

Roland Barthes and the Analysis of Film – an Introduction

le filmique, très paradoxalement, ne peut être saisi dans le film "en situation", "en mouvement", "au naturel", mais seulement [] dans cet artefact majeur qu'est le photogramme.

Roland Barthes: Le troisième sens

Roland Barthes was run down by a small van on February 25th 1980. He died a month later at the age of 65. His death is said to have caused a national mourning in France; Barthes was not known only to academic scholars. His reputation seems to have reached the general public as well – in France that is.

But who was Roland Barthes? Or to put it in a way which he would have preferred: What did Roland Barthes do?

I shall begin with some minor comments on his major theoretical contributions before I return to the main topic of this article, *Roland Barthes and the Analysis of Film*. I hope to be able to convince you that this topic is of central importance to questions concerning film analysis and close reading. This hope may prove to be vain as I have chosen not to present the kind of evidence supplied by even the smallest bit of actual analysis. Due to the restricted time of the lecture on which this article is heavily based I intend to ignore reasonable ideas of (1*) how to convince you of the importance of what I will be saying and (2*) how to make you remember it. You will only have to use one of your cerebral hemispheres. But surely I can guarantee you the joy of recognition.

Barthes' Work

From his first book, *Writing Degree Zero* (1953) – and even before that – Barthes was seriously occupied with literature, but though literature certainly was his passion Number One, he very soon took to writing about many other items in modern society. His *Mythologies*, originally published once a month in the French magazine *Lettres nouvelles* between 1952 and 1956, analysed the blind spots of post-war France. Barthes claimed the importance of trying to understand such events as wrestling, Tour de France, commercials, and many other items of daily life. Regarded as myths what these everyday happenings do is to transform history into nature. When the *Mythologies* were published in 1957, Barthes added a theoretical chapter. It is here that he takes the first step towards semiology using the concepts of connotation and denotation to express his view on the myths as being signs of a second-order semiological systems.

During the early 1960s the new wave of structuralism swept across France. Roland Barthes was one of its avant-garde personalities. His field of interest

among other things spanned from literary fiction (he wrote a book *On Racine*) to the *Elements of Semiology*, *The Rhetoric of the Image*, *The System of Fashion*. He also offered *An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives*. In 1960 he even published two articles on cinema in *Revue internationale de filmologie* (Barthes 1960 a, Barthes 1960 b) and during 1963 and -64 he gave two interviews on *Cinema and Semiology*. In the first of these interviews he was probably the first to talk about semiotics of cinema, and he anticipated some points later to become central in the work of Christian Metz. Notably he saw the possibility of studying the "large signifying units" (Barthes 1985a, p. 21) which Metz would later describe as the large syntagmatic category of the image track.

During the late 1960s Barthes changed his way of attacking objects. In his own words he abandoned the *structural analysis* of the early sixties in favour of the new *textual analysis*. As I will return to textual analysis later, I shall not elaborate on this concept now. His major work from this period no doubt is the exhaustive analysis of Balzac's novella *Sarrasine*, which was published in 1970 as *S/Z* (Barthes 1970). Though he seems to have been extraordinarily hard-working, Barthes published less – in terms of long, scientific books – during the seventies. He turned to articles, essays. He did publish books, but even they consisted of fragments. A comparison of his most structuralist book, *The System of Fashion* (1967), and two of his last books, *Fragments d'un discours amoureux* (1977) and *Camera Lucida* (1980) will show you what I mean. As had always been the case, Barthes dealt with a variety of items, but surely his later writings exhibit a much greater interest in fine arts; music, painting, literary fiction – all of which he often analyzed in relation to – himself. His previous occupation with mass culture partly disappeared. Thus one shouldn't expect to come across general considerations on a mass culture phenomenon such as film in his later writings – which, of course, one does not.

To cut a long story short, Barthes in his later years did not take too much interest in film. As he claimed in an interview given after the publishing of *Camera Lucida*:

I would like to say that if I have chosen the photograph, it is a bit against cinema. I have noticed that I was on good terms with the photograph, I love to watch photographs, and on the other hand was on difficult and resisting terms with cinema. I'm not saying that I don't go to the movies, but basically I paradoxically place the photograph above cinema in my little personal pantheon.

