

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CHANGE OF POWER

George Maude

President *Kekkonen* handed on to President *Koivisto* a number of unresolved problems in his country's security policy and for their solution he handed on, too, a number of hitherto unrealized proposals to be achieved through the agency of an active foreign policy. The most notable of these unresolved solutions is the proposal for the creation of a Northern European nuclear-free zone.

The fact that the long *Kekkonen* era left unresolved a number of security-policy problems should not in itself be a cause for surprise. The field is a notoriously tricky one and *Kekkonen* made the point in 1965 that the »position is never too good or even good enough» (*Kekkonen* 1970, 187).

If, on the other hand, the Nordic area is contrasted with most of the rest of the world, then the Northern European states stand out as an island of stability and mutual understanding. We all know by now that it is the best thing in the world to have been born in Fenno-Scandia, a truth drummed up and drummed in every sixth of December. But just as liturgy, sacred eloquence, and dogmatics do not account for the whole of theology, neither do national identification, political rhetoric, and the declared principles of friendship among neighbours make up the whole of foreign policy. Both theology and the study known as politics must in the end address themselves to the shifting context of the world.

But the casuist who looks at the *Koivisto* presidency — which, after all, is only two years old — must in all fairness try to assess how his predecessor harmonized or failed to harmonize his own perceptions shift.

The Security-Policy Components of the *Kekkonen* Era

In his analysis of pre-World War II policy *Max Jakobson* saw Finland endeavouring to live in the security of the balance created by the permanent hostility of Germany and the Soviet Union (*Jakobson* 1968, 10). As far as the *Kekkonen* era is concerned, one may with reason speak of the emergence of a certain balance (its high-point »the balance of terror») between the United States and the Soviet Union, a balance of the utmost significance, too, for Finnish security policy (*Maude* 1976, 73—5). The significance of this post-World War II balance was heightened by the fact that the balance of terror remained not merely a *high-point* but served also as a *starting-point* for negotiations that would transform the original hostility into a working *modus vivendi*.

Thus Finland no longer lived on the basis of the alleged security provided by the 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union — as had been the case for most of the *Paasikivi* era. Indeed it was during the Kekkonen presidency that the 1948 treaty became subordinated to the overall balance between the superpowers as a much-vaunted element in the general security of the world (Brundtland 1975, 106—7). In function the treaty became a component in a so-called Northern Balance, a part of an inter-locking complex of restrained military solutions undertaken by each Nordic state (Brundtland 1966), in which — as was apparently the case with the direct relations between the superpowers — military potential constituted a sort of pre-condition for political understanding, foresight, exchange of views, improvement.

A curious paradox emerged in Finnish security policy with respect to its Nordic concerns. It was endeavoured, on the one hand, to keep the military in-put into the Nordic region as a whole a low in-put: after Östen Unden had failed, Kekkonen took up the theme of a nuclear-free North and two and a half years later in his speech to the Foreign Policy Youth Society in Helsinki on 29 November 1965 mentioned the thought that Norway might leave NATO (for a fuller version of this scheme, see Pajunen 1966, 72—3) and, additionally, that the Norwegian-Finnish frontier should become a frontier of peace. On the other hand, throughout the sixties and seventies the potential of Finland's own defence forces improved continually after permission was given by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in 1962 for the Finnish army to receive guided missiles. Finnish commentators saw no contradiction in this (Jakobson 1968, chapters IX & X) and Kekkonen's vague words about the Norwegian-Finnish frontier were interpreted three years later by Foreign Minister *Karjalainen* as in no sense meaning a demilitarization of the area in question (Pajunen 1975, 95). The grand upshot of Kekkonen's regional security policy — in essence a policy of de-escalation — was a failure to alter the NATO position in the North (which strengthened as a result of the installation on Norwegian soil of navigation stations for US nuclear submarines) and a reliance instead on a Finnish military »do it yourself» policy, which dovetails into Nordic military postures (Brundtland 1975, 106), is quietly approved by NATO (Lellenberg 1979, 27; Zakheim 1982, 204), and appears to fulfil the requirements of article 1 of the 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union (Illi 1983, 377).

