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ON THE ORIGIN OF THE GENITIVE ABSOLUTE

Holger Thesleff

Since CLASSEN published his *Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch* (2nd edition, Frankfurt a.M. 1879) little advance has been made towards solving the problem of the origin of the Greek genitive absolute. CLASSEN maintained, contrary to his predecessors (except KRÜGER), that the GA could not have originated from a specific kind of genitive, such as the »*genitivus causae*» or the »*genitivus temporis*», but that it reflects the manifold use of the Greek genitive as a whole and, therefore, seems to have a complex origin.¹ He referred² to the abundant passages in Homer where a substantive (or pronoun) in the genitive is qualified by a participle, but where the genitive is syntactically conditioned; i.e. cases such as the following (I take the examples quoted in SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER p. 398): Il. 8. 118 τοῦ δ' ἰθὺς μεμαῶτος ἀκόντισε Τυδέος υἱός, 477 σέθεν δ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀλεγίζω χωομένης, 9. 463 ἔνθ' ἐμοὶ οὐκέτι πάμπαν ἐρητύετ' ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸς πατρὸς χωομένοιο κατὰ μέγαρον στροφᾶσθαι, 12. 392 Σαρπήδοντι δ' ἄχος γένετο Γλαύκου ἀπιόντος, Od. 8. 564 ἀλλὰ τόδ' ὥς ποτε πατρὸς ἐγὼ εἰπόντος ἄκοῦσα. It is to be noted that frequently, at least from a logical point of view, no distinct boundary can be drawn between such constructions and real GA:s. SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER remark (*l.c.*): »Die genannten und ähnliche Beispiele konnten von einem jüngern Sprachgefühl aus auch als volle genitivi absoluti gefasst werden».

CLASSEN'S view seems on the whole to have been accepted by modern scholars. Some have emphasized certain types of genitive as paving the way for the development, without, however, penetrating further into the question.³ And the theories of EDWARD SPIEKER, *On the so-called Genitive Absolute*

¹ See CLASSEN *Beob.* p. 184 ff.

² P. 160 ff.

³ E.g. WACKERNAGEL, *Vorl. über Synt.* I p. 292 f. stresses the importance of the temporal genitive (as in *νυκτός* »by night, in the night«), HUMBERT, *Syntaxe* p. 282 that of the ablative (separative) genitive.

and its use especially in the Attic Orators (AJPh. 6, 1885, pp. 310—343), and KARL KUNST, Vom Wesen und Ursprung des absoluten Genetivs (Gl. 12, 1923, pp. 29—50),¹ have not met with general approval. SPIEKER makes some objections to CLASSEN's thesis, to which we shall return later. His own explanation that the GA is in origin exclusively a temporal genitive, is hardly better founded than earlier theories of the kind; but as it has been further developed and supported by more advanced linguistic arguments in KUNST's treatise we may conveniently deal with it in connection with the latter. KUNST (following certain remarks made by GILDERSLEEVE on SPIEKER's exposition) is inclined to draw a fundamental distinction between the GA with the present (or perfect) participle and the GA with the aorist participle. The former is, according to KUNST, originally a »genitive of the sphere», a possessive (pertinentive), or above all a partitive genitive, the durative participle preserving in principle a temporal notion (»while»); whereas the latter is in origin an ablatival genitive, the participle, with its reference to a single point of time, suggesting a causal sense (»because»).²

KUNST is certainly right in pointing out the possibility of interpreting most of the Homeric GA:s with an aorist participle as having a causal notion: e.g. Il. 8. 37 ὥς μὴ πάντες ὄλωνται ὁ δὲ σσ α μ έ ν ο ι ο τ ε ο ἴ ο, 15. 328 ἐνθα δ' ἀνήρ ἔλεν ἄνδρα κ ε δ α σ θ ε ί σ η ς ὄ σ μ ί ν η ς. CLASSEN had made the same observation,³ though he regarded the causal notion as a further development of the temporal which he considered primary. On the other hand KUNST's differentiation between temporal present participles and causal aorist participles in the GA:s is evidently too radical. Why, for instance, should Il. 17. 532 οἱ δ' ἦλθον καθ' ὄμιλον ἐταίρου κικλήσκοντος be considered as temporal, if Il. 10. 356 ἔλπετο γὰρ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀποστρέφοντας ἐταίρους ἐκ Τρώων ἵεναι πάλιν Ἐκτορος ὀτρύναντος is causal?⁴ Or cf. Il. 22. 287 καί

¹ J. TEUTSCH, Der absolute Genetiv bei Homer, Progr. Rudolfswert 1882, has not been accessible to me; but it does not appear to have brought new aspects into the discussion. The dissertation of E. WENTZEL, De genetivis et dativis linguae Graecae quos absolutos vocant, appeared (Breslau) 1828: in CHANTRAINE, Gramm.Hom. II p. 324 note 1 there occurs the misprint 1928.

² KUNST p. 39.

³ Beob. p. 180.

⁴ In the former example, according to KUNST (p. 38), »empfand der griechische Sprachgebrauch das Rufen als so lange (in seiner Wirkung) andauernd, bis ihm durch das Herbeikommen Folge geleistet war . . . , so dass selbst da das ἐλθεῖν in die zeitlich ausgedehntere Sphäre des κικλήσκων fällt». This explanation may possibly illuminate the use of the present participle in this and corresponding cases; but it does not exclude a causal touch of meaning, quite natural with this particular verb in this particular context.

κεν ἐλαφρότερος πόλεμος Τρώεσσι γένοιτο σεῖο καταφθιμένοιο with 24. 244 ῥήϊτεροι γὰρ μᾶλλον Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὴ ἔσεσθε κείνου τεθνηῶτος. It may seem inadvisable to make, on purely logical grounds, a fundamental and genetic distinction between semantically related phrases. In fact, since many GA:s with a present (or perfect) participle, as KUNST himself admits, have an unmistakably causal tone (cf. further e.g. Il. 5. 865 οἷη δ' ἐκ νεφέων ἐρεβεννὴ φαίνεται ἀήρ κάμματος ἐξ ἀνέμοιο δυσαέος ὀρνυμένοιο, 24. 248 οἱ δ' ἴσαν ἔξω σπερχομένοιο γέροντος), the argument loses some of its force.

Let us, however, suppose that KUNST's differentiation contains some truth and look at his derivation of the GA with the present (or perfect) participle. For them KUNST assumes partly an adnominal (or similar) origin, partly, and as it seems above all, a connection with the *genitivus temporis* — he is somewhat obscure on this point.¹ KUNST, like SPIEKER (though the latter does not say so explicitly), appears to regard the type Il. 2. 551 ἐνθα δέ μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἄρνοις ἰλάονται κοῦροι Ἀθηναίων περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν which is supposed to be a »temporal genitive of the sphere« (for the term see below p. 191), as in some way or other a model for the use of the present GA in general, and in the first place for cases such as Il. 18. 10 καί μοι ἔειπεν Μυρμιδόνων τὸν ἄριστον ἔτι ζῶοντος ἐμεῖο... λείπειν φάος ἡελίοιο, 22. 432 τί νυ βείομαι αἰνὰ παθοῦσα σεῦ ἀποτεθνηῶτος; We have therefore to inspect the former type somewhat more closely. First, we find that the aorist cases cannot be fundamentally separated from the present cases even here. The following instances of what could be conveniently called »time-GA:s« are to be found in Homer:² In the plural like the above-mentioned Il. 2. 551, but with the aorist participle Od. 1. 16 ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ἔτος ἦλθε περιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν, with another present participle Od. 10. 470 ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἐνιαυτὸς ἔην, περὶ δ' ἔτραπον ὄραι μὴ νῶν φθινόνοτων, Od. 19. 153 (= 24. 143) ἀλλ' ὅτε τέτρατον ἦλθεν ἔτος καὶ ἐπήλυθον ὄραι

