ARTIKKELI

Gabriel Naudé – a librarian and a libertin between the Huguenot Wars and the Enlightenment

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The article suggests a perspective for considering the tension between (i) the authoritarian – perhaps even in a sense 'Machiavellian' – political ideas of Gabriel Naudé in *Considerations politiques sur coups d'etat*, on one hand, and (ii) his at least assumingly liberal ideas of the library in *Advis pour dresser une bibliothèque*. The study starts from the review of the frame constituted by Naudé's personality and political thought, which we, in turn, could best understand in the light of his own time and the history before him, including the history of political thought and particularly the aftermath of the French wars of religion (so-called Huguenot Wars) in the sixteenth century. The person of Naudé thus conceived of together with some developments after him until the end of the *ancien régime* and the Great Revolution of France – such as the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere – could be a frame for specifying the significance of Naudé's thought about the library.

Keywords: kirjastohistoria; libertinismi; Naudé, Gabriel; Ranska – 1600-luku; uskonsodat; valistus (aatteet); yksinvaltius

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Gabriel Naudé was born in 1600 into a “respected but modest family” in Paris (Clarke, 1970, 3). After the master of arts degree, he continued his studies with medicine. Instead of practising medicine, however, Naudé became a librarian. He served as a librarian various potentates in France and Italy. Thereafter, in 1643, Naudé's career culminated as the librarian of Cardinal Julio Mazarin (Ital. *Giulio Mazarini*), the first minister of the king of France and after the death of the king and during the minority of the new king, the strong man in queen dowager's regency. (Rice, 1939/2010, 9, 24.)

Within the library field, Naudé has been famous for his *Advis pour dresser une bibliothèque* (Naudé, 1927; in continuation *Advis*) particularly. Somewhat typical of library field is the unconditionally positive manner in which Ritva Sievänen-Allen (1978, 82) writes in the first Finnish introductory textbook to library and information science. “The instructions by Naudé have had a remarkable effect both on the contemporaries and the posterity, and his idea of the library as a systematically organised open collection of knowledge that is accessible to all has been pivotal in many respects” (see also Clarke, 1969, for instance).

Mazarin too planned to create in Paris a vast library that would be open to the public. In Europe, there earlier were only three such libraries, ”the Ambrosiana founded at Milan ... in 1609, the Bodleian opened at Oxford in 1602, and the Angelica founded at Rome .... in 1614” (Clarke, 1970, 18; see also Naudé, 1627, 115). Since the end of the year 1643, Mazarin's library was open to the public every Thursday (Clarke, 1970, 68-69). At highest during Naudé, the library consisted of some forty thousand books, which would be a considerable proportion of the estimated one hundred thousand separate editions published in Europe until the year 1600 (op. cit., 63 ff.) From 1648 to 1653 in France, a period of rebellions called Fronde (*La Fronde*) took place and in an early phase of it the Parliament of Paris confiscated Mazarin's library and sold its books. Mazarin himself had to leave the country. Without a patron, Naudé now accepted the invitation of Queen Christina of Sweden and moved to Stockholm. After Mazarin returned to France and power in 1653, however, Naudé as well left for Paris but died during his journey. (See, for instance, Clarke, 1970, 99 ff., 125, 137-139.)

The problem and dealing with it

We could have a good point of departure for depicting Naudé as a person in France of the first half of seventeenth century in contrasting his assumingly liberal thought about the library and his at least seemingly entire-

ly different political thought. At its sharpest, we can see the latter in Naudé's *Considerations politiques des coups d'etat* (Naudé, 1639/1667; in continuation *Considerations*), which is a rather peculiar work and publication. In the section "Au lecteur", Naudé writes that the plan was to print only twelve copies (op cit., 1). We shall see below how Naudé in this book praises the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre (*Massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy*), one of the most horrible atrocities during the religious wars that had raged in France from 1562 to 1598. One has seen this as an ugly taint in Naudé's otherwise so positive posthumous reputation (see for instance Granniss, 1907, 19-20). In my view, however, we should at least try to overcome mere over-praising of Naudé's modern liberality, on the one hand, and condemning his political thought with hindsight only, on the other.

I shall proceed here by trying to embed Naudé as a person in the history before and during his own time. After that, his personality thus outlined together with developments after him until the beginning of the Great Revolution in 1789 and the end of the *Ancien régime* of France will serve as a frame for discussing the concrete meaning and significance of his thought about the library. A price of my historically ample perspective is that my reasoning will be somewhat sketchy by nature. One perhaps should read especially the latter half of this article as questions, rather than as actual conclusions. On a general level, I shall be assuming that *or asking, whether*

- in Naudé's time, his political writings were expressing what he sincerely considered possible and/or necessary and possibly even in a moral sense just and right, to a degree, at least, albeit he probably had some tactical motives as well, and

- Naudé's liberal ideas of the library were but most abstract anticipation of later developments such as the public library proper as an institution of the real civil society or the bourgeois public sphere in the sense of Jürgen Habermas (1962/1991), not to mention democracy with the formal institutions and ideals characteristic of it.

I shall outline here in an essayist manner some broad but only hypothetical lines of argumentation, which one could complement and also contest by focusing on more particular and specific themes and historical developments.

Naudé's politico-intellectual environment

To understand Naudé's thought as well as the French libertinism (*libertinage*) that he represents – thought perhaps only ”in the widest sense of the word” (Rice, 1939/2010, 113) – I must shortly depict the politico-intellectual situation in France during the seventeenth century. As a general background to this, we must pay some attention to the already mentioned religious wars, so-called Huguenot Wars. Huguenot is the term used for the mostly Calvinist French Protestants.

From the chaos of the Huguenot Wars towards absolute monarchy

For Naudé, due to the manner of writing history in his time as well as in the light of his writings, history and politics were the acts of the kings and other mighty persons. Our starting point too must be such 'surface history', if we wish to understand Naudé's views and arguments, but we can add remarks on early modernity on a more substantial, socio-political level.

