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KNOWLEDGE AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

It is a well-known fact that translators from Sanskrit often provide their translation of the word *jñāna*, e.g. "knowledge", with a qualifying term, like true, higher, lower. We may imagine many reasons for this: one of them may be what the following brief paper intends to show, viz. that the word *jñāna* has shades of meaning which have not been recorded in the dictionaries most widely used: PW, pw, MonW, Apte.

Since the contexts in which the word *jñāna* appears are on the one hand very often rather complicated as far as the chain of reasoning is concerned, and on the other hand, lend themselves to re-interpretations and distortions, the starting-point for our investigation will have to be a case where an interpretation in accordance with the dictionaries just mentioned would result in absurdities. From this point of view the following text would seem fitting. Bhagavadgītā XIII,7-11: *amānitvam adambhitvam | ahimsā kṣāntir ārjavam | ācāryopāsanaṃ śaucam | sthairyam ātmavinigrahaḥ | indriyārtheṣu vairāgyam | anahaṅkāra eva ca | janma-mṛtyujarāvvyādhi-duḥkhadoṣānudarśanam | asaktir anabhiṣvaṅgaḥ | putradāra-grhādiṣu | nityaṃ ca samacittatvam | iṣṭāniṣṭopapattiṣu | mayi cā 'nanya-yogena | bhaktir avyabhicāriṇī | viviktadeśasevitvam | aratir janasaṃsadi | adhyātma-jñānanityatvam | tattvajñānārthadarśanam | etaj jñānam iti proktam | ajñānaṃ yad ato 'nyathā.*

It appears strange that e.g. *aratir janasaṃsadi* ("dislike for a crowd of people", Radhakrishnan)<sup>1</sup> — be it taken in isolation or in combination with the other moments — should deserve to be characterized as *jñāna* (interpreted as "knowledge", without any qualification<sup>2</sup>). Two alternatives seem plausible: either the twenty moments are consequences of *jñāna*, or they are conducive to *jñāna*. An investigation of a number of commentaries shows that many commentators choose the latter alternative. In doing this they apply a grammatical method which may have consequences

for the linguistic interpretation of the word.<sup>3</sup>

It might seem natural that we should turn to Śaṅkara in the first place, since he is rightly considered the most authoritative commentator. However, his way of commenting and using the text is too sophisticated and would bring us into problems having no bearing upon our immediate interest, which is more of a linguistic than of a philosophical kind. So we turn instead to Madhusūdana (ĀASS 45): *etad amānitvāditattvajñānārthadarśanāntaṃ viṃśatisaṃkhyākāṃ jñānam iti proktaṃ jñānārthatvāt*. The twenty moments are called *jñāna* because they have *jñāna* as their goal. Śrīdharaśvāmin (ĀASS 45) with a slight but significant variation: *etad amānitvam-adambhitvam-ityādīviṃśatisaṃkhyākāṃ yad uktam etaj jñānam iti proktaṃ jñānasādhanatvāt*. They are called *jñāna* because they are a means to knowledge. This brings us very near to the full-fledged technical analysis given by Rāmānuja (ed. Mahāvanaśāstrin, Bombay, saṃvat 1959): *jñāyate 'nenātmēti jñānam, ātmajñānasādhanam ity arthaḥ*. "Something, viz. *ātman*, is known through it. Therefore it is called *jñāna*. The meaning is: it is a means to the knowledge of *ātman*". So this is an instance of the well-known method of expressing a *kāraka*-analysis, in this particular case a *karaṇa-sādhanā* or *karaṇa-vyutpatti*.<sup>4</sup> If this is not merely a device invented by the grammarians and the commentators to justify various preconceived opinions of theirs, in other words if this method of interpreting reflects linguistically relevant facts, then the application of *karaṇa-vyutpatti* may well have consequences for the understanding of the word *jñāna* in other contexts, too. And since the dictionaries referred to above mention *jñāna* in the meaning of a *karaṇa* only for Kaṭh.Up. VI,10, where it is equivalent to *jñānendriya*, we will have to examine some other texts where we are likely to find similar uses of the word.

