

S U M M A R Y

Finnish Immigrants in Sweden: Their Citizenship, Contacts and Attitudes. By Vilho A. Koiranen.

Since the Second World War Sweden has been the main destination of Finnish emigrants. Today, there are about 130,000 Finnish immigrants in Sweden. From 1948—1959 about 26,000 Finns have become naturalized in Sweden. During the same period eight per cent of the Finnish employees in Sweden have become naturalized each year. The corresponding figure for Norwegians is six per cent and for Danes, three per cent.

Why did Finns change their citizenship? Reasons for becoming naturalized in Sweden were very diverse, but they may be classified into two main groups. *Concrete ends* include the gaining of political, economic and/or social advantages (suffrage, the right to own land, pension) which the immigrant could not obtain if he did not change his citizenship. *Immaterial ends* refers to the immaterial advantage one can get by becoming naturalized (e.g.: raising of social status or removing of the threat of being expelled from the country).

Hypotheses

Because many Finns emigrate to Sweden in their early 20's, it was assumed that the number of naturalized persons would increase according to age.

When naturalized in Sweden Finnish men are obliged to participate in military service there, if they have not by the time of naturalization reached the age of 47 years. Finnish girls marry Swedish men more often than Finnish men marry Swedish girls. For these two reasons it was assumed that it is easier for women to change citizenship than for men, and that women experience more pressure to become naturalized than the men.

According to a treaty among four Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the citizens of these countries have in principle the same social benefits as native citizens while living in one of these countries. In practice this concerns mostly manual workers and is a basic guarantee. It was hypothesized that to become naturalized in Sweden is more important to the white collar people than to the manual workers. To the white collar workers naturalization was assumed to mean a way of rising to responsible position, whereas the manual workers were expected to change their citizenship more often for immaterial reasons.

According to Swedish law a foreigner must live regularly in Sweden at least seven years (citizens of the four Scandinavian countries five years) before he can be naturalized there. It was assumed that the length of the stay in Sweden and the number of the naturalized persons in Sweden have a positive correlation.

Furthermore it was predicted that the »proximity» to Swedish citizenship and the number of social contacts with the Swedish community through political participation, the press, radio, various organizations and small groups correlate positively. Inversely, the

»farther» from Swedish citizenship the immigrants are, the less they have social contacts to the host community.

Citizenship and attitudes were expected to vary in the same direction, i.e., the »nearer» one is to the Swedish citizenship the more positive are his attitudes towards Sweden.

Results

A sample of 408 Finnish immigrants living in Sweden was classified in four groups according to the nearness of Swedish citizenship. The groups were: naturalized, to be naturalized, uncertain and no intention to change citizenship.

The number of the naturalized persons in Sweden increased according to age (table 2). Women were naturalized more often than men (table 3), and those (both sexes) married to Swedes more often than the unmarried or those having a Finnish spouse (table 4).

White collar people were naturalized significantly more often than manual workers. Skilled workers planned to become naturalized more often than unskilled workers (table 5).

The length of the stay in Sweden and the number of naturalized persons correlated positively (text table 3). Similarly, the number of those who planned to stay permanently in Sweden increased according to how »sure» the interviewees were about obtaining Swedish citizenship (table 6).

Only three per cent of Finnish citizens in Sweden had voted in the 1958 parliamentary elections in Finland, whereas 56 % of those naturalized in Sweden who had the right to vote there had cast their ballot. When party preference concerning future parliamentary elections was asked, very slight differences were reported between citizens of Finland and those naturalized in Sweden (text table 4).

The hypothesis concerning the interdependence between citizenship and social contacts was supported by the empirical data. Those naturalized in Sweden had more contacts with Swedish community than those who were uncertain about citizenship and who had no intention of changing their citizenship (tables 7—10).

When the interviewees were asked whether they consider the economic prosperity of Sweden or of Finland to have more importance for themselves, it was found that »nearness» to Swedish citizenship increased the positive attitudes towards Swedish prosperity (table 11). Two different Guttman scales were used as measures of Finnish patriotism and of the wish to give a Finnish education to one's children. Both scales correlated negatively with Swedish citizenship, i.e., those naturalized in Sweden were least pro-Finnish and they had the most negative attitudes in regard to Finnish education (tables 12—13).

Explanations of the Origin of Political Regionalism. By Onni Rantala.

The paper is a survey of some of the explanations advanced to account for the origin of political regions and climates.

The writer states, to begin with, that the study of political regionalism has not yet advanced so far as to be able to indicate any explanatory regularities. The way in which political regions have come into being varies from country to country, and a factor that makes a region rightist in one country may make it leftist in another. Ten groups of factors found or assumed to contribute to the origin of political regions and climates are then discussed.

