

The Internationalisation of the State. The Example of Biodiversity-Politics

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Introduction

Two events of the past year allows us to understand much clearer the situation of the international system – two events with very opposite implications. First the “battle of Genoa”; the demonstrations at the G7/8-meeting in July has shown again that the hegemony of neoliberal thinking is challenged. More than this, more than two years after the protests against the WTO in Seattle in late 1999 the critique of neoliberal globalisation now reached national governments and the global elite. Not only some governments like the German red-green-coalition but also members of international organisations like World Bank and IMF opened at least their rhetoric to the issues of the protesters. Awareness is growing at the international level, that “the market” on its own is incre-

asingly fraught with crisis (see World Bank 1997; Soros 1998; UNEP 1999). Moreover the persuasion is decreasing that the market itself is the best problem-solving institution. This gives more weight to the search for political regulations to address global social and ecological concerns. Such efforts are discussed under the heading of “*global governance*” or – more general – under the term “*re-embedding*”. Both terms suggested that markets need some corresponding political regulations to prevent crises and to solve the problems raised from “disembedded” markets. A political shaping of the world economy by embedding it in political and socio-cultural institutions seems to be the requirements of the present. At the same time the emerging so called “Anti-Globalisation-Movement” shows us that protest and worldwide mobilisation has become a relatively stable and strong actor of international politics.

So in summer 2001 the era of neo-liberal globalisation appears to be drawing to a close. But only for a short while. After the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon the situation changes dramatically. This attacks were directed against the symbols of US economic and military power (whoever is responsible for this mass murder). Trying to fight this power the attempts and also the reactions against the “terrorist threat” reveals a *crises of hegemony*. Alt-

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though at the first view being an expression of the concentration of power in one single country it represents at a second view a problem of hegemony, because it shows with clear evidence the *lack of guidance* by the US in managing socio-economic crises and global inequality – and this lack of guidance is still increasing. In a growing number of international fora the US is still blocking agreements – ironically even in the Anti-Bio-weapon-negotiations and in the institutions enforcing free trade like the WTO – or definitely withdraws from the treaty – like in the case of the Kyoto-Protocol. Although the attempt of the 11th of September can be interpreted as a problem of hegemony the answer was *not* enforcing hegemony – but *war*. Not compromises in regulating the important problems and tensions originated in the neoliberal project is now on the agenda, but national interests and the search for national security by the way of military power. But more than this: As Immanuel Wallerstein (2001) put it, the war itself is a part of the *battle over the world system*, a battle about what kind of world-system there will be in the future.

Seen from this perspective the second event is not only a strikeback against the hope of global governance. More than this the attacks reveal another aspect which is often forgotten in the debates about global governance (for a critical analysis, see Brand et al. 2000). Against the hope expressed in the strategies of re-embedding the world market capitalist globalisation is shaped by *power-relations* and different kinds of *domination*. For this reason both pictures are too simple, the neoliberal image of globalisation as a self-regulating market system *and* the hope of global governance. This hope derives from the picture of a disembedded but not very well-functioning market, in which political intervention must take place in order to control the destructive powers, or, at least, to soften its negative consequences. Taken from the analyses of Karl Polanyi and transferred to the ongoing globalisation process representing him as a today's global version of "Manchester capitalism" this picture is also misleading (Brand and Görg 2001).

Against this we have to take into consideration that power-relations and forms of domination are *inscribed in the world-system* from its beginning. In the following the current situa-

tion could not be analysed in more detail. The time passed after the attacks is too short to say anything decisively about the structures of the international system after the 11th of September. Instead of this something more fundamental is tried to do. *First*, the term "*Internationalisation of the State*" is introduced to analyse the power structures and the kinds of domination involved in the world-system. *Secondly*, it is tried to demonstrate how this structure is working. For this purpose an example is used where the impacts of the internationalisation of the state can be analysed very clearly: Biodiversity-politics – or, as we can call it, too: the *new kind of Biopolitics* directed towards the appropriation of *genetic resources*.

