

International Migration, Fertility, Lifestyles, and Social Structure

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Abstract

This paper has two aims. First, it calls attention to the neoracists, who exploit the results of demographic research for their evil propaganda. Second, it raises the question whether the subject matter of demography, is the appropriate category to work with if demographers really want to make a substantial contribution to an understanding of social development. The presentation starts with neoracism and presents an example of how one Danish demographer has published strange research most pleasing to the neoracist way of thinking. Then a model for structural lifestyle analysis is presented. This model, which is still in the developmental stage, may enable demographers to study groups of real people according to their social identities/lifestyles. Finally, the model for structural lifestyle analysis will be applied to a set of empirical data on three groups of immigrants to demonstrate how we may gain new insight into the importance of certain lifestyles in economic development. In addition, we will see how specific lifestyles and rates of fertility may be related and cause the high rates of fertility in some of the new ethnic minorities, rates which the neoracists view as something very threatening, but which may be very positive for the future development of our society.

Keywords: international migration, fertility, lifestyles, social structure, neoracism, Denmark

Introduction

This paper has two aims. First, I would like to call attention to the neoracists, who exploit the results of our demographic research for their evil propaganda. Second, I wish to raise the question of whether the subject matter of demography is the appropriate category to work with if we really want to make a substantial contribution to an understanding of social development.

Regarding the first aim, it can clearly be established that neoracism is spreading all over the EU. There are people with negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees in all the EU countries who use predictions on demographic growth in the new ethnic minorities as arguments for closing the borders of the EU by prohibiting family reunification, preventing the entry of asylum seekers, and for repatriating refugees and immigrants. One of their arguments is that the original population will soon become a minority in their own country because immigrants and refugees have a higher rate of fertility, which in the opinion of the neoracists is totally unacceptable. As researchers we must realize that we are operating in a minefield, and that the way we

have traditionally constructed our demographic predictions is not politically neutral.

Regarding the second aim, I have chosen to be very provocative, not because I want to insult any individual colleague but because I want a discussion on the possibilities of using the social identities of human beings as the point of departure of demographic analysis, instead of starting with a count of human heads. Like many other social scientists I have made demographic studies, counting heads and breaking them down by sex, age, occupation, education, etc. The more I have worked in this way, the more worried I have become. What was I really dealing with? My main interest has always been to study real human beings in a social context, but was all this counting and calculating on the basis of human heads really going to bring me more information on the different social types of human beings? People have different social identities. Pears, apples and plums are different, but they all belong to the category of fruit. We can do a lot of studies of fruit: We can study the distribution of sweet and sour fruits, of fresh and rotten fruits, and we can go on for years without ever coming round to knowing anything about real categories of fruits like apples, pears, or plums. In the same way we as demographers may go on and on, producing reports about human beings as heads without ever getting to know anything about the realities of their different social identities. Unless we start working with human beings according to their different social identities, we as demographers may not be able to make any substantial contribution to the science of humans as social beings.

It is no easy matter to sort human beings into their correct social identities, from which we may proceed with our demographic descriptions and analyses of each specific group and eventually make comparative analyses between different groups. The relationship between the individual subject and his or her social identity is unfortunately generally poorly researched, especially so in relation to questions of long-term similarities and differences in time and space. In Denmark, however, a model for analyzing lifestyles was developed in the 1980s which may enable us to distinguish between different social identities or lifestyles.

The following presentation will start with neoracism and present an example of how one of our Danish colleagues published some strange research which was most pleasing to the neoracist way of thinking. I shall then try to present the model for structural lifestyle analysis, which is still in the developmental stage, but which may enable us to study groups of real people. Finally, I will apply the structural lifestyle analysis to a set of empirical data on three groups of immigrants to demonstrate how we may gain new insight into the importance of certain lifestyles in economic development. In addition, I will show how specific lifestyles and rates of fertility may be related and cause the high rates of fertility in some of the new ethnic minorities, rates which the neoracist view as something very threatening, but which may be very positive for the future development of our society.

