should be corrected by emendation into *ἐνδόξως* meaning "in a generally accepted way" or "plausibly". This sense of *ἐνδοξος* does not occur in Plato. It is really an Aristotelian speciality (see e.g. the opening of *Top.*, especially 100b22—24 with a pun on the original sense), and accepting the emendation *ἐνδόξως* in this passage would, practically, mean accepting that *Hp.Ma.* is influenced by Aristotelian terminology. But we need not go as far as that. There is one late Platonic passage where *εὐδοξος* approximates to the meaning "acceptable": *Lg. VI 773a* τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἔμφορσιν εὐδόξους γάμους χρῆ γαμεῖν (probably with a pun on the original sense, too). So it can be inferred that *εὐδοξος* was receiving the specific sense of "plausible" in the Academy before or at the times when (presumably) Aristotle introduced his *ἐνδοξος*. It is to be noted also that the context of *εὐδόξως* in *Hp.Ma.* is similar to the normal context of *ἐνδοξος* in Aristotle, i.e. logical elenchus (288a οὐ μὴ ἐλεγχθῶ, cf. 286e, 287b); and *Hp.Ma.* 288a ὁ γὰρ πᾶσιν δοκεῖ indicates that the author understands *εὐδόξως* in the same manner as Aristotle understands *ἐνδοξος* (cf. *SE* 175a31—33), namely, as based upon *δόξα*, not *ἀλήθεια*.

So here is yet another linguistic feature pointing to mid-4th century usage. But I suspect that there is something more to *εὐδόξως*. The choice of this curious word, and the emphasis it receives in the context, are likely to convey a special point. I suggest that the author, who is intelligent and clearly fond of linguistic play and allusive hints (as will be further illustrated below), is alluding to Eudoxus of Cnidus.

Eudoxus, besides being a famous astronomer (in fact what Hippias wanted to be himself, *Hp.Ma.* 285bc), a student of medicine (cf. *ἀσυνής* above p. 107) and a 'sophist' (Philostratus *V.Soph.* 1.1 ranks him first among the sophists), was noted for his theory of *ἡδονή* as the ultimate good (Arist. *EN* I 1101b27—34, X 1172b 9—26, cf. Philippson 1925). Apparently he was the chief exponent of hedonism in the immediate environment of Plato. Yet it should be noted that Aristotle (*EN* X 1172b18) praises the balance of his character: he was a man of exceptional temperance. So it would seem that Hippias' choice of example, and also his obvious reluctance in this particular case, are truly 'Eudoxic' besides being supposedly 'plausible'. Perhaps, by the way, Diogenes Laertius misunderstood the reason why Eudoxus was called "Ενδοξος (8.91 τοῦτον ἀντὶ εὐδόξου "Ενδοξον ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς φήμης): was he known as 'Mr. Plausible' (cf. Arist *EN* X 1172b15 ἐπιστεύοντο)?

The dating of Eudoxus is still somewhat problematical, though as far as I can see some variant of the late date theory (Susemihl 1898, de Santillana 1947, Merlan 1960.98—104, Lasserre 1966.137—146) must correspond to the truth. The point at issue is how much importance there should be attached to the fact that, considering the historical conditions, Eudoxus is somewhat more likely to have visited Egypt in 365/4, as Lasserre suggests, than in 373/2, as Merlan thinks; otherwise Merlan's chronology seems to me on the whole more convincing than Lasserre's. What interests us here is of course the date of Eudoxus' second arrival in Athens, as a reputed philosopher, because if Hp.Ma. 287e refers to Eudoxus it implies that he was at the time a well-known character in the Academy with a well-established reputation of theoretical hedonism. Eudoxus' contacts with the Academy have sometimes been over-emphasized, and the hypothesis that he acted as head of the Academy during Plato's absence in Sicily in 367/6 (or 366/5) is not very reliable; but Lasserre on the other hand clearly underrates these contacts. For instance, Eudoxus' achievements in mathematics and astronomy exercised a considerable influence upon Plato's late philosophy, notably Ti. (cf. Maula 1974; also Gaiser 1965.193, 200), and Phlb. reflects discussions of his hedonism and perhaps his theory of Forms (below, p. 114). If, then, Merlan is wrong in suggesting 368/7 as the date of Eudoxus' second arrival in Athens, and Lasserre is right about the date of his Egyptian séjour, Eudoxus must have come to Athens not later than the beginning of the 350ies.

