ON THE KIRĀTĀRJUNĪYA 2.45: YĀPAYATI RECONSIDERED

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Since I encountered vt. 3 *rañjer nau mrgaramaņe* on P. 6.4.24, I have been interested in the usage of the causative. In Pāli canonical literature, *yāpeti*, among others, occurs, in almost all cases, as an intransitive, while in post-canonical literature it appears not only as an intransitive but also as a transitive. In both of them it figuratively means 'to keep going, to keep up, esp. to keep oneself going or alive, to live by',¹ except for few examples.² In Sanskrit literature, *yāpayati* corresponding to *yāpeti* seems to be employed only as a transitive, and a direct object (*karman*-) construed with it is, in not a few cases, time (*kālam*),³ such as the day (*divasam*),⁴ the night (*rātrim*)⁵ or the like. In this paper I consider the causative construction *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajaṁ yāpayanti* taking into account three types of causation, P. 5.4.60, the Pāli usage, Mallinātha's commentary and Roodbergen's interpretation.

¹ PED 554.

² Ja VI 458 Vedeham sasenāvāhanam yāpesi, Pj II 184 devalokam [someone] yāpetum, Att 25 kālam yāpetvā.

³ Pañcat III 9 (p. 165) kasmimścin nagare bhiksāṭanam kṛtvā mahati devālaye kālam yāpayati, Kārta 8.98 yamaniyamatapobhir yāpayām āsa kālam, Gaṅgavainśa 109 sakhi, idānīm tarhi kas tava sakhyāḥ kālayāpanopāyaḥ?, Tapatī 4.7 prose vayasya, kenedānīm vinodena sahacarīvipravāsamalīmasam kālam yāpayāmi, Kṛṣṇa 2.47 prose ciram vanavihāreṇaiva samayo yāpitaḥ, Koṭi 43 vakrālāpaiḥ kamapi samayam yāpayām cakratus tau.

⁴ Mālav III 2 prose athemam divasašeşam ucitavyāpāravimukhena cetasā kva nu khalu yāpayāmi, Bhāminī 7 tāvat kokila virasān yāpaya divasān vanāntare nivasan, Subhadrā 3.1 prose vāsarasyāsya yāpanasādhanam, Vicāratilaka ad loc. sakhā narmālāpādinā kālayāpanadakṣaḥ.

⁵ Megha (uttaramegha) 29 nītā rātriḥ kṣaṇa iva mayā sārdham icchāratair yā, tām evoṣṇair virahamahatīm aśrubhir yāpayantīm, Nemi 97 rātrim samvatsaraśatasamām vīkṣate sannagātrī, tām evoṣṇair virahajanitair aśrubhir yāpayantī, Bhāva 14 yasmin dātari yāpayanti ta ime hreṣāsvanair bṛmhitair vāmānām karakankaṇadhvanibhir apy ujjāgarā yāminīh, 42, 64, 66; Vik pp. 33, 51, 173, 198; Bṛpp. 4, 47, 115, 180, 276, 295, 342, 372, 410, 494, 514, 532.

The present stanza runs as follows:

suhrdah sahajās tathetare matam esām na vilanghayanti ye, vinayād iva yāpayanti te dhrtarāstrātmajam ātmasiddhaye.

The allies, natural and otherwise (of the Vṛṣṇayas), who do not betray (them), cause the son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra to pass time by obliging him, so to speak, for the sake of their own survival. (Roodbergen)⁶

Mallinātha comments: ... ātmasiddhaye [i.e.] ātmajīvanārtham, dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam [i.e.] duryodhanam, vinayād [i.e.] ānukūlyād iva, yāpayanti [i.e.] kālam gamayanti. kāryakāle tu vṛṣṇipakṣapraveśina evety arthaḥ.

Roodbergen translates: ... *Yāpayanti* (means) *kālaṁ gamayanti* 'they make (him) pass (his) time'. This is to say that when, however, the time of action has come, they will definitely choose the side of the Vṛṣṇayas.⁷

He notes as follows:

Here the non-causative construction is (1) *kālo gacchati* 'time goes'. The complete corresponding causative construction is (2) *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajaḥ kālaṁ gamayati* 'the son of Dhṛtarāṣṭrā causes time to go', i.e. he passes time. Here *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmaja* represents the agent of the causative construction and *kāla* the non-causative agent which has become the causative object (P. 1.4.52). It is perhaps worth noting that *kāla* here functions as the real object, not as an accusative word indicating the duration of the action like in *māsam āsayati devadattam* 'he makes Devadatta stay for a month' (*Bh.* No. 15 on *Vt.* VIII on P. 1.4.52, see *KARA*, p. 249). The double causative construction is (3) *suhṛdo dhṛṭarāṣṭrātmajena kālaṁ gamayanti* 'the allies cause the son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra to pass time'. Here the word representing the agent of the causative construction is put in the instrumental by P. 2.3.18 (*kartari*). If this is correct and if what holds for *gam*- holds for *yā-* too, the question is why Bhāravi, rather ungrammatically, chose to say *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam* instead of *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajena*. The answer can only be: *metri causa*.⁸

8 Roodbergen 1984: 436, note 352.

I.

⁶ Roodbergen 1984: 133.

⁷ Roodbergen 1984: 134.

What attracts our attention is that he interprets Bhāravi's usage *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam* yāpayanti as ungrammatical, that is, deviate from the grammatical double causative construction *dhṛṭarāṣṭrātmajena yāpayanti* taking into consideration Mallinātha's paraphrase, and that, consequently, he attributes it to the *metri causa*.⁹

II.

The causation (*hetumat-*) expressed by *-i*[n*ic*], in other words, the activity of the inciter [of an independent agent] (*prayojakavyāpāra-*) is classified into three types: (1) a command (*preṣaṇa-*), (2) an entreaty (*adhyeṣaṇa-*) and (3) any act fit for that (*tatsamarthācaraṇa-*). One is an incitation of an inferior by a superior, while another is that of a superior by an inferior or an equal. The other is any conduct favorable for the activity of the one to be incited (*prayojavyāpārānukūlācaraṇa-*).¹⁰

Yajñadatta commands or entreats Devadatta to go on: Go on (*yāhi*) or please go on (*yātu bhavān*). And D goes on (*yāti devadattaḥ*). In this case, with regard to Y, one says: He causes D to go on (*devadattaṁ yāpayati*). Remaining silent without commanding or entreating D to go on, Y provides D with, e.g. food and drink (*devadattāyānnapānaṁ dadāti*), while D goes on (*yāti devadattaḥ*) owing to it. Or, if both D and Y are kings and if D is more powerful, Y does not attack D (*devadattasyābhiyogaṁ na karoti*) or Y falls under D's control (*devadattasya vaśaṁ yāti*) or Y curries favor with D (*devadattam anukūlayati*) on account of his survival while D goes on (*yāti devadattaḥ*). That is to say, Y plays for time (*kālakṣepaṁ karoti*) while D goes on (*yāti devadattaḥ*). Each of these is nothing else but any act favorable for D's going on. In this case also, with regard to Y, one says: He causes D to go on (*devadattaṁ yāpayati*).

Next, Y commands or entreats time to go on: Go on or please go on. If time went on $(k\bar{a}lo y\bar{a}ti)$ according to Y's intention, with regard to Y one would say: He causes time to go on $(k\bar{a}lam y\bar{a}payati)$. But, in reality, time goes on $(k\bar{a}lo y\bar{a}ti)$ independently of Y's intentions or activities. As for Y, he does a certain act during the time. For example, he walks (*gacchati*), stands (*tisthati*), sits (*āste*) and lies down

⁹ The present metre (___, __, __, __, __, __, __, __, __) is called *lalitā, viyoginī*, etc. Cf. Roodbergen 1984: 81. This is a variety of vaitālīya (6 moras, ____, __, __ / 8 moras, ____, __, __). Cf., e.g. Pingala 4.32 *vaitālīyam dvihsvarā* [7 × 2] (*l-ah* 12) *ayukpāde, yugvasavo* [8 × 2] '*nte r-l-g-ah*; 1.15 *aṣṭau vasava iti*; 1.3 *kā gu-hā r*; 1.9 *gr l*; 1.10 (gr 9) *g ante*; 11 *ghr-ādi-parah* (gr 9, g 10); 12 *he* (g 10); 13 *l-au sa-h* [= g]; the word *svara-* means "7" according to the commentary on 4.14. Cf. also Amara 1.8.1 *niṣadarṣabha...sapta...svarāḥ* and the commentaries on 1.1.10 *āditya-viśva-vasavaş...*

¹⁰ Cf. P. 1.4.55, 3.1.26; Kaiyaṭa on Bh III on 3.1.26; Nāgeśa ad loc.; Cardona 1997: 187–188, 192 §288.