(Barthes 1981, p. 334)

Barthes however did outline the early – pre-metzi- an, so to speak – semiotics of cinema, did write mytho-

logies on for example *The Face of Garbo* and the revolutionary importance of Chaplin's *Modern Times*, did contemplate the hypnotic state you're in when leaving a cinema, did comment, though often fragmentarily, on isolated filmic phenomena. Thus he commented thoroughly on frame enlargements from Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible* in one of his masterpieces, *The Third Meaning* (1970). But he left it to others to write 'his' articles on film. Luckily somebody did.

The Influence of Barthes on Film Theory

Christian Metz claims that Barthes has had a great influence on him. Apart from a few mutual references and the fact that they have undoubtedly read some of the same books, it is difficult to trace that influence directly. But if you leave the father of the semiotics of film (i.e. Metz) behind and concentrate on his 'children', you will find that whereas the father concentrated on "pure theory", as he has put it, the children often concentrated on textual analysis. And when textual analysis is mentioned, references to Barthes seem unavoidable. A few examples: Raymond Bellour (Bellour 1979) mentions Barthes and actually uses some of the concepts from *S/Z*. Correspondingly Stephen Heath and Daniel Dayan are very fond of the parisian guru. The Englishman Heath wrote a book [*Vertige du déplacement*, (Heath 1974)] on Barthes and furthermore has referred to him in several of his writings on film and film theory (cF, Heath 1975). Dayan on the other hand – under the guidance of Barthes – wrote the book Barthes might have written. If he had taken any serious interest in film, that is. I am referring to his *Western Graffiti – Jeux d'images et programmation du spectateur dans La chevauchée fantastique de John Ford* (Dayan 1983).

Most references to Barthes within the field of film-theory and film-analysis seem to depend on three or four works all of which are examples of Barthes' intellectual brilliance and stylistic mastery, and all of which were published between 1970 and 1973. First and foremost references are made to *S/Z* and to *Analyse textuelle d'un conte d'Edgar Poe* (Barthes 1985b). The former is the extensive original example of Barthes' textual analysis, whereas the latter is the rather short, pedagogical copy. Second and third to the articles *The Third Meaning* (Barthes 1982) and *From Work to Text* (Barthes 1971). Fourth to the encyclopedic article *The Theory of the Text* (Barthes 1973).

Arriving at the central part of this article, I shall concentrate on the contributions to film-theory Barthes rather unwillingly made in the above mentioned works. These contributions fall into two different categories: one category concerns the actual strategy of close reading, another concerns more general considerations on textual codes.

Close Reading: The text and the Lexias

Let us begin with the category concerning Barthes' strategy of close reading.

To begin it will be necessary to deal with two central problems connected with 'applying' a theory fundamentally based on literary fictions and photographic images to the theory of the fiction film:

1* The first problem concerns the use of the word *text*. If *text* means "written or printed words forming a literary work", which it does according to the most important definition of *The Penguin English Dictionary*, what we need to do is, of course, to

redefine our concept. This has been done hundreds of times over the last 20 years, which is why I shall deal with this problem rather briefly returning later to the particulars of the redefinition proper to Barthes.

2* The second problem concerns the status of the object *film* in textual analysis. This becomes urgent, when you – as you often do though it is only one part of the analytical job – freeze the moving pictures in order to analyse one frame. Doing this – as Barthes did when analyzing frame-enlargements from *Ivan the Terrible* – you actually change as well the object as – speaking in terms of reading-position – yourself. The object is transformed from being a part of a signifying filmic chain to being a technically insufficient, autonomous, quasi-photografic image. The analyst on the other hand transforms his or her time of reading. Peter Wollen states that in the case of the film we have "an imposed reading time" (quoted from Metz 1985, p. 81). In the case of the photograph we conversely have "a free rewriting time".

Let us consider the first problem – that of the word *text* – a little more carefully. Nowadays only few people would restrict the use of the word *text* to "written or printed words forming a literary work". Referring, of course, to signifying practices Barthes often pointed out that the word *text* etymologically stems from the latin word *textus* which means *weaving* or *putting together*. A text therefore – etymologically – is something that has been woven or put together *regardless of* the actual material of expression, "the material nature of the signifier, or more exactly of the 'fabric' into which these signifiers are woven" (Metz 1971, p. 157). It is important however to note, that this preliminary way of defining the concept of *text* is not equivalent to Barthes' definition. But as the purpose of these clarificatory remarks is limited to expanding the borders of the previously narrow concept, I shall not go any further now. The point is that film easily submits to our 'new', semiological definition of *text*.

