Democracy versus efficiency? The Conflict between Representative and Executive Rule in Russian Local Government 1991—2

Adrian Campbell

(This contribution is based on a series of field visits to St Petersburg, Moscow and Nizhny-Novgorod during 1991—2. The author acknowledges the support for these visits from the Economic and Social Research Council, the British Council, Birmingham City Council and the World Bank.

INTRODUCTION

"Continuity had been broken, but nothing substituted in its place... Everything had a provisional air about it: impermanence and instability became the essential characteristics of Russian life" (Szamuely, 1974, on Russia at the end of the eighteenth century).

The history of Russian institutions contains a degree of recurrence which may be presented as evidence against any universalist theory of development. Indeed, behind much of the current debate in Russia, there can be discerned the contours of an older and more fundamental opposition between "Westernisers" and "Slavophils". Since the seventeenth century Russia as the "western East" has been torn by the conflict between those wishing to bring Russla into what they see as the mainstream of "world civilisation", and those seeking to consolidate its separate character and its un-Western notions of the autocracy and "the people". These opposing forces have in the past repeatedly succeeded each other (as in the nineteenth century cycles of reform and repression). More curiously they have st some stages combined, as in the repressive modernisation programmes of Peter the Great and the Bolsheviks.

One product of this contradictory history is the current alliance between the remnants of the (now banned) Party apparatus and the nationalist, neo-fascist Right, in theory sworn enemies, but in practice both proponents of the autocratic "eastern" tradition.

Whatever the dangers of this "red/brown" coalition, it is the contradictions emerging within the reformist or "Westernising" camp which are likely to be the more significant. Conflicts within the reform movement have increasingly been focused around the question of the respective roles of the executive and the legislature both at local and national level.

THE RUSSIAN TRADITION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The reasons for the weakness of the institutional base for democracy in Russia (despite widespread support for the idea of democracy), including the legacy of the Mongol empire, the size and nature of the territory, the subordination of the nobility and the absence of a burgher class, have been described by Szamuely (1974), Pipes (1974) and Bahro (1974). Modernisation and reform in the last fifty years of the Tsarist Empire saw some increase in local autonomy with the setting up of zemstvos (rural district assemblies) and municipalities. When these bodies used their limited powers in ways that were not approved of by central government, these powers would be cut back. When this failed to silence them the more direct method of reducing their electorate through raising property qualifications for voting. Central government also gave itself a veto over the level of property tax that could be levied by cities (Rogger, 1983). The Bolsheviks came to power with the slogan of "all power to the Soviets", the soviets being the local councils of workers and peasants deputies that appeared during 1917. However, the soviets were used to concentrate power rather than to disperse it. It was in the name of the soviets that the democrati-

cally-elected Constituent Assembly was dissolved early in 1918, and the soviets themselves were cleared of members of other parties (Fainsod, 1961). From then on the soviets increasingly became instruments of central government, with local accountability playing a relatively insignificant part.

The key principles by which the structure operated were "dual subordination" and "podmena". Dual subordination existed in the way in which each soviet or executive committee was accountable to the soviet or executive committee at the next level up in the administrative hierarchy. This hierarchical subordination of local to regional and regional to central government was compounded by the more direct influence of sectoral ministries to which local agencies were accountable for even the smallest decisions. Podmena was the process by which the Party usurped the representative and executive functions of the soviets at each level. Apart from maintaining party control, this was to some extent a practical response to the unworkability of the system. The only part of the structure which worked smoothly was the Party, and it was the Party which provided the only effective means of getting anything done. Studies on Soviet local government in the 1980s showed the extent to which the chaotic nature of the system allowed a degree of "covert participation" (Hahn, 1988) by citizens and allowed local officials a degree of bargaining and discretion over the implementation of decisions (Bahry, 1987).

Both Khruschev and, to a lesser extent, Brezhnev, attempted to push decision-making down the hierarchy, although each attempt to do so led to a strengthening of central authority in order to prevent the system from dissolving. However as the economy became more complex, the centre itself grew into an increasingly unwieldy labyrinth of ministeries and agencies, thus leading to demands for a further attempt at decentralisation.