The proportion of the Huguenots arose to about ten percent of the population in France. Even if Reformation had some support in the countryside as well, the higher proportion of the Huguenots among the artisans and even the merchants increased its significance in the whole of the French society. According to Mack P. Holt (2005, 36), one can characterise Reformation in France as the movement of those with ”literacy and self-confidence” – though ”the local and regional variation” was noteworthy. The first disseminators of Reformation, however, were priests who formerly had been Catholics (Knecht, 2013, 51-55).

As Robert J. Knecht (2013, 52) writes, furthermore, ”Around 1560 Calvinism began to make deep inroads to nobility”, and according to some estimates, there were regions where nearly half of the nobility supported Reformation in the 1560s, which was significant in a society where the feudal structures were still active. The clientage – the networks on the top of which there often was some representative of the higher nobility and which consisted of people belonging to lower social strata and tied to and dependent on the top of the network by various relations of change – still advanced the proliferation of Reformation (Knecht, 2013, 53). For nobility, more typically than for others, the motivations to support Reformation related to the feudal struggles of power, which complicated further the situation. On the highest political level, there became to be three sides in the wars. A faction of (i) extreme Catholics was a reaction to (ii) the king's and his administration's allegedly too soft

attitude towards (iii) the Huguenots. The extreme Catholic faction became later organised as the Catholic League (Ligue) and led by Duke Henry de Guise. Among the leaders of the Huguenots was Henri de Bourbon, the king of Navarra and eventually the king of France as well. During the wars, in any case, the king between the other camps was often rather weak.

We get a grasp of the scale of the chaos and disasters caused by the Huguenot Wars from the estimates of total population fall of two to four million (Knecht, 2013, 296) – or ten to twenty percents of the whole population of France – during the wars. Naudé himself (-1653/1739, 129), on the other hand, tells that according to Jean Bodin – a scholar of politics from the sixteenth century – and other contemporaries, the number of casualties would have been about one million. A part of the losses, of course, were caused by hunger and diseases that accompanied the wars. The amount and forms of actual violence, however, may have made the period particularly traumatic. Besides the battles between the armies, massacres following one another took place, and quite ordinary people were killing each other.

Furthermore, there were assassinations of single high leaders of the parties, as examples the murder of Henry de Guise and his cardinal brother Louis II. The murder of the brothers was arranged in 1588 by King Henry III – who, in turn, was murdered by a Catholic extremist a little later (see, for instance, Holt, 2005, 129-130 and 133). Given quite an ancient tradition, a regicide was a particularly notorious event (see, for instance, Pernot, 2001, 138). The wars finally ended once Henri de Bourbon became the king of France too as Henri IV – quite according to the order of succession, but de facto only after he converted to Catholicism.

The wars of religion had interrupted a development described by Edward John Kearns as a move from ”a medieval situation where the kings of France in their ’royal domain’ were scarcely more powerful than many of the dukes of France in their duchies”. According to Kearns, we could consider King Henri II just before the Huguenot Wars as an absolute monarch already. (Kearns, 1982, 1.) The increase of the king's power restarted during the reign of Henri IV. After he had died in 1610 – once again, as a victim of a murderous Catholic extremist (Holt, 2005, 177-178) – the development restarted relatively soon. It continued particularly during the ”great ministerial periods” (Kearns 1982, 4) of Mazarin and before him, of the even more powerful and famous first minister of the king, Cardinal and Duke Armand du Plessis de Richelieu. The latter was also the man who first invited Naudé back to France from Italy. After *Fronde* began the reign of Louis XIV, later known as the Sun King (*le Roi de Soleil*) and even as *the* symbol of the absolute monarchy.

Even Louis XIV, however, exercised power within the frame of structures

inherited from the history. The regional parliaments, including the important *Parlement de Paris*, functioned primarily as courts of justice but also had a say on the royal decrees – even if a procedure called *lit de justice* gave the king the final say. Neither had the high nobility lost all of its power. A body representing the nobility as well as noteworthy parts of the wider population – and even a possible seed for a ”representative institution of the people” (Habermas 1962/1991, 67) – had been the Estates General (*l'États Généraux*). After 1614, however, the Estates were first summoned in 1789 only, on the eve of the Great Revolution (Swann, 2001, 140). Even the power of an assumingly absolute monarch was partly, though decreasingly, a matter of negotiation. (Cf. also Bouveresse, 2016.)

The religious fronts in the seventeenth century France

Given the background of the Huguenot Wars already, the situation on the field of religion is an important part of the intellectual environment of Naudé as well. In the seventeenth century France Catholic (Counter-)Reformation had the initiative, which was the case on the secular level – where religious uniformity among the subject of the king could have been politically desirable – as well as on the properly spiritual or religious level.

The spiritual side of the Catholic Reformation was present, for instance, in a new interest in charity (care of the ill, helping the poor, etc.) among the noble ladies as well as in the communities such as the Oratory of Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle and Jansenism (Pintard, 1943/2000, 3-4). Both Bérulle and Jansenism, like Luther and Calvin, found their theological foundation from Church Father Augustin, Doctor *gratiae* from the fourth century A.D. In view of Bérulle, however, Augustinianism as ”a new Christian philosophy [...] would not only strengthen the intellectual foundation of the Catholic Church but also provide a theological bulwark against the Protestant reform movement” (Skirry, 2010, 11).

In the spirit of Max Weber (1904–05/2005, 58 ff.), we could see the Augustinian theology – especially but not only in its Calvinist form – as somehow suited for the rising bourgeoisie and even the early modernity in general. Essential was the mentality of viewing also the mundane work in general as the service of God, as a vocation, and even as an option to find out whether one belongs to those chosen for salvation, but not as a “magic” of influencing one's salvation, which depended on the divine grace only (op. cit., 61, 71). In this sense, the Augustinian doctrine of grace leads to dramatic and even modernly existential loneliness and isolation of an individual. Even if the motivation of

the Augustinian Reformation in many cases probably was sincerely religious, we could see there some moment of secularisation as well, though in quite a particular sense only.