The Internationalisation of the State

The concept "Internationalisation of the state" was first introduced by Robert Cox (1987) nearly 15 years ago to describe the process by which an international consent about neoliberal policy was introduced and became hegemonic. In contrast to the period of Fordist capitalism hegemony was no longer exercised by a single nation-state, the US. In the post-Fordist era the neoliberal transformation of national societies and the international system was propagated and became the dominant ideological framework for political regulations – called "Washington consensus" – through an international network, an international elite, the "transnational managerial class". Thus critical International Political Economy (IPE) – uses the Gramscian concept of hegemony but dissolves its connection to the analysis of a nation-state – analysed in which way power relations were *inscribed* in the so called free market (see also Cox 1996; Gill 1993). These power relations were merely exercised by discursive power, but became nevertheless a structural element in the transformation of societies over the last 25 years.

In spite of the practical success of this theoretical school at least three problems remained: *First*, empirical problems regarding the formulation and the impact of this "Washington consensus"; *second* a weakness regarding the understanding of the nation-state; and *third* a problem regarding the understanding of he-

gemony. *First*: Andrew Baker (1999) makes the argument that the introduction of neoliberal policy at the national level was not always the consequence of the formulation of an international consensus but itself a prerequisite and an important foundation of this consent. When Cox itself called this consensus “nébuleuse” the reason for this empirical problem is that the transformation of the nation-state is a necessary precondition for the international consensus. This transformation includes at least two points: new social and class compromises at the national level shaping national policy in direction towards free trade (and even in the case of the US this is still not guaranteed; see Scherrer 2000) and changing power relations between different elements of the state apparatus, especially the increasing power of the national bank and the ministry of finance (as shown in the case of the UK by Baker 1999).

If neoliberal policy is not only situated at the global level the *second* problem appears. Scholars of the International Political Economy see the nation-state as something which transform the imperative of the global economy to the nation level, more and more “reduced to the role of adjusting national economies to an unregulated global economy”, as Cox (1987, 528) put it. Therefore, IPE agreed with one of the myths of globalisation – that globalisation is something outside the national economies working only as an external coercion (for a critique, see Röttger 1997). But the problem of this perspective is: How was this process of capitalist globalisation itself enforced? To answer this question the role of the state in the societal transformation has to be analysed, as mentioned before. Globalisation is not something outside national boundaries – as such it appears only from the perspective of each single nation-state – but something that is produced by a *societal transformation within* national societies, a societal transformation, that can be described as *transition from Fordism to post-Fordism*.

Before some important elements of this transition will be listed the *third* problem has to be mentioned. Hegemony should not be reduced to the exercise of power or domination. As Hegemony has to do with the ability of political guidance it includes also the ability to

compromise and to take different interests into consideration; within each country and at the international level, and not only ideologically but also materially (Demirovic 2001). And – as mentioned before – this ability to compromise is today more and more outside the perspective of the US-Government. More and more they divide the world into those who are with them – the “alliance against terrorism” – and those who are against the interests of the US and which are now called “terrorist” or “terrorist friendly regimes”. But hegemony demand more than only power – a shared vision is needed why somebody – and also the subaltern – should follow. After 25 years of neoliberal politics in most parts of the world people see the real outcome of this strategy. The arising anti-Globalisation-movements, in itself very heterogeneously, articulated this message very clearly (Gill 2000; Brand 2001). Not only the hegemony of neoliberal thinking and practice is contested nowadays, nobody, at least the US, can offer a new vision to the majority of people. And this lack is the main reason for the ongoing war, not single terrorist attacks. As Gramsci said: Guidance is only one element of hegemony – and the other is coercion or at last military power. And if one element is missing the other is used in excess, deepening the crises of hegemony.