With Gorbachev a more radical decentralisation of political, executive and economic structures was embarked on. Local soviets were to have their power "restored" (White, 1990). Ministerial influence was reduced, state orders to enterprises cut back, and multi-candidate elections introduced into local government. The idea was that rather than have the Party keeping the administrative machinery running, local councils and their executive bodies would hold society and the economy together as the machinery of the administrative command system was dismantled.

This, as has become vident could not be achieved without a general collapse of the system, of the leading role of the Party and of the Soviet state as a whole.

Local democracy, reinvented through democratic local election in March, 1990, had begun to go into retreat less than 18 months later, in the face of a very significant strengthening of the executive branch of government at all levels. The shift towards executive power was, ironically, led by those (Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak) who had been swept to power as representatives in democratic elections. Their dissatisfaction with the efficiency of the existing democratic structures has led to running political and legal battles primarily in Moscow and St Petersburg, but also in many provincial cities and regions, conflicts which are set out in this paper.

"AUTHORITARIAN" REVIVAL?

Wthether this reinforcement of the hierarchical principle is a natural part of a transition which will finally break with the old tradition and lead to a re-flowering of representative democracy, or whether it represents a reassertion of that tradition, remains to be seen. Commentators such as Teague and Tolz (1992) regard the threat of a resurgence of authoritarianism, whether of a reactionary of reformist variety, as "not to be discounted" but see in Russia's clear preference for democratic candidates in all free elections this century (1917, 1989, 1990, 1991) as the best source of hope in preventing such an eventuality. One of the weaknesses of contemporary Russian democracy is the absence of stable political parties or groupings. This in part is the legacy of Communist rule; firstly in that the Party discredited for most citizens the very idea of party discipline and organization, and secondly, more subtly, it established a "zero-sum" political culture, that of a regime versus its opponents, rather than a pluralist culture of competing parties within the framework of a neutral constitution.

Democratic Russia, the coalition which backed Yeltsin's rise to power was always to broad to survive as one organization. However, rather than split into competing parties in the Western sense of the term, it appears to be splitting into what might be termed an "estab-

lishment" group and an anti-establishment group. These groups are now in conflict not so much in terms of votes within representative bodies, but in terms of conflicts between institutions. The new establishment (or new "nomenklatura" according to its opponents) is made up of those democrats who have made the transition to new administrative/executive structures, which have replaced the old Party-based organization. The anti-establishment group is made up of those democrats who have not found (or not wanted) a place in such structures, and have instead "championed" the representative institutions against an onslaught from the executive.

This new division in Russian politics leads as usual, to some unlikely bedfellows. Over the last year, it has often been commented how the new local executives, Mayor of St Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak, and to a lesser extent Mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov have gathered around them many of the professionals who worked in the previous regime's administration. The Mayor's office in St Petersburg and the Moscow City Government include more representatives of the ancien regime than the more radical wing of the democrats would like, particularly if they feel themselves to be personally excluded. Both Sobchak and Popov appear to be aware that the strength of "old-styie" professionals in the country's industrial structure is such that aliiances with the more progressive of these is necessary if reform is to proceed.

On the other side, radicals in representative councils are sometimes joined by the more moderate conservative deputies in opposing the re-centralisation of power.

The picture that thus emerges is thus less a battle between political parties, and more a struggle between institutions as the anti-communist revolution moves into a new consolidatory phase. Rather than a new era of competitive pluralism, democratic opponents of the executive see a new regime, democratic only in the plebiscitary sense, replacing the old.

As a result some have argued that Democratic Russia will itself become the basis of a one-party state. Such accusations, when they come from the ranks of the "Patriotic" movement and the now-illegal Party are no cause for surprise. What is more curious is that the strongest protests have been coming from within Democratic Russia itself (see Wishnevsky, 1991).

Some of these fears are unfounded, and may be written off as hysteria by self-dramatizing deputies (councillors) who cannot get used to the fact that being a rebel against the Communist system no longer has any meaning, now that that system has gone.

