

III. Monism and pluralism

1. MONIST AND PLURALIST CHOICE

If we are to discuss choice, we also have to touch upon the problem of monism and pluralism. According to Stocker, choice presupposes pluralism. He says: 'Plural values are the rule rather than the exception.' The three marks of plurality – qualitative differences, lacks, and different sorts of judgement – are central to choice.' Stocker gives an example:

That of the choice of how to get across town. Suppose that I first considered walking, taking a taxi, driving, or taking the bus. The taxi was ruled out as being too costly, and the walking as being too slow. I thus had to choose between the car and the bus. Deliberation involved weighing such different considerations as these: the car is quicker, but the bus is cheaper; taking the car requires finding a parking space, but taking the bus prevents me from returning just whenever I want, and so on. (STOCKER 1990: 178.)

Stocker makes four claims about this example:

First, it is an unloaded and perfectly typical case of a choice. Second, it involves plural values – e.g. pleasantness, time, money and what it can secure, freedom, ease – and the decision is reached by balancing and choosing among them. Third, it admits of a reasoned conclusion. Fourth, it may well be that both options are reasonable. It may be reasonable to take the bus or to take the car.

Such cases as this one do admit of a reasoned decision, whether unique or not. The consequence of denying this is that, once again and contrary to the way it seems to us, our lives are adrift on a sea of unreason and even our simplest and most straightforward acts and decision involve radically ungrounded choice. (STOCKER 1990: 178–179.)

In the following we will try to discover whether Confucius inclined more to monism or pluralism or whether he was able to inhabit a middle ground between these two poles. These questions are relevant in the discussion of contemporary ethics, as Railton says: 'Talk of pluralism and dilemma is everywhere in the air in contemporary ethics.' (RAILTON 1992: 720.) However, dilemmas are possible also in monism, for example in connection with the keeping of promises (SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG 1988: 73–77).

It is possible that Confucius' moral thinking has pluralist elements at some level without being basically pluralistic. (BECKER 1992: 708.)

Monism holds that there is one single value or one and only one fundamental ethical principle (HILL 1992: 743) according to which ethical behavior is assessed. However, Stocker sees that there is a monistic choice, but in this type of choice we never sacrifice one value for another. For example, the monistic hedonists make all choices on the basis of their one and single value, i.e. pleasure (STOCKER 1990: 169).

If Confucius is a monist he must have one single most important value according to which he evaluates all other values and actions. Secondly, he must not have in this case,

any characteristics of pluralism, such as allowing for qualitatively different evaluative considerations or that even the best act can be lacking in some way. (STOCKER 1990: 168–169.)

The qualitatively different evaluative considerations for pluralists are that there are different sorts of goods, like lying on beach and discussing philosophy, and not simply different sources of one sort of good. The pluralists choose among different sorts of goods, not simply the amount of good. ‘They can recognize that choice importantly involves determining which values to pursue and which to forgo.’ In monism there is neither need for a choice nor an opportunity to choose between different values. ‘We never have to consider whether it is worth missing out on or sacrificing one value for another. In monistic choice, the only evaluative relevant difference between options is how they stand to one evaluative consideration – one value.’ (STOCKER 1990: 169.)

If a pluralistic characteristic is to be seen in Confucius' thinking, he should assess or evaluate different types of values. He should consider which values can be sacrificed and for which values.

The second characteristic of plurality is to lack a good. Some lacks mean that the life is not good. For example, if life has no sensual pleasure, this is contrasted with the good or ideal life. Because as far as the life lacks sensual pleasures, it cannot be regarded as a good life.

Lacks can have other usages as well. When the agent chooses between sensual pleasure, such as lying on a beach, and understanding, as in discussing philosophy, this means that he forgoes one option. The forgone option can be seen as a disappointment, something which was in one's grasp, but let go. In addition, ‘a life could be lacking in a particular good even if the life is as good as circumstances allow.’ The monists, too, may think in this way, but the pluralists, unlike monists ‘can also regret missing out on and lacking a particular sort of good.’ (STOCKER 1990: 170–171.)

Many find it problematic to compare the different values in plurality as contrasted with the comparison of instances of the very same value in monism. Stocker solves this difficulty by introducing higher level synthesizing categories. If we try for example to choose between the pleasure of lying on a beach and the understanding obtained from discussing philosophy, ‘we may invoke what I will call a higher-level synthesizing category’ in order to choose between these. ‘Once we have fixed upon the higher synthesizing category, we can often easily ask which option is better in regard to that category and judge which to choose on the basis of that.’ (STOCKER 1990: 171.)

To facilitate the comparison between different values in pluralism, Stocker introduces evaluative judgements made in three different ways: The higher-level synthesizing category is not only a simple collection of lower level goods which are covered by it. Rather it introduces new evaluative features, like the Aristotelian eudaimonia is related to its constituting lower-level goods, such as pleasure. The higher-level synthesizing category collects the lower-level goods together and balances them ‘in regard to each other in evaluatively distinctive and proper ways. And such balance is not one of the original lower-level goods.’ (STOCKER 1990: 172.)

According to this first evaluative judgement of different values, we may ask whether Confucius has any such higher-level synthesizing category, for example *jen*, which is said to include several kinds of virtues and which balances them in regard to each other.

The second relation the higher level synthesizing category and the lower level good is evaluative. The question is evaluative whether the pleasure on the beach will lead to a well-spent day, 'or whether this pleasure would make for a day better spent than would that understanding' obtained from discussing philosophy. (Stocker 1990: 173.)

Thirdly, the comparisons of plural values can involve several higher-order synthesizing categories. Discussing philosophy may be a better spent day than lying on the beach, but lying on the beach may be sensually more pleasing. In order to know what to do we have to take all the different factors into account. We judge between plural considerations, and these considerations are those of higher-level synthesizing categories. (STOCKER 1990: 173.) We should note critically that if there were only one higher-level synthesizing category, we could easily slip to monism.

We may ask critically: can these various lower level categories which we have to take into account be just another name for the collection or summary of the lower-level goods? If so, then the higher-level synthesizing category is just 'a simple collection or summary of the lower-level goods it covers', and we approach monism. In other words: what makes a list of 'discussing philosophy and lying on the beach' a list of new evaluative features and not a simple summary of lower-level goods? (STOCKER 1990: 173–174.)

Stocker sees the difference between monism and pluralism in choosing activities: One may choose for example discussing philosophy, because one feels the need of intellectual training more than enjoyment on the beach. Nonetheless in this case one can regret that one has missed out on the enjoyment on the beach. In monism this kind of difference does not exist. Monism answers to all questions of moral choice in the same way: how do the options stand to that one value. (STOCKER 1990: 174–175.) If we apply this to monism, suppose our single value is intellectual development. We would choose discussing philosophy because it serves better this single value. However, if we have discussed it already for five hours, we may choose lying on beach, because it would give a suitable creative pause for our thinking and thus serve our single value of intellectual development. In pluralism we judge these two values separately, as single units. We do not relate these to some leading view.