¹ It may be asked, for instance, why the common GA expressing the absence of somebody (Il. 8. 522 λαῶν ἀπεόντων, Od. 14. 450 ἀποικομένοιο ἀνακτος, etc.) is derived from the adnominal possessive genitive (cf. cases such as Od. 19. 19 τά μοι κατὰ οἶκον ἀκηδέα καπνὸς ἀμέρδει πατρὸς ἀποικομένοιο KUNST p. 33 f.), whereas the type ἐμεῦ ζῶντος / τεθνηῶτος (Il. 18. 10, 22. 432, etc.) is put in direct connection with the temporal »genitive of the sphere« (cf. Il. 2. 551 ἐνθα δέ μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἄρνοις ἰλάονται κοῦροι Ἀθηναίων περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν KUNST p. 38), in spite of the fact that similar apparently adnominal cases are to be found with this type, e.g. Il. 13. 659 ποινὴ δ' οὔτις παιδὸς ἐγγίγνετο τεθνηῶτος.

² Here and in the following I rely on the material collected by CLASSEN, and controlled by KUNST.

μηνηῶν φθινόγοντων. In the singular Od. 11. 295 (= 14. 294) ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ μῆνες τε καὶ ἡμέραι ἐξετελεύητο ἄψ περιτελλόμενον ἔτεος, with aorist participle Od. 11. 248 χαῖρε, γύναι, φιλότητι περιπλομένοιο δ' ἐνιαυτοῦ τέξεται ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, and with φθίνειν Od. 14. 163 (= 19. 307) τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ' Ὀδυσσεύς, τοῦ μὲν φθινόγοντος μηνός, τοῦ δ' ἰσταμένοιο. Cf. further Il. 8. 538 κείσεται οὔτηθεις, πολέες δ' ἄμφ' αὐτὸν ἑταῖροι, ἠελίου ἀνιόντος ἐς αὐρίον and Od. 19. 519 ὡς δ' ὅτε Πανδαρέου κούρη χλωρηὶς ἀηδὼν καλὸν αἰείδησιν ἔαρος νέον ἰσταμένοιο. For Od. 14. 475 see below p. 203.

This is a fairly distinct phraseology with reference to the succession of years or months; the two last examples concern the change in the time of the day and the season; and in all instances the substantive is naturally a word for a temporal period. As such the »time-GA:s» are not likely, as far as I can see, to bear any particularly close relation to the type ἐμεῦ ζῶντος / τεθνηῶτος where, it should be noted, the subject of the GA is personal.

It is quite possible to reconstruct an origin for both the singular and the plural time-GA:s independently of other GA:s. The last two examples suggest a direct connection with the old (singular) so-called *genitivus temporis*¹ of the type Il. 8. 470 ἠοῦς, 22. 27 ὀπώρης, h. Hom. 19. 17 ἔαρος: in this respect I quite agree with WACKERNAGEL.² And in Od. 14. 163 (19. 307) we have a qualified μηνός which naturally suggests the regular genitive of the type ταύτης τῆς νυκτός, in fact represented in the preceding verse (τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος). There is nothing to prevent us from understanding Od. 11. 248 in the same way, as it cannot be expected that KUNST's theory should have absolute validity.³ — In Od. 11, 295 (14. 294) we meet with a somewhat different problem: the relation of the genitive to the substantives μῆνες and ἡμέραι. I am inclined to think that this genitive is, in principle, an adnominal pertinentive⁴, though there must have been associations with the

¹ This is widespread in IE. For the plural »*genitivus temporis*» cf. below p. 193 note 1.

² See above p. 187 note 3.

³ The aorist participle gives KUNST (p. 46 f.) some trouble, as it cannot have a causal notion. He supposes that it is used like a present participle and translates »im Verlauf des herumkreisenden Jahres» which, of course, is quite in accordance with all physiological rules known to us. I do not think, however, that Homer was particular about such rules, especially as the father *in spe* in this case was not a mortal, but Poseidon. Therefore a normal aorist sense seems to me to be quite in order: »the year having gone round, when the year has passed». The same in fact applies to Hes. Op. 386 and some other post-Homeric instances to which KUNST refers.

⁴ I am using the term »pertinentive» with SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER for the possessive and similar functions of the genitive proper.

independent temporal genitive.¹ My opinion arises from a consideration of the very similar cases with a plural participle which are all attached to substantives, except Il. 2. 551. Now, had this sole instance of a really absolute plural time-genitive (within the group of phrases here in question) not occurred in the *Κατάλογος τῶν νεῶν*, I would perhaps have hesitated about regarding it as secondary; but as the things are, I find it rather probable that it was modelled on the plural adnominal pertinentives of the same type, and made absolute because GA:s of other types already existed. In short, the time-GA:s can be easily explained, partly as *genitivi temporis*, partly, and in particular the plural cases, as adnominal pertinentives.

Though the time-GA:s may have had, to some extent, independent origins, it would be foolish to deny the possibility that they have been influenced by other GA:s.² The main thing to be noted in this connection, is that we have no reasons for supposing that they are, themselves, to any considerable extent more primary than other GA:s; on the contrary, the prevalence of instances in the *Odyssey* may suggest a comparatively late development.³

We have so far dealt with the theory of a relationship between the GA and the temporal genitive in a narrow sense of the term, i.e. the genitive of a substantive which denotes a temporal period; and we have not found a reasonable explanation of the GA as a whole. However, KUNST operates with a »temporal genitive of the sphere« in a larger sense which includes all kinds of substantives — even personal — provided that they have a (durative) present participle attached to them.⁴ In this way he makes himself able to connect the GA in general with the *genitivus temporis*. He refers⁵ to instances such as the following as more or less directly belonging to that genitive category: Il. 5. 501 ὅτε τε ξανθὴ Δημήτηρ κρήνη ἐπειγομένην ἀνέμων καρπὸν τε καὶ ἄχνας, 17. 393 ἄφαρ δ' ἐξ ἰκμάς ἔβη, δύνει δέ τ' ἀλοιφή, πολλῶν ἐλκόντων — with the result that the »temporal genitive of the sphere« is rather unavoidably made a principle of explaining the whole phenomenon of the GA. This is certainly what SPIEKER wants, though he does not use the term »genitive of the sphere«; and I believe this is also what KUNST has in

¹ In its ultimate origin the old *genitivus temporis*, whether pertinentive or partitive, may of course have been adnominal. And note the fact that a qualified temporal genitive can always be used adnominally, e.g. Hdt. 6. 106 ἵσταμένον τοῦ μηνός εἰνάτη.

² Cf. below p. 203.

³ The time-GA:s are proportionally very frequent in Hesiod: see KUNST p. 47 f.

⁴ This may be inferred above all from his remarks on p. 37.

