

IBN WAḤSHIYYA ON THE SOUL

NEOPLATONIC SOUL DOCTRINE AND THE TREATISE ON THE SOUL CONTAINED IN THE NABATEAN AGRICULTURE

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1. NABATEAN AGRICULTURE AND THE SOUL

Nabatean Agriculture by Ibn Waḥshiyya¹ is a strange work in the history of medieval Arabic literature. Written in Arabic in early 10th century Iraq, the work claims to be a translation of a text written in much earlier times by the “ancient Nabateans.” However, ever since the work was discovered in the 19th century the scholars have disagreed on its real origin. Today some maintain it to be a translation of an original written sometime in the Late Antiquity, while others claim the Arabic work of the 10th century to be the original. Whichever of the two alternatives is true, it is nevertheless in many ways an interesting work of encyclopaedic proportions.

Nabatean Agriculture is one of several works which together form the so-called Nabatean corpus. While it is not always very clear exactly which books actually belong to this corpus,² they are all supposedly translated in early 10th century Iraq by Ibn Waḥshiyya from “ancient Syriac” (*al-suryāniyya al-qadīma*) and clearly share a number of common features – such as the concern with magic and the esoteric – with each other. Ibn Waḥshiyya himself claims these works to represent the “ancient sciences” of the Nabateans, i.e., the non-Arab, Aramean-speaking rural population of Iraq, representing the indigenous population of the

¹ Ibn Waḥshiyya, *al-Filāḥa al-Nabaṭiyya*. From here on referred to as *Filāḥa*.

² While *Nabatean Agriculture* is by far the most important of these works, other translations attributed to Ibn Waḥshiyya include treatises on cryptic alphabets, astrology, poisons and alchemy, as well as many others. See Fahd 1993a for a list.

area preceding the Arab conquests.³ He claims to have translated *Nabatean Agriculture* in 291 A.H. (903/4 A.D.) and dictated it to his student Abū Ṭālib al-Zayyāt in 318 A.H. (930/1 A.D.).⁴ The fact that *Nabatean Agriculture* and some of the other works of the corpus existed in the 10th century can be verified from Ibn al-Nadīm's well-known book catalogue.⁵ But besides this there has been very little agreement on anything considering the work among the scholars.

While first introduced to the scholarly community already in 1835 by Étienne Quatremère, it was Daniel Chwolson who made the corpus well-known in the 1850s. Despite the obvious anachronisms and inconsistencies Chwolson largely accepted the claims made by *Nabatean Agriculture* concerning its ancient origin,⁶ arguing that the Nabatean texts were part of the long-awaited Babylonian literature and fixing the date of *Nabatean Agriculture* itself at the 16th century B.C. That this was not the case was shown clearly by the influential articles of Alfred von Gutschmid (1861) and Theodor Nöldeke (1876), which pinpointed the evident Greek, Christian and neo-Persian influences contained in the works. While von Gutschmid concluded *Nabatean Agriculture* to be a forgery devised by Ibn Waḥshiyya himself, Nöldeke went even further, attributing the work to his scribe al-Zayyāt instead.⁷

Both of them regarded all of the Nabatean texts as completely worthless, which resulted in the works being almost completely neglected. In the last few decades there has, however, been a slightly renewed interest in the subject, headed by Toufic Fahd, who in 1969⁸ started a series of articles on *Nabatean Agriculture*

³ See, e.g., Hämeen-Anttila 2002: 56–64 and Fahd 1993b for discussion on the meaning of the term “*Nabaq*” as it was used by the Arab authors of the time. The Nabateans of Ibn Waḥshiyya are completely unrelated to the Nabateans of Petra.

⁴ *Filāḥa*: 5–8; Hämeen-Anttila 2002: 69–74. Ibn Waḥshiyya's story of how he found the Nabatean works, as well as his version of the textual history of *Nabatean Agriculture*, are contained in his introduction to the work. This introduction is translated in Hämeen-Anttila 2002.

⁵ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*: 590, 731. Ibn al-Nadīm knows of both Ibn Waḥshiyya and his “friend” al-Zayyāt, whom he presumes to have died recently (p. 732).

⁶ Ibn Waḥshiyya declares the text to be a result of the work of three “Kasdānian wise men” during a time-span of more than 20,000 years, but as Hämeen-Anttila points out the year-spans of astronomical length might be meant to be interpreted symbolically. (*Filāḥa*: 9; Hämeen-Anttila 2002: 75–76, note 81.)

⁷ von Gutschmid 1861; Nöldeke 1876. von Gutschmid was not the first to consider *Nabatean Agriculture* a forgery of much later times. Already before Chwolson wrote his article on the subject, H. F. Meyer, a historian of botanics, had in 1856 assumed the work to be a forgery produced around the 1st century AD, while E. Renan suggested in 1860 dating it to the time of the later Neoplatonists, not before the 6th century. See, e.g., Sezgin 1971: 318–329 for an overview of the history of the scholarly views on the Nabatean corpus.

⁸ Fahd 1969.

and in the 1990s published the printed edition of the work. During the last few years Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila has also showed interest in the work and published a number of articles on it.⁹ However, interest in the work has so far mostly been limited to occasional articles and minor references.

Although some scholars in recent decades, such as Manfred Ullmann, have shared the negative views of von Gutschmid and Nöldeke,¹⁰ most, however, have inclined towards a more favorable attitude towards *Nabatean Agriculture*. Both Fahd and Hämeen-Anttila tend to accept the work's claims to be a translation of a Syriac original, the former suggesting a date somewhere during the first Christian centuries and the latter at approximately the 6th century.¹¹ Overall it seems, however, that because of the lack of such precise material in the work that would make it possible to identify any known historical events or persons, its exact dating has proved impossible so far. Therefore, it remains possible either that the Arabic version is a translation based on a Syriac original written sometime between the Late Antiquity and the 10th century, or that there never was any work to be translated. The difference between the two alternatives is not as big as it might seem, however, since it was largely the intellectual heritage of the Late Antiquity that the nascent Islamic world inherited.

Buried within this large agricultural manual is a small treatise dealing with the soul.¹² It belongs to the stratum of the work dealing with subjects of a scientific or philosophical nature which clearly draw on some philosophical sources in their treatment of their subject. Also it is not the only time that the work strays away from its actual subject matter, which is to provide technical information and practical advice on agriculture and botany. The 1,500 edited pages of *Nabatean Agriculture* cover, besides this, a wide variety of topics ranging from fantastic myths to descriptions of the pagan Hellenistic astral religion professed by the Nabateans.¹³

The treatise on the soul is located at the beginning of the section of *Nabatean Agriculture* dealing with the cultivation of the vine and forms a more or less continuous unit within the text. The self-proclaimed objective of the treatise is to pay tribute to the noble character of the vine. According to the author, his purpose is in reality not to relate the opinions of the Nabatean sages concerning the soul at

⁹ This article was written before the major work of Hämeen-Anttila on the *Nabatean Agriculture* was published in 2006 and hence only his articles will be used here.

¹⁰ Ullmann 1972: 441–442. According to Ullmann, in addition to the material taken from the Greek geoponical writers and the Neoplatonists, *Nabatean Agriculture* is mostly “mere deceit”.

¹¹ Fahd 1977a: 285–289, 367–369; Fahd 1993a; Hämeen-Anttila 2003a: 254–262, 271–274.

¹² *Filāḥa*: 918–931.

¹³ For a review of the contents of the book, see, e.g., Fahd 1977a and Hämeen-Anttila 2004b.

all, but rather to relate how they have praised the vine above all other plants.¹⁴ While he wants to show that the delight that wine causes in the human soul is unique and superior to the delights caused by other things, he also sees it necessary to portray the nature of the soul in some detail.

The “Nabatean soul doctrine” that the author ends up presenting here clearly draws from some philosophical source or sources, whether of the Late Antiquity or Early Islam. This is obvious first of all from the contents of this doctrine, as the themes covered are the same as those that were of central importance for the Neoplatonists. This is also obvious from the terminology used, as the treatise employs much of that technical philosophical vocabulary that the Arabic language had generated into itself by the time of Ibn Wahshiyya. These include such basic concepts of Aristotelian origin as substance (*jawhar*) and accident (*‘araḍ*) or the technical names of the different faculties and parts of the soul.

Despite the fact that the ideas concerning the soul presented in the treatise are clearly based on philosophical sources of ultimately Greek origin, the author never reveals his sources. Instead, the doctrines of evidently Greek origin are attributed to the ancient Nabatean sages with bizarre names. This feature actually characterizes *Nabatean Agriculture* as a whole and is in line with its claims to representing the Nabatean wisdom of ancient origin. No pagan or Muslim philosophers are ever mentioned by name.

Despite its philosophical nature, the treatise is clearly not a product of an original philosopher. It could be characterized rather as “popular philosophy”, its sources at least in some sense ultimately lying somewhere in the Neoplatonic treatises. After all, maybe even to a larger degree than the works of the “academic” philosophers such as Plotinus, there were in circulation paraphrases in Greek, Arabic and Syriac, providing the Neoplatonic ideas in a more simple and easily understandable form. It is ultimately these paraphrases and texts, that were responsible for the spreading and popularisation of this tradition, that his ideas can be returned to.

2. NEOPLATONIC BACKGROUND

2.1. What is Neoplatonism?

When the term Neoplatonism was initially coined in the 19th century, the prefix “neo” was added because it was thought at the time that Plotinus introduced a radical break in relation to both the thought of Plato himself and the preceding

¹⁴ *Filāḥa*: 916–917, 922.

Platonic tradition.¹⁵ But for many interpreters, both before and after the 19th century, the philosophies of Plato and Plotinus have not been so radically different from each other. Plotinus himself perceived himself not as an innovator, but as a Platonist systemizing the truths presented by the Divine Plato in his dialogues and many modern interpreters tend to agree with him more than was done before. Possibly the best way to see Neoplatonism is then as a systematization of Platonic thought to which Stoic and especially Peripatetic influences have been added.

The most characteristic feature of all Platonism is its thorough-going dualism, especially the kind which Armstrong calls cosmic dualism. By this he means a way of thinking in which the whole order of nature is, in the end, thought to consist of two opposing principles interacting with each other and which, in the case of Platonism, are the “light,” spiritual principle and the “dark,” material principle.¹⁶ This dualism is apparent in the universe in its division into two separate worlds, the higher, spiritual world and the lower, material world, the latter being only a defective imitation of the former. Probably the most important innovation of Neoplatonism in respect to earlier Platonism, however, is that in Neoplatonism even matter is thought to be ultimately derived from the One, which is the source of all being, no matter how defective.¹⁷

But despite the fact that matter also in the end has its origin in the One, Plotinus still explicitly equates matter with evil.¹⁸ This is possible because of the hierarchical ordering of the Neoplatonic universe. For Plotinus, all being emanates in a necessary and timeless fashion from the absolutely indivisible and good first principle, with each step downwards going further away from its absolute being and goodness. The nature of the One requires that this procession downwards proceeds until the very end so that everything where any goodness or being is left is produced. Matter, which is absolute non-being and negativity, is the final limit of this procession and in that sense the principle of evil. But even matter, and the creation of the material world, are necessary in order to realize the goodness of the One in full.¹⁹ The two most characteristic features of Neoplatonism would

¹⁵ See, e.g., Gatti 1996: 24.

¹⁶ Armstrong 1992: 33–37. Platonism is of course not the only common current of thought in the Late Antiquity characterized by dualism in this sense, as is evident also from Armstrong’s article comparing the dualisms of Christianity, Gnosticism and Neoplatonism.

¹⁷ Armstrong 1992: 39–40. While Neoplatonism, unlike Plato’s philosophy, is then metaphysically monistic, it is still dualistic both in its cosmic conception and its belief in two separate worlds. Armstrong’s definition of cosmic dualism does not require the two principles to be independent of each other.

¹⁸ E.g., Plotinus, *Enneads* I.8.5.6–10. But again, like Plato, Plotinus also displays inconsistency in his attitude towards matter. See, e.g., Blumenthal 1981: 220.

¹⁹ Armstrong 1996: 39–42.

then seem to be first of all its dualism and secondly the idea of hierarchical ordering and generation of reality.²⁰

As for Islamic philosophy, it can be characterized as Neoplatonic only in part, for it is only one of the two major Greek influences affecting it, Aristotelianism being the other.²¹ But the ways in which these two Greek currents of thought influenced the Islamic philosophy appearing in the 9th century²² are very different. Aristotle was considered by far the greatest authority by the Muslim philosophers and by the 10th century, as the result of the massive translation movement of the period between the 8th and 10th centuries, practically all of his works were available in Arabic translations for the use of the Muslim philosophers.²³ The name of Plotinus, on the other hand, was practically unknown to the Arabs. Despite this, none of the Muslim philosophers were pure Peripatetics and most of them were thoroughly Neoplatonic at least in their metaphysical views.

The reason for this paradox lies first of all in the fact that the way in which the Arabs received their Aristotle was mediated by the influence of the last Greek schools of philosophy in Athens and Alexandria, the latter of which was still operating at the time of the Muslim conquest of the city. Both of these schools were thoroughly Neoplatonic in their views. Already since Porphyry, however, Aristotle had become an important part of the Neoplatonic curriculum, the so-called “lesser mysteries” which preceded the study of the “greater mysteries” of Plato.²⁴ The Aristotle inherited by the Arabs was to a large degree the Platonized Aristotle of the late Neoplatonic schools.²⁵

²⁰ This second characteristic also roughly corresponds to the six distinguishing features that Merlan attributes to Neoplatonism (Merlan 1953: 1.)

²¹ To what degree Islamic philosophy is dependent on Greek philosophy is of course a controversial question. While to say that Islamic philosophy *is* Greek philosophy, as, for example, Walzer (1956: 35) does, might be exaggeration, Islamic philosophy at least in its earliest phases depends so much on its Greek sources that it can definitely be considered as a continuation of Greek philosophy.

²² The beginning of Islamic philosophy may be attributed to al-Kindī (d. c. 866), the first original philosopher writing in Arabic, and the circle around him. See, e.g., Gutas 1998: 119–120.

²³ This is shown, for example, by the entry of the catalogue of Ibn al-Nadīm on Aristotle. (Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*: 598–606.)

²⁴ Peters 1996: 40–43; Blumenthal 1996: 22–26.