Now, it is a well-known fact that Pāṇini offers the following definition of the *kāraka karaṇa*: *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam* (I,4,42). Thus, when Rāmānuja interprets *jñānam*<sup>5</sup> as *jñāna-sādhanam*, this is probably to be understood as an indirect reference to the grammatical tradition, and I think we may allow ourselves likewise to look upon Śrīdharaśvāmin's *jñānam iti ... jñānasādhanatvāt* as a *karaṇa-vyutpatti*, in spite of the fact that he does not give the usual formula. If this conclusion is accepted, we may also surmise that Śaṅkara intends to intimate a *karaṇa-vyutpatti* when saying (ad stanza 7): ... *jñānasādhanagaṇam amānitvādi-*

*lakṣaṇam ... tam amānitvādigaṇaṃ jñānasāadhanatvāḥ jñānaśabdavācyaṃ vidadhāti bhagavān. (Ānandagiri: etaj jñānam iti vacanāt (see stanza 11) katham idaṃ jñānasāadhanam ity āśaṅkyāha - tam iti.)*

Since the compound *jñānasādhana* can serve the purpose of expressing a *karāṇa-vyutpatti* only when interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa*, one point has to be clarified. In those cases where *jñāna-sādhana*, interpreted as "means to knowledge", does not make any reasonable sense, an interpretation as a *karmadhāraya* will have to be considered: "means consisting in *jñāna*", or "*jñāna* as a means", and in such cases nothing at all is said about the *kāraka*-analysis of *jñāna*. The analysis may just as well be that of a *bhāva*. It goes without saying that such complications give scope to misinterpretations and even to quibbling on the part of inexact or biased commentators. A warning against confusion of the use of a word as *karāṇa* in a sentence (mostly expressed by case-form 3) and the interpretation of the same word as containing the *kāraka karāṇa* may not be out of place.

It may not be out of place, either, to stress that the fact that a word, say *jñāna*, is referred to by a word like *sādhana* or some synonymous expression, e.g. *upāya*, does not necessarily imply any *karāṇa*-analysis of *jñāna*. The following is an instructive instance. Rājānakaṛāmakavi does not seem to have understood *jñāna* as a *karāṇa* at *Bhagavad-gītā* XIII,11. He may quite well have had a *bhāva-vyutpatti* in mind, or else he has not been sensible of any problem at all here and has left the question of the exact analysis open. However, he says in his commentary on XIII,17 *jñānajñeyam* (so in his text!) the following: *jñāna-jñeyam jñānena yathāpratipāditasvarūpeṇopāyena jñeyam*. He says that *jñānajñeyam* means "to be known through the earlier (stanzas 7-11) characterized *jñāna* (serving) as an expedient".

Quite frequently the interpretation, not to mention the translation, of such technical niceties offers considerable difficulties. This is an instance, in which the commentator, Nārāyaṇa, adds to the difficulties by expressing himself elliptically. *Brahmavidyā-Up.*, 1 (ĀASS 29, p. 381): *brahmavidyāṃ pravakṣyāmi sarvajñānam anuttamam. Nārāyaṇa: brahma praṇavas tasya vidyā jñānam | tām | kimbhūtām | sarveṣāṃ jñānaṃ jñānopāyabhūtām praṇavena brahmani jñāte sarvasya vijñānāt*. He wants to say that *brahma* is *praṇava*, and that the compound is a *tatpuruṣa*. The feminine word *vidyā* is glossed by *jñānam*. Thus: knowledge of (about) *brah-*