⁵ P. 38 f.

view, though his exposition is not altogether clear. In particular I am not quite sure what KUNST wants to do with the problematic parallels of the GA which have a clear syntactic reference. It would appear that he is trying to get rid of them when he states that the adnominal (pertinentive) genitive (as in *δῶμα πατρός*) is ultimately identical with the »genitive of the sphere» in a larger sense (the example *ἄπτεσθαι πατρός* is given).¹ If I understand him aright² he is of the opinion that the Greeks did not (or did not in pre-historic times) feel a difference in the sense of the genitive in two instances like, say, Od. 20. 216 *κτήματα δάσσασθαι δὴν οἰχομένοιο ἄνακτος* and 14. 450 *ὄν ῥα συμβώτης αὐτὸς κτήσατο μοῦνος ἀποιχομένοιο ἄνακτος*. In the first case the genitive construction expresses the »sphere» of the *κτήματα*, in the second case the »sphere» of the *κτήσασθαι*, i.e. the sphere within which the *κτήσατο* happened. Apart from other considerations it is to be remarked, against this view, that the »sphere» of the *κτήματα* is the *ἄναξ* alone, the participle having nothing whatsoever to do with them; but that the »sphere» of the *κτήσατο* is constituted by the durative action (state) expressed by the present participle (or rather, by its suffix) — a completely different thing. Supposing that there really existed a general »genitive of the sphere», the Greeks must at any rate have been aware of the fact that the main idea in the first case is the substantive *ἄνακτος*, in the second case the participle *ἀποιχομένοιο*, and consequently that the relation expressed by the genitive in *κτήματα οἰχομένοιο ἄνακτος* is not identical with the one in *κτήσατο ἀποιχομένοιο ἄνακτος*. We have therefore, from a practical standpoint, to work with the category of adnominal and other (syntactically comparable) parallels of the GA, as a fact which cannot be easily explained away.

With KUNST's theory in view, it could perhaps be assumed that the genitive constructions with a syntactic reference reflect a parallel or secondary development, the original, or at least an equally old state, being the genitive of a present participle which actually constituted the »sphere» of the action of the

¹ P. 36 f.: »[The passage Il. 2. 551 *περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν*] zeigt uns den mit Partizip verbundenen Genetiv in seiner ursprünglichen echtgriechischen Funktion als Kasus zur Bezeichnung einer bestimmten Sphäre. In dieser Bedeutung liegt gleichermassen die Wurzel des adnominalen wie des adverbalen Genetivs und das die moderne Forschung ernsthaft beschäftigende Problem der Priorität des einen von beiden scheint aus einer falschen Fragestellung hervorgegangen; ist es doch im Wesen dieselbe Vorstellung, die den Anlass bietet, bei *δῶμα πατρός* und bei *ἄπτεσθαι πατρός* den Genetiv zu gebrauchen, da dieser Kasus jedesmal jene Person (oder Sache) bezeichnet, in deren Bereich dort der im Nomen ausgedrückte Gegenstand, hier die im Verbum liegende Handlung fällt.»

² Cf. KUNST p. 37.

main verb. But now it should be clearly pointed out that the specific kind of »genitive of the sphere« here in question is a purely hypothetical reconstruction made by KUNST in accordance with earlier (and more vague) temporal theories such as that of SPIEKER. The term »genitive of the sphere« was introduced by BRUGMANN and his contemporaries for the types of genitive for which SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER use the somewhat more definite terms »pertinentive« and »partitive«. I cannot help feeling that KUNST's argumentation is an example of how delusive a term may be if it is not sufficiently well defined. In fact, the existence of a temporal »genitive of the sphere« outside the range of the *genitivus temporis* can reasonably be doubted. The *genitivus temporis* is restricted to temporal substantives; besides, it is preferably, and probably originally, singular.¹ Partitive genitives like Il. 5. 6 *λελουμένος Ὠκεανοῖο*, to which KUNST refers², are not sufficiently common to afford a basis for explaining the whole phenomenon of the GA; in historical times they have on the whole an occasional character³, and there is nothing to indicate that they were particularly widespread before Homer. Other types of genitive denoting the »sphere« within which a verbal action takes place, do not exist, and can probably not be proved to have ever existed.⁴ Nor are there any signs, as far as I can see, of participles having ever been used with so predominant a notion of the temporal period during which the action (state) happens, that a combination like, say, *ἄναξ ἀποιχόμενος* could have really constituted the temporal »sphere« of the action of the main verb; as the adjectival character of the participles clearly indicates, the leading substantive of such a combination was at least originally the main idea: »the absent *ἄναξ*, the *ἄναξ* as being absent«. I am prepared to admit that *ἄναξ ἀποιχόμενος* could secondarily mean something like »the situation of the *ἄναξ* being absent« — we shall have to work with this presumption below (p. 198). But this is not the same as »the time during which the *ἄναξ* is absent« which

¹ Il. 11. 691 *ἐκάκωσε βίη Ἡρακληείη τῶν προτέρων ἐτέων* is the only Homeric instance of what would appear to be a plural *genitivus temporis*. A plural genitive expressing »in so many years« etc. does not, as far as I know, occur before classical times, e.g. Pl. Symp. 172c *οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι πολλῶν ἐτῶν Ἀγάθων ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπιδεδήμηκεν*.

² P. 37.

³ The partitive genitive stands here for the accusative of time or space or the locative dative; cf. SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER p. 111 ff.

⁴ The type *ἄπτεσθαι πατρός* to which KUNST also refers (cf. above p. 192) is a misleading example, as such genitives are not likely to have been ever felt as anything but partitive objects of the verb.

would be a necessary condition for an application of a temporal genitive.¹

In my opinion the theory of SPIEKER, KUNST, and others that the temporal genitive to any considerable extent played a leading part in the development of the GA is extremely improbable and rather to be definitely abandoned. Let us also for the moment leave KUNST's hypothesis as to a specific origin of the aorist GA, retreat to the position of CLASSEN, and face the facts as he saw them: Homer uses a fully developed GA, but at the same time an abundance of, and in fact to some extent the same, participial constructions with a more or less clear syntactic reference. Here the adnominal (pertinentive) genitive is by far the most common, just as it is one of the most frequent uses of the genitive in general.

But I cannot help feeling that the easiest inference from these facts, *viz.* that the GA gradually developed out of such uses through being, simply, made independent of its original syntactic connections, is unsatisfactory. No explanation is given why this happened. I completely agree with SPIEKER² as he objects to CLASSEN that there is no obvious reason why the Greeks should have chosen to forget the exact construction of a normal and regular genitive.³ With almost the same right, then, we should expect to find a corresponding nominative absolute, an accusative absolute, and a dative absolute. But nothing really like the GA is to be found with other cases.⁴ And it is to be noted that participial constructions in the genitive with a syntactic reference also occur in later literature side by side with real GA:s, e.g. Ps.-Xen. Resp. Ath. 1. 18 *καὶ εἰσιόντος του ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρός*, Aristoph. Av. 1157 *ὁ κτύπος αὐτῶν πελεκώντων*, etc.; cf. in particular the very common type Aristoph. Ach. 303 *σοῦ . . . λέγοντος οὐκ ἀκούσομαι*. What was the reason for

¹ And if the combination could mean anything like that we should expect to find »absolute temporal accusatives» of the type *ἀνακτα ἀποιχόμενον (cf. below note 4), as the *accusativus temporis* is at least as common as the *genitivus temporis*.

² P. 312 ff.

³ Note SPIEKER's simple argumentation p. 312: »That the dependent pure genitive is not the one to which we must refer this use [the GA] is made likely by the following fact: being an adnominal case, it was always felt as accompanying and depending upon another noun; this relation was distinctly felt, and it is far less probable that uncertainty as to the exact construction of such a genitive gradually gave rise to the absolute use than that this is due to some use not dependent on any noun in the sentence.