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(*śete*), that is, lives (*vartate*); or, he curries favor with D (*devadattam anukūlayati*), in other words, he plays for time (*kālakṣepaṁ karoti*). Each of these amounts to any act favorable for the going on of time. And so, with regard to Y, one says: He causes time to go on (*kālaṁ yāpayati*). Therefore, in a certain context, the phrase *devadattaṁ yāpayati* corresponds to *kālaṁ yāpayati*. The trouble is that what specific meaning is intended by such a phrase as *devadattaṁ yāpayati* 'he causes D to go on' or as *kālaṁ yāpayati* 'he causes time to go on' depends entirely on the situation in which it is uttered.¹¹

III.

The Kāśikā comments on P. 5.4.60 samayāc ca (dāc 57) yāpanāyām (kṛñaḥ 58, yoge 50) as follows: kṛña ity eva. kṛṣāv iti nivṛttam. kartavyasyāvasaraprāptiḥ samayaḥ. tasyātikramaṇam yāpanā. samayaśabdād yāpanāyām gamyamānāyām dāc pratyayo bhavati kṛño yoge. samayā karoti. samayam yāpayati kālakṣepam karotīty arthaḥ. yāpanāyām iti kim. samayam karoti.

The wording $k_r \tilde{n}ah$ only [is recurred]. The wording $k_r sau$ is ceased to recur. The word samaya- "time" means 'the arrival of an opportunity [i.e. the time proper] for a task'. The word $y \bar{a} pan \bar{a}$ - does 'the passing over of that [proper time, i.e. procrastination]'. When procrastination is understood, the [secondary] suffix \bar{a} { $d\bar{a}c$ } occurs after the word samaya- on condition that the word is construed with the root k_r -. [The motivation of providing the present rule is the phrase] samayā karoti 'he passes over the proper time', which means 'he causes the proper time to go on, that is, he allows the proper time to pass away'. What [is the motivation of] the wording yāpanāyām? [It is the phrase] samayam karoti 'he makes an agreement'.¹²

The present rule is introduced into, among others, Candragomin's grammar as follows: C 4.4.44 samayād (dac 4) yāpanāyām (krña 42, yoge 35). The interpretation of the Kāśikā is substantially the same as that of Candragomin.¹³ And their interpretation is followed by Pāṇinians and Non-Pāṇinians. This suggests, I think, that yāpana- 'causing to go on' corresponds, in a certain context, to kālayāpana- 'causing time to go on', and that, as for Pāṇini, the feminine yāpanā-

¹¹ Cf. Tattvabodhinī on SK 2576 (on 3.1.26); sarvānugatam pravartanāsāmānyam ņico'rthaḥ, visesās tv arthaprakaraņādigamyāh.

¹² Cf. Amara 3.3.149 *samayāḥ sapatha-ācāra-kāla-siddhānta-samvid-aḥ*; a certain commentary ad loc.; *seṣe, samkete samayaḥ prokto niyame 'vasare 'pi ca iti.*

¹³ Samayād yāpanāyām gamyamānāyām dāj bhavati karotinā yoge. samayā karoti. kālaharaṇam karotīty arthah. yāpanāyām iti kim samayam karoti.

is a special case of *kālayāpana-*, that is, procrastination. Thus *kālayāpana-* means, on the one hand, 'delay, procrastination', 'frittering away the time', 'killing time' or 'biding one's time, gaining time, playing for time'.¹⁴ On the other hand, taking into account causation (3) above in II, it implies 'any act favorable for the going on of time' (*kālayānānukūlācaraṇa-*), say 'the sustenance of oneself, one's body or one's life' (*ātmayāpana-*, *dehayāpana-*, *prāṇayāpana-*),¹⁵ which corresponds to 'the subsistence of one's body or one's life' (*dehayātrā-*, *sārīrayātrā-*, *prāṇayātrā-*).¹⁶ In the same way, *devadattayāpana-* 'causing D to go on, i.e. subsist' implies *devadattayānānukūlācaraṇa-* 'any act favorable for D's subsistence', say *kālayāpana-/kālaksepa-* 'playing for time, biding one's time'.

IV.