²⁵ Again Ibn al-Nadīm’s catalogue reveals the great number of commentaries on Aristotle, both Neoplatonic and Peripatetic, existing as Arabic translations in the 10th century. (Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*: 598–606.)

Another reason for the near anonymity of Plotinus,²⁶ as well as the unawareness of most Muslim philosophers of their Neoplatonic background, was the fact that the most important Neoplatonic treatises were falsely attributed to Aristotle. Firstly there was the work which was known as the “Theology of Aristotle” (*Ūḥūlūjiya Aristāṭālīs*) in the Arab world and which Fakhry regards as the single work that had the greatest influence of all on Arab philosophical thought.²⁷ *Theology*, far from being a work by Aristotle, is in actuality an abridgment of books IV to VI of the *Enneads* of Plotinus.²⁸ The other influential Neoplatonic work was the treatise known in the Arabic tradition as “On the Pure Good” (*Fī al-khayr al-mahḍ*), that in the Latin world became later known as *Liber de causis*. It consists of 31 propositions that are mostly derived from the *Elements of Theology* of Proclus, but according to Taylor, uses the *Enneads* of Plotinus as a complementary source.²⁹

The question to which degree Islamic philosophy is Neoplatonic, rather than Aristotelian, varies, however, from philosopher to philosopher. In their metaphysical views almost all Muslim philosophers were Neoplatonic, for practically all of them adopted the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation as the basis of their account of creation.³⁰ But in their other views their Neoplatonic tendencies vary. One doctrine that Islamic philosophy inherited from the Late Antiquity, however, was the belief in the essential oneness of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle: although superficially different, it was in the end the same truth they were after, even though in different ways.

²⁶ The name Plotinus is not mentioned at all by Ibn al-Nadīm, but is mentioned by al-Qifī, who, however, does not know much about him. However, the epithet “al-Shaykh al-Yūnānī,” to whom a few philosophical texts are attributed, has been identified as Plotinus since mid-19th century and finally proved to be Plotinus by Rosenthal. (Rosenthal 1952; 1974: 437, 442–444; Peters 1979: 16.)

²⁷ Fakhry 1983: 19. The Arabic version of *Theology*, or its source, is thought to be written in al-Kindī’s circle at the mid-9th-century Baghdad. (Adamson 2001: 212.)

²⁸ The other passages of Plotinian origin studied by the Arabs are either anonymous, under the pseudonym Greek Sage (*al-Shaykh al-Yūnānī*), or falsely attributed to al-Fārābī. All of these are limited to books IV to VI of the *Enneads* and seem to have as a common source a larger Arabic paraphrase of the *Enneads*. All of the *Plotiniana Arabica* have been published in English translation in Henry & Schwyzer 1959. (Peters 1979: 16; Taylor 1992: 12; Rosenthal 1952: 467–472; Adamson 2001: 212–212.)

²⁹ The treatise is edited and translated in, for example, Bardenhewer 1882, which includes both Arabic and Latin versions. Taylor dates the work to the period between the early 9th and late 10th centuries. (Taylor 1992: 14, 17–19, 22.)

³⁰ See, e.g., Walzer 1962 for an analysis of the Greek sources of some Muslim philosophers.

2.2. NEOPLATONIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL

The dualistic way in which Neoplatonism perceives the world is repeated at the level of man. Man also is divided into two parts, the soul and the body, which are two diametrically opposing entities that belong to two realms of being. While the soul is immaterial, and its real home is in the intelligible world, the body is material and exists in the sensible world only. The basic Platonic conception of the relation of the soul to the body is the negative one presented in *Phaedo*, where the soul is portrayed as being tied by the body to the material world “compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars.”³¹ This view is shared by Plotinus when he depicts the body as the “secondary evil.”³² It is the bodily desires that distract the soul from pursuing a life true to its own spiritual nature.³³

But the way the Neoplatonists saw the relation between body and soul is not quite such an unambiguously negative one. It is after all part of the necessary procession of the soul to be present in the material world too, for it pertains to the order of things for everything down to the lowest level of being to be ensouled.³⁴ The soul is the controlling principle for the inanimate bodies and the life-giving principle for the animate bodies³⁵ and thus its presence in the material world is unavoidable. It is through the soul that something of the intelligible world can be present in the sensible world too.³⁶

The descent of the soul into the material world in the “Platonic myth” of the fall of the soul is then an event of mixed value. While necessary in the general scheme of things, it leads to the soul being separated from the intelligible world and to be bound by the chains of the body.³⁷ The souls, delighted by their newly found independence, become ignorant of their own nature and origin, forgetting the higher world altogether. As a result they start despising themselves and admiring material things instead.³⁸ The other side of the Platonic procession of the soul is the re-ascent back to the intelligible world. Through purification from matter, the soul may separate itself from the body and flee from the material world. For Plotinus, the soul can achieve this through contemplating itself and

³¹ Plato, *Phaedo* 82E.

³² *Enneads* I.8.1–6: “δεύτερον κακόν.” Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus starts with the assertion that Plotinus “seemed ashamed of being in the body”. (Porphyry: 3.)

³³ E.g., *Enneads* IV.8.4.22–29.

³⁴ Armstrong 1967: 255.

³⁵ *Enneads* V.1.2.6–10.

³⁶ *Enneads* IV.8.6.; Blumenthal 1996: 2–5.

³⁷ *Enneads* IV.8.4.10–29.

³⁸ *Enneads* V.1.1.1–4, 6–9, 17–18.

through realizing that its own nature is divine, and thus opposed to that of the sensible world.³⁹

Platonism is not the only ingredient in Neoplatonic psychology, however. When analysing the operations of the embodied soul, Neoplatonists often lean more on Aristotle than Plato,⁴⁰ interpreting *De anima* in a Platonic way, explaining away any aspects in too blatant a contradiction with the Platonic view.⁴¹ While describing the functions of the embodied soul, then, the Neoplatonists usually resort to the Aristotelian faculties (s. δύναμις). However, at times they also employ the Platonic tripartition of the soul into rational (τὸ λογιστικόν), spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές) and appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) parts,⁴² as well as the Aristotelian tripartition into vegetative, animal and human parts. Different classifications of the soul were then mixed together into a rather confusing set of partitions, faculties and groups of faculties of both Platonic and Aristotelian origin.

For most Muslim philosophers the work of greatest influence on their doctrine of the soul was Aristotle's *De anima*, translated into Arabic in its entirety by the end of the 9th century.⁴³ Thus, especially in their descriptions of the faculties and operations of the soul, Muslim philosophers in general follow Aristotle rather closely. But they are not pure Aristotelians any more in their psychology than they are in most other fields of philosophy. Like their Greek Neoplatonist predecessors, Muslim philosophers also had difficulties in accepting the Aristotelian naturalist definition of the soul, which denies the soul both its separate status in respect to the body and its immortality.

Thus, despite their subscription to the Aristotelian analysis of the soul in general, none of the *falāsifa* seems to subscribe to the Aristotelian conception of the soul in practice.⁴⁴ Instead they continue the tradition of the Greek Neoplatonists of mixing the Aristotelian analysis with a Platonic dualistic conception of soul and body. The tone is set already by al-Kindī who, while describing the

³⁹ *Enneads* V.1.2–3.

⁴⁰ In Blumenthal's (1976: 42) words the soul of Plotinus is separate from and opposed to the body like Plato's, but works like Aristotle's.

⁴¹ See Blumenthal 1996: 21–34. Explaining must start already from Aristotle's definition of the soul, since for Aristotle the soul is the form of the living being and therefore inseparable from the body. How this is done is discussed in Blumenthal 1996: 93–98.

⁴² Blumenthal 1996: 99–103. The Platonic tripartition was, however, usually considered to be inadequate to explain the functioning of the soul.

⁴³ Peters 1968: 40–42. al-Kindī (d. c. 866) had at least a paraphrase of *De anima* at his disposal.

⁴⁴ Al-Kindī, like Ibn Sīnā after him, actually does accept *De anima*'s definition of the soul as an entelechy, but inconsistently at the same time treats the soul as a separate substance in a very Platonic manner. See, e.g., Walzer 1962: 14. This might be due to the fact that the Arabic Plotinus paraphrase that al-Kindī used defined entelechy in an un-Aristotelian way that allowed its synthesis with the Neoplatonic view of the soul. See Adamson 2001: 216–217.

faculties of the soul in a very faithful Aristotelian fashion, portrays the nature of the soul in a very familiar Platonic fashion, describing the soul as a divine and spiritual substance separate from and opposed to the body. According to al-Kindī, the union of the soul with a body in the lower world is only an accidental and temporary episode in the life of the soul that will come to an end once the soul departs the body.⁴⁵

In Ibn Sīnā (980–1037), the interaction of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic influences is very similar. Ibn Sīnā's analysis of the soul in general follows that of *De anima* very closely.⁴⁶ Like Aristotle he divides the operations of the soul into the three main parts of ascending order and complexity of the vegetative (*al-nafs al-nabāṭiyya*), animal (*al-nafs al-ḥayawāniyya*) and human souls (*al-nafs al-insāniyya*), each containing several faculties (*quwā*, s.*quwwa*).⁴⁷ Ibn Sīnā even follows Aristotle in defining the soul as the "first entelechy of an organic body".⁴⁸ But beneath all his Aristotelianism nevertheless lies in many respects a very Platonic soul. For Ibn Sīnā, too, the soul is an incorruptible and immortal substance separate from the body that does not depend on it at least in any such way as to prevent the soul from continuing its life once the body has passed away.⁴⁹ The relation of soul and body is quite Plotinian also in many other ways, for once the soul reaches its perfection, it has no need for the bodily functions which only distract the rational soul from performing its proper activities of intellection.⁵⁰

Besides Aristotle, the Platonic and Neoplatonic treatises then influenced the soul doctrine of the Islamic philosophy. But possibly even more so than with the last Greek pagan philosophers, there was also a strong tendency to fade out the differences between the Aristotelian and Platonic views. This is visible already, for example, in the Aristotle and Plotinus that the philosophers used as their sources. Namely, at least in the case of the Arabic paraphrases of the Greek works, they did not often content themselves only with carrying the meaning of the original Greek into Arabic. Rather, according to Adamson, for example, both the Arabic paraphrases of the *Enneads* of Plotinus and *De anima* of Aristotle produced for al-Kindī in the 9th century show a similar tendency to synthesize the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic views of the soul. While *Theology* draws on *De*

⁴⁵ Fakhry 1983: 85–87.

⁴⁶ Ibn Sīnā gives his analysis especially in the "De anima" sections of *Kitāb al-Shifā'* and its abridgement, *Kitāb al-Najāt*.

⁴⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*: 40.

⁴⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*: 15: "kamāl awwal li-jism ṭabī'ī ilā lahu an yaʿal afāl al-ḥayāt."

⁴⁹ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*: 224–231.

⁵⁰ Druart 2000: 262. Hall (2004) distinguishes Aristotelian, Galenic and Neoplatonic influences in Ibn Sīnā's psychology.

anima to present Plotinus in a more Aristotelian light, the *De anima* paraphrase also draws on some Plotinian source to platonize the Aristotelian soul.⁵¹

As with their Greek predecessors, the mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian influences is especially visible in the way the philosophers analyzed the workings of the soul into different kinds of divisions. The Aristotelian faculties grouped into the vegetative, animal and human souls were the basic concept in such analysis. But the Platonic tripartition of the soul into a desiring (*shahwāniyya*), spirited (*ghaḍabiyya*) and rational (*‘aqliyya/nātiqa*) parts was also very popular, especially in contexts of ethical analysis. In the Arabic tradition these two tripartitions were identified with each other from early on, possibly due to the influence of Galen, who had already done the same in his treatise Περὶ Ἡθῶν, which was also translated into Arabic.⁵²

But in respect to the Greek Neoplatonists there were at least a few points in which most Muslim philosophers held a different position to their Greek predecessors. When comparing Plotinus and Ibn Sīnā, for example, Ibn Sīnā explicitly refutes the idea of the soul pre-existing the body,⁵³ even if the soul is immortal after its origination. For Plotinus, on the contrary, all different manifestations of the soul were really one and the same and had always existed, even if a particular soul’s descent into the material world is a temporal event. The particular souls of Ibn Sīnā and Plotinus also have a different origin, as for Ibn Sīnā it is the Active Intellect, the last entity in the series of emanations of separate intellects in his cosmology, which is the cause for the soul’s coming into existence. For Plotinus the particular souls in the last instance come from the World Soul.⁵⁴ Ibn Sīnā also considers it necessary to refute explicitly the theory of the transmigration of souls. According to Ibn Sīnā, the soul is irretrievably individuated by the body it joins at the moment of its origination and it cannot enter a different particular body after this.⁵⁵ Finally, Ibn Sīnā also wants to secure for the soul such personal immortality that retains all its distinctive characteristics, which for most Neoplatonists would have seemed impossible, considering that the body was the cause of the individuality of the particular soul in the material world.

⁵¹ Adamson 2001.

⁵² Rosenthal 1940: 416–418; Fakhry 1975: 39–46; Mattock 1972.

⁵³ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā’*: 220–224.

⁵⁴ Acar (2003) compares Plotinus and Ibn Sīnā in questions of the origin of the human soul and the actualization of intellectual knowledge, concluding that there is not a specific Plotinian influence on Ibn Sīnā in these questions.

⁵⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā’*: 230–231; Druart 2000: 264–265. Even the doctrine of transmigration, accepted universally among the Greek Neoplatonists, however, had its supporters among the *falāsifa*. For example, al-Rāzī, often considered the most Platonic of all Muslim philosophers, believed in reincarnation of the soul. See Goodman 1975.

3. NABATEAN SOUL DOCTRINE

3.1. Wine and soul

There are many things in this world that bring joy and delight to the soul, but of all those things wine is far above all others. Wine affects the soul a way that no other worldly thing does.⁵⁶ Drinking the juice extracted from the grapes of the vine “delights the heart, expels the sorrows, fortifies the weak and emboldens the coward.” All in all the benefits of wine are too many to be named and too great to be described by words.⁵⁷ But why is it that wine has such an incomparably blissful effect on the human soul? This is the main question that Ibn Waḥshiyya’s treatise on the soul sets out to answer.

