

# Money and Votes: The Cost of Election for First-Time Finnish MPs

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## ABSTRACT

In the wake of recent changes to the rules governing election funding in Finland, this article focuses on the campaign spending of the 200 'winning candidates' at the 2007 Eduskunta election and in particular those strong challenger candidates who became first-time parliamentarians. It addresses three basic questions. 1) Did the costs of election exceed the costs of re-election? 2) Did the extent of intra-partisan rivalry inflate the costs of election? 3) Did 'candidate type' affect the cost of election? Three hypotheses structure the discussion, which concludes *inter alia* that in the three larger parties the campaign budgets of 'first-timers' exceeded 'returnees', but that among the newcomers 'candidate type' mattered. Throughout, the paper draws on the comparative literature dealing with the impact of electoral systems and the effect of both inter- and intra-partisan competition on candidate campaign expenditure. The concluding section sets out a future research agenda.

Electoral systems, Zittel and Gschwend (2008: 983) have contended are incentive structures which pattern the strategic behaviour of candidates on the basis of given goals. Open-list PR voting systems in turn create incentives to develop personal-vote-seeking strategies. (Carey and Shugart 1995: 417–439) Indeed, the Finnish electoral system represents a case of an *Open list Formula with Open Endorsement and Single Vote* and it is a candidate-based system – according to Tapio Raunio (2008: 488) one of the most candidate-centred in the world – which creates incentives for those seeking legislative office to promote *personal reputation*. Carey and Shugart (1995: 428) have observed that the only factor contributing to the value of *party reputation* is the fact that votes are pooled across all candidates from the party. They add (whilst noting the operational difficulties) that campaign spending data could shed light on the relative importance of personal reputation versus party reputation. (Carey and Shugart 1995: 433) Equally, Finnish parliamentarians are first and foremost

members of party (Wiberg 2000), the legislative cohesion of parties is high and, although the incidence of 'candidate voting' is significant, citizens have over the years been marginally more likely to cast a 'party vote'. (Pesonen, Sänkiäho and Borg 1993: 74; Bengtsson and Grönlund 2005) True, for the first time in 2007, 52 per cent of respondents reported that the candidate was ultimately more important than the party in determining their vote. (Borg and Paloheimo 2009: 265) But this does not negate the wider point that there is variable but significant electoral value in both 'personal reputation' and 'party reputation'.

In any event, against the backdrop of the popular wisdom (as expressed in letters to newspapers) that candidates will not succeed without high levels of exposure,<sup>1</sup> which cannot be achieved without money, this paper focuses on the campaign spending of the 200 'winning candidates' at the 2007 Finnish general election (their party distribution is set out in table 1). In particular, it concentrates on the campaign expenditure of those strong

**Table 1. The Result of the 2007 Finnish General Election**

Party	% of valid votes	seats	first-timers	%
Centre	23.1	51	14	23.0
Conservatives	22.3	50*	18	29.5
Social Democrats	21.4	45	13	21.3
Left Alliance	8.8	17	3	4.9
Greens	8.5	15	4	6.5
Christian Democrats	4.9	7	2	3.8
Swedish People's Party	4.6	9	5	8.2
True Finns	4.0	5	2	3.8
Others	2.4	1**		
Total	100.0	200	61***	100.0
Turnout	67.9%			

\* The defection in February 2008 of the Green MP Merikukka Forsius to the Conservatives tied the two leading non-socialist parties on 51 seats

\*\* Elisabeth Nauclér, the first female for Åland representing the non-socialist Alliance

\*\*\* The figure for first-time MPs does not include candidates returning to the Eduskunta after a period away – as for example Pertti Salolainen and Claes Andersson

challenger candidates who became first-time parliamentarians and poses three basic questions. 1) Did the costs of election to parliament exceed the costs of re-election? 2) In a candidate-centred voting system, did the extent of intra-partisan rivalry inflate the costs of election? 3) Did 'candidate type' affect the cost of election?

The primary data sources used are 1) The official campaign expenditure records completed by MPs and deputy-MPs (and available online), which divide campaign income into three components – personal contributions, including bank loans; financial support from local and national party sources; external income from donations from firms and private individuals. It is, of course the case that for strong candidates their campaign budgets could be between 20 and 50 per cent higher than the declared sum, since part of the election funding will not go near the account of his/her 'support group'.<sup>2</sup> 2) Evidence from an electronic survey of all 1648 parliamentary election candidates in 2007 for which email addresses were available, conducted by *Suomen Gallup* for the author<sup>3</sup>. This forms part of an international *Comparative Candidate Survey* co-ordinated by the University of Mannheim and the detailed results are reported elsewhere. It may suffice to note here that among the 522 responses, the partisan and regional distribution was good whilst the gender and age balance of candidate was also accurately reflected in the returns. 3) Semi-structured interviews with

seventeen parliamentary candidates conducted by the author. The approach was eclectic: there were *début MPs* (44 per cent), *near-miss candidates* (39 per cent) and *speculative candidates* (17 per cent), the latter defined as those receiving less than one-thousand votes and/or ending up well adrift of the last-placed elected MP.

Sixty-one out of two-hundred or 30.5 per cent of the 2007–2011 Eduskunta comprises MPs entering parliament for the first time at the March 2007 general election and their distribution broadly reflects the strength of the parties in the legislature as a whole. The vast majority of the first-timers (73.8 per cent) represent one of the three larger 'pole parties' (Sundberg 1999), the Centre, Conservatives and Social Democrats, which obtained a combined vote of 66.8 per cent in 2007. Rather more than one-quarter (26.2 per cent) were elected for one of the five minor parties – the Greens, Left Alliance, Christian Democrats, Swedish People's Party and True Finns – which collectively polled 33.2 per cent. There is also a fairly even regional distribution of first-time MPs. 31.7 per cent were elected for the two populous constituencies in the 'deep south', Helsinki and Uusimaa, which together account for well over one-quarter (27.6 per cent) of all Eduskunta seats. Nearly two-fifths of first-time MPs (38.3 per cent) represents the six constituencies of southern central Finland, which together make up 40.2 per cent of all Eduskunta seats, whilst 30 per cent of first-timers were re-

turned for the six constituencies of northern Finland which elect 32.2 per cent of all seats. Only in the Pohjois-Karjala constituency in north-east Finland, which has a low district magnitude of only six, were no first-time MPs elected at the 2007 general election.

Leslie Schwandt-Bayer (2005: 240) has investigated the extent to which incumbency represents a *male advantage* and concludes that “even in a country with a favourable climate for women’s election, such as one with a proportional representation electoral system with a moderate district magnitude and high levels of social equality between men and women, incumbency impedes the goal of increasing the proportion of women in legislative office”. Finland, however, seems a deviant case since women are overrepresented among the first-time MPs in the 2007–2011 Eduskunta compared with the gender composition of parliament as a whole. Whereas a record 42 per cent of all parliamentarians comprise women, slightly more than half the first-timers are female members. Women make up almost 70 per cent of first-time Social Democrats and the proportion is higher still among the Greens and Christian Democrats although the absolute numbers are small (two in the case of the Christian Democrats!). The increase in the number of successful female ‘challengers’ is only one of several factors changing the complexion of election campaigns in recent years. In particular, digitalisation – the use of personal websites, blogs and YouTube – has transformed the mode of electioneering (Setälä and Grönlund 2004; Strandberg 2009) and reinforced the trend towards an individualisation of candidate campaigning. On the last point, Ilkka Ruostetsaari and Mikko Mattila (2006: 93) have argued that “Finland has seen a shift from a collective, party-based style of campaigning to individual, candidate-centred campaigning, even on the political left”.