Neoracism

Neoracism is spreading as a vicious cancer all over the European Union (Hjarnø 1993). In contrast to the racism existing before the end of World War II which substantiated its discriminating thoughts and actions by referring to biological conditions, this new racism accepts the evidence of modern science which states that it is impossible to isolate different races. Thus the neoracists acknowledge that the abilities of the individual are not determined by genes. Neoracism is thus a racism without race (Duffield 1984; Mullard 1985; Taguiff 1991 (quoted from Schierup 1995); Hjarnø 1995; Schierup 1995). The neoracists claim that because people grow up in different cultures, they are so fundamentally different that they can never live together. It is claimed

that the culture, religion, and family patterns of the majority of immigrants and refugees are inadaptable to the patterns of a modern, civilized Christian society and culture. Because of this the European Union should close its borders to family reunification and asylum seekers, and start repatriating people with a foreign cultural and religious background (Hasselbalch 1990).

Neoracists frequently exploit demographic studies in support of their evil propaganda. They usually argue that demographic studies show that the original people of the various EU countries will become a minority in their own countries because immigrants and refugees have a much higher rate of fertility (Hasselbalch 1990). In the recent presidential election in France, the right-wing candidate, Le Pen, frequently appeared on TV all over the EU stating that demographers had calculated that within 20–30 years, Frenchmen would be a minority in France, and because of that he considered France to be in a state of unacceptable occupation by foreign elements.

Some of our colleagues have started to produce strange population projections which are most appreciated by people with hostile attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. In Denmark we have a colleague who has produced reports so biased that one would have expected a massive critical response from his colleagues, but only a few have raised their voices (an exception is Horst 1990). The report I refer to is entitled "I går, i dag og i overmorgen" (Yesterday, today, and tomorrow) written by the cultural sociologist Eyvind Vesselbo (Vesselbo 1990). He produced this report for the town council of Ishøj, a suburb of Copenhagen with a relatively high concentration of immigrants and refugees and which has a mayor known to have negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees (Schierup 1993, 41–89; Ufer 1988; Hjarnø 1993). Ten thousand copies of the report was published, which is most unusual for reports made by local councils, and it was distributed free of charge to all members of the Danish Folketing, members of local councils, etc.

This report contains the weirdest type of demography. It documents that 145 males of Turkish origin who settled in Ishøj between 1970 and 1989 and who migrated to Denmark between 1969 and 1970 are related by kinship to 1,824 persons living in Denmark in 1990. Based on this documentation, Vesselbo produce two models of development which show that around the year 2000, these 145 males will be related to between 5,080 and 8,566 persons, which is a 35 to 59.1 times increase in 30 years on the basic population of 145. If the reader is not very careful, he or she may easily draw the conclusion that 145 Turkish immigrants increased to 1,824 over a period of 20 years and will go on increasing to somewhere between 5,000 to 9,000 within 30 years. Vesselbo does not draw this conclusion in the report, but from the way he constructed it, it is certainly intended that the reader draw this conclusion. Nowhere in the report does Vesselbo warn the reader against drawing this conclusion.

Our Danish colleague, the cultural sociologist Christian Horst has pointed out that Vesselbo did not use the traditional methods usually employed in demographic population projections (Horst 1990, 9–11). He did not operate with factors like rates of fertility, rates of mortality or rates of migration, which are usually an integral part of the population projections produced by the official Danish Statistical Department, which is where Vesselbo holds a permanent academic position. In the preface to his report, Vesselbo writes that professor P.C. Matthiessen has read and commented on the report. This formulation is not clear. One cannot possibly know if professor P.C. Matthiessen, the only Danish demographer with an international reputation, accepts and approves of the methods employed in the report and its conclusions, but as far as I know he has not publicly denounced the report.