Stocker's theoretical discussion above shows that we could define a simple pluralism. This would be a list of different values, a kind of value department store, from which one could buy or select anything one thinks fit. One may take lying on a beach. When one gets tired of that, one may take judo, or reading novels. In this pluralism one may change one's interests freely. Secondly, different persons may take what they want without minding what the neighbour takes. One person may take lying on beach, reading novels, judo, etc. Another may take working hard and sitting in a restaurant in the evenings. A third one may take working hard during the daytime and attending religious activities during the week ends. These are just values as such without any necessary logical interconnections, or goals.

A more sophisticated pluralism is that there are higher level synthesizing categories, which include, coordinate, and balance the lower level ones. The different higher level

categories are judged as single, separate units. Critically, we have to say that if we have one single higher level synthesizing category, to which the lower ones can be reduced, (WOLF 1992: 785) and which includes the lower ones, then we easily slip to monism. In this case we easily have a pluralistic language, but in actual fact we approach a monist position. It is possible to hold such a leading principle even without knowing it.

Another position may be a simple monism: we have only one value, and everything else serves it. We may have the one value of being a good Christian. One may have an occupation, but use all one's income for the single purpose of helping the needy, because a good Christian loves one's neighbour. Then one uses all one's free time for the same purpose, to attend Sunday services, Bible classes, mission activities, etc. Even when such a person buys a car, he buys it to be able to take part in the activities of the church and to distribute Bibles and Christian literature for example among those he hopes would read them. All this serves one purpose: to be good Christian. This moral system would involve the belief that all other people should be good Christians as well. This monist would recognize that there are other values, but he himself follows only this one value, and nothing else.

When we take Stocker's theory, the distinction between monism and pluralism becomes more sophisticated. We have the higher-level synthesizing category, which points towards one value in monism. However, there is some difference, in the ends at least, which are many in pluralism, but in monism just one. If we want to understand Stocker's distinctions, the evaluative features of the higher-level synthesizing category are more 'rational' or complex than just a list of features. One has to consider their interconnections and mutual balance and to evaluate how they contribute towards their higher-level synthesizing category. Pluralism appears more clearly when Stocker says that there are many higher-level synthesizing categories. The whole picture is a kind of construction, where one has the main higher-level synthesizing categories. Each of these consists of lower level goods which have certain complex preferences and interconnections and relationships to their higher level synthesizing category. We may also suppose, although Stocker does not point it out, that one lower level good may contribute to one or more higher level synthesizing category.

Susan Wolf takes pluralism in the following way and points out the difficulty of choice between moral values in pluralism:

Pluralism in ethics, as I understand, is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of values or principles that are relevant to moral judgment. While the utilitarian says that all morally significant considerations can be reduced to quantities of pleasure and pain, and the Kantian says that all moral judgment can be reduced to a single principle having to do with respect for rationality and the bearers of rationality, the pluralist insists that morality is not at the fundamental level so simple. Moreover, as many use the term, and as I shall use it in this essay, the pluralist believes that the plurality or morally significant values is not subject to a complete rational ordering. Thus, it is held that no principle or decision procedure exists that can guarantee a unique and determinate answer to every moral question involving a choice among different fundamental moral values or principles. (WOLF 1992: 785.)

With the reservations mentioned above, we may take Stocker's theory as a starting point when looking into Confucius' thinking about choice, in order to determine whether he has a monistic or pluralistic frame of reference, or both.

2. CONFUCIUS AND THE MARKS OF PLURALITY

2.1. Qualitative differences of values

2.1.1. Monistic statements

In the following, we will examine whether Confucius evaluates different types of values and whether he considers which values can be sacrificed and for what reason. Secondly, we will examine whether he deliberates about lacking a good and thirdly whether his thinking has a specific sort of judgment in the form of higher-level synthesizing categories which are needed to compare different values. These categories may introduce new evaluative features, organizing and balancing them. The relation between a higher level category and a lower level good is evaluative, and there may be several higher level synthesizing categories.

There are some statements which gesture towards monism:

The Master said, With those who follow a different Way 道 it is useless to take counsel. (AN. 15:39.)

Tzu-chang said, He who sides with moral force (德) but only to a limited extent, who believes in the Way, but without conviction – how can one count him as with us, how can one count him as not with us? (AN. 19:2.)

The disciples of Tzu-hsia asked Tzu-chang about intercourse with others. Tzu-chang said, What does Tzu-hsia tell you? He replied saying, Tzu-hsia says: Go with those with whom it is proper to go; Keep at a distance those whom it is proper to keep at a distance. Tzu-chang said, That is different from what I have been told: A Gentleman reverences those that excel, but 'finds room' for all; He commends the good and pities the incapable. Do I myself greatly excel others? In that case I shall certainly find room for everyone. Am I myself inferior to others? In that case, it would be others who would keep me at a distance. So that the question of keeping others at a distance does not arise. (AN. 19:3.)

Master Tseng said, Chang is so self-important. It is hard to become Good 仁 when working side by side with such a man. (AN. 19:16.)

These refer to the idea that Confucius and his disciples are the only ones who have found the right Way, *tao* 道. However, this does not imply that this *tao* cannot include different values and assessment of them.

2.1.2. Sacrifice of values

We will first discuss whether Confucius ponders which values can be sacrificed (DAN-COHEN 1992: 225) and then whether Confucius assesses or evaluates different types of values.

The following opinions may be regarded as indicating that Confucius does consider whether certain values can be sacrificed: The 'wealth and rank' 富與貴 desired by everyone and which Confucius himself appreciated, and even life should be sacrificed

for the Way. 'Poverty and obscurity' 貧與賤 must be tolerated if they cannot be avoided except to the detriment of the way 道. (AN. 4:5, 8:13.) The undemanding lifestyle of Confucius' favorite disciple Hui reflects similar sentiments (AN. 6:9).

Confucius wants to sacrifice the values of material wealth for the value of not doing wrong:

The Master said, He who seeks only coarse food to eat, water to drink and bent arm for pillow, will without looking for it find happiness to boot. Any thought of accepting wealth and rank by means that I know to be wrong is as remote from me as the clouds that float above. (AN. 7:15. See also AN. 7:11.)

When Yen Hui died, his father Yen Lu begged for the Master's carriage, that he might use it to make the enclosure for the coffin. The Master said, Gifted or not gifted, you have spoken of your son and I will now speak of mine. When Li died he had a coffin, but no enclosure. I did not go on foot in order that he might have an enclosure; for I rank next to the Great Officers and am not permitted to go on foot. (AN. 11:7.)

Confucius was ready to sacrifice some of the prestige of the funeral for his personal prestige (AN. 11:7). The disciples gave to Yen Hui a 'grand burial'. Confucius regarded this as a fault in them (AN. 11:10).