Returning to the second problem – that of the status of the object film in textual analysis – I find it necessary to introduce the concept of *lexia*. The *lexia* is the *socialized unit of reading*: "in sculpture, the statue; in music, the "piece"" (Metz 1985, p. 81), in photography the photograph, in *Sarrasine* one should expect it to be the entire novella. When reading *Sarrasine* step by step, however, Barthes chooses his own *lexias*. He expels the word *socialized* from the definition of the *lexia* and cuts up the novella into 561 *lexias*, which then are *his* unities of reading. He admits that this fragmentary reading

will be arbitrary in the extreme; it will imply no methodological responsibility, since it will bear on the signifier, whereas the proposed analysis bears solely on the signified. The *lexia* will include sometimes a few words, sometimes several sentences; it will be a matter of convenience; it will suffice that the *lexia* be the best possible space in which we can observe meanings;

(Barthes 1970, p. 20, English translation, p. 13)

Reading a book for instance allows everybody to make up their own *lexias*. You can take your time, which was what Peter Wollen referred to when talking about "a free rewriting time". Watching a movie nobody can make up their own *lexias*, as the cinematic *lexia* is profoundly socialized as it is "determined in advance by the filmmaker" (Metz op.cit.). We have here the "imposed reading time" of Peter Wollen. Transferring 'non-socialized' *lexias* to the field of film thus means transforming your reading-position from that of the ordinary moviegoer to that of the analyst. As I pointed out this transference not only concerns

the moviegoer. It also concerns the film, which is transformed from being a part of a signifying filmic chain into being a technically insufficient, autonomous, quasi-photographic image, into being an interruptible series of photos.

Barthes himself did not like the imposed reading time of the film. He felt that he was being "forced to a continuous greed", that the film did not give him time for thoughtfulness. Conversely – and not surprisingly – he emphasized "the interest of the frame-enlargement". He questioned the widespread view that the essence of film is the movement of the images. Conversely he – rather surprisingly – stated that the truly filmatic – the filmatic of the future – is to be found in the frame enlargement or in the still-photograph (cf. the initial quotation)!

Naturally the transformatory interventions are all made in order to satisfy an analytical desire. You transfer a bit, you transform a bit, but you most certainly gain a lot.

What is gained is in fact the possibility of a *two-faced close-reading*:

1* You enable yourself to make allowance for textual elements which might otherwise have been neglected or ignored. The video cassette recorder altogether enables us to read the films closely. That stands to reason. But it also enables us to do a lot of useless work. Given the opportunity of close reading some analysts have striven to make close reading equivalent to the worst examples of new literary criticism and early Russian and Czech formalism. I shall never forget reading Larry Crawford's detailed analysis of *The Bakersfield Carlot Scene in Psycho* (Crawford 1982) (this is the scene in which Marion buys a new car) with a university class. We all were very positive to begin with, but as the analysis moved along, we gradually realised that though its conclusions might be true, we got absolutely nothing out of them. Unfortunately the same thing could be said about passages in Belour's in many respects epoch-making analysis of the 14th segment of Hitchcock's *North by Northwest* and of Heath's analysis of a scene from Orson Welles' *Touch of Evil*.

2* More interesting however is the second gain which concerns the possibility of *watching the weaving of the textual 'fabric'*, of attending the production of the text. Daniel Dayan mentions that the fragmentary reading takes place on a level:

which might prove to be ideal for the study of cinematic texts. This is the level where the convergence of the various systems and discourses which constitute the film may still be suspended, may still flow back against these systems or against these discourses.

(Dayan 1983, p. 14)

According to Dayan, whose analysis certainly proves him right, fragmentary reading thus enables us to stop the overwhelming flux of the film in order to come to terms with the often complex convergence of its systems and discourses, as he puts it. Dayan underlines – in close continuation of Barthes – that some of the systems and discourses of a given film normally are difficult to notice. These hardly observable elements of signification, which are often silenced by the ruling cinematic order, become observable in the frame enlargements used in fragmentary readings. They form what Barthes called the third meaning; they form what Dayan calls the *graffities*, the *parasitic discourses* of the text.

