

EX ORIENTE LUMINA
HISTORIAE VARIAE MULTIETHNICAE

**Festskrift tillägnad Juha Janhunen
på hans 61. födelsedag 12.2.2013**

STUDIA ORIENTALIA 113

EX ORIENTE LUMINA
HISTORIAE VARIAE MULTIETHNICAE

**Festskrift tillägnad Juha Janhunen
på hans 61. födelsedag 12.2.2013**

Edited by

**Tiina Hyytiäinen, Lotta Jalava,
Janne Saarikivi & Erika Sandman**



Helsinki 2013

Ex Oriente Lumina: Historiae variae multiethnicae

Edited by Tiina Hyytiäinen, Lotta Jalava, Janne Saarikivi & Erika Sandman

Studia Orientalia, vol. 113, 2013

Copyright © 2013 by the Finnish Oriental Society

Societas Orientalis Fennica

c/o Department of World Cultures

P.O. Box 59 (Unioninkatu 38 B)

FI-00014 University of Helsinki

FINLAND

Editor

Lotta Aunio

Co-Editors

Patricia Berg

Sari Nieminen

Advisory Editorial Board

Axel Fleisch (*African Studies*)

Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila (*Arabic and Islamic Studies*)

Tapani Harviainen (*Semitic Studies*)

Arvi Hurskainen (*African Studies*)

Juha Janhunen (*Altaic and East Asian Studies*)

Hannu Juusola (*Semitic Studies*)

Klaus Karttunen (*South Asian Studies*)

Kaj Öhrnberg (*Librarian of the Society*)

Heikki Palva (*Arabic Linguistics*)

Asko Parpola (*South Asian Studies*)

Simo Parpola (*Assyriology*)

Rein Raud (*Japanese Studies*)

Saana Svärd (*Assyriology*)

Typesetting

Lotta Aunio

Cover photo

Tiina Hyytiäinen & Repe Reilin

ISSN 0039-3282

ISBN 978-951-9380-82-7

WS Bookwell Oy

Jyväskylä 2013

CONTENTS

Preface	vii
TIINA HYYTIÄINEN, LOTTA JALAVA, JANNE SAARIKIVI & ERIKA SANDMAN	
In Search of Hidden Languages	1
JAAKKO ANHAVA	
Shen Congwen 沈從文 (1902–1988): un auteur mésestimé.....	7
MICHEL BÉNIARD	
Perplexing Emperorship: The Status of the emperor of Japan in the United States’ planning bodies in 1943–1944.....	13
OLAVI K. FÄLT	
The Taz Ethnic Group: Its past and future	21
ALBINA GIRFANOVA	
Tibetan Nuns: Gender as a force in a culture under “threat”	27
MITRA HÄRKÖNEN	
Finnish Students of Oriental Philology in St Petersburg.....	39
KLAUS KARTTUNEN	
An A Mdo Tibetan Woman’s Life and Religious Practice.....	47
KELSANG NORBU (SKAL BZANG NOR BU, GESANG NUOBU 格桑诺布) WITH C.K. STUART	
Bargaining for Deities and Chattels: Recent developments in Xiahe as reflected in the local antiques trade	63
JUHA KOMPPA	
Li Hanqiu 李涵秋 (1874–1923): Ein Author zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Der Roman “Die Fluten Von Guangling” (廣陵潮 Guangling Chao) Als Spiegel Seiner Zeit	77
STEFAN KUZAY	
Challenges of Qinghai Province	93
ANJA LAHTINEN	

