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## Finnish *juuri* and *just*: Varieties of Contextual Uniqueness

### 1. Introduction

This paper discusses the meaning and use of the Finnish words *juuri* and *just* against the background of recent research on focus particles.<sup>1</sup> The two words are stylistic and dialectal variants; an additional variant of *just* is *justiin(sa)*. For convenience, this group of words will be referred to using the abbreviation J.<sup>2</sup> Another word in Finnish that comes close but, as we shall see, is not identical to J, is *nimenomaan*. Most of what is said here is likely to apply to the Swedish particle *just*. Despite appearances, English *just* does not correspond to J, since the two are intertranslatable in some restricted contexts only, their clear semantic affinity notwithstanding (see König 1991:121–124). J has close counterparts in various European languages. König (1991a, b) groups Finnish *juuri* together with such particles as German *eben*, *genau*, *gerade*, English *exactly*, *precisely*, Norwegian *akkurat* etc. I might add Hungarian *éppen*, *pont* and *direkt*.

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<sup>1</sup> My usual thanks to Lauri Carlson for discussions and help. A remark by Ekkehard König made me rewrite the final sections once more – painfully; but thank you.

<sup>2</sup> There are other uses of *juuri* and *just* this paper will not deal with, although they may well throw light on the background of the Focus Particle uses (cf. König 1991b:27–31). These are exemplified in the following:

- (i) Mummo jaksaa **juuri** (**ja juuri**) käydä ulkona.  
'Grandma can *only just* ~ *barely* go out.'
- (ii) Mummo ei **juuri** jaksaa käydä ulkona.  
'Grandma can *hardly* go out *at all*.'
- (iii) Mummo kävi **juuri** ulkona.  
'Grandma *just* went out.' (temporal adverb)

In addition, *just* is frequently used as a feedback item in conversation, e.g., answering questions, not unlike *precisely* or *right* in English. Finally, *juuri* is also a noun, meaning 'root'. The historical connection can be explained via the meaning 'precisely': the particle *juuri* derives from an obsolete lative case form of the noun, meaning something like 'to the root(s)', i.e., 'completely' (SKES I).

The uses of J to be discussed in this paper are of the type in (1)–(7). These examples all illustrate the property of J that is the centre of our attention here: using J seems to require, or imply, that the denotation of the partner constituent of the particle has already somehow been activated in the context. Examples (1) through (3) are from written Finnish sources; those in (4) through (6) are from colloquial spoken Finnish; and finally, (7) gives a Swedish example.<sup>3</sup>

- (1) Tuore Newsweek-lehti kertoo, että Neitsyt Maria alkoi ilmestyä kuusi vuotta sitten *Lounais-Jugoslaviassa sijaitsevassa Medjugorjen kylässä* neljälle nuorelle tytölle ja kahdelle pojalle. [--] Niin paikalle saapuneet pyhiinvaeltajat kuin miljoonat videolta tapahtumaa seuranneet katoliset uskovat Jumalan lähettäneen Marian viimeisenä varoituksena harhautuneelle ihmiskunnalle. Neitsyt Maria on ilmoittanut, että hän ilmestyy maan päällä viimeistä kertaa **juuri Medjugorjessa**. (SK-30)

‘[The Virgin Mary has been reported by Newsweek to have appeared to four young people in the village of Medjugorje, in South-Western Yugoslavia six years ago. Maria’s appearance is supposed to be God’s last warning to humankind.] The Virgin Mary has announced that she will make her last appearance on the earth <J> in Medjugorje.’

- (2) Länsimaisen kulttuurin nousu lähti alulle Välimeren ympärillä. Yksi syy, miksi kulttuurin nousu osui **nimenomaan tälle seudulle** on ehkä **juuri Välimeri**, sopivan suuri erottamaan eri kulttuurit ja näin kehittämään niitä kutakin omaan yksilölliseen suuntaansa, toisaalta sopivan pieni kontakteihin eri kansojen välillä ja vaikutteiden saantiin puolin ja toisin. (Pekka Matilainen, Yliopisto 1/93:6)

‘Western Culture started from around the *Mediterranean Sea*. One reason why the rise of culture happened <N> in this area is perhaps <J> the *Mediterranean*, large enough to allow individual developments in each culture, and small enough for contacts and influences between nations.’

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<sup>3</sup> The examples marked "SK" are from the weekly magazine *Suomen Kuvalehti*, and the spoken examples from the Helsinki spoken language corpus consisting of interviews originally made for sociolinguistic purposes; these as well as the examples marked "WS" and the Swedish ones belong to the corpora at the Department of General Linguistics, University of Helsinki. — A few words on the notation used with the examples: square brackets indicate explanations and summaries used for brevity instead of translations. J’s focus and its previous mention appear in italics, and J itself is boldfaced. As the examples tend to get rather long, I will mostly compromise between morphological glossing and idiomatic translation, simply indicating by <J> the presence of J at the point where it occurs in Finnish. I apologize for the somewhat pseudo English that often results from this decision. The particle *nimenomaan* (in (2) and some more in section 6) will be indicated by <N>.