As this meaning is the third, we must (and I shall be very brief here) distinguish it from the first and the second meaning. The first meaning should be examined by the first semiotics, Barthes says. In other words by the semiotics of the message. Judging from Barthes' example thinking about Roman Jakobson and

Greimas and about the Barthes of *The photographic message*, for instance, would give an impression of the first level of meaning. The second level should be examined by the second semiotics, the semiotics of signification, which is the semiotics founded in the late sixties with reference to the symbolic order of Lacan for instance.

As for the third meaning Barthes refers to Julia Kristeva and to the concept of *signifiante*. He has great trouble in being rigorously scientific in a traditional way about the third meaning. The textbook of semiotics tells us that a sign is a relation between a signifier and a signified. A signifier without a signified is "an abracadabra", as Hjelmslev (Hjelmslev 1976, p. 45), has it, and the thought of a signified without a signifier exists only in religious and other idealistic discourses. The signs of the third meaning however introduce a slight pell-mell. They are incomplete signs. As it is deliberately suggested by the phonetic similarity between the French words *signifiant* and *signifiante*, there is a narrow connection between the signifier and the third meaning, the signifiante; the signs of the third meaning do have a signifier, and as they are not 'abracadabras', they also have a signified. Only one does not know that signified, it is in a way inexpressible. Herein lies the strength of the signs of the third meaning as well as their ability to turn out – the analysts' – hair grey. It takes a lot of rigour trying to analyze third meaning signs as they are very likely to carry you away while you are trying to 'express the Inexpressible', since you are very likely to resort to individual comments which are of no interest whatsoever to anybody but yourself and your psychoanalyst, if any. Still, calling somebody's attention to an imminent danger like this does not equate with urging him or her to lay off. On the contrary. Since Freud it has been or ought to have been an obligation to the humanities to try dealing scientifically with the 'Inexpressible'.

71

The reference to Freud is by no means accidental. As it may have crossed your minds, psychoanalysis plays an important part in Barthes' strategy for reading the third meaning. Before going into the section on the textual codes I wish to attract your attention to the psychoanalysts' way of listening to their patients as it bears resemblance to the barthesian reading strategy.

I am, of course, referring to the concept of *suspended attention*. By directing his attention towards no particular aspects of the patients chain of associations the analyst *tries* to avoid any kind of prejudice, whether personal or theoretical or whatever. When he has listened for a certain period of time, general impressions of the various information start taking shape. Only then should he intervene. Only then should he theorize and if necessary revise prevailing theories.

If we try to enable ourselves to treat any fragment of film which we wish to read closely in a similar way we hopefully will reach as outstanding results as did Barthes when for two years he directed his suspended attention towards Balzac's novella. Daniel Dayan certainly has marked a possible direction for future close readings in his analysis of John Ford's *Stagecoach*.

Textual Codes

Now the time has come to talk a bit about the textual codes.

Hearing the word *code* one's mind should adjust to the utmost rigour. Let me remind you of two circumstances. (1*) Semiotics usually defines a code as "a limited entity of signs and units and the procedures arranging them". (2*) Furthermore one often has the impression that the application of the concept of code implies that all objects taken into consideration within a given field make use of the same number of

codes – or at least that they are potentially able to do so. None of these circumstances are valid here, though as for the number of codes the five codes Barthes adopted when analyzing Balzac and Poe seem to have gained a certain status of general validity.

Barthes' concept of code is deliberately inconsistent with what could be labelled a rigorously scientific concept of code: "[] we use *Code* here not in the sense of a list, a paradigm that must be reconstructed" (Barthes 1970, p. 27, eng. p. 20). In a definition echoing his early understanding of the principle of the myth (the transforming of history into nature) Barthes states that a code is "a body of rules which are so worn out that we accept them as natural" (Barthes 1985b, p. 355). As Barthes' method of reading is rather inductive – he tries to leave every deductive prejudice behind – he does not claim the number of codes found in *Sarrasine* and in *The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar* to be valid of any other texts. All he wants is to "assume the multivalence of the text". Barthes is interested in the structuration of the unique text, not – as he was in the early 1960'es – in the structure of all – or just many – texts. As, however, the codes of the Balzac- and the Poe-texts are very much the same and as these codes are of great import to what Barthes calls the classic text, we – the epigones – have reason to believe that they apply to the classic filmic texts as well. The analyses presented by Bellour, Heath, Dayan, and others seem to me to support this point of view.