### 1. The three central hypotheses

In a candidate-based voting system, the evidence suggests that campaign spending will have a significant impact on the likelihood of a candidate’s electoral success. Thus Benoit and Marsh (2008) note, in relation to the multi-party, multi-member STV system in Ireland, that “spending is strongly and positively related to the probability that a candidate will win a seat”. Equally, the wider litera-

ture also points to a possible *incumbency advantage* in respect of legislative office, particularly in majoritarian electoral systems. In other words, if a candidate is able to differentiate him/herself on a policy basis and has built up a legislative ‘niche’ it may not be necessary to spend so much money to be re-elected. Manow (2007: 195–207) has observed the greater electoral security of German Bundestag members returned from the single-member constituencies compared with the MPs elected on closed PR party lists. Prior (2006) has posited that the rise of television as a mass medium in the 1960s contributed to strengthening the incumbency advantage in elections to the US House and he adds that incumbents not only attract more positive news coverage throughout their tenure of legislative office, but are also better funded than challenger candidates during campaigns. Maestas and Rugeley (2008), however, argue that legislative experience is not necessarily a fundraising bonus in US House elections but that, where competitive conditions encourage strong candidates, nonincumbents accumulate sufficient funds to mount credible campaigns. The wider debate (Moon 2006) has also focused on the efficiency of legislators’ campaign expenditure and brought out the greater incentives to spend for marginal compared with safe incumbents.

Maddens and colleagues (2006: 161–168) proceed on the basis that in an open PR list voting system, with multi-member constituencies and large district magnitudes, the incumbency advantage – in terms of voter visibility – will normally be much smaller than in majoritarian electoral systems. They hypothesise that incumbent and challenger spending will be equally effective in open list systems and find, in relation to the 2003 legislative election in Flanders/Belgium, that the expenditure of *high quality candidates* (operationalised as those with the most media coverage) had a substantial effect on their vote regardless of incumbency status. Importantly, however, the Belgian case is not quite comparable to the Finnish because voters can opt for the list or for one or more individual candidates. In any event, the debate about an ‘office advantage’ in relation to the extent and efficiency of campaign spending and vote accumulation will doubtless continue.

In the Finnish case, where the selection process is decentralised (Kuitinen 2008), strong challenger candidates who become first-time parliamentarians

**Table 2. Defeat of Marginal Incumbents at the 2007 Finnish General Election**

	Inter-Partisan Defeats	Total	Intra-Partisan Defeats	Total
Constituency	party		party	
Helsinki	Kesk; SDP; PS;	3	Kok; SDP	2
Uusimaa	Kesk; SDP (2); VAS;	4	Kesk; Kok(2); SDP (2)	5
Varsinais-Suomi	KD;	1	Kok (2); SDP (2); VAS 1;	5
Satakunta		0	Kesk;	1
Häme	SDP	1	Kesk	1
Pirkanmaa		0		0
Kymi	SDP	1	Kok	1
Etelä-Savo	Kesk; SDP	2	SDP (2)	2
Pohjois-Savo	VAS	1	Kesk (2)	2
Pohjois-Karjala	SDP	1		0
Vaasa	Kesk; SDP	2	Kesk (2); Rkp;	3
Keski-Suomi		0	Kesk; Kok; SDP;	3
Oulu		0	Kesk (2)	2
Lapland		0	Kesk; SDP	2
<b>Total</b>		<b>16</b>		<b>29</b>
Re-elected MPs		124	62.3%	
Retiring MPs		30	15.1%	
Inter-Party Defeats		16	8.0%	
Intra-Partisan Defeats		29	14.6%	
		199	100%	

Kesk = Centre; SDP = Social Democrats; PS = True Finns; Kok = Conservatives; VAS = Left Alliance; KD = Christian Democrats; Rkp = Swedish People's Party

may well have a record of service in local government, have unsuccessfully contested the 2003 general election and hold a position in the party at the district level. Some will have ended up in 2003 as a deputy MP ('first reserve') and served in parliament in place of a mid-term retiree. However, all things being equal, strong incumbents may be presumed to enjoy discreet campaign advantages in terms of superior organisational resources – a pre-existing support group (*tukiryhmä*) – professional networks and the publicity associated with office. Whilst the campaign value of incumbency is variable – there may or may not be hidden value-added spending before the campaign proper – it seems plausible to expect that challenger candidates will need to outspend in order to counter the perceived campaign advantages of safe incumbents. Hypothesis 1, therefore, is concerned with negating the campaign value of office.

### *Hypothesis 1*

*The cost of election to parliament will be greater than re-election* – that is, the campaign budgets of

successful challenger candidates will exceed those of re-elected MPs.

Candidate-centred voting systems oblige candidates to compete for election with co-partisans, as well as candidates from other parties, and the index of intra-partisan defeats – that is, the percentage of incumbent candidates defeated by challenger candidates – may be taken as one indicator of the extent of internal party rivalry. (Villodres 2003: 55–66) In Finland the index of intra-partisan defeats has been relatively high. In March 2007, 15 per cent of incumbent candidates lost their parliamentary seats as a result of defeat by a candidate of the same party whereas inter-partisan defeats – that is, incumbents displaced as a consequence of party vote shrinkage in the constituency – accounted for the displacement of only 8 per cent of incumbent candidates (table 2).

The cross-national evidence suggests that the extent of intra-partisan rivalry, as well as inter-party competition, will have an effect on campaign budgets (as well as strategies and behaviour). Cox

and Thies (1998) found that candidate spending rose as intra-party competition increased in the Single Non-Transferable Vote System used in Japan before 1993. Also on Japan, Reed (2008: 279) notes that campaigning against co-partisans on the basis of constituency service proved an expensive, labour-intensive proposition. Samuels (2001: 100) has concluded that Brazil's open PR list voting system creates incentives for candidates "to worry first and foremost about beating their list-mates for a seat" – obtaining more votes than other parties' candidates was a secondary concern. At worst intra-party competition can encourage corruption (Chang and Golden 2007) and – as in pre-1993 Japan – what Nyblade and Reed (2008) refer to as *cheating*, that is illegal acts for electoral gain. There is no suggestion of this in the Finnish context although the author's candidate interviews suggest that 'beating list-mates' à la Samuels may not be so 'matey' and that successful challengers are likely to target those they perceive to be marginal incumbents from within their own party. A strong female candidate, for example, may well single out a female incumbent on the party list as her main opponent and work to outflank her.<sup>4</sup>

