I. Introduction

1. THE AIM

The aim of the present study is to analyze the conceptions of preference and choice in the Confucian Analects. The purpose is to see what types of choices are made and what kinds of things are preferred.

In addition, during the analysis, the relationship between Confucian thinking on the questions of preference and choice and the corresponding thinking in contemporary Western ethical theories will be discussed. The aim of this is to see whether the Confucian Analects reveal any new issues of moral choice which have not been worked out in the Western literature of moral theory. In this way the study hopes to make a contribution to the formation of a more profound theory of preference and choice and to enrich our general conception of moral choice and the debate within the field of philosophy.

Our Western discussion about moral philosophy uses examples and issues found also in the ancient Greek or Roman tradition to stimulate thinking. For example Hare uses the story about Odysseys asking his men to tie him to the mast so that he can listen to the sirens and his preferences: 'Although Odysseys will then prefer that his sailors should set him free, he does not now prefer overall that they then should.' (HARE 1985: 82.) The present study aims to elucidate the issues of the Chinese moral tradition. Some of these issues may be different from ours, but perhaps not less important.

The question about choice in the Confucian Analects seems to have arisen when Herbert Fingarette wrote his book *Confucius – the Secular as Sacred* (1972). Fingarette's opinion is that a genuine choice among real alternatives never occurred to Confucius, 'or at least never clearly occurred to him as a fundamental moral task'. Fingarette takes passages 12:10, 21 and 13:18 of the Confucian Analects, which are interesting about choice, and tries to show that these do not represent a real choice.

One can see that Fingarette's frame of reference is moral philosophy of the analytic tradition. However, he neglects to note which works he has used and refers to. Nevertheless, his book caused discussion among those who are interested in Confucian moral theory, especially in the West.

In the *Philosophy East and West*, Henry Rosemont and Charles Wei-hsun Fu discuss the points raised by Fingarette. Benjamin Schwartz in his *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (1985) often refers to Fingarette's book and maintains an opposing position concerning Confucius and choice, for example in p. 79: 'In Fingarette we find no allusion to such inner states of perplexity or dilemmas involved in the choice of lesser evils. Confucius and his disciples constantly confront choices.'

The discussion of moral choice in the Confucian Analects leaves most of the issues of moral choice discussed within the Western analytic tradition untouched.

Confucius' thinking has been very influential in China for over 2000 years. During this time every new generation in China has re-examined his thinking according to the requirements of the time. At different times replies to different questions from Confucius' thinking have been sought. This has also been done in the West during the last two centuries.

This study will present the basic principles of Confucian thinking from the point of view of preference and choice and other moral principles which are necessary for the existence of preference and choice, such as voluntarism and pluralism.

The area of research is limited in terms of both source and topics. The only source is the Confucian Analects. This is the earliest and most reliable source of early Confucianism. The second limitation is that only such preferences and choices are discussed which relate directly to morality and especially to moral principles. We realize that concentrating only on the moral area imposes strict limitations, and secondly that any preference and choice may indirectly have some moral significance.

2. THE APPROACH

In this study we take the main facts of moral choice as topics of the different chapters. The first chapters are basic. In these we try to work out what kind of foundation preference and choice have in the Confucian thinking in the Analects. After this we examine some of the other main issues of preference and choice.

In each chapter we introduce the main points of each topic or issue as it is generally defined in the modern literature on ethical theory. Some of the issues are generally agreed upon, such as what is utilitarianism and what is meant by a moral dilemma. Even in these topics there are specialists who have developed them in their works, and we have utilized these works in this study.

After introducing the topic we attempt to discover what the Confucian Analects say about it. We do not try to 'prove' that the Confucian Analects have for example a pluralistic or a monistic philosophy. We only try to discover to what extent the Analects reflect these views and where the balance lies, and what are the possible special characteristics of the views. Sometimes the Analects have clear sayings about the topic in question and sometimes there are more indirect sayings or narrations which have a certain moral conception in the background. In this research we will discover which facts are ignored in the Analects and which are discussed in greater detail. In addition we will see whether the Analects contain any views which are ignored by the modern writers. This allows us to recognize and identify the special Confucian characteristics.

The approach used here is not a listing of topics, but rather aims to form a Confucian conception of the main topic in question. In this way we will work out what is the Confucian brand or special characteristic of every main topic.

