Rangaistuksen määrääminen ja ennakkopäätöksiä koskeva tulkintaoppi
Avainsanat:
Istanbulin sopimus, korkein oikeus, lähisuhdeväkivalta, rangaistuksen määrääminen, rangaistus, rikosasia, rikosoikeusAbstrakti
Sentencing and the theory of interpretation of precedents
In the article, the authors ask how Supreme Court precedents regarding sentencing should be approached in jurisprudence and what type of interaction is possible between a judge and a scholar in this area. The question is approached through analysis of Supreme Court case-law. The aim of the article is to answer the following questions: Is there a consistent doctrine of interpretation behind the Supreme Court’s sentencing precedents? Are there features that are unique to precedents in the area of sentencing and how does the interpretation of said precedents differ from the interpretation of precedents in other areas of law? The analysis is focused on three Supreme Court cases which deal with different questions of sentencing law.
The conclusion is that there is no uniform view on the interpretation of precedents. However, the interpretation of sentencing precedents is founded on the central characteristics of interpretation in criminal law, which in turn emphasise the significance of the principle of legality. The structure and content of interpretation reflect the features that are characteristic to legislation concerning sentencing. Both from a scholar’s and a judge’s point of view it is also important to draw special attention to the formal and procedural settings of the precedent, as these provide the boundaries of the court’s deliberation. Sentencing typically involves the interpretation of open and principle-like norms, which provide the interpreter with a reasonable amount of leeway.
