

SUMMARIES

The Use of Operations Research in the Study of Administration

By Ilikko B. Voipio

Operations research is today widely applied in industry and business management, and its sphere of application is continually expanding. In this study, the author attempts to extend the use of operations research to the study of administrations; of the numerous methods available, that of linear programming was selected. The aim of linear programming is to optimize the objective function within the limits set by the study; the result is an optimal distribution of resources.

This method was used in a case study of the Helsinki University Student Union. The aim was to find the optimal composition of the administrative and office staff, without raising the present salary level or lowering the level of performance. In order to discover the performance level of the staff, the average performances were measured by classes; there were four classes, following the division into salary classes. The resulting class averages were taken as values in a capacity matrix; the performance indices corresponding to the present composition were taken as boundary vectors, while an estimate corresponding to the estimated advantage of the work was taken as the objective function. The resulting indices were taken as input values for a normal IBM linear library program, which was run on an IBM 1620 computer. In this case study, the mean increase in advantage with the values given was 10 % — 60 %.

The method is most suitable for large administrative units, in which the work output is practically constant. In applying the method it is important to observe that it is not concerned with the work of particular individuals, but with the functioning of the entire administrative machine. Thus the individual is perceived not as a machine, but as part of a whole; the method is not concerned with internal personal relations.

The Function of the Parliamentary Representative: Approaches and Trends

By Martti Noponen

The article examines the membership in the legislative organ or representative body and the functions of representatives from four main points of view: 1) how the function of the representative depends on the nature of

the entire political system, 2) what the collective and individual functions of the representatives are and how they carry out these functions (activity, influence), 3) the way in which individual representatives view their office, on the basis either of their general approach to their tasks or of their voting on particular issues, and 4) the development of the representative's function, particularly of the qualifications needed for office, and the need to develop the forms of parliamentary work.

The position of the individual representative and the nature of his work depend greatly on the position and function of the legislature in the administrative system in general. In extreme cases, either the final legislative decisions are normally made in the legislature, after detailed deliberation and discussion, or the task of the legislature is only to ratify decisions which have been planned and formulated elsewhere. In the former case (e.g. in many western nations) the work of the representative is highly valued; it demands a stable organization, regular sessions, deliberation and specialization — so that in fact legislators for whom this is their primary occupation, are comparable to professional politicians. The latter type of legislature is generally represented by the parliaments in the socialist countries, in which the focus of activity is on representation, on the legitimization of decisions, rather than on the formulation of laws. Under such conditions membership in parliament is literally a position of trust, an honorary office, the functioning of which is irregular and non-professional. The differences described are also clearly reflected in the social background of the representatives.

The individual activity of the members of a truly functioning parliament involves on the one hand obligatory tasks leading to conformity, and on the other hand independent initiative and other features leading to differential activity. In the socialist countries these differences become even more prominent, due to the fact that only the leading part of the legislature functions regularly.

The attitudes of the representatives toward their work has been analyzed either through behavioral norms and role images or through voting conformity and attitude dimensions appearing in parliamentary groups. As the starting point in role analysis, the representatives' behavior is defined as role behavior in so far as they are aware of the expectations directed toward them either by other representatives or from the outside, and strive to behave in accordance with the norms and expectations connected with their position. It may be too difficult to discover all the interactions involved in the work of the legislature, but it seems possible to create an overall picture of the norms, experiences, motives, goals and situational factors which even on the basis of their own role-conceptions guide the legislators' work.

There has been much more research into the behavior of representatives based on the results of open voting in parliament. In this way it has been possible to measure the effect of party affiliation on voting decisions (the voting cohesion of parliamentary groups), or to discover other more or less permanent group formations and the basic oppositions and ideological cleavages (attitude dimensions) operating in the background of such groups.

Finally, the article examines the evolution of the representative's function in general, with special attention to the increase in the amount of work and the lengthening of legislature sessions, together with the problems connected with these factors, e.g. specialization, and the necessity of developing new

forms of parliamentary activity. In Finland, as opposed to many other countries, freedom of speech and initiative on the part of representatives has up to now not been directly restricted. During the last four years, however, the question of the conditions of parliamentary work has been openly discussed here also.

The Elites and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy

By Aira Kalela

The author of the article set herself two tasks. First of all, a comparison was made between the attitudes of certain elite groups and those of the general public toward foreign policy in Finland and Norway. Secondly, certain hypotheses set forth by Johan Galtung were tested on Finnish material. The foreign policy elite groups included representatives of all the four categories set up by Almond. The material was collected in Norway in 1964, 1965 and 1967 and in Finland in 1964, 1968 and 1969. Although there are some differences between the samples and the items, they were considered comparable to a great extent. The items chosen for the present comparison dealt with the possibility of avoiding war and with questions of increasing defense expenditures, of aid to the developing nations, of granting customs preferences to the developing nations and of establishing a world government.