So at least three elements – guidance and social compromises, discursive or political power and coercion and military power – has to be integrated in the model of the state at the international level, too. Taking together these problems, we need a much more complicated model of the “Internationalisation of the State”. For this model the societal transformation connected with and entail globalisation has to take into account, because they are necessary to understand the changing relationship between the state and society. Regulation theory and materialist state theory offer an analytical guide, particularly the contributions from the analysis of the state form, as well as from Poulantzas and Gramsci (see, for example, Poulantzas 1978; Hirsch 1995; Brand et.al. 2001). The main concepts of these approaches will not be elaborated here in detail. Let me only focus on the three main tendencies in the current transformations of states and the state systems that

we can find in the work of Bob Jessop (1997) and Joachim Hirsch (2000).

Firstly, there exists a tendency towards a *denationalisation of the state*. This does not imply the disappearance of the national state form as such, but rather a loosening of the relations between states and ‘nationally’ identified societies. It has been brought about by, on the one hand, increasing social heterogeneity caused by marginalisation and fracturing processes, migration and refugee movements, and, on the other hand, by dispersed economic regionalisation processes which have cut across state borders and are associated with a decline in the capacity of states to steer economic development within their own borders.

Secondly, there is a tendency towards a *de-statification or privatization of politics*, which is reflected in the increased importance of “governance”, in contrast to hierarchical “government”, as a political steering mode. Political regulation networks emerge in which the state prefers to act as ‘first among equals’, as a moderator and co-ordinator of various societal actors, such as transnational corporations, interest groups, and scientific and research communities, as well as NGOs. As an alternative to bureaucratic-legislative steering, informally negotiated procedures have become increasingly important, though they are still based on the existing physical coercive potential of the state. The basis for the increased importance of negotiation processes can be found in the contemporary processes of globalisation, particularly in the reduction of the political possibilities of the state and the greater prominence of powerful ‘private’ actors, especially transnational corporations (TNCs). In the context of intensified competition between states and societies, these “networks” are used to mobilise complex societal knowledge and power resources to strengthen ‘national competitive capabilities’. So the nation-state is transformed to something that Joachim Hirsch (1995) called some years ago the “national competition state”. That means the internal structures and the power relations between different parts of state apparatus – especially between the ministries of social affairs and of finance - changes, as mentioned before.

Thirdly, there has been a tendency for an *in-*

ternationalisation of policy-regimes, resulting from the increasing need for international regulation of the global accumulation processes and its consequences, as well as the increasing regionalisation of global capital as in the EU. This tendency expresses itself in the growing significance of international and supranational organisations and international regimes. At the same time, internationalisation also involves an increased relevance of sub-state regional and local political levels (“glocalisation”) and wider interconnected co-ordination and negotiation requirements in both a horizontal and vertical sense. International political regulation as such is by no means an alternative to capitalist globalisation, as sometimes suggested in the global-governance-discourse. As at the national level markets and their institutional preconditions – i.e. legal frameworks and property rights – has to be established and to be guaranteed by the state at the global level, too. Hence, the “monopoly of legitimate force” (Weber 1980) and the physical coercion capability of the state have to be reproduced. For this reason that international institutions and regimes are introduced to regulate contradictory societal relationships different and contradictory interest are inscribed in these forms of international regulation, too.

It would, therefore, be an analytical error to interpret these processes as a general ‘weakening’ of national states. At the same time the concept “internationalisation of the state” should not be used only for international policy regimes or international hegemony, leaving beside the internal transformation of state and societies. Actually, what is occurring is a transformation of states and the states system, including a reorganisation of the relations between ‘state’ and ‘society’, and a transformation of social and class relations which are institutionalised by the state.