Thus while Finland has continued to preach disarmament to the rest of the world (e.g. UPLA 1977, vol. I., 40—3), its own military forces form part of a rising level of military in-put into the North and justifiably *Zakheim* refers, even if in inverted commas, to a Finnish »build-up» in Lapland. To this it may immediately be countered that a strong Finnish military presence obviates the necessity of having to endure an even stronger Soviet military presence. But this counter-assertion is highly questionable. At least in peacetime, in spite of the remarks allegedly dropped by Marshals *Malinovsky* and *Ustinov* (Simelius 1983, 270 & Maude 1979, 40), it is hardly in the interests of the Soviet Union to tarnish the image of Finland as a peace-loving state, whose

services through an active policy of neutrality are of considerable value to the Soviet Union. In wartime Soviet defence depends on forward action (Komissarov 1973, 150) and the *Verteidigung gegen Hilfe* that one commentator has viewed as characteristic of the Finnish military outlook (Ørvik 1972, 188—9) may all too easily be seen to contain the seeds of the doctrine of a symmetrical neutrality, armed against all comers, an interpretation that General Bernard Rogers, as a result of his interview in the *Helsingin Sanomat* of 4 January 1983, provoked the commander-in-chief of the Finnish defence forces into endorsing.

Nevertheless recently published military memoirs confirm the picture of Kekkonen as a president who certainly did not trust in a policy of »going it alone» in defence of the country (Simelius 1983, 177). Rather was the maintenance of neutrality the task of foreign policy (Simelius 1983, 209—10). Unfortunately, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Maude 1983, 245), Kekkonen's outlook in respect of armed neutrality became somewhat ambivalent, an ambivalence that only reflected the deepest contradictions in Finnish security policy (on these see Maude 1976, esp. 38—45).

The preceding critique has revolved around the floating upwards of the 1948 treaty into a wider sphere than that originally devised for it. The treaty was devised against Germany. Kekkonen learned the significance of this through the crises in Finnish-Soviet relations of 1958 and 1961 and he continued to make the necessary objections to the presence of German troops in Norway's NATO manouvres well into the 1970's. But from another point of view Kekkonen succeeded in playing down the German component. His support in the seventies for Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* — whether through the German »package-deal» (Maude 1976, 77—83) or the more important role undertaken by Finland in respect of the furthering of the European Security Conference — tended to reduce the German »threat». This was a wise policy on Kekkonen's part, but it did bear with it once more the danger of seeing henceforward Finnish security in terms of an improving *global* context, clinging to SALT-type solutions, in regard to which Finland had nothing to say or do but host the occasional session. To his credit Kekkonen himself was aware that such deferential provision of services was not enough and in 1978, for example, brought out a refurbished plan for the Nordic nuclear-free zone. How much back-up he received from the other foreign-policy making agencies in the country is another question, witness the embarrassing silence that greeted Leonid Brezhnev's *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* interview of 26 June 1981.

Koivisto's Quietism

When Mauno Koivisto became president in January 1982 he emerged as the clear choice of a certain internal political consensus, one aspect of which was a desire on the part of many citizens for a less intrusive, less personally-

involved presidency. Some members of the Finnish community may now feel that as far as foreign policy is concerned the president's reticence has, after all, begun to be a drawback and has led instead to a too prominent *party-political* in-put into foreign-policy making. This criticism is directed above all at the Social Democratic Party. I shall try to argue that — on the contrary — the whole spectrum of foreign-policy making, whether the presidential, governmental, parliamentary, party, or foreign office level is involved, is too restrained. Because of the nature of the theme under discussion in this journal, however, I shall focus attention mainly on the president.