Sometimes we have to examine the same passages in different contexts: for example, the story about Upright Kung is discussed in connection with both dirty hands and

dilemma situations. In this way one and the same passage may be related to several questions in moral theory. At the end there is an attempt to form a synthesis of preference and choice in the Confucian Analects.

In the approach, we should also pay some attention to the authenticity of the Confucian Analects. Certain parts of the text are more reliable than others as a source of the genuine ideas and opinions of Confucius. In the approach we must also have a method of handling the Chinese concepts. We cannot assume that the concepts have similar meanings to the Western ones. We cannot expect to find a concept which would be close to 'dilemma' or 'pluralism'. However, we will try to find the Confucian idea which according to the text of the Analects relates closely to the concepts which we use when we speak about moral choice and preference. To be more precise and accurate, we will give the Chinese characters for the essential concepts which are used in the Analects.

This study has also a methodological aim. This aim is to create a system by which it is possible draw conclusions on moral theory from an old source, where the thinking is not expressed in a systematic fashion, but has a systematic structure behind it (SCHWARTZ 1985: 61–62). The method will make it possible to find this underlying systematic structure of moral theory and principles.

3. THE PRIMARY SOURCE

The earliest, most important and most reliable source of early Confucianism is the Analects, *Lun yü* 論語, or collection of sayings of Confucius (551–479 BC). It also includes some sayings of Confucius' disciples, discussions between Confucius and his disciples, and some short narratives. Sometimes the way of presentation is more or less 'poetic' because of ambiguity which may be included there on purpose. Consequently two different interpretations could both be correct. (WANG T'ieh 1989: 60; YANG Pe-chün 1965: 1–2; WALEY 1964: 21; SCHWARTZ 1985: 61–62.)

It was compiled by Confucius' disciples and partly also by their students. The final compilation of the work was undertaken at the end of Ch'un Ch'iu or at the beginning of the Warring States period. Yang draws his conclusion concerning the date of compilation of the work on the basis of the terminology used in the Analects. The usage of the term as a second person pronoun in AN. 17:7 refers to the beginning of the Warring States period. (YANG Pe-chün 1965: 3–4; LEGGE 1969: 321.)

Waley notes the existence of differing versions of Lun yü:

> During the period 100 BC to AD 100 two versions were currently used, the Lu version (upon which our modern version is chiefly based) and the Ch'i version, which had two extra chapters. Much later (second century AD) a third version came into general use. This was the Ku Wen (ancient script) text collated by Cheng Hsüan when he made his famous edition, of which fragments have been recovered from Tun-huang. We know some twenty-seven instances in which the Ku version differed from the Lu, and in all but two of these instances the version we use today follows Ku not Lu. (WALEY 1964: 24)

The Ch'i version is now lost, although some fragments are left. 'The *Hsin-lun* of Huan T'an (c. AD 1) says that Ku had four hundred characters different from Lu.' (WALEY

1964: 24; cf. NYLAN 1994: 83–145; VAN ESS 1994: 146-171.) Cheng Hsüan's version is lost. In Sinkiang in 1969 a partial copy of it was found which had been made by a twelve-year-old schoolboy in 710 AD (LAU 1979: 221).

It has been suggested that books 16 to 20 are of later date than the rest of the work. These last five books have certain common characteristics which distinguish them from the rest of the work. Nevertheless, they still contain some of the genuine Confucian tradition of Confucius' disciples and of Confucius himself. But books 10 to 20 have been regarded as less genuine than books 1 to 9. Dawson says:

> It looks as if Books 3–9 (out of a total of twenty books) may form the oldest stratum, but even they may contain later insertions; and although they have a clearer ring of authenticity, it is impossible to vouch for the genuineness of any of the sayings included in them. (DAWSON 1981: 5–6.)[1]

Lau finds some principle of organization in the Analects. He discusses the saying of the disciples and concludes:

> We can roughly divide the *Lun yü* into three strata. The first stratum consists of the books well ordered and in which no sayings of disciples are included. The next consists of Book I (and possibly Book II) and Book VIII. Although these books show a lack of internal organization of the chapters and contain sayings of disciples, they, nevertheless, do not use 'K'ung Tzu' for Confucius. Finally, there is the stratum consisting of Book X and the last five chapters. These are all interlinked through a number of features and are likely to be much later in date than the bulk of the work. (LAU 1979: 232.)