First, there is the group of *economic* factors. Political regionalism is partly explainable in terms of the social and economic conditions of the voter and, above all, his social

class, which, in turn, is intimately related to his means and income level. The impact of these and other similar factors upon voting behaviour in different countries have been studied, e.g., by Høgh, Goguel, Heberle, Gosnell, Holcombe and Lipset.

The second group of factors is associated with past or present regional differences in the conditions of *landownership*. The authors who have given attention to these include Siegfried, Goguel, Heberle, Nilson and Lipset.

Industrialization, which gave rise to labour movement and labour parties, as well as differences in the degree of industrialization, form the third group. Dalén, for example, has studied these factors from the point of view of political regionalism.

Religion seems to be a factor bearing on political attitudes especially in countries with religiously heterogeneous populations, among religious minorities and among the adherents of radical religious movements. The authors referred to in this context are Siegfried, Rydenfelt, Goguel and Dupeux.

The significance of party *organizations* for political regionalism is a disputed matter. Though it has been pointed out that the part played by party organizations must not be underrated (Goguel), the presence of powerful organizations may be the result of, rather than the reason why, a party has a great number of followers in a region.

Leader *personalities* may also bear on regional differences in voting behaviour. In some instances it has even happened that a renowned and esteemed person has exerted such an influence for decades after his death.

Previously, the party *press* may have been a factor making for regional differences. Today it is possible that a party is in a strong position in a region where it has not a single newspaper organ.

Although some authors feel that political regionalism is ascribable in its entirety to geographical, economic, social or religious factors, it is indisputable that past *political events* can also bear upon them.

The local party situation, again, may be of consequence with regard to the preservation of the victories already won.

The existence of an interrelation between *linguistic* or *ethnic boundaries* and political regionalism has been demonstrated in some instances.

Finally, geographical isolation may constitute a factor conducive to political uniformity.

The survey is concluded by a brief summary of the research results of Stuart Rice, Holcombe, Gosnell, Heberle, Siegfried, Goguel and Høgh.

The Attitudes and Obstruction Methods of Parliamentary Groups during 1922—1930 in the Treatment of the Bill Concerning the State of War. By Vilho Tervasmäki.

The Finnish defence forces had their origin in the White Army of General Mannerheim. This was the principal reason why the political parties that leaned mainly of the section of the population that had sided with the »Reds» in the War of Independence were, in the 1920s, against nearly all the measures that the government took in an intention to strengthen the defence of the nation. As their parliamentary representation was not sufficient for the rejection of the bills concerned, they used the right of the »postponing veto» to leave the Universal Military Service bill, of 1920, and other important bills concerning military matters pending over the following elections. After the elections, all these bills were adopted by Parliament. In the case of the State of War Act, the obstruction was so successful that the bill introduced by the government in 1922 was not adopted until 1930 and even then in a form markedly »watered» in comparison with the original bill.

In 1923 the treatment of the bill was discontinued when the matter was postponed, because of the repeated demands of Social Democrats, to the last session of that year. In 1924 and 1925, the matter was delayed through its lengthy deliberation in the Constitutional Committee. Its treatment was brought to an end in 1926, but it was left pending over the following elections by the votes of the Social Democrats and Communists. In the next Parliament it was treated in the order stipulated for constitutional laws and rejected, again, by the votes of the leftist parties. The treatment of the two distinct bills given to Parliament in 1928 could not be brought to completion. It was only the proposals given to the next Parliament that were adopted in 1930 when the Social Democrats abandoned their opposing attitude.

Not only the wounds of the War of Independence contributed to retard the treatment of the bills concerned, but also the suspicions felt by the political left that the State of War Act might be used by the government as a weapon in domestic policy, particularly against the right to strike of the labourers. The adoption of all these bills would have been postponed to the second term of sessions in 1930 had the Social Democrats and the representatives of the Swedish People's Party not refrained from using the »postponing veto«. The fact that the bourgeois groups, and the group of the Agrarian Union in particular, consented to discontinue the treatment in 1923, as well as the small amount of activity that their representatives showed in the debate, are indications that they did not realize the toughness of the opposition of the left. It is also evident that the members of the bourgeois groups did not recognize the significance of these laws for the preparations of the defence of the country.

Though the bourgeois groups, which were almost unanimously behind the proposals of the government, occupied from 118 to 134 of the 200 seats in Parliament, the leftist parties succeeded in making use of the indeterminateness and absences of some bourgeois representatives for eight years. The mild obstruction on the part of the minority was effective as long as the main group in opposition, the Social Democrats, regarded the State of War Act as too great a threat to the general civil rights.