Biopolitics – global conflicts about genetic resources

Societal transformations as they occur in the transition to post-Fordism are always connected with transformations of their relationships to their natural environment. These close connections are expressed with the term “*Societal*

Relationships with Nature". This term derives from the Frankfurt School of critical theory and was introduced and applied to the discussions around the ecological crises in the last years (see Jahn and Wehling 1998; Görg 1999; 2001; Brand and Görg 2001). One point is very important for the understanding of what is following. The *Societal Relationships with Nature* are not restricted to processes normally dealt with as ecological or environmental problems. Much more comprehensive than these issues they include all processes, institutions and forms of living in which societies regulate their relationship to the material world. Therefore, by using this term we are more able to understand the social context in which (explicit) environmental policy take place – and it can help us to understand the forces which might have greater impact on these regulations than the explicit policy directed against environmental problems.

Analysing the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, a new trend is becoming visible. Although the ecological problems of the "Fordist-fossilistic development model" (Altvater 1993), such as climate change or the ozone depletion, continue to be serious, new lines of conflicts are increasingly appearing which are connected with new technologies and the associated new socio-economic contradictions. Of central importance here, in addition to micro-electronics, is the application of new biotechnology and gene-technology methods. Besides the microelectronics and the IT-technologies the most far-reaching impulses for a new structuring of the relationships with nature emanate from the industries based on the application of life sciences - the so called "Life Industry", working in the field of pharmaceuticals and agriculture. It is true that the gold-rush atmosphere, which was for a long time dominant in the field, seem to be over. At least the "green genetic technology" in agriculture and the production of food has met with considerable resistance not only for technical reasons but also because of the ecological consequences. Nevertheless, the search for the "green gold of the genes" (Spangenberg 1992; Ten Kate and Laird 1999) or the formation of a new form of "biopolitics" directed towards the control and application of genetic resources (Flitner et al.

1998) continues to be one of the most dynamic and important areas of conflict in the formation of *post-Fordist relationships with nature* (Görg and Brand 2001).

So the global environmental problem, the "loss of biological diversity", is closely connected with this conflict over the appropriation of genetic resources, because the "diversity of life" (Wilson 1992) represents the essential "input", the raw material for the new biotechnologies. In contrast to this interlinkages between "economy" and "ecology" the loss of biological diversity is still largely understood only as a global environmental problem. Following this understanding the adoption and the coming into force of the *Convention on Biological Diversity* (CBD) at the UNCED 1992 in Rio de Janeiro is seen as a good example in the architecture of global governance, because concern about this global environmental problem has led to the formation of an international environmental regime (Sanchez and Juma 1994; Swanson 1997).

But the role of socio-economic factors are further-reaching than the regime-theoretical point of view suggest. Socio-ecological and socio-economic aspects are particularly closely connected in the sphere of biodiversity policy and politics. Being not only an environmental regime, but at the same time also a part of a complex and contradictory international regulation system regarding the terms of the appropriation of genetic resources the CBD and this regulation system as a whole is fraught with tensions. Particularly different societal forms of shaping the relationships with nature - capitalist and non-capitalist forms of using genetic resources - strikes together. The amalgamation of environmental and resource questions, i.e. of ecological, economic and social dimensions, has characterised the "internationalisation of the state" in this area in a very contradictory way. Only some of the most important aspects regarding the theoretical questions about the internationalisation of the state raised before shall be mentioned in what following: how *social compromises* are *inscribed* at the international level, how *discursive power* are exercised and in which way some of the main dimension of the *transformation of the state* – governance and denationalisation - are

involved in this process. But at the same time I want to show which role *coercive power* and the “monopoly of legitimate force” plays at the international level, too.

First, social compromise are inscribed in the CBD because this convention is itself a compromise between the interest of very different actors. First of all nation states from the South and the North reached a compromise between the interest of Northern countries, regarding access to genetic resources, and Southern countries, interested in financial support and technology transfer (Svarstadt 1994). Without considering this conflict line and the solutions found in the CBD this international agreement cannot be understood. But more than this, the interests of weaker actors like local communities and indigenous peoples are also represented in the provisions of the CBD. Particularly article 8j requires from national governments to respect the traditional rights of local people associated with the sustainable use of genetic resources. But because these rights, internationally discussed as “Community rights” (GRAIN 1995) or “Traditional Resource Rights” (Posey 1996), are acknowledged only in an *instrumental approach* – so far as they contribute to the conservation of genetic resources – and *subjected to the national sovereignty* about genetic resources (Stoll 1999), their interests are much weaker represented than others. And there is another problem which is discussed more intensively in the last years: the contradictory relationship between this provisions of the CBD and other international agreements, especially the agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS, a part of the WTO-agreements.