In AN. 9:3 Confucius wanted to sacrifice the general practice in performing rites. He preferred to follow the traditional prescriptions of rituals instead, because the general practice was not more economical than the traditional prescriptions. In another instance Confucius acted in a different way from the point of economy. Tzu-kung preferred to save a sheep which was traditionally used in the offering for the first day of the month, but Confucius preferred to offer it (AN. 3:17). Tzu-kung made this proposal because in the state of Lu this ceremony had lost its significance, and in his mind it would be better to prefer greater economy. Confucius had a conservative interest, and he wanted sacrifice economy due to this interest (DUBS 1958: 251). Possibly Confucius' idea was that while any part of the ceremony was retained, there was a better chance of restoring the whole (LEGGE 1969: 161). Both these cases show that Confucius preferred antiquarian interests and tried to find reasons to promote these against economic considerations. Also, the ritual was a kind of 'trait complex' (HOYT 1969: 32) which was difficult to change.

One's life may clearly be sacrificed for Goodness, in principle, at least. 'The determined scholar' 志士 and a good person 仁人 will not 'seek life at the expense of Goodness: and it may be that he has to give his life in order to achieve Goodness' 無求生以害仁, 有殺身以成仁. More literally: 'Do not seek life and ruin Goodness. Kill themselves to keep Goodness complete.' (AN. 15:8; LEGGE 1969: 297; CH'EN Mu 1976: 216. See also AN. 15:34.) The 'True Knight of the Way' has a burden of Goodness. Confucius says about this: 'and must we not grant that it is a heavy one to bear? Only with death does his journey end; then must we not grant that he has far to go?' (AN. 8:7.) The class of knights, *shih* 士 'consisted of the younger sons of aristocrats, who had no opportunities of holding hereditary office, together with the descendants of the ruling families who were dispossessed when their states were wiped out during this period of history, in which the large states continued to eliminate their smaller neighbours.' Confucius belonged to this class. (DAWSON 1981: 61; CREEL 1951: 100.)

In one instance Confucius wanted to sacrifice justice for filiality. A son had to hide the crime of his father. The attitude of a father towards his son should be the same. (AN. 13:18.)

These cases do not show Confucius deliberating deeply about values to be sacrificed. However, it is important to note that Confucius has recognized this issue. He has indeed recognized that there are different values which can be weighed with each other. The cases show that in Confucian thinking there are values which compete against each other. This is one of the conditions for a choice, because 'every choice is a choice between competing values' (SEUNG & BONEVAC 1992: 809). In these cases, no matter whether we call them sacrificing values or competing values, Confucius has to choose one value and give up the other.

In this we see that the first condition for pluralism appears in Confucius' thinking, not just implicitly or artificially, but clearly and explicitly, if not often and in no well developed way.

The evaluating of values can be presented in other ways as well (SEUNG & BONEVAC 1992: 801). One way is to assess different values and to express the qualitative differences between values. The Analects express these assessments in several instances.

2.1.3. *The existence of different values*

The existence of different values is recognized in the following:

The Master said, Who expects to be able to go out of a house except by the door. How is it then that no one follows this Way 道 of ours? (AN. 6:15. See also AN. 7:28.)

Here Confucius recognizes the fact that although his *tao* 道 is the best one, it is not followed by other people. Confucius goes still further in his attitude towards pluralism. It is possible to say that he accepts to some degree other values than those which he is advocating. This appears in that Confucius recognizes the existence of a value which opposes his opinion. He lets a person follow his own value which conflicts with a value held by Confucius. One may, after a one year mourning period, start wearing silk brocades and eating good rice if one feels at ease doing so, although Confucius himself despised this practice (AN. 17:21).

In addition to this attitude which seems to indicate some degree of pluralism, Confucius considers the qualitative differences of values, or different qualitative options of certain values. These qualitative options appear in Confucius' opinions about rituals, *li* 禮. Confucius prefers to be too sparing rather than too lavish in them: 'In ritual at large it is a safe rule always to be too sparing rather than too lavish; and in the particular case of mourning-rites, they should be dictated by grief rather than by fear.' (AN. 3:4.)

The differences in the quality show that there are different values. There is the value of being too lavish, which is opposite to what Confucius teaches. Confucius is not a pluralist in the sense that he would accept both being too sparing and too lavish in rituals at the same time. Here he does not place two values beside each other and remain indifferent in regard to them.

'Human life is barbaric if it consists only in satisfying the needs necessary for survival. As soon as we can choose the manner of satisfaction and attend to less pressing needs, culture enters.' (KEKES 1987: 261.) Rituals here refer to culture and cultural needs. Confucius placed a high value on these as we saw above in his opinion about offering a sheep. (AN. 3:17.)

This Confucius' choice of the ritual resembles a case in Sophocles's *Antigone*. In this play,

Creon, King of Thebes, forbids the burial of his nephew, Antigone's brother, Polyneices who betrayed Thebes. Tradition dictates that the dead should be buried by their family. The responsibility falls to Antigone; she accepts it, disobeys Creon, and buries her brother. Antigone has to choose between human and divine law; she chooses the latter, and Creon, representative of human law, exacts the penalty she had known she must pay: her death. (KEKES 1987: 251.)

Although Confucius' case is less dramatic, still the spirit of the choice is the same.

Certain qualitative options are not tolerated for the knight:

The Master said, A Knight whose heart is set upon the Way 道, but who is ashamed of wearing shabby clothes and eating coarse food, is not worth calling into counsel. (AN. 4:9.)

The qualitative characteristics of the Gentleman are stated by Confucius, and to possess the opposite of these characteristics or to deviate from them is to be a 'small man', for example:

The Master said, A Gentleman in his dealings with the world has neither enmities nor affections; but wherever he sees Right 義 he ranges himself beside it. (AN. 4:10.)

The Master said, Where gentlemen set their hearts upon moral force (德) 德, the commoners set theirs upon the soil. Where gentlemen think only of punishments, the commoners think only of exemptions. (AN. 4:11.)

Competence is more important than the office itself, diligence is more important than recognition:

The Master said, He does not mind not being in office; all he minds about is whether he has qualities that entitle him to office. He does not mind failing to get recognition; he is too busy doing the things that entitle him to recognition. (AN. 4:14.)

The Master said, A Gentleman takes as much trouble to discover what is right 義 as lesser men take to discover what will pay 利. (AN. 4:16.)

The Master said, A Gentleman covets the reputation of being slow in word but prompt in deed. (AN. 4:24.)

Even in these passages, Confucius has a clear attitude as to which qualities of the values are preferable. He does not accept different qualities beside each other. 'A nice calculation of one's chances of success was irrelevant.' (CREEL 1951: 141.) He recognizes the existence of different qualities, but he also states which he prefers.

Confucius is asked about the qualitative characteristics of Goodness 仁 such as not showing signs of elation when appointed to office and not showing signs of disappointment

when dismissed from office or trying to find a good minister in order to serve him, but not finding one (AN. 5:18). These characteristics are irrelevant for Goodness.

We have seen that Confucius placed some values higher than others. We will now turn to an examination of which values he was prepared to forgo, and which he wished to retain.

2.1.4. *To forgo values*

Different values are placed in an order of preference. Stocker says: the pluralists 'can recognize that choice importantly involves determining which values to pursue and which to forgo.' (STOCKER 1990: 169.) In the following Confucius expresses his ideas about this.