- (3) Rita Polsterin ja hänen miehensä kasvatuseriaatteita on vielä vaikea muotoilla sanallisesti, mutta Rita korostaa hellyyden ja rakkauden merkitystä. — Se on pohja jolle kaikki muu rakentuu. *Meillä pusitaan ja halitaan koko ajan paljon*, hän sanoo ja nauraa, että tätä toista odottaessaan hiukan toivoi poikaa ja **juuri siksi, että olisi kasvattanut pojastaan miehen, joka uskaltaa näyttää tunteensa**. (Me Naiset 46/82)  
 '[Rita Polster stresses the importance of love and tenderness in child-raising.] *There's a lot of kissing and hugging going on all the time in our family*, she says, laughing that, when she was pregnant for the second time, she had a slight wish it would be a boy, and **<J> for the reason that she would have liked to raise her son into a man who dared to show his feelings.**'
- (4) MK: hypättiin mentii s-, tai siis, ö, menti siihen, nev, joko veivai-, veimas, veivas valmiiks semmosii laineita, ja sit mentiiv vaa hyppiin sinne niin ku, aina puolelt toiselle tai sitte et *alotettiin sielt keskeltä*, ja sittehän jos, ku pienet ku ne hypäs ne alotti aina mamma helmasta se tarkotti **just sitä et meni siihen keskelle** ja veivaajat sit vast rupes veivaamaa, joko ihan oikeita tai sit näit laineita, — (tiin3b)  
 '[describes skipping games played by children] they either were already making those waves [with the rope], and you just went in and jumped, or then *you started from the middle*, and then if, when smaller children jumped they always started from mummy's hem which meant **<J> [it] that you went to the middle** and the those who turned the rope started turning it —'
- (5) RM: Sä olit myyjänä siellä  
 PK: joo, myyjänä joo, ni et viime kesän ma olin sitten, jouduin olemaa Hämeentie ja Korkeavuorenkadun Vintterillä, se on aika kiva *siel sai olla yksin, t siis sillai nii että, ei olluk kukaan*, mä tykkää aika paljo semmosest **just semmosest itsenäisestä ammatist** ei kukaan niinku käyn naputtamas vieres mitä teet mitä jätät tekemättä, — (tiin3b)  
 'RM: You worked as a sales clerk there  
 PK: yeah, last summer I worked at Winter's at Hämeentie and Korkeavuorenkatu, that was quite nice *you could be alone, I mean nobody was*, I quite like **<J> such independent work** nobody comes to nag about what you do and what you don't —'
- (6) OH: Entäs tuo, *Uimastadion* ootteks te siellä käyny?  
 PK: oolem paljon.  
 OH: Eik se oo, kesäsin *kauheen täys*?  
 PK: oo-on.  
 OH: Mut te, viihdytte kuitenkin?  
 PK: no, mä, yleensä ni ma otin, ma otin aurinkoo enemmän kun uin sit *tuol Uimasta-, Stadionilla justiinsa*. et ei siellä oikeen se vesi kyllä houkuta. *siinä mieles just ku siel o niin ahdasta*. (tiin2d)  
 'OH: do you go to the *Stadium* to swim? PK: yes, a lot.  
 OH: isn't it *terribly crowded* in summer? PK: ye-es.  
 OH: but you like it? PK: well, generally I sunbathed more than swam then *at the Stadion <J>*. the water there is not tempting. *in the sense <J> that it's so crowded.*'

- (7) Och *hon var ju en bra hovmästare*, eller hur? - Ja, absolut, svarade fröken Ställhammar på sin tilldragande värmländska. Men var inte *just det* rätt så besynnerligt? Varför bryter man opp vid förti års ålder från en ansedd krog i Paris och söker en tillfällig anställning i Stockholm? (lang.snt)

'And *she was a good head-waiter*, wasn't she? — Yes, absolutely, answered Miss S in her pleasant accent. But wasn't <J> *that* rather strange? Why does one leave a respectable restaurant in Paris at forty and take a temporary job in Stockholm?'

The previous occurrence is not always identical with J's partner constituent. Note, for example, the paraphrases 'awfully full' and 'so crowded' in (6). In (3), where J is attached to an adjunct clause, no previous occurrence of this clause as such can be pointed to in the text. But clearly the use of J here still implies that the content of the clause has somehow been activated; this is indeed the case, as the family practice of 'showing one's feelings' has just been discussed. The following alternative for the last sentence, for which there is no background in the text, would not be felicitous:

- (8) — että tätä toista odottaessaan hän hiukan toivoi poikaa ja *juuri siksi, että oppisi hieman paremmin tuntemaan miessukupuolta*.  
'when she was pregnant for the second time, she had a slight wish it would be a boy, and <J> *for the reason that she would get to know the male sex a bit better*.'

Looking for English translation equivalents for J sentences, *it*-clefts easily come to mind. However, a quick look at any collection of cleft sentences shows that the two constructions are not always intertranslatable. There are clefts that do not translate into J clauses for the simple reason that the focus value has not been activated. The following from (Filppula 1992) is a case in point:

- (9) a. a: You don't need very many [clients] if they've all got a hundred and fifty thousand.  
A: Yes, but it doesn't really make any difference you see = what they've got. *It's how much they move it that counts*.  
b. Se siinä (\*juuri) vaikuttaa kuinka paljon he sitä liikkuttavat. *it* there (\*<J>) counts how much they it move.

In contrast, (10a) is a J environment, and (10b), its perfect translation. Using J here would not strictly speaking be obligatory, as the order makes the narrow focus explicit. Changing the order as in (10c) would make J quite essential.

- (10) a. A: Did you meet Fuller?  
 B: Yes, it was he who invited me. (Filppula 1992)  
 b. A: Tapasitko Fulleria?  
 B: Tapasin, *hän* minut **juuri** kutsui(kin).  
 yes [met-1SG], he I-ACC <J> invited(-too)  
 c. B: Tapasin, **juuri** *hän* kutsuikin minut.

In his recent extensive treatment of focus particles, König (1991a) includes Finnish *juuri* in his discussion on particles conveying *emphatic assertion of identity* (see also 1991b). Rather than treating these particles as exclusive focus particles, as I will do below, he says that they are used "emphatically to assert the identity of one argument in a proposition with an argument in a different, contextually given proposition" (p. 127). His description is that given by Atlas & Levinson (1981) for cleft sentences (see also Filppula 1992). Relevant from the present point of view is König's observation that the German particles *gerade* and *eben* tend to occur in contexts where the sister constituent has occurred previously.

Why would one want to assert identity, if indeed *assert* is the right word here, let alone emphatically? König's answer is particularly supported by the German particles he discusses. These often carry an implication of dissonance or incompatibility; the relevant propositions would not usually go together. This tendency is described by König in terms of Gricean cooperative principles: a statement of identity between two values in two propositions in natural language is often pointless unless it is in some way remarkable from the point of view of stereotypical assumptions. Dissonance is one potential factor that makes the occurrence unexpected. König draws attention to the lexicalization potential of this inference: the implicature may become part of the conventional meaning of the expression (p. 134). German *ausgerechnet* is a case in point.

This paper explores other potential motivations for the seemingly pointless identity statement. It is not that Finnish J cannot be used in typical "dissonance" contexts and thereby acquire the overtone singled out by König (indeed, his examples would almost invariably translate to Finnish with J), but this is obviously just one of the potential contextual enrichments than

can be made. With the exception of (7) (and see also (23)–(24) in section 3), the examples in this section do not seem to carry particularly dissonant overtones.

It seems to me that the motivation for using J in Finnish is more general: it makes explicit the connection between the two values, or in other words, it signals that one has indeed observed this connection. In what follows, I shall first briefly clarify the concept of focus particles in general and analyse some contextual restrictions on the use of J in particular. In the rest of the paper, I try to develop a description of J that relies on the analogy between J and the prototypical exclusive focus particle ‘only’. The exclusive nature of J will be seen to go hand in hand with the previous activation constraint.