ma or *praṇava*. The word *jñāna* is likely to be understood as a *bhāva*, since *vidyā* hardly lends itself to any other interpretation. Now, this knowledge is in the *mūla* said to be *sarva-jñānam*, interpreted by Nārāyaṇa as "a means to (all-)knowledge". Nārāyaṇa makes this perfectly clear by saying *jñāna-upāya-* immediately after (*sarveṣāṃ*) *jñānam*. However, by expressing himself too succinctly and wanting to gloss *sarva-jñānam* by using an adjectival expression that agrees with the feminine word *vidyā*, he has placed the reader in a rather awkward position: he is faced with the necessity of interpreting *jñāna-upāya-(bhūtām)* also as "knowledge as a means". A conclusion to be drawn from this would be, on the one hand that Nārāyaṇa does not seem to have been aware of the fatal ambiguity of the expression *jñāna-upāya-*, on the other, that an investigation which has for its object such commentaries as may be supposed to be relevant for linguistic conclusions, should perhaps leave out paraphrases of grammatical analyses and stick exclusively to strict analyses of this type: *jñaptir iti jñānam* for the *bhāva*-analysis, and *jñāyate 'nena* for the *karāṇa*-analysis<sup>6</sup>.

Bhagavadgītā XIII,12-16 contains a description of *jñeyam* (= *brahma*). This passage does not constitute any problem from our present point of view. However, the stanza that follows has caused the translators considerable trouble, Bhagavadgītā XIII,17: *jyotiṣāṃ api taj jyotis | tamasah param ucyate | jñānaṃ jñeyam jñānagamyam hṛdi sarvasya dhiṣṭhitam* (var.: *viṣṭhitam*). We cannot enter into any discussion of the various interpretations given by translators and commentators. We shall be mainly concerned with such interpretations of *jñāna* as presuppose a *karāṇa-vyutpatti*. No such interpretation is to be found in the translations of Radhakrishnan (knowledge), Zaehner ([true] knowledge), Garbe (Erkenntnis), etc. This is what Śaṅkara says: *jñānam amānitvādi*, and Ānandagiri fulfils: *jñānam amānitvādi karāṇavyutpattyeti śeṣaḥ*. Dhana-pati (Śrīmad-Bhagavadgītā, ed. Wāsudew Laxman Shāstrī Paṇṣīkar, Bombay 1912) is even more outspoken: *jñāyate 'neneti jñānam amānitvādi*. — As for *jñāna-gamyā*, Madhusūdana may be quoted: *jñānagamyam pūrvoktenāmānitvādinā tattvajñānārthadarśanāntena sādhanakalāpena jñānahetutayā jñānaśabditenā gamyam prāpyam na tu tad vinety arthaḥ*. Nīlakaṇṭha (Śrīmad-Bhagavadgītā, ed. Paṇṣīkar): *jñānagamyam iti | yatas taj jñānenāmānitvādinā jñānasādhanena gamyam prāpyam*. Rāmānuja: *tac ca jñānagamyam amānitvādhir uktaiḥ jñānasādhanaiḥ prāpyam ity arthaḥ*. The following translation which may quite well correspond to the intention of the

author or compiler of the text, would be the result of this: "That (viz. *brahma*), being the light even of the lights (viz. the sun, etc.), is said (in the Upaniṣads) to be beyond the darkness. (But) as means of knowledge, as object of knowledge and reachable through (this very) means of knowledge it resides in the heart of everybody." As for the material taken from the Upaniṣads, cf. Radhakrishnan and Zaehner. I think "beyond the darkness" was intended to connote "beyond *prakṛti*", and *-gamyā* and *hṛdi* ... *dhiṣṭhitam* obviously stand opposed to *param*.