Assuming that Hp.Ma. 287e contains a reference to Eudoxus, we get 367 B.C. as earliest terminus post quem for the composition of the dialogue. But whatever other allusions to Eudoxus there may occur in it (cf. 285bc, 298a; 303e ἀσυνής, above; and possibly the suggestion of gold as a 'catalyst' in Hippias' second definition 289e, cf. the discussion of Eudoxus' theory of Forms by von Fritz 1927), it is clear that the author is not particularly interested in mathematical or astronomical matters. He is an Academic, but he does not represent the trends of Plato's last phase which became dominant also among Plato's immediate followers in the Academy. He is rather a Socratic.

It is interesting to note that there are other signs of Socraticism in the Academy about 360 B.C. C.W.Müller has recently (1975.94—104) with some very good arguments dated the pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus in the 350ies. It is amusing that Müller (102 f.) finds in Sis. 388c an anachronistic hint not unlike what was assumed for Hp.Ma. above, though a more explicit one. He argues that the example of Callistratus in this passage refers to the well-known politician's hiding after his condemnation to death in 361. So Hp.Ma. appears to be approximately contemporary with Sis. Yet, rather obviously, it is not written by the same author: the grip and the style are different.

With this tentative dating of Hp.Ma., the doctrinal or terminological points that it seems to share with Phd. (see especially Capelle 1956), Smp., R., and possibly Euthphr., are best explained as 'reminiscences'. Rather obviously, the author has also made use of Grg. (474d—475a, cf. Hp.Ma. 295c—e, 297e—298a; this is argued by Röllig, and accepted even by his opponent Grube 1926.144—146). But the connections with Hp.Mi., discussed by Apelt and especially Pavlu (1941.49, 53—55), are not very clear except perhaps 286b; also, Pavlu (50 f.) refers to some possible reminiscences of Prt. and Men. It is practically certain that most of these works were written before ca. 370 B.C. (though for Euthphr., Hp.Mi. and parts of R. this is not so certain).

From the chronological point of view it would be considerably more interesting to know in what relation Hp.Ma. stands to Plato's later works, including Prm. and Tht. So far as I can see there are no manifest indications that the author of Hp.Ma. has read any of these dialogues, but there are certain points of contact that are by no means negligible.

Tarrant (1920.321) has drawn attention to the fact that Tht. 184e—185b discusses "each" and "both" in terms of ὅψις and ἀκοή in a manner similar to Hp.Ma. 300a—e; the Hp.Ma. passage seems to be based upon a piece of argumentation resembling the Tht. passage, if not the actual text of Tht. In Hp.Ma. 301b κρούειν reminds of a similar context in Tht.154e (cf. 179d, Phlb.55c, Grube 1926.140; cf. further Sph. 246 bc, below). Cf. also Tht. 152c συρφετός, above p. 106. But the Tht. is difficult to date; at any rate it is hardly later than 367 B.C.

The question of the relation of Hp.Ma. to Sph. will, somewhat unexpectedly, bring us to make an excursion to comedy.

Pohlenz (1931.305f., overlooked by Friedländer II³ 300 n.16) has suggested that the vexed διανεικῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας Hp.Ma. 301b (cf.e) and διηρημένα 304a, like the partly related passage Sph. 246bc (originally adduced by Apelt), may playfully refer to some recent criticism or censure of the Platonic διαιρέσεις; and if this is so, it rather strengthens our suspicions that Hp.Ma. was written in the Sph. period, ie. the 360ies or 350ies. In fact, I think, there can be hardly any doubt that Pohlenz and Gigon (1955.20) are right in considering διανεικῆ σώματα a quotation. By a happy chance there exists a fragment from a comedy of Anaxandrides called Αἴσχυρα ("The Ugly Woman", Athen.10.455f = 6 Kock) where the bombastic style of Timotheus the Citharode is ridiculed: ἀρτύως διηρητάμηκε καὶ τὰ μὲν διανεικῆ / σώματος μέρη δαμάζειτ' ἐν πυρλιτύτῳ στέγῳ (cj. Kock, -κτύτοισι γᾶς et sim. codd.) / Τιμόθεος (fr. 23 Wilam.) ἔφη ποτ', ἄνδρες, τὴν χύτραν οἴμαι λέγων. Pohlenz who knows the fragment does not seem to have taken a closer look at it. The διανεικῆ σώματος μέρη represent the Homeric νώτοισιν...