We still should notice, however, some other mixtures of modernisation, secularisation, and religion, advancing political stability under an absolute monarchy. While giving protestants some rights and even privileges in the famous Edict of Nantes from 1598, Henri IV probably was no more so interested in the cause of Reformation. Now as the king of France, he perhaps simply wished to protect the peace and assumed that Reformation would eventually fade away. (Rothrock, 1960, 17-18.) Trevor-Roper (1967, 8), on the other hand, writes how ”Cardinal Richelieu, it is well known, like Henri IV before him, relied largely on Huguenot men of affairs”, continuing then with a list of the reformed bankers used by Richelieu. An important minister of Henri IV, Duke Maximilien de Sully, was a Huguenot. During the Thirty Years' War, France allied with reformed Sweden. This all tells about secularisation of the state simultaneously with the Catholic Reformation: ”The secular state was born of necessity and compromise, a reluctant concession on the part of rulers of increasingly centralized states.” (Johnson & Koyama, 2012, 27-28 and 34.)

The Edict of Nantes, in any case, lost some of its significance already in the first half of the century and was finally cancelled by Louis XIV in 1685 (Johnson & Koyama, 2012, 28, for instance). Port Royal, the famous centre of the Jansenists, was closed during Louis XIV's reign and Jansenism finally condemned as heresy. The Jesuits, allowed to return to France in 1603, were the major antagonists of Jansenism. (Treasure, 2003, 244-247; Kearns, 1982, 10 and 95 ff.)

As a whole, Catholicism and religion were politically significant, but also independent constituents of the intellectual climate in the seventeenth century France. So-called Gallicanism aimed at ”administrative independence of the French church vis-a-vis the papacy”, but succeeded to maintain some independence on the French crown as well (see Becker, 1974). Contrary to earlier views, Caroline Maillet-Rao (2013, 541) claims that the group of Dévots favoured absolutism, but opposed Richelieu who, according to the Devots, was using the power that should belong to the king or “God’s chosen” only.

Libertinism of ”*le siecle des saints*”

While justifying his notion of ”libertinage érudit” Pintard (1943/2000, vii-viii) comments on the problems within the abstract divisions such as the opposition of ”libertinism of manners (*libertinage des moeurs*)” and of ”ideas

(*idées*)" – or "*le libertinage proprement dit et la libre pensée*". Naudé's libertinism, however, clearly belonged to the erudite side.

Edward John Kearns (1982, 15), in turn, divides the libertins according to their social status. On the one hand, there are those who had some social status and/or a powerful protector and who tended to think and express their thought in a relatively cautious manner. On the other hand, there were those without any significant social position and/or patron and their thought and expression was radical and who thus took the risk of "official displeasure". Examples of the latter are Lucilio Vanini and Cyrano de Bergerac, while Pierre Gassendi, François La Mothe de Vayer, and Naudé would exemplify the former group. So-called libertinism was a current of thought among quite a small group of people.

Referring to the spiritual side of Catholic reformation, Pintard (1943/2000, 4) still characterises the colourful seventeenth century of France as the Century of the Saints (*Siecle des Saints*), then asking how there fits libertinism that quite often is at least indifferent as regards religion – if not openly atheist. A plausible suggestion with Pintard (1943/2000, 5) is that in the time after the Huguenot Wars, there emerged something like a "'third party' (*tiers parti*) of the indifferents detached of positive faith, the violence, and the brutalities of all the sects." Indifference as regards religion, on the other hand, could have been a way to hide actual atheism, which – and public expressions of which, particularly – would have been dangerous. Condemning and then executing Vanini in 1619 in Toulouse was a warning example (Kearns, 1982, 15). The actual views on the religion of Naudé himself, however, could be "almost impossible to determine" (Popkin, 1979/2003, 82).

We also could recognise the core ideas of libertinism through – and in a logical, though not temporal sense, between – two renowned figures from the history of philosophy. The legacy of Michel de Montaigne in libertinism of the first half of the seventeenth century was his often even somewhat pessimistic scepticism. With Montaigne, this probably was a reaction to the insanity of the wars of religion, manifested in essays such as *De la vanité* and *De la coustume, & de ne changer aisément vne loy reccue* (Montaigne, 1580/1600, 80 ff. and 977 ff.). With René Descartes, in turn, one of the primary aims was to overcome scepticism. As regards religion, further, Descartes – viewed by Cardinal Bérulle as "the main hope for a new Catholic rationalism" to replace the Aristotelian Thomism (Kearns, 1982, 10) – did probably not share the typical views of the libertins.

Another vein of thought still typical to the libertins is a kind of conformism as regards both politics and religion, combined with an individualist disposition. Particularly for the libertines with a "certain social status", most impor

tant would have been the freedom ”in their private intellectual doubts” (Kearns, 1982, 15; see also Bianchi, 2008, 208, and Russo, 1997, 384, for instance). On the other hand, the position of libertinism as the third party between Catholicism and Reformation could mean that they should not take any side in this respect. Some libertins, including Naudé, however, could have favoured Catholicism without any genuinely religious motivation and only for political reasons related to the political order, which they at least silently accepted – and Naudé even rather loudly supported. According to Rice's (1939/2010, 10) general assessment, "Naudé is the partisan of authority and monarchy, not an enthusiast, it is true, but a skeptic, jealous of his own comfort, and enemy of the troubles and disorders arising out of political discontent.” According to Frédéric Gabriel (2004, 75), further, ”Naudé's work opens itself perfectly to an ultra-Gallican reading (*à une lecture ultra-gallicane*)” and contains a view of ”the functional religious power not unrelated to the political religion (*pouvoir religieux fonctionnel qui n’est pas sans rapport avec la religion politique*).”

