

THE INFLUENCE OF NORTH KOREAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES ON THE INTEGRATION OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS IN SOUTH KOREA

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This paper investigates how the political socialisation of North Korean defectors (NKDs) in North Korea affects their adjustment in South Korea. This project is based on a survey of 106 NKDs and interviews with some of the respondents and South Koreans who help NKDs. An account is given of the history and resettlement of NKDs in South Korea, including the difficulties they experience. Furthermore, the paper describes the political ideology of self-reliance (*Juche*) and heavily monitored lives to which NKDs have been exposed in North Korea.

The research finds that resettlement can be significantly affected by self-reliance ideology and heavily monitored lives. When NKDs in South Korea realised the deceptive reality of self-reliance ideology, they adjusted better than those who maintained the *Juche* point of view. Being brainwashed by Kim Jong-il's regime caused NKDs to develop distrust and become individualistic. Due to having antipathy and hatred towards their enemies, they were inclined to be critical, aggressive, and negative towards South Koreans. Many also held a Manichean mindset and tended to avoid attending seminars and training meetings. The negative influences of their former lives in North Korea have generally had a great effect on their resettlement in South Korea.

In March 2013, there were 1,470,873 foreigners in South Korea, and 24,934 of these were North Korean defectors (NKDs) (*Haengjeonganjeonbu* 2013: 4). Most NKDs – not only adults, but also teenagers – have great difficulties in adjusting to life in South Korea (Kang Ju-won 2002; Cho Yong-gwan 2004). In addition to the problems that confront many immigrants – such as linguistic and cultural differences, and discrimination by the host society – NKDs face other hidden obstacles because of their past political socialisation and heavily monitored lives (*jibdanjuui*)¹ (Cho Yong-gwan 2004; Kim Seung-cheol 2006). The North Korean regime controls its citizens, indoctrinating them from early childhood with the ideology of self-reliance (*Juche*), instilling fear and protecting itself from any liberal ideas that might infiltrate the country. At the same time, however, the dissatisfaction of citizens has been seen to increase as a result of Kim Jong-un's

¹ *Jibdanjuui* refers to the way in which the lives of North Korean citizens were closely monitored by both their neighbours and the regime. Citizens in this system receive heavy ideological indoctrination from childhood, and they pursue collective goals rather than individual goals. Citizens are also strongly encouraged to dedicate their lives and resources to serving their leader and the Korean Workers' Party.

failure to meet such basic needs as food and energy (Haggard & Noland 2011). As there is a danger of such dissatisfaction resulting in anger and hatred towards the regime, the regime combats it by forcing citizens to monitor each other. It also attempts to divert their anger and complaints towards outside enemies (such as the USA and South Korea), internal enemies,² and, to a degree, towards their associates (Cho Yong-gwan 2008). Thus, even when they reside in South Korea, NKDs can be emotional and express antipathy towards that country, because this behaviour was instilled in them while they were in North Korea. Cho Yong-gwan (2004) argues that there is a need to investigate the impacts of political socialisation and heavy monitoring on subsequent resettlement in South Korea. Yet few scholars have conducted analysis by means of survey data and interviews. Based on a survey of 106 NKDs, 20 of whom were interviewed in person, this project will therefore attempt to fill a gap in the examination of how earlier political socialisation and heavily monitored lives affect the adjustment of NKDs to life in South Korea. Social workers who work for NKDs were also interviewed. The following section provides a brief account of the history and resettlement of NKDs.

HISTORY AND RESETTLEMENT OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS (NKDS)

Eastern European countries such as the USSR and East Germany renounced communism and adopted a capitalist approach in the late 1980s and early 1990s, embracing free trade in place of the previous barter system between Communist countries. This had a significant impact on North Korea, which had previously relied heavily on this barter mechanism (Kim Seung-cheol 2006: 1). In addition, 600,000 to 1 million people in North Korea (about 3–5% of the population) died of starvation in the 1990s due to famines and floods (Haggard & Noland 2011: 6). Many North Koreans left the country in order to survive, with most of them living illegally in China after crossing the border without entry visas. Those who were more fortunate made their way to South Korea, either directly from China or via countries such as Mongolia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Many North Koreans still reside illegally in China today.

Because of their undocumented and illegal status, there is no official data on the total number of NKDs.³ North Koreans mainly defected because of the food shortage in the 1990s, but those who have left since 2000 have generally been motivated by the idea of a better life (Yun In-jin 2007: 28–29). There were only 34 NKDs in South Korea in 1993, but this number has steadily increased: 1044 in 2001, 1896 in 2004, 2804 in 2008, 2402 in 2010, and 1509 in 2012. By March 2013, the total number of NKDs had reached 24,934 (Ministry of Unification 2013). After Kim Jong-un became the leader of North Korea, in 2012 the number dropped dramatically. This is because Kim Jong-un set up strict controls, giving orders for NKDs to be shot if found crossing the border (Jeong Jae-seong 2011).

2 For example, Park Nam-ki, who reformed the North Korean currency system in 2009 at Kim Jong-il's request, was publicly executed in 2010. Park served here as a scapegoat for the general public's anger at the failure of the monetary devaluation. The anger of the citizens was also aroused due to serious food shortage problems in North Korea. So Kim Jong-il executed his secretary Seo Gwan-hee, who was in charge of agriculture, blaming him for creating the food shortage as an American spy in 1997. The problem was actually caused by Kim Jong-il, who refused to open his country in order to maintain political power (*Yonhap News*, 26 June 2011).

3 The exact number of NKDs in China is unknown, but it has been estimated to be between 5,000 and 100,000. Robison (2010: 15) estimated 5,000–15,000, while the estimate of the South Korean Minister of Unification, Hyun In-taek, is 100,000 (requoting Haggard & Noland 2011: 2).