In Pāli canonical literature, *yāpeti*¹⁷ generally occurs as an intransitive, figuratively meaning 'to keep going, i.e. to subsist' in contrast to *atināmeti* or *vītināmeti*¹⁸ construed, in most cases, with a direct object (*karman-*) referring to the notion of time, while, in post-canonical literature, such a commentator as Buddhaghosa or Dhammapāla paraphrases it with *attabhāvain gameti/pavatteti*¹⁹ (he keeps his body going) besides employing *yāpeti* as a transitive such as *sarīrain/attabhāvain/jīvain yāpeti*²⁰ (he keeps his body or his life going). With regard to *yāpeti* as an intransitive, Edgerton thinks that it is originally *kālain yāpeti*²¹ (he keeps time

¹⁴ Cf. notes 3–5; Kām 9.14.1 (= Śukran 4.7.237 = Hit p. 103), 18.27.31; Hit p. 41 kālayāpanam, p. 76 kālayāpaḥ; Nalod 2.18 navadāmasamāpanayāpanayā, the commentary ad loc. yāpanā kālaharaņam.

¹⁵ The Jayamangalā on Kāmas 1.4.2 yātrāvasād veti: yatra vā syād yāpanam [, i.e.] sarīrasthitih, on Kāmas 4.1.32 tadanurūpam [, i.e.] āyānurūpam [vyayam kuryāt] kālayāpanārtham. Cf. Pañcat II 6 (p. 126) kandaih phalair munivarā gamayanti kālam (= ŚārigP p. 49, but kṣapayanti instead of gamayanti); Mbh 3.246.6, 12.206.17, 12.15.24–25; Daśak 197, commentaries and subcommentaries on P. 6.1.146 āspadam pratisthāyām.

¹⁶ Cf. Mbh 12.205.14 yātrārtham adyād āhāram vyādhito bheşajam yathā, Śrīk 7.31, Kathās 52.101, Bhag 3.8, BhāgP 4.23.20, Mālat pp. 23–24, Suśr sū 1.4; Cakrapāņidatta on Caraka śā 5.12; Aruņadatta on Asṭah sū 5.51–52. Cf. also Med p. 128 yātrā tu yāpane [i.e. vartane] 'pi syād gamanotsavayoḥ striyām, p. 90 yāpanam vartane (living on, subsisting) kālaksepe (procrastination) nirasane 'pi ca.

¹⁷ Cf., e.g. AN V 270 yo manusānām āhāro, tena so tattha yāpeti, tena so tattha tiṭṭhati, etc.

¹⁸ Cf., e.g. AN I 206 divasam atināmeti, Vin I 155 so tam sattāham bahiddhā vītināmeti, etc.
19 Pj I 212 yāpenti [i.e.] attabhāvam gamenti, Pv-a 29 = Thī-a 208 yāpenti [i.e.] attabhāvam pavattenti.

²⁰ Cf., e.g. Sv III 852 attanā ca jīvāhī ti sayañ ca jīvaṁ yāpehī ti attho, Th-a III 99 so ... āhārena sarīraṁ yāpetuṁ, Ud-a 330 attabhāvaṁ yāpento, etc.

²¹ BHSD 446.

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going), while Buddhaghosa and Dhāmmapāla, among others, are of the opinion that its origin is *attabhāvaṁ yāpeti*²² (he keeps his body going). Because the causation is (3) in both cases, *kālaṁ yāpeti* (he keeps time going) means, in a certain context, *yāti* (he keeps going), *jīvati* (he is alive) or the like, while *attabhāvaṁ yāpeti* (he keeps his body going) means *āhāraṁ āhāreti* (he takes food), *udakaṁ pivati* (he drinks water), etc. in short, *yāti*, *jīvati*. Thus *kālaṁ yāpeti* amounts, in a certain context, to *attabhāvaṁ yāpeti*. Therefore *yāpeti* is equivalent to both of them.

The question is which of these two interpretations is on the mark. 1) In canonical literature, *yāpeti* occurs, in almost all the cases, as an intransitive.²³ 2) There are a few cases in which it is construed with an accusative word expressing the notion of time,²⁴ which may refer to a direct object or may be an adverbial expressing the entire connection of time with an action, etc.²⁵ 3) In view of the wording samayāt, the word yāpanā- in P. 5.4.60 refers, without any doubt, to time, not to a person nor to his or her body. 4) This causes us to presuppose such a phrase as kālam yāpayati (he keeps time going), not śarīram yāpayati (he keeps his body going). From these I would like to suggest the following working hypothesis. i) 1 and 2 correspond to or reflect 3 and 4 respectively. ii) Therefore the accusative word expressing the notion of time in 2 is a direct object (karman-), not an adverbial expressing duration. iii) Such a phrase as kālam vāpeti (he causes time to go) is used side by side with kālam atināmeti/vītināmeti at onea stage, but the latter becomes dominant at the stage of canonical literature.²⁶ iv) As for the phrase kālam yāpeti, it comes to exclusively imply yāti (he keeps going, i.e. subsists); and so, one says only "vapeti"27 without taking the trouble to say "kalam yāpeti"; consequently, yāpeti amounts to a stereotyped expression, and is employed as if it were an intransitive denoting 'he keeps himself going, i.e. subsists'; it is, in almost all the cases, this *vāpeti* that we meet in canonical literature. That is to say, the string is "kālo yāti (time keeps going) > kālam yāpeti (he keeps time going) > yāpeti (he keeps himself going)", not "kāyo yāti (his body keeps going) > kāyam