⁴ The rare »nominative absolute» is always an occasional anacoluthon: *exx.* in SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER p. 403 f. The »accusative absolute» (mostly with ὥς) leads a disputable existence from the 5th century onwards: *exx.* in SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER p. 402 f. The type ἐξόν, δέον (*ibid.*) is wholly irrelevant. And a »dative absolute» is never manifest: see SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER p. 401.

a development of a specific, syntactically more independent genitive idiom at that particular pre-Homeric time, as the conditions would appear to be always approximately the same?

It is important to consider the fact that the roots of the GA reach very far back in time. This may be inferred, not only from the existence of a fully developed GA in Homer,¹ but from the character and distribution of the Homeric instances. They consist mainly of short formulae, simply subject and participle, of about half a line in length: *ἔμευ ἀπομηνίσαντος, πολλῶν ἐλκόντων, κείνου τεθνηῶτος, δηίων ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντων*, etc. The formulae have a rather general content of meaning; they are easily handled, and may have belonged to the stock phraseology of rhapsodes for centuries before Homer. It is further to be noted that the great majority of them are affective, expressive, or picturesque; and their concentrated, pregnant form suggests something like ancient sayings. More than the half of the instances occur in *s p e e c h e s* with a considerably emotional charge, e.g. Il. 1. 88 *οὐ τις ἔμευ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο σοὶ . . . βαρείας χεῖρας ἐποίσει*, 14. 100, 22. 432, etc. Some other cases are also rather *expressive*, e.g. Il. 11. 458 *αἶμα δέ οἱ σπασθέντος* (sc. ἔγχεος) *ἀνέσσυτο*, Il. 15. 328. Remarkably many instances are to be found in *similes*: Il. 5. 499 ff. *ὡς δ' ἄνεμος ἄχνας φορέει . . . ὅτε τε ξανθὴ Δημήτηρ κρήνη ἐπειγομένων ἀνέμων καρπὸν τε καὶ ἄχνας*, 864 f., 15. 325, 17. 265, 393, 20. 405, 23. 521, Od. 19. 519, 20. 25: this fact may also suggest a very old phraseology. The rest of the cases consist of a few »absence«-formulae (Il. 15. 548 *δηίων ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντων*, Od. 14. 450, 17. 296 *ἀποιχομένοιο ἀνακτος*), some »time-GA:s« (Il. 2. 551, Od. 1. 16, 10. 470, 11. 295 = 14. 294, 19. 153 = 24. 143, most of them being rather adnominal; cf. above p. 190), and the phrase Il. 18. 605 f. (= Od. 4 18 f.) *δοιῶ δὲ κυβιστητῆρε κατ' αὐτοὺς μολπῆς ἐξάροντος ἐδίνεον κατὰ μέσσοις*.² Finally it may be observed that the GA is more often employed, and with more variety, in the Iliad than in the Odyssey. There are remarkably few aorist GA:s in the Odyssey: only 4 cases (the time-GA:s 1. 16 and 11. 428 of which the former is rather adnominal; 14. 475 which may be related to such GA:s, see below

¹ Pointed out by WACKERNAGEL Vorl. über Synt. I p. 292. SPIEKER p. 315 thinks that the Homeric GA:s reflect an early stage; but his opinion is probably only due to a comparison between Homer and classical prose in this respect.

² The phrase Od. 4. 717, 19. 195, 24. 272 *πολλῶν κατὰ οἶκον ἐόντων*, which CLASSEN (Beob. p. 183) records among real GA:s, was probably felt as a partitive genitive. The type is not uncommon later, cf. Eur. El. 649, Pl. Lach. 198a, etc.

p. 203; and 24. 535 πάντα δ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ πῖπτε θεᾶς ὅπα φωνησάσης); but in the Iliad some 15 cases (none of these a time-GA, and doublets not counted).¹ And proportionally many of the present GA:s in the Odyssey are formulae of the non-expressive kind (cf. above p. 195). — These facts seem to confirm one's impression that the GA is a very ancient phenomenon, not really productive at the beginning of the historical era of the Greek language.

The tendency in Homer to restrict the GA to certain types of formulae, already touched upon several times, is interesting. The following groups are easily discernible: The »life/death»-type; the »will and call»-type; the »presence/absence»-type² (the instances are recorded below p. 200 f.); and the »time-GA:s» (see above p. 189 f.). These cases make together more than the half of all Homeric instances of GA; and the types are also proportionally common in later literature.³ It can hardly be proved that they constitute the original GA:s out of which the syntactic phenomenon in general was developed. But they seem to form — except possibly the last-mentioned type — an ancient class with a central position among the uses of the GA; and any theory as to the origin of the GA has therefore in the first place to be tested with them.

Looking for an explanation of the GA we have to keep in mind that the phenomenon is very old. This fact increases the difficulties of arriving at an exact and certain answer; but at the same time it allows us to work with the category of genitive within less narrow limits than the usage of historical Greek would postulate.

It is convenient to differentiate, with SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER (p. 89 ff.), between »pertinentive», »partitive», and »ablative» genitive. Considering the prehistory of those genitive classes, it seems fairly obvious that the *p e r t i n e n t i v e* is on the whole irrelevant for our purpose unless we accept CLASSEN's view and consequently assume an essentially adnominal origin

¹ CLASSEN *Beob.* p. 180 f. records 17 cases, among which 9. 426 and 19. 62 have the same GA-phrase. In 14. 521 f. I am inclined to regard the genitive as adnominal: see below p. 202. 22. 47 is probably partitive. On the other hand may 1. 47 f. ἐκλαγξαν δ' ἄρ' οἰστοὶ ἐπ' ὤμων χωμόνοιο / αὐτοῦ κινηθέντος possibly be added to the list, as the last two words at least seem to be modelled on current GA:s.

² Though there is only one »presence»-case in Homer: cf. below p. 201.

³ The »life/death»-type is extremely common in tragedy, e.g. Soph. Phil. 413, Eur. Or. 1070; further e.g. Ar. Pax 111, Pl. Crito 47d, 54a. For the »will and call»-type cf. e.g. Soph. OT. 288, Eur. Hel. 672, Ar. Lys. 874, Pl. Hp.Ma. 373c; with ἐκόντος and similar e.g. Soph. Ai. 455, Pl. Charm. 175b. The »presence / absence»-type is habitual in inscriptions, e.g. Lex Gort. 11. 49; in literature e.g. Pind. Nem. 6. 29, Soph. OC. 666, Ar. Lys. 1133, Pl. Euthyd. 280b. »Time-GA:s» (potentially adnominal) are often found in inscriptions together with the type τοῦ δεινός ἀρχοντος e.g. Inscr. Buck². 43.

for the GA. The adverbial pertinentive is confined to certain types of verbs (see SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER p. 122 ff.), and has probably always been so; and in any case it would not afford a reasonable principle of explanation. The p a r t i t i v e genitive may have been used somewhat more freely instead of other cases before Homer; but this is equally irrelevant. I have stated my opinion (above p. 193 f.) that the temporal genitive, or any other »partitive» genitive, cannot explain the whole phenomenon of GA. The old (singular) type *νοκτός* can be connected with the time-GA:s only (and in the first place with the singular ones). On the other hand a plural partitive may be seen in the type Od. 4. 717 οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτ' ἔτλη δίφρω (sc. ἐνί) ἐφέζεσθαι πολλῶν κατὰ οἶκον ἐόντων (cf. above p. 195 note 2); but this is a category of its own, only having potential associations with real GA:s.