## 2. Focus Particles

The focus particle (henceforth, FP) uses of J pattern syntactically like elements such as *myös* ‘also’, *jopa* ‘even’ and *vain* ‘only’. There is a degree of freedom in the linear placement of FPs both in relation to their partner — the constituent that is or contains the focus — and the clause itself. J’s positions are illustrated in (11). Typically, J precedes its partner, but it can also follow it immediately if accented, as in (11c), and the third possibility is that it occurs later in an adverb position, as in (11d).<sup>4 5</sup>

- (11) a. Se tarkoittaa juuri<sub>i</sub> SITÄ<sub>i</sub>  
           it means <J> *it*-PARTITIVE  
       b. Juuri<sub>i</sub> SITÄ<sub>i</sub> se tarkoittaa  
       c. SITÄ<sub>i</sub> JUURI<sub>i</sub> se tarkoittaa  
       d. SITÄ<sub>i</sub> se juuri<sub>i</sub> tarkoittaa  
           ‘That’s what it means.’

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<sup>4</sup> For the syntactic and semantic variability of FPs, see also Hoeksema and Zwarts (1992).

<sup>5</sup> A common way of clarifying the relationship between a FP and its focus is to coindex the two, as I will do in this section. The rest of the construction is the scope of the focus. I also follow the common practice of representing prosodic prominence in capital letters in my fabricated examples. Note that the focus is not necessarily identical with the FP’s partner but might also be its subpart.

The meaning of FPs is typically described as follows: They quantify over a set of alternatives to the value of the focused expression, either excluding or including these alternatives (exclusive or restrictive vs. inclusive or additive FPs, respectively). In addition, they may convey that the alternatives are organized on a scale and say something about the status of the focus value on this scale. In fact, it is focusing *per se* that is regarded as being responsible for the introduction of alternatives in several recent treatments (e.g. Jacobs 1983, 1992, Rooth 1985, 1992, Krifka 1992). We can distinguish *bound* or *associated* focus, which is operated on by one of the FPs as outlined above — or perhaps other corresponding elements — and *free* focus, which is not accompanied by an FP. In Jacobs' treatment, for instance, a free focus is just a special case in that it is associated with an abstract illocutionary operator, which obviously does not give rise to the type of extra meaning conveyed by an FP.

It is also common to describe focusing using "structured meanings", complex logical forms that partition the sentence into two parts, one of which stands for the background and the other, for the focus (see e.g. Krifka 1992). The background part contains an unbound variable, to be bound by the focus denotation. For the sentence to be communicatively relevant, the background must be contextually salient. The focus, then, is what makes the sentence communicable, or informative, when substituted for the variable. FPs are represented as operators on the logical form.

The idea of an open logical form activating a set of alternatives is not unlike another widely accepted account of focus, viz. focus as an answer to a topical question, or as new information. After all, what questions do is introduce such open propositions, requesting a specification of one or more alternatives. This is the approach taken in L. Carlson's Dialogue Game (DG) model of discourse.

DG makes possible a fairly intricate system of discourse interpretation using extremely simple underlying principles together with a rich theory of discourse structure. A dialogue game is a model of an idealized discourse, monologue or dialogue. In this game, players make explicit or implicit moves

according to general pragmatic principles and, on the other hand, specific dialogue game rules. As an example of such a rule, a player is entitled to put forward a question whenever the presupposition of the question has been put forward or activated; here the presupposition of a WH question is the corresponding existential statement. (Carlson 1983, 1984, and this volume; see also Vilkuna 1989 for an application to Finnish word order.)

In DG, focus or new information is basically defined as the part of the sentence that substitutes for some part in the premise the sentence is addressed to, that is, the question it addresses. The non-focus (old, background) portion of the sentence repeats material from the premise. This is illustrated in the schematic dialogue in (12a). On the other hand, (12b) illustrates what happens when an FP attaches to the focus.

- (12) A: Mitä sinä ostat isälle? 'What will you buy for father?'  
 a. B: Minä ostan isälle KIRJAN.  
       I buy father-ALL book-ACC  
       'I will buy him a book.'  
 b. B: Minä ostan isälle KIRJAN<sub>i</sub>kin<sub>i</sub>.  
       'I will buy him a book, too.'

Using an FP generally excludes the interpretation of the FP focus as an immediate direct answer to a search question. It is not that answers such as (12b) are unacceptable; they may answer the question indirectly, providing among other things the information needed for answering the question. The additive particle *-kin* in (12b) specifies B's move as an additive one: instead of the actual question A asks, B's rejoinder continues and supplements a dialogue move entailing 'I will buy father something that is not a book', and only these two moves together answer A's question. The feeling that (12b) is less than an optimal dialogue, at least in isolation, is due to the fact that B seems to be presupposing that A knows something her question indicates she does not know. In DG, this existential presupposition that goes with the additive particle is represented as a dialogue premise that is somehow – implicitly or explicitly – activated in the game. (See Vilkuna 1984, where multiple-focus instances are also discussed.)



To return to J, its role in contexts like this is somewhat more difficult to characterize. If taken as answers to the question in (12), both of the following also seem to imply that B thinks A already knows something in addition to what is revealed by her question.

- (13) A: Mitä sinä ostat isälle? 'What will you buy for father?'  
 a. B: Minä ostan hänelle juuri<sub>i</sub> KIRJAN<sub>i</sub>.  
 'I will buy him <J> a book.'  
 b. B: Juuri<sub>i</sub> MINÄ<sub>i</sub> ostan hänelle KIRJAN.  
 '<J> I will buy him a book.'

Typically, (13a) would make sense if B assumes that A already is (or should be) in possession of the answer, probably because books had been discussed previously. (13b) would be saved by a previously activated assumption that there is someone who will buy father a book; B would just reveal the identity of this person. As can be seen, I assume that FP sentences may contain additional foci. Another type of multiple focus results if the FP focus is inherited from the premise:

- (14) A: Miksi sinä ostat hänelle juuri<sub>i</sub> KIRJAN<sub>i</sub>?  
 'Why are you going to buy him <J> a book?'  
 B: Ostan hänelle juuri<sub>i</sub> KIRJAN<sub>i</sub>, kun en keksi MUUTAKAAN.  
 'I will buy him <J> a book, since I can't think of anything else.'

### 3. Focusing with J

Let us now look at some characteristic properties of J focusing. Given the extremely meagre meaning J seems to have, it is possible that the particle is sometimes used for focus marking only. Recall the "previous activation" constraint: using J, one can mark the focus where the contextual givenness of the focus value might lead to an unintended interpretation, giving something else as the focus. This is nicely illustrated by the frequent occurrence of instances such as the following, where an anaphoric pronoun in a position commonly filled by a topical element could easily be taken as old and topical.