I would like to stress the word *classic* noting that the five codes will only be found in classic texts, whether literary, filmic or whatever. Barthes refers to the classic text as being *readerly* as opposed to other *writerly* texts. The more readerly a text, the more the reading is determined in advance, the less the symbolic code is in action. The more writerly a text, the greater the liberty of the reader, the less the other four codes are in action.

Bearing these preliminary remarks in mind let us now look at the five barthesian codes. They are: (1*) the *hermeneutic code*, (2*) the *semic code*, (3*) the *symbolic code* or rather the *symbolic field*, (4*) the *proairetic code* and (5*) the *cultural codes* – in plural. It could easily be argued that all codes are cultural; wanting to distinguish however, Barthes uses a specific category for codes referring to culture (cf. below). From a certain point of view the codes fall into two groups. The first and the fourth codes, the hermeneutic and the proairetic codes, are temporal, dynamic, and irreversible. The rest, the semic, symbolic, and cultural codes, on the other hand "establish permutable, reversible connections". The irreversible codes tend to close the text, to fix the meaning. The reversible codes tend to open the text, to let the meaning explode. The reversible codes are at various degrees intimately connected with the above mentioned *signifiant*-*ce*.

1* The *hermeneutic code* has to do with the "terms by which an enigma can be distinguished, suggested, formulated, held in suspense, and finally disclosed" (Barthes 1970, p. 26, eng. p. 19). In other words it is as well a narrative as an enunciatory code. It is narrative in as far as it raises questions of developments – its terms differ from the beginning through to the end. But these developments only concern the fictitious agents in so far they have to do with their knowledge. As it deals with questions of knowledge the hermeneutic code is enunciatory: who knows what when? Very often the enunciator (≈ the implied author) holds back information and thereby strengthens the desire to know on the side of the enunciatee (≈ the implied reader). The hermeneutic code normally tends to close the text.

- 2* The *semic code* concerns the semes of the text. They are the signifieds of connotation. When reading a lexia, which is a signifier or a chain of signifiers, you try to find one word that covers the signified. That word is approximate, uncertain, but still it is the seme. A seme, Barthes says, is a "connotator of persons, places, objects, of which the signified is a *character*. Character is an adjective, attribute, a predicate (for example; *unnatural, shadowy, star, composite, excessive, impious*, etc.) (Barthes 1970, p. 196, eng. p. 190). To take an example: When Barthes reads the word *Sarrasine* in the title of Balzac's novella he connotes *femininity*. Had the signifier been *Sarrasin*, the seme would have been *masculinity* and so on.
- 3* The *symbolic code* is not a code at all. Barthes prefers the word *field* instead of code for two reasons. The first undoubtedly is that he wants to refer to psychoanalysis and 'le champ symbolique' of Lacan. The second is that even his own rather vague concept of code is too rigorous in this connection. The symbolic field is of an immense extension. It is "the place for multivalence and reversibility" (Barthes 1970, p. 26, eng. p. 19), and it has several entrances. In *Sarrasine* Barthes notes three: the rhetorical, the psychoanalytical, and the economic. The rhetorical entrance deals with the economy of language, the psychoanalytical entrance with the economy of the body, of the gender, and the economic entrance with economy of economy! Under normal, non-catastrophical circumstances all the entrances of the symbolic field operates in 'either-or's. With examples from *Sarrasine* this runs as follows: the either femininity or masculinity in the economy of language, either woman or man in the economy of the body, either rich in land or poor in the economy of the economy. But sometimes catastrophic collapses are introduced, and the paradigmatic slash mark between *either* on the one hand and *or* on the other breaks down. Barthes writes:

it is fatal, the text says, to remove the dividing line, the paradigmatic slash mark which permits meaning to function (the wall of the antithesis), life to reproduce (the opposition of the sexes), property to be protected. In short, the story represents [] a generalized collapse of economies: the economy of language, usually protected by the separation of opposites, the economy of genders (the neuter [the eunuch] must not lay claim to the human), the economy of the body (its parts cannot be interchanged, the sexes cannot be equivalent), the economy of money (Parisian Gold produced by the new social class, speculative and no longer land-based – such gold is without origin, it has repudiated every circulatory code, every rule of exchange [])