One may forgo the minor considerations in administration:

When Tzu-hsia was Warden of Chu-fu, he asked for advice about government. The Master said, Do not try to hurry things. Ignore minor considerations. If you hurry things, your personality will not come into play. If you let yourself be distracted by minor considerations, nothing important will ever get finished. (AN. 13:17.)

The Master said, It is wrong for a Gentleman to have knowledge of menial matters and proper that he should be entrusted with great responsibilities. It is wrong for a small man to be entrusted with great responsibility, but proper that he should have a knowledge of menial matters. (AN. 15:33.)

Blind fidelity is not needed, but consistency is necessary:

The Master said, From a Gentleman consistency is expected, but not blind fidelity. 子曰,君子貞,而不諒 (AN. 15:36.)

One can be without eloquence, although one is allowed to be eloquent:

The Master said, One who has accumulated moral power (*te*) will certainly also possess eloquence; but he who has eloquence does not necessarily possess moral power. A Good Man will certainly also possess courage; but a brave man is not necessarily Good. 子曰,有德者,必有言,有言者,不必有德,仁者,必有勇,勇者,不必有仁 (AN. 14:5.)

In these passages Confucius has choice-sets of values in which one value may be given up and the other option is preferred (DAN-COHEN 1992: 225). In the last case both options are possible, although one of them is preferred. In these cases the value is not necessarily sacrificed because of another value. The question is not of competing values either. One value is preferred and the other may be sacrificed, or may prevail. If both values prevail, this does not necessarily cause harm for the preferred value.

This idea, to promote some values and to forgo others, is a quite simple notion of pluralism which can be found in Confucius' thinking.

2.1.5. The order of preference of the values

In addition to forgoing values, Confucius places some values in a rank order, in an order of preference. The order is: 1) to delight in something, 2) to prefer something, 3) to know something (CHENG Shu-te 1974: 352).

The Master said, To prefer it is better than only to know it. To delight in it is better than merely to prefer it. 子曰，知之者，不如好之者，好之者，不如樂之者 (AN. 6:18.)

This expresses his attitudes towards knowing. This short aphorism implies that to prefer involves a movement of will and to delight involves sentimental considerations, like enthusiasm. It is quite clear that 'knowing' 知 here refers to knowing some value of good quality, like *jen* or *tao* of Confucius. It is noteworthy that the highest degree is a level which includes all the values of the two lower levels. The highest level includes the values of lower levels. The lower values work as elements of the higher ones. This may be regarded as a small example of a higher level synthesizing category, which will be handled later.

In leading the people, Confucius prefers material considerations to cultural ones. Before instruction there should be a good material basis: an abundant population and material wealth. This ranking list, too, multiplying, enriching and instructing people, is accumulative. When there is instruction, the population is already numerous and materially wealthy. (AN. 13:9.)

The values of the 'true knight' 士 are ranked:

1) Tzu-kung asked, What must a man be like in order that he may be called a true knight (of the Way)? The Master said, He who in the furtherance of his own interests is held back by scruples, 行己有恥, who as an envoy to far lands does not disgrace his prince's commission 不辱君子命 may be called a true knight.

2) Tzu-kung said, May I venture to ask who would rank next? The Master said, He whom his relatives commend for filial piety 孝 his fellow-villagers, for deference to his elders.

3) Tzu-kung said, May I venture to ask who would rank next? The Master said, He who always stands by his word 言必信, who undertakes nothing that he does not bring to achievement 行必果. Such a one may be in the humblest possible circumstances, but all the same we must give him the next place.

Tzu-kung said, What would you say of those who are now conducting the government? The Master said, Ugh, A set of peck-measures, not worth taking into account. (AN. 13:20.)

This ranking lists the knights according to their qualities in the order of preference. It would be correct to suppose that here, too, the best knight has accumulated all the good qualities of the knights of the lower ranks.

The principles of the ruler are in a rank order which is designed to bolster the development of the individual to fit him to wield power. The ruler should have the intellectual quality of wisdom 知 which brings him into power. Then he needs the moral quality of Goodness, *jen* 仁, to secure that power. After that he must govern with dignity 莊以蒞之, and lastly he has to handle the people according to the prescriptions of ritual 禮. If he fulfills all the other requirements, but fails in the last one he is still a bad ruler. (AN. 15:32; CHENG Shu-te 1974: 973.) In this rank order, ritual is held in higher esteem, so much so that to neglect it will make all the other good qualities almost useless.

The passages discussed above testify that Confucius spoke about the qualitative differences between values. He spoke about different sorts of goods, not different sources of the same good, as monists do. He recognized that one may pursue one value and forgo another. In this way, according to Confucius, one may choose values. Confucius also speaks about sacrificing one value because of another. This presupposes that both values are good, but the chosen value is preferred. The value which is not preferred can be obtained only when certain conditions prevail. Confucius goes even further than that. He places values into an order of preference. He has schemes in which all the values of the lower rank are incorporated into the higher rank.

This shows that Confucius has the first characteristic of plurality. It should be mentioned that this characteristic, of qualitative differences of values, is only very little discussed in the Analects, but it appears clearly enough to legitimize the conclusion. This trend of pluralism in the Analects will be better defined when we examine the second characteristic of it, namely the notion of lack.

2.2. Lack

2.2.1. Examples of lack

The lack of good is the second characteristic of plurality, as mentioned above. A life can lack good as a whole if it lacks certain goods, such as those of sensual pleasure, despite the fact that it may be rich in wisdom and honor. 'Because and in so far as the life is deficient in sensual pleasure, it is not a good life.' On the other hand, it is possible that 'a life could be lacking in a particular good even if the life is as good as circumstances allow.' (STOCKER 1990: 170, 171.)

Confucius' thinking about lack or defects is a special and mostly unexplored area although all the sayings about lack can be easily found in the Analects, including several functions of lack or defects.

Confucius' opinions about defects or negative characteristics are concentrated in certain parts of the Analects, namely in books 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15 and 17:1–20. In addition to the different kinds of defects, books 4, 13 and 14 have another special feature, namely that each chapter includes some kind of dual pattern of expression or thought more or less explicitly presented. In some of the chapters the mentioned characteristics are woven into everything that is said in the chapter or saying, in others the characteristics cover only part of the chapter or saying.

The topics appear in varying clarity in almost all of the chapters of the mentioned books (NIKKILÄ 1992: 11–12). This does not mean that it was Confucius' own idea to group the sayings containing a defect into the mentioned parts of the Analects. It is rather the compilers who were responsible for this.

Some examples of the defects or negative characteristics are:

- * An intolerable defect, refraining, or consciously omitting (P. G. SMITH 1986: 16) to choose the company of the Good:

The Master said, It is Goodness that gives to a neighborhood its beauty. One who is free to choose, yet does not prefer to dwell among the Good 擇不處仁 or chooses not to dwell *jen* – how can he be accorded the name of wise 知? (AN. 4:1.)