- (15) Kuukauden kuluttua Anders seisoi taas Japon pomojen edessä. Hän tarjoutui tekemään töitä palkatta kunhan vain pääsisi näyttämään mihin pystyi. Ehkä *juuri se* ratkaisi asian. (SK-01)  
 '[Anders had made repeated attempts to get a job] He offered to work without a salary as long as he was given the opportunity to show what he could. Maybe <J> *that* settled the matter.'

But there seems to be more than that. Explanations based on focus disambiguation do not work in sentences such as (11b–d), where the J-focused anaphoric pronoun is in the initial, pre-subject position, since this marked word order itself forces a focused reading on the initial constituent. These are a subtype of the "Focus Topicalization" (FOCTOP) sentences in (Vilkuna 1989). They could be used as confirmations of an interlocutor's assertion or implication. One of the key observations about J is its strong unacceptability in another subtype of FOCTOP, contradiction focus. (16) and (17) are typical examples of J focus of the kind in (11b–d). But were (17) to be continued as in (18), where the speakers disagree as to the appropriate focus value, J would be out of the question:

- (16) Tarkoittaako tämä sitä, että jokaisen ihmisen, joka haluaa olla vastuuntuntoisen kansalaisen kirjoissa, olisi tällä hetkellä käytävä testauttamassa itsensä?  
 "Kyllä! *Sitä juuri se* tarkoittaa", Sirkka-Liisa Valle vastaa. (SK-09)  
 'Does this mean that everybody who wants to be counted as a responsible citizen should take the [AIDS] test? "Yes! *That* <J> it means", Sirkka-Liisa Valle replies.'
- (17) Koukkuun hän ripusti taulun, jossa oli lainaus Maolta: "Kun aseistetut viholliset on tuhottu, jäljellä ovat aseistamattomat viholliset." Punakaartilaiset lukivat lainauksen ääneen ikään kuin olisivat vannoneet vakavan valan. Sitten he käskivät minua lukemaan sen. Yksi heistä huusi minulle: "Aseistamaton vihollinen! *Sitä te juuri olette!*" (SK-29)  
 [The writer recounts his experiences of brain-washing in Red China.]  
 'A Mao quote on the wall said: "When the armed enemies have been destroyed, the unarmed enemies will still be left." [-] One of the Red Guards shouted at me: "Unarmed enemy! *That* you <J> are!" [That's what you are!]
- (18) Mutta toinen punakaartilainen sanoi: "Aseistamaton muka! *Aseistettu* hän (\*juuri) on!"  
 'But another Red Guard said, "Unarmed? Hah! *Armed* he (\*<J>) is!"'

Moreover, the contradictory context in (19) below shows that the proponent of a particular answer cannot use J even if she has already mentioned the answer, unless it has been accepted, or at

least provisionally entertained, by her opponent. J would be just as odd in A's second line as it is in B's rejoinder:

- (19) A: Mä tarkoitin ANNAA.  
'I meant ANNA.'  
B: MUA sä (\*just) tarkoittit.  
'ME you (\*<J>) meant.'  
A: Eipäs kun ANNAA mä (\*just) tarkoitin.  
'Oh no, ANNA I (\*<J>) meant.'

Even if the focused element has explicitly been mentioned, apparently it cannot be used with J unless it really has been "taken in" by the addressee. This is why J in the following would be unimaginable, B being genuinely baffled about the meanings of the two words:

- (20) A: Sublimaatio on luonnollinen tapa reagoida deprivatioon.  
B: Ai mikä on luonnollinen tapa reagoida mihin?  
A: (\*Juuri) sublimaatio (\*juuri) deprivatioon.  
'A: Sublimation is a natural way to react to deprivation. B: What is a natural way to react to what? A: (\*<J>) Sublimation to (\*<J>) deprivation.'

The same constraint seems to apply to the following scenario. Assume that A hands to B a plate of various cakes and sees how B hesitatingly approaches the biggest cake. Now A can encourage B by saying (21a). But A herself could not point to, say, a more modest choice, using (21b). Or if A explicitly offers B one single cake, perfectly visible to B as well as to herself, she could hardly say (21c):

- (21) a. Ota vaan *just se*.  
'Go ahead, take <J> that.'  
b. Ei kun ota mieluummin *just tää*.  
'No, take rather <J> this.'  
c. Ota *just tää*.  
'Take <J> this.'

The above shows that mere previous occurrence of the focus value is not enough for the use of J. The J focus must have occurred in the interlocutor's representation — or rather, the speaker must have grounds to think that is the case; as an answer

to the current question, it must be at least potentially offered by the hearer.<sup>6</sup>

All this does not mean that a speaker who uses J should necessarily be in total agreement with her interlocutor. This is illustrated by the following example:

- (22) A: Ei täällä mitään opiskelijoita tarvita.  
 B: Päinvastoin, **juuri opiskelijoita** täällä tarvitaankin.  
 'A: There's no need for students here. B: On the contrary, <J> students are needed here.'

The difference between (22) and disagreement contrasts like (18) and (19) lies in the fact that speaker A here answers a polar question based on the premise "it is students that are needed", attributed to B. That is, this premise is rejected but at least entertained by A.

Equally illuminating is the piece of dialogue in (23a), where the answer is unexpected; A suggests an answer to her own question, although without realizing that it *is* the answer. (23a) contrasts with (23b), where B simply confirms what A seems to offer as an answer. A monologue variant of (23a) is (24), another typical instance of J.

- (23) a. A: Mitä sä täällä teet? 'What are you doing here?'  
 B: Istun. 'Sitting.'  
 A: Eiks teill oo bileet? 'Don't you have a party at home?'  
 B: **Siks just**. 'Because of that <J> [= That's why.]'  
 (TV play "Viiskulmasta itään", MTV 22.3.93)

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<sup>6</sup> This is often very concretely the case in conversation:

- (i) OH: Kuka sitä kuoroa johti?  
 KK: se oli semmonen ku Parviaine, mikä oli meillä laulun opettajana, mikä se, em mä muista etunimeä.  
 OH: Onk se se joka on laulukirjan kir-?  
 KK: **just** se. (t1m2d)  
 'OH: Who conducted the choir? KK: It was someone called Parviainen [-] I don't remember his first name. OH: Was it the one who wrote a songbook? KK: <J> the one.'
- (ii) IH: mä tapasij just mä tapasij just torstaina yhen tyttö joka oli Rovaniemeltä, oike-, opiskelee oikeustieteellisessä.  
 RM: Oiskohan Vuorisen Kata?  
 IH: on, **justiisa**. (in3d)  
 '[RM comes from Rovaniemi.] IH: I just met a girl from Rovaniemi who studies law. RH: Could it be Kata Vuorinen? IH: Yes, <J>.'