²² Sp II 481 yāpetum [i.e.] gametum. Cf. notes 19–20, Sd (677) gamu gatiyam, Sd (680) yā gatipāpuņesu, Sd (1547) yapa yāpane: Yāpanam pavattanam.

²³ Cf. note 17.

²⁴ Pv III. 5.1 angutthasnehena yāpesi rattim, DN III 73 te ... sattāham vanamūlaphalāhārā yāpeyyanti and MN I 151 imam me nivāpam nivuttam migajātā paribhuñjantā dīghāyuko vaņņavanto ciram dīgham addhānam yāpentu.

²⁵ P. 1.4.52 gati- ... -akarmakānām aņikartā sa ņau (karma 49), 2.3.2 karmaņi dvitīyā, Sd 587 gati- ... sayādīnām kārite vā (dutiyā 580); P. 2.3.5 [kuriyāguņadravyaih] kālādhvanor atyantasamyoge (dvitīyā 2), Sd 581 kālāddhānam accantasamyoge (dutiyā 580).

²⁶ Cf. note 18.

²⁷ Cf. As 404 (= Nidd-a II 344) yātrā ca me bhavissatī ti yāpanā ca me bhavissati.

 $y\bar{a}peti$ (he keeps his body going) > $y\bar{a}peti$ (he keeps himself going)", nor " $k\bar{a}yo$ $y\bar{a}ti > k\bar{a}ya\dot{m} y\bar{a}peti > k\bar{a}la\dot{m} k\bar{a}ya\dot{m} y\bar{a}peti$ (he keeps his body going during the time) > $k\bar{a}la\dot{m} y\bar{a}peti$ (he keeps himself going during the time) > $y\bar{a}peti$ (he keeps himself going)". v) In post-canonical literature, side by side with the employment of such a phrase as $sarīra\dot{m}/attabh\bar{a}va\dot{m}/\bar{j}va\dot{m} y\bar{a}peti$, commentators paraphrase $y\bar{a}peti$ (he keeps himself going, i.e. subsists) by $attabh\bar{a}va\dot{m} y\bar{a}peti$ (he keeps his body going, i.e. sustains his body) so that one can easily understand the meaning of the apparently ungrammatical expression. Therefore I think that Edgerton's interpretation is on the mark.

To sum up, what holds for *kālam* yāpayati does for *kālam* yāpeti, too. "He causes time to go" means 'he delays, procrastinates²⁸ [, fritters away the time, kills time, bides his time, gains time or plays for time as the case may be]'. In addition, it exclusively implies *attabhāvam* yāpeti (he causes his body to go, i.e. to subsist),²⁹ which connects, I believe, to *devadattam* yāpayati³⁰ (he causes D to subsist, i.e. he allows D to subsist).

V. CONCLUSION

As I have quoted above in I, according to Roodbergen, Bhāravi could not help saying *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajaṁ yāpayanti* due to the *metri causa* though he should have employed the double causative construction *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajena yāpayanti* (= *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajena kālaṁ gamayanti*). As for the double causative construction itself, it is correct. The Kāśikā on P. 1.4.52 says: *aṇy(antānām) iti kiṁ gamayati devadatto yajñadattaṁ; tam aparaḥ prayuṅkte: gamayati devadattena yajñadattaṁ viṣṇumitraḥ*.

What is [the motivation of] *aņi* [in the wording *aṇikartā*]? [To begin with, D says to Y: Go (*gaccha*). And Y goes (*gacchati yajñadattaḥ*). With regard to D,

²⁸ Att 25 vankamaggena gacchantī komalatāya sīgham gantum asakkontī kālam yāpetvā.

²⁹ Cf. Mp I 328 pabbajitvā kālam vītināmessāmi.

