

SUMMARIES

The Majority Rules and The Power Relations of The Parties in The Parliament

by Markku Laakso

The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the order of constitutional legislation, as expressed by Article 67 of the Parliament Act of 1928. According to this Article the proposed constitution or amendments to the constitution can be handled in two ways: (1) *Holding-over* : the bill is approved by a simple majority to be held over to the first session of the newly-elected Parliament. The bill must then be approved by a 2/3 majority to take effect. (2) *Declaring urgent* when the bill can be passed during the same parliamentary session: the bill is declared urgent by a majority of 5/6, after which it must be approved by a 2/3 majority.

The problems of the majority rules have been approached in this research from a purely »theoretical« point of view, on grounds of the power relations of the parliamentary parties. The study is connected with the question of changing the majority rules which is a very actual problem in Finland at this moment. The first intention is to clarify the positions of the parties with different majority rules by help of a voting power index. An other very important aim is to find criteria for changing the majority rules by help of a game-theoretical analysis.

In this study three factors has been chosen for criteria to evaluate the question of majorities: (1) *equality* means that the power relations of the parties correspond as much as possible to their number of representatives in the parliament, (2) *minority protection* means the increase of power of the stable »medium-sized small parties«, especially The Liberal People's Party and The Swedish People's Party, and (3) *leadership* means in this context the centralising of power to the biggest party in the parliament, The Social Democratic Party.

The results obtained can be summarized to the following table:

Criterium	Stipulated majority recommended	
	Declaring urgent	Final approval
Equality	2/3	1/2
Minority protection	4/5	1/2
Leadership	3/4	3/5

The results obtained are completely clear, i.e. on the proposed criteria only one recommendable majority can be found. Of the accounted results it is, furthermore, worth of mentioning that every party has, with a certain stipulated

majority, a so called Shapley-maximum, which means that the party can reach a very advantageous position compared to its number of representatives in the parliament. This implies, naturally, that the changing of the majorities goes back to the question of giving more power to a certain party and diminishing it from a certain party. So, the question of changing the majority rules in our constitution is developing to political fight of »re-division» of political power in our parliament.

Social Resources and Class Division

by Raimo Blom

This analysis is concerned with the distribution of social resources. Besides to form descriptions about the distribution of several types of social resources, the aim of the study was to examine the dispersion vs. accumulation of social resources and the inequality of class position, social origin and position in the division of labour.

The data were collected from an inquiry (by post) carried out at the end of 1969 among the Finnish adult population (age 19—66). The return percentage of the inquiry was 66.3 %, that is to say 1917 respondents. Compared with the adult population the representativeness of the data was high.

The variables measuring social resources were following:

1. *Gross family income* (marks.)
2. *Education* (measured by a scale based on the social value; points from 0 to 10).
3. *Prestige* (points based on the evaluation of occupation, variation from 0 to 40).
4. *Number of influential positions* (measured on two scales which were based on points given from membership in associations, trade unions and party organizations and from partaking in municipal decision-making; variation of the scales from 0 to 6 and from 0 to 18 points; the intercorrelation of the scales 0.90).
5. *Frequency of interaction* (based on points given from the total frequency of interaction with eight separate social groups, variation from 0 to 24 points).

The *main* results of the research were as follows:

1. The division of social resources, even others than income, is widely unequal. If the division of resources were investigated by using 'resource-influence' -type of measures the inequality of their division would seem even greater.
2. The inequality in division of social resources is wide even within separate classes and within the group of industrial workers. The inequality of the division of resources within these groups is only slightly lower compared to the whole adult population.

3. The possessions of different social resources are connected to each other. The relatively loosest connection exists between the number of positions of influence and other resources analyzed. The results were interpreted to show the principle of limited dispersion of social resources *connected with capitalist distribution*.
4. The possession of all the resources depends to some extent on the social origin. Independent of other resources the social origin affects most strongly the quantity of education. The result was interpreted to show the importance of education when the inequality of social origin is transmitted.
5. Class differences are significant in the possession of all resources. Class differences operate also in the distribution of all resources with respect to geographical regions and occupational groups. Exclusive of the number of positions of influence, the class differences in the division of resources are greatest in industry, traffic and services.
6. Seen from the point of view of both interconnection of resources and the dependence between resources and structural position, the number of influential positions, and probably more generally political resources, have a special kind of character compared to other social resources.

In the end the interrelation of equality research and the fulfillment of equality was discussed. The most important conclusions were: (a) the illusory nature of equality between exploiters and exploited, independent of formally equal rights; (b) the emphasis on regional and occupational resource differences over class differences is opposed to the fulfillment of equality; (c) suspicion that the production of scientific facts to decision-makers does not automatically lead to the realization of equality.