SUMMARIES

PERIPHERAL INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND SMALL POWER STATUS AS VANTAGE POINTS FOR FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

By Raimo Väyrynen

Research on small powers has been actively pursued over years. In the turn of the last decade it experienced a boom which is now about to disappear. It has been more and more often concluded that neither in the security policy nor in economic relations the small powers constitute any uniform category which could provide an explanation of the direction and the content of their foreign policies. To be meaningful the research on small powers must be combined with the analysis of the international position of peripheral nations. In concrete terms this means the focus on two approaches, viz. the internationalization of capital and the center-periphery models which could be then refined by introducing the size variable into the analysis. In this perspective the small-power approach is a subcategory of more general studies which concentrate on the international power structure and economic tendencies towards internationalization.

In the second part of the article Finland's peripheral position in the international system is illustrated by some empirical evidence. From this fact the analysis proceeds to show that in the field of security policy the peripheral position and small-power status of Finland have hardly had any major influence on the foreign policy of the country. In the economic sector the situation is, however, different; these attributes most apparently have shaped Finland's official attitude towards such actual questions as the transfer of technology, control of transnational corporations, sovereignty over natural resources and the New International Economic Order in general.

ON THE ART OF KICKING ONESELF IN THE BACK: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF A REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

By Krister Ståhlberg

The problem of politics and administration often nowadays finds its focus in the theory of a representative bureaucracy. This theory, or rather line of reasoning, seems to be one of the very few somewhat concrete formulations of the thrust visavi bureaucratic responsibility in the New Public Administration. But not only is the theory of interest within the tradition of public administration. Increasingly it has practical relevance in a finnish context because it seems to be the only more or less comprehensive intellectual excuse for an increasingly all pervasive party-politicazation of the finnish bureaucracy.

The theory of a representative bureaucracy holds that the distinction between politics and administration is outmoded. So is the view that bureaucratic behavior can be controlled by formal external rules. Public administrators are influenced in their behavior by the values they have aquired in their respective socialization. Thus the bureaucrats must mirror the social composition of the population at large in order to represent the distribution of values in society. Also, in order for the representative bureaucrats not to misrepresent their value-background, they must develop a democratic ethos. This representativity is the reason why we can expect the bureaucrats to behave in accordance with the wishes of the population. And since democracy means that the rulers rule in accordance with popular wishes, a representative bureaucracy is a safeguard of democracy.

If a theory can be tested against its conceptual clarity, its logical consistency and its empirical claims, we must, unfortunately, conclude that the theory of a representative bu-

reaucracy meets none of these tests. It is conceptually fuzzy in that most of the sweeping concepts in the formulation have rarely been given measurable meanings, i.e. should the bureaucrats be representative of what, of whom, when and so on. The theory also is logically problematic. Is not a bureaucrat as such unrepresentative of most social groups? Does his position in the bureaucracy not influence his values? And the empirical claims in the theory do not fit well with what we have established about bureaucratic behavior. Bureaucrats representing varying social groups do not negotiate in order to find a common solution representing the ultimate will of the people. A change in values occures generally in bureaucrats as they stay within the bureaucracy and climbe the ladder.

SHOULD FINLAND FOLLOW THE SCANDINAVIAN MODEL IN HER ELECTORAL REFORM?

By Markku Laakso

Representative democracy has many common features in all Nordic countries. All five countries apply the list system of proportional representation in multi-member constituencies. However, there are certain important differences in transforming votes into parliamentary seats. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden apply the odd-number *Sainte Lagüe* rule modified through the stipulation of a 1.4 barrier against party fragmentation (divisors 1.4, 3, 5, and so on). Iceland, Denmark and Sweden further reserve a certain number of seats in a national pool to be used as so-called adjustment seats. Finland and Iceland use the d'Hondt system under which the total number of votes cast for each party list is divided in turn by 1, 2, 3, and so on. The well-known fact that the *d'Hondt* system favours the larger parties has given rise in Finland to pressures to change the electoral rule to the more proportional system adopted in the other Scandinavian countries.

What happens if a country changes one proportional electoral rule for another? The Scandinavian experience offers a highly interesting research area in this respect. Around 1950, Denmark, Norway and Sweden changed from the d'Hondt method of allocation to the modified Sainte Laguë rule. The consequences of this shift represent the primary focus of this article. The results are especially important when we keep in mind the present discussion in Finland on constitutional reform, which also includes a re-evaluation of the electoral system. What can Finland learn from the Scandinavian experience?

The empirical data consist of election results from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden after the World War I. Table 2 (Taulukko 2) gives the mean deviation from proportionality (D) and effective number of parties (N_V, N_S, N_P are the effective number of parties on the vote, seat and power share levels respectively). In Denmark elections under the d'Hondt rule with additional seats are very proportional (years 1920—53). The very high proportionality of the d'Hondt rule is explained by the use of the additional adjustment seats. The adoption of the modified St. Laguë rule paradoxically made elections more disproportional (years 1953—75). In Iceland elections under the mixed electoral system which combined features of both proportional and majority systems (years 1927—59) were very disproportional. The electoral reform of 1959 with the d'Hondt rule and additional seats made Iceland one of the most proportional countries in Scandinavia (years 1959—74). Finland has applied under the period considered (years 1919—75) the same electoral system and the results are quite proportional. Adoption of the St. Laguë rule in Norway (years 1953—73) has made elections more proportional. The time period in Norway when the country used the d'Hondt rule (years 1921—27) does not much differ from the years 1930—49 when in addition the electoral alliances were permitted. In Sweden the d'Hondt rule (years 1920—48) has been markedly more disproportional than the St. Laguë method (years 1952—68). The system of additional nationwide seats (1970—76) has further reduced the deviation from perfect proportionality.