(Barthes 1970, p. 221, eng. p. 215)

- 4* The *proairetic code* is a code of actions and behaviour. The word *proairetic* is used with reference to "Aristotelian terms, in which *praxis* is linked to *proairesis*, or the ability rationally to determine the result of an action" (Barthes 1970, p. 25, eng. p. 18). As in the case of the semic code practical analysis is made by labelling a title to a sequence. Such titles could be terms of the experiences of everyday life (*to knock at door, to arrange a meeting*) or they could derive from more novellistic models (*the Abduction, the Declaration of Love, the Murder*). The proairetic sequences form the basis of a structural analysis of narrative. It should be noted however that Barthes does not systematize the sequences into a general narrative model. Once again he is interested only in the unique balzacian text. As I stressed earlier the proairetic

code joins the hermeneutic code in trying to close the text.

You may wonder whether Barthes offers any rules for determining the beginnings and ends of proairetic sequences. Well, he does not. But remember the lexias. The cutting up of a text into lexias was said to be "arbitrary in the extreme". The same thing here: "the proairetic sequence is never more than the result of an article of reading" (Barthes 1970, p. 26, eng. p. 19).

5* The *cultural* codes are codes of reference. They refer to "a science or a body of knowledge" (Barthes 1970, p. 27, eng. p. 20), to any cultural belief and/or knowledge present in the text. They seem to be unquoted quotations from an anonymous book, "whose best model is doubtless the School Manual" (Barthes 1970, p. 211, eng. p. 205). Barthes lists the possible books on which *Sarrasine* is based:

a History of Literature [], a History of Art [], a History of Europe [], an Outline of Practical Medicine [], a Treatise on Psychology [], an Ethics [], a Logic [], a Rhetoric, and an anthology of maxims and proverbs about life, death, suffering, love, women, ages of man, etc.

(ibid.)

The five codes live side by side in the classic, readerly text. The text is woven by these codes which "create a kind of network [] through which the entire text passes (or rather, in passing, becomes text)" (Barthes 1970, p. 27, eng. p. 20). One code or the other may be dominant at a certain point of the text, but the five codes are frequently heard simultaneously. As a whole they make the text a stereographic space, they endow the text with a plural quality.

The whole idea of Barthes' textual analysis is to teach us to listen to the polyphonics of the text. This is the reason why he abandons the structural analysis and turns to textual analysis. This is the reason why he prefers the reversible, opening codes to the irreversible, closing codes. And this is the reason why he prefers the frame enlargements and the still photos to the moving pictures.

Summary

Having reached the end of the article I would – in spite of one of my introductory remarks – like to help you remembering at least some of the things I have said.

The article had five sections. After a brief introduction, I introduced a general outline of the development of *Barthes' work*. I noted that he did not take too much interest in film. Thus his writings on film are rather rare. Next I tried to trace the *Influence of Barthes on Film Theory* mentioning Raymond Bellour, Stephen Heath, and Daniel Dayan. The fourth part was concerned with *Close reading: the Text and the Lexias*. I started dealing with the concept of *text* and went on discussing the status of the object film in textual analysis. I introduced the concept of *lexia* and stated that close-reading based on lexias such as the frame enlargement or similarly small fragments enables us (1*) to make allowance for textual elements which might otherwise be neglected and (2*) to watch the weaving of the textual 'fabric'. I went on discussing the concept of *significance*, of *third meaning* and finished that section off by referring to the listening strategy of psychoanalysis: *suspended attention*. In the final section I briefly mentioned the five *Textual Codes* Barthes uses for describing the classic text: the hermeneutic code,

the semic code, the symbolic field, the proairetic code, and the cultural codes.

Knowing that there is much more to be said and a lot of questions to be put, I hope at least to have raised your curiosity concerning *Roland Barthes and the Analysis of Film*. Though you may disagree on the various answers, Barthes gives to central questions concerning textual and structural analysis, you may also agree that asking these questions is never out of place. If this article makes somebody consider these questions, it suddenly turns into a writerly text. If so it serves its purpose.

I am greatly indebted to Christian Gramby, M.A., for strengthening my broken English.

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73

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S/Z is quoted from the English edition. I am responsible for remaining translations.