The combination of *jñāna* and *jñeya* being very frequent in many kinds of texts, it is worth-while to examine another instance. Bhagavadgītā XVIII, 18: *jñānaṃ jñeyaṃ parijñātā | trividhā karmacodanā | karaṇaṃ karma kartēti | trividhaḥ karmasamgrahaḥ*. This stanza forms part of an extremely complicated context which would demand a much more detailed treatment than can be given to it here. Looked upon in isolation from the immediate context, the stanza seems to consist of two symmetrical halves. Śāṅkara makes the symmetry appear by giving a *karaṇa*-analysis of *jñāna* and *karaṇa*: *jñānaṃ jñāyate 'neneti* and *karaṇaṃ kriyate 'neneti bāhyaṃ śrotṛādi antasthaṃ buddhyādi*. As for *karman*, interpreted as "object", he gives the analysis we know from the grammarians: *karmepsitatamaṃ kartuḥ kriyayā vyāpṛyamānam*<sup>7</sup>, which corresponds to *jñeyaṃ jñātavyam*. For *kartṛ* and *parijñātṛ* no special analysis is required.

It may be of some interest to try to find out whether there is a more profound reason why Śāṅkara offers this analysis of *jñāna*. For it is not sure that symmetry alone was decisive. In any case it was not possible to maintain any symmetry with regard to the immediately following stanza, XVIII, 19: *jñānaṃ karma ca kartā ca tridhaiva guṇabhedataḥ | procyate guṇasamkhyāne ...*, where Śāṅkara does not stick to the technical interpretation of *karman*, but declares: *karma kriyā, na kāraṇaṃ pāribhāṣikam īpsitatamaṃ karma* (Ānandagiri: *kartur āpsitatamaṃ karmeti yat pāribhāṣyate tan nātra karmavācyam ity āha - neti*.) Now Śāṅkara may be within his rights here, because it may well be a completely new point of view that is brought about in this stanza (*guṇasamkhyāne*, acc. to Śāṅkara: *kāpīle śāstre*). However, we will have to consider whether Śāṅkara sticks to his *karaṇa*-analysis of *jñāna* also in stanzas 19, 21, and 22, not to speak of the utterly problematic stanza 20. Space does not permit a detailed examination, but this much may be said about the general line of reasoning: the matter in question is three kinds of *jñāna*, classified with regard to

the connection with the three *guṇas*. From Śāṅkara's point of view (also from that of the Bhagavadgītā, if a decisive point of view that could be characterized as its own may be taken for granted in a compilation of this kind) all talk of any identity between *brahman* : *ātman* on the one hand and any *jñāna* that is connected with *prakṛti* ought to be out of question.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, it would seem natural that Śāṅkara regards *jñāna*, as it appears in this context, as a means, alternatively as "lower" knowledge, and that he finds it convenient to suggest this by giving a *karāṇa*-analysis of the word in stanza no. 18, which may be regarded as an introductory stanza. But it is a part of Śāṅkara's tactics not to commit himself to any claim of complete consistency. Therefore he does not offer any explicit analysis at all of *jñāna* in st. 19 and 22, a fact which — for st. 19 at least — may be supposed to imply that the analysis given in st. 18 continues to be valid; in stanza 21 he confines himself to rejecting *karṣṇva* (in the sentence, obviously: *jñānasya karṣṇvā-sambhavād yena jñānena vettīty arthaḥ*; Madhusūdana likewise: *yena jñānena vettīti vaktavye yaj jñānaṃ vettīti karāṇe karṣṇvopacārād edhāṃsi pacantītivat*). In st. 20, finally, where *sāttvikam jñānam* is treated, an explicit *karāṇa*-analysis would, perhaps, bring the commentator into difficulties. For there — oddly enough, since we are dealing with the plane of *prakṛti* — we find a formulation which may easily be interpreted as suggesting an identification with *brahman* : *taj jñānam advaitātmadarśanam sāttvikam samyagdarśanam*. If this is in fact so, the word *jñāna* could not easily permit a *karāṇa*-analysis here. In a long and detailed exposition dealing with the words *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma* of Taitt. Up. II,1 (ĀASS 12, p. 47 ff.) the commentary, ascribed to Śāṅkara, says that the word *jñāna*, when it is an attribute of *brahma*, cannot be analysed as expressing any *kāraka*, since that would imply modification. The word *jñāna* has to be understood as a *bhāva*. The following short quotation will show the line of reasoning: *jñānam jñaptir avabodho, bhāva-sādhano jñānaśabdo brahmaniśeṣaṇatvāt satyānantābhyām saha | na hi satyātānantatā ca jñānakarṣṇve saty upapadyate | jñānakarṣṇvena hi vikriyamāṇam katham satyaṃ bhaved anantaṃ ca. Ānandagiri clarifies: bhāvasādhana iti | bhāvavyutpattikaḥ | kriyāsāmānyam yady apy anyatra bhāva ucyate tathāpy atra nirviśeṣam cinmātram bhāvavyutpattiyā lakṣyate satyādiśabdasaṃnidhānād iti draṣṭavyam.*