NKDs mostly experience difficulties in South Korea because they are isolated and marginalised from mainstream South Korean society (Lee Gi-yeong 2003: 121; Yun In-jin 2006: 413–414). Due to their incompatibility, NKDs struggle to adjust to the capitalist South Korean country (Kim Seung-cheol 2006: 31–32). When employed, most NKDs usually resign within six months (Kim Seung-cheol 2006: 26); thus, they are not very welcome in the workplace (Cho Yong-gwan 2000: 101). Kim Soon-yang (2010: 106) found that 85.8% of NKDs in South Korea earn less than 1 million won (US\$800), which is less than 57% of the average income of South Koreans. Furthermore, over 80% of NKDs receive a government allowance. Instead of seriously searching for jobs, they have a tendency to rely on government support and are often unwilling to accept “3D”⁴ jobs (Kim Soon-yang 2010: 111). In general, those who are employed have casual or flexible work arrangements (rather than full-time, permanent jobs) (Ryoo Ji-wung 2005: 46). The main reason for NKDs to avoid full-time employment is that it makes them ineligible for government grants (Yun In-jin 2006: 420).

NKDs leave North Korea in search of better lives for themselves and their children. But as they are generally poorer than South Koreans, most NKD parents are unable to afford to send their children after school to a private academy (*hagwon*), which is more popular and influential than formal school in South Korea (Kim Jin-yeong 2012: 1). Furthermore, as the school systems between the two Koreas differ, and NKDs spend an average of three years coming over to South Korea, it can be very challenging for them to follow South Korean curricula (Jang Mun-gang 2005: 7, 12; Ryoo Ji-wung 2007: 167). Consequently, they become frustrated and anxious about their future. Another important reason for poverty is that many NKDs send their subsidy money to family members left behind in North Korea or China, in order for them to be able to also come to South Korea. NKDs also need to pay reimbursement fees to the brokers who facilitated their immigration into South Korea (Kim Soon-yang 2010: 107).

Along with these challenges, NKDs have problems with anxiety and distrust (Kim Seung-cheol 2006: 33). Approximately 27.2% of NKDs suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), due to famine, torture, sexual abuse, severe hardship, and so forth experienced in North Korea or China (Cho Young-a & Yoo Si-eun 2007: 59; Kim Soon-ok 2011). Because NKDs who have PTSD or mental problems tend to hide them, as these conditions are looked down on in North Korea, they neither want to acknowledge that they suffer from these conditions nor desire to receive medical or psychological treatment. Instead, they seek to solve the problems themselves (Kim Eun-kyoung & Kwon Jung-hye 2009: 762). This increases the difficulty of their resettlement in South Korea.

However, a small number of NKDs have been successful (for example, Cho Myeong-cheol, who became a member of the Korean parliament in 2012). Some NKDs like Park Sang-hak, a renowned activist, strive to free North Koreans by revealing the abuse of human rights in North Korea. They also send care packages and leaflets to the North via balloons. Relatively speaking, those who have married South Koreans have resettled more successfully, according to Kim Yeong-su (2000: 109). But most NKDs struggle to adjust in South Korea. Their places of resettlement typically become ghettoized, and South Koreans are hesitant to welcome NKDs into their neighbourhood because of the fear that their property value will decrease (Kim Soon-yang 2010: 103). Another index that shows the maladjustment of NKDs to South Korean society is

4 Dirty, dangerous, and difficult.

crime rate. The crime rate of NKDs was approximately 20% during 1998–2007, which is five times higher than that of South Koreans (Park Gwan-gyu 2008).

NKDs are located almost on the bottom tier of South Korean society in terms of wealth. When Yun Yeo-sang (2004: 175) measured the extent of NKDs' satisfaction with their assimilation into South Korean society, they rated their satisfaction level at 3.5 on a scale of 1 to 5; their former lives in North Korea were rated at 3. Although Yun Yeo-sang did not consider the difficulties faced by refugees in the early stages of resettlement, the fact that their degree of satisfaction was only a half point higher than it had been in North Korea indicates that they are not particularly happy with their new lives in South Korea, and that they face numerous difficulties and challenges. Similarly, Yun In-jin (2006: 424) found that 57.3% of NKDs are in the lower class and 27.5% are in the extreme lower class. Of greater concern is the fact that second-generation NKDs tend to do poorly at school, are often subject to bullying, and have difficulty reaching the upper levels of school and entering university (Gu Geum-seop 2006: 116–119).

Because of their unsatisfactory resettlement experience, 69% of NKDs would prefer to immigrate to other countries, while 33.3% would return to North Korea if they could avoid punishment (*Tongilnews* 18 Oct. 2004). In fact, 1,195 NKDs left South Korea for Western countries by the end of 2010 (Ahn Yun-seok 2011). Additionally, four NKDs (Kim Gwang-ho, his wife and daughter, and Goh Gyeng-hee) repatriated to Pyongyang and held a press conference on their experiences in South Korea in January 2013 (Kim Yeong-gwon 2013). Their maladjustment in South Korean society can be attributed to a number of different factors.

THE CAUSES OF FAILURE FOR NKDS TO ADJUST IN SOUTH KOREA

There are many reasons why NKDs have difficulty adjusting to South Korea. Some may be related to the host society itself. South Koreans tend to discriminate against those who seem economically inferior to them (Kang Ju-won 2002: 26), and NKDs fall into that category.⁵ Furthermore, the South Korean media often focuses on the negative attributes of NKDs, such as crime and their dependency on government welfare. The media rarely explains the real reasons for such behaviour, such as the difficulties NKDs face in South Korea due to stress or fear that their family members in North Korea or China will be punished (Kang Ju-won 2002). Such selective presentations by the media likely add to discrimination.

Secondly, there are problems caused by the linguistic and cultural differences that have developed between South and North Koreans. Although the two ostensibly speak the same language, standard South Korean expressions contain a significant number of foreign words and idioms of middle-class Seoul that NKDs do not know (Jeon Su-tae 1992). Owing to the isolation and ideology of North Korea, its standard language uses vocabulary based on the *Pyongyang* dialect adapted from the speech of labourers or farmers (Jeon Su-tae 1992). Furthermore, when North Koreans in South Korea use certain hostile expressions towards a person they consider to be an adversary, they often come across as rude, aggressive, or ignorant (Jeon Su-tae 1992: 41–46). One young NKD in his early thirties shared his experience:

5 Park Se-jeong's (2009: 13) study shows that there are two aspects to discrimination shown by South Koreans: they have an inferiority complex in relation to people from more developed countries (such as the US and the UK) and a superiority complex towards people from developing countries. South Koreans consider NKDs to be inferior.