Namuyi Tibetans: Electrified change	111
LIBU LAKHI (LI JIANFU), C.K. STUART & GERALD ROCHE	
Niidosang: A Huzhu Mongghul (Tu) Deity	127
LIMUSISHIDEN, HA MINGZONG & C.K. STUART	
Understanding the Enigma of Traditional Korean Culture.....	145
ANDREW LOGIE	
Sitting by the Rice-Basket: Hunger phrases in Chan Buddhism.....	155
ANU NIEMI	
Notes on the Maintenance of Diversity in Amdo: Language use in Gnyan thog village annual rituals	165
GERALD ROCHE & LCAG MO TSHE RING	
Language in Taiwanese Social Movements	181
TARU SALMENKARI	
Die Modernen Türksprachen: Skizze zu einem Familienportrait	189
CLAUS SCHÖNIG	
Arabic Script among China's Muslims: A Dongxiang folk story	197
MIKKO SUUTARINEN	
A Short Introduction to Tibetan Kinship Terms in A-mdo	209
WUQI CHENAKTSANG	
Several Observations Concerning the Sibe Practice of the <i>Deoci</i> and <i>Andai</i> Rituals of the Khorchin Mongols	217
VERONIKA ZIKMUNDOVÁ	

PERPLEXING EMPERORSHIP: THE STATUS OF THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN IN THE UNITED STATES' PLANNING BODIES IN 1943–1944

Olavi K. Fält

Japan made its surprise attack on America's military base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 7 December 1941. The next day, the United States declared war on Japan. This meant that Japan's future was also now included in the planning of a post-war world, which had begun in the United States immediately after the start of the war in the autumn of 1939. Significant persons in the planning process that concerned Japan included Joseph Ballantine, expert in the Japanese language, and Professor George H. Blakeslee, expert in East Asian history, both directors of the State Department's Far East unit. Two other experts worth mentioning were Professor of Japanese History Hugh Borton and Joseph Grew, who had been the United States ambassador in Tokyo for ten years. (Okkonen 2002: 42–49)

One of the main problems in planning the future of post-war Japan was the question of the status of the emperor. This study analyzes the discussion about this matter by utilizing material produced by the planning bodies in the initial phases of the planning process in 1943–1944, when the actual planning work in this respect began in earnest.

A fundamental problem was the connection between the emperor and militarism. A memo from April 1943 dealing with the status of the emperorship stated that victory over militarists and militarism in Japan raised the question of the future of the emperorship. According to the memo, it had been a dominant and essential part of Japan during its period of rapid rise and aggression. The United Nations could not tolerate a Japanese administration which would continue to be a threat. Therefore, according to the memo, it was necessary to consider if preserving the emperorship was something that would be impossible for the United Nations to consider. (OPJD, 1-B-2, 1)

Linking the emperorship and Emperor Shōwa to militarism was a difficult issue, given the rather widespread view within the administration of the United States that the emperor himself was not actually collaborating with the aggressive military factions. For example, in the autumn of 1941, before Japan's surprise attack, Ambassador Grew had emphasized the emperor's peacefulness (OPJD,

5-E-1; 5-E-2). The memo also stated that the emperor was a gentle and sincere family man who had accepted the passive, titular role expected of him by the Japanese political system. It further mentioned that he personally supported peace if it was at all possible. (OPJD, 1-B-2, 3–12)

According to the memo, there were two alternatives in the post-war situation: abolition of the emperorship or its continuation. The advantages and disadvantages of both alternatives were very carefully weighed. Curbing of nationalistic fanaticism and the political movement stemming from it, weakening of Japan as an organized state, promotion of more rationalistic conceptions related to Japan's national uniqueness and international mission, and decreasing the influence of Japan's military spheres were seen as the advantages of abolition. On the other hand, the potential difficulty of finding competent Japanese for an administration without an emperor, general resentment, an attitude of opposition, unwillingness to cooperate, disarray, and emergence of an attitude of disregard for the law were considered to be disadvantages. It was also feared that abolition of the emperorship would create a permanent impetus for rebellion and revenge. (OPJD, 1-B-2, 3–12)

In examining the positive and negative sides of continuing the emperorship, attention was primarily fixed on the fact that the United Nations' proclamation of 1 January 1942 pledged to respect all nationalities' right to choose the form of government under which they wished to live. According to the memo, there was no sign that the Japanese did not wish to continue living under an imperial system. Yet preservation of that system would require measures that would prevent military factions from rising to power again. At the same time, it was necessary to solve problems that arose due to nationalistic beliefs linked to the emperor's divinity and uniqueness. Because preservation of the imperial system would also reinforce Japan's national power, even though such power would be transferred from the military to liberal thinkers, this would not in and of itself obviate future problems. (OPJD, 1-B-2, 3–12)