As a demographer, one does not need to employ unusual and strange methods in attempts to produce population projections which can be used by the neoracists. Even if we strictly follow our normal procedures, our results are most appreciated by the

neoracists. As long as we have a situation with a higher rate of fertility among immigrants and refugees than in the local population, our projections will be used to support xenophobia. I feel rather uncomfortable about this situation, and I have started to take a closer look at the very object of our research. I have come to the conclusion that instead of looking at heads we might start looking at people, who from a social point of view are very different. I have found that the relation between the individual subject and social identity was poorly researched, especially in relation to questions of long-term similarities and differences in time and space, but I have also found that the structural lifestyle analysis, which is being developed in Denmark (Højrup 1989, 1995; Christensen 1987; Hjarnø 1991, 1993) may provide demographers with fruitful potential for developing their field of research so that it will embrace real people as socially different entities.

Lifestyles

No individual has the opportunity of choosing his or her father or mother. When born, an individual is placed in a specific social environment which will prescribe his or her way of behavior. The lifestyle of the parents, grandparents, sisters, and brothers will, through the process of primary socialization, be implanted in the individual. He or she will be brought up to understand what members of this environment consider right and wrong, and what they considered is the correct way of life. The individual will learn to view the way life is lived or the ideal life which is aimed at as the only correct and natural one. This will mark his or her consciousness and way of thinking. The individual sees what he or she experiences as the "objective" truth and not as something based on his or her own conceptions – the ideology of the individual. This ideology is invisible, but in spite of this it is an impressive force in the lifestyle of human beings. All human beings are tied to specific lifestyles independent of their "own" will. What people want is determined by their culture, i.e. their lifestyle.

Any lifestyle demands that certain specific conditions of existence are available in the society. If they disappear, the individual will look for alternatives which will enable him or her to continue his or her lifestyle. If no such alternatives are available, the lifestyle will perish.

The concept of lifestyle is not one normally employed in demography. It is commonly used by ethnologists and social anthropologists who, however, have had great trouble in agreeing on a precise definition (Højrup 1989; Christensen and Højrup 1989; Åström 1989; Lindqvist 1989). This problem appears to be in the process of being solved by the development of the structural lifestyle analysis which was developed in Denmark during the 1980s. We now have a tool in the developmental phase which provides new possibilities for making precise lifestyle analyses which may be utilized by demographers in population studies (Højrup 1983).

Structural lifestyle analyses were developed in connection with a research project initiated by the Danish State Institute for Research on Building. The aim of the project was to develop new methods which could be used in planning, so that future planning would to a greater extent be based on an understanding of the different ways of existing in a given population (Groth and Møllgaard 1979). The ethnologist Thomas Højrup was given the opportunity to take a closer look at the relations between the lifestyles and living conditions in the project area, and report on conflicts in living conditions. In relation to this work Højrup put forward a model which we today refer to as structural lifestyle analysis (Højrup 1983).


The model was inspired by French structural Marxism which defines society as a complex structural whole, a social formation constituted by different modes of pro-

duction (Althusser 1965; Althusser and Balibar 1970; Friedman 1974, 1976; Hjørnø 1979). Each mode of production requires a specific set of conditions of existence in order to be articulated, and these conditions consist of economic, political, legal and ideological social relations which provide the basis for the living conditions required by a lifestyle or -styles.

The concept of the mode of production is crucial in this analysis, and it is used both to describe a social form of organization as well as to describe the actual behavior and ideological ideas i.e. the lifestyle or -styles (Linde-Laursen 1989, 92–105).

In his book "Det glemte folk" (The forgotten people) Hjørnø presents a detailed description of the structural lifestyle analysis. It is made up of structures formed by concepts. It is composed of two parts, one embracing the mode of production and its conditions of existence, and the other relations between conditions of life and lifestyle. These two parts are connected where the conditions of existence meet the living conditions (see Figure 1). By analyzing the mode of production it is possible to deduce the conditions of existence which may be utilized as conditions of living a lifestyle.


Figure 1. Model of social formation.



As stated above, structural lifestyle analysis was developed to identify conflicts related to the living conditions of groups of people in a population in a regional area. These conflicts arise when the living conditions and the conditions of existence are incompatible. If the living conditions of a certain lifestyle cannot be satisfied by the conditions of existence, individuals will try to reproduce the conditions of existence or establish alternatives. If this is not possible, the lifestyle will disappear. Hjørnø has called such a conflict Neoculturation (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Model of neoculturalism.