When I was working as a labourer, an elderly co-worker told me to buy some cigarettes when I was clearly not his slave. After doing his errand a few times, I defied him, told him that he was not my king and that he had no authority over me, using all the insulting terms I could think of. Since then, I was never asked to do it again.

In South Korea it is common for an older person to ask favours of a younger person. Unaware of this cultural aspect, the young NKD opposed the elderly man. Following this incident, the NKD was isolated from the other workers and felt alienated. This example shows how a lack of shared culture can create difficulties, even among people using the same language.

Thirdly, due to political socialisation based on North Korean ideology, the academic abilities and professional skills of NKDs have not been developed to the level that is typical in South Korea. As a result of the heavy focus on political socialisation by the North Korean government, this phenomenon is unique to NKDs.⁶ As NKDs have spent a significant amount of time assimilating and practising political ideologies centred on the personality cult of Kim Jong-un, and far less time learning about other disciplines and acquiring professional skills, their academic knowledge, work-related skills, and ethics are vastly different from those of their counterparts in South Korea (Yun Yeo-sang 2004: 175). In an interview, one NKD shared the following:

I began to work with enthusiasm and strong determination, but soon I found that my skills were lacking. I also felt fear when I observed South Koreans working hard. I was greatly shocked and felt anxious.

Similar to this respondent, many NKDs often feel inadequate in the workplace as they realise that their skills and work ethics are different from those of their South Korean colleagues. For this reason, Pyo Jung-hwa (2006: 100) considers that they need professional training in South Korea. Students also struggle with school because of different expectations and educational opportunities. Han Man-gil et al. (2011: 6) point out that the dropout rate among NKD students was 8.5% in middle school and 9.1% in high school (compared to only 0.8% in middle school and 1.8% in high school among South Korean students in 2009). Due to learning difficulties, only 36% of NKD teenagers attend formal schools, while 54% of NKD teenagers leave mainstream South Korean schools to instead attend alternative schools (*daeanhaggvo*) funded by the government and non-governmental organisations (Baek Hye-jeong et al. 2006: 166; Kim Mi-suk 2004). Poor performance at schools appears to lead to a failed cultivation of the second generation of NKDs. Scholars such as Kim Seung-cheol (2006) and Cho Yong-gwan (2008) argue that the greatest obstacle for NKDs in adjusting to life in South Korea could be their past indoctrination in political ideology and its lingering effects. Thus I will outline the political ideology and heavy regulation governing people's lives in North Korea.

THE NORTH KOREAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF SELF-RELIANCE (*JUCHE*) AND HEAVILY MONITORED LIVES (*JIBDANJUUI*)

The concept of self-reliance (*Juche*) implies autonomy and independence outside of the control of foreign powers. Kim Il-sung used this concept in the mid-1950s to reduce the influence of

⁶ Political socialisation refers to the indoctrination of North Koreans in *Juche* political ideology. All people, from children to the elderly, receive ideological education, and their behaviour is monitored by the government and at community meetings.

his political opponents, who were mostly from the USSR and China. The use of *Juche* today is no longer consistent with its original meaning, however. Rather, under Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and now Kim Jong-un it has become an ideological means of controlling the North Korean people and maintaining political power. A number of related concepts (Lee Eun-yeong 2002: 17) have also been developed, including North Korea's "own style of Socialism" (*Urisik-sahoejuui*), "Korean race as superior" (*Minjok-jeiljuui*), "red-flag ideology" (*Puleungi-sasang*), and "strong economic-military state" (*Kangseong-daegugron*).

North Korea's "own style of Socialism" stresses the importance of developing North Korea as an economically independent nation, in order to ensure stability from the economic crises of the world (Kwon Seong-ah 2003: 280–281). The principle of the "Korean race being superior" was instituted in order to strengthen the concept of the dynastic North Korean-style communist regime. The concept of *Minjok* means 'Korean race' and *jeil* means 'the best'. According to Kwon Seong-ah (2003: 5), the North claims that the idea of the superior Korean race is based on Kim Jong-il being the best leader in the world with the best ideology: *Juche*. Therefore, superior Korean race actually refers to Koreans who agree with the leadership and its *Juche* ideology; most South Koreans are excluded (Kwon Seong-ah 2003: 55). The notion of a "red-flag ideology" urges citizens to be loyal and to make sacrifices for Kim Jong-un, even amidst hardship, because it is believed that he provides social and political stability in the same way that parents provide these things for their children (Jeong U-gon 2001: 18). The Kims' regime has also promoted the principle of a "strong economic-military state", with strong economic development and military strength through the military-first policy (*Seongun jeongchi*). The strong economic-military state component is seen as being more important than ever since 2009 (Yun Seong-won 2009), because Kim Jong-un has aspired to maintain the strong support of the military.

By using *Juche* ideology, the North Korean regime aims to produce subservient subjects who are dedicated, loyal to the regime, and ready to protect the country from foreign "imperialistic" nations (Cho Yong-gwan 2008: 61). Children begin to absorb *Jucheism* from the age of two. Cho Yong-gwan (2008: 69–70) gives the example of kindergarten children being trained to say "many thanks to our Father *Wonsunim* 'great leader'" (referring to the late Kim Jong-il) whenever they receive toys or sweets. One female NKD student I met in South Korea said, "Kim Jong-il is alright, but his high officials are greedy and corrupt and that is why our citizens suffer." She demonstrated continuing trust in Kim Jong-il.

From early kindergarten on, citizens live strictly monitored lives. They are taught to cast off their individuality and follow the will and direction of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and its leader (Kim Seung-cheol 2006: 59). North Korea claims that heavily monitored lives encourage citizens to strive for the benefit of society as a whole, rather than the benefit of individuals. People are manipulated to work for the benefit of the regime; they are taught to be hypercritical (criticising others for their wrongdoings at weekly meetings), aggressive (a result of built-up antipathy towards enemies), and distrustful due to criticism and monitoring by others (Cho Yong-gwan 2004: 175; Kim Seung-cheol 2006: 40). To survive in this difficult society, they are forced to be dishonest; if they live according to the instructions of the regime, they cannot get by (Cho Yong-gwan 2004). Cho Yong-gwan (2004) also points out that North Koreans have been trained to see things – or people – only in a dualistic Manichean perspective, as either friends or enemies. The ideological input and heavy monitoring of lives in North Korea appear to have affected the resettlement of NKDs in South Korea. This paper therefore investigates

how political socialisation and heavily monitored lives in North Korea affect resettlement in South Korea. It also considers the implications of these findings for facilitating the successful resettlement of NKDs in South Korea. The study is based on a survey that was administered to 106 NKDs in South Korea.

METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY

The survey was administered to 106 NKDs in groups of five to fifteen people and in some cases individually between April and November 2012. It was conducted by attending meetings and visiting local residential communities and churches to contact the individuals. Respondents were welcomed to ask questions about the survey when necessary. Some respondents, as well as some South Koreans who help NKDs, were also asked more specific questions, the responses to which are integrated in this paper. Even though there were more than 23,260 NKDs in South Korea in 2012 (Ministry of Unification 2013), it was not easy to make contact with them. This is because many NKDs are reluctant to reveal their identities, due to concern for the welfare of family members who remain in North Korea. Many had even changed their names. However, with the help of a number of scholars and social workers, I was able to meet and survey more than a hundred NKDs. The survey included a total of 29 questions (see Appendix).

Questions 1–9 focus on background information. Questions 10–20 relate to the impact of *Jucheism* on NKDs' lives in South Korea, and questions 10 and 11 ask specifically whether or not the concept of *Jucheism* has facilitated their resettlement in South Korea. The North Korean government often claims that it will continue to do things its own way, maintaining dignity and self-reliance even in the face of poverty and hardship, with the assistance of foreign aid from countries such as South Korea and China (Cho Yong-gwan 2004). This concept seems to have influenced NKDs because they had been exposed to the *Juche* ideology for a long time.

Kim Seung-cheol (2006) claims that *Jucheism* stresses unjustified pride and superiority in the North Korean people, which could cause NKDs to misapply this concept in South Korea and contribute to their maladjustment there. Hence questions 12–14 examine the effects of *Jucheism* on their lives, specifically in regards to the ideas of “strong economic-military state” and “superior Korean race”. NKDs were strongly encouraged to live for the leader, even negating their own individual goals, but many were very disappointed with him (Kim Seung-cheol 2006). Thus questions 15 and 16 were added in order to investigate the effect of “red-flag ideology”. Based on Cho Yong-gwan's (2004) study, which claims that following the leader in North Korea creates passivity and dependence, question 17 asks how this affects their lives in South Korea. Question 18 is included to learn about the reactions of NKDs when they found out that they had been deceived by Kim Jong-il and his regime. After becoming a Christian in the South, one NKD scholar named Kim Seung-cheol insisted that the leader in North Korea was treated like a god. Over 62.3% of NKDs in South Korea have become Christians, compared to only 25% of South Koreans (Kim Seung-cheol 2006). In order to explore the validity of Kim Seung-cheol's statement (2006), questions 19 and 20 seek to determine the relationship between following a religion and subscribing to the personality cult of Kim Jong-il.

Questions 21–28 relate to the influence of heavily regulated lives on NKDs' resettlement experience. North Koreans are encouraged to hate their domestic and international enemies (Cho Yong-gwan 2004). Therefore, question 21 seeks to determine how hatred towards enemies affects the lives of NKDs in South Korea. Question 22 asks about the influence of the antipathy they internalised in North Korea on their linguistic expressions, while Question 23 relates

to whether they classify people in a Manichean sense into two distinct categories (such as “enemies” and “friends”). North Koreans can experience difficulties finding a middle ground, tending instead to see things in black and white (Cho Yong-gwan 2004). This is the reasoning behind question 23.

North Koreans must attend weekly meetings where they criticise each other and themselves (Kim Seung-cheol 2006); this may be a cause for them to develop aversion to meetings. Questions 24 and 25 were added to examine this possibility. In addition, North Koreans also have to confess their wrongdoings in these weekly meetings, sharing personal issues and problems that relate to their colleagues (yet not any sensitive political issues, which could place them in a position of potential prosecution) (Cho Yong-gwan 2004). As this tendency could remain in South Korea, question 26 was added. Moreover, due to the criticism that they receive in weekly meetings, North Koreans may develop distrust toward other people, as well as a tendency to be dishonest. Therefore, questions 27 and 28 were added to determine this possible impact on their resettlement. Finally, question 29 was added as an outcome measurement; it asks NKDs for an overall assessment of their resettlement in South Korea.

SURVEY ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Of the 106 people who participated in this study, not all participants completed all of the surveys. Unanswered questions have been identified. The data was processed using SPSS version 21.⁷ Cases with p-values of less than 0.05 were considered significant. Answers to questions asking for the respondents’ agreement had responses ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). From the responses to question 1 (see Appendix), it was determined that 72 respondents were labourers or farmers, 13 were students, 7 were soldiers, 3 were housewives, and 2 were public servants. In terms of age, 3 respondents were under 20, 21 were 21–30, 37 were 31–40, 26 were 41–50, and 19 were over 51.

Pearson correlation between question 2 and resettlement showed a weak positive relationship: $r(104) = .26, p = .007$. This result shows that the younger respondents were when they left North Korea, the more successful their (1 = strongly agree) resettlement was. As seen in question 3, one graduated from primary school only, 61 finished secondary school, 26 finished TAFE, and 13 finished university courses or above. The level of education did not correlate with the participants’ adjustment rate.

53 respondents left North Korea alone, while 47 left North Korea with family members. 44 respondents lived in South Korea for less than two years, and 32 respondents lived in South Korea for 2–4 years. The correlation between questions 4 and 5 and resettlement were not significant. With whom the respondents defected and how long they stayed in South Korea did not affect their resettlement. In terms of length of residence in other countries before arriving in South Korea, 52 respondents spent less than two years in a third country while 41 respondents spent over 4 years.⁸ Pearson correlation showed a moderate negative relationship: $r(104) = -.38, p < .001$ (1 = 0–1 year, 5 = over 4 years). The longer that NKDs spent in other countries, the quicker they adjusted to their new circumstances. 62 respondents were married and lived

⁷ SPSS is a program for data management, documentation, and statistical analysis. It is capable of running analyses such as t-tests, correlations, regression, factor analysis, and non-parametric tests, and it is able to produce graphs, figures, and provide trends of data for the user.