As one member of the executive, a prefect of one of Moscow's new administrative districts put it:

"These copuncillors call themselves democrats, but they are children of Communism like everyone else, and they play the game by the old rules. For all their rhetoric they are themselves nothing but a new nomenklatura, struggling to maintain their priveliges — that's why they fight with Popov (Moscow Mayor). With these new democrats it's worse than with the Communists — at least under Communism there was a system, and they promoted some of the best people, even if they destroyed others. These people haven't a clue — what do they stand for after all? They go round saying how they were defenders of the White House during the coup... I know how few people were there, only a hundred the first night, and now it seems all of Moscow was there. All they stand for is there. All they stand for is anti-communism, and they can't function now the Party has gone. After all, how long can you go on being "a defender of the White House"? One month? Two months?

I would get rid of all the elected councils, we're not ready for them. In a few years' time, when we have a real market economy, when we have proper political parties, not dilletantes, then we can have political control of the executive. I would be happy to work under political control in those decisions, but it's too soon.

(interview, March, 1992).

THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER

The democratic multi-party local elections of March, 1990 saw democratic forces win majorities in Moscow, Leningrad (St Petersburg) and Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) as weil as a number of smaller cities. The democratic gains would have been significantly greater had not the electoral system under-represented urban electors, allowing most oblast' (province) councils to remain under conservative control (Slider, 1992). The significance of the change, both in terms of the popular discontent which fuelled it, and the incapacity of existing institutions to accommodate it, have led commentators such as Moses (1992) to characterise it as part of a

revolutionary process. In terms of the national reform movement, it built on the successes of the elections to the USSR supreme soviet in 1989, complemented the wave of strikes then occurring, and reinforced Yeltsin's rise to power, first as chairman/president of the Russian parliament and later Russian President.

The election victories testified not only to the democrats' popular support (which the Party failed to comprehend), but also to their greater skill in electioneering, at which the Party apparatchiks proved incompetent (Colton, 1990).

The democrat-led councils acquired national significance in the struggle for reform. Major figures in the reform movement, Anatoly Sobchak and Gavriil Popov were elected chairmen of the city councils of Leningrad and Moscow respectively.

Given the historic proportions of the victory, it was all the more surprising when little was achieved in its wake. The structure inherited was increasingly seen to be unworkable. Under Party rule councils had not in reality been running their own affairs, and so the relationship between representative and executive functions had mattered little and was not specified in practice. Those decisions that could be taken locally were taken by the executive and almost always ratified by the council. If people had a grievance they would more often than not, go to the Party, not their local councillor. The ward role of councillors was poorly developed.

Now councils were able in theory to represent the people in ways which had not been possible before. They could appoint reformists to the executive and, in theory, get results. When this was found not to occur, the democrats themselves faced increasing popular discontent. Although the failure could partly be blamed on sabotage by the banished communist apparat, it was clear that inexperience, indecisiveness, indiscipline and disunity on the part of the new deputy intake and its executive also placed its part.

In place of a struggle for power between democrats and conservatives, there emerged a struggle for power within the democratic camp, between the legislature and the executive, between which the order of precendence had no clear legal basis. In St Petersburg the conflict between Sobchak as chair of the council, and Schelkanov, the more radical chair of the executive committee (the management of the city administration) became a serious brake on progress (Rutland, 1991). In April, 1991, Schelkanov offered the resignation of himself and his entire executive committee for the eighth time in one year.

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF STRONG EXECUTIVE RULE

It was Gorbachev, not Yeltsin who was the first beneficiary of the idea of having a strengthened executive to accelerate the reform process. When, in June 1990, Gorbachev assumed the title of executive president, he received the support of many of the radicals, although some regarded the change as concentrating too much power in the hands of one leader. Anatoly Sobchak, who was later to become executive Mayor of St Petersburg, was among those strongly in favour of a strong executive. In his political autobiography (Sobchak, 1991) he emphasised his support for the logic of Gorbachev's move, and his belief that the (then dying) moral leader of the reform movement, Andrei Sakharov, also supported it, albeit tacitly.