According to the treatise, this special influence is due to its divine nature. Sun itself, the main divinity of the Nabatean pantheon, has provided the grapes with its providence and made the vine the noblest of all plants. Thus, wine shares many of the divine properties of the Sun, even though it lacks its permanence and eternity.⁵⁸ But it is also because wine and the soul are alike that wine is capable of bringing such powerful delight to the soul. Like wine, the substance of the particular souls that inhabit the human beings also comes from the Sun. Therefore wine and the soul have the same divine origin and it is because they share the same substance with each other that wine is able to affect the soul in such a powerful way.⁵⁹

The main goal of the treatise is to demonstrate just how the state of delight caused by wine in the soul is different from and superior to similar states caused by other things. Specifically, the author compares the effects of wine to the pleasures caused by music. Even though music also makes the soul happy, the effect it has is not at all similar to the effect of wine. While the influence music has on the soul is only transitory and passes away with the fading away of the sounds, the effect of wine is “lasting, permanent and necessary”.⁶⁰

This is because the two states of delight reach the soul in a fundamentally different way. While music makes the soul happy by the intermediary of the sense

⁵⁶ *Filāḥa*: 920 (7)–921 (2).

⁵⁷ *Filāḥa*: 915 (13–14), 915 (19)–916 (7).

⁵⁸ *Filāḥa*: 921 (16)–922 (2).

⁵⁹ *Filāḥa*: 921 (10–16), 928 (12–17).

⁶⁰ *Filāḥa*: 931 (7–10): “al-taṣwīt bi-’l-alḥān wa-’l-ḍarb bi-’l-ālāt...fa-huwa ka-’l-shay’ al-‘araḍī al-ghayr thābit, wa-surūr al-nafs min al-khamr kāna surūran bāqīyan thābitan lāziman.” How the pleasures of wine are permanent and lasting does not become very clear, but compared to the pleasure caused by music they do last longer.

of hearing, the effect of wine is direct and requires no intermediaries. The main difference between wine and music is then that wine influences the soul directly, while in music the influence takes place through the medium of the body.⁶¹ The premise behind the argument which the treatise attempts to pursue is that the human soul has two kinds of states or affections: those that occur together with the body and those that occur apart from the body.⁶² While the first reach the soul through a bodily organ, the latter reach the essence of the soul directly.⁶³

3.2. ORIGIN OF THE SOUL

The universe is divided into two different worlds in the cosmological scene of the treatise: a higher spiritual world (*al-ʿuluww/al-ʿulwiyya/al-ʿālam al-ʿulwī*) and a lower material world (*al-ʿālam al-suflī*).⁶⁴ These two worlds are depicted in contrast with each other, the higher world being superior in every sense to the lower world, which is also called the “world of darkness” (*ʿālam al-ẓulm*).⁶⁵ While the soul (*nafs*)⁶⁶ of nature pertains to the higher world, it unfortunately is not destined to stay there forever. Instead it must descend to the lower world of matter and adapt to a bodily existence. Its staying in the material world is only a temporary state of affairs, however, and in the end the soul will again return to its true spiritual home.⁶⁷

There are also two different kinds of souls in the universe. Firstly there is the one Universal Soul (*al-nafs al-kulliyya*), and secondly there are the numerous particular souls (*al-nafs al-juzʿiyya*). It is the Universal Soul which all of the particular souls come from originally before descending into the lower world.⁶⁸ The Universal Soul is described as the “soul of the entire universe” (*al-nafs li-l-ʿālam*

⁶¹ *Filāḥa*: 928 (15)–931 (12).

⁶² *Filāḥa*: 929 (15–16): “li-l-nafs infīʿāl bi-mushāraḳat al-ĵasad lahā wa-infīʿāl tanfarid bihi ‘an al-ĵasad.”

⁶³ *Filāḥa*: 930 (9–21). It is not the case, according to the author, that wine would affect the soul through the organ of the mouth or tongue directly, for unlike with music, it is only after some time from its consumption that the pleasurable effects appear.

⁶⁴ E.g., *Filāḥa*: 918 (6), 919 (21)–920 (2), 921 (15). Cosmology is not really discussed in the treatise, but it is clear from the way the two worlds are portrayed that the upper world is to be described as divine and spiritual, while the lower world is sensible and material.

⁶⁵ *Filāḥa*: 917 (18).

⁶⁶ *Nafs* is the only term employed in referring to the soul. *Rūḥ*, which often would designate the spirit or the higher soul at least in Islamic contexts, is never used.

⁶⁷ *Filāḥa*: 919 (20)–920 (2).

⁶⁸ *Filāḥa*: 918 (10–11), 923 (19). *Filāḥa*: 922 (13–14), however, tells us that the Nabatean sages disagree with each other on the origin of the particular soul.

kullīhi) as well as the “Universal Soul of both worlds” (*nafs al-‘ālamayn al-kullīyya*).⁶⁹ What makes the role of the Universal Soul more complicated, however, is that the Universal Soul in fact is none other than the Sun itself,⁷⁰ the main divinity of the Nabatean divine hierarchy.

This basic cosmological conception conforms well to the Neoplatonic one of dualism of two worlds and two principles. The higher and lower worlds, which are in the end characterized by the opposite principles of spirituality and materiality, are very much like the corresponding intelligible and sensible realms of the Plotinian universe. And in this cosmology, too, there is the one superior source, or divinity, which all the lower levels of existence seem to come from and which, at least in a very general level corresponds to the Neoplatonic One (τὸ ἕν), First Cause (*al-‘illa al-ūlā/al-sabab al-awwal*), the First (*al-awwal*), or whatever name it is given.⁷¹

That the material world as a whole is ensouled is also very much a Neoplatonic doctrine. For Plotinus this world soul is called the “Soul of the All” (ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆ), which seems to be in many ways a rather similar entity as the Universal Soul of our treatise. For Plotinus and our author, the origin of the individual souls lies in this World Soul which in the end is one and the same thing with the individual souls.⁷² For the Arabic Plotinus this “Soul of the All” translates into the same word used by our treatise, Universal Soul (*al-nafs al-kullīyya*), and the similar idea of the individual soul’s pertaining to this Universal Soul in the higher world is conveyed.⁷³ In contrast, in much of the Islamic Neoplatonism, the soul’s origin does not lie in a world soul, but rather in the Active Intellect (*al-‘aql al-fa‘āl*), the last in the series of separate intellects above the sub-lunar world. It is from this entity that the rational human soul is emanated once the body prepared to receive it is generated.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ *Filāḥa*: 918 (9), 922 (4–5). In p. 917 (16–17) it is also called the “soul of both worlds, the higher and lower” (*nafs al-‘ālamayn kilāhumā, al-‘ulwī wa-l-sufī*).

⁷⁰ *Filāḥa*: 918 (9–10), 922 (18–19).

⁷¹ Curiously this first principle in our treatise also happens to be the Sun, which was the favourite metaphor to visualize the pouring of being downwards from the first principle: in the emanationist scheme of the Neoplatonists being flows down from the One as light flows from the Sun, illuminating the entire world with its presence. Even based on the scant information given in the treatise it is, however, clear that, besides some rough correspondence, it is in most other respects nothing like the Plotinian One, which is completely beyond being and attribution.

⁷² *Enneads* IV.3.1–2.

⁷³ Rosenthal 1955: 58–59. According to the “Greek Sage”, once we leave this earthly world (*al-‘ālam al-arḍī*) and arrive at the noble world (*al-‘ālam al-sharīf*) and get attached to the Universal Soul (*wa-itṭaṣalnā bi-l-nafs al-kullīyya*), we will know who we are, whence we came, where we went to and where we had been.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Davidson 1992 for the doctrines of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Ruṣhd on these separate intellects and the relation of Active Intellect to the human soul.

The fact that the particular souls of the material world have a similar origin for Ibn Waḥshiyya and Plotinus also leads them into similar problems. Since for both of them the particular souls come from the world soul originally, and are in essence one and the same thing, they both have to find a factor responsible for the plethora of individual souls which at least appear different from each other in the material world. According to Ibn Waḥshiyya, the problem is that “if the particular souls are from the Universal Soul, then these particular souls must be similar and alike to each other so that they are all one and the same thing, even though we see them as different.”⁷⁵ And according to Plotinus, “if my soul and your soul come from the soul of the All, and that soul is one, these souls also must be one,” but “... it would be absurd if my soul and anyone else’s soul were one soul: for if I perceived anything another would have to perceive it too, and if I was good he would have to be good ... and in general we would have to have the same experiences as each other and the All.”⁷⁶

Both authors also have approximately the same answer for this problem.⁷⁷ The individual characteristics that differentiate the particular souls from each other is explained by the influence of the bodies that the particular souls inhabit in the material world. The fact that the souls are associated with material bodies inevitably brings changes of some sort to the souls, even if these changes are only accidental and do not influence their essence.⁷⁸ Also, the sense impressions that the souls have in the lower world bring changes to the souls, according to both, for as Plotinus says “different souls look at different things and are and become what they look at.”⁷⁹ For Ibn Sīnā too, as for Neoplatonists in general, the body is the factor that individuates the rational souls, but as there is no pre-existence of souls for him, the rational soul is individualized at the moment of its origination by the particular body it settles in.⁸⁰

As for the “Platonic myth” of the fall of the soul, the view of the soul as a divine entity thrown into the dark material world from the higher world is very much conveyed in the treatise. The descent of the particular souls, leading to their separation from the Universal Soul-Sun, is described in negative terms. As a result

⁷⁵ *Filāḥa*: 918 (13–15): “fa-idhā kānat al-nufūs al-juz’iyya min al-nafs al-kulliyya fa-qad kānat yajib an takūn hādhihi al-juz’iyya mutashābiha mutashākila kulluhā shay’an wāḥidan wa-naḥnu nushāhiduhā mukhtalifa.”

⁷⁶ *Enneads* IV.9.1.11–13, 15–20.

⁷⁷ Interestingly the treatise also presents an alternative theory for the individualization of the particular souls, which it immediately dismisses, however. According to this view the souls originate from different astral divinities, some from the Moon and others from the Sun or Jupiter. (*Filāḥa*: 918 (13–19)).

⁷⁸ *Filāḥa*: 918 (19)–919 (11); *Enneads* IV.3.14.

⁷⁹ *Enneads* IV.3.8.15–16; *Filāḥa*: 919 (8–10).

⁸⁰ Above, p. 11.

of this fall they have to abandon their true home, and settle in one of the bodies in the material world. Consequently they succumb to a state of dispersion and division, which is contrasted by their original and natural state of unity.⁸¹ As the Arabic Plotinus says, the soul is one and many: being an intermediary entity between the intelligible and sensible worlds it is one in its own world, but many in its dispersion among bodies.⁸²

In the Neoplatonic account there is, however, also the other side of the story, where the soul's descent is depicted as a "mission" to ensoul the material world. In the case of the treatise, no reason at all is given as to why the soul should descend into the lower world in the first place. While the view of Plotinus on the relation between the soul and the material world is then more positive than that of our treatise, as Adamson points out, the Arabic Plotinus describes the fall in considerably darker terms than the Greek original, thus approaching the view offered by the treatise of Ibn Waḥshiyya.⁸³ Also, the rather negative view presented by the treatise might be connected to the fact that the treatise does not deal with metaphysical or cosmological problems, but with the subject of individual souls. Both Plato and Plotinus agree that, from the point of view of an individual soul, its descent is anything but a happy event.

According to Plotinus, however, the particular souls do not descend into the sub-lunar material world directly. Instead, there is an intermediary phase in their descent in which they, after leaving the intelligible realm, first occupy an astral body in the heavenly region. This is because the heavenly bodies, though material, are at least in some sense nearer to the intelligible world than the lower bodies of the sub-lunar world and do not have the same contaminating influence on the souls occupying them. Only after this intermediary phase do some souls descend down to the lowest of bodies in the world of generation and corruption.⁸⁴ It seems possible that the treatise of Ibn Waḥshiyya might at least hint at this doctrine, even though it is not much elaborated.⁸⁵

The reverse side of the procession of the particular souls is also present. In the "religious" aspect of Neoplatonism, purification from matter is required for the soul to again become aware of its true intelligible nature and to re-ascend to the spiritual world. Here the same theme is repeated when we are told that the soul

⁸¹ *Filāḥa*: 918 (10), 919 (12–13), 923 (1–2).

⁸² Rosenthal 1955: 48–49.

⁸³ Adamson 2001: 225–227.

⁸⁴ *Enneads* IV.3.15.1–9, IV.3.17. In a treatise of the Arabic Plotinus *Risāla li-'l-Shaykh al-Yūnānī fī bayān 'ālamay al-rūḥānī wa-'l-jismānī* the soul is told to attach itself first to the heaven because it is the body nearest to it ("al-jism alladhī huwa aqrab ilayhā") and it is of a finer (*alṭaf*) and nobler (*ashraf*) constitution. The other bodies are the coarser and dirtier the more remote they are from the world of the soul. (Rosenthal 1955: 44–45.)

⁸⁵ See note 176 in the translation.

recovers from its oblivion once it discards the “heaviness” (*thiqal*) it has gathered from the material bodies and can then escape back to the higher world. The treatise also reiterates the characteristic language of “longing” (*ishtāqat*) used by the Neoplatonists to describe the desire human souls have to regain the immaterial form of existence they once possessed.⁸⁶ However, the exact method in which the soul can regain its lost purity and free itself from the contamination of matter is not revealed. For the Neoplatonists this would require either intellectual contemplation or practical means of asceticism and theurgy.⁸⁷ Possibly it is the connection that the particular souls are told to maintain with the Universal Soul even in the lower world⁸⁸ that enables the souls to flee “from this lowly world clinging to the rays of the Sun.”⁸⁹

3.3. NATURE OF THE SOUL

As to the basic conception of the kind of being that the soul is in reality, the image appearing from the treatise seems to conform very well to the Neoplatonic one. Firstly, the soul of the treatise is clearly immaterial, opposed as it is consistently with the material body.⁹⁰ Secondly, the soul is immutable in its substance, as is repeatedly stressed by the treatise.⁹¹ Thirdly, it is unified and indivisible in its substance, a fact which is also repeatedly stressed by the treatise.⁹² Fourthly, the soul seems to be immortal, both pre- and post-existing the body it occupies.⁹³

⁸⁶ *Filāḥa*: 919 (20)–920 (2).