The politics of consensus embodied in Mauno Koivisto relates also to the Finnish view of the world outlined earlier in these pages. The vision of the world is still that of a bi-polarized entity capable sooner or later of adjusting itself into the minimal degree of consensus required so that most countries, including Finland, can live in peace. Koivisto, when head of the Bank of Finland expressed pessimism in respect of the economic expectations of his fellow-countrymen, but as president he seems to rate the prospects of their political security much higher. Perhaps this is because the latter issue is not going to depend very much on the Finns themselves. In his interview with the press on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday on 24 November 1983 he concentrated not on the break-down of the Geneva talks but on the amount of progress that could be seen in them. These views easily link up with typical Finnish-establishment opinions like those expressed by Olli Kivinen in his column in the *Helsingin Sanomat* of Christmas Eve last: »Ei tule sotaa» — »there will be no war» — since both the United States and the Soviet Union regulate the situation in Europe and, wait for it, the balance of terror is keeping the peace.

However, both president and *Helsingin Sanomat* commentator are determinedly of the opinion that the balance should be reduced, the president — to go by his American speeches of 29 September and 3 October — even more so than the commentator. Can anything be done by the Finns to help this process? In America Koivisto concentrated, in his public pronouncements at any rate, on the expression of wishes: wishes that other nations would do as Finland has done and support non-nuclear proliferation agreements, wishes that ICBM and cruise missile negotiations would succeed in removing the threat of the new and reducing the number of the existing weapons, wishes for all kinds of disarmament agreements, even from his speech of 29 September was drawn out the wish that states would renounce the first use of nuclear weapons.

And there has been more. Finland has continued to offer its services, particularly in the context of the European Security Conference mechanism. This line of policy seems fairly close to the heart of Koivisto. It is of course the operation of international consensus politics that is involved here, but some striving has been necessary to keep the low flame of international consensus still alight. Koivisto headed an appeal on 18 April 1983, to which the leaders of five other states acceded, asking for the Madrid negotiations to be attended with due seriousness and shortly after, during his visit to Denmark, won the

additional support of the Danes for his démarche. The holding of the Stockholm disarmament conference, with its organizational preliminaries in Helsinki in October-November last, also bears testimony, in part, to the conviction and energy with which Finnish foreign-policy makers have tried to arrange an alternative forum for the superpowers and other states when direct negotiations between the two superpowers themselves get stranded.

It seems churlish to say that this is not enough, but churlish one must be. Like the Austrians, the Finns do not apparently intend to have any substantive proposals for the forthcoming Stockholm Conference. Everything is to be left in the final resort to the goodwill of others, to the issuance of a kind of *volonté générale*. But whether taken into the Stockholm conference or left outside it, there is a tough European problem in existence, a problem that impinges more and more on Northern Europe: missiles.

Kekkonen and Koivisto

If we draw comparisons between the Kekkonen and Koivisto foreign policies, it might be argued that Kekkonen produced a number of proposals for Northern European security, not one of which has been capable of realization, while Koivisto, to the contrary, has tried to avoid too close a definition but has worked on the basis of exchanges of opinion that have resulted in the emergence of a satisfactory degree of mutual understanding.

A typical example of this kind of approach would be President Koivisto's discussions last March with Prime Minister *Willoch* of Norway. No advance was then made with the old Kekkonen proposal for a frontier of peace between Norway and Finland (a proposal still on the agenda of Finnish foreign policy), but understanding about the security goals of both states was expressed. What did this mean? According to the report in the *Helsingin Sanomat* of 12 March it meant, among other things, that where necessary (to satisfy presumably Norwegian fears of the Soviet Union) an increase in the Finnish military in-put into Lapland might again occur.

In short we are back with the problem on which Kekkonen hooked himself: that, in the event, Nordic security was not to rest on de-escalation, but on the maintenance of military stability by a gradually-increasing in-put. How gradual? The *Sunday Times* of 18 December reported an American discussion for the siting of cruise missiles on Norwegian soil. These would of course be without nuclear warheads. . .