The rationale for the strong executive system was that interest groups from the old regime were so well entrenched that conventional democratic politics would be unable to prevent them from sabotaging the reform process and disobeying the law. In the event, there was a hidden agenda, namely to prevent the newly-elected representative councils from getting in the way of administrative efficiency and the construction of new centres of power.

At the March 1991 sitting of the Russian Parliament, the hardliners led by Ivan Polozkov (since retired), failed to censure Yeltsin, then chair of the parliament, and opened the way to a vote in favour of establishing an elected executive presidency in Russia. This event may with hindsight be regarded as the crucial turning point in the democratic revolution, allowing Yeltsin to acquire the democratic legitimacy with which he was to overthrow the August coup. The hardliners had no credible candidate for the presidency and Yeltsin was to win overwhelmingly when the contest was held on June 12, 1991. The presidency was to have a significant symbolic value in the politics of the Russian reform movement. As Urban has noted, "the establishment of the office was in many respects indistinguishable from the campaign to capture it (1992:201).

This significance was shared at the local level by Sobchak and Popov, both of whom

received council majorities in favour of adopting a strong mayor system in their respective cities. An executive mayor directly elected by the entire population was seen to be the solution for the lack of decisiveness in local administration and representation. Endless wrangling between chair of council and chair of executive commitee would be solved by having one person take charge of the administration, pursuing initiatives within the budgetary framework decided by the council. Again supported by the Democratic Russia movement, Sobchak and Popov won the elections even more decisively than had Yeltsin at the national level, their elections, like his own being held on 12th June. Despite their support from the councils both new mayors were increasingly seen as hostile to the legislature.

EXECUTIVE VERSUS REPRESENTATIVE RULE IN ST PETERSBURG

One of the more fundamental problems of the system the democrats inherited in St Petersburg (as in Moscow) was the sheer number of deputies (councillors) both in the City Council and in the city as a whole. The City Council is made up of 380 deputies. Above it, at oblast or province level are a further 110. Below it there are 21 districts ("raioni"), each with around 150 deputies. To confuse matters further, the oblast, city and all the districts had their own executive commitee (ispolkom) which presides over the administration. No clear basis for the division of labour between levels existed, nor even any constitutional framework for assigning the respective duties of the legislative and executive bodies.

Insufficient discipline and a multitude of ill-defined interests appear to prevent the council from functioning effectively. This was particularly evident in the debate on the controversial housing privatisation reforms in April, 1991. Split between the broad options of giving housing away to occupiers, selling to the highest bidder, and distributing housing vouchers, the council debated for two days culminating in a mass of votes on amendments (which stirred Sobchak, then still chair of the council, as opposed to mayor, to berate deputies for discrediting democracy by their indecision) and final agreement to put no less than eight variations to the electorate for them to decide (which some saw as an abdication of the council's role). Amendments were very much a feature of debates, providing large numbers of individual deputies the chance to contribute, at the cost of substantial amounts of time being spent on voting; the debate on the establishment of a strong mayor received no less than 117.

Most of the deputies were new to politics and had no background in public administration, being drawn largely from the ranks of defence industry engineers and academics. A similar profile was found in Moscow, where as many as 90 % of deputies were drawn from the non-clerical white-collar bracket (Colton, 1990).

The councils' work was organised by 28 commissions elected by the deputies, the chairs of these commissions forming the Praesidium of the council, to which the chair and two deputy chairs of the council also belonged. Although the praesidium contained councillors of acknowledged ability, the degree and type of its authority remained unclear. It was unable to solve the problem of the lack of co-ordination between legislature and executive. As traditional authority collapsed, some council executives were said to be expanding their "commercial activity" as far as business was concerned, taking large personal payments for services — a practice which a Presidential edict of April 1992 was eventually to attempt to stamp out.

The struggle between the two wings of government began in June 1991, and intensified following the abortive coup. Sobchak as mayor increasingly attempted to reduce the power of the council, and particularly its praesidium (made of 28 chairs of committees until June, 1991, now reduced to 13 members directly elected by the council). As far as Sobchak was concerned, the council's role was to be confined to debating and agreeing the budget. This was the minimum required to comply with the Russian republic Law on Local Government which stipulated that budget's needed to be ratified by elected representatives at each level of local and regional government.