Lau translates more according to Chu Hsi:

Of neighborhoods benevolence is the most beautiful. How can the man be considered wise who, when he has the choice, does not settle in benevolence? (LAU 1979: 72.)

Here one is free to choose, and could choose differently from the recommendation (WEISS 1942: 186), but one cannot be called wise if one chooses differently. (CHU Hsi 1952: 110. See also RONGEN 1988: 89; J. C. H. WU 1974: 14–16.)

* The consequences of the lack of Goodness 仁:

The Master said, Without Goodness a man cannot for long endure adversity, cannot for long enjoy prosperity. The Good Man rests content with Goodness; he that is merely wise pursues Goodness in the belief that it pays to do so. (AN. 4:2.)

* Lack of sympathy:

Of the adage 'Only a Good Man knows how to like people, knows how to dislike them,' the Master said, He whose heart is in the smallest degree set upon Goodness will dislike no one. (AN. 4:3–4.)

* Lack of a Gentleman, a way of presentation:

Of Tzu-chien he said, A Gentleman indeed is such a one as he If the land of Lu were indeed without gentlemen, how could he have learned this? (AN. 5:2.)

* Defective ability to speak:

Someone said, Jan Yung is Good, but he is a poor talker. The Master said, What need has he to be a good talker? Those who down others with clap-trap are seldom popular. Whether he is Good, I do not know. But I see no need for him to be a good talker. (AN. 5:4.)

* Inability to turn one's merits to account:

The Master said, A man may be able to recite the three hundred Songs; but, if when given a post in the government, he cannot turn his merits to account, or when sent on a mission to far parts he cannot answer particular questions, however extensive his knowledge may be, of what use is it to him? (AN. 13:5.)

* Defect of uprightness:

The Master said, If the ruler himself is upright, all will go well even though he does not give orders. But if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders, they will not be obeyed. (AN. 13:6.)

The circumstances in Wei are equally as bad as in Lu (WALEY 1964: 173):

The Master said, in their politics Lu and Wei are still brothers. (AN. 13:7.)

* Causing a defect:

The Master said, The 'honest villager' spoils true virtue (*te*). (AN. 17:13.)

The Master said, To tell in the lane what you have heard on the highroad is to throw merit (*te*) away. (AN. 17:14.)

These examples show that the lack or defect has been presented in many ways in the Analects. The method of this chapter differs from the previous chapters, since here we move in a more unexplored area. Literature on moral theory elaborates only very little upon which defects are allowed or tolerated, which are needed or necessary, and which cannot be tolerated, and which are indifferent in or for certain conditions.

2.2.2. *The function of negative characteristics in the Analects*

In order to gain an overview of what Confucius meant by his choices among defects, I prefer to list them (see the present study, p. 149) and the conditions in each book and try to group them in classes. Each book should be handled separately, because, even though the books have a common theme of defects, they still have other special features which are different from each other. I will then analyze each group in order to see its significance for preference and choice.

This study uses the following classification of negative characteristics in the Confucian Analects:

1. Negative characteristics and their consequence
2. Not allowed negative characteristics
3. Necessary negative characteristics
4. Recommendable negative characteristics
5. Allowed negative characteristics
6. Impossible negative characteristics
7. Lack of an experience
8. Realized negative characteristics
9. Possible negative characteristics
10. Elimination of negative characteristics.

This list of negative characteristics or lacks can be viewed in the light of Stocker's theory.

The lacks which have consequences are mostly ethical. Such consequences are intellectual, moral, social and those which concern competence and the ability to govern. These lacks can be said to cause at least some loss of the good life. Those lacks which are not allowed, and where the agent is Gentleman, a general agent which is not mentioned, or a more specified person, can be said to be detrimental to the good life.

In opposition to these lacks are the necessary lacks, which are not detrimental to the good life, but which contribute to it. Some of these seem to be quite negative, such as dislikes, faults, enmities, etc., but some are positive; only the way of expressing them is negative, like not hurrying things, or to be pleased inconsistently with the Way. The agent is mostly Gentleman for whom it is recommended to have these negative characteristics in order to be successful in his office. The agent of the recommendable lacks is

more often a named person or a general one than Gentleman, which is mentioned only once or twice in this connection. The recommendable lacks are not necessary, and the absence of them will not necessarily have an adverse effect upon his life. However, their presence is advantageous for one's life. In this way they are positive. (See LOUDEN 1992: 58–60.)

The allowed negative characteristics are mostly specified to a person. These are allowed sometimes because of the circumstances, such as the fault not being an agent's own, a country not being ruled according to the Way and the special present situation. These fall into Stocker's second category, where the life is as good as the circumstances allow.

The impossible lacks are logical. The defects and experience are those of Confucius. The realized lacks are those which only exist, but about which there are no value statements on whether they are necessary, allowed or intolerable. It is understood, although not said explicitly, that some lacks are intolerable, and that some are irrelevant or recommendable. The possible lack is only a statement. The elimination of the negative characteristics is not very emphatic.

The list shows that in the background of Confucius' thinking, or at least of the thinking in the Analects, there is a quite sophisticated scheme of negative characteristics. Formally these express more than the lack of the good life and as good a life as circumstances allow. These lacks also describe the good life itself and also some necessary conditions for such a life.

If we take pluralism and see it in the light of Confucius' opinions about lacks, we get a more sophisticated pattern of thought than that which Stocker gives us. Stocker looks upon defects as negative phenomena, but Confucius sees the positive sides as well. The agent must have certain negative characteristics in order to have the good life. Moreover, such characteristics vary in their strength, and Confucius assessed the lacks in this respect. Some are necessary and some are only recommended, and some are allowed.

The decisive difference in this respect between pluralism and monism is that the monists 'can imagine that with a change of circumstances the life could have been better, and they can complain that what is here and now the best possible is not better than it in fact is'. The pluralist's regrets in addition to this is to 'regret missing out on and lacking a particular sort of good'. (STOCKER 1990: 171.)

Confucius' view is that he does not always regret, but has an attitude to the lack of a particular sort of good. In his thinking, one has rationally to decide or choose which lacks are regrettable and which are recommendable and which are in between, more or less indifferent lacks. If we see this in terms of pluralism, this respect of lacks in Confucius' pluralism is more pluralistic than in Stocker's theory.

3. HIGHER-LEVEL SYNTHESIZING CATEGORIES

3.1. *Jen* as a higher-level synthesizing category

In this context it will be necessary to compare different values. If Confucius compares different values with each others, he follows pluralism, but if he relates everything to one value he follows monism.

Our first task is to find the higher-level synthesizing categories in Confucian thinking. Stocker's third point, in which the comparisons of plural values can involve several higher-level synthesizing categories, is included in this listing of several Confucius' higher-level synthesizing categories. And then we have to discover what the lower-level goods are, and what the relationships between the lower-level goods and the higher-level synthesizing categories may be.

Any attempt to include all of Confucius' higher-level synthesizing categories would entail an introduction to his entire moral thinking. For our purposes it is enough to deal with only the main characteristics and to see whether he does indeed have higher and lower-level categories.

