

## SUMMARY

### RISTO HYVÄRINEN: NEUTRALITY AND ARMS LIMITATION

In spite of the fact that the contribution of the neutral states to international politics has greatly increased in recent years the scientific study of the phenomenon of neutrality has gained only very limited results. Very little is as yet known about for instance the factors conducive to a state of neutrality or the factors influencing its stability. According to present views a state of neutrality is supported by certain general conditions linked with geographical location and the structure of international politics and, also, by factors at work within the neutral state itself.

A strong defence capability is generally considered to be one of the basic factors supporting neutrality. This view is based on the theory of the so-called military vacuums, according to which inadequately defended areas cannot escape becoming areas of military operations in the event of general war. Thus, a sufficient defence capability is necessary for the maintenance of neutrality. Although this theory seems to be by and large correct, there are certain rather exceptional cases where arms limitation by neutral countries tends to actually increase their security. This concerns, for instance, countries that have virtually no chances for a successful defence, such as Denmark at the time of the German invasion during the Second World War. Such a country may, by limiting its own defence capability, reduce the intensity of the military operations performed within its own territory and thus increase the security of its own citizens.

The same approach to the problem is observable in the attitude of many small states to the acquisition of nuclear arms. A logical consequence of the theory of military vacuums would indeed be for the neutral states to acquire nuclear arms, a view which has in fact been put forward by certain scholars. On closer analysis it appears, however quite clearly that this would in fact considerably weaken the security of such a neutral state. Under no circumstances would the neutral state be able to build up a nuclear capability strong enough to act as a deterrent against an attack by the big nuclear powers. In the event of a large scale atomic war the nuclear armament of a neutral state may on the contrary force the belligerent powers to eliminate this latent threat against them. The optimal solution to the security problem of neutral states seems thus to lie neither in maximum armament nor in disarmament. The building up an adequate defence capability is a pre-requisite for the maintenance and enforcement of national security, but in certain cases and within certain geographical areas a limitation of armaments may bring about a greater degree of security than an increase of them. The whole problem appears to be far more complicated than we have been led to believe by the rather extreme schools of thought that have up to date devoted their interest to it.

**OLAVI BORG: MODELS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPPING IN ATTITUDES OF VOTERS IN HELSINKI**

This paper deals with the general ideological and international orientation of Finnish voters immediately after the presidential and parliamentary elections in the year 1962. The study is limited to the voters in the capital, Helsinki. A two-staged sample was drawn out of this population and it amounted to 797 persons. The interviewers managed to question 75.4 per cent of these, 7.5 per cent refused, and 14.9 per cent were not met. The final sample represents, with one exception, quite well all the voters in Helsinki as regards the support given to different parties. Communists made the exception, the interviewers managed to question only one third of them. The sample includes the voters for the five main parties in the capital: the National Coalition (Kok; bourgeois, right), the Social Democratic Party (Sdp; non-Marxist), the Swedish People's Party (Rkp; heterogenous language party, moderate centre), the Finnish People's Party (Kp; attenuated liberal, moderate centre), and the Finnish People's Democratic Party (Skdl; Marxist, leftist socialist partially, purely communist mostly). Two little groups took part in the election too; they were the Social Democratic Union (Tpsl; the left wing of the Social Democratic Party which separated in 1958 from the main party) and the Liberal Union (Vpl; bourgeois, rather close to the National Coalition). Earlier, the Agrarian Party has had no support in Helsinki but now it made an appearance under the name of Centre Party (Kep). It won very little support from the voters and subsided after the elections.

The orientation of the voters was measured by two questions: the voters were asked to name the country or countries which they thought would be the best model to Finland, on the one hand, in its social, and, on the other hand, in its economic development. The main findings as regards the differencies of orientation of voters can be summarized as follows.

1. Among the voters in Helsinki three different orientations were manifest: Nordic orientation, orientation towards Great Western Powers and the socialist orientation. A more detailed account runs as follows:

a. *Nordic or the Scandinavian* orientation consists of choosing either Sweden, Norway, Denmark or Finland herself. These were dominant by far, but there were exceptions too. The main exception was made by those who voted for the National Coalition or the Finnish People's Party, and, particularly the male and the upper-class voters of these two parties; all this as regards the economic development. The voters of the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish People's Party were markedly more Scandinavian orientated than the others. As regards social development, almost all groups were very strongly Scandinavian orientated — with the exception of the Skdl (communists) and the Centre Party voters. Among the Nordic, and, in fact, all countries, Sweden was most frequently chosen.

b. *The orientation towards Great Western Powers* consists, first of all, of choosing either the USA or Western Germany, maybe England, but very seldom some other countries (e.g. Canada). This orientation is — with the exception of some strata of the population — considerably less frequent than the Scandinavian orientation, but still more frequent by far than the socialist orientation. Western orientation is strongest among those who voted for the National Coalition, the Finnish People's Party, and the Centre Party. In the two first mentioned parties this was particularly manifest among the male and the upper-class voters as regards the economic development.

c. *Orientation towards socialistic countries* was very rare. In most strata of the population there is no choice in favour of these countries; only the voters of the Skdl

and, to a little extent, those of the Social Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party favour these countries. Even the supporters of the Skdl were divided: the ones preferred the socialistic, the others the Scandinavian countries. Soviet Union was most frequently mentioned among the socialistic countries.