The comparative literature also implies the distinction between the quantity and quality of intra-partisan competition – the *number* of co-partisan rivals and the *effective number* of co-partisan rivals. On the point of *quantity*, Shugart (2008: 47) notes that "when preference votes determine candidates' order of election, the higher the magnitude, the more co-partisans there are in competition and thus the premium on emphasising connections with groups of constituents". He adds that in such a context a candidate's emphasis on his or her personal attributes and record of service may attract preference votes away from co-partisans, or even from voters who might otherwise favour another party but are available to be won over because of the attractiveness of a specific candidate. On the point of *quality*, Samuels notes (2001: 95) that "a candidate who faces thirty tough candidates will be more likely to spend more than a candidate who faces thirty-one patsies". There is good reason to believe that *district magnitude* will have an impact on the quality and not simply the quantity of intra-partisan competition – that is, the number of serious co-partisan candidates. This is because the larger the constituency's allocation of seats, the lower the effective electoral threshold and the

greater the prospect of election purely on the basis of a personal candidate vote. On the Finnish mainland there is presently considerable variation in district magnitude, which ranges from six and seven seats in the outlying northern and eastern constituencies to thirty-four in the 'metropolitan' south and this has been shown to have an impact both on the level of electoral participation and the basis on which the voting decision is made. (Borg and Paloheimo 2009: 243–278)

In addition to purely electoral system incentives, the strength of partisan support in a district is likely to affect the quality of intra-party competition on a simple supply and demand basis. In other words, the higher the level of a party's support in a constituency, the greater the supply of winnable seats and the stronger the intra-party rivalry for them.<sup>5</sup> Internal party competition is also likely to be intensified by the retirement of experienced parliamentarians and the availability of 'orphan votes' – that is, the personal votes of the retiring member which will be looking for a 'new home' or candidate allegiance.<sup>6</sup> The mechanics and dynamics of intra-partisan rivalry will vary whilst internal candidate competition may be discreet and concealed or, in a few cases, public and acrimonious. However, on the basis of the above, a second hypothesis suggests itself.

### *Hypothesis 2*

*Where intra-party candidate competition for winnable seats is strong, the campaign budgets of successful challenger candidates will exceed those of marginal incumbents who experience intra-partisan defeats.*

In the conclusion to the 2003 general election study, Lauri Karvonen and Heikki Paloheimo (2005: 293) submit that "party-based representative democracy is clearly to a degree on trial in Finland". The widespread evidence of declining turnout, diminished trust in parties and weakened partisan identification, both in Finland and other western democracies, is unequivocal. Levels of party identification vary of course from one survey and one country to the next but as voter loyalties have weakened, the comparative literature indicates that the voting choice has become more individualised (Thomassen 2005: 16; Dalton 2000: 337) and the campaign has increased in importance. As Schmitt-Beck and Farrell (2006: 192)

have pointed out, “partisan dealignment makes increasing proportions of the electorate susceptible to conversions through campaigns”. Not only do political campaigns appear to matter, but *candidate types* can plainly affect the nature of the local campaign. Carty, Eagles and Sayers (2003: 627), for example, note that “the comparative importance of the candidate versus the party in mobilizing Canadian campaign personnel is striking”<sup>7</sup> and they add that in desirable districts the selection of *local notables* leads to highly personalised campaigns only weakly integrated with that of the wider party. Indeed, when a candidate-centred electoral system operates in a climate of weak or weakened party identification, the incentive to run high-profile challenger candidates (‘celebrities’), with high name recognition (nationally or locally) to attract floating voters, will grow.

Comparative research has found that “the national celebrity enjoyed by movie stars or athletes can translate into valuable personal reputation in some electoral systems”. (Carey and Shugart 1995: 419) This has been the case in Finland, particularly in the Centre and Conservative parties, although in 2007 for the first time the Social Democrats’ central party office requested its constituency organisations to keep list places open to be filled by, among others, *celebrity candidates*. Celebrity candidates (*julkkikiset*) are not a new phenomenon – in 1962 for instance three Olympic gold medallists were elected to parliament (Niemi 2007: 152) – but their frequency has increased and, depending on definition, at least five per cent of the 2007–2011 Eduskunta may be said to comprise first-time MPs that were celebrity candidates. This could perhaps be viewed as a manifestation of the wider phenomenon – well documented in the international literature – of a personalisation or ‘presidentialization of politics’ (Poguntke and Webb 2005) and, in this connection, Lauri Karvonen (2009: 112) has concluded that whilst parties have not lost their central place, the personal input of individual politicians (candidates as well as party leaders) has become more important in Finnish politics.

In any event, in those constituencies where a large district magnitude has meant a low effective electoral threshold, the personal vote a celebrity candidate can attract will effectively secure election without the need for expensive campaigning. Celebrity candidates are in any event nationally known figures by definition which, it may be sur-

mised, will not need to spend large sums to achieve the ‘visibility threshold’ for election. Their ‘reputation’ may also facilitate external funding and mean they are less likely than other strong challenger candidates to have to dig deep into their own pockets for campaign finance. According to a TV4 study, the big ‘vote pullers’ in 2007 – those candidates gaining over 10,000 votes – attracted so much external support that they contributed only about one-quarter of their campaign budgets from their own resources.<sup>8</sup> Celebrity candidates are not necessarily ‘vote pullers’ and they have traditionally fared better in some constituencies than others. None the less, a third and final hypothesis relating to the variety of candidate types suggests itself.

### *Hypothesis 3*

*The cost of election for those strong challengers who are celebrity candidates will be lower and their personal contributions to the campaign budget smaller than the average for first-time parliamentarians as a whole.*

## **Results**

Together the 200 ‘winning candidates’ at the March 2007 general election amassed campaign budgets totalling nearly 7.7 million euros and each MP spent on average 38.4 thousand euros to be elected (table 3). Not surprisingly, the sum was substantially greater in the three larger parties – nearly 43 thousand euros – than in the minor Eduskunta parties – 26.2 thousand euros. Significantly, in line with hypothesis 1, it cost more to be elected than to be re-elected in 2007. First-time MPs spent on average nearly 41 thousand euros (table 4) compared with 37.7 thousand for incumbents (table 5). In all three of the larger parties the size of the budgets of successful challenger candidates exceeded that of returnees. However, whilst successful challenger candidates in the pole parties outspent returnees, the latter had larger campaign expenditures than new parliamentarians in the minor parties (tables 4–5).

Among first-time MPs, campaign spending loosely reflected the size of the legislative parties and was largest in the Conservatives, Centre and Social Democrats. Re-stated, the average spending of first-time pole-party MPs of over 47 thousand euros was more than double that of their counter-

**Table 3. The Average 2007 General Election Campaign Budgets of All MPs by Party (euros)**

Party	Total Campaign Budget	Average Budget	N
Conservatives	2,424,415.64	48,488.31	50
Centre	2,479,468.15	48,617.02	51
Social Democrats	1,370,778.01	30,461.73	45
Left Alliance	505,028.20	29,707.50	17
Swedish People's	356,072.67	35,607.26	10*
Greens	329,780.75	21,985.00	15
Christian Democrats	133,110.30	19,015.75	7
True Finns	95,068.77	19,013.75	5
	7,693,722.49	38,468.61	200
'Pole parties' average	42,977.13		
Minor parties' average	26,278.90		

\* Includes the Åland MP Elisabeth Nauclér

**Table 4. The Average 2007 General Election Campaign Budget of First-Time MPs by Party (euros)**

Party	Total Campaign Budget	Average Budget	N
Conservatives	999,690.10	55,538.34*	18
Centre	700,763.15	50,054.50**	14
Social Democrats	429,527.95	32,963.68***	13
Left Alliance	81,745.23	27,248.41	3
Swedish People's	155,807.33	31,161.46	5
Greens	79,203.88	19,800.97	4
Christian Democrats	15,574.00	7,787.00	2
True Finns	35,550.77	17,775.36	2
	2,496,862.41	40,932.17	61
Pole parties' average	47,310.69		
Minor parties' average	22,992.57		

\* The campaign budgets of first-time Conservatives ranged from 119,000 euros in the case of Eero Lehti in Uusimaa to 36, 200 for Henna Virkkunen representing Keski-Suomi.