- b. [A, B: same as above]  
 A: Ai niin teillä on ne bileet. 'Oh yes, you have that party at home.'  
 B: *Siks just.*
- (24) Niin toivottava kuin uudistus olisikin - tai ehkä *juuri siksi* - se ei kuitenkaan ole Pystyselle mikään ota tai jätä -kysymys, —. (SK-01)  
 'As desirable as the reform would be — or perhaps <J> *because of that* — it isn't however a take-it-or-leave-it question for Pystynen.'

One more variation. In the following, A does entertain the proper answer, but what she explicitly offers is a disjunction of two competing ones. Again, J is rather out of place in B's move. It seems to me that if B did use J here, this would count as a sign that she does not treat both of A's alternatives equal, giving precedence to the second.

- (25) A: Istusä täällä siks että sut on ajettu ulos vai siks kun teillä on bileet? 'Are you sitting here because you've been thrown out or because you have a party at home?'  
 B: Siks (??)just) kun meillä on bileet.  
 'Because ??<J> we have a party.'

Let us review what has been observed this far. As argued in (Vilkuna 1989), a FOCTOP sentence repeats the speaker's unique answer; therefore it can be used both for confirmation and contradiction. But in the latter type of context, there are two competing answers, and this is what J-focusing does not seem to tolerate. This conclusion is supported by (25), a non-contradiction context that excludes J. In (22), on the other hand, the two speakers disagree, but not over the answer marked with J, 'students'; to answer the question B tackles, 'students' is indeed the only thing available. Obviously, J is not appropriate for marking the speaker's own "private" answer, as indicated by (20) and the context sketched for (21b) and (c). On the other hand, a "public" answer, one suggested by the interlocutor as in (23a) or the writer himself as in (24), can be marked as a shared answer using J. Finally, cases like (15), which I assumed might use J for focus marking *per se*, fit this picture ideally, as they are precisely instances of such "public" answers.

J frames the sentence as the only shared answer. This situation is in fact reminiscent of the conditions for the use of definite descriptions. According to the standard view, definite descriptions induce an existential presupposition (the referent in question exists in some sense) and a uniqueness presupposition (it is the only one of its kind in the context). In the game-theoretical framework, we could let the two players each choose a discourse referent and inspect their choices to secure that they are identical; only if they are can the game be continued, for if they are not, a presupposition failure results (Lauri Carlson, p.c.). Now if J is represented as conveying contextual uniqueness of the focus/answer with respect to a particular question, that is, uniqueness agreed upon by both players, we are able to explain why J cannot be used in corrections or alternative questions. The hearer must have a unique choice, which is then marked by the speaker as her choice as well.

In section 5, I will suggest a general description of J using some of the basic parameters of the FP theory. But before that, we should briefly compare J with closely related particles meaning ‘exactly’ or ‘precisely’.

#### 4. Exclusion: ‘Precisely’

As the colloquial phrase *just eikä melkein* ‘J and not almost’ indicates, J overlaps significantly with words meaning ‘exactly’, such as *täsmälleen* or *tarkalleen* in Finnish or *precis* in Swedish. J and *täsmälleen* are interchangeable in the following examples:

- (26) a. Yllättävää kyllä, nämä ihmiset ovat **juuri** sellaisia, joiksi heidät kuvitteleekin. (SK-23)  
 ‘Surprisingly enough, these people are <J> the kind you imagined them to be.’
- b. Jaana Ilomäen isä haluaa itselleen *siistin tukan* ja saa **juuri** sellaisen. (SK-49)  
 ‘J.I.’s father wants a neat haircut and gets <J> that [such].’

*Täsmälleen* is an exclusive degree modifier: no more, no less. It operates on well-defined values of scales and excludes degrees on both sides of the exact one in question. The standard used to establish the exact degree is typically something in the

context, as in (26), where anything falling outside the quality previously imagined, or outside the kind of haircut Jaana's father wants, is excluded. Some occurrences with J or *täsmälleen* do not need an explicitly established standard, such as *sopiva*, *oikea*, *oikein* 'right', *sama*, *samanlainen* 'the same (kind)', *yhtä ADJ kuin* 'as ADJ as', and numerals and measure phrases like *kaksi kilometriä* 'two kilometres'. These imply the presence of either an inherent (numerals, measures) or implicit standard (the right size for someone or for some purpose).

J is not interchangeable with *täsmälleen* when the adverbial modifies a verb, as in (27). Note that *täsmälleen* is not an FP. Unlike J and the other FPs, it can be focused itself and end up, for instance, as the focus of negation:

- (27) Hän ei kertonut summaa (ihan) TÄSMÄLLEEN ~ \*JUURI.  
'She didn't reveal the sum (quite) precisely ~ \*<J>'

Conversely, *täsmälleen* cannot substitute for J when J's partner is not representable as something of which "more or less" can be imagined in the first place. Thus, substituting *täsmälleen* for J in (1), partly repeated here as (28), would imply 'not merely in the vicinity of Medjugorje', whereas the original point of example (1) is, rather, 'not in any other place' (not in any of the potential alternatives of the town).

- (28) Neitsyt Maria ilmestyy maan päällä viimeistä kertaa *juuri Medjugorjessa*. 'The Virgin Mary will make her last appearance on the earth <J> in Medjugorje.'

Example (27) also shows that *täsmälleen* and J in its *täsmälleen*-like use can be negated. In this case, the accentuation is likely to be as in (29a), and the sentence is likely to imply, 'coming close' to the value in question. Such a reading is quite hard to get with non-scalar foci, as in (29b); this excludes the FP use of J.

- (29) a. Tämä ei ole TÄSMÄLLEEN ~ JUURI ~ JUST sellainen ~ SELLAINEN.  
'This is not exactly like that (but it comes close).'
- b. \*Tämä ei ole JUURI Anna. ~ ?Tämä ei ole juuri ANNA.  
'This is not <J> Anna.'

The ambiguity of J between an ‘exactly’ meaning and a “pure” FP use also shows up in affirmative measure contexts, although accentuation is likely to disambiguate it. Thus, (30a) questions the need for preciseness of measure (‘couldn’t it be a bit under or over?’), whereas (30b) is about the measure itself (‘couldn’t it be two, five or six instead?’):

- (30) a. Pitääkö niitä olla JUST kolme kiloa?  
must-QUES they be <J> three kilos
- b. Pitääkö niitä olla just KOLME kiloa?  
‘Must we have <J> *three kilos* of them?’