Within the French libertinism of the sixteenth century, there indeed are views approaching the notion of liberal in our days even. I shall denote such positions a little redundantly as liberal libertinism. By the innerly somewhat contradictory notion of authoritarian libertinism, in turn, I refer to Naudé's and others' in a way or another approving attitude towards quite a strong monarchy and the Catholic hegemony.

The liberal librarian and his authoritarian views on political issues

Even if I here focus on Naudé's thought about the library, we still should notice his works criticising superstition and mysticism in various forms (see Naudé, 1623 and 1625). This side of his thinking, together with his ideas of the library, manifests his advocacy of knowledge and rationality in quite a persistently modern sense of the words. Naudé's authoritarian attitude, then, manifests itself in defending those in power against the populace's expressions of dissatisfaction, for instance. As a young man, he criticises the libels attacking Duke de Luynes, the favourite of King Louis XIII, and during *Fronde*, he defends Mazarin against the rebellious accusations (Naudé, 1620 and 1649).

Naudé's assumingly liberal ideas of the library

In Naudé's assumingly liberal thought about the library in *Advis*, two

crucial moments are (i) his views of the collection (Naudé, 1627, 37 ff.) and (ii) his view of a library that is open to anyone (”*a vn chacun*”), to even the ”smallest” who could benefit from it (”*au moindre des hommes qui en pourra auoir besoin*”) (op. cit., 114-115). We shall discuss only later, however, what actually might have meant for Naudé that the library should be open to anyone. As regards the content of the library, some general-level remarks on Naudé's ideas are in place here already.

Behind the Bodleian Library, there were ideas of Francis Bacon. Compared to Bacon's focus on instrumental knowledge, we should notice Naudé's historical emphasis and focus on the books themselves (cf. Johnson, 2011, 10-13). In what Naudé was looking for in the history, however, we could find a kind of governing-technical advice for ruling and maintaining order and stability. As regards its general structure, Naudé deals with the problems of collection through categories such as books by both the ancient and new principal authors, books commenting on them, etc. (Naudé, 1627, 37 ff.). Still compared to the Bodleian Library and Thomas Bodley himself, Naudé was more particular in excluding the influence of his own likes or dislikes, which may have made his collection policy more universalist, so to speak (cf. Lemke, 1991, 33).

As a somewhat problematic example of Naudé's at least assumingly liberal attitude as regards the collections of the library, with a connection to his political thought as well, we can take his claim that in the library, there should be the books of the heretics as well, such as Martin Luther or Jean Calvin. According to Naudé (1927, 47), “our doctors (*nos Docteurs*)” should find such books in the library “to refute them (*pour les refuter*)”. Of course, we could think that within the Catholic hegemony, this is only an excuse hiding Naudé's actual views, which then could be much more radically liberal. We should remind, however, that in the sixteenth century already, there had been not only ideas of mere politically motivated and temporary ”*tolérance*” or “acceptance of something intrinsically undesirable”. There had also been some advocates for ”*liberté de conscience*” with actual ”respect for the individual conscience” (Smith, 1994, 30). The latter, in turn, could already anticipate some more universal later ideas of human rights or civil liberties.

Naudé (1627, 45-46), on the other hand, uses the *pour les refuter* argument for still another, somewhat vague category of books ”which have been written on little-known topics” or which ”teach us nothing but vain and useless matters”, such as the books on magnetic ointment, philosopher's stone, artificial memory, or Art of Llull. Parallelling these with the books by Luther and Calvin might also tell us something about Naudé's general attitude towards Reformation as well as towards the religion altogether.

I perhaps should remark here finally that towards the end of the

eighteenth century the library initially created by Naudé and later re-opened as *Bibliothèque Mazarine* was not among the best exemplars of the Enlightenment. Its collection policy especially seemed to have not very much in common with the ideas of Naudé. Louis-Sébastien Mercier, a French playwright and essayist, tells that the library contained plenty of old religious polemics while the philosophical works were present quite scarcely – if not entirely forbidden. In this way, one had nullified Cardinal Mazarin's ”only good act” (”*la seule bonne œuvre que le cardinal Mazarin ait faite en sa vie*”). (Mercier, 1783, 127-128; see also Franklin, 1860, 173.)

The authoritarian libertine praising St. Bartholomew's Day massacre

Coup d'état was in Naudé's time a notion meaning an exceptional and often violent action the aim of which was to protect the state against some significant threat and which broke the limits of the law and/or violated the ordinary morality. As examples of coup d'états of different nature, Naudé mentions the murders of de Guise brothers (”*mort des messieurs de Guise*”) and Henri IV's conversion to Catholicism in order to become the king of France, which might not have been a sign of a sincerely religious disposition.

St. Bartholomew's Day massacre beginned August 24, 1572, and continued for some weeks in Paris, and for some months in the provinces. In *Considerations*, Naudé's (1639/1667, 170) assessment of the massacre as “a just and remarkable act the causes of which were more than legitimate” (“*une action très-juste, & tres-remarquable, & dont la cause estoit plus que légitimé*”) was even in its time scandalous – and Naudé was clearly aware of this. He remarks that both Protestants and Catholics of his time condemn the massacre (op. cit., 169). He also blames for cowardice (*lâcheté*) the French historians ignoring the reason that made the massacre justified. On the other hand, the *Considerations* begins, as Rice (1939/2010, 88) writes, with ”an entire chapter of apology for composing the work.” Naudé makes a sharp distinction between morals and knowledge, according to Rice: right and wrong belong to morals only, not to knowledge. In this way, Naudé himself can appear as a realist who only is telling how power is exercised in the courts and by the princes.