\*\* The campaign budgets of first-time Centre MPs ranged from in excess of 102,000 euros for the Vaasa MP Paula Sihto to 15,000 for Markku Uusipaavalniemi in Uusimaa

\*\*\* The campaign budgets of first-time Social Democrats ranged from 57,000 euros in the case of Pauliina Viitamies in Mikkeli to 13,000 for Tommy Taberman in Uusimaa

**Table 5. The Average 2007 General Election Campaign Budget of Returnees by Party (euros)**

Party	Total Campaign Budget	Average Budget	N
Conservatives	1,463,943.85	45,749.24	32
Centre	1,778,705.00	48,073.00	37
Social Democrats	942,250.06	29,445.31	32
Left Alliance	423,282.97	30,234.49	14
Swedish People's	200,265.34	40,053.06	5
Greens	250,576.87	22,779.91	11
Christian Democrats	117,536.30	23,507.26	5
True Finns	59,518.00	19,839.33	3
	5,236,078.39	37,669.63	139
Pole Parties' average	41,434.64		
Minor Parties' average	27,662.61		

parts in the minor legislative parties. A Conservative MP elected for the first time in 2007 had on average a campaign income of just over 55½ thousand euros – the highest of all the successful challenger candidates – and this was nearly 10 thousand euros more than Conservative ‘returnees’. The same pattern could be observed in the Centre Party. The average campaign budget of a ‘first-timer’ was just over 50 thousand euros, approximately two thousand euros more than for returnees. The average campaign budget of first-time Social Democrat MPs in 2007 was just under 33 thousand euros, a figure that was appreciably lower than in the two non-socialist pole parties albeit, as in the latter, greater than for returnees. The average, of course, concealed significant variations.

Only a minority – 26 per cent – of the successful challenger candidates in 2007 were elected for the five minor parliamentary parties and the small numbers in each party question the significance of their average budgets, as well as making comparisons with the cost of returnee campaigns problematical. None the less, despite the low numbers, it is clear that the size of the campaign budgets of first-timers in the minor parties was well below that of their counterparts in the pole parties and lower too than for returnees in these [minor] parties. For the three first-timers in the Left Alliance’s parliamentary group, the figure was just over 27 thousand euros; for the four first-time Green MPs under 20 thousand euros; and for the two Christian Democrat first-timers under 8 thousand euros. In the minor parties in particular there appears to have been a strong ‘circumstantial element’ in the electoral success of challenger candidates, since ‘outspending the opposition’ was rarely a viable option. Summing up, at the March 2007 general election, the cost of election to parliament – that is, the size of the campaign budgets of strong challenger candidates – exceeded the cost of re-election in the larger parties, although returnees outspent first-time MPs in the minor parties.

Unfortunately, it is not possible rigorously to test the second hypothesis because campaign data are available only for those marginal incumbents suffering intra-partisan defeats that ended up as deputy parliamentarians. However, rather than being reduced to the status of ‘first reserve’, some losing MPs finished well down on the list. For example, the [then] Centre party secretary, Eero Lankia, was the most marginal incumbent in 2003 –

the last-placed of his party’s five MPs in Uusimaa – but was only in eighth place four years later. None the less, it is possible to compare the campaign budgets of losing incumbents and best-performing challenger candidates (and subsequently first-time MPs) in eleven of the twenty-nine cases of intra-partisan defeats (table 6).

In the eleven cases for which data are available, the average campaign budget of 42,708 euros for the leading challenger candidates – who became first-time MPs – exceeded that of the marginal incumbents they displaced by causing an intra-party defeat (33,153 euros) by nearly 29 per cent. Yet the pattern is not consistent and not all intra-partisan defeats involved the challenger outspending the incumbent. In view of the relatively small number of cases of intra-partisan defeats where the campaign costs of challengers and incumbents can be directly compared, and given that there was not a consistent pattern of outspending the incumbent, conclusions must necessarily be tentative. Clearly, there is not enough evidence to validate hypothesis 2.

In practice, elections can turn on an outstanding personal vote for a single candidate in one of the large-magnitude constituencies in ‘metropolitan Finland’. In 2003 the Centre was hugely indebted to the appeal of Tanja Karpela (19,169 votes) in Uusimaa and the same could be said for the Conservatives four years later, since the former finance minister and presidential candidate, Sauli Niinistö, polled a record of over 60 thousand votes in Varsinais-Suomi. Both could be regarded as celebrity politicians, widely covered in the media, although they acquired celebrity status in contrasting ways. (Karvonen 2009: 110–112) Loosely stated, Karpela was a *julkkis* who developed into an ‘recognised politician’ (albeit retaining a high magazine profile)<sup>9</sup> whereas Niinistö started life as a little-known politician and became something of a celebrity figure (with the attendant high-mag profile).

Celebrity politicians may or may not have been celebrities (*julkkikset*) before their election to parliament. Celebrity candidates challenging incumbent parliamentarians, however, necessarily come from outside the world of politics. Indeed, of the 61 successful challenger candidates in 2007 (viz first-time MPs) 9 or nearly 15 per cent comprised ‘celebrities’, all but one – the documentary programme-maker, Tarja Tallqvist, elected for the



**Table 6. Costing Intra-Party Defeats**

Marginal Incumbents Going Down To an Intra-Party Defeat		Leading Challenger Candidates From the Same Party	
Constituency	Campaign Budget		Campaign Budget
<i>Uusimaa</i>			
Särkiniemi (Centre)	16,197	Uusipaavalniemi (Centre)	15,000
Kuisma (SDP)	35,047	Guzenina-Richardson (SDP)	27,150
<i>Varsinais-Suomi</i>			
Puisto (SDP)	28,000	Taimela (SDP)	20,454
<i>Keski-Suomi</i>			
Olin (SDP)	28,000	Peltonen (SDP)	47,394
Vielma (Conservatives)	28,000	Virkkunen (Conservatives)	36,200
<i>Etelä-Savo</i>			
Backman (SDP)	14,892	Viitamies (SDP)	57,300
<i>Pohjois-Savo</i>			
Kettunen (Centre)	24,513	Heikkinen (Centre)	65,010
<i>Vaasa</i>			
Hautala (Centre)	69,780	Mieto (Centre)	45,238
<i>Oulu</i>			
Moilanen-Savolainen (Centre)	46,190	Vehkaperä (Centre)	33,637
<i>Lappi</i>			
Rask (SDP)	21,900	Ojala-Niemelä (SDP)	50,974
Rundgren (Centre)	52,200	Seurujärvi (Centre)*	71,439
Average (euros)	33,156		42,708

\* Seurujärvi was managing director of *InLike*, a municipally-owned organisation promoting the economy of the Inari commune, a member of the board of *Lapin liitto* and one of 23 first-time MPs that were members of the business interest group *Suomen Yrittäjät*. Seurujärvi's election campaign focused exclusively on regional issues and the realisation of a Saami Cultural Centre in particular.