The Council in St Petersburg was further marginalised when Sobchak moved his executive, now re-named the mayor's office, away from the Maryinsky Place which it had previously shared with the council, and took up residence in the Smolny Institute. Smolny had previously been the seat of the Leningrad Oblast' party Committee. Democrat councillors accused Sobchak of ignoring them and surrounding himself with officials from the old Party structure.

A meeting of the "Association of St Peters-

burg Residents" in the Tauride Palace on 3rd April, 1992 provided an example of the anti-Sobchak hysteria which had developed. The meeting, convened to pass a resultion in support of the Yeltsin government's policies added to the resolution a vote of no confidence in Sobchak who was roundly condemned by almost all the speakers, to cheers from those assembled, who included many city council deputies. It fell to a lawyer, Schmit (previously a defender of dissidents under the old regime) to berate the delegates in return, asserting them to be unworthy of the name "intelligentsia". In part the rift reflected the deep divisions between the city's middle class activists and the defence industry management, upon whom the majority of jobs in the city depended, and with whom Sobchak was seen to co-operaing Increasingly closely.

EXECUTIVE VERSUS REPRESENTATIVE RULE IN MOSCOW

Within two weeks of becoming mayor., Gavriil Popov was said to be reviewing plans for the abolition not only of the city districts, but of the city council itself (Avayev, 1992). The conflict between Popov and the council (notably the "small council" of forty leading members) was the main reason given for Popov's first resignation in late December, 1991 (he withdrew his resignation on receiving an edict from President Yeltsin giving him greater powers). Criticised for over-reacting, Popov made a lengthy declaration in the popular press (Moskovski Komsomolets, 19. 12. 91), justifying his decision and warning Muscovites of the plight to which irresponsibility by the council would lead them. In particular the council had thrown out his plan for giving away housing to existing residents subject to taxation for any that received more than 25m sq.per person. The council rejected this in favour of a cash sale only plan, which would have fewer takers in the short term and would require highly complex valuation of each unit, in a period where no price value for any commodity could be regarded as reliable. Popov made less of his no less significant disputes with the Russian Parliament, whose different views on reform (he had wanted privatisation and de-monopolisation to precede liberalisation of prices) led him to press for a law granting special status for Moscow. One Moscow commentator (interviewed December, 1991) saw such conflict as inevitable in the transition period — the executive were pledged to reforms which, however introduced, were likely to create more losers than gainers. In such circumstances, the democratic representative role was bound to come under strain, and perhaps be sidelined altogether.

Popov's assault on the legislature was reflected in his restructuring of the executive. He abolished the executive committees of the 33 city districts and replaced them with 10 administrative districts, each governed by a prefect reporting to the city government. This was ostensibly done to reduce the influence of the Party, whose structure was based on the same district boundaries. In practice Party influence had been waning for two years and disappeared after August, 1991.

The Prefecture boundaries did not coincide with any organ of representative authority, and were thus unable (according to the Russian Law on Local Government of July, 1990) to draw up their own budget. In fact it may be argued that the change led to a single-tier of management, since prefects are all members of the City Government. Below the prefecture level are the 124 "municipal districts". These were established by Popov on an experimental basis in early 1991 before he became mayor, but then applied to whole city in late 1991/early 1992. The municipal districts are based on housing district boundaries and are intended to provide decentralised administration. One of the problems has been that many areas of "no-man"s land exist between these districts — leading in some cases to refuse being dumped between muncipal boundaries.

Each municipal district is led by a sub-prefect who reports to the prefect of the administrative district in which the municipal district is situated. As many as 70 % of the subprefects are former deputies of the district councils, cooperated into to new system whilst others continue to voice objections from the sidelines. It is maintained that municipal councils will exist in the future, with the district councillors re-convening at municipal district level (Vasilieva, 1992), although there is no legislative basis for this at present, and many of the district councillors are resisting such a move.