Then again, it very soon becomes clear that Naudé does not write only about what actually happens. In the third chapter of his book, he brings out theoretical – and here we can say, indeed, moral-theoretical – conditions under which a coup d'état can be justified (see Naudé, 1639/1667, 118 ff.; Rice, 1939/2010,

91 ff.). According to Rice, Naudé takes the five conditions for this directly from *De la sagesse* by Pierre Charron (1604, 489-495). According to Naudé, a coup d'etat must be (i) defensive, rather than offensive, and (ii) necessary and beneficial for “the public of the state (*public d’etat*)” and the prince, it (iii) must proceed in ”small steps”, rather than ”galloping” (*au galop*) and furthermore, (iv) one chooses the smooth and easy methods and (v) for justifiability of the acts, the prince executes them only ”regretting and moaning” (“*ne les fassent qu’à regret & en soupirant*”, which is nearly the same expression that Charron had used , op. cit., 495).

We certainly may ask, whether St. Bartholomew's Day massacre satisfied the demands (iii) and (iv) in particular. According to ”modern estimates”, the massacre ”resulted in between 5,000 and 20,000 deaths” (Johnson & Koyama, 2012, 26). Naudé himself does write about ”getting free” of Admiral Coligny – a leader among the Huguenots who recently had become a member of the royal council – ”and his accomplices” (”*défaire de l’Amiral & de ses complices*”. Naudé, 1639/1667, 171), which could mean a relatively small group of people. Then again, Naudé must have been aware of the larger scale of the killing. He even defends the massive murdering quite openly despite the objection based on the fact that many of the victims were innocent (op. cit., 172 ff.). Related to this is that Naudé clearly had no respect for the ordinary people (for particularly harsh words, see op. cit., 233 ff.; see also Pintard, 1943/2000, 550).

Further reflections on and around Naudé's views on politics

How could we understand that Naudé – assumingly, at least, quite a liberal librarian – defended an atrocity like the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day? Rice (1939/2010, 10) characterises Naude as a man who – ”in spite of his considerable independence of character and love of freedom of individual opinion” – had the skill of pleasing the mighty persons by his writings. We even may ask whether Naudé actually meant *Considerations* – instead of Cardinal Bangi formally addressed at the beginning of the book – for the eyes of Cardinal Richelieu, with the aim of advancing the options for a career in France. As a thought experiment, at least, we could look for some other and perhaps less selfish motives with Naudé as well, and thus “do justice” to the one investigated in the study of history (cf. Kalela, 2012, 35).

Some currents of political thought before and in Naudé's time

We first should notice that much of what Naudé writes about the coup d'etats can be found already in the political scholarship in his own time and shortly before him. According to Justus Lipsius, a Dutch scholar of politics, the foundation of political activity is prudence (*prudentia*), which according to Naudé (1639/1667, 50) means ”a choice and sorting what one should escape and hope (*un choix & triage des choses qui sont à fuir, ou à désirer*)”. With Lipsius (1589/1632, 104) himself, the core of prudence is the choice (”*prudentiam vocamus [...] electio rerum quae aliter atque aliter sese habent*”). Lipsius here approaches the basis of the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis* as a form of intelligence containing the questions about right, wrong, and the ends of our actions (see Aristotle, -322BC/1975, 1094a-1094b; see also Suominen, 2016, 39).

Behind the notion of coup d'etat as Naudé uses it, there is his division of political prudence into ”easy” and ”difficult” as Rice (1939/2010, 93) formulates it. Naudé’s own expressions are a little more complicated: (i)”ordinary and easy, proceeding along the normal paths and without exceeding the laws and customs of the country” and (ii) ”extraordinary, more rigorous, severe and difficult” (”... de*ux sortes de prudence : la première ordinaire & facile, qui chemine suivant le train commun sans excéder les loix & coustumes du païs : la sécondé extraordinaire, plus rigoureuse, severe & difficile*”, Naudé, 1639/1667, 53). Lipsius' somewhat rude but also rather illustrative wording adds to the 'pure' *prudentia* the notion of the mixed prudence (*prudentia mixta*) required in exceptional situations (Lipsius, 1589/1632, 178; Rice, 1939/2010, 92). Illustratively enough, Lipsius (op. cit., 182-183) even suggests a classification of the frauds or wrongdoings allowed by *prudentia mixta* into “light”, “medium”, and “grave” (*levis, media, gravis*). In a pragmatic perspective, on the other hand, Charron (1604, 494-495) justifies somehow intelligibly this kind of reasoning, which otherwise might seem odd to a reader in the twenty-first century at least: ”To do justice in big matters, to make wrong in little ones is allowed (*pour faire droite en gros, il est permis de faire tort en détail*). We could, of course, compare this with emergency powers legislation proper, which emerged only later.

With the notions of coup d’état is still connected with the notion of the reason of state (*raison d’état*) present in the political theory of the early modernity. According to Paul-Erik Korvela (2006, 15), the notion means that the activities of government have rules that differ from those regulating the behaviour of an individual – to the degree that ”the virtues of private life may

very well turn out to be vices when they are applied in politics, i.e. public conduct”.

This thought is often combined with the Florentine political theorist Nicolo Machiavelli. It was, however, much older and also present in the Italian Renaissance shortly before Machiavelli. According to Korvela, further, Machiavelli himself never uses the expression of *ragion di stato*. (See Korvela, 2006, 33). Edmund M. Beam (1982, 35-41) claims that in France before St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, Machiavelli was ”an object of disinterested speculation” and there actually were ”the serious students of politics who read his work carefully”. After that, however, Machiavelli was ”the object of violent passions, invective and vilification” only.

Adrianna E. Bakos (1991, 400-401), on the other hand, tells how using the expression raison d'etat already became a sign of the notorious 'Machiavellianism'. The same effect had the names of the persons like Tacitus, Emperor Tiberius, and the former King Louis XI of France with his ”reprehensible view of politics” sometimes summarised by the phrase ”who cannot fake, cannot reign (*qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare*)”. ’Machiavellianism’ in this particular sense could manifest itself still in Naudé's (1630) A*ddition a l’histoire de Lovys 11*. formally describing cultural advancements during Louis XI, but probably with the aim of polishing the late king's reputation in other respects as well.