Waley suggests: 'I should hazard the guess that books III–IX represent the oldest stratum. Books X and XX (first part) certainly have no intrinsic connection with the rest.' (WALEY 1964: 21. See also Hamburger 1959: 338)

The present author has found some features from the Analects to supplement Lau's findings, summarized in the work NIKKILÄ 1992. The main points of those findings are that there is a pattern of presentation of thoughts starting from general principles in books 1, 2 and 4 continuing towards more special cases of named persons in Book 5 and part of Book 6, reaching finally the most special case in Book 7, that of Confucius himself. Book 3, which appears to be very different, discussing rites, sacrifice, temple etc., does not follow this pattern. Possibly it has been put in between the other books regardless of the original pattern of presentation.

In addition, there are other ways of presentation as well, such as the strict arrangement of chapters into groups of four in Book 2 according to a common idea, topic or catchword. Various patterns in the arrangement of the material can also be seen. For example, the handling of something negative in Book 3; dual patterns, like two opposite ethical or other concepts and simultaneously mentioning something negative in Book 4, dual patterns and defect; both patterns simultaneously in Book 13. The theme of negative

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[1] The usage of the name K'ung Tzu is not uniform within books 16 to 20. In other books Confucius has been referred to as Tzu 子 and if he is speaking with a high official he is referred to as K'ung Tzu 孔子. During the Warring States period Fu tzu 夫子 was used when addressing a person spoken to. This has been used in AN. 17:3, 17:7, 19:17. The last five books in addition have numbered sets and apocryphal stories and references to historical personages. (LAU 1979: 222–227; CH'IEN Mu 1978: 12–13; WALEY 1964: 11, 21; LEGGE 1969: 16.)

expressions is continued in Book 14, but not the dual pattern, which is continued in Book 15. Book 15 also includes negative expressions in most of the chapters. Book 16 has numbered categories. Book 17 has some listings and a dual characteristic. Book 18 has a common theme of movement from somewhere, and Book 19 the principle of joining. Certain chapters in all books are exceptions and do not follow these themes. (NIKKILÄ 1992: 11–12.)

> It seems first that the Confucian Analects has at least some underlying organization, possibly recognized by some of the compilers. Some of them may have sandwiched sayings in between and in this way made the organization more unclear. Secondly, it is apparent that the text has a comparatively reliable part which represents genuine early Confucian tradition... The internal organization of the text, which is quite clear in some parts of the Analects, helps one to look critically at some passages which clearly deviate from their contextual environment. However, even these cases, although more doubtful as possible later additions, could be as genuine as the rest of the text, since a later addition of an old passage does not make the passage new, only the act of addition is of later date. In all, the Confucian Analects is a remarkably reliable literary source of early Confucianism and early human thought in general. (NIKKILÄ 1992: 12.)

4. THE LITERATURE USED

The literature on moral theory which discusses moral dilemmas and choice is continuously expanding. Some examples of these works below: Christopher W. Gowans (ed.), *Moral Dilemmas* (1987); Allan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. A Theory of Normative Judgement.* (1992); R. M. Hare, *Moral Thinking. Its Levels, Method and Point.* (1991); John Kekes, *Moral Tradition and Individuality* (1989); Michael Stocker, *Plural and Conflicting Values* (1990), and Meir Dan-Cohen's article *Conceptions of choice and conceptions of autonomy* (1992).

Although there are numerous articles about Confucianism and its relations to modern society, its relations to modern moral theories have been discussed very little until now. An article written by Wang Kai-fu, *Lun ju chia ti tao te wan tse chi ch'i ji chu* 王開府, 論儒家的道德原則及其礎 handles this topic briefly and uses an approach similar to the one used in the present study, but it does not develop the ideas in any depth. Also its references to moral theories remain rather sketchy, and it does not reveal the many-sidedness of Confucian thinking nor the possible Confucian contributions to modern theories.

5. PREFERENCE IN A GENERAL SENSE

Before going into Confucian philosophy, it is necessary to briefly introduce the main lines of thinking on preference and choice.

Dan-Cohen defines preferences as 'comparative evaluative attitudes which permit the agent to rank various options in terms of their relative desirability.' The valuation that issues from these comparative attitudes is necessarily relative. (DAN-COHEN 1992: 222–223.)