διηνεκέεσσι (Il. 7.321, etc.) "slices of meat cut the whole length of the chine". In Hp.Ma. 301b (cf. also 301e) Hippias is perhaps supposed to be quoting Timotheus, but the author rather has the passage from Anaxandrides in mind. The contrast to the simple χύτρα, which is the actual point here, is alluded to earlier in the dialogue (288c, 290d). Anaxandrides belongs to those comedy writers that made fun of Plato (cf. Diog.Laert. 3.26), and so it is reasonable to assume that Plato's notorious διαυρέσεις were parodied in this comedy too (cf. Epicrates ap. Athen. 2.59c = fr. 11 Kock). Presumably, then, Hippias at 301b (cf. also the comic κνήσματα and περιτυμήματα at 300a) resorts to Anaxandridean phrases when railing against the 'Socratic', i.e. Platonic, "chopping up things". Perhaps the Αὔσχροα also contained some joke with the Platonic καλόν, perhaps even with Eudoxus; this is quite hypothetical, of course. At any rate, though all allusions probably implied in Hp.Ma. 301b(e) and 304ab cannot be explained in this way, and the connections with the Sph. passage (which can hardly refer to Anaxandrides alone) are also rather obvious, the quoting of Anaxandrides gives us some useful hints. The Αὔσχροα cannot be dated (366/5 B.C., the archonship of Cephisodorus, is one of many dates possible according to the fragmentary victory list, IG XIV 1098), but we know that Anaxandrides was active until ca. 350 B.C. which suits the general frame we have arrived at. And the general inference of Tarrant that the author of Hp.Ma., contrary to Plato, has made a considerable use of contemporary comic phraseology, indeed drawn linguistic details from comedy in an un-Platonic manner, looks more than probable in this light. Perhaps after all Anaxandrides is the source of many of the linguistic oddities in the dialogue.

Important evidence is also afforded by Phlb. which can with some probability be dated in the 350ies (cf. Thesleff 1967.25). It can hardly be doubted that Phlb. somehow reflects Academic discussions of Eudoxus' hedonism (see e.g. Philippson 1925, Gaiser 1965.197—201). The seemingly original definition of τὸ καλόν suggested by Socrates in Hp.Ma. 297e—298a, τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡδύ (cf. 303e ἀσυνέστατα αὔταιτων ἡδονῶν εἶσι καὶ βέλτισται) has clearly some affinity to the examination of 'pure pleasure' as restricted in the first place to sight and hearing in Phlb. (especially 51b, 52c, cf. Arist. EN 7.1154b26, 10.1176a1). But, as Röllig and Tarrant have seen, the Phlb. passages are more advanced and the author of Hp.Ma. is not likely to have known them (at least Geffcken II Anm. 156 n.220 and Gauss III/2.129 f. are wrong in asserting that the exposition of Hp.Ma. is dependent upon that of Phlb.). Both Hp.Ma. and Phlb. independently fall back upon the same oral or otherwise lost sources. Or should Phlb. 51c τοῖς τόρνοις contain a direct reminiscence of the famous χύτρα?

Tarrant's suggestion that Hp.Ma. may have something to do with

the criticism of the theory of Forms in Prm. is not so plausible (Tarrant 1920.322 f.; Grube 1926.146). And the worlds of Ti. and Lg. are too far from that of Hp.Ma. to make direct connections probable.