The introduction of cruise missiles into Western Europe dwarfs everything else for Finland, including the alleged military stability of Northern Europe. It is the greatest challenge of the Koivisto period and so far the responses have been poor. For one thing Koivisto has been purposefully blithe for years about the stability of the Nordic area (the comments of Jouko *Kajanoja* reproduced in the *Helsingin Sanomat* of 7 March 1983 are salutary in this regard). For

another thing the supposed dominance of the Social Democratic Party in foreign policy thinking has not in this question amounted to much, taking into account the cherished special relationship with the German Social Democrats, whose policy when in office helped to start the whole missile question off. Where then was the Socialist International with its remarkable Finnish membership and officialdom? Surely the coming of the cruise-missiles rated as much concern as the problems of Puerto Rico?

What is involved with cruise-missiles is a direct threat to the national interest of Finland. Of course this interest was discussed in private talks when Koivisto visited the USA and *Genscher* came to Finland on 2—4 November. But the public pronouncements and debate on this issue — such as they and it have been — show only a confusion at best and a reliance on the outworn at worst.

Interviewed by the Yleisradio TV news reported on 27 November Foreign Minister Paavo *Väyrynen* assured the nation that the missile threat, as far as Finland was concerned, was from submarine-based and not from land-based cruise-missiles. This interview was preceded by an item of news telling of the threat to Finnish air-space of cruise-missiles sited in England. This is true, since those sited at Molesworth are certainly tracked through Finnish air-space to Leningrad and points north, thus aiming at the communications network between Leningrad and Murmansk. The Soviet general Viktor *Tatarnikov* confirmed in his *Suomenmaa* interview of 10 December 1983 the threat to Finnish air-space of land-based cruise-missiles.

So upset was the deputy speaker of the Finnish Parliament by the Euro-missile question that he sounded the death-knell of the Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal and called instead for military consultations with the Soviet Union under article 2 of the 1948 treaty.

But Mikko *Pesälä's* call was premature. It appeared there was yet a third alternative. In the TV news of 28 November and in an interview in the programme *Ajankohtainen 2* on 29 November colonels G. *Hägglund* and A. *Hämäläinen*, respectively, stated that the Finnish army would try to shoot the cruise-missiles down. This was admittedly a difficult task, but, in the event of success, hitting the missiles would not be devastating as they were programmed to explode somewhere else. Indeed all this may have been the tenour of Paavo *Väyrynen's* recent visit to the Soviet Union: he was telling *them* that the Finnish forces would once more »do it themselves«.

Soviet reticence in regard to the Finnish-Russian aspects of the Euro-missile problem should not mislead us. General *Tatarnikov* made it clear that the Soviet forces will in any case act to destroy the missiles, and though the precise mechanism by which this is to be done remains at the moment unclear, it can surely be attempted from Soviet soil. Finnish volunteering to do the job on the Soviet behalf seems incredibly hasty, to put it mildly. Military self-sufficiency of this kind cannot have any virtue in NATO eyes: whether it is endeavoured to shoot down NATO cruise-missiles in the name of fulfilling the

obligations of the 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union or whether it is done in the name of the classic obligations of neutrality, the end product is the same for NATO — either way the Finnish armed forces shoot down cruise-missiles not intended for Finnish targets. The subsequent stage in NATO thinking is obviously to plan preventive action against a country whose armed forces will act in this way. The possibility that Finland will form an exception to the United States' declaration of non-use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state, that it will fall, in short, into the category of states »allied to a nuclear-weapons state or associated with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining . . . attack«, a category of states against which the US could use nuclear weapons, has already been raised by one researcher (Rosas 1983, 225). Declarations of intent to shoot down cruise-missiles do not improve this scenario.

