Helsinki Law Review https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview <p>Helsinki Law Review’tä toimittavat Helsingin oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan oikeustieteen opiskelijat. Aikakauskirjan ensisijaisena tarkoituksena on tarjota sekä perustutkinto- että jatko-opiskelijoille mahdollisuus kehittää akateemisen kirjoittamisen ja arvioinnin taitojaan sekä osallistua julkaisutyöhön. Aikakauskirjan julkaisija on Helsingin yliopiston oikeustieteen opiskelijoiden tiedekuntajärjestö Pykälä ry.</p> <p>Aikakauskirja ilmestyy pääasiallisesti kahdesti vuodessa. Kirjoituksia julkaistaan suomen, ruotsin ja englannin kielillä. Suomen- ja ruotsinkielisistä kirjoituksista julkaistaan lisäksi englanninkielinen tiivistelmä. Helsinki Law Review ottaa vastaan lehden tilauksia yhteisöiltä. Aikakauskirjan painettuja kappaleita on myös jaossa Pykälä ry:n toimistolla (Mannerheimintie 3 B, 00100 Helsinki).</p> <p>Helsinki Law Review’tä ohjaa ja valvoo toimitusneuvosto, jonka jäsenet valitaan Helsingin yliopiston oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan henkilöstöstä. Jokaisesta artikkelista pyydetään nimetön referee-arviointi kahdelta sopivaksi katsotulta oikeustieteen asiantuntijalta. Arvioijille kerrotaan, että heidän arvioimansa artikkeli on opiskelijan kirjoittama.</p> <p>Aikakauskirjaan voidaan viitata lyhenteellä <em>HLR</em>.</p> fi-FI sade.mantyla@helsinki.fi (Sade Mäntylä) tuomas.tiihonen@helsinki.fi (Tuomas Tiihonen) ti, 21 marras 2023 10:02:02 +0200 OJS 3.2.1.4 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Pääkirjoitus https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/140933 Sade Mäntylä Copyright (c) 2023 Sade Mäntylä https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/140933 ti, 21 marras 2023 00:00:00 +0200 A Situationally Sensitive Critique of the Space of Law School from a Queer and Trans Perspective https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/130456 <p>In this article, I explore the challenges of radical queer and trans critiques of law and life in two Finnish law schools. Drawing on critical theories and personal experience, I demonstrate how the space of law school exercises power to silence and ”other” radical queer and trans energies. The bulk of this article focuses on three specific moments when this power is exercised: when speaking up, dressing up, and looking around. I argue that this power dynamic is made possible by the ”apolitical” theories of law and legal expertise according to which a great majority of law schools are still structured. I conclude the article with a gentle encouragement: we can and should enter these sites of power with the desire to resist the power dynamics of the “apolitical” space of law school. This article is written with that desire – to resist conventional expectations of legal and academic writing. The opportunities are manifold.</p> Rakel Jylhä-Vuorio Copyright (c) 2023 Rakel Jylhä-Vuorio https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/130456 ti, 21 marras 2023 00:00:00 +0200 Discrimination or Democracy? Reviewing the French Veil Ban in Light of the European Convention on Human Rights https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/128633 <p>This article aims to examine the rhetoric and legal logic exercised in S.A.S. v France, where the European Court of Human Rights reviewed French national legislation which treads perilously upon codified European human right norms. This article focuses on the French ban on full-face coverings in public and critically analyzes the logic of the arguments utilized by France to defend the ban. The case commentary is enriched with an analysis of the political and social rhetoric that must not be ignored when discussing justice and law.</p> <p>Despite nearly a decade having passed since the verdict, it remains crucial to review the legal vocabulary utilized and understand how it complicated the Court’s analysis due to France framing the matter as a judgement over values. This rhetoric persists today, making it improbable to contest these violations beyond a national judicial system. The article seeks to challenge the complacency of the Court due to hesitation to make a judgement over values, despite its existence to safeguard specific values. It also encourages continued skepticism toward the Court’s ability to secure human rights and fundamental freedoms. </p> Logan Sunnarborg Copyright (c) 2023 Logan Sunnarborg https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/128633 ti, 21 marras 2023 00:00:00 +0200 Henkissosiaalinen valtio: suojaako vihapuheen rajoittaminen demokratiaa? https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/131088 <p>A wayfarer once told about his childhood: “I grew up wandering in a horse carriage. Life was dangerous, my family was persecuted and discriminated. My father had to protect his children and keep a discipline. We had physical limits, but mentally we were free.”</p> <p>What is the difference between mental and physical limits? How does one categorize restrictions on freedom of speech, such as prohibiting hate speech? Are these restrictions mental, physical, or perhaps social? It is settled that law as a system is socio-mental by its nature, but freedom of speech is socio-mental also by its substance. How do socio-mental restrictions then fit our modern democratic model?</p> <p>The philosophical frame of reference of the article consists of enlightenment era literature on European democratic models, especially Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Law. It is concluded that in democracy’s struggle for existence, it may not be most useful to restrict hate speech as a crime. Democratic conversation could be improved in other ways, such as including minorities in public discussion.</p> Susanna Ahonen Copyright (c) 2023 Susanna Ahonen https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/131088 ti, 21 marras 2023 00:00:00 +0200 Identifying the Identified: Unraveling the Third Element of Personal Data in EU Law https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/131108 <p>The notion of ’personal data’ is a well-established concept within European Union legislation, having been defined and interpreted through various legal texts and court cases over the past two decades. However, the third element of this definition, which pertains to the identification or identifiability of an individual, continues to generate considerable ambiguity. The crux of this uncertainty lies in determining the circumstances under which an individual can be deemed ’identified’. This interpretation is of paramount importance, as data that cannot be associated with an identified or identifiable individual is not classified as personal data, thereby falling outside the scope of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).</p> <p>Historically, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not provided a clear stance on the threshold of identifiability. The Working Party, established under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive, has offered its own interpretation, providing a detailed perspective on what constitutes an ’identified’ individual. Despite its non-binding nature, this opinion is frequently employed by legal scholars as a foundation for defining personal data. However, the absence of references to this opinion in CJEU judgements, coupled with the fact that the European Data Protection Board (the successor of the Working Party 29) has not officially endorsed or adopted the WP 136 opinion, leaves the question of what can be considered as ’identified’ open to interpretation and debate.</p> Yacine Ouarab Copyright (c) 2023 Yacine Ouarab https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/131108 ti, 21 marras 2023 00:00:00 +0200 ”Joka ottaa vakuuttaakseen, ottaa vastatakseen” - Vakuutus vastuunrajoituskeinona yritysten välisissä sopimuksissa https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/130680 <p>In industries such as construction, maintenance and warehousing, business contracts typically include provisions concerning contracting partners’ insurance coverage. For example, under 38 § of the Finnish general conditions for building contracts (YSE 1998), it is stated that unless otherwise agreed, the main contractor is obligated to acquire a construction all risk policy to cover the actual construction site and all the subcontracts related to the main contract. If there is a breach of contractual obligations resulting to a property damage, it can be argued that the contract’s insurance provisions act as a limit of liability resulting in a situation where the party guilty of breach of contract is not legally liable for the damages covered by the policy. The findings of this article indicate that insurance provisions in business contracts can either limit or extend the parties’ legal liabilities for damages caused by breaches of contractual obligations.</p> Artturi Mikkonen Copyright (c) 2023 Artturi Mikkonen https://journal.fi/helsinkilawreview/article/view/130680 ti, 21 marras 2023 00:00:00 +0200