³⁰ Cf. Suśr sū 14.3 sa (= rasaḥ) ... krtsnam śarīram aharahas tarpayati vardhayati dhārayati yāpayati cādrstahetukena karmaņā, Dalhaņa ad loc. [śarīram] yāpayatīti vrddham [vāpayati tasya] ksīyamāņadehatvāt; ni 1.12 prāņodānau ... mārutāh pañca yāpayanti śarīriņam, Dalhaņa ad loc. yāpayanti [i.e.] dhārayanti; śā 9.5 etābhir (= ūrdhvagadhamanībhir) ūrdhvam nābher udara-···-bāhavo dhāryante yāpyante ca; śā 9.7 etābhir (= adhogamadhamanībhir) adho nābheḥ pakvāśaya-···-sakthīni dhāryante yāpyante ca; Caraka vi 1.4 te (= ṣaḍrasāḥ) ... śarīram yāpayanti; Aruņadatta on Astah sū 1.7 avikŗtāh punar deham vartayanti [i.e.] yāpayanti; Astas sū 2.24 sa (= vaidyaḥ) pādahīnān apy ārtān guņavān yac ca yāpayet; śā 6.93 tena (= annena) eva ca ... śarīrayantram ... svāsthyabalopacayayuktam ... yāpyate; Divy 498–499 tayā sa dārako yāpitaḥ pālito vardhitaḥ; Loka-n 177 manussā ... sakarañño puttabhariyā vā itthāgāre vā amacce vā nāgare vā yāpenti, 180 tumhe ... nāgare ca amacce ca yāpetha.

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one says:] D causes Y to go. Someone else [, say V,] incites [, in his turn,] him [to cause Y to go in such a way as this: Cause Y to go (*gamaya yajñadattam*)]. [And D causes Y to go (*gamayati devadatto yajñadattam*) in the same way. In this case, the wording *ani* prevents the technical term *karman-* "direct object" from being applied to such a causal agent as D. And so, the causal agent D is put in the instrumental by P. 2.3.18. Consequently, with regard to V, one says:] *gamayati devadattena yajñadattam viṣṇumitraḥ* [(V causes D to cause Y to go). Thus the present motivation is such a double causative construction].³¹

To return to the subject, Roodbergen seems to take it for granted that the present direct object is *kālam*, not *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam*, partly because he keeps in mind "The *PW*, s.v. *yā*-, Caus. *yāpayati* 2), records the meaning *verstreichen lassen*, *zubrigen (eine Zeit)* [...] BHSGD, II, s.v. *yāpayati*, records sub (2) an intransitive usage, with ellipsis of *kālam* which in Skt means *spends time* [...] Cappeler's rendering [...] with reference to the Divyāvadāna in the sense of 'to cause to subsist, maintain', s.v. *yā*-. Here [...], see BHSGD, II, s.v. *yāpayati*, (1) trans., *nourishes, maintains*", and partly because, in his opinion, Mallinātha paraphrases *yāpayanti* by *kālam gamayanti*.³²

1) As far as the causative construction is concerned, not only kālam yāpayanti but also dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam yāpayanti is correct. From the definition of a causal agent (hetu-) given by P. 1.4.55 tatprayojako hetuś ca (kartā 54), it is clear that both of them premise kālo yāti (time goes on) and dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajo yāti (the son of Dh goes on, i.e. subsists) respectively. 2) The former causative construction, equivalent to kālayānānukūlācaraṇam kurvanti, implies, in a certain context, kālakṣepam kurvanti (they play for time; they bide their time), and the latter, equivalent to dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajayānānukūlācaraṇam kurvanti, does the same, e.g. kālakṣepam kurvanti. 3) In the present stanza, there is nothing to reveal to us that Bhāravi intended the double causative construction dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajena [kālam] yāpayanti with the causative construction dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam jāpayanti. 4) It is, I believe, not yāpayanti, but dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam ... yāpayanti that Mallinātha paraphrases with kālam gamayanti.³³ In other words, he does not, in my opinion, regard the present causative construction as a double causative due to the metri causa. If it were a

³¹ The interpretation of the Kāśikā is followed by Bhaṭṭoji and Nāgeśa without any objection. Cf. SK 540 (on P. 1.4.52) and Nāgeśa on SK 540.

³² Roodbergen 1984: 436, note 352.