⁸⁷ When Neoplatonism is often inclined towards moderate asceticism, *Nabatean Agriculture* actually contains a vehement attack against ascetics of all creeds, whether Islamic, Christian or Indian. See, *Filāḥa*: 258–262 and Hämeen-Anttila 2004a.

⁸⁸ *Filāḥa*: 918 (9–11).

⁸⁹ *Filāḥa*: 919 (20)–920 (1).

⁹⁰ However, the Nabatean sages are told to disagree about whether the soul or its faculties occupy a position in space. Some say that the body is the location of the soul, while others consider the soul to dispense of location altogether. (*Filāḥa*: 924 (7–8).)

⁹¹ *Filāḥa*: 919 (2, 7, 10–11).

⁹² *Filāḥa*: 923 (10–11, 19).

⁹³ That the soul post-exists the body is clear, for after the body’s destruction it seems that the soul either reincarnates in another body or returns to the higher world to unite with the Universal Soul. No possibility of the soul disappearing altogether is mentioned. As for its pre-existence, there is no indication whatsoever in the treatise that the particular soul would be created only with the generation of the body, but quite on the contrary it seems that the already existing soul adopts a body and is particularized once it descends into the material world. As the Sun, the Universal Soul from which the particular souls draw their substance, is eternal and everlasting, it would seem logical that this would be the case with particular souls as well.

Fifthly, the nature of the soul is of divine origin, its substance being the substance of the Sun. And finally, the soul seems to be a substance in the sense of being completely separate and independent in respect to the body it occupies. All these qualities are central to the Neoplatonic conception of the soul.

Of the two spheres of being in Neoplatonism, the first is characterized by immutability, while the second is characterized by constant change. When the spiritual world is a world of eternal stability, the bodily world is a world of generation and corruption, i.e., of constant flux. Since the soul pertains to the first of these worlds, it also must be immutable in its essence. If it, on the contrary, were changeable in its essence, it would also be corruptible and thus perishable, just as the bodies of the material world are. It is then especially to avoid the soul's mortality that Plotinus and other Neoplatonists make great efforts to prove that the soul remains unchanged substantially even in the ever-changing world of generation. But this task is made difficult by the fact that the compound of soul and body clearly does experience affections of different kinds, such as anger or pleasure, and the soul has intellectual and moral experiences that would seem difficult to explain without any changes taking place in the soul.⁹⁴

Plotinus protects the lower soul from changes first of all by restricting affections (s. πάθος) to the body only. The soul, on the other hand, does not possess affections, but judgments. For example, in the case of sense-perception, only the bodily sense organ is really affected by the sensation, while the actual perception is a judgment of the soul related to that bodily event.⁹⁵ Similarly in the case of such emotions as fear, anger or pleasure, even when the emotion is initiated due to a thought in the soul, the alteration occurs in the body rather than the soul. Judgment, unlike affection, is not really a change, at least in the same sense as bodily alterations are changes. The "changes" occurring in the soul are then rather actualisations of existing potentialities of the soul in which the soul is the active part, whereas affections are alterations which the body receives in a passive manner.⁹⁶

Secondly, in regard to change, the soul is in reality immune to it already due to its very nature. Plotinus adopts the analysis of change that Aristotle presents in *De generatione et corruptione* where all change is described as involving a pair of

⁹⁴ *Enneads* III.6.1–5; Fleet 1995: xix, 71–72. Since, for Plotinus, the higher soul never descends, that part of the soul is of course completely unaffected by bodily life due to its nature (see, e.g., I.1.9.1–4). Aristotelians or materialists, such as Stoics or Epicureans, did not have this problem, since they did not have to claim immutability for the soul as they did not think it was immortal either.

⁹⁵ *Enneads* III.6.1.1–14, III.6.6., I.1.7. This makes Plotinus' theory of sensation sound quite modern in comparison with that of Aristotle, for example, for whom the sensation was a much more direct event involving no distinction between sensation and perception. See, e.g., *De anima* II.5.

⁹⁶ *Enneads* III.6.3.

opposites. Therefore this change can concern composite things only, such as all bodies of the sub-lunar world are. The soul, on the other hand, is a simple entity which is not composed of parts that could be dissolved and does not possess such contrariety as is required for all change according to Aristotle. Thus, the soul as a non-bodily entity cannot be destructible either.⁹⁷ Ibn Sīnā also follows to a large degree the argument of Plotinus in his attempt to prove the very un-Aristotelian doctrine of the incorruptibility and consequent immortality of the soul.⁹⁸ The impassivity of the soul even in the sensible world is then one more proof that soul truly pertains to the realm of the true being (ἡ ἀληθινὴ οὐσία) of the intelligible, rather than the non-being of the bodily.⁹⁹

The very subject of the treatise of Ibn Waḥshiyya is concerned with one particular change in the state of the soul, namely the effect that wine has on the soul. In regard to change, the treatise displays a very similar attitude as that of the Neoplatonists. The treatise also seems to regard the changes occurring in the soul in the lower world as a problem. On the one hand, it admits that some changes do occur in the soul due to the influence of the body that have the effect of the soul drifting away from its spiritual nature. But on the other hand, it is careful to stress that these changes do not involve the substance (*jawhar*) or essence (*dhāt*) of the soul, but only its accidents (s. *‘araḍ*).¹⁰⁰ In its essence the soul remains completely unchanged even in the lower world. While the author does not show a similar sophistication of analysis while discussing these changes, he seems, however, to lay similar importance on maintaining the essentially immutable nature of the soul. This emphasis seems to have its origin in the Neoplatonic concern with keeping the soul free from the kind of changes that the bodies have, even if the author is not necessarily aware of the connection this question has with the soul's immortality.

But what then are the movements (*ḥarakāt*) attributed to the soul in the treatise,¹⁰¹ if the soul is an unchangeable and immaterial thing that does not even occupy a place from which it could move from? According to the treatise, the souls that have already experienced incarnations in several bodies have gained

⁹⁷ *Enneads* III.6.8–9., IV.7.12.

⁹⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Najāt*: 61–63, 107–109.

⁹⁹ Interestingly, absolute matter, unlike the body, is also impassive due to its being absolute non-being. This Plotinus proves in III.6.7.–10.

¹⁰⁰ *Filāḥa*: 919 (7–8): “fa-huwa taghayyur bi-taghayyurihā lā fī dhāt al-nufūs wa-lā fī jawharihā, bal taghayyur ‘araḍ yumkin zawāluhu.” *Filāḥa*: 923 (7–10) makes a distinction between enduring and transitory accidents (*‘araḍ thābit/‘araḍ zā’il*) and the changes the soul adopts in the lower world obviously belong to the latter category.

¹⁰¹ *Filāḥa*: 918 (9–10), 919 (20).

heaviness in their movements.¹⁰² Plotinus too grants the soul some kind of movement (κίνησις) which is, however, not the kind of movement that the bodies have. Rather, movement of the soul is the kind of movement that relates to its own sphere of being, the intelligible. Thus, for souls, movement consists in intellection rather than physical transition from one place to another. The idea that the “movement” of the soul consists in thinking is also expressed by the Arabic Plotinus.¹⁰³ That desires or emotions would be movements of the soul is, however, denied by Plotinus, for in reality emotions rather result in movements of the body.¹⁰⁴ Probably the “movements” of the souls of Ibn Waḥshiyya too consist of their intellection, which drifts further away from the pure state in which it was in the higher world with each body the soul occupies.

The treatise also shares the Neoplatonic concern with the essential unity of the soul. For the Neoplatonists the soul has to be a simple entity, for as it is intelligible, it cannot be a compound consisting of separable parts, such as the material bodies are. After all, such composite entities are doomed to be dissolved once just as they once were put together. The problem is that the embodied soul, however, seems to possess all kinds of operations that would entail dividing the soul into distinct parts responsible for those operations. According to Neoplatonists, such divisions are only due to the entering of the soul into the bodily sphere, however. The soul as an intermediate entity, while being indivisible in its essence, becomes divisible while in the sphere of bodies.¹⁰⁵

The Arabic Plotinus of *Theology of Aristotle* and Ibn Waḥshiyya both emphasize that this division that the soul accepts for itself when it enters a body does not involve the essence of the soul. Since the bodies of the material world are divided due to their nature, the soul also has to become divided in accordance with the divisions of the body it occupies. The discussion of our treatise and of the Arabic Plotinus on this theme here in terms of the accident-essence distinction proceeds in very similar lines in both texts. According to the treatise, although the particular soul is in a sense divided into different parts, the essential nature of the

¹⁰² *Filāḥa*: 919 (14–19): “wa-ayḍan inna al-nufūs allātī qad taraddadat fī al-ajrām taraddudan kathīran lā budd an yaḥduth lahā thiḡal mā, lā fī jawharihā bal fī ḥarakatihā faḡaḡ.”

¹⁰³ Rosenthal 1953: 490–491. *Al-Shaykh al-Yūnānī* assigns a kind of movement pertaining to its nature to each of the four successive “impressions” (*athar*) proceeding from the One. That of the soul is differentiated from the bodily movement below it by the fact that it not spatial (*mawḡiʿiyya*) and from the movement of the Intellect above it by the fact that it is not as regular (*mustawīya*).

¹⁰⁴ *Enneads* I.1.13., III.6.3.22–26; Blumenthal 1971: 48, 54. Aristotle too reflected on the question of what kind of movement the soul might have and in his analysis divided movement in general into four different kinds: 1) change of position, 2) change of state, 3) decay and 4) growth. Thus, κίνησις designates “movement” in a very wide sense, often corresponding more to the English word change than to actual movement. (*De anima* I.3.)

¹⁰⁵ *Enneads* IV.3.19.

soul defies division, the division seemingly occurring to it in the material world being merely accidental to it and having no influence on its substance.¹⁰⁶

3.4. SOUL AND BODY

The nature of the relation between the body (*jirm/jasad/jism*) and the soul inhabiting it appears as one of absolute contrariety in the treatise. While the soul is immaterial, the body is material.¹⁰⁷ While the soul is immutable in its substance, the body is in a constant state of alteration.¹⁰⁸ While the soul is essentially indivisible, the body is divided into parts.¹⁰⁹ While the soul is immortal, the body is perishable.¹¹⁰ And finally while the soul is of divine origin and pertains to the higher world, the body is dirty (*qadhir*) and belongs to the lower world.¹¹¹ This conception conforms very well to the more negative side of the Neoplatonic attitude towards the body, such as when it is depicted as the “secondary evil,” even if the body as an image of the higher realities, too, is not devoid of all beauty. In the treatise, the body, nevertheless, seems to be portrayed in an utterly negative and even hostile manner and its influence on the soul is perceived as primarily corruptive.

But what is the relation between a material body and an immaterial soul then like exactly, as their natures are diametrically opposed to each other in this manner? For all dualists the relation between the body and the soul is necessarily a problematic one. Plotinus describes the relation between the soul and the body in many ways, and resorts to several allegories in order to clarify it, but always holds it to be a union of unequal partners. First of all Plotinus denies that the soul, as an immaterial and therefore non-spatial entity, could be “in” the body as in a place.¹¹² But since the soul must somehow be related to the body it gives life to, Plotinus rather describes the soul then as being “present” (πάρεστιν) in the body in a similar manner as fire is present in the air.¹¹³ Finally, Plotinus also employs

¹⁰⁶ *Filāḥa*: 923 (10–11, 19); Henry & Schwyzer 1959: 39–41; *Enneads* IV.3.19; Adamson 2001: 224–225.

¹⁰⁷ *Filāḥa*: 918 (19)–919 (2).

¹⁰⁸ *Filāḥa*: 919 (5–6).

¹⁰⁹ *Filāḥa*: 924 (2–3).

¹¹⁰ This is again not stated explicitly in the treatise, but it seems hard to see how an organic body could continue its existence once the soul departs it.

¹¹¹ *Filāḥa*: 920 (1–2).

¹¹² *Enneads* IV.3.20.1–28.

¹¹³ *Enneads* IV.3.22.

the Platonic expression of the soul using the body as an instrument or being like a steersman in a ship.¹¹⁴

While the question of how a non-bodily entity can interact with a bodily entity in the first place is not really dealt with by the treatise, there is an obvious awareness of the difficulties involved in such a relation at a few points. First of all the author seems to be somewhat uncertain whether the soul actually resides in the body itself or only somewhere in its proximity.¹¹⁵ Secondly, the views of the Nabatean sages are told to be split in two in respect to whether or not the soul resides in the body at all, at least in a spatial sense. According to some of those sages then “the body is the location of the soul,” while according to others “the soul is not in any location.”¹¹⁶ Otherwise the way the soul resides in the body is seen in an unproblematically negative light, without further elaboration of the manner of this residence. The terms employed by the treatise (*sakana*, *ḥalla*), however, point towards the idea of the soul living inside the body as in a temporary residence.¹¹⁷

Despite their different natures, in some way the body nevertheless succeeds in influencing the soul. The body brings about changes in the particular soul, even if these changes do not involve its substance. According to the treatise, the particular souls that stay in the bodies change together with the changing of the bodies they have settled in. Bodies themselves are constantly involved in changes of different kinds, alteration being in their very nature. Thus, the bodies receive growth (*al-ziyāda*) and diminution (*nuqṣān*) in their quantity (*al-kammiyya*) and change in accordance with the material nourishment (*mawādd al-aghḏhiya*) that they absorb in themselves. Also, the four natures (*al-ṭabāʾir al-arbaʿ*) – heat (*al-ḥarāra*), coldness (*al-burūda*), moisture (*al-ruṭūba*) and dryness (*al-yabs*) – bring about uninterrupted alterations in the bodies.¹¹⁸

The way the treatise stresses the constantly changing nature of the material bodies is very much in line with the Neoplatonic context, where the bodily world is the realm of generation and corruption, and bodies are entities that are in constant flux. The brief analysis of the changing of the bodies is very Aristotelian.

¹¹⁴ *Enneads* IV.3.21. While this allegory describes well how the soul conducts the body and is separable from it, it is, however, not adequate for Plotinus in other respects, since it does not illustrate the way the soul is present everywhere in the body as the image of fire does.

¹¹⁵ *Filāḥa*: 919 (7): “wa-ʾl-nufūs ḥālla fihā (ajsām) wa-mujāwiratuhā.”

¹¹⁶ *Filāḥa*: 919 (7–8): “fa-ʾAdamā wa-Anūḥā yarʾāni anna al-jasad makān li-ʾl-nafs wa-ghayruhumā mimman dhakamā yaqūlu inna al-nafs lā fī makān.”