Both the Finnish and the Norwegian elites were more convinced that wars could be avoided and thus logically more reluctant to increase defense expenditures than were the respective publics. The elites were more eager to increase assistance to the developing countries and to establish a world government. On the other hand, it was also found that the Norwegian elite was more inclined to support foreign aid and the establishment of a world government than was the Finnish elite. No significant differences were found between the elites of the two countries concerning the rest of the items.

The effect of party identification on foreign policy attitudes were also studied. Two principal types of attitude distribution profiles were found in Finland: items with a clear left-right polarization, and items with the highest percentages for social democrats. The former category consisted of items dealing with war, defense, the EEC and customs preferences. The right was generally more nationalistic and tough-minded and the left more pacifist and internationalistic. The social democrats were most strongly in support of aid to the developing countries and the establishment of a world government. In general the attitude distribution profiles were similar for both the elite and the general public groups. The only exception was the question of foreign aid: the leftist elite was most strongly in favor then the rightist elite, followed by the right-wing public and the left-wing public respectively. This can be accounted for by the fact that in 1964 the question was still fairly new; the left-wing public belongs mostly to the periphery of society, which usually becomes aware of new ideas later than the center.

The effects of party identifications seem to be only partly similar in Finland and in Norway; the ideological cleavage between left and right (or center) in Finland seems much clearer than in Norway.

As for »tough» and »soft» orientation, it was found that the Finnish elite was clearly »softer» than the public. The author also tried to verify Galtung's hypothesis to the effect that attitude formation is more differential and consistent (and the way of thinking more inductive, pragmatic and means-oriented) in the center of society than at the periphery. This was tested by computing correlations between soft and tough items. If the hypothesis is correct, the correlation between soft and tough items should decrease from the periphery to the center, and should be positive and relatively independent of social position between two similar items. *Joenniemi* has already shown that there is no significant difference between the periphery and the center of Finnish society in this respect (see Table 2). On the other hand, it was found that the Finnish elite was highly consistent in its attitude formation, and that the difference between the elite and both the periphery and the rest of the center was very significant. Correlations for the elite between two different items are highly negative, between two similar items highly positive. We can thus accept Galtung's hypothesis, with the reservation that »center» is replaced by »elite».

Another of Galtung's hypotheses, according to which the style of thought of the center is more inductive, pragmatic and means-oriented, was also tested. The hypothesis was found to be partly valid. At the same time, it was found that the elite was in some cases more moralistic than the periphery, a phenomenon that Galtung's theory is unable to account for.

The Political and Legal Applications of Permanent Neutrality: Austrian and Swiss Attitudes towards Membership in the United Nations

By Jukka Huopaniemi and Mauri K. Elovainio

(This article is essentially a recapitulation of some of the discussion on the different positions of Austria and Switzerland as to membership in and the actions of the United Nations. Different as Finland's international status is from that of the two countries, the neutrality of which is of a legal nature, there are, intertwined with the juridical aspects of the abovementioned discussion, certain political considerations that are of interest also for the Finnish public. The emphasis is by far on the Austrian question, which has contributed most of the newest features to the nature of permanent neutrality.)

One of the problems of long standing connected with permanent neutrality is its compatibility with membership in international organizations, the aim of which is collective security: how are the duties derived from neutrality — not to participate in wars between other states, to treat impartially the belligerents — and the consequences of these duties as regards peace-time policy — not to conclude any military or economic treaties that may endanger the war-time possibility to retain a neutral status — to be connected with the duty of the members (as stipulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations

and the Charter of the United Nations) to participate in military, economic or other sanctions against states that have committed an act of aggression or threaten international security?

After some hesitation, Switzerland chose to join the League of Nations, having been guaranteed that she will not be obliged to participate in the military sanctions or to permit the passage of foreign troops. However, the remaining obligation to participate in economic sanctions proved very uncomfortable during the Italo-Ethiopian war, and in 1938 Switzerland was exempted even from this duty.