Before coming to this question again a *second* element of the internationalisation of the state has to be mentioned once again: the discursive power. This aspect of power contributed to the compromise represented by the CBD in the way that a central element of neoliberal hegemony was introduced - the assumption that the economic value of biodiversity is seen as the most important lever for the conservation of biodiversity. Behind the growing importance represented through the economic value of genetic resources there stands the belief that the self-regulating market will be the best instru-

ment to preserve biodiversity (Pearce and Moran 1994). In this respect the CBD is a very new kind of an environmental protection agreement. Not the restriction of access to nature, as normally intended by the establishment of environmental protection areas, but the “facilitated access” to genetic resources is the principal aim of the provision on access. Therefore, the CBD is in no way a measure to protect the environment against industrial purposes but itself a very important contribution to the “merchandising of Biodiversity” (Martinez-Alier 1997). This discursive construction of biodiversity as an economic resource and at the same time as a source of national competitiveness plays an important part in the discourse of “ecological modernisation” or “green developmentalism” (McAfee 1998). Like the Washington consensus this discursive strategy is well represented by a global elite, called the “*Global Resource Manager*” by Michael Goldman (1998). These class of Global Resource Managers consists of members of governments, international organisations like the World Bank and NGOs simultaneously; and they are well represented also in such efforts like the “Bio-trade Initiative” of the UNCTAD (1997).

Third: This discursive power inscribed in the CBD does not mean that some actors had the full power to exercise their interests without resistance. On the contrary the CBD itself and the ongoing negotiations on the understanding of their provisions as well as the process of national implementation and the complex relationships with other agreements are full of contradictions and conflicts. This is the case because a variety of social interests and the strategies of different social actors are inscribed in this kind of international policy regime, too. Structures of Global Governance and their institutions are by no means neutral instruments to solve common problems but *fields of conflicts* representing the interest and the respective power of sometimes contradictory and antagonistic actors. Therefore the different institutions and regimes representing different compromises and power-relations, generating an “architecture” of Global Governance, that is in itself necessary *contradictory*.

In this complex and contradictory international regulation system the nation state still plays

in important role, but also the transformation of nation states is visible. Because of the special structure of the North-South-conflict in this field, the CBD acknowledged one principle which stands – at the first view – in contradiction to the whole direction of globalisation: the principle of *national sovereignty* about genetic resources. In this field, again we can not speak about a “retreat” or a “hollowing out” of the nation-state. But acknowledging the principle of national sovereignty does not mean that all states have the real sovereignty and are able to control what happened with genetic resources taken from their territory. Not only cases of *Biopiracy* are increasing, forms of illegal appropriation of genetic resources without any information of the provider countries – not to talk about the local providers. This practise is criticised as illegally because very often the receiver, most of them big TNCs like Monsanto or others, announced patents on the genetic resources appropriated without any charge or even information (RAFI 2000).

But the national sovereignty of the provider countries is limited also for structural reasons. Because there is something we call a *structural competition* between providers the potential of most Southern countries to control their resources are very weak. This structural competition weakens the interests of provider countries because there are some Southern countries wishing to sell their resources but only very few TNCs able to commercialise them - and so the providers compete for the chance to sell their resources. Moreover states need special technical and juridical knowledge which in many countries simply does not exist. And here, too, a privatisation of politics took place. NGOs and other companies, working like a broker, try to help countries to establish rules and legal matters to create global markets for genetic resources. And this privatisation is by no means a way to mere democratic procedures but the reverse – a part of the “*re-feudalisation*” of politics, giving more powerful actors more control over political processes.