Mode of production



We are dealing here with theoretical constructions. A lifestyle is a theoretical concept. No individual lives a lifestyle. In every society there are several modes of production, and the individual is influenced by others with different lifestyles. This means that it is impossible to use the model directly to “sort” individuals. The ideology and behavior of an individual may combine elements of more lifestyles, but in practice one specific lifestyle is assumed to be dominant in the individual, because there are limits as to how much inconsistency there can be in the behavior of any individual (Hjalager and Lindgaard 1984). To solve this problem more research is needed.

In his book Højrup focused exclusively on modes of production as the only constituent of lifestyles. His model is not capable of explaining lifestyles determined by economic processes outside the sector of production. The limitations may be overcome if we concentrate on reproduction itself. It will soon become clear that production processes and local reproduction can be dependent upon larger reproductive processes, not merely for their survival, but for their constitution. This will include modes of production as well as modes of exchange, i.e. all strategies of the organization of economic process in general (Friedman 1994, 7, 16–18).

In his analysis, Højrup focused on two different modes of production which were important in the area where he worked. These were simple commodity production and the capitalist mode of production. Related to simple commodity production, we find one lifestyle, that of the self-employed, whereas two different lifestyles were identified within the capitalist mode of production, that of the wage earner and that of the careerist.

Within the mode of simple commodity production, the producer owns the means of production and usually has all the qualifications required to carry out the process of production. This mode is the basis of the lifestyle of the self-employed. We also find this lifestyle in relation to persons who are self-employed in trade. Within the capitalist mode of production, labor has become polarized. Manual work has in many ways become simpler and more monotonous and with little demand for intellectual qualifications in the person performing the tasks. This type of job produces the lifestyle of the wage earner. Simultaneously with the above development in capitalist production, the demand for planning, administration, organization etc. has increased, and to accomplish these needs, employees must have qualifications and skill, be well-educated, etc., which produces the lifestyle of the careerist. Figures 3–5 are illustrations of the main differences between the three major lifestyles.

Figure 3. The lifestyle of the wage earner.

Working hours are different from leisure time

Work is "the means"

Leisure time is "the aim"

Work

A person sells his working time = earns a wage. The person does not own the firm.

The price of working hours is politically determined.

It is negotiated by the union (us) and the employers association (management = them). It is important to monopolize the selling of time through solidarity (the union). Good fellowship is therefore important. "We"

make demands on "them" in order to achieve something. "We" are put to work by "them".

Extra working hours = overtime payments

Leisure time

One consumes one's wages. Leisure time is time which one has at one's disposal = freedom. One fulfils oneself. Leisure time is separated from work: knocking-off time, holidays, weekends. Age of retirement is a utopia which one looks forward to.




Figure 4. The lifestyle of the careerist.

Work = engagement, having freedom to dispose over, success

Work is the aim, all around lie the means.

Work:

One sells solutions to tasks = do engaging jobs. "My work is my hobby", The price of the work one does is individually determined. One is a member of the staff. Say "We" about the firm. One demands freedom to dispose of, responsibility, an engaging job, challenges, promotion in proportion to results. One gives loyalty; one's work is the number one priority in life. One makes demands on oneself.

Freedom = The right to dispose over things related to one's work, to be employed means that one can shift to another firm, when one wants to make a change.

Relaxation = Interests outside work. One does things which are stimulating, regenerating, activities which may strengthen one's image, exciting, well worthwhile.





Figure 5. The self-employed lifestyle.

Day's work

Working hours and leisure time cannot be separated.

To have one's own firm is the aim in life. One owns one's own firm, takes responsibility for it, must be able to produce competitively. Freedom. Being one's own master. One must be able to succeed in competition with other firms. One depends on oneself. One's firm and one's private economy are one and the same. The family usually participates in the firm.




The entrepreneur

Individuals who are brought up in a family with a self-employed lifestyle are more likely to establish themselves as self-employed than persons who were brought up in the lifestyle of the wage earner or in the lifestyle of the careerist (Hjalager and Lindgaard 1984).