The notion of tyranny and the unquestioned legitimacy of the strong monarchy?

As a part of the legitimacy of the monarchy in the time of Naudé as well, quite a classical manifestation of the idea that the power of a prince as well must have some rules consists of the notions of tyranny and tyrant inherited from the Antiquity already. With Aristotle (-322BC/1959, 207, 1279b), ”tyranny is monarchy ruling in the interest of the monarch”. For Naudé (1639/1667, 68-69) himself, a tyrant is a sovereign who uses the power for his own particular interests (*bien particulier*). According to Thomas Aquinas, furthermore, the subjects even are allowed to dethrone a tyrant – though not kill him (Tenkku, 1981, 278; see also Gilson, 1947, 454). (Cf. also “absolutism” vs “despotism” in Bouveresse, 2016, 77-78.)

The notion of tyranny, then, implies as its (quasi-)logically required alternative the 'good' and legitimate monarchy. We should pay attention here to Naudé's argument according to which the subjects who understand how power works and princes act ”can more easily recognise when the conduct of their princes tend to establish a tyrannical domination (*peuvent plus facilement*

reconnaistre quand les deportements de leur Princes tendent à établir une Domination Tyrannique)." (Naude, 1639/1667, 23). Once again, Naudé would appear as a realist arguing that knowledge about the conduct of the princes and in the courts is beneficial, regardless of whether one accepted or not such conduct. Particularly in the case of Naudé, however, there still is the following problem. Should not we assume that given Naudé's unscrupulous realism, he also might have considered the idea of 'good' monarchy as somehow unrealistic and even naive? The very idea of avoiding tyranny by enlightening the subjects could be an excuse only meant for Cardinal Bangi.

According to Carlos Gómez (2000, 130), Cardinal Richelieu was for Naudé "the model of the new prince, [...] of the statesman who acts wisely and always at the service of the reason of State". At the beginning of the second part of his *Testament politique*, Richelieu solemnly tells that a prince should use his power with the "reign of God (*Régne de Dieu*)" as the foundation and always aiming at "public interests" ("*Intérêts public*" vs "*Particuliers*"). After discussing many practical issues like trade, military power on the land and the seas, as well as diplomacy, Richelieu beautifully ends the arch by promising that a prince in this way also obtains the possession of the hearts of his subjects (Richelieu, 244 ff., 254 ff. and 410-411). There is no reason to exclude the possibility that *Régne de Dieu* could have meant with Richelieu something like charity and righteousness – though perhaps only as far as they were consistent with *raison d'état* since the state was what ultimately mattered, rather than the minister or even the king (Bouveresse, 2016, 79-80).

Richelieu's text as such seems neither very unconcerned about the well-being of the subjects nor so unwilling to recognise the duties of the prince in this respect – as authoritarian and even ruthless as he otherwise might have been. Then again, Richelieu could have decided merely to write sublimely enough for the eyes of King Louis XIII "*le Juste*" whom the text should have advised on political matters after the death of the cardinal himself. Naudé, furthermore, might have admired Richelieu's determined actions, rather than his sublime words.

In the seventeenth century France, in any case, there were people for whom exactly the kind of political thinking that we find with Naudé – as well as with Richelieu – would have meant tyranny. As Arthur Herman (1992, 265, see also 250 ff.) writes, "efforts to reestablish Catholic worship and royal authority were in the Huguenot vocabulary 'cruelty' and 'tyranny'". There were people for whom the name of Louis XI praised by Naudé simply was the name of a tyrant, as well as the name of Charles IX, the young king of France during the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day (see Bakos, 1991, 405). Already in the sixteenth century, Etienne de La Boëtie, for instance, had been critical as regards

the overly powerful king. According to Anne Kupiec (1999, 28-29), Naudé should have known La Boëtie's manuscript *Discours de la servitude volontaire*, which probably was in the library of Henri de Mesme, the first mighty patron whom Naudé served as a librarian. We could conclude that Naudé indeed was aware of the critical views as well and actually 'choose' to favour absolutism and even what some others at least might have seen as "*Domination Tyrannique*". Kupiec's (1999, 29) conclusion is that ”even if Naudé is a free spirit – a libertine – it does not mean a libertarian (*si Naudé est un esprit libre – un libertin – , ce n'est pas un libertaire*)."

Then again, there is the option that Naudé like the others favouring absolutism saw the anti-absolutist views as somewhat apart from the reality and in this sense, insignificant. Naudé thus might well have seen what he was supporting as the legitimate and proper monarchy. In a sense, fortifying the king's central government also was the form of modernity relevant in the seventeenth century France – even if for some people, precisely this' kind of modernity could have become a menace to the already classical ideals of the legitimate monarchy as opposed to tyranny.

Memories, presence, and fears of new civil wars in the seventeenth century

The Huguenot Wars were present still in the seventeenth century as memories, of course, in addition to the gained and lost real positions and options. At the end of the seventeenth century, the prevailing view according to Philip Benedict (2013, 111) was as follows. ”Two baneful leagues of rebels" had nearly ruined the country. Huguenots would be the primarily guilty party, but the faction of the extreme Catholics too – with their ”ambition disguised as zeal" – was accused. In the first half of the century and the time of Naudé, the memories were more controversial. On both sides, reminding about atrocities of the other side served maintaining "confessional identity" (op. cit., 113). In addition to the memories, furthermore, there were real and actual inner armed conflicts and rebellions in the time of Naudé as well (Beik, 1974; Abad, 2003). Holt (2005, 178 ff.) even denotes the period 1610 to 1629 in France as "the last war of religion."