According to Braybrooke, preference is putting one thing ahead of another. 'What one prefers is what one would rather do, or rather have'. This does not mean that a thing which is preferred is also desired, because the choice may be forced. 'A girl prefers to marry a given man rather than his rival; she may not desire to marry at all.' (BRAYBROOKE 1968: 93, 94.) Consistently with this we can say that preference is only 'a relation between propositions,' or 'a relation between sentences which express those propositions.' (JEFFREY 1974: 377.)

According to Gauthier preference belongs to one of the three dogmas which modern moral theory takes over from economics: utility, which is a measure of subjective and individual preference; rationality, in which the rational individual 'will maximize the extent to which his objective is achieved'; and the third dogma 'that interests are non-tuistic: interacting persons do not take an interest in one another's interests.' (GAUTHIER 1990: 11. See also SAGOFF 1986: 303.)

Rationality in preference means that 'A rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully executed' In order to be able to rank the options the person 'must be able to compare the possible outcomes in any situation to determine that which he prefers to the others.' (GAUTHIER 1990: 12, 214.)

Preference relates to reasons. According to Gibbard, when we have most reason to do something, then we do it. The alternative in preference is regarded as rational because it is supported by the 'preponderance of reasons'. According to the Humean conception of reasons, 'the reasons are settled by desires or preferences'. According to this, if it is going to rain, one may have a reason of preferring keeping dry to getting wet. Taking an umbrella would satisfy this preference. This satisfaction makes the preference of keeping dry a reason. (GIBBARD 1992: 160.)

In this study we examine those preferences which are related to norms and morality in Confucius' thinking. We have chapters on disciples and preference of regions, but these are included because they, too, illuminate Confucius' moral preferences.

Hodgson says that morality belongs to the realm of value and not to the realm of facts. Consequently, morality is not 'regarded as concerning facts or matters to which the concepts of truth and falsity are applicable.' It does not belong to the domain of reason, which relates to facts. It belongs to the domain of emotion or preference 'in which each individual can make a choice.' However, Hodgson regards emotion or preference as rational: 'Generally, I contend that emotion, while it can be irrational, is a part of rationality; so that the involvement of emotion in value judgements does not make them non-rational.' (HODGSON 1991: 448–449; MACKIE 1990: 134.)

Hodgson emphasizes that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' (HODGSON 1991: 448). However, this question has been a continuous topic in discussions of value theory, but no unanimous agreement has yet been reached. (BUTCHVAROV 1989: 47; ALLEN 1988: 153; JOHNSON 1991: 147–160; MACINTYRE 1992: 57–60.)

This study will also clarify to what extent Confucius followed this emotional or sentimental view of ethics, especially in relation to his conception of preference and choice.

6. CHOICE IN A GENERAL SENSE

Preference leads the agent to choose what he prefers. Choices thus depend on one's preferences. Nozick says about the theories of choice: they

> assume that a choice among actions is to be dependent upon a person's preferences and indifferences among the outcomes of these actions. (NOZICK 1990: 313.)

> Choice is intimately related to belief. With respect to any choice, there will be certain propositions such that nobody can make that choice unless he believes that they are possibly true: if he believes that they are false, he cannot make it. (DONAGAN 1987: 90)

These propositions are that the situation must be such that one is able to bring about an event one wants to choose and one must be able to control one's bodily and mental functions.

'Sartre assigns a central place to the thought that in his actions a man expresses that fundamental project in choosing which he chooses himself.' According to Kant 'the maxims under which a man's actions are determined are grounded in an ultimate disposition which is itself chosen.' (BALDWIN 1980: 31.)

According to Aristotle, choice

> is a power exclusive to humankind which, when exercised, leads to action of a specifically human sort. To act from choice is to act in the way proper to man. (DENT & BENSON 1976: 153.)

The ideal type of choice requires a choice-set. This set has two or more options among which the agent can choose. The agent ranks the options in the choice set according to his preferences and picks the leading option. The agent cannot determine the contents of the choice-set. If this were possible, then the real choice-set would be the more inclusive set out of which the 'choice-set' was selected. This means that the agent has to choose from an artificially limited choice-set. Consequently 'the potential for frustration inherent in this aspect of choosing is obvious.' (DAN-COHEN 1992: 222–224.) In other words, the agent may sometimes have to choose from options which are all distasteful to him.