Every society needs entrepreneurs. Denmark is a poor country in natural resources, but Danes have one of the highest standards of living in the world. This is because Danish entrepreneurs have been able to produce a mass of small- and medium-sized enterprises which have proved capable of competing internationally. Danish society has been lucky in that it has been able to reproduce this plethora of enterprises, so that those closing down have constantly been replaced by new ones. In the past, Denmark has been able to produce enough individuals with an entrepreneurial vocation, but this may not be the case in the future. In 1960, 25% of the active population was registered as self-employed; today the same figure is about 10% (Figure 6). This means that a smaller proportion of the population will be socialized in families where the parents are self-employed. What consequences this may have on commercial development in the future has, as far as I know, not been investigated.

Today the development of new jobs in the private sector in Denmark mainly takes place in areas outside Copenhagen, which used to be the main industrial center as well

Figure 6. Percentage of the self-employed, salaried employees, and wage earners in the Danish labor force, 1950–1993



Source: Danmarks Statistik: *Tiårs-oversigt*

as the administrative center (Tanvig 1995). The Copenhagen area cannot keep pace with the rest of Denmark. The proportion of individuals with a self-employed lifestyle and an entrepreneurial spirit is higher in rural Denmark than in Copenhagen. For many years Copenhagen was able to draw individuals eager to have a higher education and who had the entrepreneurial spirit, because it had a monopoly on higher education. This is no longer so. Denmark now has five universities. Civil engineers are trained both in North Jutland and in Copenhagen. Studies have shown that a large proportion of the civil engineers trained in North Jutland remain in that area, where they are believed to be the cause of many new jobs created in the area (Dalum 1993; Dalum and Villumsen 1994, 40–48). Modern means of communication also make it much easier to establish commercial enterprises outside Copenhagen.

Copenhagen is, however, a center for immigrants and refugees (Hjarnø 1995, 11–15). About half of all refugees and immigrants live there, and in contrast to the rest of the population some of these groups have a high proportion of members with a self-employed lifestyle. Among nationals from Pakistan, around 20% of the active age group is today self-employed and this figure is increasing. The rate of self-employment among Pakistani nationals in Denmark was in 1988 11.3% and in 1991 15.3%. Immigrants from Turkey are fast moving into self-employment with the rate of self-employed among Turkish nationals 2.4% in 1988 and 5.4% in 1991. These figures do not show that many immigrants from Turkey are involved in business in Turkey (see Hjarnø 1990), whereas immigrants from the former Yugoslavia who arrived in Denmark at the same time as the immigrants from Turkey and Pakistan show very little interest in setting themselves up as self-employed. The self-employment rate among Yugoslav nationals was 2.1% in 1991.

Comparing the three migrant groups


The difference in the rates of self-employed in the three groups of immigrants may be explained by employing structural lifestyle analysis. All three groups started to come to Denmark as labor migrants in the late 1960s. On January 1, 1971, Denmark stopped issuing new labor permits, and since then only family reunification has been allowed (Hjarnø 1995, 15–24) (Figure 7).

The first labor migrants from Turkey came to Denmark in 1967 (Hjarnø 1970; 1973). These were small groups of men who, due to the recession in West Germany, tried to find employment in neighboring countries. They found it easy to get labor permits in Denmark and soon a chain migration developed. The majority of the 35,000 immigrants who lived in Denmark on January 1, 1995 come from only three provinces in Turkey (Hjarnø 1970). They come from small villages where their parents were farmers. Half of them are Kurds (Hjarnø 1990).

Up until 1956, villagers in Turkey were allowed to take uncultivated land under cultivation. By registering the land with the authorities they could get a title deed, and from then on had to pay land tax. Many tried to avoid the taxes and did not register the land they used. In 1956, the Turkish authorities prohibited taking new land under cultivation. Land which was not registered was confiscated and divided between the people in the village. Because of the ban on cultivating new land, it was no longer possible to increase production by taking new land under cultivation (Hjarnø 1990).

Before the 1956 ban on taking new land under cultivation, the economy of rural households was dependent on the number of men who could plow. The more sons a couple had, the more land it could cultivate and the richer the household could be. This social structure favored households with many sons, and the villages had a high rate of fertility.