⁸ Countries other than South Korea and North Korea which NKDs passed through during their exodus.

Table 1 Correlations between *Jucheism* questions and settlement in South Korea

Question	Correlation Coefficient	p value
Q11. <i>Jucheism</i> influenced independence	-.64**	<.001
Q12. <i>Jucheism</i> influenced unjustified pride	.64**	<.001
Q14. Minjok-Jeiljuui	-.01	.953
Q15. Lived for Kim Jong-il, now I live for my family and myself	-.07	.484
Q16. Lived for Kim Jong-il but now for South Korea	-.17	.076
Q17. Accustomed to follow KWP party, now become passive and dependent	-.26**	.007
Q18. Deceived by Kim Jong-il, now don't trust authority	-.49**	<.001
Q19. Following Kim Jong-il helped to have a religion in South Korea	-.10	.287
Q20. Easy to believe in God if replacing Kim Jong-il with Him	-.10	.299

Note: **p<.01.

with their spouses in South Korea, and 42 were not married. 82 were female, while 24 were male. Female respondents reported a slightly better adjustment ($M = 2.35$, $SD = 0.53$) than male respondents ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 0.49$), $t(104) = 2.24$, $p = .027$.

Table 1 shows whether maintaining *Jucheism* the North Korean way or not affects the resettlement of NKDs. It indicates that there was a strong negative correlation between “*Jucheism* influenced independence” (Q11) and resettlement; in other words, the more that participants thought *Jucheism* made them independent, the less able they were to adjust to their new location. Regarding this same question, Table 2 shows that 57% of respondents agreed that *Jucheism* made their new life in South Korea more independent and self-reliant, whereas 37.3% disagreed. In contrast, Table 1 indicates that there was a strong positive correlation between “*Jucheism* influenced unjustified pride” (Q12) and resettlement; the more they believed that *Jucheism* caused unjustified pride, the better they adjusted to South Korea. Approximately 37.4% of respondents to this question answered that *Jucheism* formed unjustified pride which was not helpful for their resettlement in South Korea, while 53.2% disagreed. This indicates that a majority of NKDs believe that *Jucheism* gave them justified pride (Table 2). Question 10 asked NKDs about the overall effect of *Jucheism* on their resettlement of South Korea: 58.4% of respondents answered that *Juche* ideology that they had learnt in North Korea had a positive effect on their lives in South Korea, while 41.6% of respondents believed that it had a negative impact. Questions 10–12 show that more than half of the respondents believed that *Jucheism* made them more independent and was a justifiable grounds to be proud in South Korea. In response to question 13, 42.1% of respondents stated that North Koreans are more self-reliant and independent, whereas 32.7% of respondents answered that South Koreans are more independent and 24.3% answered that they did not know. Even though 85.2% of NKDs

rely on government allowances (Kim Soon-yang 2010), they felt that they live independent and self-reliant lives. This suggests that their understanding of *Juche* is not directly related to economic self-reliance, but is more focused on ideological or political aspects. When I asked a former teacher in North Korea about this, she explained:

Initially NKDs believe that *Juche* gives them the pride and self-reliant spirit to get through all the difficulties they face in South Korea, but as time passes, this sentiment gradually disappears as they realise that *Juche* is not actually effective and that it only provides a source of self-comfort.

There was also a strong negative correlation between “Deceived by Kim Jong-il, now don’t trust authority” (Q18) and resettlement: the more that NKDs do not trust any authority in South Korea due to their previous deception by Kim Jong-il, the less they feel adjusted to South Korean society (Table 1). Approximately 93.4% of respondents stated that they had developed a general distrust of leaders and authority (25.2% answered “strongly agree” and 68.2% answered “agree”) (Table 2).

There was a weak negative correlation between “Accustomed to follow KWP party, now become passive and dependent” (Q17) and resettlement (Table 1). The more they believed in following the KWP and the top leader (which made them passive and dependent), the less likely they are to feel satisfied in their new surroundings in South Korea. Table 2 shows that 92.5% of respondents felt that they had developed a tendency towards passivity and a spirit of dependence in North Korea because they were accustomed to following and obeying the directions of the KWP party and its leader, which has made it difficult for them to sort out problems that they face in South Korea. One NKD, a welder, told me:

Table 2 Responses to *Jucheism* questions (percentages)

Question	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Q11. <i>Jucheism</i> influenced independence	25.2	12.1	4.7	29.0	28.0
Q12. <i>Jucheism</i> influenced unjustified pride	22.4	30.8	8.4	13.1	24.3
Q14. <i>Minjok-Jeiljuui</i>		9	9.3	42.1	46.7
Q15. Lived for Kim Jong-il, now I live for my family and myself	9	1.9	6.5	11.2	78.5
Q16. Lived for Kim Jong-il but now for South Korea	5.6	12.1	62.6	14.0	4.7
Q17. Accustomed to follow KWP party, now become passive and dependent	0	1.9	4.7	78.5	14.0
Q18. Deceived by Kim Jong-il, now don’t trust authority	0	0	5.6	68.2	25.2
Q19. Following Kim Jong-il helped to have a religion in South Korea	7.5	2.8	53.3	21.5	14.0
Q20. Easy to believe in God if replacing Kim Jong-il with Him	0.9	1.9	41.1	28.0	27.1

Note: **p<.01.

It is very challenging to make a decision on my own for the struggles my family and I have to face in South Korea. I am anxious to make decisions as I am not confident.”

The responses to the other questions did not correlate with resettlement in South Korea. Distribution of responses to “Lived for Kim Jong-il, now I live for my family and myself” (Q15) showed that most participants strongly agree (78.5%) (Table 2). This means that because they dedicated their whole life to following Kim Jong-il, they have now decided to live for themselves and for their families. Distribution of responses to “Lived for Kim Jong-il but now for South Korea” (Q16) showed that most participants were neutral about living for South Korea and community in South Korea (62.6% responded in a neutral manner) (Table 2). The answers to “Lived for Kim Jong-il, now I live for my family and myself” (Q15) and “Lived for Kim Jong-il but now for South Korea” (Q16) indicate that many respondents consider themselves to have wasted time and efforts by devoting their lives to Kim Jong-il, as a result of which they have become more individualistic, pursuing their own goals without considering other people or the nation as a whole. Yet surprisingly there is no significant correlation between questions 15–16 and resettlement.