In practice, according to some respondents interviewed in the Moscow Mayor's office in March, 1992, the institution of the prefecture has not yet begun to work as intended. Some

prefects were said to be adopting a role of "fixer", not unlike the old Party secretaries, increasingly running all affairs in their district, whereas their role was meant to be to act as facilitator for market reforms.

To counter any tendency of prefects to revert to the old style of "administrative command" management, the subprefects have been organised into an association, and, according to some, given the task of making sure the prefects implement mayoral policy. One mayor's office official joked that they could become a kind of Mayor's secret police at local level, something which was seen as necessary given the conservatism of much of the administration.

THE FATE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA?

The struggle between executive and legislature is not confined to the major cities. Soon after becoming Russian President, Boris Yeltsin issued edicts by which he reserved the right to nominate "heads of administration" in all provinces, whether the relevant council approved or not. This rule was applied in all areas save Moscow and St Petersburg, where the mayors had been directly elected (although they still have a dual role as personally responsible to the President).

Some governors and heads of administration were appointed directly in spite of their declared preference for standing for election.

The heads of administration, or governors, then have the task of nominating the mayor's and district heads of administration, again regardless of whether the council accepts the decision. In some cases (the city of Nizhny-Novgorod for example) this led to the city council initially opposing a candidate for whom they would have been happy to vote, had he not been imposed. Thus the personal nomination approach, whilst having the advantage of sweeping away cadres of the old regime, may cause problems in terms of the legitimacy of new officials, who might in any case have won council backing.

It is likely that once a new constitution is adopted, new election will take the place of direct nominations, and a system of directly-elected administrators will come to be the rule. Such a system already exists in the Ukraine, where under the Basic Law of 1991, the chair of the council is directly elected by the people, and automatically becomes head of the administration. It is not yet clear whether this practice will prevent the internecine struggles that have characterised city government in Russia over the last two years.

Although the outlook for local government is likely to improve once the more severe reforms have passed through the system, there is nonetheless a degree of legitimate concern over a tendency towards arbitrary rule. Zhukov (1992), the chair of the Russian parliament committee on local government relates how in Pskov province, the council complained over the actions of the head of administration, who had arrogated to himself all powers related to the formation of budgets, and had (temporarily) received central government backing for this illegal move. Similar instances are said to be not uncommon.

While the local councils and administrations in Russia fight it out, they risk losing credibility amongst the population at large. Even though a majority of the latter support the economic reforms, the government both local and central is seen increasingly to consist of a morass of struggling elites.

Furthermore, the economic reform programme is placing an unprecedented burden on local government. In order to balance the budget at national level, increasingly difficult decisions are being passed down the hierarchy. With the increases, in energy prices occurring this year, expenditures at local level will have to be cut by dramatic amounts — estimates of 50—70 % even being referred to in interveiw. Decisions will increasingly be decentralised down to establishment level in areas such as health and education, and the managers of these will increasingly need to attract outside funds to maintain services.

Interviews with reformist officials in the major cities demonstrated considerable discontent with the pressure being placed on them by central government. One senior official declared (interview March, 1992), that when he complained that to maintain expenditure on what were already underfunded services, he would need twice the amount of income, central government officials simply told him to "cut social programmes".

In this and in other cases, local reformers felt they were being left in a position where they would face social collapse with no assitance

or understanding from central government. As one official put it:

"If we were being asked to cut 20 % of department budgets, that would give people an incentive to seek out waste. But when we're asked in effect to cut 80—90 %, people think it won't happen and do nothing".

Another commented:

"Sometimes I just sit there and gaze off into space, because I can't see any way out".

In the event, the liberalisation of energy prices the reform which threatened to cause most disruption to local government finance and social cohesion, is now (June 1992) being phased over two years, whereas at the time of the above interviews (March, 1992), the government's policy was for one shock increase to be carried through by May, 1992. This policy change may have reflected pressure from Yeltsin's local government appointees as well as the more frequently referred-to increase in the influence wirelded by the industrial lobby, who began to receive key government appointments in May/June 1992.

CONCLUSION

The old opposition of conservative and democrat in Russia is increasingly giving way to a different axis of conflict, between the representative and executive wings of government at all levels, a struggle for power in itself rather than for specific reform programmes. This threatens to undermining the popular perception of the reform process. As social problems increase (which they are likely to do, at least for the medium term), this is in turn likely to lead to significant conflict between central government and local administration.