Figure 7. Number of nationals from Turkey, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia, 1974–1994.



After the Turkish government banned cultivation of new land, it became more and more difficult for villages to maintain their standard of living. The population increased and the farmers' attempts to increase the productivity of the land by taking up cultivation of sugar beets instead of barley and wheat could not stop the decline in the standard of living. Attempts to find alternative sources of income by engaging in retail trade and transportation proved unsuccessful. The competition was much too strong, and very few succeeded. Thus their traditional conditions of existence were threatened (Hjarnø 1990).

In the 1960s more and more villagers learned that emigration to Western Europe was a way to earn money. In a Kurdish village which I have studied since 1970, I found that 75% of all males between 18 and 55 years of age had migrated to West Germany, and mainly Denmark, within three years (Hjarnø 1970). Prior to their departure each of these 300 men had a horse, and a plow. When they emigrated they sold the horse, and the males who remained in the village bought tractors, combine harvesters and other types of modern farming machinery and were able to continue cultivation of the available land. The place of work of the emigrants had thus been replaced by machines. Because of the remittances from the emigrants and the income from agriculture in the village, the villagers were now able to increase their standard of living considerably, and the possibilities of emigration to Denmark encouraged a high fertility (Hjarnø 1990).

These males emigrated in order to work and earn money by doing paid labor in Danish and West German industry. Their aim was to save up so they could return and establish themselves as self-employed. They gradually learned that it was not possible to buy land. All emigrants wanted to buy land and nobody wanted to sell. The emigrants then tried to place their savings in small retail stores, in buses, and lorries, but very few were successful. Some also tried to become builders, but usually they lost their money because the rate of inflation was much higher than their calculations. They were trapped in Denmark, and by the end of the 1970s the political situation in Tur-

key deteriorated. Some became very worried and started to bring their wives and children to Denmark. When the Turkish Army seized power in September 1980 to prevent a Fascist coup, family reunification stopped for a couple of years. Many migrants nourished the hope that the military rulers could improve their chances of returning to Turkey, but this did not materialize, and family reunifications was resumed. Many emigrants abandoned all hope of ever going back to Turkey and setting up as self-employed. They started to look for possibilities in Denmark, and many are now engaging in different types of business in Denmark. Small shops, restaurants, grillbars, taxi firms, etc. are the most common (Hjarnø 1990).

As self-employed they are in a much better position to continue their traditional lifestyle. Husband and wife help each other in the business and when the children are old enough to assist the parents, they are put to work. Many self-employed spend most of their time in their business. Usually the owners have a flat or house where they sleep, but early in the morning they go to work. The children go to school from there, and when they return from school they often do their homework in the back shop. Most of the food they eat is prepared in the business. Many of the small enterprises cooperate with each other. Households related by kinship cooperate with each other, as well as those from the same village. They assist each other in setting up new businesses, those engaged in retail trade make purchases together, etc. Boys leave school early to assist in the business, and when interviewed some of the self-employed openly say that they consider it an advantage in business to have many children, especially sons, who can assist the parents. They clearly believe that a high rate of fertility is positive.

Immigrants from Pakistan mainly come from rural communities in the Punjab (Bajaj and Laursen 1988; Hjarnø 1985). The majority were brought up in households where the parents were engaged in agriculture as self-employed farmers or tradesmen. Lack of land for agriculture and lack of alternatives for making an income locally, combined with a high natural increase in the local population, made it more and more difficult for many to maintain their standard of living. In the 1950s emigration to Europe started. Some moved to England, but when it became difficult to enter England some tried to get labor permits in West Germany and Holland. From there, some moved on to Denmark, and when Denmark stopped issuing new work permits on January 1, 1971, the labor migrants from Pakistan migrated to Norway (Lien 1986; 1993). This was a chain migration.