With the a b l a t i v a l genitive things are somewhat different. At an earlier stage the ablative seems to have been largely employed, without prepositions, in a separative sense: e.g. Il. 15. 655 νεῶν . . . ἐχώρησαν. It cannot be doubted that the ablative (whether formally identical with the pertinentive-partitive, or not) in Greek as in other IE. languages originally expressed the place which the subject leaves or comes from, and that the elucidation by means of prepositions is a comparatively late feature. Further, being a separative case, the ablative was also capable of denoting, in a more a b s t r a c t way, the point from which a thing is viewed or determined. In historical times this ablative is manifest above all as the genitive with comparatives (SCHWYZER and DEBRUNNER p. 98 ff.); cf. the use with secondary prepositions like ἀντίον (*ibid.* p. 97), and the type Hdt. 1. 110 πρὸς βορέω ἀνέμου τῶν Ἀγβατάνων (*ibid.* p. 96).¹ Finally, the genitive expressing the cause with verbs of emotion (*ibid.* p. 133 f.), and verbs like περιδίδομαι, τίνω, τιμωρέω, αἰτιάομαι, ἀμφισβητεῖν, etc. (*ibid.* p. 130 f.) may have something to do with the ablative. But it is important to note that the Greek ablative on the whole lacks a definite causal notion.² The ablatival genitive, whether adnominal or, and this is more frequent, adverbial, simply indicates t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e.

The scholars who, like HUMBERT³, believe in a predominantly ablative

¹ Though not found in Homer, this is evidently an old use, as the IE. parallels show.

² The old explanations of BERNHARDY and ROST (see CLASSEN Beob. p. 185), according to whom the GA is originally a »causal genitive», are therefore quite improbable. KUNST's premises for the aorist GA:s are somewhat different; but he seems also to suppose a connection with a »causal genitive».

³ See above p. 187 note 3.

origin of the GA in general have not taken the trouble of proving their hypothesis. However, KUNST's argumentation for an ablative derivation of the aorist GA:s seems to me to be a step in the right direction. It is certainly worth while to consider the whole of the Homeric material from this standpoint.

We notice, as a fact of some importance, the possibility of leaving the subject of the GA unexpressed, whereas the participle is, as a rule, never absent.¹ In the following passages in Homer the GA consists of a participle alone: Il. 11. 458, 15. 191, 18. 606 (= Od. 4. 19), 22. 531.² This peculiarity suggests that the GA does not convey a mere additional circumstance — which could reasonably be expressed by a noun alone — but a more independent statement, because of its semiverbal nature approximating to a full sentence. As the relation of the participle to the subject of the GA is not attributive, the GA may be said to convey the idea of a situation.

And it is to be noted that leaving out the subject of the GA does not on the whole affect the clearness of the sentence, simply because the possibility of referring the participle of the GA to the subject of the main verb is definitely excluded. As regards Greek, there can hardly be any doubt on this point. As such it is, of course, a fairly trivial fact that the subject of the GA is in principle not identical with the subject of the main verb³ — not even the passive type *quo facto abiit*, where the main subject psychologically dominates the whole clause, is at home in Greek;⁴ in such cases the Greeks would use a participle agreeing with the main subject (*participium coniunctum*). But it is tempting to make a further inference from this regarding the nature of the GA: the two subjects, that of the GA and that of the main verb, are in a way opposed to each other, being always different. The main sentence expresses a kind of a contrast to the GA. An inspection of the material below will support this assumption.

I find it extremely important to observe that the Homeric GA:s do not on the whole express secondary implications, or merely temporal relations⁵, such as might be expected had the construction originated in an attributive participle depending on an adnominal or similar genitive. It is not a *genitivus*

¹ Exceptions such as Soph. OC 1588 *ὑφηγητῆρος οὐδενὸς φιλῶν*, which occur sometimes in post-Homeric literature, are explained by the verbal nature of the predicative.

² For the instances in later literature, see KÜHNER and GERTH II p. 81.

³ Exceptions rather remind one of anacoluthon: see KÜHNER and GERTH II p. 110 f.

⁴ Cases such as Isae. 2. 28, Dém. 37. 6, 39. 3 are exceptional.

⁵ Cf. the Sanskrit GA, below p. 206.

consequentiae in the sense of a »begleitender Umstand«, as some scholars have been inclined to understand Priscian's remark on the GA (18. 14) but, as Priscian probably himself wanted the term to be understood, the idea of which the main action is the consequence.¹ This is the case with the present (and perfect) GA:s as well as with the aorist ones. Naturally the consequence implied is not temporal with the present GA:s, nor on the whole clearly causal. The GA usually expresses the actual basis or background for the action of the main verb, a necessary condition for it. A single example will illustrate what I mean. In Il. 17. 265 ἀμφὶ δέ τ' ἄκραι ἠιόνες βοῶσιν ἐρευγομένης ἄλός ἔξω the expression ἐρευγομένης ἄλός ἔξω is no irrelevant addition, like an *epitheton ornans* only supplying an aesthetical background, nor does it denote just a temporal coincidence, or on the other hand explicitly state the reason why the ἠιόνες βοῶσιν (it could hardly be translated »because the sea outside is roaring«); it gives the condition on which the (ἀμφι)βοῶν is dependent, the actual circumstances lying behind it: during the roaring of the sea, and as a consequence of it, the riverbanks βοῶσιν. Such a relation between the situation expressed by the GA and the main action may be observed in almost all Homeric instances.

These three observations regarding the Homeric GA, its forming a *s i t u a t i o n* of its own, its making a *c o n t r a s t* to the main sentence, and its character of a *c o n d i t i o n* or *b a c k g r o u n d* for the main action, afford a suitable starting point for our investigation of its possible ablative origin.

It is easy to imagine that an ablative in prehistoric times could express such a relation between two ideas. Analyzing the pre-Homeric clause ἀμφὶ δὲ ἠιόνες βοῶσιν ἐρευγομένης ἄλός ἔξω into the basic ideas ἠιόνες βοῶσιν and ἐρεύγεται ἄλς, we find it quite natural that a language tending to synthetic expression (and lacking the appropriate conjunctions)² would choose to put the latter idea in the ablative, by making it nominal (ἐρευγομένη ἄλς) and so capable of taking an »ablative« form (ἐρευγομένης ἄλός), in order to indicate that the situation ἐρευγομένη ἄλς forms the background or *p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e* for the ἠιόνες βοῶσιν, the circumstance from which the action (noise) arises. When the GA contains a present (or perfect) participle the action of the main verb may be said to depart from a (durative) state;

¹ See EDWIN FLINCK-LINKOMIES: De ablativo absoluto quaestiones (Ann.Ac.Scient.Fenn. B. 20, 1, Helsingforsiae 1929) p. 11.

² It is a well-known fact that temporal, causal, and conditional subordination received their conjunctive means of expression comparatively late.

but a (punctual) aorist participle rather makes an actual point of departure: in e.g. Il. 22. 383 ἧ καταλείψουσιν πόλιν ἄκρον τοῦδε πεσόντος the τοῦδε πεσόντος marks the point after which the καταλείπειν will happen, being at the same time dependent on it. It is obvious that such a relation will often have a causal character. But in principle the GA is not explicitly causal, temporal, or conditional; those categories are inventions of theoretical logic, and should not be introduced here.