Christian Democrats – representing the larger parties. For the Centre they were Juha Mieto, the former skier, Markku Uusipaavalniemi, the captain of the national curling team, and Risto Autio, an actor on the television ‘soap’ *Kotikatu*. For the Social Democrats they were Maria Guzenina-Richardson, a former presenter on Music Television, the controversial former bishop of Turku, Ilkka Kantola, the television ‘personality’ and romantic poet Tommy Tabermann, Marko Asell, a weight-lifter in the Finnish national team and the former prime minister’s wife Päivi Lipponen.

In her analysis of the media coverage celebrity candidates received during the 2007 general election campaign, Mari Niemi limits herself to the nine above-listed persons.<sup>10</sup> However, a case could be made for including others in the category, including for example Heli Järvinen in the Etelä-Savo constituency. Järvinen’s success was the first

time the Greens had elected an MP in Etelä-Savo. Whilst she fought a highly energetic campaign, Järvinen was familiar to substantial sections of the public through her television work – in other words, she was something of a celebrity candidate – and, crucially, admitted that she did not think she could have won without her ‘media face’. In any event, the third ‘variable candidate type’ hypothesis is investigated only in respect of the nine celebrities covered in Niemi’s work.

In line with hypothesis 3, the overall campaign budgets of celebrity candidates (table 7) was lower than for all first-time MPs, as too was the proportion deriving from a personal outlay, including recourse to a bank loan. True, the number of cases was relatively small and there was considerable variation in the size and structure of the campaign budgets.<sup>11</sup> But the figures make a strong *prima facie* case in support of the hypothesis. The aver-

**Table 7. The Campaign Budgets of the Nine Winning ‘Celebrity Candidates in 2007**

Candidate	Total Budget	Personal Outlay	External Funding	Party Support
Mieto (Kesk)*	45,238.00	3,000	16,850	25,388
Uusipaavalniemi (Kesk)	15,000.00	3,000	12,000**	–
Autio (Kesk)	30,000.00	12,621	14,379	3,000
Guzenina-Richardson (SDP)	27,150	500	24,150***	2,500
Kantola (SDP)	23,800.00	3,200	–	20,600
Taberman (SDP)	13,000.00	12,500	500	–
Asell (SDP)	20,090.00	2,000	8740	9,350
Lipponen (SDP)	32,656.00	5227	25,679	1,750
Tallqvist (KD)	3,119	–	1,621	1,478
Average	23,339.00	4,672	11,546	7120
% of Total		20.0	49.5	30.5

\* Mieto’s poll of 13,768 was the seventh highest personal vote of all the parliamentary candidates at the 2007 general election.

\*\* 5 thousand was undeclared from KMS

\*\*\* The lion’s share of Guzenina-Richardson’s campaign budget emanated from two seminars organised by her support group *European Ma Gu* at which admission tickets ranged from 300-500 euros. At her request, no campaign funding was sought from firms. Lipponen amassed twice the average external income for first-time Social Democrat MPs and 5 thousand came from KMS.

age campaign budget of the 61 first-time MPs in 2007 was just under 41 thousand euros and their average personal contribution of 11,904 euros represented 29.1 per cent of their total campaign budgets. The average campaign income of the 45 newcomer MPs for the pole parties was higher still at over 47 thousand euros and their personal financial input of 13,116 euros comprised 29.5 per cent of the campaign budgets of first-time Conservative MPs, 28.8 per cent for Centre newcomers and 26.3 per cent for Social Democrat first-timers. In contrast, the average campaign budget of 23,339 euros for the nine celebrity candidates was substantially lower than that for all first-time MPs and lower still when compared with newcomers for the pole parties. The celebrities’ average personal outlay of 4,672 euros – 20 per cent of their total campaign income – was also markedly lower than for other first-timers.

## Discussion

The funding scandal of early summer 2008 raised important questions about the campaign expenditure of parliamentary candidates and the need for transparency with respect to its sources.<sup>12</sup> The fact that details of campaign budgets were not openly or readily declared – not untypically donations exceeding 1700 euros were concealed as income raised by the candidate’s ‘support group’ – fed the

suspicion in some quarters that parliamentarians were promoting corporate interests rather than the interests of the citizenry as a whole and that Finland could no longer be regarded as a representative democracy.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, it appeared that, in terms of principal-agent theory, MPs had new principals – not the electorate but their donors. Politicians, moreover, were seen not only to be flouting the electoral law but lacking integrity and those in cabinet office appeared to be acting in contravention of article 60 of the constitution, which requires ministers to be known as honest and capable citizens.

Importantly too, the funding scandal raised central questions about the cost of gaining election. The evidence of ‘campaign cost inflation’ was unmistakable: the campaign budgets of elected MPs in 2007 was substantially higher than four years earlier (Moring and Mykkänen 2009: 40–41), despite the growing use of relatively cheap electronic modes of electioneering (websites, blogs, candidate selection machines etc). At the 2003 Eduskunta election, the average campaign budget of the 200 MPs was 26,000 euros; four years later it had risen to nearly 38,500 euros. During the funding imbroglio, moreover, there was a widespread view, reflected in letters to the editor columns of the national press, that only money could buy the ‘candidate visibility’ necessary to be returned to parliament. This raised the basic empirical question of

**Table 8. The Average Campaign Income Raised from External Funds by MP Type (euros)**

Party	All MPs	First-Timers	Returnees
Conservatives	1633,317.58	675,862.62	957,454.96
Centre	1421,240.14	360,689.22	1060,550.92
Social Democrats	632,641.82	163,413.24	469,228.58
Left Alliance	179,271.20	43,315.20	135,956.00
Christian Democrats	46,813.68	3,731.00	43,082.68
Greens	43,599.64	15,868.39	27,731.25
Swedish People's	229,323.24	101,534.24	127,789.00
True Finns	25,765.00	20,165.00	5,600.00
Total	4,211,972.30	1,384,578.91	2,827,393.39
Average	21,059.86	22,698.01	20,340.95
% of total campaign budget	54.7	55.5	54.0

whether the degree of candidate visibility was negatively correlated with campaign spending – that is, the higher the candidate's public profile, the lower the campaign budget needed to win.

The paper proceeded on the basis of a possible 'office advantage' and that, by dint of strong personal networks and their reputation as legislators, previous MPs (incumbents) would need to spend less to gain re-election than challenger candidates in general. Equally, among the latter, it was feasible to expect 'celebrity candidates', their 'media faces' ensuring a high level of exposure, to succeed with smaller campaign budgets than most other challenger candidates. Since open-list PR voting systems create incentives to develop personal-vote-seeking strategies, it was also surmised that the intensity of intra-party candidate competition would have a measurable impact and raise the campaign budget of challenger candidates other than perhaps those of celebrity types.