¹¹⁷ This idea is of course not at all alien to Neoplatonism either, even if Plotinus at his most sophisticated would reject it. The Arabic Plotinus again uses the very same words, while saying that “bodies are (for the soul) like dwelling places” (*wa-ʾl-ajsām shibh al-masākin*) or that the soul “takes lodging” (*taḥullu*) in a body. (Rosenthal 1955: 42–45.)

¹¹⁸ *Filāḥa*: 918 (19)–919 (8).

The kinds of change classified by the treatise are the ones that Aristotle gives in his *De generatione et corruptione*, namely alteration (ἀλλοίωσις/*istiḥāla*), on the one hand, and growth (αὔξεισις/*ziyāda*) and diminution (φθίσις/*nuqṣān*), on the other. Equally, the treatise shows some knowledge of the process of this change in Aristotle while mentioning the four primary contraries.¹¹⁹ The blatant Aristotelianism the treatise displays here is, however, in no contradiction whatsoever with its Neoplatonism. The Neoplatonists had absolutely no difficulties in adopting an Aristotelian analysis when it was not too much in contradiction with their essentially Platonic views and such Aristotelian doctrines as the ones relating to bodily change were embraced without problems.¹²⁰

The treatise's subscription to the doctrine of transmigration is also easiest to explain by the Neoplatonic origin of its soul doctrine. While reincarnation was accepted by practically all pagan Neoplatonists, most of their Muslim counterparts rejected it, probably due to its obvious contradiction with the Islamic dogma. The doctrine, however, was not only of a religious nature for the Neoplatonists, but also had a specific philosophical task to perform, namely to prevent the problem of the infinity of souls. Since the number of bodies is infinite in a world that had always existed and will always exist, as was the case with practically all Neoplatonists, whether pagan or Muslim, only a rotation of souls through these bodies could save them from an infinite quantity of souls.¹²¹

Even if transmigration was refuted by most of the *falāsifa*, it was by no means unknown in the Arabic world, even in its philosophical form. According to the Arabic Plotinus, the soul wanders from one body to another due to its failure to return to its own world at its separation from the body, either because it has completely forgotten the higher world or because it has grown so fond of the body and the pleasures attached to it. When freed from both of these factors, however, it will return to the intelligible world rather than occupy yet another body.¹²² Very much in a similar vein, the treatise of Ibn Waḥshiyya, although without providing as many details, describes the souls as migrating from one body to another with

¹¹⁹ Aristotle, *On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away*, I.4–5, II.3–4. The treatise does not mention the main subject of this work of Aristotle, namely the generation and corruption of things.

¹²⁰ Another question is whether the Neoplatonists in general were very much interested in analyzing the bodily sphere. Plotinus at least does not seem to devote much time to investigations on bodies for their own sake, i.e., physics, but, nevertheless, *Enneads* III.6.8–9, for example, follows the Aristotelian analysis of bodily change. Obviously this particular Aristotelian doctrine, far from being in contradiction with Neoplatonism, rather supports the idea of the fluid nature of the bodily sphere.

¹²¹ Jaffer 2001: 172–173. The argument is further based on the premise that an actual infinite, which the souls as immortal beings would form without reincarnation, is impossible.

¹²² Rosenthal 1955: 44–47.

each body increasing its forgetfulness. Only once the soul liberates itself from this oblivion can it return to its own world.¹²³

For both, this forgetfulness consists essentially in an ever increasing drifting apart from the higher world. For Ibn Waḥshiyya, the more time a particular soul spends in the bodies, the less it conceives things as they are in reality, and consequently some souls are nearer to the higher world than others.¹²⁴ Similarly, for the Arabic Plotinus, some souls are nobler (*ashraf*) than others, depending on their proximity to the intelligible world (*‘ālam al-‘aql*). In the intelligible world the soul conceives things in an undivided manner, through the essence of things, while in the material world the bodies prevent the soul from conceiving things directly, and are left only with the particularized and deficient conception provided by sense-perception.¹²⁵

3.5. FACULTIES AND PARTS OF THE SOUL

According to the treatise, the very first thing occurring to a soul in the lower world is its division (*tajzī’/inqisām*) into parts. This division does not involve the substance of the soul, however, the soul being an essentially indivisible entity. The reason for this division is the body, for an organic body is divided into different parts and organs and when the particular soul settles in it, it is divided in accordance with it. But since the division is of only an accidental nature for the soul, once it leaves its bodily existence nothing of this division remains.¹²⁶

As even the embodied soul is not truly divided then, the different “parts” are not really parts at all, but faculties or powers (*quwā*, s. *quwwa*) pertaining to the soul in its relation to the body. Among the two kinds of activities that the soul possesses, i.e., those in which it is associated with the body and those in which it is separated from it, the faculties fall into the first category. The faculties are then functions or activities (*af‘āl*, s. *fi‘l*) of the soul in which the soul operates through the body, using the body as an instrument. Each faculty is associated with a bodily organ (*‘uḍw*) of its own within which the specific activity arises. According to the treatise, the soul has prepared each organ of the body in such a way as to enable a specific faculty to appear from it.¹²⁷

The Neoplatonists in general also felt compelled to divide the soul into distinct parts and faculties, despite its essentially undivided nature. After all,

¹²³ *Filāḥa*: 919 (11–19).

¹²⁴ *Filāḥa*: 919 (14–17): “‘alā mā hiya fi ḥaqā’iqihā.”

¹²⁵ Rosenthal 1955: 46–55.

¹²⁶ *Filāḥa*: 922 (21)–923(2, 9–11), 923 (19)–924 (2).

¹²⁷ *Filāḥa*: 923 (11–14), 924 (8–11).

explaining the operation of a thing consisting of logical parts is much easier than that of an absolute unity. Both the author of the treatise and the Neoplatonists in general also carried out this division in much the same way in the sense that they mixed together elements of both Platonic and Aristotelian origin.

The main division of the soul carried out by the treatise is its partition into a desiring soul (*nafs shahwāniyya*), irascible soul (*nafs ghaḍabiyya*) and rational soul (*nafs mufakkira* 'aqliyya').¹²⁸ While the functions of these three parts of the soul are not discussed in great detail, each of them embraces a series of different activities within itself. The desiring soul contains the activities of appetite (*shahwa*), desire (*tawaqān*) and nutrition (*ightidhā*) that seem to relate to the growth (*numūw*) of the body, of which nutrition is the immediate cause.¹²⁹ The irascible soul seems to be concerned with affections and emotions, courage (*najda*) and anger (*ghaḍab*) being attached to it. Besides, such basic actions of a sub-rational nature as defense (*dhabb*) and protection (*muḥāmāt*), which are presumably related to these emotions, are mentioned.¹³⁰ Finally, the rational soul is concerned with intellectual activities, such as discrimination (*tamyīz*) and thinking (*fikr*).¹³¹

The division presented here is clearly the Platonic tripartition of the soul as it is presented especially in the *Republic*¹³² and which was employed by the Neoplatonists at times ever since Plotinus. But for Plotinus it clearly does not play as central a role in explaining the operation of the soul as it does for the treatise of Ibn Waḥshiyya.¹³³ In the case of Muslim Neoplatonism, the situation is quite similar. While the more Aristotelian of them, such as Ibn Sīnā, preferred the Aristotelian tripartition of vegetative, animal and human souls in any serious analysis of the soul, the Platonic division was nevertheless very widespread. However, it was adjusted to fit into the Aristotelian doctrine and the three Platonic parts were generally identified with the three Aristotelian ones.

The terms employed by the treatise to denote these three parts are the ones generally used by those employing the Platonic tripartition in Arabic philosophy,

¹²⁸ *Filāḥa*: 923 (11–18), 924 (1–2).

¹²⁹ *Filāḥa*: 923 (16–17), 925 (5–6).

¹³⁰ *Filāḥa*: 923 (15–16), 925 (4–5).

¹³¹ *Filāḥa*: 923 (14–15), 925 (4).

¹³² Plato, *Republic* IV, 435e–444e and IX, 580d–581a. The translations given to these parts in literature vary greatly, while the Greek and Arabic names seem to be more stable. The three parts are then in ascending order τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν/*nafs shahwāniyya* ('desiring, appetitive, sensual, concupiscent soul'), τὸ θυμοειδές/*nafs ghaḍabiyya* ('spirited, irascible, wrathful, choleric, passionate soul') and τὸ λογιστικόν/*nafs 'aqliyya/nātiqa* ('rational soul').

¹³³ Plotinus discusses the Platonic division, for example, in I.1.5 and I.2.1.16–20, and in IV.7.14 he even claims without qualification that the embodied soul actually is tripartite. The Arabic Plotinus of the *Theology* also repeats this Platonic tripartition. (Henry & Schwyzer 1959: 39–40.)

such as the Brethren of Purity or al-Fārābī.¹³⁴ In an Arabic epitome of a Galenic work, the Platonic doctrine, in a form in which Aristotelian elements have already been embraced by it, is summarized by assigning each of the souls their proper objects of desire towards which they aim and functions which they perform. According to this summary, the object of desire for the desiring soul is pleasure, and its function is to nourish the body, while the irascible soul inclines towards conquest and is the seat of anger, and the rational soul inclines towards the Beautiful and perceives agreement and disagreement in things.¹³⁵

The way in which each of the three parts are placed in a certain organ of the body follows loyally the Platonic doctrine as it was somewhat modified by Galen.¹³⁶ In the treatise the lowest part of the soul is placed in the liver (*kabid*), the middle part in the heart (*qalb*) and the highest part in the brain (*dimāgh*).¹³⁷ This was the way the Platonic division was presented in manuals of the late Greek period and the way this doctrine was universally adopted in the Arab period.¹³⁸ This Galenic-Platonic doctrine, despite its apparent materiality in ascribing a bodily location even for the highest faculty of intellection, a thing which even Aristotle would not do, does not nevertheless seem to be in contradiction with the Neoplatonic one. That the two lower parts of the soul are to be located in the liver and heart can be found in Plotinus as well, while the Arabic Plotinus of the *Theology of Aristotle* seems to assign, at least at one time, bodily locations for each of the three parts.¹³⁹ Despite this, the division of the treatise is not that of Plotinus, for the way he classifies the faculties is much more complicated than the neat tripartition presented here. But precisely in the sort of popular philosophy that our treatise represents, it seems that the Platonic tripartition was the norm at least in the Arab era, and probably in the Late Antiquity as well.

The Aristotelian side of this division of mixed origins is that the treatise employs the Aristotelian concept of faculty. In doing this the treatise conforms well to the pattern of the Neoplatonists, for they too employed faculties as the principal means for explaining the operations of the embodied soul. According to

¹³⁴ E.g., Diwald 1972: 49; Rosenthal 1940: 416.

¹³⁵ Mattock 1972: 247. The fact that the middle soul is characterized as the seat of anger explains its Arabic name.

¹³⁶ Plato gives the physical seats for his three parts in *Timaeus*, 69d–72d. Aristotle, on the contrary, placed all psychic functions with the exception of intellection, which had no physical seat at all, in the heart. Subsequent accumulation of anatomical knowledge, and especially the discovery of the nervous system, with the brain as its centre, led Galen and others again to place psychic functions in the brain. See, e.g., Hall 2004: 71–73.

¹³⁷ *Filāḥa*: 925 (4–6).

¹³⁸ Mattock 1972; Hall 2004: 73–74; Rosenthal 1940: 416–418; Fakhry 1975: 45–46; Diwald 1972: 52–53.

¹³⁹ E.g., *Enneads* IV.3.19.20–22; Henry & Schwyzer 1959: 39–41.

the treatise, a faculty is an activity of the soul associated with a specific organ of the body, which the soul has prepared for the activity in question to arise from it. This view is shared completely by the Arabic Plotinus of the *Theology of Aristotle*, according to whom every faculty of the soul has a location in body shaped by the soul in order for the activity of that faculty to appear in that part of the body.¹⁴⁰ That the treatise makes the three Platonic parts of the soul to be faculties of the Aristotelian type is in complete accordance with the way the Platonic parts, when used by the Neoplatonists, were Aristotelianized into faculties in order to preserve the essential unity of the soul.¹⁴¹

The several sub-faculties classified under the Platonic tripartition seem to be mostly of Aristotelian origin in the end, although their classification here does not completely coincide with the Aristotelian operations of the vegetative, animal and human souls. Rather, they conform again much better to the Galenic-Platonic tripartition into which the Aristotelian analysis was already incorporated to a degree. Of the functions associated with the lowest part of the soul, nutrition and growth correspond clearly to the basic life-giving functions that form the basis of the nutritive faculty (τὸ θρεπτικόν) of the plant soul in Aristotle,¹⁴² while desire and appetite would correspond to the lowest of the Platonic parts.¹⁴³

As for the middle soul, anger and courage have a self-evident place in the Platonic middle soul, for the spirited soul is characterized as the seat of anger by Plato himself, while courage is its perfection.¹⁴⁴ The functions related to defence and repelling, which we are told are caused by anger, might be related to the Aristotelian animal soul. Namely, for Aristotle to this part also belongs the faculty of movement in space (κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον), which is caused by the organism either being repelled away from something or attracted towards it.¹⁴⁵ The name *mulk* (possession, control) associated with the middle part in the treatise, on the other hand, might refer to the function of the subduing and restraining of the desires of the lowest soul that the spirited soul has as its task in the Platonic division.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Henry & Schwyzer 1959: 43.

¹⁴¹ Rosenthal 1940: 416–417; Diwald 1972: 49; Fakhry 1975: 46. Similarly then al-Fārābī or the Brethren of Purity, while using the Platonic tripartition, transform the three “parts” into three faculties. That there was some lack of clarity among the Muslims of what exactly they were is reflected by Miskawayh (c. 940–1030) saying that some call them three faculties (*quwā*) and some three souls (*anfus*). The author of our treatise also seems to be somewhat uncertain, for he calls them by both of these terms.

¹⁴² *De anima* 415b30–416b32.

¹⁴³ See, e.g., Mattock 1972 and Hall 2004 (pp. 73–74) for a description of the way these two tripartitions were combined by Galen.

¹⁴⁴ *Republic* IV, 436a–b, 442b–c.