The conspicuous connection between the degree modifier J and the FP J must obviously be the implication of exclusion. With the former, less than perfect degrees of the quality in question are excluded, while the latter excludes potential alternative qualities or referents. Let us now examine the latter variety in more detail.

## 5. Exclusion asserted and implied

If we accept the basic division of FPs into inclusive and exclusive, it seems fairly obvious that J is not one of the former. We will shortly see that the idea of excluding alternatives may not always sound particularly attractive with J. However, there does seem to be something intuitively right about it. This is supported by the uniqueness reading induced by J focusing as well as by the paraphrases given by dictionaries. The Finnish dictionary *Nykysuomen Sanakirja s.v. juuri* characterizes the focusing (*tähdentävä, vahventava*, that is, ‘emphatic’) use of J with a paraphrase of the type ‘x and no non-x’; a similar paraphrase is given for *vain* ‘only’. The same goes for the definition of Swedish *just* in the dictionary *Svensk Ordbok*: ‘precisely this among the different possibilities’ (*precis (denna eller detta) bland de olika möjligheterna*).

I will therefore assume an affinity between J and ‘only’, the paradigm example of exclusive FPs, and try to see how far this assumption takes us. One respect in which these two differ is that ‘only’ seems inherently to be about quantities and J, about



individual values. To take a typical J context, consider (31), a response to being asked to do an unpleasant chore. The speaker of (31a) seems to be complaining about the number of people, but in (31b), her complaint is about the choice of individual:

- (31) a. Miksi vain minä? (Mikseivät muutkin?)  
 ‘Why only me? (Why not the others, too?)’  
 b. Miksi juuri minä? (Miksei esimerkiksi Anna?)  
 ‘Why <J> me? (Why not Anna, for example?)’

To capture the essence of this similarity and difference, I propose the division of labour sketched in (32). With both particle types, alternatives are excluded. However, the exclusion clause is the main truth-functional content of an ‘only’ clause, whereas it is a presupposition in a J clause. As for ‘only’, this is the standard description; what must be defended here is J’s status, and there is indeed some explaining to do concerning the exact nature of (32a) as a presupposition.

- (32) For any sentence S of the form  $FP P(m)$ , where FP is a particle,  $m$  is the focus and P the scope of the particle,
- if FP is ‘only’, S entails (a) and presupposes (b), and
  - if FP is a J word, S entails (b) and presupposes (a):
- (a)  $\neg (\exists x)((x \neq m) \ \& \ P(x))$   
 (b)  $P(m)$

The difference between what is asserted by ‘only’ and J sentences is fairly intuitive. For example, to deny the former, one is likely to say as in (33a), whereas the latter are denied as in (33b):

- (33) a. A: Onko totta että **vain** Anna tuli?  
 ‘Is it true that only Anna came?’  
 B: Ei, tuli sinne muitakin.  
 ‘No, others did come too.’  
 b. A: Onko totta että juuri Anna tuli?  
 ‘Is it true that <J> Anna came?’  
 B: Ei, ei Anna tullut (vaan Mikko).  
 ‘No, it wasn’t Anna who came (but Mikko).’

An essential difference between asserted and presupposed material is that the latter remains constant under negation, modality and modifications of illocutionary force. As predicted, questioning

a J clause does not alter the implication (32a). With (34), one asks whether Anna came, and whatever the additional meaning, it is the same as in the corresponding assertion.

- (34) Tuliko sinne *juuri* Anna?  
 came-Q there <J> Anna  
 'Was it Anna who came?'

With negation we run into the type of difficulty encountered with FPs like 'also': J seldom occurs in negative contexts. But when it does, it typically takes scope over negation, indeed preserving the uniqueness implication. Thus (35), one of my few examples of J in a negative sentence, presents the people under discussion as *the* group of people *not* involved in terrorist activity; other people may or may not be terrorists. With *vain*, the sentence would be ambiguous with respect to scope: it could have a scope analogous to the current one (now rendering all other people terrorists), or the reading where *vain* is in the scope of negation (saying that some other people are terrorists).<sup>7</sup> The fact that the meaning component induced by J cannot be negated groups J together with 'also' as a presuppositional FP.

- (35) Heillä ei ole konepistooleja, he eivät uhkaa ketään, *juuri* he eivät tee terroritekoja. (SK-50)  
 'They have no machine guns, they don't threaten anybody, <J> they don't commit terrorist acts.'

The introduction of an exclusion (uniqueness) presupposition as in (32) makes an implicit but noteworthy addition to the generally accepted typology of FPs, according to which exclusive FPs are truth-functionally exclusive, and only additive FPs are presuppositional. Using the conventions in (32), 'also' presupposes (36a) and asserts (36b):

- (36) a.  $(\exists x)((x \neq m) \ \& \ P(x))$   
 b.  $P(m)$

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<sup>7</sup> From the point of information structure, as *he* 'they' is focused, there is a break between the second and the third clause in (34). Unlike the two first clauses, the J clause does not simply describe the people in question but represents them as an answer to a question like "Who (is ~ are the one(s) who) does not commit terrorist acts?", which is likely to leave the reader with the implication that other groups do commit such acts.

What does the introduction of presupposed exclusion add to the general picture? In short, the traditional exclusive FPs can be literally used to exclude, but merely presupposed exclusion serves the purpose of identification – securing correct choice among alternatives. Seeing this, we can agree with König's (1991a:127) view that (German) J words are not really exclusive FPs, simultaneously keeping the connection to 'only' expressed in (32).

The matter is best approached by considering certain typical uses of the usually acknowledged types of FPs. Both can be used to explicitly correct moves that convey a mistaken inclusion or exclusion. An example of an ordinary truth-functional exclusive particle in such a use is (37a), and an example of an additive FP sentence after an unfounded uniqueness claim is (37b). In both cases, B's rejoinder entails that she rejects and corrects A's claim.

- (37) a. A: Anna and Mikko are coming.  
 B: **Only** Anna is coming. (That is, you were wrong.)
- b. A: Only Anna is coming.  
 B: Mikko is **also** coming. (That is, you were wrong.)

Substituting J for 'only' in a situation like (37a) does not make much sense; whatever B's rejoinder in (37c) means, it does not correct A's. (Several indications of this were seen in section 3.)