In the long run, the problem is that Russia has yet to decide what should be the long-term role, status and structure of local government, something which the continued debate on the constitution has failed to make clear. Russia has a tradition of official authoritarianism balanced by local informal insubordination. Even the new President's authority has been evaded sufficiently to justify a new system of fines for officials who fail to carry out presidential directives (Izvestiya, 17. 1. 92). As a curious twist to this story of conflict between executive and representative organs, the Russian parliament voted (Izvestiya, 16. 1. 92) to send its own representatives/observers out to the localities. As the paper commented, with so many representatives of central government at large, was local government really necessary at all?

POSTCRIPT

The events described in this article have developed in a somewhat confusing way since the time of writing. In May, Moscow City Council (i.e. the representative body) passed a decision which declared that the city's administration would return forthwith to the "pre-Popov" structure, restoring the executive structures of the 33 district councils in the city (Izvestiya, 22 May, 1992). This re-organisation, presumably involving the partial or wholesale dismantling of the 10 prefectures and 124 municipal districts established since late 1991, was said to be likely to cause more inconvenience to administrators than to the general public, who were said to be still used to dealing with the original districts.

Curiously, two days later, Moscow City Government (i.e. the executive body) gave a press conference on its plans to widen the scope of the prefects' powers in the new administrative districts. Questioned by Izvestiya reporters as to how this tallied with the decision of the council two days before, city officials stated simply that to return to the previous structure would not be practicable (Izvestiya 24th May 1992).

To confuse matters further, Gavriil Popov did finally resign as mayor in June, 1992, although he declared that his move would not lead to any major restructuring of the executive.

REFERENCES

Avaev, M. (1992) "Yezda v Nyeznaemoye Byez Tormozov". Narodny Deputat, 4 (567), 46—52.

Bahro, R. (1974) "The Alternative in Eastern Europe", London, Pluto.

Bahry, D. (1987) "Outside Moscow: Power, Politics and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics". New York, Columbia Univ. Press.

Colton, T. (1990). "The Politics of Democratization: the Moscow Election of 1990". Soviet Economy, 6:4. 285—344.

Fainsod, M. (1961) "How Russia is Ruled", Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press.

Hahn, J. (1988) "Soviet Grassroots: Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press.

Moses, J. (1992) "Soviet Provincial Politics in an Era of Transition and Revolution, 1989—91. Soviet Studies. 44.3. 479—510.

Pipes, R. (1974) "Russia under the Anclen Regime", London and New York.
Rogger, H. (1983) "Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881—1917, Harlow, Longman.
Rutland, P. (1991) "From Perestroika to Paralysis: the Stalemate in Leningrad". RFE/RL Report on the USSR, March 22, 1991. 12—16.
Sakwa, R. (1990) "Soviet Politics", London Routledge.
Slider, D. (1992) "The CIS: Republican Leaders Confront Local Opposition". RFE/RL Research Report. 6. 3. 92. 7—11.
Sobchak, A. (1991) "Khozhdenie vo vlast", Moscow, Novosti.
Szamuely, T. (1974) "The Russian Tradition" London, Secker and Warburg.
Tolz, V. and Teague, E. (1992). "Is Russia Likely to Tum to Authoritarian Rule?". REF/RL Research Report. 24. 1. 92. 1—8.
Urban, M. (1992). "Boris 'Eltsin, Democratic Russia and the Campaign for the Russian Presidency". Soviet Studies, 44.2. 187—208.
Vasilieva, V. (1992) "Prefectura: nachalo puti". Narodny Deputat 3 (566) 30—35.
White, S. (1990) "Gorbachev in Power", Cambridge, CUP.
Wishnevsky, J. (1992). "Russia: Liberal Media Criticise Democrats in Power". REF/RL Research Report. 10. 1. 92. 6—11.
Zhukov, G. (1992) "S kyem v konfliktye Popov i Sobchak?". Narodny Deputat. 3 (566) 23—29.