¹⁴⁵ Aristotle discusses causes of movement in *De anima*, 432a15–435a10.

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., Mattock 1972; Hall 2004: 73–74.

Finally, in the case of the highest part, all the alternative ways of partitioning agree at least on a general level, for intellection self-evidently has to be the proper activity of the summit of the human soul. Presumably the faculty of discrimination (*tamyīz*) consists of discerning one thing from another,¹⁴⁷ while thinking (*fīkr*) refers to discursive, non-intuitive intellection. Namely, for Plotinus this kind of discursive intellection (*διανοία*), which can only apprehend things externally by dividing them into concepts, is not the highest kind. The real intellect (*νοῦς*) for him pertains to that part of the soul that never descends into the material world and which comprehends things intuitively in an undivided manner.¹⁴⁸ It seems that for our treatise such direct intuitive intellection is not possible for an embodied soul separated from the intelligible world, as there is no trace in the treatise that the soul would not descend into the lower world in its entirety. For this reason too, in the lower world the soul does not perceive things as they are in reality.¹⁴⁹

In its divisions and faculties our treatise follows then the Galenic-Platonic scheme rather closely and is more Platonic than Neoplatonic in this respect. Compared to the Plotinian divisions, in which the Platonic parts also had a role, the treatise relies much more on the Platonic tripartition than either the Greek or Arabic Plotinus does. The treatise also lacks entirely the one division that all Neoplatonists seemed to be fond of, namely the partition of the soul into rational and irrational parts. In this division the lower, irrational part consists of the operations of the soul from sensation downwards, while the rational part consists of the functions related to reason. This bipartition can also be found in the Arabic Plotinus of *Theology*.¹⁵⁰ Strangely enough, in our treatise there does not seem to be any special position reserved for the rational soul raising it above the lower parts in value. The difference might again be accounted for by the general lack of elaboration of the treatise and the more simplified nature of its views.

Apart from the faculties of the soul, there are also the five senses (*al-ḥawāss al-khams*), characterized by the treatise as “ways to the soul” (*turuq li-l-nafs*). There is not much information given in the treatise of the exact mechanisms of sensation, however, and all in all the description is rather simplistic. The senses work in co-operation with the body in an analogous manner with the faculties, a single bodily organ being involved with each sense. The five sense faculties and the sense organs related to them are listed in the treatise without much elaboration of their detailed operation.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ See Goichon 1938: 388–389 for how the term is employed by Ibn Sīnā.

¹⁴⁸ Blumenthal 1971b: 43.

¹⁴⁹ *Filāḥa*: 919 (14–17).

¹⁵⁰ E.g., Henry & Schwyzer 1959: 139, 143–145. See Adamson 2001: 225–226 for discussion of the rational-irrational distinction in *Theology*.

¹⁵¹ *Filāḥa*: 925 (7–11).

The five senses are called at one time the “five external senses” (*al-ḥawāss al-khams al-zāhira*),¹⁵² but no mention of internal senses – if they exist – is ever made. The relation of the sense perception to the three faculties or “parts” of the soul is also left rather vague. Apparently, sense perception does not belong to any of the three parts of the soul, but instead forms a unit of its own, since the treatise consistently discusses the three faculties and five senses as entities of the soul that are distinct from each other. The three “parts” and the five senses then together form the eight faculties that the particular soul possesses in the lower world.¹⁵³

Let us now again return for a while to the main subject of the treatise, namely to prove that the delight that wine causes in the soul is of a non-bodily nature. As one of the arguments to prove this claim, the author compares the eight faculties with this affection of joy brought about by wine. The difference is, we are told, that while for all of the three faculties one can find a specific location in the body where the activity in question arises, and for all of the five senses one can find a location of the body from which the sense-impressions enter the soul, for the pleasures of wine no such location can be found. The possibility that these delights might reside in the heart is dismissed with a lengthy condemnation of the simplicity of the multitudes.¹⁵⁴ However, it seems hard to see why this delight could not have the heart as its seat as the other emotions that belong to the middle part of the soul clearly do. Nevertheless, unlike the senses and faculties, the pleasures of wine are to be found in the essence of the soul itself and are therefore of a more noble nature than them.¹⁵⁵

3.6. TREATISE AND NEOPLATONISM

Ibn Waḥshiyya’s *Nabatean Agriculture* emerged at the beginning of the 10th century somewhere in Iraq. Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid empire, was at the time the centre of that vigorous translation activity that led to most of the works of Greek philosophy and other sciences still available in the area being transmitted into Arabic. It was because of this activity that Greek philosophical and scientific ideas infiltrated into Arabic literature, and indigenous Arabic traditions of philosophy and other Greek sciences were formed. But the translation movement did not only contribute to the beginnings of systematic philosophy as incarnated in al-Kindī, but also to the appearance of those stranger and more “popular” forms of

¹⁵² *Filāḥa*: 924 (8).

¹⁵³ *Filāḥa*: 924 (12–14): “quwā al-nafs al-thamāniya allātī hiya laḥā.”

¹⁵⁴ The author lists the absurd tales that the “general multitudes” are capable of believing in in *Filāḥa*: 926 (10)–927 (2).

¹⁵⁵ *Filāḥa*: 924 (12)–925 (2), 925 (11)–926 (4), 927 (12)–928 (11).

synthesis of Greek philosophy, such as the epistles of the so-called “Brethren of Purity” (*Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ*). They combined doctrines of Greek origin, such as Pythagorean number mysticism, Aristotelian natural science and Neoplatonic emanationist metaphysics, into a peculiar mix of other themes varying from magical to religious.¹⁵⁶

The small treatise on the soul contained in *Nabatean Agriculture*, too, is produced around the peak of the great formative period of Islamic philosophy and the penetration of Greek ideas into Arabic thought. It is also the time when the works that conveyed Neoplatonism to the Arabic world were compiled and translated. Whether the fact that the compilation of Ibn Waḥshiyya’s work is located at this same point of time is merely accidental or not, his treatise on the soul seems to reiterate such Neoplatonic ideas that were current at his time and that had formed part of the mainstream of Arabic philosophy since al-Kindī. But since the same Neoplatonic ideas had been the philosophical mainstream already since the 3rd century, this is of course not a good enough argument for dating *Nabatean Agriculture* definitely to the early Abbasid era, rather than the Late Antiquity.

The majority of the ideas concerning the soul presented in this treatise seem to be of Neoplatonic origin. This is evident first of all in the fact that the treatise shares a similar basic conception of the nature of the soul with the Neoplatonists. Thus, here too the soul is characterized by its divine origin, immateriality, immutability, indivisibility and immortality. In a very Platonic manner, the soul is seen as an entity of divine origin in temporary refuge in the material world.

The one aspect that possibly most characterizes Neoplatonic thinking is its dualism. Thus, just as the world is divided into intelligible and sensible realms of diametrically opposing natures, so too is man divided into the soul and the body. This Neoplatonic dualistic thinking is also repeated in the treatise. Thus we find there a higher and lower world, of which the origin of the soul is to be found in the former. The treatise also sees the natures of the soul and the body as contrary to each other in every respect in a Neoplatonic manner, and the influence that the body has on the soul seems to be completely negative, inhibiting the soul from living life true to its real nature. With such a view of the relationship between the soul and the body, their temporary union in the lower world is necessarily a dualistic one, where they function as separate from each other as possible.

Another aspect common to the Neoplatonic vision of the soul and our treatise is the “Platonic myth”, where the cycle of the individual soul is depicted in terms of fall and redemption. The first stage of this cycle is the soul’s fall from the initial purity of the higher world and its descent into a material body of the lower

¹⁵⁶ See Netton 1982: 1–52. The *Epistles* are traditionally dated and located in the 10th/11th century Baṣra.

world. Both for Plotinus and our treatise the particular souls have their origin in the one Universal Soul that ensouls the world as a whole. They also share the view that the particular souls must live through successive reincarnations in a number of bodies of the lower world, each body pushing the soul further away from its true nature. Only after again becoming aware that their real nature is in the spiritual world are they once again free to escape from their material bonds. The treatise shares here the often rather otherworldly attitude that Neoplatonism has towards the material world, where it is essentially seen as a place which the soul should escape from.

The fact that the treatise and the Neoplatonists share a similar basic conception of both the nature of the soul and of the relation that the soul and the body have with each other, often leads them into similar problems. As all souls are seen by both as essentially the same soul coming from the Universal Soul, they have to account somehow for the diversity of souls in the visible world. Both the Neoplatonists and the author of the treatise answer this problem in a very similar manner, regarding the body as being primarily accountable for the individual characteristics of the distinct souls. As both hold the souls to be as essentially unchangeable and indivisible, they also have to explain away the apparent changes of state that the souls seem to have in the lower world as mere accidents, with no effect on the soul's substance. This is also related to their shared conception of the nature of the union between the soul and the body and their desire to keep them as far away from each other as possible, leading to difficulties in explaining how the soul and the body can function as a one, unified organism at all.

While explaining the various operations that the soul seems to perform together with the body, the treatise follows the Neoplatonists in mixing ideas of Platonic and Aristotelian origin together. As the Neoplatonists often did, so too does our treatise employ the Platonic tripartition into desiring, irascible and rational parts, and like them it interprets these parts rather as Aristotelian faculties in order to preserve the unity of soul better than Plato did. However, at least at the higher manifestations of philosophy, the Neoplatonists were not very satisfied with the ability of the Platonic tripartition to explain the way the soul works. Therefore they usually resorted to it mainly in ethical contexts. Our treatise, on the contrary, employs it as the principal means of explaining the workings of the soul, even though it is mixed with the Aristotelian faculty theory. Even though the partitions of our treatise seem to be in no contradiction with the Neoplatonic view then, they seem to be more Galenic than Neoplatonic, for it was Galen who synthesized the Platonic and Aristotelian tripartitions into one.

There are also many elements of clearly Aristotelian origin in the treatise. Such are, for example, the abovementioned faculties. An Aristotelianism in an even more pure form can be found in the brief discussion that the treatise gives of

bodily change. The analysis is clearly Aristotelian, employing the Aristotelian classification of different kinds of changes that the bodies endure, as well as discussing the four primary qualities that play an essential role for Aristotle in explaining these changes. Aristotelian influences are also visible at the level of the philosophical language and concepts used, of which the author seems especially fond of the accident-substance distinction. All this is, however, very much in line with Neoplatonism. Ever since Plotinus, Aristotelian philosophy was very much appreciated and embraced by the Neoplatonists, as long as it was not in contradiction with any of their Platonic views of central importance. Such Aristotelian doctrines as the faculties or the different classes of bodily change, on the contrary, sustained the ideas of the indivisibility of the soul and fluidity of the bodily sphere that were central to Neoplatonism.

It seems then that this little treatise contained in *Nabatean Agriculture* conforms rather well to the general Neoplatonic philosophy of the soul, even though the way it covers the subject is rather more simplistic than that of such Neoplatonists as Plotinus or Ibn Sīnā. Although there is, of course, no one to one correspondence with Plotinus, for example, or even the Arabic paraphrases, the themes nevertheless are essentially the same in which the Neoplatonists were interested, and the doctrine is very much in harmony with the Neoplatonic doctrine.

If the Greek and Islamic versions of Neoplatonism are compared, it moreover seems to fall closer to the Greek pagan than Muslim Neoplatonism, at least if the latter is represented by such figures as al-Kindī or Ibn Sīnā among the mainstream of *falsafa*. This is visible in the fact that, like most Greek Neoplatonists, the treatise also embraces such basic Neoplatonic doctrines as the soul's transmigration and pre-existence, which most of the Muslim Neoplatonists rejected. As for other non-philosophical influences, considering that *Nabatean Agriculture* itself claims to be a product of the wisdom of the ancient Nabatean sages, there seem to be very few "Nabatean" ingredients involved in the treatise. Instead, it seems that all of the essential components of the Nabatean soul doctrine can be traced back to Neoplatonic, Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, with the exception of the special role played by the Sun in it.

TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE ON THE SOUL¹⁵⁷

And with this lengthy discussion that we use symbolically,¹⁵⁸ we desire benefits for our souls and to transmit that which fortifies and delights our souls leading them to these benefits. For when we see plants, crops, running water, beautiful

¹⁵⁷ *Filāḥa*: 918 (1)–931 (19).

¹⁵⁸ "alladhī narmuzuhu."

flowers, verdant spots and pleasing meadows, our souls are often delighted and pleased by this and are relieved and distracted from the sorrows that came to the souls and covered them, just as drinking wine makes one forget one's sorrows.

As this is so, then when the vine climbs up the palm tree in such a soil as we have described before, looking at it is like looking at the higher world,¹⁵⁹ and it acts on the souls in a similar manner as the Universal Soul acts on those particular souls that are in us.¹⁶⁰ As we have told, we are concerned only with our souls here, except for that which is related to them in a way that cannot be avoided. Then let us discuss our souls separately, except for that which we necessarily have to include also because it is related to the soul.

Since the movements of the particular souls that are in us follow the movement of the soul of the entire world – which is the Universal Soul or the Sun – the movements of the particular souls are connected to the Universal Soul. For the particular souls are from the Universal Soul, but are divisible and separable,¹⁶¹ so that this Universal Soul takes hold of these separated particular souls and provides for them. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that whatever gladdens and fortifies the particular soul is similar and alike with the Universal Soul in some way¹⁶² and has taken its place in its world.¹⁶³ And note the superiority of the vine over all plants and other things!

And if someone says to us: If the particular souls are from the Universal Soul, then these particular souls must be similar and alike to each other¹⁶⁴ so that they are all one and the same thing, even though we see them as different. Perhaps their being different indicates that they come from different origins, so that some of them come from Jupiter, some from the Moon and some from the Sun. As for your claim that they come from the Sun alone, there is an error of judgment which lies in your agreement that a part of a simple thing is alike with the whole which it belongs to.¹⁶⁵ We say: The answer to this is that the souls are different because of

¹⁵⁹ *al-ʿulwiyya*. The opposite of the higher world is the lower world (*al-ʿālam al-sufī*).

¹⁶⁰ “wa-kānat fāʿila fī al-nufūs mithla fīʿl al-naḥs al-kulliyya fī hādhihi al-anfus al-juzʿiyya allatī fīnā.” The Universal Soul (*al-naḥs al-kulliyya*) is the soul of the world, while the particular, individual souls (*al-naḥs al-juzʿiyya*) that animate the human beings have separated from it and descended to the lower world.

