

SUMMARIES

Imperialism and Interaction: Two Approaches to the Study of International Trade

By Peter Wallensteen

International trade can be studied either from »pure» economic point of view or from more general socio-political point of view. In the former case such concepts as »production», »growth» and »utilization of the resources» are used in the analysis, in the latter case they are of the type »dependence», »dominance» or »conflict».

The latter approach divides into two schools: theories of imperialism and theories of interaction. These two schools are subjected to a closer analysis and comparison. Of the former school special attention is paid to writers like *Hobson*, *Lenin*, *Magdoff* and *Frank*. *Homans*, *Russett* and *Galtung* are discussed as representatives of the latter school.

First some differences in Hobson's and Lenin's definitions of imperialism are discussed. Hobson focuses on legal control and capitalist and non-capitalist colonial dominance, Lenin in turn on economic control and general dependence of subordinate countries on fully developed capitalist countries. Again if we compare the imperialism school with the interactionists the latter assume homogeneous actors (nations), neglect the study of actors who represent a nation in international relations and assume a great independence of the actors.

In analyzing the causes of dependence in international relations the theorists of imperialism emphasize the economic interest as crucial one way causal factor. The interactionists in turn speak in terms of mutual dependence and two way causation. Thus interactionism necessarily leads to perspective where e.g. imperialism is seen as result of random events and processes. Both schools, however, pay equally attention to the structure of international relations analyzing it either in terms of rank distribution or dominance relations. There is, however, a clear difference between e.g. Lenin and the interactionists in respect to symmetric (equal power) relations: Lenin considers them competitive, the interactionists consensual. As to asymmetric (top dog-underdog) relations e.g. Frank considers them necessarily exploitative and detrimental to the subordinate partner, while e.g. Hobson considers imperialist subordination under certain conditions advantageous to the subordinate. To the interactionists the asymmetric relations are problematic: it is difficult to apply the generalized propositions about individual behavior to the analysis of action of unequal aggregate actors. The same differences are also reflected in suggested strategies for changing the asymmetry. Thus Hobson suggests changes in the structure of superordinate actor, Lenin in

the structure of subordinate actor, Frank suggests the withdrawal of the subordinate actor and the interactionists (e.g. Galtung) suggest changes in superordinate-subordinate relation itself.

It is finally suggested that the differences between the imperialism school and the interactionists reflect the basic differences in the researchers' systems of values. Lately these value differences have been diminishing and this may lead to recognition of the fact, that these two schools of thought are not necessarily opposite but complementary to each other.

Game Theory and International Alliances: A Model and its Empirical Validity

By Uolevi Arosalo

The common goal approach to group formation is first contrasted with the game theoretical approach. *Riker's* model of the minimal winning coalition and its basic principles is discussed and developed for the study of international alliances. It is suggested that coalition formation in case of international actors (nations) follows the strategy suggested by *Riker's* model at the first stage but at the second stage it changes into a status quo oriented mixed motive strategy. This basic hypothesis is tested by secondary data collected by *Singer, Small* and *Russett*, about alliances between nations in 1920—1957.

The alliances are classified into those established before 1939 and after 1939. Actors (nations) are classified into Big Powers (A), middle sized nations (B) and small nations (C) along two dimensions of power: resources measured by GNP and status measured by *Small & Singer's* index of the range of diplomatic relations. Power measured by the first measure is assumed to be distributed so that $A > B > C$ and $A > B + B$ and $B < C + C$. Power measured by the latter measure is assumed to be distributed so that $A > B > C$ and $A < B + B$ and $B < C + C$. Hypotheses for both measures are derived separately and they are tested by comparing the expected probability values of bilateral alliances with the empirical values from *Small, Singer* and *Russett* data. The basic hypothesis about strategies at the two stages of development is confirmed by the data. Before 1939 the alliances followed the strategy of minimal winning coalition and after 1939 the strategy of mixed motives has become more popular.

Finally the possibilities of further changes in strategy at later stages of development and in special circumstances are discussed.

The Role of Finland in the System of International Organizations

By Raimo Väyrynen

The research reported here applies a set of concepts developed by the author in some earlier publications. The main concepts are the geographical level of activities, the functional sector of activities, the range of authority and the internal stratification of the international organizations. These con-

cepts were used in analyzing the participation of Finland in the system of international organizations. Technically this was done by comparing the characteristics of the organizations Finland was a member of with the characteristics of all the existing international organizations of the world. Furthermore the general trends in Finland's participation in the system of international organizations were investigated and the orientation implied by Finland's memberships was revealed by calculating the number of common memberships with main groups of European countries.

The main findings of the empirical analysis were:

1. Finland's participation in international organizations is oriented almost exclusively to global organizations.

2. Finland is over-represented in socio-cultural and coordinative organizations and under-represented in economic, political and military organizations.

3. Finland is relatively passive in its organizational activities, measured e.g. by the number of headquarters of international organizations in Finland. This may be, however, also due to the policies of international organizations.

4. Finland participates more actively in international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) than in governmental ones (IGOs) as all neutral countries of Europe do.

All these four findings can be interpreted to reflect Finland's neutral status in international politics.

5. Finland's organizational relations with the socialist countries are under-developed and she is mainly oriented towards the group of EEC countries. This may be partly due to great number of memberships of these countries which offer greater interaction opportunities.

6. The internal stratification of international organizations was measured by the mean deviation of the distributions of ranks of member countries. It was found that Finland has in general common memberships with more equal countries than what is the general pattern. This is especially true at the regional and subregional levels, although this may be due to the contextual effect of Nordic and Western European region. Furthermore the stratification of coordinative and socio-cultural organizations with Finland as a member had increased from 1951 to 1966. In general it is possible to say, however, that Finland when compared with other countries is oriented in her organizational relations towards influence rather than dominance type of relations.

Finally some policy implications related to peace theory were derived from the results. Finland ought to increase her common memberships with socialist countries in order to act better as a bridge between the East and West. On the other hand Finnish memberships with the Third World countries is not to be encouraged and the policy should be such that these countries could first establish their own organizations so that a bargaining model between their organizations and those of developed countries can be realized.