These observations will have shown at least two matters of importance

for further investigations. First, that Śāṅkara handles language and texts with a great deal of licence when imposing upon them his philosophical predilections. He abstains from analysing the word *jñāna* when an explicit grammatical analysis would draw attention to some difficulty; he avoids clarifying the difference between *jñāna* as *karṭṛ* in a sentence and the same word as *karṭṛ-vyutpattika*. All this means that Śāṅkara's commentaries should be treated with particular caution when problems of a lexicographical character are concerned.<sup>9</sup> — The second matter of importance is the question as to whether the methods invented by the commentators and grammarians are in fact an adequate instrument for the interpretation of old texts. It is to be feared that the method itself forces upon the text a precision which it does not really possess.

In addition to the instances treated I shall quote a couple of contexts from various texts in support of the thesis I am advocating. It should be noted, to begin with, that the *karaṇa*-analysis of *jñāna* which in Kaṭh.Up. VI,10 results in the interpretation *jñāna* = *jñānendriya* (PW, pw, MonW) is not at all unusual in the commentaries. Some instances: Śvet.Up. V,2, Nārāyaṇa (ĀASS 17:2): *jñānair bibharti* = *jñānair, jñāyate ebhir iti jñānānīndriyāṇi, taiḥ*; Bhagavadgītā XVIII,18, Rājānakarāmakavi (ĀASS 112): *jñānam, yena jñāyate tad indriyādi*. A somewhat different meaning is arrived at by the same analysis in the following instances. Muṇḍ.Up. III,8, Ānandagiri (ĀASS 9): *jñānaprasādeneti | atra jñāyate 'rtho 'neneti vyutpattyā buddhir ucyate*<sup>10</sup>; Bhagavadgītā XVIII,18, Hanumān (ĀASS 44): *jñāyate 'neneti jñānaṃ prakāśanam*. (It should be noted that Hanumān interprets *karaṇam*, which is parallel to *jñānam* in the text, as *śrotrādibuddhīndriyaṃ vāgādīkarmendriyaṃ ca*. It is natural that he did not want to ascribe the same meaning to *jñāna*.)

The expression *vivekajñāna* in Vyāsa's bhāṣya ad Yogasūtra 2,52 (ĀASS 47) is commented on as follows by Vācaspatimīśra: *jñāyate 'neneti jñānaṃ buddhisattvapra-kāśo, vivekasya jñānaṃ vivekajñānam*. From this we learn that *jñānam* is a means to knowledge, identified with the (intellectual) light that appertains to the *guṇa sattva* that constitutes *buddhi*. The expression *vivekajñānam* is interpreted as a *tatpuruṣa*, implying that *viveka* is the result of (the activity exercised by means of) *jñāna*. The alternative would be an interpretation as a *karmadhāraya*, which would imply identity of *viveka* and *jñāna*. Such an interpretation, which would no doubt lead to fatal consequences for the correct understanding of

Vyāsa's line of reasoning, is rejected in this way by Vācaspati.<sup>11</sup>

Our last instance is taken from Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on Spandakārikā 2,2 (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, VI, p. 59). Here we find two alternative (*va*) interpretations of one and the same word *jñāna*, one of them *karaṇa-vyutpatti*: *jñāyate 'neneti jñānaṃ bāhyābhyantarāṃ karaṇacakraṃ*; the second implies a *bhāva-vyutpatti* and reads: (*jñānaṃ*) *grahaṇāt-makam jñaptimātram*. This is the context: *Mūla: jñānajñeyasvarūpiṇyā śaktyā paramayā yutaḥ | padadvaye vibhur bhāti tadanyatra tu cimmayaḥ*.