¹⁶¹ “wa-annahu jāʿiz ʿalayhā al-inqisām wa-l-tafarruq.”

¹⁶² “huwa mushbbih li-l-kulliyya min wajh mā wa-mushākilatuhā.” Ibn Sīnā defines in *al-Najāt mushābaha* as “unity of quality” (*ittiḥād fī al-kayfiyya*) and *mushākala* as “unity of species” (*ittiḥād fī al-nawʿ*). (Goichon 1938: 155, 164.)

¹⁶³ “wa-qad qāma fī ʿālamīhi maqāmahā.” That is, while the thing that makes the particular soul glad resembles the Universal Soul residing in the higher world, this thing itself has come to exist in the world of the particular soul, or the lower world.

¹⁶⁴ “mutashābiha mutashākila.”

¹⁶⁵ “inna juzʿ al-basīṭ mithla kullihi.” *Basīṭ* means simple as opposed to a compound (*murakkab*). All bodily entities are compounds by definition, with the possible exception of

something that came upon them and because of things that became associated with them after their separation and dispersion. Those things that came upon them, changing them somewhat, are the bodies¹⁶⁶ in which the souls settled, and their differences are due to differences in their residences. For the body – which is the residence of the soul – differs in accordance with differences in the material constituents of the nourishment that it is fed with,¹⁶⁷ as the bodies accept growth and diminution in their quantity,¹⁶⁸ while the souls do not accept any kind of change in their substance.¹⁶⁹ And since this is so, then the souls have to change in accordance with the bodies in which they reside, while the bodies change in accordance with the material substances from which they receive growth and diminution.

Also the four natures, which are heat, coldness, moisture and dryness,¹⁷⁰ may change the bodies constantly. For the bodies receive change in two ways: they are in a constant state of change and alteration¹⁷¹ and undergo growth and diminution.

astral bodies, so only spiritual substances, such as the soul, can really be simple. As a simple entity is the same throughout, any of its “parts” are the same as the whole thing. See Goichon 1938: 23.

- 166 *al-aqsām*. *Jism* in general denotes any natural or physical body composed of matter and form and is synonymous with *jirm*. However, of the two, *jirm* is often preferred when referring to the simple, celestial bodies. Ibn Waḥshiyya seems to use these two terms – along with *jasad* – interchangeably with no difference in meaning. The treatise also employs a fourth term for body, *badan*, but its meaning is more narrowly related to the human body than that of the three others. See Goichon 1938: 41–42, 44–45.
- 167 “bi-ḥasab ikhtilāf mawādd al-aghdhiya allatī taghdhūhu bihā.”
- 168 “al-ziyāda wa-l-nuqṣān fī al-kammiyya.” *Kammiyya* denotes quantity (ποσόν) as one of the ten Aristotelian categories. In Aristotelian physics there are three kinds of change (κίνησις): change in quantity, change in quality and change of place. The first kind of change is called growth (αύξεισις) or diminution (φθίσις): growth occurs when something is added to a body, diminution when something departs from the body. See Aristotle, *On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away*, I.5 and *Categories*, VI.
- 169 *jawhar*. Substance (οὐσία) is the first of the ten Aristotelian categories, accident (᾿αραδὶ συμβεβηκόσ) being its opposite. Substance is for Aristotle primarily anything that cannot be attributed to something else, e.g., one particular horse, while accidents are attributes of the substances. Thus, everything that exists is either a substance or an accident. In the treatise, substance is used in another Aristotelian manner, namely as synonymous with essence (*dhāt*). In this sense substance means those essential qualities pertaining to a thing that define what it is and without which it could not exist. (Aristotle, *Categories*, V, 2a11ff.; *Metaphysics*, V, 1017b10–27.)
- 170 “fa-inna al-ṭabā’i’ al-arba’ allatī hiya al-ḥarāra wa-l-burūda wa-l-ruṭūba wa-l-yabs.” The four primary natures or contrary qualities are the basis for the Aristotelian doctrine of four elements: earth, water, air and fire. Each of the four elements is a combination of two of these contrary qualities. For Aristotle, all change takes place between a pair of opposites, and since each of the elements contains at least one opposite quality with each one of the other elements, every one of these elements may change into any other element. (Aristotle, *On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away*, II.3.)
- 171 *istiḥāla*. This is qualitative change defined by Ibn Sīnā as movement from one quality to another (*al-ḥaraka allatī min kayf ilā kayf*). Qualitative change is one of the three Aristotelian kinds of change. See note 168 above and Goichon 1938: 97–98.

While the souls stay in them and are neighbors to them,¹⁷² they change together with the changing of the bodies, but not in the essence¹⁷³ or substance of the souls, but as a change of perishable accidents that are in a constant state of extinction and transition.¹⁷⁴ But these changes do not occur in the souls due to their proximity to the body only, but also because they receive what the five senses¹⁷⁵ bring to them. For these five senses are ways into the soul which constantly bring something to it, while the soul undergoes the change. So the soul is changed for many reasons, but they are not substantial or essential changes. When the particular souls are transferred from some bodies to others – and they are constantly changing their body – we find them for that reason forever forgetting the body from which they came. We have learned that this oblivion is due to the change which the souls receive from the bodies, leading them even to forget the Universal Soul from which they were separated.

The conditions of the souls here are often clearly different from each other. This is because those souls that have fallen from the higher world and settled in one of the bodies are not like the souls that have moved from one body to another. Instead the soul that has fallen from the higher world is further away from receiving change, as well as higher in its knowledge and wisdom and nearer in its conceiving things according to what they are in reality, while the soul that has moved from one body to another has none of these properties.¹⁷⁶ The souls that have repeatedly had residence in various bodies necessarily gain some heaviness,¹⁷⁷ not in their substance, but only in their movement. This change occurs in the soul due to the abundance of bodies it has resided in.

¹⁷² “wa-’l-nufūs ḥālla fihā wa-mujāwiratuhā.”

¹⁷³ *dhāt*.

¹⁷⁴ “bal taghayyur ‘araḍ yumkin zawāluhu wa-huwa dā’im al-zawāl wa-’l-intiqāl.”

¹⁷⁵ *al-ḥawāss al-khams*. The five senses are: sight (*baṣar*), hearing (*samʿ*), touch (*lams*), taste (*dhawq*) and smell (*shamm*).

¹⁷⁶ “wa-dhālika anna mā habaṭa min al-nufūs min al-ʿuluww fa-sakana fī jirm min al-ajrām, [laysa] mithla mā intaqala min jirm ilā jirm, bal takūnu al-nafs al-hābiṭa min al-ʿuluww abʿad min qabūl al-taghyr wa-ʿlam wa-aḥkam wa-akthar taṣawwuran li-’l-umūr ‘alā mā hiya fī ḥaqā’iqihā, wa-anna mā intaqala min jism ilā jism lā yakūnu lahu shay’ min hādhihi al-awṣāf.” The negation *laysa* has to be amended for the sentence to make sense, especially since the second part of the sentence starts with *bal*. In the first part *jirm* is used for body consistently, while *jism* is employed in the latter part. With goodwill this might be interpreted as *jirm*, referring to celestial bodies, while in the latter part *jism* would refer to earthly bodies. Thus, it could be interpreted as hinting towards the Neoplatonic doctrine of the soul’s descent through an astral intermediary. The author, however, does not use these two terms for body consistently in this way.

¹⁷⁷ “thiqal mā.”

Ādamā¹⁷⁸ has said that when one of the particular souls throws off its heaviness, oblivion departs from it, and when oblivion departs from it, then heaviness departs from it. Then it recalls the world it used to be in,¹⁷⁹ starts desiring to return to it, and flees from this lower world¹⁸⁰ clinging to the rays of the Sun. But it would have no need for that, had it not been afflicted with the contamination of the dirty bodies so that it must seek help from the rays of the sun in order to ascend to the place to which it should ascend.

This is the reason for the changing of the souls, for they are from different origins that impose the changes on them.¹⁸¹ Let us now examine the change occurring in the soul due to the drinking of wine, whether it is like the rest of the changes occurring in the soul or whether there is a difference between them. For if it is like the rest of the changes caused by things, then wine is like any of those things and then wine and all of those things are similar to the Universal Soul. If, however, the change occurring in the soul because of drinking wine belongs to those things that are contrary to all things causing change, then we learn that this thing peculiar to wine is in the substance which the Sun has bestowed on the grape, for all action belongs to the Sun.¹⁸² And when we said before that Venus is especially concerned with the vine, it has to be that when the Sun bestowed Venus with delight and joy, it had especially favored the vine by entrusting it with delight and joy.

But we will not be satisfied with this proof alone. Instead we require, besides it, something stronger which is drawing conclusions from the changes caused by the drinking of wine besides delight and joy, or occurring together with delight and joy. So we consider this and say: We see that when a person drinks some amount of wine – which is between too little and too much – joy, delight, and what is similar to them come to his soul, and, in addition, courage and boldness come to his soul. And if he does not attain degree of drunkenness, then when a person thinks on something, the thought leads him from it to the benefits that he conceives in his soul. So, besides delight and joy, two other benefits and changes caused by wine are added to the soul that are of greater value than joy and delight.

178 Ādamā – or Adam – is one of those “Nabatean wise men” whose name has a clearly Biblical origin.

179 “ālamahā alladhī kānat fīhi.” The higher world.

180 “al-‘ālam al-suffī.” The lower, material world.

181 “fa-hādhā sabab taghayyur al-nufūs, li-annahā min uṣūl mukhtalifa awjabat taghayyurahā.” As has become clear by now, all of the particular souls, of course, have the same origin, namely the Universal Soul. The “different origins” here refer then presumably to the varying bodily histories the particular souls have behind them. Some of them have just descended to a body in the lower world, while others have already spent a while migrating from one body to another.

182 “li-anna al-fi’l kullahu li-’l-shams.”

And since this is so, then we have found that wine acts on the soul in a way that is different¹⁸³ from the action of other things. It shares a few aspects with the soul¹⁸⁴ and is different from it in other aspects. Sometimes drinking a moderate amount of wine causes something other than joy, delight and other things that we have mentioned here to come to the soul. For it is evident that wine, along with other things causes delight and joy, but wine is also especially favored with other kind of activity that is greater than these things.¹⁸⁵ If we started to enumerate all the things that wine imparts to the soul, it would take a long time.

The origin of this peculiarity and its difference from the actions of all other things, is due to the Sun having favored the grapes with a gift that it has not bestowed to others. Despite this, we must say, however, that for all the things that wine imparts to the soul, the sages have found other things that act similarly on the soul. All these things, however, come to the soul through the participation of the body in them. As for those changes that occur in the soul alone – without the participation of the body – these are joy and delight. These things the soul receives alone without the body participating in them at all. For people have not found in this world anything that would impart the soul as much joy and delight. And it is distinguished from those things that the soul and the body possess together, while the property of that kind of change coming to and occurring in the soul is, on the contrary, in something that the soul accepts from the body and together with the body.¹⁸⁶ And for all these changes occurring in the soul with the participation of the body, another thing has been found that does the same thing and has the same effect on the soul as wine, except for that what we mentioned above – joy and delight – which alone is only in the soul without the participation of the body.

Since our investigating this subject has led us to conclude that delight and joy are a state in the soul that the soul receives alone and that belongs to the soul without the body participating in it, that shows that this is a state in the soul from the substance of the soul in particular. For the substance of the body, or any other thing, has no manner of participating in it. Since it has been shown that the particular soul that is in us is of the substance of the eternal, everlasting, high and eter-

¹⁸³ *mubāyin*. In Ibn Sīnian terminology *mubāyana* means difference in the sense of a distinguishing characteristic. (Goichon 1938: 27.)

¹⁸⁴ “fa-qad shāraḳat bi-’l-yaṣīr al-naḑs.”

¹⁸⁵ “zāhira anna lahā muṣhāraḳa li-ghayrihā fī al-surūr wa-’l-aṣrāb, wa-lahā ikhtīṣāṣ takhtaṣṣu bihī min al-ḑīl ghayr dhāliḳa wa-akthar minhu.”

¹⁸⁶ “fa-ṣāra hādhā mutamayyiz min tilka al-ashyā’ allatī hiya li-’l-naḑs wa-’l-jaṣad ma’an, fa-takūnu ṣifa dhāliḳa al-taghyīr al-qā’im fī al-naḑs al-’arīḑ lahā innamā huwa bi-shay’ taqbaluhu min al-jaṣad ma’ahu.”

nally pre-existent Sun,¹⁸⁷ it shows that what is imparted to it from something similar to it in substance¹⁸⁸ is from the same substance. And what imparts this to the soul is the juice of the grape, the substance of which is alike with the substance of the soul, for it is similar to the soul and resembles it. This shows that joy and delight are a state in the soul that the soul acquired from the higher world and that was imparted to it by wine, for wine is similar to the soul in its substance¹⁸⁹ and the soul is from the substance of the Sun.

In this manner most of that which we perceive in the Sun and as pertaining to the Sun can also be perceived in wine and as pertaining to wine, except for permanence and eternity.¹⁹⁰ For the Sun is eternal, while wine is not eternal in its essence and form. So is the case with most of the properties [of the Sun] that wine has some of them. While wine possesses the juice of the fruit obtained from the grapes, this suggests that the grape possesses the providence of the Sun and is especially favored with it. For the Sun has given the juice of the grape a state that resembles some of its own states and for that reason the vine is the most noble of all plants in general. For no other plant, or any other thing, has the nature and action similar to that of wine.

Ṣaghrīth has said: And let not anyone suspect that I exceeded the proper bounds in speaking so about wine, and say that I raised wine in its substance and action on the same level as the Sun, and made the joy and delight which it causes in the soul alike with the matter of the soul, which is the Universal Soul of the two worlds and of the particular souls that are in us.¹⁹¹ I did not raise wine on the same level as the particular soul, let alone that I would have raised it on the same level as the Universal soul. How could I do such a thing? Instead I deemed the glory of the wine to be the joy and delight it brings to the soul, and deemed it to be magnificent and glorious because it serves the soul and honored it for the delight it causes in it. This does not mean that I raise wine and the particular soul – let alone the Universal Soul – on the same level. This is the meaning of my words when I praise wine, and I do not treat it and the particular soul as equals under any circumstances.