Over half of the participants were also neutral in terms of “Following Kim Jong-il helped to adopt a religion in South Korea” (Q19), which indicates that their choice of religion was not affected by the experience of following Kim Jong-il.

Questions 21–28 relate to the influence of NKDs’ heavily monitored lives in North Korea and the antipathy North Koreans are taught to have towards their enemies. Table 3 shows that there are negative correlations between all questions and resettlement. There was a strong negative correlation between “Monitored life made them judgemental” (Q24) and resettlement: the more that participants become critical due to their heavily monitored lives in North Korea, the less acclimated they feel. Approximately 91.6% of respondents to the question “Monitored life made them judgemental” (Q24) stated that they criticise and judge other people easily

Table 3 Correlations between heavily monitored lives questions and settlement in South Korea

Question	Correlation Coefficient	p value
Q22. Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea	-0.32**	0.001
Q23. Having a Manichean attitude	-0.36**	<.001
Q24. Monitored life made them judgemental	-0.48**	<.001
Q25. Avoidance of meetings due to monitored life in North Korea	-.20*	0.040
Q26. Regret sharing my stories in South Korea	-0.38**	<.001
Q27. Hard to trust South Koreans for they were deceived by North Koreans	-0.24***	0.014
Q28. Becoming deceptive due to the North Korean regime	-0.37**	<.001

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01.

Table 4 Responses to heavily monitored lives (percentages)

Question	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Q22. Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea	3.7	13.1	6.5	56.1	19.6
Q23. Having a Manichean attitude	5.6	12.1	15.0	55.1	11.2
Q24. Monitored life made them judgemental	0	9	6.5	75.7	15.9
Q25. Avoidance of meetings due to monitored life in North Korea	1.9	14.0	12.1	52.3	18.7
Q26. Regret sharing my stories in South Korea	10.3	19.6	7.5	36.4	25.2
Q27. Hard to trust South Koreans for they were deceived by North Koreans	2.8	18.7	12.1	28.0	37.4
Q28. Becoming deceptive due to the North Korean regime	13.1	17.8	1.9	41.1	25.2

Note: **p<.01.

because citizens of North Korea are accustomed to monitoring and criticising the activities of those around them (15.9% answered “strongly agree” and 75.7% answered “agree”) (Table 4). One NKD, a former labourer in North Korea, shared his experience dealing with a public servant in South Korea. When he found his monthly payment was not deposited in his account, he promptly visited the district office and shouted at the worker who was in charge of the allowance. As he was employed full-time, the South Koreans no longer paid him the allowance. He needed to wait for his salary, as he was no longer eligible for the allowance. But he proudly told me:

I rebuked him, saying “Are you my king?” and asked him to immediately pay the allowance into my bank account. I also threatened to report him to his boss and get him sacked. Even though the worker told me to quiet down, I ignored his request and continued to rave on in order to display my furious anger and frustration.

When I asked Jeong Eun-ju, a social worker in South Korea, she answered that NKDs tend to maintain their very critical attitude, using dehumanising linguistic expressions which South Koreans do not use, even towards those who are trying to help them. For this reason, many NGO workers or volunteers who try to help NKDs eventually quit after experiencing such incidents. She said that social workers “need much more patience dealing with NKDs”. Cho Yong-gwan (2004: 85) says that NKDs abuse South Koreans when they do not receive the type of help they expect or consider to be their right, such as when they need to wait for a period of time or are no longer eligible for an allowance.

In response to question 21, 44.9% of respondents view South Korean society more critically than South Koreans, and 20.6% of respondents answered that this view gives them courage to fight and challenge the irrational demands of their bosses in South Korea. The respondents who selected items “a” and “c” (which demonstrate a negative and critical attitude towards South Koreans) numbered 65.5%. Only 26.2% of respondents answered that they were not impacted by this. The response of this question shows that the antipathy towards enemies developed in

North Korea still persists to some extent in the form of aggressive and critical attitudes towards South Koreans. In my interviews with North Korean defectors, I discovered that some had left their workplaces after arguments with their bosses. One woman proudly told me that she had thrown a food tray when her boss had scolded her; she believed this was an indication of strength. Rather than recognising her mistakes and her lack of manners, she chose to fight her boss.

There were moderate negative correlations between “Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea” (Q22), “Having a Manichean attitude” (Q23), “Regret sharing my stories in South Korea” (Q26), “Becoming deceptive due to the North Korean regime” (Q28) and resettlement. Table 4 shows that 19.6% of respondents to “Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea” (Q22) agreed strongly with the fact that they are more tough, critical, and quarrelsome because they were taught from childhood to have hatred and antipathy towards their enemies. In total, 75.7% of the respondents agreed with “Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea” (Q22), while 28% did not think this affected their resettlement in South Korea.

The moderate negative correlation between “Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea” (Q22) and resettlement (Table 3) indicates that the more that NKDs use tough, critical, and quarrelsome linguistic expressions learned in North Korea, the worse their adjustment in South Korea. I interviewed two people who disagreed with “Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea” (Q22): one was a former soldier and the other was a former manager in a North Korean restaurant owned by the government. They believed that such critical and quarrelsome language is based on the nature of North Korean expressions, rather than ideological and educational factors.