On average the cost of election to parliament in 2007 *did* exceed the cost of re-election and, particularly in the Conservatives and Centre, challenger candidates outspent incumbents to become first-time MPs. Interestingly, however, although greater in size, the *structure* of the campaign budgets of challengers varied relatively little from that of incumbents. External funding accounted for the largest portion of the campaign income of the 200 MPs elected in March 2007, amounting to over 4.2 million euros in total (table 8). It consisted of donations from private individuals, including relatives; support from interest groups and various associations, including local trade-union branches;

and revenues raised by candidate 'support groups'. External income made up 54.7 per cent of the campaign budgets of all MPs – 55.5 per cent for first-time MPs and 54.0 per cent for incumbents. The greatest share of external income was raised by parliamentarians in the Centre and Conservative parties (table 9) – as the two leading non-socialist parties not all that surprising – and it may be fair to suggest that when parties have comparatively easy access to private-sector 'sponsors' the proportion of campaign income deriving from external funding will be relatively high for both challenger candidates and incumbents.

The average personal cost of election to the 2007–2011 Eduskunta was not cheap at just under 13 thousand euros but again there was little difference between first-timers (just under 12 thousand) and returnees (13.4 thousand). The Greens were the obvious 'outliers' (tables 10–11). To be elected or re-elected, Green candidates had on average to 'invest' just over 18 thousand euros of their own resources. Put another way, two-thirds of the Greens' parliamentary group found over four-fifths of their individual campaign budgets from their own pockets and two-fifths made personal contributions which exceeded nine-tenths of their total campaign budgets.<sup>14</sup>

The greatest disparity in the structure of the campaign budgets of 'winning candidates' in 2007 was in the proportion of funding that derived from party sources (essentially events in which the local party branches were involved). Generally, it was low at less than 12 per cent on average (table 12). However, whereas for returnees the figure was un-

**Table 9. The Average Campaign Income from External Sources by Party**

Party	All MPs	n	First-Timers	n	Returnees	n
Conservatives	32,506.35	50	37,103.47*	18	29,920.46	32
Centre	27,867.45	51	25,763.52	14	28,663.53	37
Social Democrats	14,058.70	45	12,570.24	13	14,663.39	32
Left Alliance	10,545.36	17	14,438.40	3	9,711.14	14
Christian Democrats	6,678.66	7	1,865.50	2	8,616.53	5
Greens	2,906.64	15	3,967.09**	4	2,521.02	11
Swedish People's	22,932.32	10	20,306.84	5	25,557.80	5
True Finns	5,153.00	5	10,082.50	2	1,866.66	3
		200		61		139

\* This made up 66.8 per cent of the total budget of the 18 first-time Conservative MPs. In the case of Eero Lehti, the figure was 92.3 per cent – 70 thousand euros coming in the form of a gift from his father Aarne Lehti to his support group *Hyvinvoiva Yhteiskunta* (a 150-strong organisation which in 2007 had 21 paid-up members).

\*\* Both Green challenger candidates and incumbents depended very heavily on personal contributions and very little on external sources. Only 13.2 per cent of the campaign budgets of the 15 Green MPs derived from external funding.

**Table 10. The Average Personal Campaign Contribution of MPs at the 2007 General Election (euros)**

	Average Personal Outlay of All MPs	Proportion of Total Campaign Budget (%)
Conservatives	679,126.91	27.6
Centre	771,718.28	31.1
Social Democrats	427,108.35	31.2
Left Alliance	264,009.50	52.3
Christian Democrats	71,268.38	53.5
Greens	270,201.68	81.9
Swedish People's	74,929.65	21.0
True Finns	30,310.77	31.9
Total	2,588,673.52	
Average	12,943.36	

**Table 11. The Average Personal Campaign Contribution of First-Time MPs at the 2007 General Election (Euros)**

	Average Personal Contribution of First-Time MPs	Proportion of Total Budget (%)
Conservatives	16,395.60	29.5
Centre	14,425.60	28.8
Social Democrats	8,679.07	26.3
Left Alliance	6,393.84	23.5
Christian Democrats	4,122.50	26.5
Greens	12,728.86	64.3
Swedish People's	2,878.66	9.2
True Finns	11,755.38	66.1
Average	11,904.20	
Average for returnees	13,399.41*	

\* One-quarter of long-serving Conservative incumbents – with a per capita average of 16 years parliamentary experience – made no financial contribution to their campaign budgets. In contrast, Anne Holmlund, whose father was the chair of the short-lived Finnish Private Entrepreneurs' Party (*Suomen Yksityisrittäjien Puoluejärjestö*) in the early 1980s, contributed 93.6 per cent (43,720 euros) of her campaign budget out of her own resources.

der one-tenth, it was higher at 16 per cent for first-time MPs. It is difficult to know how to interpret this difference although it may be that incumbents tend to be more dependent for income-generation on support groups that are more institutionalised than those of challengers.

When the electoral system facilitates intra-party competition, the incentive to cultivate a personal vote is likely to increase with district magnitude. District magnitude will dictate the quantity of co-partisans. Equally, as noted, it may be assumed that the stronger the intensity (quality) of intra-partisan competition, the greater the incentive for individual candidates to cultivate a personal vote. The problem is how to measure the intensity of intra-party competition and to gauge a candidate's

concern to maximise a personal vote. The incidence of intra-partisan defeats might reasonably be considered a proxy for the intensity of party competition. As stated earlier, in March 2007 15 percent of incumbents forfeited their seats to rival co-partisans and 93 per cent of internal party defeats occurred in the three larger parties – where the supply of winnable seats was, of course, greatest.

**Table 12. The 2007 General Election Campaign Income from Party Sources (euros)**

Party	Total	First-Time MPs	Returnees
Conservatives	111,971.15	28,705.15	83,266.00
Centre	285,509.72	138,114.00	147,395.72
Social Democrats	311,027.33	152,286.17	158,741.16
Left Alliance	61,746.50	19,248.50	42,498.00
Christian Democrats	15,028.24	3,598.00	11,430.24
Greens	15,997.43	12,420.05	3,559.38
Swedish People's	51,819.78	39,879.78	11,940.00
True Finns	38,993.00	6,440.00	32,553.00
Total	892,075.15	400,691.65	491,383.50
% average	11.6	16.0	9.4

In an electoral system encouraging individualised campaigns, objective indicators designed to identify those candidates primarily concerned to optimise a candidate vote are difficult to find. For example, an overwhelming majority of 92 per cent of all candidates for the three larger parties – compared with 67 per cent in the minor parliamentary parties – reported having an individual support group, which plainly constituted an integral element in the planning and execution of their campaigns. Three-quarters of respondents in the candidate survey (82 per cent in the pole parties) claimed to have raised issues of concern to their constituencies which their party had not taken up. Many candidates also produced individual newspapers which generated income through selling advertising space. These had a fairly standard format: 1) a *personal manifesto* of prioritised themes reflecting the candidate's interests, experience and expertise 2) *endorsements*, written and/or pictorial, from members of the candidate's support group, ordinary members of the public, the party leader or a retiring member of parliament 3) *target pieces*, that is, contributions written by the candidate or, more usually supporters, singling out particular groups of voters. In short, there was a degree of individualisation in the campaigning of all serious candidates in 2007.