Comm.: ... *kidṛśyā śaktyā? jñānajñeyasvarūpiṇyā, jñāyate 'nena iti jñānaṃ, bāhyābhyantarāṃ karaṇacakraṃ, grahaṇāt-makam, śabdādi sukhādi ca viśayajātam anantaviśeṣam, tad eva rūpaṃ vidyate yasyāḥ, sā tathā, tayā*.

The long and detailed explanation that follows upon this quotation does not, unfortunately, permit any conclusion as to whether both alternatives were intended to be valid at the same time. The truth may quite well be that Rāmakaṇṭha did not dare to be positive in one or the other direction just because the *mūla* did not possess the precision that is presupposed by the method he used. If this is indicative of a general dilemma in interpreting the word *jñāna* in the contexts, we will have to take the difficulty into account also when dealing with linguistic and lexicographical problems. Therefore, the utmost caution must be observed when the following preliminary conclusions are presented.

It is obvious from the material adduced that the word *jñāna* is capable of a greater variety of interpretations than the dictionaries lead us to believe. Thus, it appears in contexts which make it natural, or possible, for commentators to interpret it as "means to knowledge". A comparison with the word *pramāṇa* is instructive. Whereas in contexts of philosophical rigorousness the word *pramāṇa* is mostly<sup>12</sup> interpreted as "a means of acquiring *pramā*" (MonW), *pramā-karaṇam pramāṇam* (Tarkabhāṣā), the word *jñāna* cannot be interpreted as *\*jñā-karaṇa*, because a word *\*jñā* does not exist. So *jñāna* answers not only to *pramā* but also to *pramāṇa* (*pramā-karaṇa*), and *jñāna-sādhana* is used when an accurate correspondence to *pramāṇa* is required.<sup>13</sup>

If we consider this lack of precision in the word *jñāna* — a key-word in Indian culture like *brahman*, *sat*, *nirvāṇa*, etc. — from the point of view of the history of Indian ideas and see it in a very broad perspective, it is not easy to tell whether it is a drawback or not. This much is



certain: that it constitutes a crux to the translators into other languages which do not share this cultural background. One single example will illustrate our dilemma. Aṣṭāvakra-gītā 2,15: *jñānaṃ jñeyaṃ tathā jñātā tritayaṃ nāsti vāstavaṃ*.<sup>14</sup> Irrespective of how we choose to interpret *jñānaṃ*, as a *bhāva* or as a *karṇa*, we will get into difficulties. If we choose both we will face the paradoxical situation that what is called a *tritaya* is in reality a *catuṣka* in that *jñānaṃ* stands for *jñānaṃ* and *jñānasādhanam*. As a matter of fact this may quite well be the truth, for if we turn to chapter 20 (20. Gesang) we find the following which may be taken as a parallel: *kva sādhyam kva ca sādhanam | kva sādhaḥ kva siddhir vā | ... || kva pramātā pramāṇam vā kva prameyam kva ca pramā*.