2. Some countries are clearly more popular as models for social than for economic development. Such countries as Sweden, Finland herself, England and the socialistic countries can be mentioned in this connection. On the other hand, some countries are more popular as models for economic than for social development. The USA, Western Germany and the western countries in general, belong to this category. The difference is particularly marked as regards Western Germany: it is chosen seven times more often as the model for economic than for social development.

3. Those who are satisfied with their economic conditions prefer Scandinavian or western countries more often than those who are dissatisfied with their economic circumstances. A greater number, relatively, of those who find their economic circumstances dissatisfactory prefer socialistic countries than of those who are satisfied with their circumstances. None of the economically satisfied have made their choice in favour of socialistic countries. The satisfaction with the economic standing correlates strongly with the position of the party in the right-left scale. The further left we come, the greater is the economic discontent.

4. Male voters are more certain in naming their models than female voters; the social democratic voters are more certain than the voters of other parties; the representatives of the highest social classes are more certain than the representatives of other classes, and the middle-aged voters are more certain than the young and the old voters.

5. From the point of view of general orientation the voters can be divided rather clearly into two groups: a) those who are orientated mainly towards Scandinavian countries, and, in addition to this, towards western countries, but not at all, or very rarely, towards socialistic countries and b) those who, to a great extent, are orientated towards Scandinavian countries, but equally, or even more, towards socialistic countries, and not at all, or very infrequently, towards western countries. The majority of the subjects of the study belonged to the first group — they had voted for some bourgeois party or for the Social Democratic Party. To the second group belong the Skdl and the Social Democratic Union, in the choice of the social model also the Swedish People's Party, though this, as well as the Social Democratic Union, are what we might call marginal cases.

#### KLAUS TÖRNUDD: CONFLICT WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION

This paper purports to illustrate the type of abstract conflict analysis developed particularly by Thomas C. Schelling, using as material the current conflict concerning the financial crisis of the United Nations and the possible application of article 19 in the Charter. In view of the necessity of simplifying the issue and making some more or less speculative assumptions, the actors have been denoted by symbols; the paper deals mainly with two principal antagonists, A and B.

A and B are members of the organization F. Both consider the continued membership of both to be in their own interest. B does not pay its share for financing certain activities of F, considering them illegal, while A considers it illegal not to pay for them. A threatens B with the application of the rule concerning the automatic loss of the right to vote in the assembly of F. B claims that a member cannot lose its vote »automatically»

but that this requires an explicit decision by a two-thirds majority. Since B always can challenge the procedure followed, B can in any case create a situation where each member of F has to take a stand on the matter. The strategy of A is to appear as rigid as possible and persuade as many members as possible to bind themselves openly to the view propounded by A, thus increasing the credibility of A's threat. The strategy of B is also to appear as rigid as possible, stressing that an attempt to suspend B's voting privileges would aggragate the international situation, hurt F and be regarded by B as an unfriendly act on the part of any member supporting A in an eventual vote.

Both A and B appear to be rigidly bound to their respective positions, none of them can easily back out. The credibility of A's threat is somewhat weakened by the fact that it requires the active support of a large number of members. A may consider applying a secondary threat by binding itself to a certain course of action either in the case that both the primary threats of A and B are carried out or in the case that the realization of A's primary threat does not succeed. Only the first type of secondary threat, however, would not weaken the credibility of the primary threat. It is easier for B to make its threat credible, since it can be carried out by B alone and be directed separately against each member who supports A. B's threat is less demanding on third parties, since it is obviously enough for B that they refrain from taking a position, while A would require them to support A. In any case, the credibility of the threats of both A and B depends very much on the attitudes of other members; several situations may be construed in theory.

No solutions or predictions are put forward in the paper, which of the serves as an illustration. The actual outcome of the financial crisis of the United Nations may already be known when this is printed.

**VALTIOTIETEELLISEN YHDISTYKSEN JULKAISUSARJA**  
**POLITIIKAN TUTKIMUKSIA 7**

ILMESTYY TAMMIKUUSSA 1965

**OLAVI BORG: SUOMEN PUOLUEET JA PUOLUE-  
OHJELMAT 1880—1964. 424 sivua.**

Valtiot.tri Olavi Borg on koonnut teokseensa täydellisen kokoelman vaikeasti löydettäviä eri puolueiden virallisia ohjelmia, sekä puolueiden periaate- että yleisohjelmia. Kirja muodostaa samalla yhtenäisen katsauksen puolueiden ohjelmahistoriaan.