In one instance Confucius lists three categories, *tao*, *te* and *jen*, which we will take here as the objects of our study and attempt to determine to what extent these can be seen as higher-level synthesizing categories.

Set your heart upon the Way 道 (*tao*), support yourself by its power 德 (*te*), lean upon Goodness 仁 (*jen*), seek distraction in the arts (Music, archery etc.). (AN. 7:6; CH'EN Mu 1958: 2.)

There is general agreement among scholars that in Confucius' thinking the main ethical concept, *jen*, includes other virtues, it is a sum of virtues.⁵ *Jen* 仁 is the most central and important ethical concept in the Confucian Analects. It appears 109 times in 52 different passages.⁶ According to the Analects, *jen* includes the following goods: 剛, 毅, 木, 訥, 近仁. Lustlessness, resoluteness, simplicity or 'tree-like', reticence are all close to *jen*. According to Wing-tsit Chan, this passage reflects the view that the 'scholar-Gentleman is one of courage and strength' rejecting the idea that *ju* was to be weak.⁷

⁵ CHAN 1955: 298; CUA 1972: 130; H. D. SMITH 1968: 43; SONG 1983: 58; TONG 1969: 528; TUNG Shu-yeh 1962: 18; TU Wei-ming 1981: 48.

⁶ CONCORDANCE 1972: 183–184. Grimm has calculated the occurrences of *jen* in the following way: 'Wir finden in den ersten Kapiteln, also der einen Hälfte des Textes, die vermutlich die ältere ist, insgesamt 28 Aussagen über JEN. Davon sind 10 positiv, 5 negativ, 13 indirekt unschreibend. Gegenüber diesem etwas über einem Drittel liegenden Anteil von positiven Aussagen finden wir unter den insgesamt 30 Aussagen der Kapitel 11–20 genau die Hälfte als positive Aussagen, ihr Anteil has also zugenommen. Entsprechend sinkt der Anteil von negativen plus indirekt unschreibenden Aussagen von 64% in der ersten Hälfte auf 50% in der zweiten.' (GRIMM 1976: 13–14; cf. NIKKILÄ 1992: 127.)

⁷ AN. 13:27, 178. For the translations see CH'ENG Shu-te 1974: 817; LAU 1979: 123; WALEY 1964: 178. 'Mästaren sade: De principiellt orubbliga, de beslutsamma, de trohjärtade och de i sitt tal

Another list of things included in *jen* is: 'He who could put the five into practice everywhere under Heaven would be Good.' The five are: 恭, 寬, 信, 敏, 惠. Courtesy, breadth, good faith, diligence and clemency. This is followed by an explanation: 'He who is courteous is not scorned, he who is broad wins the multitude, he who is of good faith is trusted by the people, he who is diligent succeeds in all he undertakes, he who is clement can get service from the people.'⁸ This explanation tries to consider the consequences and usages of these goods. Each of these goods has its own area of application. In this way an attempt is made to balance these goods in regard to each other in practice. (STOCKER 1990: 172.)

In governing the people, especially the barbarians, *jen* includes the following things: 'In private life, courteous, in public life, diligent, in relationships, loyal.' 居處恭, 執事敬, 與人忠. (AN: 13:19; LEGGE 1969: 271. See also CHENG Shu-te 1974: 845; CHIEN Mu 1978: 80.)

One lower level category, courage, is related to *jen*, the higher-level one in the following way: 'A Good Man will certainly also possess courage 勇, but a brave man 勇者 is not necessarily Good.'⁹ These passages evaluate the goods and reflect the relationships between the higher-level synthesizing category of *jen* and the lower-level goods.

Seichi says:

Many scholars try to explain it in the context of love, care and perseverance. I agree that all these virtues are included in *Jen*, but none alone can represent what *Jen* stands for, however important each virtue may be... *Jen* was the embodiment of all virtues integrated together. (SEICHI 1973: 36.)

This explanation is consistent with Stocker's point, noted above, that the higher level synthesizing category is not a simple collection of goods, but that it introduces new features. (STOCKER 1990: 172.)

Because of these inclusions, and evaluations, although not on a very sophisticated level, *jen*, Confucius' main ethical concept, can be seen as a higher-level synthesizing category. It is precisely because of this method of inclusions and balancing that we may say that Confucius has pluralistic elements here.

ödmjuka, dessa har nära till den sanna dygden.' (HENRIKSON & HWANG 1987: 90.) For the text see LEGGE 1969: 274; CHAN 1955: 310–311. On AN. 13:27 see also SONG 1983: 58; CHEN, Li-fu 1986: 11.

⁸ AN. 17:6 (p. 211). Most of the explanation appears in Shu Ching 20:1. (WALEY 1964: 211.) For the text see LEGGE 1969: 320.

⁹ AN. 14:5 (p. 180). Fingarette says: "'Courteous", "diligent", "loyal", "brave", "broad", "kind", (13:19; 14:5, 17:6) – these are traditional virtues which give us no insight or other help.' (FINGARETTE 1972: 41.)

3.1. *Tao* as a higher-level synthesizing category

Tao 道 has more than eighty occurrences in the Analects. In the previous study (NIKKILÄ 1992: 69–79) I divided these according to the contextual meaning into three categories: general *tao*, universal *tao*, *tao* of ruling, *tao* of the Gentleman.¹⁰ Since in the previous study *tao* of Confucius was scrutinized and divided into categories, and every occurrence was taken into account, it is appropriate perhaps to give a summary of the results here.

'General *tao*' of Confucius is defined in relation to other Confucian ideas and concepts. The Confucian ideal of antiquity is included in the characteristics of general *tao* (AN. 1:12, 3:16; LAU 1979: 61, 70; YEN 1972: 18–19). This *tao* of the ancients is a model for the contemporary people (AN. 15:24, 11:19; WALEY 1964: 31). A filial son continues his father's *tao* without changing it. These retrospective features of *tao* reflect its continuity and conservatism. There is a tension between *tao* and the will of a man who desires high station and dislikes poverty.¹¹

There should be a degree of intensity in one's *te* and *tao*, otherwise it is not clear whether one has them or not. Confucius requires a total commitment to them. *Tao* has an ethical connotation in connection with *te* 德, *jen* 仁 and the arts, *i* 藝, and especially with 'loyalty and consideration', *chung shu* 忠恕. Loyalty refers to loyalty to superiors and consideration to the Golden Rule. These two together are the ideal standard which is to be the guiding and controlling factor in moral experience, exposing the center of the Confucian system, and being the very nature of Confucian *tao* and running through it and being its constructive principles.¹²

Tao also expresses intimacy in the social process (AN. 9:29, 30; LAU 1979: 100).