Thus we arrive at this pattern:

<i>jñāna</i>	<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>sādhana</i>
<i>jñāna</i>	<i>pramā</i>	<i>siddhi</i>
<i>jñātṛ</i>	<i>pramātṛ</i>	<i>sādhaḥ</i>
<i>jñeya</i>	<i>prameya</i>	<i>sādhyā</i>

The observations made in this paper will have shown the importance of the study of the interdependence of the linguistic material and the arsenal of hermeneutic expedients which were at the disposal of Indian speculation in the course of a long history. The formation of such patterns as those treated above, their motivation philosophically and linguistically, their use in different contexts, their influence upon thought or, at least, upon how a thought is communicated — these are some of the problems that present themselves. The implications of the method *kāraka-vyutpatti* and *bhāva-vyutpatti*,<sup>15</sup> as well as of the methods of dissolving compounds, should be paid attention to, not only because they are of importance for the understanding of the texts but also because a theoretically well-founded method of translating Sanskrit into modern European languages should be aimed at.<sup>16</sup>

#### N o t e s

<sup>1</sup> Radhakrishnan = The Bhagavadgītā. With an introductory essay, Sanskrit text, English translation and notes. By S. Radhakrishnan. London. (First published in 1948.) — Zaehner = The Bhagavad-gītā. With a commentary based on the original sources, by R. C. Zaehner. Oxford 1969. — Garbe = Die Bhagavadgītā. Aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt ... von Richard Garbe. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig 1921.

- <sup>2</sup>Radhakrishnan says "(true) knowledge" in order to avoid the difficulty. Zaehner says in his commentary on XIII,6 "... (whereas) the 'knowledge' or 'wisdom' of 7-11 is simply a list of virtues and clearly is not at all what is meant by 'wisdom' in the rest of the Gītā, that is a direct intuition of eternal Being". I have to add here, in order to preclude every possibility of misunderstanding, that I agree to a certain extent with Zaehner as to the interpretation of *adhyātma-jñāna-nītyatvam* "constant attention to the knowledge of what appertains to self". As for *tattvajñānārthadarśanam* (Zaehner: "to see where knowledge of reality must lead") I would rather interpret *tattvajñāna* as the opposite of *mithyājñāna* and for a parallel I refer to Nyāyasūtra 1 and 2.
- <sup>3</sup>None, in fact, choose the former alternative. We are not going to consider such poetical interpretations as the one presented by Rājānakarāmakavi (ĀASS 122) who compares *jñāna* to a tree, of which the different moments constitute the branches. No interpretations of this or any similar kind will be of any interest in this connection. Only those which refer to a strictly grammatical analysis or which evidently presuppose such an analysis will be taken into account. Otherwise the investigation would no doubt run the risk of being filled with subjective considerations of no stringency whatsoever.
- <sup>4</sup>Since the word *sādhana* is used in other meanings in this paper, we will stick to the term *vyutpatti* in order to avoid misunderstanding.
- <sup>5</sup>The Sanskrit terms will be quoted in extenso when their contextual form is of importance for the interpretation, otherwise the usual practice is followed.
- <sup>6</sup>Stray *kartr-*, *karma-* and *adhikaraṇa-*analyses cannot be discussed in this paper. — Readers who are not familiar with the methods of the commentaries are referred to the Kātantra for comparison: II,4,12 *yena kriyate tat karaṇam*, II,4,13 *yat kriyate tat karma*, II,4,14 *yaḥ karoti sa kartā*.
- <sup>7</sup>Cf. the Kāśikā I,4,49.
- <sup>8</sup>Cf. Bhagavadgītā XIV,6: *tatra sattvaṃ nirmalatvāt prakāśakam anāmayam | sukhasaṅgena badhnāti jñānasāṅgena cānagha*. Śāṅkara: ... *tathā jñānasāṅgena ca | jñānam iti sukhasāhacaryāt kṣetrasyaivāntaḥkaraṇasya dharmo nātmanah | ātmadharmatve saṅgānupapatter bandhānupapatteś ca*. Ānandagiri: *jñāyate 'neneti sattvapariṇāmo jñānam ...* This kind of *jñāna* cannot be an attribute of *ātman*. It is a modification of *sattva* and the word is grammatically interpreted as a means by Ānandagiri. Śāṅkara himself does not go that far.
- <sup>9</sup>The same thing is likely to be true of other commentators who have strong predilections of their own. Since commentaries play an important part in the lexicographical work that is being done in Pāli, this problem should be paid attention to there as well.
- <sup>10</sup>It may be noted that, acc. to Nyāya, *buddhi* is "content" (contenuto di uno stadio della coscienza, Suali, Storia della filosofia indiana, p. 272), whereas in Sāṅkhya it can, of course, be interpreted as "instrument".
- <sup>11</sup>Woods does not bring out Vācaspati's intention by his translation, which is literal and in fact nonsensical: "Discriminative thinking is the thinking of discrimination", (The Yoga-system of Patañjali. Harvard Or. Ser., Vol. 17, p. 196). Generally speaking, literal translations of the devices of the Indian *ars interpretandi* are bound to