Above all, good treatment of the emperor provoked general feelings of sympathy among the Japanese. This was considered to be an advantage of preserving the emperorship, which would promote national stability as well as implementation of the changes required of Japan by the United Nations. It would also be easier for a non-military administration to implement renewals in recovering of Japan if it could function in his name in accordance with the constitution. (OPJD, 1-B-2, 3–12)

To some extent the image of the emperor created by the memo was contradictory, as seen above, but its basic features were nevertheless positive. This was most likely affected first and foremost by the rather common conception that he had been against starting the war. Secondly, it should be noted that the memo

considered it to be a slightly better outcome if the emperorship remained in Japan after the war. Although the assessed disadvantages related to continuation of the institution appeared to be very serious such as fear of the power of military spheres and the difficulty of changing an ultra-nationalistic mind-set, they were offset by the support that the emperorship could possibly give for major post-war recovery and maintaining peace, which were important for the interests of the United States. Thus, it was natural to present a positive image of the emperor as a person and a political player, in order that the expectations associated with him and the emperorship as a whole could be exploited in practice.

Support for preservation of the emperorship was also given by the minister of Great Britain's embassy and renowned specialist on Japan, Sir George B. Sansom, who stated in a discussion with Borton and Blakeslee in July 1943 that it would be extremely unwise to displace the emperor (OPJD, 1-B-20). This view was most likely also reinforced by the assessment of the supporters of the preservation of the emperorship about his actual ability to influence the country's politics: the emperor reigned but did govern (OPJD, 1-B-23, 1).

When the matter was discussed in October 1943 by a large 16-member committee that contemplated Japan's post-war status, Ballantine felt it would be wise to leave the institution untouched at least for the duration of the surrender and the creation of a new post-war system. He did not believe that the military spheres could achieve such a position again after the war that they could exploit the emperorship, and so preserving the institution did not risk a revival of militarism. Therefore, he felt that a better solution was to preserve the institution and exploit it while building a new Japan. (OPJD, 1-C-4; Takemae 2002: 202)

The position of the supporters of the preservation of the emperorship was also reinforced by a discussion between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and China's leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, in November 1943. Namely, Chiang stated that the decision about the status of the emperor should be left to the Japanese themselves, in order to avoid any complications in post-war international relations (OPJD, 5-A-4). By this he apparently referred to the unstable international situation that had resulted from the peacemaking process of the First World War.

In the continuing discussions concerning the future status of the emperor, it was noted that the United States' policy was to not attack him in war propaganda and not to bomb the imperial palace. The emperorship as such was of no value. If the Japanese themselves were ready to abandon it, the United States would have nothing against it. Problems would arise only if it became necessary to act contrary to the will of the Japanese. Here the discussion always returned to the starting point: if the emperor was provided with good advisors and he could be used to reinforce a democratic Japan, then he should be supported. Or should the

emperorsip be eliminated in order to further ensure the destruction of militarism? (OPJD, 1-C-8, 10–14)

All along, the possible concrete benefit offered by the emperorsip was its potential to promote the objectives of the United States – and more broadly, the United Nations – in Japan. Although in principle it involved potential political advantages offered by the institution, the image of the emperorsip and the emperor was essentially positive. If the image had been very negative, there would not even have been any discussion about exploitation – but in any case, it was positive enough to make discussion possible. By refraining from propagandistic attacks against the emperorsip and bombing of Tokyo’s imperial palace, the United States also sought to keep all options open for the future.