Like the migrants from Turkey, those from Pakistan were mainly males who wanted to go back to their home country with their savings to set themselves up as self-employed. They soon learned that due to the high airfares between Denmark and Pakistan, it was very expensive to maintain close contact with their wife and children, so by the beginning of the 1970s they started bringing them to Denmark. They also learned that it was difficult to return to Pakistan, and some began to establish themselves as self-employed. Many became Danish nationals, whereas the immigrants from Turkey have kept their Turkish citizenship (Hjarnø 1995). The exact rate of self-employed in the active age groups of migrants from Pakistan is not known. Among those who have kept their Pakistani passports, about 20% are now self-employed, but the figure is probably higher among those who have become Danish citizens.

Like the self-employed immigrants from Turkey, the self-employed immigrants from Pakistan have used the traditional kinship-based organizations for cooperation between households. They also let their sons assist them, whereas the wife and girls do not participate so actively in the actual business as among immigrants from Turkey. The males interviewed also state that they believe it is an advantage to have many sons who can help in the business at an early age.

Many of the immigrants from the former Yugoslavia were recruited differently than the immigrants from Pakistan and Turkey (Bruus Pedersen 1974; 1975; Schierup 1988;

Schierup and Ålund 1987). In the late 1960s, Danish firms which needed different types of skilled workers, such as welders, sent Danes to Yugoslavia to recruit laborers. Many of those who were brought to Denmark were already living as wage earners often in urban areas. They came to Denmark to earn money, so that they could return with savings, which would enable them to buy a better house and a car, and their hope was to go back and find a paid job which could provide them with a higher standard of living.

The economic situation in Yugoslavia did not develop favorably. Many remained in Denmark. They brought their wife and children to Denmark and have continued to be engaged in paid work. Like the other two groups, they have a rate of unemployment which is much higher than among Danes (Hjarnø 1991; 1995, 13–15). Few have become self-employed; the aim in life of the majority is not like that of most Pakistanis and the majority of immigrants from Turkey to become self-employed. They are to some extent much more like Danes with the lifestyle of a wage earner. The rate of fertility was lower than that of the immigrants from Turkey and Pakistan right from the start, although it was fairly high compared with that of the Danes, but the rate of fertility has fallen close to that of Danes (Figure 8 and 9). The Yugoslavs interviewed do not believe it is economically advantageous to have many children. They state that children are expensive but they have them because they love children.

Figure 8. Total fertility rate. Selected nationals, 1980–1993.





Figure 9. General fertility rate, selected nationals, 1975-1993.



Conclusion

By employing structural lifestyle analysis it is possible to distinguish between the differences in lifestyles of a given population. We have not yet developed methods for identifying the different groups more precisely in quantitative terms, but we can get a rough idea of the quantitative proportions on which we can do some analyses. By using lifestyles and studying their distribution in a population over time, new information as to social development can be obtained. By doing this, the higher rate of fertility in some lifestyles among immigrants and refugees may not be interpreted as something problematic, as is done by the neoracists. The high proportion of individuals with a lifestyle of the self-employed in some of the new ethnic minorities may be a very positive shot in the arm for some of the old industrial centers, which are badly in need of entrepreneurs to keep up the creation of new enterprises and new places of work. The high rate of fertility of some of the new ethnic minorities may also prove to be an advantage, viewed in the light of structural lifestyle analysis, because Denmark and many other modern industrial societies will possibly face problems in the future, since the proportion of people with a self-employed lifestyle is decreasing.

Structural lifestyle analysis is still a model in the making, but it is in my opinion a serious attempt to deal with the relationship between the individual subject and social identity, which up to now, has been very poorly researched, especially in relation to questions of long-term similarities and differences in time and space.

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Appendix 2

Citizenship of the mother	1975	1976	1977	1978
Yugoslavia	2,547	2,467	2,300	2,059
Turk	4,067	4,223	4,809	4,930
Pakistan	7,879	7,357	6,652	6,154
General population	1,019	1,747	1,660	1,668

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Pakistan	7,879	7,357	6,652	6,154
General population	1,019	1,747	1,660	1,668
Other European Countries	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
Africa	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
America	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
Asia	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
Rest of Asia	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
Other	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
Foreign Citizens	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
Danish Citizens	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345
Total	1,345	1,345	1,345	1,345

Source: Danish Statistics, Copenhagen 1994/11

Appendix 1.