Tao is closely related with man, it is rooted in man. It is the entity which grows out of man's activities and is the harmonizing subject of his person and will. Its function is

¹⁰ In the first part (books one to ten) there are 39 occurrences, of which all 39 appear in Confucius' words, and in the latter part there are 50 occurrences which include 33 in Confucius' own words (HU Chih-kuei 1965: 5). For a short summary of Confucian *tao*, see H. D. SMITH 1973: 65–66. — Legge translates *tao* in the Analects in the following 21 ways: road, path, way, course, path of duty, duty, characteristic, truth, right, doctrine, principle, rule, things, studies and employments, well instructed, government, governed, order, lead, speak, say. (NIKKILÄ 1992: 69.)

¹¹ AN. 1:11. The same sentence is repeated in AN. 4:20. See also AN. 19:18; LAU 1979: 61, 75, 155; CHENG Shu-te 1974: 38–40; LIU Pao-nan & LIU Kung-mien 1973: 15–16. — AN. 4:5. Lau says that this sentence is most likely corrupt. The sentence should read: 'Poverty and low station are what men dislike, but if I got them in the right way I would not try to escape from them.' (LAU 1979: 72; cf. NIKKILÄ 1992: 70.)

¹² AN. 19:2; LAU 1979: 153. 'Ch'en regards Te and Tao as being almost interchangeable concepts in Confucius' philosophy. CH'EN Ta-ch'í 1967: 71.' (NIKKILÄ 1992: 70.) 德, 仁, 藝 (AN. 7:6), 忠恕 (AN. 4:15, 105; LEGGE 1969: 170; KARLGREN 1972: 265; WALEY 1964: 105). Wilhelm translates 忠 as 'Bevusstsein der Mitte' (WILHELM 1950: 89). See also FINGARETTE 1979. 忠 'refers to trying one's best and to keeping one's position, (as when the father has his position or rank, and the son has his and is loyal to his father, and both take care of their responsibilities.)' (CHU Hsi 1952: 23; cf. NIKKILÄ 1992: 69.) — See also AN. 4:15, 15:23, 5:11; KARLGREN 1972: 43; MAHOOD 1971: 9; MIYAZAKI 1965: 86. 忠 is interpreted as 'the mean in action' (HAMBURGER 1959: 329).

the ennoblement of one's person and self and will to act in accordance with *tao*. One's own activity is needed in order to broaden *tao*, but *tao* cannot enlarge man.¹³

Confucius' *tao* is the only right *tao*, to be distinguished from other *taos*. However, one may have a limited exchange of ideas with the supporters of other *taos* (cf. ROSEMONT 1976: 470). Confucian *tao* is of the utmost importance. It is the goal of life; one is ready to die after being told about the way. (AN. 4:8; CHU 1981: 441.)¹⁴

This summary allows us to see that the 'general *tao*' includes different characteristics. We may therefore conclude 'general *tao*' appears as a higher-level moral principle. The mutual relationships between these characteristics are not discussed. However, some problems within each characteristic was pondered to some extent, as seen above.

'Universal *tao*' is *tao* which prevails in the country or in the whole empire according to the will of Heaven or Destiny 命. The first characteristic of this universal *tao* is the *tao* of centralized authority. This means that everything in the governmental administration functions harmoniously and well. Every official has his own task to perform.¹⁵

The next characteristic is one's attitude to this *tao*. Riches must not be accepted against *tao*, when *tao* does not prevail 天下無道. To accomplish great tasks is far more important than short-sighted small gains. When *tao* prevails 天下有道, Confucius' ideas are welcomed, and he does not need to try to alter things. (AN. 8:13, 4:5, 13:17; CHANG Chien 1989: 42.)

In terms of higher-level synthesizing categories, this universal *tao* is another aspect of view to 'general *tao*', which becomes universal when it is applied universally 'under Heaven' 天下.

'*Tao* of ruling' is a principle of government administration used by kings and ministers. This *tao* requires one to rule by using *te* 德 and *li* 禮 (AN. 19:22, 3:16, 1:12; KRAMERS 1979: 59). Those who do not have *tao* must not be killed by the ruler (AN. 2:3; TS'AI Jen-hou 1986: 21; EGEROD 1990: 84; AN. 12:19). But an officer or minister should retire if he is not allowed to exercise his principles of ruling (AN. 11:23–24; RUBIN 1986: 166; EBER 1986: 144–145).

In the terms of higher-level synthesizing categories, this *tao* is the same as the preceding ones, but used in ruling. For this purpose, some lower-level categories, such as using *te* and *li*, and the attitude towards the opponents of *tao* are added. Close to this is *tao* of those who rule. This is the '*tao* of the Gentleman' 君子. This is acquired through learning 學 (AN. 19:7) and by association with those who already have it (AN. 1:14, 19:19; FINGARETTE 1972: 21). Another characteristic is the 'root' and the small *taos*. *Tao* grows in attending to the root 本, which refers to filiality 孝 and fraternal submission 弟. Opposite to these 'roots' or primary things stand the 'small *tao*' 小道

¹³ AN. 15:28. LAU 1979: 136; SHIH SAN CHING CHU SU 1977: 140; CHU Hsi 1952: 110. Chu follows this interpretation (CHU T'ien-kuang-hung 1976: 1028). CREEL 1954: 47–48; CHAN 1970: 15; TONG 1969: 522; TU Wei-ming 1989: 2.

¹⁴ AN. 6:12, 15, 17, 15:39, 40. See also AN. 2:16, 91; WALEY 1964: 91; FRANKE 1953: 75; FORKE 1925: 112–118. Watts says: 'to follow its own *tao*, because if we do not allow all other things their *tao* we cannot expect to have our own *tao*.' (WATTS 1978: 108.)

¹⁵ AN. 14:36, 38, 16:2. YANG 1959: 138. 'Verdensaltets store harmoni, tao, er et forbillede som det menneskelige samfund skal efterstræbe,....' (EGEROD 1964: 315). See also LIDIN 1974: 5–9.

such as agriculture, medicine, etc., which have their importance, 'but, if pursued too far they tend to prove a hindrance; for which reason a Gentleman does not cultivate them.' (AN. 1:2.) The Gentleman prefers *tao* over all other considerations. Modesty in appearance is an essential part of this *tao*, but it is not the only sufficient requirement.¹⁶

A Gentleman who has *tao* has no worries about the future, is decisive, reverent to superiors, generous in caring for the common people, just in employing their services, not violent, trustful in appearance, not boorish or unreasonable in speech. (AN. 5:15–16, 8:4, 14:28, 30.)

A Gentleman 君子 loves his fellow men, and the small man is easy to command. The Gentleman is pleased when he is served according to the Way. The small man 小人 is his opposite in this respect. Here again, new characteristics or lower-level categories are added according to the usage of *tao* by the Gentleman. In this context, the *tao* of an officer or *shih* 士 is worth mentioning: It entails an undemanding style of life and the heaviness of his duty. (NIKKILÄ 1992: 175–176; AN. 17:4, 13:25, 8:7, 18:2.)