- (37) c. A: Anna ja Mikko tulevat. 'Anna and Mikko are coming.'  
 B: **Juuri** Anna tulee. '<J> Anna is coming'

This is not surprising if J's uniqueness meaning is presuppositional. Presuppositions are background assumptions, something taken for granted; they are not meant to be argued about, or to argue about anything else. From this point of view, the surprising thing may seem to be that 'also' can be used in this way. But this is strictly speaking not the case. In (37b), it is not the existential presupposition 'Someone else is coming' that is responsible for the actual correction (the addition), but the assertion of 'Mikko is coming'. The existential presupposition only acknowledges what A has just implied, namely 'Anna is coming'. (After all, if P holds and then Q is stated to hold, then other things being equal, P and Q will both hold).

Hence if (32a) is a presupposition conveyed by J, it is to be expected that J has no corrective force, and we can also see why B's move in (37c) sounds irrelevant. By what he asserts, B only seems to repeat what A's move entails; by what he presupposes, B assumes something that strictly speaking contradicts what A just said. This makes it hard to find a connection between the two moves.

But there is more to be said about the exact nature of the presupposition. This is revealed if we try to apply yet another test for finding out the distribution of implied and asserted material. The test is based on the fact that speakers are committed to their presuppositions; therefore, admitting a negation of a presupposition should be contradictory. (For applications to FP sentences, see König 1990: 54–55). As (38a) shows, admitting the negation of (32a) does sound less than felicitous, but not hopelessly incoherent. What is more, a slight addition like that in (38b) makes the combination sound completely natural:

- (38) a. !Ehkä joku muukin kuin Anna tuli, ja *juuri* Anna tuli.  
'Maybe someone else beside Anna came, and <J> Anna came.'
- b. Ehkä joku muukin kuin Anna tuli, mutta pääasia on että *juuri* Anna tuli. 'Maybe someone else beside Anna came, but the main thing is that <J> Anna came.'

The difference between (38a) and (b) is that the latter has some pragmatic plausibility; it does not just assert the fact that it was Anna who came (which is presupposed), but its importance. But the conclusion remains that J is not necessarily incompatible with a context that (explicitly or implicitly) contradicts (32a), which was suggested as its presupposition.

In the DG model, a presupposition like (32a) or (36a) could be either a necessary dialogue premise or a restriction concerning the type of question to be answered (Carlson 1983: 220–236). By virtue of the inherently definite pronoun, an *it*-cleft constrains the quantificational character of the question answered by it, indicating that it is a unique-answer question ('Who is the one who came?'). Since J clauses are compatible with other answers, this interpretation of presupposition is not what we are after here. Note in particular that J sentences can clearly be used to answer existentially quantified questions:

- (39) A: Keitä sinne tulee? 'Who(PLUR) are coming?'
- a. B: Mikko, ja ehkä *just Anna*. 'Mikko, and maybe <J> *Anna*.'
- b. B: Ainakin *just Anna*. 'At least <J> *Anna*.'

I therefore suggest that (32a) should be seen as a necessary dialogue premise. It is an assumption that the question has a uniquely identifiable answer in the context, that is: this particular answer to this particular question has already somehow been put forward in the dialogue. This does not preclude the existence of other potential answers, but if these are not mentioned, as is usually the case, a conversational implication may arise according to which the answer was indeed the only one. This interpretation makes it easy to see the motivation for the previous activation constraint of J foci; in a sense, both (31a) and (31b) are presupposed by a J sentence. Logically, (32a) does not entail (32b) except with the additional assumption  $(\exists x)P(x)$  (e.g., 'someone came'). But without this assumption, the exclusion clause hardly does any work; consider, for example, how odd it would be to say *Nobody but Anna came and even Anna didn't come*.

As we saw, the contextual uniqueness of J focusing is analogous to the uniqueness implication of definite descriptions. In both, exclusion is used to describe contextual uniqueness, not in fact to make negative claims. Of course, J focusing has nothing to do with the identification of referents. The phrase *the cat* is definite because its referent is the only (type of) cat in the context, but *juuri kissa* is not marked as the contextually unique cat but as the contextually unique answer to some particular question. The exclusion implications of J and *the* differ in scope.

The exclusive presupposition is just a skeleton until put to use in context. Why is it so important to indicate the previous occurrence of the focus? I would like to suggest that the central use of J is to indicate that the speaker can take the hearer's point of view and that she does not miss obvious connections to previous discourse. Obviously, this means guesswork; we do not know what answers to the topical questions our hearers are interested in, or what they were attending to in the first place. The only potential clue that is present is what is available to both interlocutors from the context or what has been previously mentioned. Of course, I cannot guarantee that you keep in mind

all the things I have mentioned; thus, adding *J as if* I assumed you had taken things into account has a positive, therefore often polite effect: it conveys that I am making the connection and that I assume you are clever enough to do the same.

## 6. Uniqueness and optimality

*J* is not not common in the presence of other values satisfying the actual predicate, but it is clearly compatible with them. Still, *J* seems to preserve the impression that the focus value is somehow special, singled out from among its alternatives. In the case of, say, (39), other people may be coming, but Anna's arrival is the *point*; the answer "Anna" is unique in the sense of being the centre of attention, perhaps the optimal, most interesting, most relevant answer. Let us now take a look at some real-life examples where this type of interpretation is especially prominent and briefly compare *J* with a similar but subtly different particle.

- (40) Pidän *esimerkiksi juuri mansikkajäätelöstä*.  
'I like for example <*J*> *strawberry ice-cream*.'
- (41) Makrofagisolujen tehtävänä on siepata elimistön vihollisia - syödä ja tuhota ne. Eräät bakteerit tai virukset näyttävät kuitenkin tunkeutuvan makrofagisolujen sisään ja säilyvän siellä hengissä. *Yksi näistä on Rankin tutkimuksen mukaan juuri aids-virus*. (SK-41)  
'The function of macrophagean cells is to catch enemies of the organism — to eat and destroy them. However, certain bacteria and viruses seem to be able to penetrate a macrophagean cell and survive inside it. One of these, according to Ranki's study, is <*J*> *the aids virus*.'

At first blush, it may seem that any meaning even suggesting uniqueness should be impossible for the *J* foci in these sentences, for the sentences strongly imply that there are other examples of what I like, and other organisms resistant to macrophages. In terms of the account given above, this is not a problem. When asked 'give me an example of what you like', I may say (40) if strawberry ice-cream has been discussed so that it can be taken as the obvious candidate answer. Other examples are not ruled out. (41) certainly admits other organisms besides the AIDS virus as members of surviving organisms, but these are not further discussed in the text. The only example of a survivor relevant here is indeed the AIDS virus. The text clearly suggests that it

might have this property, and the J sentence confirms this suggestion.