During the first decade of the existence of the United Nations, the position of neutrality was on the decline. It was silently agreed in the Conference of San Francisco that a state cannot invoke a status of neutrality to be freed from membership obligations to give every assistance in the UN enforcement or preventive actions. Certain experts, notably Hans *Kelsen*, regarded this as an authoritative proof of the incompatibility of (permanent) neutrality with UN membership. However, as the belief that the UN constitutes a genuine system of collective security proved an illusion with the beginning of the Cold War, there was a turn of the tide, which culminated in Austria's admission as a member without any discussion of the acceptability of her possible claims on the right to be exempted from participation in sanctions on account of her permanent neutrality, which she had adopted shortly before in the same year 1955. The fortunate coincidence of the two events made it possible for Austria to demand that her permanent neutrality be respected even by the UN, especially by the four members of the Security Council that had previously acknowledged Austrian neutrality.

Even Switzerland had initially adopted a favourable attitude towards membership in the new world organization in the immediate post-war period, but was soon rebuffed by the attitude, mentioned above, that prevailed among the leading members at that time: they were not prepared to accept *Guggenheim's* interpretation that the Security Council could in accordance with the wording of Articles 43 and 48 of the Charter refrain from concluding the special agreements on making available military forces necessary for carrying out the sanctions with *some* of the member states (which have other international obligations derived from permanent neutrality). Without a clear recognition of such a possibility in the case of Switzerland, the Swiss people did not want to jeopardize their well-established neutrality, and the idea of applying for membership was dropped. This attitude has remained ever since, despite certain signs of a newly-aroused interest. As *Dietrich Schindler* has pointed out, the Austrian example is not applicable to Switzerland, because the latter cannot expect her neutrality to be made the object of a new recognition, without which, however, the duties derived from the Charter are placed in a primary position with regard to the duties of neutrality. Still, it is the skepticism of the Swiss people and the Swiss government concerning the advantages of membership that constitutes the main obstacle to joining the world organization, according to *Schindler*.

Soon after Austria's entry into the UN, *Charles Chaumont* presented an extensive analysis of the stipulations of Chapter VII of the Charter, arriving at favourable conclusions from the point of view of the acceptability of the membership of permanent neutrals. Not only can the possibility of making the exceptions referred to by *Guggenheim* be resorted to, but it must be

remembered that only the *aim* of collective security is common for all members, whereas the *methods* can be different. In certain cases refraining from action can be more profitable for world peace than active participation in sanctions, and in such cases neutrality may be a condition of peace. These arguments have found a wide-spread echo in Austria. The leading member of the Austrian school, Alfred *Verdross*, argues that the Security Council can exempt a state from sanctions both with regard to concrete individual cases and in general with regard to all future conflicts. He even goes to the length of stating that the leading members of the Security Council, being aware of Austria's special position at the time of her admission to membership, have taken over the responsibility of not inviting Austria to participate in sanctions, which would be a violation of neutrality. Some Austrians have expressed reservations regarding this extreme view of Verdross; e.g., Wolfgang *Strasser* points out that the members of the Security Council are above all obliged to see to it that the stipulations of the Charter are carried out and in cases where only economic sanctions are possible (since no military agreements between the Security Council and the member states have been concluded) in a critical situation, they may not be in a position to allow any exceptions. According to Strasser, the exceptions are justified only when they are based on the possible pacifying effect on the whole geopolitical region of which the neutral state is a part, which may well hold true of Austria as a neighbour of states belonging to both of the two great military blocs. Karl *Zemanek* admits in principle that on the level of abstract ideas permanent neutrality and membership in the UN are mutually exclusive; the solution lies, according to him, in the fact that abstract ideas almost never have their exact counterparts in reality. The whole Austrian question can be understood only against the background of the world political situation: the collective security system of the UN has in reality been replaced by a new balance of power system in which the neutrals may have an important function in the localisation of conflicts before they are escalated to Great Power conflicts. In practice, collective security exists only outside of the spheres of influence of the Great Powers, and thus the conflict between the membership obligations and duties of neutrality is exceedingly improbable, since such a possibility depends on enforcement of Charter stipulations which have almost fallen out of use — the remaining possibility does not constitute a real political problem.

The end of the article contains an account of the Swiss and Austrian procedures with regard to the 1966 resolution of the Security Council to apply economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia — a case in which the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter did in fact come into use. Adhering to her interpretation that the decisions of the UN are not legally binding on her, Switzerland (having been notified of the resolution by the Secretary-General) decided to pursue a policy of neutrality with regard to the sanctions, which meant non-participation in the sanctions and reducing trade with Rhodesia. Austria, while enforcing the provisions of the resolution, pointed out that this was not meant to form a precedent for similar cases in the future, but the decision applied only in this particular case and under the given circumstances.