In the beginning of 1944, the opinion that if the Japanese themselves held fast to the emperorsip it should be renovated but if they were ready to abandon it then it would be terminated appeared to be ratified in a recommendation by the new Inter-Divisional Area Committee, which had been set up in October 1943 to deal with Japan. (OPJD, 2-A-5; Takemae 2002: 204–205) Furthermore, if the administration of the occupation utilized the Japanese administrative organization, certain functions could be taken care of by the emperor. If the Japanese administration was not utilized, however, it would be best to temporarily terminate all his administrative tasks. (OPJD, 2-A-6)

In a statement given to the Department of State in the beginning of April 1944, renowned Japanese specialist Julius W. Pratt recommended that the emperor be well-treated. In his opinion, there was no reason from the standpoint of politics or religion to believe that the objectives set for Japan by the United Nations could be achieved by taking a harsh position. He did not consider the emperor to be an “actual war criminal”, so there was no cause to punish him for crimes committed by the military. Neither was there any reason to punish him as a symbol of nationalism; on the contrary, this would only turn him into a martyr within nationalistic spheres. According to Pratt, the emperor could be used as a symbol of both positive and negative objectives. (OPJD, 2-A-6) Pratt’s statement can probably be interpreted as supporting the exploitation of the emperorsip in the planning of a new Japan.

The overarching principle in the planning was to evaluate the emperorsip only in terms of the possible advantages it provided (OPJD, 2-D-2). The status of the emperor himself was not considered important. For example, Ballantine – who chaired the Inter-Divisional Area Committee – felt that the military defeat and Japan’s occupation would already significantly weaken his position (OPJD, 2-D-1).

On 24 April 1944, the Committee proposed two alternative plans for dealing with the emperorsip once Japan surrendered. The first plan recommended

placing the emperor and the imperial family under supervision and moving them from the imperial palace to a location that was easier to guard. The emperor would be isolated, but his closest advisors would be allowed to meet with him and he would continue to be treated as the head of state. Because people would be assured of his security and well-being, such an arrangement would promote a civil administration. The commander of the occupation forces should terminate all tasks of the emperor except those with which administrative obligations would be delegated to lower-ranking officials. This would permit the smooth implementation of a civil administration. All officials would be as if under his jurisdiction, although in practice they would be under the supervision of the administration of the occupation. At the same time, publicly announcing the limitations placed on the emperor would indicate the superiority of the occupation administration over him. Again, if all the emperor's tasks were terminated, the occupation administration would have to prepare to assume responsibility for the administration of Japan in practice as well, not simply supervise it. This would also be necessary if it were impossible to submit him to the supervision of the occupation administration. (OPJD, 2-A-7)

In the alternative plan, the emperor and the imperial family would be kept in complete isolation where no one would be able to visit them. The emperor would not be allowed to issue statements and none would be issued in his name. The status of the imperial institution would be discredited by denying his divinity, omnipotence, and infallibility. The occupation authorities would support and encourage any groups that declared themselves ready to terminate the emperorship. In this alternative, the administration of the occupation would have to be prepared to assume responsibility for the practical functioning of the Japanese administration in case the Japanese authorities refused to cooperate. (OPJD, 2-A-8)

In his statement concerning the work done by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee, submitted on 26 April to the Committee on Post-War Programs, Ballantine emphasized that the occupation administration's treatment of the emperor should be of such nature that it would indicate to the Japanese how as a head of state he was considered to be an ordinary mortal and that he was actually just a human being. If the emperor were to only take care of minor administrative tasks under the supervision of the occupation administration, he himself would indicate that he was not divine. In turn, that would lead to renovation or termination of the emperorship based on an initiative by the Japanese, which alone would ensure a permanent solution. (OPJD, 2-C-7)

According to Ballantine, the primary objective of occupation was to promote the security of the United States. He rejected the generally prevailing idea that the

imperial institution would become a security problem because Japanese militarism and aggression were largely based upon it. In his view, the emperorship had been exploited in order to propagandize militarism for a relatively short time – only a few decades – compared with the centuries-long period during which the emperorship had had no political power. Militarism would most likely have existed regardless of the institution. According to Ballantine, the Committee did not believe that Japanese militarism was based on the emperorship. Instead, it was based on an ideology and mindset that had existed among the Japanese already for centuries. It could be completely eradicated only by ensuring Japan's military defeat and thereafter by implementing a long-term, gradual recovery program. (OPJD, 2-C-7)