According to Table 4, 66.3% of respondents to the question “Having a Manichean attitude” (Q23) stated that they tend to classify South Koreans as either friends or enemies (11.2% answered “strongly agree” and 55.1% answered “agree”), while 33.7% of respondents disagreed with this statement. The North Korean regime encourages its citizens to use dehumanising and humiliating expressions towards their enemies (Jeon Su-tae 1992). When they use such expressions, however, it has a negative effect on South Koreans and tends to foster reluctance to associate with NKDs. The moderate negative correlation in Table 3 between “Having a Manichean attitude” (Q23) and resettlement shows that the more NKDs formed such Manichean viewpoints in North Korea, the less able they were to adjust in South Korea. When I conducted an interview with Cho Yong-gwan, who has been helping NKDs for over 13 years, he illustrated this with a negative example of some NKDs that were taken advantage of by South Koreans. If NKDs consider someone to be their friend, they tend to trust them. In this way, they are sometimes financially deceived by South Koreans, who appear to be treating them kindly but are actually cheating them. This is supported by Kim Jih-un and Jang Dong-jin’s (2007: 20) research, which revealed that 21.5% of NKDs have been defrauded; this is 43 times greater than the number of South Koreans (0.5%). Additionally, NKDs tend to be demanding if they consider South Koreans to be friends, causing South Koreans to feel burdened and to gradually avoid them (Cho Yong-gwan 2004).

The question “Regret sharing my stories in South Korea” (Q26) is also related to the influence of weekly meetings that were held in North Korea. As they were accustomed in North Korea to sharing personal issues in weekly meetings, NKDs tend to be more open than South Koreans. Table 4 shows that 61.6% of respondents answered that they agree with “Regret sharing my stories in South Korea” (Q26), while 30% disagreed with this. The moderate negative correlation between “Regret sharing my stories in South Korea” (Q26) and resettlement

(Table 3) indicates that the more they retained their North Korean way of sharing their issues and problems in South Korea, the less well they were able to adjust in South Korea.

Table 4 shows that 66.3% of respondents to the question “Becoming deceptive due to the North Korean regime” (Q28) agreed that even though they had acted according to the directions of the KWP and its leader, they had not been able to obtain enough food and money to survive (25.2% answered “strongly agree” and 41.1% answered “agree”). They had therefore been forced to secretly sell vegetables, food, and industrial products. Caused to live a double life, they had to be dishonest for the sake of survival. This tendency still remains to some extent in South Korea. The moderate negative correlation in Table 3 between “Becoming deceptive due to the North Korean regime” (Q28) and resettlement indicates that the more they led a double life in South Korea, the more difficulties they experienced during their adjustment in South Korea. One elder in a church expressed his frustration in an interview:

I don't know to what extent I should believe what they are saying, I often find what they are saying so different from what they are doing. I become more frustrated when I discover that they have been lying, and they do not apologise for it.

He said, “I am very exhausted dealing with NKDs.” This exemplifies the frustration felt by South Koreans when dealing with NKDs.

There was a weak negative correlation between “Avoidance of meetings due to monitored life in N Korea” (Q25), “Hard to trust South Koreans for they were deceived by North Koreans” (Q27) and resettlement. The more reluctant that they are to attend meetings or seminars in South Korea, the less satisfied they tend to be with the resettlement process. Similarly, the more distrust that built up in North Korea, the less satisfaction they have in resettlement. As seen in the question “Avoidance of meetings due to monitored life in North Korea” (Q25) in Table 4, because of their experience of weekly monitored meetings (*Saenghwal-chonghwa*), 71% of respondents stated that they were now reluctant to attend meetings and seminars (18.7% answered “strongly agree” and 52.3% answered “agree”). There is a weak negative correlation in Table 3 between “Avoidance of meetings due to monitored life in N Korea” (Q25) and resettlement. I asked four respondents in an interview why they do not want to attend such seminars or meetings, and they all answered that they assume these to be similar to the kind of meetings in North Korea where they used to criticise others and be criticised by their colleagues. They detest even hearing the word “meetings”, and this is why they tend to be reluctant to attend them in South Korea. Having this kind of attitude may make it more difficult for them to gain work skills that are necessary in South Korean society. However, when I attended churches attended by NKDs, surprisingly I saw large groups of them (30, 40, 25, and 22). I asked the pastors and elders of the churches why so many attended church meetings. They explained that churches provide NKDs with money and necessities. Generally they attend meetings to receive financial, emotional, and cultural support (Jeon Woo-taek & Cho Young-a 2003: 112). But church leaders also informed me that NKDs move to other churches without any hesitation when they learn that they can receive more money and tangible benefits elsewhere.

Table 4 shows that 65.4% of respondents to the question “Hard to trust South Koreans for they were deceived by North Koreans” (Q27) agreed that they found it difficult to trust people because they had been let down by their former colleagues and associates (37.4% answered “strongly agree” and 28% answered “agree”), whereas 21.7% of respondents disagreed. The weak positive correlation in Table 3 between “Hard to trust South Koreans for they were deceived by North Koreans” (Q27) and resettlement indicates that the more they distrust the

people and colleagues they associate with, the less well they adjust in South Korea. In an interview with one NKD, he told me that it was not easy for him to trust the advice of social workers and even his NKD colleagues. This type of attitude makes NKDs suspicious of those around them and is difficult for South Koreans to understand, because in general they are unaware of the difficulties that NKD face. In another interview, one Korean pastor stated that NKDs tend to rely on their own judgement rather than listening to the advice of social workers or experts in the field. Through a process of making errors, they gradually become alienated from South Korean society (Cho Yong-gwan 2004).

CONCLUSION

The results of this survey and interviews show that political socialisation and heavily monitored lives in North Korea can continue to have a significant influence on the lives of NKDs in South Korea. The impact of *Jucheism* was shown in Table 1 in the correlations between Questions 11, 12, 17 and 18 and resettlement. As mentioned on page 9, the strong negative relationship between the question “*Jucheism* influenced independence” (Q11) and resettlement indicates that the more NKDs thought self-reliance ideology (*Jucheism*) made them independent, the less able they were to adjust to South Korea. On the contrary, the more they realised that *Jucheism* gave them unjustified pride, the better they adjusted in South Korea; this was shown in the strong positive relationship between “*Jucheism* influenced unjustified pride” (Q12) and resettlement. This indicates that educating NKDs about the falsehood of *Jucheism* helped them to adjust in South Korea.

In addition, NKDs were deceived by the Kim’s regime. Though they were supposed to live, serve, and follow Kim Jong-il, they actually developed great distrust in the authority and regime. There was a strong negative relationship between the question “Deceived by Kim Jong-il, now do not trust authority” (Q18) and resettlement. This indicates that the more they were deceived by the Kims’ regime, the less they were generally able to adjust in South Korea.