Foreign nationals and labor occupation, November 1992.

Citizenship	Total in the labor force and working	Hereby in %		
		Self- Employed	Salaried employees	Workers
Nordic	9,349	12.7	61.5	25.8
Norway	4,356	12.4	60.7	26.9
Sweden	3,366	13.7	63.1	23.2
Finland	688	11.6	60.6	27.8
Iceland	939	10.9	60.2	29.0
EEC-Countries	11,995	16.4	49.0	34.6
Belgium & Luxembourg	130	15.4	65.4	19.2
France	755	13.2	55.5	31.3
Greece	176	21.0	23.9	55.1
Netherlands	1,020	25.3	51.2	23.5
Ireland	401	7.2	43.9	48.9
Italy	730	30.8	31.1	38.1
Portugal	121	10.7	43.0	46.3
Spain	371	13.5	36.7	49.9
Great Britain	4,377	15.6	49.3	35.0
Germany	3,914	14.2	52.5	33.3
Rest of Europe	11,432	11.5	18.2	70.4
Yugoslavia	3,089	4.1	15.8	80.1
Poland	1,012	13.6	28.1	58.3
Switzerland	551	13.2	61.7	25.0
Turkey	6,041	14.2	9.9	75.9
Austria	297	13.8	57.2	29.0
Other European Countries	442	17.4	43.2	39.4
Africa	1,344	10.6	25.6	63.8
America	2,326	15.2	56.4	28.5
Asia	5,752	18.6	17.5	63.9
Pakistan	1,019	35.0	10.7	54.3
Rest of Asia	4,733	15.1	18.9	66.0
Others	648	20.4	33.6	46.0
Foreign Citizens	42,846	14.4	38.7	46.9
Danish Citizens	2,296,567	11.5	55.1	33.5
Total	2,339,413	11.5	54.8	33.7

Source: Danmarks Statistik, Arbejdsmarked 1994:11.

Appendix 2.

Total fertility rate for selected nationals 1975-1993

Citizenship of the mother	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Yugoslav	2.347	2.467	2.300	2.959	2.588	2.897	2.495	2.106	2.137	2.277	2.205	1.971	1.923	2.270	2.138	2.301	-	-	-
Turk	4.067	4.222	4.869	4.930	5.152	4.741	4.546	3.515	3.302	3.292	3.284	3.669	4.189	3.737	3.750	3.495	3.624	3.730	3.345
Pakistani	7.879	7.757	6.652	6.154	5.428	5.433	4.685	4.315	4.109	4.216	4.574	4.540	4.543	4.282	4.280	4.436	4.228	4.381	4.048
General population	1.919	1.747	1.660	1.668	1.602	1.546	1.437	1.427	1.377	1.400	1.447	1.480	1.496	1.560	1.621	1.668	1.683	1.704	1.749

General fertility rate 1975-1993

Citizenship of the mother	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Yugoslav	85.7	88.2	74.5	95.8	84.7	88.6	74.0	63.5	60.6	65.4	63.5	56.0	54.8	66.3	63.1	69.2	-	-	-
Turk	149.3	154.7	183.8	180.6	180.8	165.6	159.4	133.3	123.4	129.3	127.9	146.0	163.1	146.1	147.7	135.2	138.5	144.0	127.3
Pakistani	343.6	346.9	277.5	252.3	220.8	218.0	190.6	164.1	151.2	144.6	152.9	148.0	149.2	142.9	142.4	147.3	143.1	143.1	129.2
General population	61.3	55.3	52.0	51.7	49.0	46.8	42.9	42.1	40.3	40.9	42.2	43.1	43.5	45.3	47.1	48.5	49.0	51.6	51.4

Source: Danmarks Statistik. Befolkningens bevægelse 1988-1992.

General fertility rate Annual number of live births per 1,000 women of reproductive age (15-49 years old).

Total fertility rate Number of children that can be born alive to 1,000 women during the reproductive period of their lives (ages 15 through 49), if all 1,000 women lived to be 50 years old, and if at each age they experienced the given year's age-specific fertility rates.