According to Ballantine, many members of the Committee felt that the ideal solution would be to develop a political system in Japan without the emperorship. However, the Committee's basic principle was that renovation or abolition of the institution would have to be based on the will of the Japanese, not outside pressure. (OPJD, 2-C-7)

Ambassador Grew also presented a statement to the Committee on Post-War Programs in favor of the emperorship. Although he thought Emperor Hirohito (Shōwa) could not continue as emperor after the war, he nevertheless believed in the emperor's personally peaceful intentions. Grew felt it was important to preserve the emperorship even if the emperor were replaced, primarily because exploiting the institution would guarantee the Japanese authorities' cooperation with the occupation authorities. With the help of the imperial institution, Japan could be constructively developed in a direction that best served the security interests of the United States. Grew thought the institution could be exploited for the good of peaceful international cooperation much more easily than for the recently witnessed militaristic aggression. In his view, Japan had qualities which would allow it to once again join the international community. In building that future, the emperorship – if allowed to do so – could play a strong and important role. (OPJD, 2-C-8; Nakamura 1992: 60–63)

The Committee worked on its actual plan until the beginning of May. The most significant addition to the plan, introduced on 24 April, dealt with the humanization of the emperor. The last paragraph of the recommendation stated that in all contacts with him, the occupation authorities should in every way avoid reinforcing the conception of the Japanese that their emperor differed from other rulers, being above them and of divine origin, with divine qualities, inviolable and irreplaceable (OPJD, 2-A-11).

By May 1944, the plans regarding the emperorship had reached a recommendation proposal based on administrative utilization of the emperorship to advance the United States' future occupation goals. Another alternative that

was presented was administrative bypassing of the emperorship, even though it would have required significantly more occupation authorities to assume responsibility for and, in practice, take care of Japan's administration. Dispensing with the emperorship was considered possible only if the initiative came from the Japanese and had the support of the people behind it. The emperorship as such was not considered important, only the benefit it brought to the United States.

Despite the war, the image of the ruler of the enemy country was positive enough for the planning bodies to believe he could be advantageously used to promote the interests of the United States. Behind this was the understanding that the emperor had been against starting the war. Secondly, the planning bodies included top American experts in Japanese culture, history, and society – Blakeslee, Borton, Ballantine, and Grew – who helped inform the current situation in terms of its historic framework and cultural context. The situation was not examined only on the basis of the present moment; the discussion consistently considered special features of Japanese culture and their impact on possible solutions, albeit always in relation to achieving the greatest possible practical benefits from the standpoint of the United States.

When the occupation began in September 1945, the occupation administration led by the United States followed the basic lines of action that were recorded in April and May of the previous year to a great degree (Takemae 2002: 204). However, this matter is not always mentioned in the discussions about the decisions made in regard to the future status of the emperor, even in the most important studies dealing with the period of occupation (Dower 1999: 277–345).

REFERENCES

- DOWER, John W. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press.
- NAKAMURA, Masanori 1992. *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the making of the 'Symbol Emperor System', 1931–1991*. Tr. Herbert P. Bix, Jonathan Baker-Bates & Derek Bowen. NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- OKKONEN, Tuula 2002. *Yhdysvaltojen näkemykset, suunnitelmat ja toimenpiteet Japanin koulujärjestelmän uudistamiseksi 1942–1947*. (Acta Universitatis Ouluensis Humaniora B 45) Oulu: Oulu University Press.
- OPJD, The Occupation of Japan. US Planning Documents 1942–1945. Ed. Makoto Iokobe, Kobe University. Published by Congressional Information Service Inc. and Maruzen Co. (microfiches).
- TAKEMAE, Eiji 2002. *Inside GHQ: The Allied occupation of Japan and its legacy*. Tr. and adapted from the Japanese by Robert Ricketts & Sebastian Swann. London: Continuum.