Accordingly, a 'warts-and-all' (rough) proxy for the extent to which a primarily personal vote is sought could be the subjective placement of candidates on a 0–10 scale, where zero represents a fully-blown 'individualiser', solely concerned with self-promotion and 10 an exclusively partisan orientation. In the author's survey of *all* the parliamentary candidates at the 2007 general election, *partisans*, that is those working to attract the great-

est possible attention to their candidacy for a particular party (8–10 on the scale), comprised 29 per cent of all candidates compared with 43 per cent who were *equal measure campaigners*, (4–7) seeking to strike a balance in their campaign between profiling themselves as individuals and promoting their party, and 28 per cent who were *individualisers* (0–3) seeking to attract the maximum amount of attention to themselves as candidates. Overall, there was a strong negative relationship between the size of the legislative party and the partisanship of its candidate campaigns and in the three larger parties only 11 per cent of candidates could be described as partisans. The pole parties possessed the greatest share of individualisers, with an average of 37 per cent nationally compared with 27 per cent for the other parliamentary parties and 15 per cent for the extra-parliamentary parties.

A rigorous (multiple regression) analysis of the data is presently being undertaken but, suggestively, the proportion of individualisers declined from south to north in line with the decrease in district magnitude. The individualisers (38 per cent) exceeded the national average by ten percentage points in the large districts in the 'deep south', corresponded exactly to the national average (28 per cent) in the 'central belt' but comprised only half the national average (14 per cent) in the peripheral north and east. The incidence of individualisers was highest in the three pole parties in the southern and central regions – the average for both was 44 per cent – but in the south over two-fifths of *all* the candidates for the eight parliamentary parties could be counted as individualisers and the differential between the larger and minor legislative parties was only three percentage points. In short, although the tendency towards an individualisation

of campaigning is most pronounced in the pole parties, it is a feature of the campaigning of all the legislative parties in the ‘deep south’.

When combining the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of intra-partisan competition, it appears that the incidence of individualisers – those prioritising their particular attributes and personal-vote-seeking strategies in their campaigning – will be highest in the larger parties, where the supply of winnable seats is likely to be greatest, but will also be relatively frequent among candidates of all parliamentary parties in constituencies with a high district magnitude.

Despite the powerful incentive to cultivate a personal vote in core support areas with a moderate to high allocation of parliamentary seats, there was insufficient support for hypothesis 2 that to contrive an intra-partisan defeat the winning challenger needed to outspend the losing incumbent. Some did, as in the case of Pauliina Viitamies, whose expensive campaign sufficed to defeat two Social Democrat co-partisans in the Etelä-Savo constituency.<sup>15</sup> But the pattern is not consistent. As a random example, another Social Democrat, Katja Taimela, spent only just over 20 thousand euros in displacing her party colleague and incumbent MP, Virpi Puisto, whose campaign budget was nearly 8 thousand euros greater. More work on the campaign cost implications of intra-party rivalry is needed, but it may be that internal party candidate competition serves to inflate the cost of success for both challengers *and* incumbents. For example, in the Centre heartland of Vaasa constituency, where three first-time MPs were elected as a result of intra-party defeats, the average campaign budget of the leading candidates – including the losing incumbent Lasse Hautala who received 10 thousand euros from *Kehittyvien maakuntien Suomi* (KMS – ‘The Finland of Developing Regions’) – was over 70 thousand euros. Paula Sihto generated in excess of 102 thousand euros in campaign income (5 thousand initially undeclared from KMS).

In a strong preferential voting system (Karvonen 2004), candidate type appears to make a difference and challenger candidates with a high public profile – especially so-called ‘celebrity candidates’ – may be elected following comparatively low-budget campaigns. The case of Tarja Tallqvist – at best a ‘minor celebrity’ and hardly a household name! – is particularly interesting because it suggested that, in the right circumstances, candi-

dates with the appropriate ‘visibility’ could be elected to parliament on a ‘shoestring budget’ for one of the minor parties. Tallqvist’s total budget was a mere 3119 euros, the third lowest of all 200 successful candidates in 2007.<sup>16</sup> The [then] 63 year-old Tallqvist had absolutely no previous political experience. Indeed, she claimed she did not know what a membership ballot [to select a candidate] was and did not recognise the importance of a ‘support group’ until it was suggested to her that she would need one. Yet, despite being a complete political novice, Tallqvist gained an impressive 4391 votes and contributed to a 4.1 per cent increase in the Christian Democrat poll in the Uusimaa constituency. As a maker of television documentaries, Tallqvist enjoyed a relatively high personal profile and this was enhanced by an Internet petition she initiated, which collected 420,000 signatures, calling for improved salaries for nurses (she had previously organised an anti-paedophile petition).

There was some resentment at the constituency level, particularly among the ‘male guard’,<sup>17</sup> at the way Tallqvist had been imposed by the national party following an approach to her from the party leader Päivi Räsänen. Resentment towards Tallqvist was further fuelled when she made it a condition of standing on a Christian Democrat list that the nurses’ salary campaign should remain non-partisan and could not be used in the Christian Democrats’ national campaign or by any of its individual candidates. Tallqvist was to all intents and purposes standing as an Independent, promoting a personal agenda – improved nurses’ salaries and better care for the elderly – and the party slate was largely a means to an end.

This was true of other celebrity candidates, especially those on the non-socialist side, since for them the party ticket was something of a flagship of convenience under which to navigate a route to parliament. Some approached the main parties to run for parliament, whilst others were approached to stand by the leadership of their parties. A rough cost-benefit calculus applied: the celebrity candidate would win the marginal vote that could swing elections one way or another and in return would receive campaign support from the central party – although the precise extent of this is difficult to gauge. Even those celebrities that went unelected gained a far from exiguous personal vote although, paradoxically, according to a *Taloustutkimus* poll

commissioned by MTV 3 in February 2007, only one-quarter of Finns regarded celebrities as deserving of the same attention as other candidates. In constituencies where celebrity candidates have not traditionally prospered, it may be necessary to invest more in their success – Mieto's budget in Vaasa exceeded 60 thousand euros – but in general the evidence from the 2007 general election lends cautious support to the 'variable candidate type' hypothesis 3. The campaign budgets of celebrity candidates were smaller than the average for first-time parliamentarians as, too, were their personal contributions.

### Concluding remarks

The above analysis represents a 'snapshot': it relates to only one election and cannot identify trends. Clearly, moreover, the official campaign expenditure data must be treated with extreme caution and, as the party funding scandal ('Kalligate') in early summer 2008 revealed, the accuracy of the structure, if not the overall size of the winning candidates' budgets cannot be assumed. Symptomatically, several MPs made belated declarations of KMS funding, as well as concealing corporate-sector 'sponsorship' as revenue generated

through their support groups. In the case of strong candidates, some of the campaign costs doubtless by-passed the support group's account altogether. The limitations of the evidence from the MPs' personal campaign records are of course readily acknowledged. However, whilst the results may be more indicative than conclusive, the article raises important questions for future research. 1) In view of the rising cost of gaining election, to whom are incumbent parliamentarians in practice accountable – their party, voters or their support groups? The case of Ilkka Kanerva, following his resignation as foreign secretary, strongly suggested the latter.<sup>18</sup> 2) Does intra-partisan rivalry have implications for 'constituency service'? In other words, is 'pork-barrel politics' (whatever that means in the Finnish case) (more) attractive to marginal incumbents whose position may come under threat from a strong intra-party challenge? 3) Does the incidence of 'celebrity candidates' betoken a wider attenuation in the linkage between candidate and party? In other words, in a convergent party system, is the party label more a matter of convenience than conviction for candidates? These questions among others constitute an important future research agenda.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See for example, Heimo Polvi, 'Kansanedustajien toimikausia voitaisiin rajoittaa' *Helsingin Sanomat* 5.2.2009; Tapio Siirilä, 'Myös Suomessa mennään rahalla eduskuntaan' *Helsingin Sanomat* 4.7.2008; Kirsikka Siik, 'Vaalirahoituksen tarve tulee poistaa kokonaan' *Helsingin Sanomat* 16.6.2008. Siirilä held that "the lion's share of MPs has been elected because they have had more money to spend on their campaigns not because they are better qualified than others to represent the people". Siik, the Green Party's deputy-chair in Tampere, put the same point more graphically. "Even if an unemployed single parent or a disabled pensioner were to be selected as a candidate he/she would not be elected simply because there would not be the resources for an advertising campaign. Candidates do not succeed without massive visibility and this cannot be achieved without money." See also Paavo Tukkimäki, 'Ostettuja ihmisiä' *Helsingin Sanomat* 3.6.2008