³³ Cf. Mallinātha, e.g. on Kir 2.2 parito vīkṣya, samantato vivicya, where it is not vīkṣya, but parito vīkṣya that he paraphrases with samantato vivicya; 2.6 nirūdhim āgatā, prasiddhim gatā, 2.15 viṣādena samam, anutsāhena saha and 1.8 bhūtim samunnayann, utkarṣam āpādayan. The same is true with the present case, though a few words intervene between dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajam and yāpayanti.

double causative construction due to the metri causa, he would paraphrase it with, for example, *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajaṁ duryodhanaṁ vinayād ānukūlyād iva yāpayanti*, [i.e.] *tena duryodhanena kālaṁ gamayanti* (they cause that very Duryodhana to cause time to go on), because, unlike Bhāravi, he is free from the restrictions of the metre. Therefore against Roodbergen, I interpret Mallinātha's paraphrase *dhṛtarāṣṭrātmajaṁ duryodhanaṁ ... yāpayanti, kālaṁ gamayanti* as follows: They allow the son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra, i.e. Duryodhana to subsist; in short, they bide their time. This smoothly connects to his following comment *kāryakāle tu vṣṣṇipakṣapraveśina evety arthah*, and to his introduction to the preceding stanza as well: *nanu titikṣayā kālakṣepe duryodhanaḥ sarvān rājño vasīkuryād ity atrāha* "But if there is a lapse of time due to forbearance, wouldn't bring Duryodhana all (other) kings under his control? With regard to this (question the speaker) says:" (Roodbergen 1984).

ABBREVIATIONS³⁴ AND LITERATURE

а	aṭṭhakathā.
Amara	Amarakośa (A.A. Ramanathan, Amarakośa with the Unpublished South Indian Commentaries, pts 1–3, Madras, 1971–1983).
an	Anguttaranikāya.
As	Atthasālinī.
Așțah	Aştāngahrdaya (Pt. Hariśāstrī Parādkar, Astāngahrdaya of Vāgbhata with Aruṇadatta's Sarvāngasundarā & Hemādri's āyurvedarasāyaṇa, Varanasi, 1982).
A <u>ș</u> țas	Aşṭāṅgasaṁgraha (R. Kinjavadekara, Aṣṭāṅga-Sangraha with Indu's Śaśilekhā Commentary, Delhi, 1990).
Att	Hatthavanagallavihāravamsa.
Bh	Mahābhāşya (S. Sharma & R.K. Shastri, Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya of Patañjali with Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa & Nāgeśa's Uddyota, vol. III, Delhi, 1988)
Bhag	Bhagavadgītā (S.J. Shambhu Sadhale, The Bhagavadgītā with Eleven Commentaries, vol. I, Delhi, 1985).
BhāgP	Bhāgavatapurāņa (J.L. Shastri, Bhāgavata Purāņa with the Commentary of Srīdhara Svāmin, Delhi, 1983).
Bhāminī	Bhāminīvilāsa (E.V. Dapade & D.G. Apte, Bhāminīvilāsa of Jagannath Pandit, Delhi 1994).
Bhāva	Bhāvavilāsaḥ (in The Kāvyamālā 2, ed. P. Durgāprasād, K.P. Parab & V.L.S. Panshīkar, Varanasi, 1988).
BHSD	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary.

³⁴ With regard to the abbreviations of Pāli texts (PTS), I follow von Hinüber 1997, except for Sd (Saddanīti).