Let us now consider the habitual types of GA to which reference was made above (p. 196). Leaving for the moment the time-GA:s, we have:

The »life/death«-type. The aorist case Il. 22. 383 was touched upon above; Il. 22. 288 is a similar one. The present (and perfect) formulae are interesting, as almost all of them clearly imply the ideas of basis, point of departure, and contrast: Il. 1. 88 οὗ τις ἐμεῦ ζῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο σοὶ . . . βαρείας χειρᾶς ἐποίσει, 18. 10 . . . ἔειπεν Μυρμιδόνων τὸν ἄριστον ἔτι ζῶοντος ἐμεῖο . . . λείπειν φάος ἠελίοιο, 19. 210 πρὶν δ' οὐ πως ἂν ἔμοιγε φίλον κατὰ λαιμὸν ἰεῖη οὐ πόσις οὐδὲ βρωῖσις ἐταίρου τεθνηῶτος, 22. 384 (following the above-mentioned aorist case) ἠὲ μένειν μεμάασι καὶ Ἔκτορος οὐκέτ' ἐόντος, 432 τί νῦν βείομαι αἰνὰ παθοῦσα σεῦ ἀποτεθνηῶτος; 24. 244 ῥήϊτεροι γὰρ μάλλον Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὴ ἔσεσθε κείνον τεθνηῶτος, Od. 16. 373 οὐ γὰρ οἶω τοῦτο γε ζῶοντος ἀνύσσεσθαι τάδε ἔργα, 439 ὅς κεν Τηλεμάχῳ . . . χειρᾶς ἐποίσει ζῶοντός γ' ἐμέθεν καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ δερκομένοιο. Cf. Od. 1. 404 μὴ γὰρ . . . ἔλθοι . . . Ἰθάκης ἔτι ναιεταώσης, 20. 218 μάλα μὲν κακὸν υἱὸς ἐόντος ἄλλων δῆμον ἰκέσθαι. In several cases the contrast is strengthened by a negative in the main sentence. It may be noted that Od. 16. 439, where the ablatival notion is perhaps not so manifest¹, is modelled on Il. 1. 88.

The »will and call«-type. Aorist: Il. 10. 356 ἔλπετο . . . ἐταίρους . . . ἵεναι πάλιν Ἔκτορος ὀτρύναντος, 21. 290 τοίω γὰρ τοι νῶι θεῶν ἐπιταροῦθω εἰμὲν Ζηνὸς ἐπαινήσαντος. Present: Il. 17. 532 οἱ δ' ἦλθον καθ' ὄμιλον ἐταίρου κικλήσκοντος, 19. 273 οὐδέ κε κούρην ἦγεν ἐμεῦ ἀέκοντος ἀμήχανος (or attribute?)², 24. 289 ἐπεὶ ἄρ γέ σε θυμὸς ὀτρύνει ἐπὶ νῆας ἐμεῖο μὲν οὐκ ἐθελούσης. Cf. Od. 24. 535 πάντα δ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ πίπτε θεῶς ὄπα φωνησάσης, and Il. 24. 248 οἱ δ' ἴσαν

¹ Unless the -θεν suffix was felt as ablative: on the whole -θεν seems to retain its ablatival (separative) notion in Homer; see CHANTRAINE Gramm.Hom. I. p. 243 f.

² The reference of ἀέκοντος may be similarly disputed in Il. 1. 301, cf. Od. 10. 405, etc. At any rate these constructions may be regarded as related to real GA:s.

ἔξω σπερχομένοιο γέροντος, Od. 1. 390 καί κεν τοῦτ' ἐθέλοιμι Διός γε διδόντος ἀρέσθαι. Though the last case may be a conventional formula (cf. Aesch. Sept. 719, Ag. 678, Eur. Suppl. 1146, etc.), the action of the main verb in all instances evidently departs from, and is based on, the situation expressed by the GA.

The »presence/absence»-type. The cases in the Iliad imply a similar idea of point of departure and, in fact, contrast: Il. 8. 522 μὴ λόχος εἰσέλθῃσι πόλιν λαῶν ἀπέοντων, 15. 325 ὥς τ' . . . πῶν μέγ' οἴων θῆρε δύω κλονέωσι . . . σημάντορος οὐ παρεόντος, 548 ὁ δ' ὄφρα μὲν . . . βοῦς βόσκ' . . . δηίων ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντων. In the Odyssey the type appears to be more freely used in standard formulae: Od. 4. 393 ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται οἰχομένοιο σέθεν (hardly attribute to μεγάροισι; on the relevance of -θεν see above p. 200 note 1), 14. 450 ὄν ῥα συβώτης αὐτὸς κτήσατο μῶνος (or οἴος) ἀποιομένοιο ἄνακτος, 17. 296 δὴ τότε κεῖτ' ἀπόθεστος ἀποιομένοιο ἄνακτος, 18. 268 μεμνησθαι πατρὸς καὶ μητέρος . . . ἐμεῦ ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντος, 19. 19 ἔντεα πατρὸς καλά, τά μοι κατὰ οἶκον καπνὸς ἀμέρδει πατρὸς ἀποιομένοιο (note that the word πατρὸς is taken up again, which indicates that the construction was not felt as an attribute), 20. 232 ἦ σέθεν ἐνθάδ' ἐόντος ἐλεύσεται οἴκαδ' Ὀδυσσεύς (-θεν again). Cf. Od. 5. 287 ἦ μάλα δὴ μετεβούλευσαν θεοὶ ἄλλως . . . ἐμεῖο μετ' Αἰθιοπίεσσιν ἐόντος. I have used the label »presence/absence»-type because the »presence»-cases are later at least as frequent as the »absence»-cases.¹ On the other hand the (ἀπ)οιομένοιο- phrases are rather stereotyped.

Things are not on the whole different with the other Homeric GA:s.

Aorist: Il. 8. 37 (= 468) ὥς μὴ πάντες ὄλωνται ὀδυσσαμένοιο τεοῖο, cf. 10. 426, 19. 62. Il. 8. 164 οὐκ εἶξαντος ἐμεῖο πύργων ἡμετέρων ἐπιβήσασθαι. 10. 246 τοῦτου γ' ἐσπομένοιο καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς . . . νοστήσασθαι. 11. 458 αἶμα δέ οἱ σπασθέντος (sc. ἔγχεος) ἀνέσσυτο. 11. 509 μὴ πῶς μιν πολέμοιο μετακλινθέντος ἔλοιεν. 13. 409 καρφαλέον δέ οἱ ἀσπίς ἐπιθρέξαντος ἄυσεν ἔγχεος (or going more directly with ἄυσεν?). 15. 328 (= 16.306) ἐνθα δ' ἀνῆρ ἔλεν ἄνδρα κεδασθείσης ὑσμίνης. 19. 75 οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν ἐγκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος (or more directly with

¹ Cf. above p. 196 note 3. Looking at the Homeric material, however, one gets the impression that the »absence»-cases are the original. In fact this stresses the notion of contrast in the GA in question.