So we have various reasons to believe that Hp.Ma. was composed in the later 360ies or early 350ies. Two passages in Xenophon give us additional reasons. — In Oecon. 8.19—20 Ischomachus reminds his young wife that even the simplest and most trivial household implements may be beautiful, καλόν, and his list of examples ends in a Xenophontic climax: καλὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ πάντων καταγελάσειεν ἂν μάλιστα οὐχ ὁ σεμνὸς ἀλλ' ὁ κομψός, ὅτι καὶ χύτρας φημὶ εὐρύθμον φαίνεσθαι εὐκρινῶς κειμέννας. Xenophon may be alluding to Anaxandrides (cf. κομψός); but there must be a reflection or an allusion to Hp.Ma. 288cd too where we have, beside the notorious χύτρα, both σεμνῶ and κομψός (linguistic arguments for Xenophon's using Hp.Ma. were put forward by Chantraine 1947; cf. Soreth 1953.18 n.2 against Tarrant's suggestion that Hp.Ma. on the contrary alludes to Xenophon). Those who have discussed the relation of Hp.Ma. to Oecon. seem to believe that Oecon. is rather early. However, though the Oecon. may have been planned in Scillus where Xenophon lived until ca 371, it was written down as a kind of Appendix to the Mem. which was not finished before the 360ies (Breitenbach 1967.1776, 1806, 1809—1811, 1902). As far as I can see there is nothing to prevent us from assuming that Mem. and Oecon. have received their present form in the 350ies. — Furthermore, Socrates' discussing τὸ δίκαιον with Hippias, Mem. 4.4.5—25, has several points in common with the first part of Hp.Ma. (see Breitenbach 1967.1831). Especially the opening διὰ χρόνου, immediately motivated in Hp.Ma. but somewhat loosely and artificially attached to Xenophon's story, is a fairly strong indication that Xenophon has been using the Hp.Ma. and not vice versa. Besides, Xenophon is known to exploit the Socratic literature extensively and freely, whereas we do not know of Socratics or Platonists using Xenophon's accounts except for polemical reasons.

The conflict between the rhetors and the Socratics which is brought to a sudden outburst in Hp.Ma. 304ab, cannot really be used for dating: this conflict extends at least from Plato's Apology and Polycrates in the 390ies to Isocrates' Antidosis ca. 355 B.C., and it is still present in Plato's Laws.

There seems to occur at least one allusion to Hp.Ma. in Aristotle's Topica (the other possible allusions, Top. 102a6, 135a13, referring to the identification of καλόν with πρέπον as in Hp.Ma. 293e, are less obvious because this may be an Academic commonplace, cf. Ps.-Pl. Alc.I 135b and Leisegang 1950.2383). In Top.6.146a21—32 Aristotle gives as an example of a faulty definition the describing of τὸ καλὸν as τὸ δι' ὄψεως ἢ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδύ, and he criticizes it approximately in the same manner as Socrates does in Hp.Ma. 298a—300b.

Aristotle is quoting from memory and does not give the definition exactly in the form in which it stands in Hp.Ma., τὸ καλὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς τε καὶ ὄψεως ἡδύ (298a), which would have been slightly more appropriate to his argument. This part of the Top. is generally agreed to be very early (see e.g. 'Aristotle on Dialectic' 1968.69, 102, 202 n.4), and supposing that Aristotle wrote it ca. 360 B.C. it is understandable that the recently published Hp.Ma. should have provided him with an example.

To sum up, there are a fair number of indications suggesting for Hp.Ma. a date roughly around 360 B.C. This date, as such, is a sufficient indication that Hp.Ma. is spurious: it is impossible to imagine Plato writing a Hp.Ma. at the period when he produced Sph., Ti. and Phlb. The dialogue, like most other spuria in the Corpus, displays a Socratic trend manifestly not conforming to Plato's late philosophy. Hp.Ma. shows that Plato had at least one pupil who was capable of writing on Socratic themes in the lively Socratic manner. Though this pupil is hardly the author of Sis. (above, p. 112), should he be made responsible for other pieces in the Corpus?

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