Choice involves also costs: 'The loss of the forgone opportunities that the making of any given choice allegedly entails.' When one has chosen an option from the choice-set, she has to give up all other options. The question arises of whether the choice-set could include itself as a member. In this case one could choose all the items in the set, without having to give up anything at all. But even in this case choosing involves a certain sacrifice. For example, 'by choosing to have the entire choice-set, that is, by ordering everything that's on the menu, I forgo the dietary advantages of a more modest meal.' (DAN-COHEN 1992: 224–225.)

According to the general philosophical description, when making a moral choice, the individual agents have the following kind of autonomy: Firstly, each agent governs himself within a wide area of choices. This means on the one hand, that each agent has rights and duties, which the agent knows in advance, and which are well within his capacity. Thus each agent can plan and spend his own preferred life inside a wide but circumscribed area of free choice. On the other hand, each agent respects the rights of everyone else. This means that no one interferes in the choices of anyone else by coercion, threats, manipulation, etc. Secondly, the others let the individual agent make his own moral choices, trust him to be morally conscientious and allow him to be responsible for his own mistakes. Thirdly, when the agent is morally self-governing and has no external pressures, he will respect the rights of others and fulfill his duties. He allows others to have their due area of freedom in the same way as he has his own. Within these areas of freedom no-one needs threats, special rewards, blind obedience, etc. (HILL 1983: 228; LANFEAR 1986: 191–192; PUTMAN 1987: 87–99.)

> We may forfeit our autonomy, but we remain responsible for this very forfeiture. By deciding not to decide for ourselves, we do decide for better or for worse, in favor of submission to the decisions of others. (GILL 1978: 345.)

Commitment means leaving out certain options when choosing. 'If autonomy is based on choosing, then commitment must be seen as a constraint on one's autonomy.' (DAN-COHEN 1992: 235.)

Formally speaking, according to Nozick, at present there is no adequate normative theory of choice. He notes that the 'writers on theory of choice do not distinguish among, consequences, effects and results.' (NOZICK 1990: 304.) Although the aim of this work is not to discuss and contribute to formal theories, Confucian thoughts may contribute some insights which should be considered in any attempt to develop a more general theory of choice.

Choice is a precondition for rational action. 'A person acts rationally in doing something only of he has (or perhaps, if he could have) chosen or decided to do it.' If the agent could not have chosen to do certain action, then although to do it may have a higher expected utility than any other action available to the agent, he could not act rationally in doing it. (NOZICK 1990: 324.)

Dent explains Aristotle's conception of choice which involves deliberation:

> Aristotle frequently asserts that man possesses a capacity to originate his own action in a distinctive kind of way, a capacity which animals and infants do not possess. This special capacity is for acting according to our own 'choice'; and choice is 'deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation' (E.N. 1113a 11–13). 'Choice is either desiderative reason or rationcinative desire and such an origin of action is a man' (E.N. 1139b 3–4), In fact, of course, men do not always act from choice in the sense intended; they also sometimes act from appetite or from passion, as it is in the nature of animals and infants always to do. Se when it is said that man can act from choice, it is meant that this is a power exclusive to humankind which, when exercised, leads to action of a specifically human sort. To act from choice is to act in the way proper to man. (DENT & BENSON 1976: 153.)

Kapitan assumes 'that choice is a species of intending to do something or other.' From this premise he continues that deliberation is 'practical reasoning with an end in

view of choosing some course of action.' When deliberating the agent has alternative possibilities or courses of action open for him to undertake or not. 'One deliberates only by taking for granted that both performing and refraining from any of the acts under consideration are possible for one, and that which is to be selected is something entirely up to oneself.' In this one's personal identity is important for one's choice. The choice is the determining factor in the undertaking: 'One's choice alone will determine the undertaking, not some other conditions existing prior to choice.' (KAPITAN 1986: 230, 232, 234.)

The choice has epistemic contingency: 'In terms of epistemic contingency; a deliberator assumes his choosing to be contingent relative to what he knows.' Moreover, a prerequisite for real choice is that one is free to choose. Consequently, determinism, which is 'the doctrine that each state of the world is fully determined by antecedent states,' does not belong to a free choice. Indeterminism means here that the agents are convicted that their choices are their own. (KAPITAN 1986: 231, 237, 239, 247.)