The comparative study of electoral rules shows the modified St. Laguë rule to be more proportional than the d'Hondt method. The exception of Denmark is explained by its additional seats system. The electoral systems with

additional seats (Denmark, Iceland, Sweden 1970—76) are naturally the most proportional systems considered irrespective of the electoral rule applied.

The problems of comparative research in the area of electoral systems are many, simply because no two countries apply exactly the same electoral system. The Scandinavian countries are quite similar in many respects but there are also many important differences which make general conclusions difficult. Therefore, electoral reforms must be based on national solutions which take into account a country's historical development and particularly its party system. Finland can learn from Scandinavian experiences but the final decision and arguments for that choice can not be adopted from other countries.

THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LABOUR PROTECTION AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND — IN THE LIGHT OF ACCIDENTS AT WORK

By Guy Ahonen

The present paper discusses whether or not the economic analysis of labour protection matters should be increased in Finland, and also what kinds of problems are connected to the use of the economic approach in labour protection contexts.

The fact that Finnish labour protection research lags behind many other countries in certain fields of economic analysis of labour protection motivates an increased application of the approach under consideration. Furthermore, the argument that economic analysis in general possesses qualities that ordinary labour protection research (medically and technologically orientated) does not, is sufficient reason for increased activity in this special area of labour protection. Especially since economic analysis provides an exact basis for optimization of labour protection measures and since economic analysis relates the labour protectionally important values to other societally important values, it is important to develop the integration of the economic and labour protectional disciplines.

While economic analysis needs an actual work environmental context to become »labour protection economics», its extensive application will likely affect all labour protection research. Thus e.g. the economic analysis of the optimal level of air conditioning of industrial work sites requires knowledge of the causal relationship between the production process and occupational diseases. It is not enough to know that the relationship is significant or highly significant; the number of disease cases produced by a specific production procedure must be estimated. Medical and technological research must possess certain qualities to be applicable to economic analysis. The successful use of economic methods furthermore presupposes a statistical data base suited for economic analysis.

The economic analysis of labour protection seems to be dependent on the qualities of other kinds of labour protection research, and its application has some implications for most labour protection research. It is therefore plausible that a quantitative increase in the economic analysis of labour protection in Finland would imply a qualitative development of labour protection research in general.

A closer look at the costs connected to the accidents at work during one year (1976) in Finland reveals some of the practical and theoretical problems associated with the economic analysis of labour protection matters. The following estimate gives the costs of the work site accidents in 1976 in Finland:

A. The insured workers:			
1. Fatal accidents			
— income losses	139.3	mill.	FMK
— gross margin losses	262.6	»	»
2. Disability cases			
— income losses	1,328.9	»	»
— gross margin losses	1,328.9	»	»
1. and 2.			
— medical care costs	135.6	»	»
— administration costs	63.0	»	»
— production costs and other material costs	1,659.9	»	»
B. The uninsured sector	820.0	»	»
TOTAL	5,736.0	mill.	FMK

The estimate brought up the following questions connected to the quantification of labour protectional losses:

— How should the loss of working potential be measured (here suggested: income loss and gross margin loss)?
— How is the working potential of the partly disabled to be measured (here suggested: according to the medical disability degree)?
— Should the losses resulting from narrow escapes be considered (here: yes)?
— How should the production costs related to the occupational accidents be measured (here: according to certain rough coefficients multiplied by the insurance fees)?
— How should the cases remaining outside the accident records be considered (here: according to calculations based on the estimated number of workers in the uninsured sector and the type of work occurring there)?
— How should the losses appearing at different points of time be discounted (here: real values, no discounting)

When applying different plausible solutions to the problems above (excepting the discounting problem) the following "costfork" was achieved:

If the costs were completely discounted by a rate of 10 % the minimum amount would further decrease to less than 3,000 million FMK. Consequently, the losses caused by the accidents at work in 1976 in Finland can be estimated to be between 3,000 and 7,000 million FMK, depending on the estimation methods used. As the methods often have certain (opposite) implications for the estimation of labour protection (input) costs,[1] their relevance for the economic evalution of labour protection measures is apparently great.

In conclusion, labour protection in Finland would obviously gain from an increased number of applied economic analyses: especially if both substantial and methodological questions were to be examined in all analyses. Qualities, such as higher precision degree, would be required of ordinary labour protection research, while economic analysis would render the results of medical and technological labour protection research applicable more rapidly in practice.

[1] The bigger the discount rate, the smaller tends to be the estimated cost for accidents, and the bigger the estimated input cost for avoiding accidents.

	MIN	MAX
Loss of working potential	2,110 mill. FMK	3,847 mill. FMK
Medical care	171 » »	250 » »
Administration costs	63 » »	63 » »
Production costs etc.	1,135 » »	2,900 » »
TOTAL	3,479 mill. FMK	7,066 mill. FMK