We have an option to see how Naudé himself saw the situation in the 1640s, in a memorandum that Cardinal Mazarin asked him to collect of the reasons speaking for returning to Italy instead of staying in France. The text is confidential by nature, originally meant to Mazarin only, and printed and published only in 1870. The way in which Naudé depicts the situation might thus be re-

latively sincere – even if his pleasant memories of Italy from the 1630s could have had an influence. In any case, he expresses a worry of possible new civil wars in France and assumed that they could be even more disastrous than the Huguenot Wars had been (Naudé, 1643/1870, 50-51). As factors creating the threat, he mentions the discontent caused by increasing taxes as well as the Huguenots whom he still assumed to have reasons, urge, and power to revolt (op. cit., 50-51, see also 36 ff.).

In a sense, Naudé's fears were not groundless, even if as regards both its duration and the disasters caused, Fronde was not comparable to the Huguenot Wars. Together with the memory of those wars, in any case, the actual conflicts of Naudé's lifetime and the fear of the future rebellions could have stirred up his worry about peace and the stable order in the country and thus further motivated his advocacy for the powerful monarchy as well. According to Damien (1995, 111 ff.), further, a ”stable State (*Etat fort*)” was necessary for Naudé even as the protectors of the library that he was building.

Throughout Naudé's political thought, we actually can see a kind of 'the end justifies the means' morality. Despite the notoriety of such views, on the other hand, one hardly could entirely exclude the ends pursued from a seriously moral judgment of actions. In any case, a burning question would arise while considering an atrocity like the massacre of Bartholomew's Day. What kind of actions could we justify in this way? In a purely and – I would say – even harshly utilitarian spirit and assuming that the massacre could have ended the wars, of course, one could compare the death toll of the massacre with the amounts of victims still required before the end of the Huguenot Wars.

Further reflections on and around Naudé's thought about the library

While understanding Naudé's political thought, a look at the history before his time was pivotal and we even could assess the moral value of his views in the light of traditional ideals of the monarchy. To assess the meaning and significance of his assumingly liberal ideas of the library, in turn, we perhaps should consider the developments after his own time. His reputation as the liberal classic of modern librarianship, after all, might be the product of attributing to him ideas that became relevant only later. Focusing on the politico-social developments during the rest of the ancient régime until the Great Revolution already could be illustrative enough here.

Naudé's publicly open library as a part of the bourgeois, scholarly, or only abstractly public literary and political sphere

We perhaps should consider some politico-social developments during Naudé's time and after it in the light of Jürgen Habermas' (1962/1991, 51-56) intervowen notions of the literary and political bourgeois public spheres. Though as if in passing only, Habermas (op. cit., 51) mentions the libraries too as parts of the emerging literary public sphere.

Gómez's (2000, 132) remarks that the library with Naudé become ”a symbol of a new kind of universality of knowledge (*el símbolo de una nueva universalidad del saber*)”, which can provide ”the strong spirit with a capacity to in a moral sense autonomic action (*una capacidad de acción moralmente autónoma (preud'hommie) al esprit fort*”; strong spirits was one of the names referring – though sometimes only ironically – to the libertines). We should ask, however, what actually were the potential circles of the strong spirits to whom the openness of Naudé's library might have had some significance. For Naudé already, there could have been a literary public sphere, but it would have been in a relatively narrow sense scholarly by its nature, rather than broadly bourgeois.

An insightful yet somewhat abstract vein of thought with Damien (1995, 33 ff.) could be illustrative here. While printing and publishing *Advis* instead of merely giving some hand-written copies to his patron Henri de Mesme, Naudé executed what Damien calls *coup d'éclat*. Damien obviously uses the expression in quite a particular sense, with the betrayal of confidence as a part of it. Naudé's *coup d'éclat* while publishing *Advis* would be a ”'*coup d'état' biblio-thècaire*” (op. cit., 63). According to Damien, the very essence of the Naudéan library as well would be to replace the privacy and confidentiality between a patron and servant – or between friends and within a family, for instance – by opening the library and what it contains to an anonymous anyone (”*un chacune*”, op. cit., 34). Publishing a guide for librarianship could seem a rather innocent act, of course. According to Damien, however, it was both a betrayal of confidence and a revolution of the established order of knowledge in Naudé's time – and public discussion about the library as such even was a controversial matter (op. cit. 17 ff.). Damien even compares publishing *Advis* to the coup d'etats dealt with in *Considerations*, where Naudé indeed became a ”traitorous and indelecate revealer of the secrets of the State (*révélateur traître et indélicat des secret d'Etat*)” (op. cit., 45). Those secrets, after all, should have belonged to the princes and their ministers only.

The notion of the betrayal of confidence, in turn, could be an insightful though possibly also an abstract approach to what Habermas denotes as the

public sphere – or of what we could conceive of as an early civil society of autonomous individuals, as opposed to the family, for instance. In this sense, we can see with Damien as well a notion of the political and literary public sphere, which, however, is neither particularly bourgeois nor in a narrower or broader sense scholarly. Instead, it would be only abstractly public, a public sphere without any actual and recognisable public comparable to the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century – at least as far as we are considering it within a broad context of political and social history.

Some peculiarities of the early modernisation in France, however, could tell about some continuity as well between Naudé's scholarly circles and the only later emerging truly bourgeois public sphere and its social foundation. Related to the position of the bourgeoisie proper acting within ”the sphere of production and distribution” (Habermas, 1962/1991, 68), then, Antonio Negri's (1970/2007, 322-323) analysis of the political dimension of Descartes' ”reasonable project” and ”reformism” is illustrative – though otherwise perhaps not so plausible. Broadly, Negri's thought is that (i) *the king* or God, i.e. the third Cartesian substance, maintains order within which the human subjects, *res cogitans*, or (ii) *the bourgeoisie* can act on and benefit from (iii) *the common people* or the ”multitude”, which is the ”new force of production – that of labour”, or ”the material basis of the productive motor”, and in the Cartesian concepts, *res extensa* or matter.