With the fact that there is no real sovereignty, the legal acknowledgement of national sovereignty is at the same time important for establishing global markets for genetic resources.

On this level there is no contradiction between national sovereignty and the internationalisation of policy regimes. More than this: both aspects of the “internationalisation of the state” - the increasing international co-ordination and the transformation of the national states - becomes understandable as a precondition for the “valorisation” of genetic resources. Both are an important part for the constitution of biological diversity as a resource for capitalist exploitation, for two reasons:

On the one hand, there is a search for rules and legal procedures constituting well functioning markets. Due to the considerable costs of research and development of new products the Life Industry itself is interested in legal and planning security. The political-institutional embedding of economic processes via the establishment of laws is not at all against the interest of industry or capital. And this is still the case even if biological diversity is still being appropriated to a large extent illegally (see the remark on Biopiracy above). Because these rules and procedures have to be standardised at the international level the establishment of common standards and the harmonisation of national laws has to be enforced by international regimes, i.e. the TRIPS-agreement. But this increasing importance of international regimes is not a zero-sum-game implying the retreat of the nation-state.

On the other hand there is a need of the enforcement and protection of capitalist property relations in an area in which until now there were either no property relations, or others, i.e. non-western ones. Genetic resources are still used by local people for very different purposes - for food, shelter or something else -, but normally with no property rights or with very different rights systems. So the enforcement of private property is connected with strong and violent conflicts in some parts of the world. And this job has to be done until now by the nation-state, who has to secure the capitalist mode of production in its foundations (Poulantzas 1978). Although capitalist markets are seen sometimes as something opposed to the state the reverse is right: particularly the coercive capability of the state is a precondition of markets ensuring or introducing their legal foundations - if necessary with violence.

Contradictions in the international regulation system

Precisely the field of biological diversity is an example of the fact that markets must be politically established and secured. These political measures violate rights from local communities and indigenous peoples with other forms of resource use systems. Because of this resistance “from below” is also increasing. This involves, above all, the fact that in this area a new *valorisation of nature* has to be established against the resistance of widely varying social players and against the background of very complex interest positions (Görg 1998; on the systematising of different phases of valorisation cf. Altwater 1993). On the economic side this valorisation implies new technical methods for discovering and utilising new resources. Resources are not biological given entities but are constituted as economically valuable products and means of production by discursive and technical methods. Although at first glance the economic-technical dynamic in the area of biological diversity appears to be central, the state and the international regulation system plays a central role in the reshaping of the appropriation of nature. The analytical (and the political) point of view should thus be less directed towards the question *whether* markets are politically regulated or “embedded”, and more towards *how*, i.e. what form and content concrete policy measures have, in which way power-relations are inscribed and how these measures work, particular in respect to unequal social and power relations worldwide.

From the political point of view the valorisation of genetic resources means the worldwide enforcement of legal standards and, above all, property relations. In connection with that, global distributional conflicts were regulated in the sense of the safeguarding of existing relationships of power. But this enforcement of legal standards took place in a contradictory way on very different fora, namely in international environmental agreements and in trade liberalisation agreements. These contradictions gives weaker actors the opportunity to challenge the regulation systems, at least to some degree. International policies have to be concretised first in the national states, were appropriate national

regulations and laws must be discussed and enacted. And because in this process - even at the national level, and also in the following negotiations at the international level - very different societal interest has to be integrated, international policies are not at all consistently formulated (Petit et al. 2000). Even under the auspices of the UNO, *different terrains* exists, all of which are sites for regulating the issues at stake here: the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) or the CITES-Convention on endangered species, namely only the most important ones. But more important in regulating the markets of genetic resources are regimes on trade liberalisation and the harmonisation of property rights like the WTO, in particular the TRIPS-agreement or the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). Between these regulation-systems exist a lot of tension regarding certain provisions. Two of them are very important in this area and today under heavy discussions: the question of patentability of genetic resources and the rights of traditional peoples.