result in nonsense. It is a well-known fact that literal translations of highly technical texts were produced on a large scale by the Tibetans. For the problems connected with this activity, see Nils Simonsson, *Indo-tibetische Studien. Die Methoden der tibetischen Übersetzer, untersucht im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung ihrer Übersetzungen für die Sanskritphilologie*, Uppsala 1957. Especially pp. 238-280. As is well-known to the readers of the present volume, Pentti Aalto has enhanced our knowledge of the corresponding problems in the Mongolian translations from Tibetan and Sanskrit in a series of beautiful works.

- <sup>12</sup> For an instance of *bhāva-sādhana* see Th. Stcherbatsky, *Erkenntnistheorie und Logik nach der Lehre der späteren Buddhisten*, München-Neuberg, 1924, p. 102 and note 162.
- <sup>13</sup> The expression *jñāna-sādhana* is, of course, preferred to *jñāna-karaṇa*, since this has the well established meaning of *jñānendriya*.
- <sup>14</sup> *Die Aṣṭāvakra-gītā*, Bearbeitet und übersetzt von Richard Hauschild. Berlin 1967. (Abh. d. Sächs. Ak. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig. Phil.-hist. Kl., Band 58, Heft 2). From the point of view taken in this paper Hauschild's translations of the contexts to be treated cannot be accepted.
- <sup>15</sup> In addition to the instances given in this paper, I wish to draw attention to Pāṇini IV,3,95: (*so 'sya*) *bhaktiḥ*. The Kāśikā offers a *karmavyutpatti* which fits the context: *bhajyate sevate iti bhaktiḥ*. None of the lexicographers referred to in this paper have taken this into account, even though Böhtlingk himself translates the *sūtra* in accordance with this analysis, or so it seems: "dies ist der Gegenstand seiner Zuneigung oder Verehrung". Candragomin, however, may have taken offense at this analysis and changes the *sūtra* into *tatra (asya) bhaktiḥ* (III,3,63), thus making a *bhāva*-analysis the only conceivable one. (*māhārāje bhaktir asya, māhārājikaḥ*.) The question as to the linguistic authority of Pāṇini, Vāmana and Jayāditya on the one hand, opting for a rather unusual interpretation, as against Candragomin on the other, who offers what we are inclined to expect, is intriguing but can only be raised here. In order to avoid misunderstanding I should add that if we suppose Pāṇini to have used an abstract noun more or less as we do saying e.g. "she is his true love", then this would hardly be of less interest from a linguistic point of view.
- <sup>16</sup> Space does not allow any detailed illustration of this general statement. The following hint will suffice for the time being. The fact that Sanskrit does not possess any epexegetical genitive, whereas in European languages the genitive is quite often of that character (e.g. "the land of Sweden") is constantly a cause of confusion in translations. Cf. above, note 11. — Most of the problems discussed or mentioned in this paper are being studied in a long-term project at the department of Sanskrit of the University of Uppsala by a team whose concern is the technique of the Indian commentators. My thanks are due to the other members of the group, viz. Gunilla Gren-Eklund, Uppsala, Poul Skrap, Copenhagen, and Eivind Kahrs, Oslo, for their keen observations and encouraging interest.