There was a weak negative correlation in Table 1 between the question “Accustomed to follow the KWP party, now become passive and dependent” (Q17) and resettlement. The more they believed in following the KWP and the top leader (which made them passive and dependent), the less satisfied they tended to feel in their new surroundings in South Korea.

The impact of their lives being heavily monitored in North Korea was found to be significant, as seen in Table 3. There were negative correlations between all questions and resettlement. The correlation between the question “Monitored life made them judgemental” (Q24) and resettlement showed a strong negative relationship (see page 11): the more prone NKDs were to criticise and easily judge, the less able they generally were to adjust in South Korea. There were moderate negative relationships between “Critical/aggressive speech due to input in North Korea” (Q22), “Having a Manichean attitude” (Q23), “Regret sharing my stories in South Korea” (Q26) and “Becoming deceptive due to the North Korean regime” (Q28), and resettlement. Lying easily (living double lives), using critical and quarrelsome expressions, maintaining North Korean ways of living, and having a Manichean viewpoint impacted resettlement moderately negatively.

There were weak negative relationships found between “Avoidance of meetings due to monitored life in North Korea” (Q25) and “Hard to trust South Koreans for they were deceived by North Koreans” (Q27) and resettlement. This means that refusing to attend meetings and having distrust towards people and colleagues affected resettlement negatively to some degree.

Considering the difficulties and problems experienced by NKDs that have been outlined above, it is crucial to understand the negative effects of political socialisation, in particular *Jucheism* and heavily monitored lives. Measures should be taken to counteract these in order to facilitate the successful resettlement of NKDs in South Korea. Providing sufficient re-education to NKDs in order to address the negative effects of earlier political socialisation and heavily monitored lives is critical for successful resettlement. To extend the scope of this research, there is a need for longitudinal studies on how the influence of NKDs' political socialisation changes over time after arrival in South Korea. This will have great relevance in assisting the resettlement of future NKDs.

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APPENDIX: SURVEY FORM

1. What was your occupation in North Korea?
2. How old are you?
 - a. 10–20
 - b. 21–30
 - c. 31–40
 - d. 41–50
 - e. over 51
3. What level of education do you have?
 - a. Primary school
 - b. Secondary school
 - c. TAFE
 - d. University, MA, PhD
 - e. Other
4. How did you defect from North Korea?
 - a. With family
 - b. Alone
 - c. With friends
5. How long have you been in South Korea?
 - a. 0–2 years
 - b. 2–4 years
 - c. 4–6 years
 - d. Over 6 years
6. Do you currently have a job?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. I am a student
7. How long did you spend in other countries such as China, Mongolia, Thailand, or Vietnam before arriving in South Korea?
 - a. 0–1 year
 - b. 1–2 years
 - c. 2–3 years
 - d. 3–4 years
 - e. Over 4 years
8. Marital status in North Korea
 - a. Married
 - b. Unmarried
 - c. Married once but spouse is dead or missing or in North Korea
9. Gender
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
10. How does the education you received on *Jucheism* in North Korea affect you now?
 - a. Positively
 - b. Negatively
11. The *Jucheism* I was exposed to in North Korea has made my new life in South Korea become more independent and self-reliant
 - a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree
12. The *Jucheism* I was exposed to in North Korea has made me hold unjustified pride which is not helpful in South Korea.
 - a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree
13. Who do you think shows more self-reliance and is more nationalistic: South Koreans or North Koreans?
 - a. North Koreans
 - b. South Koreans
 - c. I don't know

14. I learnt about the superiority of the Korean race through *Minjok-jeiljuui* in North Korea, but I am angry when I am treated like other Asian workers in South Korea.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
15. I was taught that I must live for the sake of Kim Jong-il and protect him with my life. I found this meaningless so I have decided to live only for myself and my family in South Korea.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
16. I was taught that I must live for the sake of Kim Jong-il and protect him with my life. I found this meaningless so I have decided to live for South Korea and our local community in South Korea.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
17. As I was accustomed to following the commands of the KWP party and *suryeong* [the top leader] in North Korea (there was no choice to oppose in North Korea), I have become passive and dependent,
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
18. I had been deceived by North Korea's regime and Kim Jong-il for a long time, so I have decided not to believe in any authority or leader unless I am really convinced.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
19. The experience of following Kim Jong-il has helped me to accept religion in South Korea because it is similar to a religion.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
20. It is easy to believe in the Christian God if I replace Kim Jong-il with God.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
21. You were taught through heavily-monitored lives to hate the oppression of imperialists such as the USA and Japan, and the bourgeoisie, without compromising, and to fight against them. How does this affect your life in South Korea?
- It has given us the courage to resist and fight South Korean bosses who are too demanding
 - It does not affect us at all
 - I have a tendency to look at problems more critically than South Koreans
 - I get angry with South Koreans easily because they have abundance, while I have little
 - Other
22. As I was taught to feel hatred and antipathy towards our enemies from childhood, so my linguistic expressions in South Korea are more tough, critical and quarrelsome than those of South Koreans.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree
23. When I meet South Koreans, I tend to think of them as either enemies or friends, not neutral.
- I strongly agree
 - I agree
 - Neutral
 - I disagree
 - I strongly disagree

24. As I am accustomed to living a heavily-monitored life, and encouraged to criticise others, I have a tendency to judge other people and speak to them critically.
- a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree
25. As I used to live a heavily-monitored life and was encouraged to criticise others, I am reluctant to go to meetings/ seminars in South Korea.
- a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree
26. I share my real problems and issues openly with South Koreans, but they are reluctant to share with me and are secretive. I regret having shared openly as the other party did not choose to do so.
- a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree
27. As I was often deceived by my colleagues and associates in my heavily-monitored life in North Korea, it is hard for me to trust people.
- a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree
28. I was taught to act in the interests of the nation and the leader, according to the directions of the KWP and the top leader, but because I could not survive by doing only what the regime asked me to do, I also had to pursue my own interests in secret in order to survive.
- a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree
29. Are you satisfied with the progress of your settlement in South Korea?
- a. I strongly agree
 - b. I agree
 - c. Neutral
 - d. I disagree
 - e. I strongly disagree