In terms of the contents of *tao*, it may therefore be divided into general *tao*, universal *tao*, *tao* of ruling, *tao* of the Gentleman. Confucius himself does not use these terms. However, the materials show that *tao* does fall into these types. The division exists as a background pattern of thought, which can be seen in the Confucian usage of the concept *tao*. The discussion above shows that *tao* is a higher-level synthesizing category which has lower-level ones. Each type of *tao* has some specific lower-level categories according to its usage. This means that the relationships between the lower-level categories of *tao* are grouped according to the usage of *tao*. In other words, the lower-level categories are balanced against each other from the point of pragmatism (VAN BRAKEL & SAUNDERS 1989: 268). However, we cannot say that this balancing is done 'in regard to each other in evaluatively distinctive and proper ways' (STOCKER 1990: 172). The balancing is on quite a primitive level of thought, but what is important is that the idea is contained by *tao*.

¹⁶ AN. 1:2: 君子務本，本立，而道生，孝弟也者，其為仁之本與。LEGGE 1969: 138–139; LAU 1979: 59. Cf. ROBERTS 1966: 47. For matters which are 本, see AN. 19:12; LAU 1979: 154. Actions like sweeping and cleaning are regarded as being opposite to the basic 本 or essential concerns of the gentleman (LEGGE 1969: 343; AN. 19:4; YEN 1972: 18; AN. 15:31–32, 14:1–4).

3.3. *Te* as a higher-level synthesizing category

Te 德, virtue, includes loyalty 忠 and good faith 信 and the right kind of social environment, where right 義 prevails as well as the idea of antiquity. 'The work first, the reward afterwards' (AN. 12:10, 14:6).

Te includes taking the essential things into account:

The Master said, The men of the south have a saying, 'Without stability a man will not even make a good *shaman* or witch-doctor' 巫醫. Well said! Of the maxim: 'if you do not stabilize an act to *te*, you will get evil by it (instead of good)', the Master said, They (i.e. soothsayers) do not simply read the omens 占 The wu 巫 should read the omens. (AN. 13:22.)¹⁷

The passage apparently implies that one must not leave the essential or necessary thing undone, even though this might not be realized by outsiders: the soothsayers did not read the omens, although it should have been done. Another passage in this same spirit is one stressing that in undertakings of great moral import one should be absolute, but in lesser matters a certain latitude is allowed.¹⁸

A reciprocal attitude is related to *te*. One should meet *pao* 報, resentment, with upright dealing and *te* with *te*. (AN. 14:36; NIKKILÄ 1982: 178; NIVISON 1978-79: 53.)

Some characteristics are excluded from *te*, and others are irrelevant for *te*. 'Clever talk can confound the workings of *te*, just as small impatiences can confound great projects' 巧言亂德, 小不忽大謀 (AN. 15:26). Swiftmess to speak is incompatible with *te*. What has been heard, should be practiced first (AN. 17:14, 14:5). One's *te* should be real or genuine and not semblance (AN. 17:13; cf. the interpretation in Mencius 7:37, LEGGE 1969: 500-501).

To have wealth does not necessarily mean one possesses *te* (AN. 16:12).

Te has some characteristics which can be said to be its lower-level categories. The Analects does not discuss their mutual relationships, but does, however, pay some attention to their relationships to *te*.

In these higher-level categories *jen*, *shih*, *tao* and *te*, we can see that they are divided into lower-level categories. The mutual relationships between the lower-level categories are not investigated in any detail. Some relationships between the lower-level categories and the higher-level are discussed however. With these three categories, *tao*, *jen* and *te*, Confucius approaches pluralism, but there is little attempt to investigate and define their contents rationally.

¹⁷ KREMSMAYER 1956: 66-77; THIEL 1969: 149-204; NIKKILÄ 1982: 44-45, 53-54. The statement on *te* is a quotation from the I Ching 32,3, the Hang Hexagram (LEGGE 1963). See also CHU Hsi 1952: 92; cf. NIKKILÄ 1992: 57.

¹⁸ AN. 19:11, 226. 'Undertakings of great moral import are matters such as loyalty, keeping promises, obedience to parents, the laws which govern conduct. WALEY 1964: 226. This interpretation follows Chu Hsi, who interprets 大德 as big things and 小德 as small things. CHU Hsi 1952: 133. These have also been interpreted as good people and less good people. CH'ENG Shu-te 1974: 1141.' (NIKKILÄ 1992: 57.)

The materials above testify that Confucius did speak about the qualitative differences between values. He spoke about different sorts of goods, not different sources of the same good, as monists do. In the qualitative differences of values, Confucius has the following points of pluralism: He discusses different values, places them into an order of preference, but some values are indifferent, some values are sacrificed for others, some values may be forgone as not as important as that value which is chosen. A value which is not preferred, can be obtained only when certain conditions prevail. He places values into an order of preference. He has schemes in which all the values of the lower rank are subsumed in the higher rank.

Confucius has a special pattern of thought which contains the idea of lack or negative characteristics. This coincides with the second mark of plurality. If we take the plurality and see it in the light of Confucius' opinions about lacks, we get a more sophisticated pattern of thought than that which Stocker offers. Stocker views the defects as negative phenomena, but Confucius sees the positive sides as well. The agent must have certain negative characteristics in order to have the good life. Moreover, such characteristics vary in their strength, and Confucius assessed the lacks in this respect. Some are necessary and some are only recommended, and some are allowed. If we see this in terms of pluralism, this respect for lacks in Confucius' pluralism is more sophisticated than that of Stocker's.

In the higher-level synthesizing categories, the Analects testify to the existence of such categories. In the case of *tao*, *jen* and *te*, we note that these are divided into lower-level categories. However, Confucius handles these on a less rational level than he should if he were a strong pluralist. He discusses the relationships between the lower-level and higher-level categories, but mainly leaves the relationships between the lower-level categories without attention, except that in connection with *tao* he has different lower-level characteristics according to the usage of *tao*.

The lack of rational thinking which is in Confucius' thinking about lower-level categories of the higher-level synthesizing categories is offset by the more sophisticated thinking in his ideas of lack. This notion corrects the weaknesses of Confucius' position as a pluralist and redeems to some extent his chances of approaching proper choices.

When we assess Confucius' moral thinking, we can see that his intention and the main direction of his moral thought was that of a pluralist. Since he displayed a rich and deep thinking about the negative characteristics, a closer study of these could reveal new features in his moral thinking.

We do not do justice to the materials if we label his thinking exclusively as monism, since methodologically he has clear and distinct features of pluralism. On the other hand, we cannot label him exclusively a pluralist either, because part of his thinking about higher-level synthesizing categories and the lower-level categories lacks sufficiently distinct and proper balancing (STOCKER 1990: 172), and consequently it cannot be said that it follows pluralism. On the other hand, we cannot expect this kind of rational quality in thinking which is from the time when philosophical thinking was only beginning on Chinese soil. Nevertheless, the materials show that in some aspects the thinking is quite well developed rationally, for example in the sophisticated discussion of lacks.

Since Confucius' thinking may be said to inhabit the ground between monism and pluralism and has taken into account different values we may pose the question of whether he sees any contradictions between different values, whether he recognizes moral dilemmas.