One could even talk about a kind of alliance of the king and bourgeoise against the power of the high feudals and about the emergence of a civil society around and within – rather than as opposed to – the absolutist monarchy and its administrational structures (see, for instance, Bouveresse, 2016). By buying so-called *paulettes*, the office holders even with a bourgeois background had since the beginning of the seventeenth century an option to have their offices as a kind of private property and, in some cases, even hereditary, which eventually could make them members of what one called the nobility of robe (*noblesse de robe*) (Giesey, 1983, 202; Swann, 2001, 146-147; Habermas, 1962/1991, 67-68). While recruiting his ministers, for instance, Louis XIV favoured the nobility of robe (Swann, 2001, 141-142). To a degree, this all probably weakened a little the position of the traditional feudal sword nobility (*noblesse d'épée*) and strengthened the position of those with a bourgeois background and of the bourgeoisie itself. Habermas (1962/1991, 68) even writes that there became to be a kind of equality between the citizens or subjects since they all were “equally subjugated to authority” of the king, “were private”, and furthermore, “Their sphere, whether bourgeois or not, was the société civil.” Instead of any actual equality, however, one perhaps can see here a kind of continuum from bourgeoisie through *noblesse de robe* to at least some members of the actual

and traditional nobility even.

According to Ellen Meiksins Wood (2012, 295-296), “A typical French bourgeois, the kind of person who would, for example, constitute the revolutionary bourgeoisie of 1789, was likely to be an office-holder, a professional, even an intellectual”. Such persons were also particularly apt to observe and then participate in politics and to become the literary spokesmen of the bourgeoisie as a whole, of the people even more widely, and eventually, of the republic. The literary associations of Arras in the 1780s, after all, were places of the early evolvement of the political ideas of one young lawyer, Maximilian de Robespierre (see Hardman, 1999, 8-9). Naudé too participated in some literary circles of men ever since he was quite a young man and eventually, in the 1640s after becoming able to buy a house in Gentilly, he formed a circle of his own as well (see Boer, 1938).

Very much a man of the seventeenth century, after all?

As such, the social position of Naudé and of the scholars around him – as a good example the Dutch-born lawyer Hugo Grotius who used to visit the Library of Mazarin – was not very different from that of the men of the Enlightenment – or of the Great Revolution during which there indeed were actual plans of properly public district libraries "throughout France" (Harris, 1984, 139-140). We thus should notice the significant developments of the political and literary spheres since Naudé and before the latter half of the eighteenth century – or between the times of Naudé and Robespierre, for instance. These developments were partly matters of sheer quantities, partly more qualitative by nature.

Swan (2001, 165) writes that ”By the eighteenth century, the climate had altered profoundly” from the situation during Fronde and in Naudé's time. Swann refers to political literature that was not only ”produced much greater, but [...] also sustained over a far longer period and was accessible to a greater number of people”. Thereafter, ”in addition to government newspapers and court circulars”, he lists forms of literature such as ”foreign periodicals, clandestine pamphlets and publications, notably the Jansenist Ecclesiastical News (*Nouvelles ecclésiastiques*), parlementary remonstrances (which were published despite an official ban), royal replies to those protests, handwritten broadsheets, and many other forms of literary ephemera.” Finally, “it was a healthy diet to put before the public that gathered in the salons, academies, masonic lodges, reading rooms, coffee houses, and other places of sociability to read about or discuss current affairs.”

Qualitatively, then, there was a move from 'governing-technical' open-mindedness among the few, we could say, to the genuinely political aspects of the Enlightenment. Damien (1995, 262) as well, while contrasting Naudé and the Enlightenment, writes: ”After having put in place the matrix, Naudé reserve its use to the State (*Naudé, après avoir mis en place la matrice, en réserve l'usage à l'Etat*).” Even if we could be sceptical about Damien's optimism, we should at least notice his claim that ”The egalitarian democracy of bibliography precedes the political democracy (*La démocratie égalitaire du bibliographie précéde la démocratie politique*).” The decomposition of literary hierarchies would precede the decomposition of social hierarchies and on the literary level, ”there is no more any book [such as the Bible] that would contain all the books (*il n'y a plus de livre qui contienne tous les livres*.” Damien, 1995, 308). Damien's argument culminates in his view of ”*homo bibliothecus*” as ”*homo democraticus*” (op. cit. 307 ff.). We could ask, of course, whether any kind of an actual *homo democraticus* might had any place in the mind of Naudé.

It could be plausible to assume that Naudé himself, after all, was very much a man of the first half of the seventeenth century. This would also be consistent with my assumption that Naudé's political writings could express – to a degree at least – his real views of what kind of political action can be even in a moral sense just and right. At least psychologically, it would be plausible to assume that Naudé's views tended to approach those of his mighty patrons. Metaphorically, he would have been looking at the world and society through the windows of the palaces of those mighty, aristocratic, and politically authoritarian patrons who tended, on the other hand, to be more or less open-minded as regards literature, their private thought, and perhaps even their conduct as far as it was not too publicly visible. While making his library publicly open, however, Cardinal Mazarin relocated his literary open-mindedness from private to an at least narrowly public sphere of the scholars and the administrative and governing elites. In this project, Naudé had an option to put into practice the ideas that he had expressed some fifteen years earlier.

Only later, however, there became to be an actual civil society ready to intervene and eventually take the supreme power in the state. We probably could say that Naudé advanced and participated in some forms and practices, which in the course of time only became the parts of the political ideals, which assume that the population widely should be aware if there were, for instance, symptoms of tyranny in the behaviour of the king or some other kind of government. The need for such awareness, in turn, could be a part of the solemnly democratic foundation of the library open to all in the sense of the only later emerging public library proper. In this sense, Naudé's role as an

anticipator of later developments in the library field would have been abstract, indeed. What anticipates something, on the other hand, tends to be somewhat abstract if compared to what it anticipates.

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