Choice in ethics refers to imperatives, 'oughtness'. According to Sartre, before the young man had made his decision, neither of the alternatives was the action he ought to do; his choice made one of them right for him. (RAPHAEL 1975: 10.)

According to Perry, Hare maintains that the principal function of moral judgments is to furnish a guide to choices and conduct, and that to perform this function they must be interpreted not as indicatives, whose function is said to be merely that of stating what is taken to be the case, but as imperatives, i.e. as prescripts. (PERRY 1987: 161.)

Hare says that choosing prudently means

> to treat one's own future preferences as of equal weight to one's present; and then exhibiting morality as universalized prudence – i.e. using the universalizability of moral judgements to show that, if we are thinking morally, we must pay as much regard to the preferences of other people as to our own. (HARE 1981: 100.)

Choice and rationality are essential elements of ethics:

> Ethics often concerns itself with how one can rationally decide difficult cases of moral choice and action, and with whether there are general strategies (e.g., utilitarianism) which decide or help decide certain cases or even types of cases. But ethics must also investigate whether there is a rationality in the attainment of the ethical standpoint, where what is right or good (or the thought or belief in what is right or good) is the true motive of action. (PRIOR 1977: 181. See also NOZICK 1990: 324.)

This conception of ethics is voluntaristic, in which the choice is important. Kekes opposes this view and tries to emphasize education on the grounds that it forms the character, which naturally and spontaneously directs our moral actions:

> The idea that choice lies at the foundation of morality is mistaken because it ignores the fundamental role conventions and education play. Conventions and education, however, require an object upon which they can exert their influence. This object is character. Moral education inculcates a morality.... This is the process by which character is beginning to be formed. And when we have well formed characters, the actions we perform effortlessly follow from them. Normally, acting in many moral situations is not a matter of choosing but doing what comes naturally. People of good character spontaneously do what is right in the normal course of events. (KEKES 1989: 41.)

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This eudaimonistic conception of morality, however, recognizes the importance of choice, but only in exceptional, unusual or conflicting situations. (KEKES 1989: 41–42.)

These different opinions raise the issue of whether an agent's character or his choices is of primary importance in morality. In this study we will discuss, whether and to what extent Confucius follows either a voluntaristic conception of morality, in which the choice is the primary foundation of ethics, or the eudaimonistic conception in which the character of the moral agent is the primary foundation of ethics. This will clarify the bases of Confucian ethics and especially the systematic foundation of his thinking on preference and choice.

Plurality is necessary for choice. 'Plural values are the rule rather than the exception.' The three marks of plurality '– qualitative differences, lacks, and different sorts of judgement – are central to choice.' (STOCKER 1990: 178, 179.) In choice we have sortal comparison, for example whether promise-keeping is morally more important than gratitude. Most of the sortal comparisons are problematic. (STOCKER 1990: 200–201.)

Mackie thinks that the agent has to judge and feel that the cases are different. 'A disposition for choice can express itself in differential choices only if the agent not only judges but also feels the cases to be significantly different.' (MACKIE 1990: 188.) Thus Mackie brings intellectual and sentimental factors into one's choice.

In the following, we will first discuss the issues which form the basis for moral preference and choice in the Confucian Analects. We will see whether the Analects tends more towards voluntarism or eudaimonism: in other words, whether the choice of action or the character of the agent is decisive. We will then attempt to delineate the monistic and pluralistic elements in the Analects. We will then discuss the problematic situations of choice, dilemmas in general and the more specific dilemmas, the situations of so called 'dirty hands'. This leads us to the major chapter on utilitarianism: whether and to what extent the moral preference and choice in the Confucian Analects is based on utilitarian ideas. Confucius traveled a great deal with his disciples. This leads us to consider what kind of role regionalism and choice of region plays in Confucius' moral thought. Confucius came into intimate contact with different kinds of people, disciples and officials. It is therefore of interest to discover what kind of persons he chose and preferred as good moral agents and what the characteristics are of the disciples which Confucius preferred as good disciples. We then discuss what role emotions play in the moral preference and choice in the Confucian Analects. In the final chapter we will attempt to synthesize the moral preferences and choices in the Confucian Analects as well as the Confucian suggestions for general ideas of moral preference and choice.