The first one regards to the question of which exceptions exist to the duty of the TRIPS-agreement to protect intellectual property rights, namely *patents*. At the one hand, there is a conflict about what should be allowed to be patented. Here some actors – i.e. the campaign “No patents on life” – demand that living organism or parts thereof like genes should not be allowed to be patented for ethical or socio-economic reasons or because there are no inventions – as demanded in the patent law – but only a discovery. At the other hand there exist a discussion about the exemption clause of the TRIPS-article 27.3(b) which allows exemptions from the duty to give patent protection for some reasons. Here the question is: Should plants and animals which are important for food security or their genetic components be excluded, should they obtain special provision as discussed with regard to important pharmaceuticals, too? These questions are directed towards the relationship between the TRIPS-agreement and other international regimes like the CBD or the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources under the control of the FAO. And the discussions about potential contradictions bet-

ween different provisions of different agreements raised the question which agreement will prevail (CEAS 2000; Corea 2000).

But there is another problem regarding the rights of traditional peoples which is also discussed in this fora but tackling a more fundamental issue – the foundation of western property rights. Indigenous communities have important knowledge about genetic resources which are valuable also for industrial purposes because of their “inextricable link” (Posey 1999) with genetic diversity. But at the same time this knowledge cannot be protected through western Intellectual Property Rights for reasons of collective ownership and ethical embeddedness (Brush 1993; Agrawal 1998). This problem stands behind the practice of Biopiracy – and it raised discussions even in WIPO and the TRIPS-council about the need to modify Intellectual Property Rights (WIPO 2001). Behind this discussions we can also see that conflicts between capitalist property rights and non-capitalist modes of production still exist – and that the “primitive accumulation” (Marx) is still going on. In many regions of the world – above all in peripheral ones – dynamic processes of “primitive accumulation” are still taking place today, which in addition to the ever increasing commodification of all spheres of life make up a large part of the post-Fordist accumulation dynamic. And as in the 18th Century described by Marx this process is still accompanied by violent conflicts in many parts of the world (see Goldman 1998).

In the coming years it will be seen which regulation systems succeed in prevailing. This is neither functionalistically predetermined nor already decided by the trend towards the valorisation of nature. Particularly the individual clauses of the treatment of property rights are still discussed controversial. But without doubt the valorisation is still the major force behind this restructuring of social relationship and the relationship with nature at the global level. And this valorisation is accompanied with coercive

state power as it is accompanied with resistance and violent conflicts. An analysis must therefore not limit itself to examining the fact that state regulations are being established or markets regulated. From a critical-emancipatory perspective the question arise whether regulations can be used in a reformist manner or to strengthen the rights of weaker actors, or whether they should be rejected altogether (as discussed now in respect to the “Bretton Woods” institutions WB and IMF by the anti-Globalisation movement). Answering this question requires a more comprehensive understanding of the creation of the political at an international level, that is, of the “*internationalization of the state.*” And in this investigation the question of power and resistance must play an important role.

Seeing from the conflicts emerging around the valorisation of genetic resources and the coercive power exercised by the state to secure property rights violence and domination is still an endemic element of capitalist globalisation. Not yet the 11th of September, but also the “battle of Genoa” was an appearance of this power relations inscribed in the capitalist world system. Did the 11th of September really changed the world? Following Immanuel Wallerstein (2001) this event have to be understand as a part of the battle over the world system. Seeing in this way the violence exercised in both events - in the attacks against WTC and Pentagon as much as in the ongoing war - are rooted in the violent social relationship in a global manner. This violent social relationship are in no way new - but as the attacks shows that they are now coming to a point where hidden violence turn over in manifest violence. Beyond the hope of Global Governance to civilise capitalist social relations the fear of a even more violent world seems more realistic to me - and not only because of the ongoing war but because of the fact that the societal relationships are deeply stamped with violence.

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