ἐχάρησαν?). 21. 437 Φοῖβε, τίη δὴ νῶϊ διέσταμεν; οὐδὲ ἔοικεν ἀρξάντων ἐτέρων (probably an idiomatic phrase). For Od. 14. 475 see below p. 203. I would add to these Il. 1. 47 ἐκλαγξαν δ' ἄρ' οἰστοὶ ἐπ' ὤμων χωομένοιο αὐτοῦ κινηθέντος (cf. above p. 196 note 1). But I very much doubt the relevance of the passage Il. 14. 522 οὐ γὰρ οἷ τις ὁμοῖος ἐπισπέσθαι ποσὶν ἦεν ἀνδρῶν τρεσσάντων, ὅτε τε Ζεὺς ἐν φόβον ὄρησεν which CLASSEN and KUNST record among real GA:s. An ablative interpretation is, of course, possible, though the connection with the main sentence is remarkably loose. Because the ἀνδρῶν τρεσσάντων, not very happily, comes after an οὐ . . . τις to which it would seem to belong as a partitive genitive — though this cannot be the true sense — I am inclined to think that the line 522 is a comparatively late interpolation.¹

Present (and perfect): Il. 5. 203 μή μοι δενοίατο φορβῆς (sc. ἵπποι) ἀνδρῶν εἰλομένων. 5. 501 ὅτε τε ξανθὴ Δημήτηρ κρίνη ἐπειγομένων ἀνέμων καρπὸν τε καὶ ἄχνας. 5. 865 οἴη . . . ἐρεβεννὴ φαίνεται ἀήρ . . . ἀνέμοιο δυσασέος ὀρνυμένοιο. 9. 574 τῶν δὲ τάχ' ἀμφὶ πύλας ὄμαδος καὶ δοῦπος ὀρώρει πύργων βαλλομένων (or more directly with δοῦπος?), cf. Od. 22. 309 (= 24. 185). 14. 96 ὃς κέλευι πολέμοιο συνησταότος καὶ ἀντιῆς νῆας . . . ἄλλαδ' ἐλκόμεν. 14. 100 οὐ γὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ στήσουσιν πόλεμον νηῶν ἄλλαδ' ἐλκόμενάων. 15. 191 ἦ τοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον . . . ἄλλα ναιέμεν . . . παλλομένων (sc. ἡμῶν). 17. 265 ἀμφὶ δέ τ' ἄκραι ἠιόνες βοόωσιν ἐρευγομένης ἀλὸς ἔξω. 17. 393 ἄφαρ δέ τε (or δ' ἐξ) ἰκμάς ἔβη (sc. ἐκ βοείης) . . . πολλῶν ἐλκόντων. 18. 606 (= Od. 4. 19) δοιῶ δὲ κυβιστητῆρε κατ' αὐτοὺς μολπῆς ἐξάροχοντος (sc. αἰδοῦ) ἐδίνενον κατὰ μέσσους. 20. 405 ὡς ὅτε ταῦρος ἤρηνγεν ἐλκόμενος Ἐλικῶνιον ἀμφὶ ἀνακτακούρων ἐλκόντων. Od. 20. 25 ὡς ὅτε γαστέρ' ἀνήρ πολέος πυρός αἰθρομένοιο . . . ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα αἰόλλη. For the prevalence of instances in the Iliad, see above p. 195 f. All these cases seem to me to confirm the hypothesis as to an ablative origin of the GA: the action of the main verb departs from, and at the same time depends on, the situation constituted by the genitive expression. — The passage Il. 23. 52 ὁ δέ (sc. τροχός) τ' ἄγχι μάλα τρέχει, οὐδέ τι πολλὴ χώρα μεσσηγύς, πολέος πεδίοιο θέοντος (sc. ἵππου) is probably to be counted with the rest. KUNST (p. 32) thinks that θέοντος belongs with ἄγχι, but he does not consider the absolute character

¹ I also rather doubt the theoretically possible interpretation of taking ποσὶν as the comitative dative normally used with ἐπέπεσθαι, and regarding the genitive construction as a possessive pertinentive belonging to ποσὶν.

of the phrase ἄγχι μάλα. Od. 16. 275 σὸν δὲ φίλον κῆρ τετλάτω ἐν στήθεσσι κακῶς πάσχοντος ἐμεῖο and 20. 312 ἀλλ' ἔμπης τάδε μὲν καὶ τέτλαμεν εἰσορόοντες, μήλων σφαζομένων οἴνοιό τε πινομένοιο are in my opinion rather more disputable. As the verb τλῆναι is nowhere else found with the genitive, KUNST (p. 46) regards these cases as real GA:s; I would, however, suppose some kind of connection with the genitive with verbs of emotion; ultimately, to be sure, the ablative comes in even here. On the other hand the genitive in Il. 23. 599 τοῖο δὲ θυμὸς ἰάνθη ὧς εἴτε περὶ σταχύεσσιν ἐέρση ληίου ἀλδήσκοντος which CLASSEN regards as GA, is as far as I can see obviously adnominal; a GA interpretation would not even make sense.

It was shown above (p. 190) that the time-GA:s may be divided into two classes, each having a discernible origin of its own. In fact, an ablative interpretation does not suit the plural type μνηῶν φθινόντων very well: there is no definite situation formed by the GA, no basis for the main action to depart from; as was said above, the type is probably originally adnominal. With the singular type περιπλομένου ἐνιαυτοῦ things are somewhat different. Here an ablative origin seems possible; and it becomes rather more plausible with the cases Il. 8. 538 ἠελίου ἀνιόντος εἰς αὐρίον and Od. 19. 519 ἔαρος νέον ἵσταμένοιο. Are we to abandon the hypothesis positing a connection with the old *genitivus temporis*, in spite of the remarkable parallels ἡοῦς, ὀπώρης, ἔαρος (see above p. 190)? I do not think so. It is reasonable to suppose that these singular time-GA:s really derive from both sources, in other words, that their origin is complex. But in one passage, which is seemingly related to the time-GA:s, I would rather stress the ablative interpretation: Od. 14. 475 νῦξ δ' ἄρ' ἐπῆλθε κακῆ Βορέαο πεσόντος («as the Northwind came over us»). Admittedly there are temporal genitive parallels such as Il. 5. 523 νηγεμῆς, Thuc. 3. 23. 5 ἀπηλιώτων: but the Βορέαο πεσόντος has a very strong notion of point of departure and condition for the νῦξ ἐπῆλθε κακῆ, thus clearly suggesting a close connection with the GA:s recorded above.

A further category of its own, only secondarily approximating to GA:s, is formed by the type Od. 4. 717 οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτ' ἔτλη δίφρω (sc. ἐνί) ἐφέζεσθαι πολλῶν κατὰ οἶκον ἐόντων, cf. 19. 195, 24, 272. I have already expressed my opinion (above p. 195 note 2) that this genitive is in principle partitive.

We have now examined the Homeric GA from the aspect of the ablatival genitive, and we have found, I believe, some indisputable facts in favour of

our hypothesis. In short, the arguments are as follows: The GA is a very ancient phenomenon, used with considerably more force and variation in the Iliad than in the Odyssey: we are therefore not bound to explain it merely by means of the use of the genitive attested in historical times. The GA resembles a sentence of its own, constituting a situation clearly differentiated from, often opposed to, the main action, but with a direct relevance for it. It forms a basis, a background, a condition, a kind of point of departure for the idea expressed by the main sentence. This principle is on the whole so manifest (even in the later language, as far as I can see) that it cannot be regarded as mere coincidence; in Homer the exceptions are few in number and easily explained.

This idea of basis and departure may quite naturally be connected with the notion of the ablatival genitive which was apparently widely used in prehistoric times and which, as above all the comparative genitive shows, was at an early date capable of expressing abstract relations.

It remains to make a new approach to the problem of the parallels of the GA which have an apparent syntactic reference.

To some extent the ablative seems to have been at a very early stage formally identical with the pertinentive-partitive genitive.¹ In prehistoric Greek the morphological identification became gradually almost complete. This could hardly have happened if the uses of the two (or three) kinds of »genitive» had not been to a great extent closely similar, and more similar than e.g. in Latin which preserves the formal difference between the ablative and the genitive proper. We may suppose — though this cannot be proved — that the GA arose at a time when the ablative case still had forms of its own; it existed, then, during the period when the ablative began to be wholly identified with the genitive. Consequently it adopted throughout the case-endings of the genitive — the Homeric use of the non-possessive *-θεν*-forms in the GA² may possibly reflect a feeling of its ablative origin. And as another consequence, there occurred the situation which CLASSEN took as the starting point for the development: the GA, being formally a genitive (and the use of the specific ablatival genitive at the same time becoming gradually more limited), could be used precisely like any genitive proper; in other words, the GA was given syntactic

¹ Except the o-stems, always so in singular; see BRUGMANN, *Kurze vergl. Gramm.*, p. 382.