The following seems particularly adverse to an uniqueness presupposition. How could one simultaneously accept that anyone's writings are apt to turn people's attention to constructive thinking *and* to "nothing but" unconstructive things like terrorism and so on?

- (42) [von Wright kirjoittaa terrorismista, huumeista ja puoliuskonnollisista liikkeistä ihmisten pakotienä.] Minun mielestäni von Wrightin teksti on kuitenkin omiaan herättämään kanssaihminen mielenkiintoa paitsi rakentavaan ajatteluun *myös ja valitettavasti juuri terrorismiin, huumeisiin, puoliuskonnollisiin hurmosliikkeisiin.* (SK-19)  
 '[von Wright writes about terrorism, drugs and semi-religious ecstatic movements as means of escaping reality.] In my opinion, von Wright's text is liable to turn people's attention towards not only ['except'] constructive thinking but *also* and regrettably <J> *terrorism, drugs, semi-religious ecstatic movements.*'

As we know, J allows the other answer, but can we say that terrorism, drugs etc. are the uniquely suggested answer in this context? Literally speaking probably not, but J can actively convey that it is. The reason is the uniquely high argumentative value of J's partner constituent. For someone who is critical of von Wright's opinions, it is highly relevant that these opinions can be argued to turn against themselves. This is a good example of König's dissonance implication.

As an extreme example, consider the possibility of the combination *myös juuri* 'also J'. While I have no attested examples,<sup>8</sup> many speakers find it acceptable, contextualized as in the following:

- (43) Ryynänen ja Rissanen ovat tutkijoita, jotka katsovat että kieli on ensisijaisesti sosiaalinen ilmiö. *Väänästä* taas on pidetty pikemminkin formaalisen paradigman edustajana. Tämä kuva ei ole aivan oikea: tosiasiaa *myös juuri Väänänen* tulee korostaneeksi kielen sosiaalista luonnetta.

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<sup>8</sup> In the following, on the other hand, *-kin* seems to mean 'for example', rather than 'too' (see Vilkuna 1984):

Neuvostoliitossa ei tehdä gallupeja ja *juuri senkin* takia ensimmäinen ryhmäni on Kadun Mies. (sk-50) 'Gallups are not used in the Soviet Union and because of <J> *that(-too)* my first target is the Man in the Street.'

‘Ryynänen and Rissanen are linguists who regard language a primarily social phenomenon. Väänänen has been taken to represent the formal paradigm. This picture is not quite correct: in fact, *also* <J> *Väänänen* happens to emphasize the social nature of language.’

Clearly, what saves this unexpected combination of particles is the fact that *Väänänen* is highly topical in the context.

J words are closely related to the particle *nimenomaan*, and it seems to be the latter that is most clearly at home in contexts where rhetoric value decides, like those in (42) and (43). Examples follow: (44) has ‘also’ much like (42); in (45), other Europeans are explicitly included and Germans are presented as their particularly outstanding subset. It may also be symptomatic that *nimenomaan* seems to be clearly more common than J in coordinations of the type in (46), which is similar to (45) in that there is an inclusion relation between the two values. The meaning of *nimenomaan* comes close to ‘particularly’ in these contexts.

- (44) Se on sittenkin sivistyksemme olennainen osa, ei vain aineellisten saavutustensa tähden vaan *myös ja nimenomaan* henkisen olemuksensa johdosta. (WS-01)  
 ‘It is still an essential part of our culture, not only because of its material achievements but *also and* <N> because of its spiritual character.’
- (45) Yhä useammat eurooppalaiset, *nimenomaan* saksalaiset, haluavat poistaa taktiset ydinaseet maaperältään. (SK-43)  
 ‘More and more Europeans, <N> Germans, want to remove tactical weapons from their ground.’
- (46) USA, *ja nimenomaan* Reagan haluaa kurittaa YK:ta, --. (SK-22)  
 ‘US, and <N> Reagan wants to discipline the UN.’

But *nimenomaan* seems to relax the requirement for previous activation as well, although most of its occurrences do seem to come with a previous mention. Examples like the following are typical of *nimenomaan*, without no previous mention; J would be odd here.

- (47) a. Miksi sinä teit niin, vaikka minä *nimenomaan* kielsin?  
 ‘Why did you do so, although I <N> forbade you?’
- b. En minä inhoa sitä – minähän *nimenomaan* TYKKÄÄN siitä.  
 ‘I don’t hate it – I <N> like it.’

The difference between J and *nimenomaan* seems to stem from the scalar nature of the latter. This is an exclusion-based use



in a way: the particle's partner is stated to be unique in the sense of being the (conversationally) optimal one among its alternatives. What "conversational optimality" actually means may be quite hard to describe. One way to understand it is metalinguistic optimality as in (47); another can be discerned in (42), where the suggestion is that the particular opinions cited will actually turn people to the very kind of thinking they originally purported to oppose — that is, optimality in terms of surprise, news value (again, König's "dissonance" reading). Obviously, the line between J and *nimenomaan* is fuzzy; uses of J that come closest to *nimenomaan* are the ones that explicitly acknowledge the presence of the other alternatives.

## 7. Conclusions

This paper has analysed *juuri* and *just(iin)* in their varying contextual uses, trying at the same time to find a more abstract common core meaning. My conclusion is that this common core can be represented by making J words a subtype of exclusive focus particles. The difference between J words and 'only' words — that is, between asserted and presupposed exclusion — is quite marked: the exclusion presupposition serves to uniquely identify some particular value. In this sense, there is a strong analogy between J focusing and definiteness.

König (1991a,b) described German J-type words as "emphatically asserting identity". The characterization given in this paper is based on more basic notions but is in no sense incompatible with König's view. Not only is exclusion the way to express identity in logic; it is also a rhetorically valuable way to assert identity:

- (48) Ja sieltähän tulee Mikko ja — kukas muu kuin Anna.  
'And there comes Mikko and — who else but Anna.'

Here, the possibility that the person coming could be anyone else but Anna is questioned. Another example: The announcer of a Music Television program talks about the European tour of the band Faith No More and then proceeds to advertise MTV's own program. In this program, she says, the watchers will be enter-

tained by *no-one else but Faith No More*. In this way, exclusion is entertained just for the purpose of indicating that there is in fact only one alternative, hence emphatically identifying it. It seems that this rhetorical device is only favoured in context where there is a reason to expect this one particular value — again a similarity to the previous activation constraint of J words.

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