It has, on the other hand, been maintained in Finland that cruise-missiles are essentially second-strike missiles and are therefore properly to be considered and even dismissed as »political« weapons (Iloniemi 1983, 500). Without entering into the technical-political question of whether these weapons are to be launched at the same time as the prime main strike, simply arriving somewhat later in the day, there are still several objections to their dismissal as an irrelevant factor. One objection has already been made by General Bernard Rogers and it is to the effect that these missiles reduce the nuclear threshold (on this see a particularly judicious editorial in the *Turun Sanomat* of 21 December 1983). Another is already indicated above, namely that these missiles widen the network of nuclear planning so that more and more countries become *directly* taken into the nuclear scenario, perhaps, as in the Finnish case, by their mad desire to resist. Finally it may be argued that in so far as the weapon is political it is deserving of a political response. This is the case once more for the Nordic nuclear-free zone.

The cruise-missile issue shows up the fundamental weakness of a security policy based in the last resort on military defence. I have elsewhere pointed out the weaknesses of this policy with respect to the defence of Lapland and advocated instead a concentration of the resources of the Finnish defence forces upon the protection of the main population centres, a policy that could be interpreted to all concerned as one that testified to Finland's wish to be outside the conflicts of interest of the great powers and pursue a policy of peace (Maude 1983). Failing this, and above all in addition to this, the onus is upon an active foreign policy that will proclaim the necessity of a Nordic nuclear-free zone as the key element in the Finnish national interest.

There is some truth in Mikko Pesälä's juxtapositioning of the nuclear-free zone and consultations under the 1948 treaty. His failure was to jettison the former for the latter. However coolly the NATO states, especially Norway, have reacted towards the nuclear-free zone proposal, nevertheless they are prepared to talk about it, albeit reluctantly. There is nothing to talk about with them if resort is made instead to military consultations with the Soviet

Union, nor is it meaningful to have discussions on the justification, in terms of the principles of neutrality, for shooting cruise-missiles down. »Going it alone» is not a negotiating stance.

In spite of the fact that the Kekkonen Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal has remained unrealized on the agenda of Finnish foreign policy for over twenty years, its importance has been testified to by President Koivisto in his interview with the Norwegian *Dagbladet* of 2 August 1982 and in a further statement on 28 May 1983. Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen paid tribute to the significance of the proposal in his talk to the Helsinki Paasikivi Society on 27 November last. Unfortunately he refused at the same time to admit the linkage between the zone idea and a *direct* threat to Finland and Sweden from the installation of land-based cruise-missiles.

This linkage should be publicly and decisively brought out, for the issue is not a Grenada/Afghanistan vote but a matter of clear national interest is involved, in the expression of which there is no tarnishing of Finnish neutrality: on the contrary such an expression would strengthen Finnish neutrality.

The Soviet interest in the zone is growing rather than diminishing. In a Swedish TV interview of 7 March 1983 General Nikolai *Tshervov* expressed the willingness of the Soviet Union to consider at least the taking of the Baltic sea into a Nordic nuclear-free zone and General Viktor Tatarnikov confirmed in his *Suomenmaa* interview Soviet readiness to withdraw nuclear weapons from a wider than ever area of the Soviet Union should a Nordic nuclear-free zone be created.

That is one side of the 1948 treaty. What of the other, the potential enemy, Germany, read West Germany? When Foreign Minister Genscher came to Finland on 2 November one of his first actions was to throw cold water on the Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal. A recent Finnish study has also endeavoured to show how closely, through BALTAP, the West German defence system impinges on the Danish (Nyberg 1983, esp. 46—7). But these facts should not be used to hinder the creation of a Nordic zone as a political expression of the Nordic states' joint security concerns. And when it comes down to it, it has to be said that West German, Danish, and even Norwegian governments do not last for ever: within the *parliaments* of all three states are strong anti-nuclear forces.

In any case a clear expression of what is conceived to be the Finnish interest in an essentially *European* question cannot be regarded as an unfriendly act even by the present governments of those states. Every state has the right to say publicly where its security interests lie. Such a statement could be the start of a dialogue with other European states. Finland should become, in short, less globally-orientated and more European. And it should abandon the thought, inherited from the slip-up of Kekkonen's Nordic policy, that once the defence of Lapland is put in order the security of the North is as good as guaranteed.

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