<sup>2</sup> Ralf Sund, 'Vaalirahoituksesta vielä kerran' *Kaleva* 27.6.2008. For example, a candidate will place an advertisement in the local newspaper and the bill will go directly to the firm supporting the candidate.

<sup>3</sup> The response rate was a relatively modest 36 per cent, although the party, regional and gender balance were good.

<sup>4</sup> On occasions, intra-party rivalry can inflate the vote of the targeted incumbent and the principal challenger. In 2003 Susanna Haapoja was elected as the seventh and lowest-placed of the winning Centre candidates in Vaasa, only 650 votes ahead of Paula Sihto. Four years later, the intense competition between the two for the position of leading female candidate led to improved tallies for both – Haapoja's vote grew by 18.4 per cent compared with 2003 and Sihto's by 28.9 per cent.

<sup>5</sup> In this respect the Swedish People's Party appears to represent something of a limiting case, suggesting that the extent of intra-party candidate rivalry is likely to be greatest in parties with captive or at least highly exclusive electorates. As a Swedish People's Party candidate in Uusimaa remarked: "It is often said that you must remember that you do not compete against one another but against other parties, but that is rubbish. Of course we compete against each other when it is so clearly a one-party system [in Swedish-speaking districts]."

<sup>6</sup> For example, Paavo Arhinmäki's election in Helsinki for the Left Alliance was indebted to the retirement from politics of his long-serving party colleague Outi Ojala and the True Finn Tony ('Viking') Halme. Arhinmäki profited

financially and organisationally from being the candidate of the Young Left. However, the turning point in his fortunes came with the acrimonious resignation of Suvi-Anne Siimes as Left Alliance chair in 2006 since this allowed Arhinmäki, who subsequently challenged for the leadership, to profile himself more effectively, particularly through press and television interviews.

<sup>7</sup> The exception are the ‘party insiders’ who are selected through a relatively closed nomination process.

<sup>8</sup> ‘Vaalien ääniharavat käyttivät vähän omaa rahaa’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 11.6.2007

<sup>9</sup> ‘Mitä Tanja tahtoo’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 13.1.2008

<sup>10</sup> Niemi does allude to such non-elected ‘names’ as the rap musician Henri Vähäkainen, the presenter and former Miss Europe, Riitta Väisänen, and the former athlete Juha Vääntainen, all standing for the Centre. But she does not analyse their coverage in the media.

<sup>11</sup> Päivi Lipponen was boosted by a 10-thousand euros’ donation from KMS. Guzenina-Richardson’s support group *Euroopan Ma Gu ry* raised virtually the same amount of external income as Lipponen but at the candidate’s insistence there were no donations from firms.

<sup>12</sup> In a controversial television interview in May 2008, the chair of the Centre’s parliamentary party group, Timo Kalli, admitted breaking the law on the declaration of election campaign funding simply because there were no sanctions for violating the legal requirement that the source of donations in excess of 1,700 euros be clearly specified. Six months earlier, the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption group *Greco* had reported critically on the laxity of the rules governing election funding in Finland and Kalli’s confession triggered a spiral of revelations that made an incontrovertible case for transparency in the whole process. It emerged that a significant number of MPs, including ministers, had broken the law by not declaring donations and that an organisation called ‘The Finland of Developing Regions’ (*Kehittyvien maakuntien Suomi-KMS*), involving five leading business figures, had supported over fifty successful parliamentary candidates, mostly from the Centre, but also Conservatives, a few Social Democrats and a solitary Green. There was nothing illegal in this as such but as, almost daily, more and more politicians owned up to failing to declare the sources of their campaign funds, a deep sense

of ‘sleaze’ pervaded proceedings. See ‘Suomi joutuu pian tiukentamaan puolue- ja vaalirahoituksen valvontaa’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 8.12.2007; ‘KMS-yhdistyksen varapuheenjohtaja: Yhdistys perustettiin keskustan toimistossa’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 2.6.2008

<sup>13</sup> The prime minister Matti Vanhanen, who had himself (unknowingly it seems) received 10 thousand euros from KMS referred dramatically to the ingredients of a crisis of legitimacy affecting the entire political system. See ‘Vanhanen ei tiennyt vaalituen tilittäjää’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 9.6.2008; ‘Vanhanen: Järjestelmää uhkaa luottamus kriisi vaalirahasotkun takia’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 21.5.2008; ‘Uskottavuusongelma, ei legitimitiitikriisi’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 21.5.2008

<sup>14</sup> The obvious deviant case was Merikukka Forsius since nearly two-fifths of her campaign budget comprised external funding, including 5 thousand euros from KMS.

<sup>15</sup> Lauri Saukkonen, ‘Työväenyhdistyksen satsaus järkevä’ *Länsi-Savo* 14.2.2007; Antti Lehtonen, ‘Järkevä satsaus – kenen kannalta?’ *Länsi-Savo* 16.2.2007; ‘Viitamiestoppuuttelee demareiden kiistelyä’ *Länsi-Savo* 19.2.2007

<sup>16</sup> The campaign budget of two True Finn MPs was lower. Pirkko Ruuhonen-Lerner’s was 1,834.77 euros (all a personal contribution) whilst Pertti (Veltto) Virtanen’s was 2,000 euros.

<sup>17</sup> The men running the constituency party were backing the pastor Antero Laukkanen, a born-again Christian and founder of the Helsinki Charismatic Baptist Lighthouse Church who had stood unsuccessfully in 2003. In his post-election ‘blog’ there was no mention of Tallqvist’s success but only condemnation of the increasing secularisation of the Eduskunta and regret that Christians in Uusimaa had not supported Christian candidates. Tom Dixon, ‘Prayer Movement Gains Momentum in Finland’ *Charisma* July 2001; ‘Pysy kanavalla 20 maaliskuuta 2007’ <http://anterolaukkan.blogspot.com>

<sup>18</sup> Before retiring on sick leave to the Turku archipelago, Kanerva addressed the annual meeting of his support group *Varsinais-Suomen Linjanvetäjät* at which according to *Iltta-Sanomat* 160 persons were present. ‘Kanerva kävi tervehtimässä tukijoitaan’ *Helsingin Sanomat* 6.4.2008

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