² See above p. 200 note 1 and p. 201.

reference in accordance with normal rules for the genitive, whenever the speaker wanted.¹ It should be noted that the possibilities of handling a genitive like, say, ἀποιχομένοιο ἀνακτος according to ordinary syntactic rules were much greater during the times here in question than in e.g. classical times; even such a detail as the absence of the article accounts for that. This, on the other hand, made the category of GA less definite, stressed its seemingly anomalous character, and hence contributed towards its becoming somewhat obsolete. We have now arrived at the stage represented by the Homeric poems. With the tendency indicated the construction would probably have disappeared completely at a comparatively early date. But there arose some new factors which brought about the renaissance of the GA in 5th and 4th century literature and, probably to some extent, in the colloquial language. These factors demand an investigation of their own which cannot be entered on here; but it may be pointed out in this connection that the GA is never in classical times or later really at home in living speech.²

I have preferred this hypothetical explanation of the development of the GA met with in Homer, to the possibility of supposing that the GA arose at a date when the ablative function had already been completely taken over by the genitive. In that case we should have to face the difficulty of explaining how the principle of »point of departure« could be established at a time when the prevalent use of the same genitive forms was pertinentive-partitive. It cannot be doubted that the pertinentive-partitive notion of the genitive formation on the whole was stronger than the ablative, once the formal

¹ The continuing of the Aeolic epic tradition in an Ionic environment can be assumed to have been a contributory factor.

² SPIEKER (especially p. 340) seems to think that short GA:s were on the whole current in popular speech of classical times, whereas complex constructions were avoided. It is obvious that some short formulae tended to be habitually used: a time-GA, for instance, as χειμῶνος ὄντος is found 5 times in Aristophanes (see SPIEKER *l.c.*); and the type ἐμοῦ ζῶντος which often approximates to an oath is quite frequent (cf. SPIEKER p. 339). But apart from such formulae, short GA:s seem to me to have been almost as rarely used in the colloquial language as more complex GA expressions. The general frequency of the GA in Aristophanes and Plato is extremely low, as SPIEKER's statistics (p. 322) indicate — KUNST's remark (p. 50), »... von den zahlreichen absoluten Genetiven der alten Komödie greife ich bloss Ar. Thesm. 540 f. heraus...«, is misleading in this respect. And to a large extent the instances consist of formulae. The GA is considerably more common in Pindar and in tragedy (cf. GILDERSLEEVE's notes, SPIEKER p. 318 and 319), though tragedy admittedly also employs several idiomatic formulae; and it is still more frequent, and used with much more variation, in the historians and, on the whole, in the orators (cf. SPIEKER p. 320 ff.). Note also the evidently non-colloquial use of time-GA:s *et sim.* in decrees (τοῦ δεινός ἀρχοντος, εἰπόντος, etc.).

identification had come about;¹ it is rather probable that, for the ablative, a loss of range of applicability accompanied the loss of specific forms. We should not expect a secondary function of the genitive to form the nucleus of a new usage. And the syntactically conditioned parallels of the GA would again come in as a disturbing problem.

It has been necessary to go far back in prehistoric times, though there is an evident risk of the hypothesis approximating to mere speculation. The facts attested in Greek itself do not help us any further. But what can comparative linguistics do for us?

Sanskrit has its »locative absolute» which is symptomatic of the old IE. tendency to synthetic expression, but which is wholly irrelevant for the Greek GA. In the later language there appears the rather more interesting phenomenon of a »genitive absolute». It is commonly regarded as independent of the Greek GA; in my opinion it is relevant for our purpose insofar as it shows what the Greek construction would be like had it developed out of a pertinentive-partitive genitive. The usage consists of cases such as the following: *divaṃ jagāma munīnām paçyatāṃ tadā* »he went then to heaven, the ascetics looking on»: ² note the purely temporal relation; there is no actual dependency, no basis for the main action to depart from. In Sanskrit there seem to be no traces of an ablative absolute. — The Germanic and Balto-Slavic languages have only a »dative absolute».³

The Latin ablative absolute would at the first sight appear to be the evidence we are looking for. But a closer analysis of it, such as LINKOMIES⁴ has made, shows that it may be explained out of conditions peculiar to Latin. LINKOMIES is certainly right in regarding the sociative ablative — i.e. a variant of the old instrumental — as the main idea underlying the ablative absolute such as it exists in historical Latin;⁵ and he may also be right in doubting

¹ This is shown, for instance, by the fact that the ablative of historical times on the whole demands elucidation by means of prepositions. Note also the fact that the morphological process in question was not a fusion like that of old locative and dative (and probably also instrumental) forms, resulting in the Greek »dative», but a complete victory of the genitive forms over the ablative forms.

² See WHITNEY, Sanskrit Grammar, p. 100 f. The exact derivation of the construction is uncertain. At any rate it is probably to be connected with the tendency, in later Sanskrit, to extend the use of the genitive at the expense of other cases. The preference for GA constructions with the (active) present participle of the verb *paç-* »to see» is remarkable and stresses the difference from the Greek GA.

³ Probably a *dativus commodi*; cf. BRUGMANN, Kurze vergl. Gramm., p. 610.

⁴ See above p. 199 note 1.

⁵ This had before been suggested, among others, by TAMMELIN (TAMMIO) and BRUGMANN: see LINKOMIES p. 24 ff.

the existence of a really absolute ablative construction in Oscan and Umbrian.¹ However, with the Homeric GA in mind it is tempting to suppose that in origin the Latin ablative absolute really was an ablative proper, and that the sociative associations came in with it later, just like the pertinentive-partitive associations coming in with the Greek GA: in the complex formation of the Latin »ablative« the instrumental notion is on the whole stronger than the ablative. An argument in favour of this hypothesis may be found by looking at the Old Latin use of appositional nouns in personal so-called ablative absolute, a phraseology which, contrary to many participial types of construction, may seem to be without Greek parallels.² In Plautus the following words occur in this usage:³ *auctor* (*me auctore*, etc.), *arbiter*, *iudex*, *advocatus*, *adiutor*, *adiutrix*, *interpres*, *impulsor*, *lubens*, *invitus*, *vivus*, *praesens*, *absens*. Though *me auctore* and the like may be quite naturally taken as sociative ablatives, they form at the same time a condition, a background, a point of departure for the main action. It is remarkable that secondary circumstances, irrelevant for the main idea (e.g. * *me milite exercitus progressus est*), are not expressed by this type of ablative absolute, though they would appear to be quite normal with a sociative ablative (cf. the type *capillis dissolutis*). And is it mere coincidence, or due to secondary influence from Greek, that the »will and call«-type as well as the »life/death«-type and the »presence/absence«-type are represented in the above-mentioned group of words?

These problems, or apparent problems, cannot be solved here. I have only wanted to indicate some possible supports for the theory that the Greek GA, being originally ablative, reflects an old (Western?) IE. usage.

¹ P. 33 ff. Cases such as *toutad praesentid* may, at any rate, be due to Latin influence.

² It corresponds to the well-known tendency, in older Latin, to avoid present participles except in a purely nominal sense. Note the lack of a present participle for the verb *esse*.

³ Cf. LINKOMIES p. 44 ff., esp. p. 72.