Bŗ	Bṛhatkathāślokasam graha (R.P. Poddar & N. Sinha, Buddhasvāmin's Bṛhatkathā Ślokasamgraha, Varanasi, 1986).
С	Candragomin's sūtra (in Cāndravyākaraņa of Candragomin, pts. 1–2, ed. K.C. Chatterji, Poona, 1953–1961).
Caraka	Carakasamhitā (V.J. Trikamji, The Charakasamhitā of Agniveśa with the āyurveda- Dīpikā Commentary of Chakrapāṇidatta, New Delhi, 1981).
Daśak	Daśakumāracarita (M.R. Kale, The Daśakumāracarita of Daṇḍin, Delhi, 1966).
Divy	Divyāvadāna (E.B. Cowell & R.A. Neil, The Divyāvadāna, Delhi, 1987).
DN	Dīghanikāya.
Gangavan	inśa Gangavamśānucarita (A. Thakur, Gangavamśānucaritam, Patna, 1982).
Hit	Hitopadeśa (M.R. Kāle, The Hitopadeśa of Nārāyaṇa, Delhi, 1967).
Ja	Jātaka.
Kām	Kāmandakīyanītisāra (R.R. Lala Mitra, The Nītisāra by Kāmandakī, Calcutta, 1982)
Kāmas	Kāmasūtra (D. ´Sāstrī, The Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana with Yaśodhara's Jayamaṅgalā, Varanasi, 1982).
Kārta	Kārtavīryodaya (J. Schneider, Sukṛtidatta Pantas Kārtavīryodaya, Swisttal-Odendorf, 1996).
Kāśikā	Kāśikāvṛtti (D.D. Shastri & K.P. Shukla, The Kāśikāvṛtti with Haradatta's Padamañjarī & Jinendrabuddhi's Nyāsa, pts. 1–6, Varanasi, 1965–67).
Kathās	Kathāsaritsāgara (NSP edition).
Kir	Kirātārjunīya (M.P. Durgāprasād & K.P. Parab, The Kirātārjunīya of Bhāravi with the Commentary Ghaṇṭāpatha of Mallinātha, Bombay, 1933).
Koți	Koțiviraham (in The Kāvyamālā 5, ed. P. Durgāprasāda & K.P. Parab, Varanasi, 1988).
Kṛṣṇa	Kṛṣṇakutūhala (H. Ojhā, Kṛṣṇakutūhalam, Varanasi, 1990).
Loka-n	Lokaneyyappakarana.
Mālav	Mālavikāgnimitra (R.D. Karmarkar, Mālavikāgnimitra of Kālidāsa, Delhi, 2002).
Mālat	Mālatīmādhava (R.G. Bhandarkar, Mālatī-Mādhava of Bhavabhūti with the Commentary of Jagaddhara, Poona, 1970).
Mbh	Mahābhārata (Poona Critical Edition).
Med	Medinīkośa (J. S. Hośhing, Medinīkośa of Śrī Medinīkara, Varanasi, 1968).
Megha	Meghadūta (M.R. Kale, The Meghadūta of Kālidāsa, Delhi, 1969).
MN	Majjhimanikāya,
Mp	Manorathapūraņī.
Nalod	Nalodaya (K.K. Hariharan, Nalodaya with the Commentary Kavihṛdayadarpaṇa, Delhi, 1995).
Nemi	Nemidūtam (in The Kāvyamālā 2, ed. P. Durgāprasād, K.P. Parab & V.L.S. Panshīkar, Varanasi, 1988).
ni	nidānasthāna.
Nidd-a	Niddesa-a (= Saddhammapajjotikā).
Р	Pāņini-sūtra.
Pañcat	Pañcatantra (M.R. Kale, Pañcatantra of Viṣṇuśarman, Delhi, 1991).
PED	Pali–English Dictionary.
Piṅgala	Pingala's Chandaḥsūtra (Pt. Kedaranātha, Chandaḥśāstram of Pingalanāga, Delhi, 1994).
Pj	Paramatthajotikā.
Pv	Petavatthu.

śā	śārīrasthāna.
ŚārṅgP	Śārṅgadharapaddhati (P. Peterson, Śārṅgadharapaddhati, Delhi, 1987).
Sd	Saddanīti.
SK	Siddhāntakaumudī (Giridharaśarma and Ānandaśarma, Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakaumudī with Bālamanoramā and Tattvabodhinī, pts 1–4, Delhi, 1977–1979).
Sp	Samantapāsādikā.
Śrīk	Śrīkaṇṭhacarita (The editor's name not mentioned, Śrīkaṇṭhacaritam of Maṅkhaka with the Sanskrit Commentary of Jonarāja, Delhi, 1983).
sū	sūtrasthāna.
Subhadr	ā Subhadrādhanañjaya (N.P. Unni & B.M. Sullivan, The Kūṭiyāṭṭam Drama Subhadrā- Dhanañjaya with Vicāratilaka Commentary, Delhi, 2001).
Śukran	Śukranīti (B. Miśra, Śukranīti, Varanasi, 1999).
Suśr	Suśrutasamhitā (V.J. Trikamji & N. Rām, Suśrutasamhitā of Suśruta with the Nibandhasamgraha Commentary of Śrī Dalhaṇāchārya, Varanasi/Delhi, 1980).
Sv	Sumangalavilāsinī.
Tapatī	Tapatīsamvaraņa (N.P. Unni & B.M. Sullivan, Tapatī-Samvaraņam, Delhi, 1995).
Th	Theragāthā.
Thī	Therīgāthā.
Ud	Udāna.
vi	vimānasthāna.
Vik	Vikramacarita (F. Edgerton, Vikrama's Adventures, pt. 2, Delhi, 1993).
Vin	Vinayapiṭaka.
vt	vārttika (in The Vyākaraņa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, ed. F. Kielhorn & rev. K.V. Abhyankar, vol III, Poona, 1972).
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