187 “al-shams al-bāqī al-sarmadī al-‘ālī al-qaḍīm.” Of the four attributes given to the Sun here three refer to the eternity of the Sun. *Bāqī* denotes its post-eternity, *qaḍīm* pre-eternity, and *sarmadī* means eternal in the sense of both *a parte ante* and *a parte post*.

188 “muḵānis li-jawharihā.” Of the same genus. Ibn Sīnā defines *muḵānasa* as identity of genus (*jins*) (Goichon 1938: 50.)

189 “fa-kāna al-khamr mushbih fī jawharihi jawhar al-nafs.”

190 “wa-ka’anna ‘alā hādhā inna mā nushāhiduhu fī al-shams wa-li-’l-shams aktharuhu fī al-khamr wa-li-’l-khamr illā al-baqā’ wa-’l-sarmadiyya.” This alternative reading of the manuscript variants seems to make more sense than the one chosen by the editor Fahd.

191 “hiya nafs al-‘ālamayn al-kulliyya li-hādhīhi al-nufūs al-juz’iyya allatī fīnā.”

After all I have not been the first to praise and extoll wine, but have followed in it earlier Kasdānian, Kanʿānian, Nahrian and Sūrānian sages, as well as sages from among the other Nabatean tribes.¹⁹² For they have agreed on praising and honoring wine and agreed on its high value and magnificent standing. Every one of them spoke on this subject with this meaning, and even if they contradicted each other in their sayings, yet they all agreed in them on extolling, praising and honoring [the wine]. However, despite this, they disagreed on the subject of particular souls and their origin, the source of coming to be and element,¹⁹³ even though they agreed that everything belongs to the Sun. My purpose here is not, however, to relate their beliefs concerning the soul, but to relate their sayings in praising the wine above all other plants. However, when all that is connected to the soul and associated with it, it is necessary to relate what they said about the soul in the places where the talk about wine goes together with the talk about the soul.

They differed greatly on their explanation of the particular soul, but agreed that the Universal Soul is the Sun. Then after agreeing on the subject of the Universal Soul, they disagreed on that of the particular soul and disagreed on whether to associate something else with the Sun, even though only few of them held this view. Namely Ṣardāyā was a sage of the Kanʿānians, as was Tāmtharā, both of whom were astronomers,¹⁹⁴ and they were the first to discuss the soul. And before them there was Kāmās the Nahrian and Ādamā the Babylonian, who was the messenger of the Moon. These most distinguished among our ancestors wrote about the soul and disagreed on some notions regarding this matter, but agreed in it on their division and dispersion after the separation of the souls from the totality which they called their world.¹⁹⁵ I have here related what they said about the division before other things, because we need to put it down here as it is the basis for verification of other human properties.

We say that their agreement on this is a proof of its certainty, but if we add to their agreement arguments from some of them, it will be even more convincing. For proving something from two aspects and with two arguments is stronger than proving it with only one argument. We shall mention their argument for the division of the soul in all of our text, but we must relate first what they said on this division, whether it is substantial to the soul, occurring in its essence, or is

192 “bal iqtadaytu fihī bi-ḥukamā’ al-kasdāniyyīn wa-’l-kanʿāniyyīn wa-’l-nahriyyīn wa-’l-sūrāniyyīn al-awwalīn wa-ghayr hā’ulā’ min ’ajyāl al-nabaṭ.”

193 “wa-mukhtalifūn fī aṣliḥā wa-maʿdin inbiʿāthihā wa-ʿunṣuriḥā.”

194 ʿālimā al-falak.

195 “wa-ajmaʿū fī dhālika ʿālā tajziḥā wa-tafarruqiḥā baʿda infiṣāliḥā min kullihā alladhī sammāuhū ʿālamahā.”

accidental to it. And if it is accidental, does it belong to the enduring accidents or the passing, transitory and changing accidents?¹⁹⁶

I say that Ṣardāyā argued that the soul is divided and stated on this matter that the first condition that occurs to the soul is its partition and division. But the division of the soul is something the soul does in a way of a passing – not enduring – accident. That is, the soul does not receive the division in its essence and substance, but only receives it from part of the separating accident that comes to it as we said. He said: And if someone says to us that we find that there is a division in the soul in its essence, in its partition into a desiring soul,¹⁹⁷ irascible soul¹⁹⁸ and thinking, rational soul,¹⁹⁹ we say to him that it is as you said, except that they are not a division and a partition in the soul, but instead are faculties²⁰⁰ of the soul that are associated with the body and possess these functions through the corresponding organs of the body. Those functions which lie in the highest organ cause, through this faculty, which uses that organ, discrimination and thinking. Those functions which lie in the middle organ, which is the *mulk*,²⁰¹ cause, through this faculty, courage and anger in it. And those functions which lie in the lowest organ cause in it appetite, desire and nourishment, which is the cause for growth. And these are the three faculties of the soul, not souls that have divided and separated from one soul and become three souls.

Since this is so, then our souls are from the soul, and their division is not in their substance and essence, but is accidental to them. These faculties appear in the soul, and from the soul, when the soul is united with the body. But when the soul departs the body, none of these three accidents remain in the soul and the soul remains alone possessing what it solely possesses. That is, when the soul settles in the body, it is said of the soul that it is divided and partitioned in accordance with the division and partition of the body, in a manner of transitory association which ends when the soul leaves its union with the body.

196 “fa-hal huwa min al-aʿrāḍ al-thābita am min al-aʿrāḍ al-fāniya al-bāʿida al-muntaqila.” For Ibn Sīnā the essential accidents (*al-aʿrāḍ al-dhātiyya*) are those that follow from the essence of the subject – without forming part of it, however. Non-essential accidents, on the contrary, are of an incidental nature which the subject may or may not have. (Goichon 1938: 218.)

197 *nafs shahwāniyya*. This is the lowest of the three parts in the Platonic tripartition of the soul which is introduced at this point of the treatise.

198 *nafs ghaḍabiyya*. Fahd consistently has *nafs ʿaṣabiyya* for the middle part of the soul which, however, makes much more sense with the addition of the diacritical points. *Nafs ghaḍabiyya* (the irascible or wrathful soul) is the standard Arabic term for the Platonic middle part.

199 *nafs mufakkira ʿaqliyya*.

200 *quwā*. Faculties or powers (s. *quwwa*) of the soul do not form separate parts of the soul for either Aristotle or the Neoplatonists.

201 This term probably refers to conquest or possession. According to an Arabic epitome of a Galen’s work, the object of the middle soul’s desire is conquest, and its main function is to control the lowest of the three parts of the soul. See Mattock 1972: 247–248.

And this is the judgment of Ṣardāyā the Kan‘ānian on the matter of the partition of the soul. Tāmtharā shares his view on this matter, while Ādamā agrees with both of them, as does Kāmās the Nahrian. However, despite this, they think that the soul has no need with these activities of its faculties for the places and locations of the body, since they subsist by themselves.²⁰² And this self-subsistence dispenses of location. Ādamā and Anūḥā²⁰³ think that the body is the location of the soul, while others among those we mentioned say that the soul is not in any location. These organs to which we attributed these faculties of the soul are the locations in which these faculties of the soul appear. This is because the soul has prepared and made each organ suitable for the activity to appear from it, just as it has prepared the senses so that from each sense in each of the organs something determined – which does not go beyond it to another organ – appears. Similarly it has also prepared each one of the organs according to its form, persisting in bringing forth one of the faculties of the soul from that organ and in it.

Let us now examine, after relating what the ancient sages said, whether joy and delight are similar to the faculties of the soul appearing in the inner organs and whether they belong to the class of the eight faculties of the five external senses.²⁰⁴ And if they belong to these things and they are similar to each other, then they act in a similar way and are like the eight faculties that are in the soul. But if they do not belong to these faculties and activities in any way, and there is no similarity between them, and they are not related in any way to those faculties, then we have learned that joy and delight are not faculties of the soul acting in association with the body at all, but instead appear from the soul itself and its substance. Thus they are more noble and sublime than all of the faculties of the soul, and they belong to the soul through its very substance, so that their position is like the position of soul in this world. Also joy and delight do not come from the soul as a cause and an effect, so that the soul would be the cause, and joy and delight would be its effects. Instead, the delight is the soul and the soul is the delight, for it has become clear that their essences are one and the same. And that is what we wanted to demonstrate.

As for demonstrating that the delight in the soul is not like the five senses nor like the three faculties of the soul, it has become evident from our showing that delight and joy are the essence of the soul and are in the soul in its substance. But we must add a proof to this, confirming it and so we say:

202 “li-annahā qā’ima bi-nafsihā.”

203 Biblical Noah.

204 “wa-hiya min jins al-quwā al-thamāniya fī al-ḥawāss al-khams al-zāhira.” That the five senses contain eight faculties might be explained by the fact that the sense of touch may be thought to consist of four distinct faculties, one for each primary quality. According to Aristotle, it is difficult to say whether touch is one sense or several. See Aristotle, *De anima*, II.11. However, the five senses and three parts of the soul also form together eight faculties.

The brain, which is the highest organ, is the location in which the thinking, discriminative and rational faculty²⁰⁵ comes to be. The heart, which is the middle organ, is the location in which courage and anger causing protection, defense and repelling come to be. The liver, which is the lowest organ, is the location in which the appetitive and growing faculty²⁰⁶ of the soul comes to be, for they belong to its nature. Sight, which is located in the eyes, is the location from which colors, images and forms come to the soul, which perceives them through this sense. Hearing, which is located in the ears, is the location from which sounds, which are hammerings together of some kind,²⁰⁷ come to the soul. Smell, which is located in the nostrils, is the location from which the odors come to the soul and through which the soul perceives fragrances. Taste, which is located in the mouth and the tongue, is the location from which tastes come to the soul, and therefore the soul perceives them through this way. Touch, which is located in the whole body, is the location from which the touching of things comes to the soul. The soul perceives that through them. But we do not find a location for joy and delight through which the soul perceives them, or in which they come to be from the soul, as we did for these eight.

Someone might say that the heart is the location of sorrow and anxiety, which are opposed to gladness and delight. For this is known to the common sense of the people and is current on their tongues, so that they say to each other: "You have brought gladness to my heart, or you have covered my heart with sorrow," or "my heart has been filled with delight because of this, or my heart has been filled with worries because of this." Also they say: "You have caused pain to my heart with this, or you have made my heart sick with this." Also they say that "someone has a valiant heart, or a sturdy heart, or that his heart is violent in its anger." Thus people have agreed, or most of them, on the heart being the location of joy, delight and sorrow, and of courage and boldness and cowardice and weakness. And if this is so, then the heart is the location of joy and delight, as it is the location of courage and bravery, and cowardice and cruelty.

If this is true, then joy and delight are states that are in the soul in association with the body, and their location is the heart. Then delight and joy act in a similar way as those activities of the soul that occur in association with the body, and it is not true that they would be states in the soul coming from the essence and substance of the soul, or that they would be opposed to those activities of the soul in which the body is associated with the soul. If this is true, then your claim that joy and delight are in the soul in its essence and substance is false. In response to

²⁰⁵ "al-quwwa al-mufakkira wa-'l-mumayyiza al-'āqila."

²⁰⁶ "quwwa al-nafs al-mushahhiya wa-'l-nāmiya."

²⁰⁷ "iṣṭikākāt mā." *Iṣṭakka* means knocking together of something, such as teeth.

this, we say that in your attempts to prove our statements wrong you, our esteemed challenger, base your arguments against us on fables spoken by the people that have not been proved to be true, and of which there is no physical evidence. For the general crowds and masses often believe in many things that are absolutely not true, but are imaginary and natural to them.²⁰⁸ But instead your – our esteemed interlocutor – way to refute our statements should have been by demonstrative proof or physical demonstration²⁰⁹ that would have been more appropriate for our intellects. As for your reliance on the figures of speech²¹⁰ spoken by the common people and beliefs in which they believe without proof or knowledge, so that they pass them on to one another, you do not have an argument that you could force us to accept.

For this reason there are many similar beliefs of the common people and masses about things that are not true and have no basis. So the followers of ʿIshīthā²¹¹ and the people of his creed that follow his practices believe that in this lower world there are creatures that are called *jinn*s, and some of these *jinn*s are called demons.²¹² They also believe that in the deserts and arid regions there are creatures that are called *ghouls*,²¹³ that in the upper half of their body are in the form of a woman, while the lower half of their body is in the form of a donkey, so that they have hooves, like the hooves of a donkey, at the end of their legs. And when someone who is under twenty years of age sees one of them, he is paralyzed and is not able to move, so that she seizes him and cuts his throat and then sucks his blood. They also believe that in the islands of the sea there are creatures called ‘*anqāʾ*’,²¹⁴ whose upper half is in the form of a bird, so that it has the head, beak and wings of a bird, while its lower half is in the form of a man with the thighs,

208 “hiya fihim ṭabʿiyya wahmiyya.”

209 “bi-dalīl burhānī aw bayān ṭabʿī.”

210 *majāzāt*.

211 Biblical Seth.

212 “wa-hāʾulāʾ al-jinn baʿḍahum/baʿḍuhum yusammūnahum shayāṭīn.” Alternatively: “and some of these people call them demons.” The Arabic word *jinn*, of course, refers to the Arabian spiritual creatures of pre-Islamic origins, mentioned already in Qurān and familiar to western readers from the pages of the *Arabian Nights*. Here, however, the meaning of the word depends on the timing of *Nabatean Agriculture*. If it is a translation of a Syriac text from the Late Antiquity, then *jinn* would be the Arabic translation for some creatures similar to the *jinn*s, such as the pagan *daimones*. In the Arabic tradition, *jinn*s may be either good or bad, and the term *shayāṭīn* (s. *shayṭān*) is commonly used to denote the malicious *jinn*s in general. Lane offers in one of the innumerable notes to his translation of the *Arabian Nights* a description of how these creatures have been perceived by the Arabs, and of the different variants among them. (Lane 1927, note 20 (pp. 976–981).)

213 According to Lane, *ghouls* (*ghūl*) are commonly regarded as a variety of the malicious *jinn*s (*shayāṭīn*) that eat men, especially lonely travelers in the deserts, according to one opinion. See Lane 1927: 980.

214 Griffons.

legs and feet of a man. And this creature flies from east to west and from west to east in one day. They also believe that there are serpents in the sea that talk in the language of India, and that in the land of China there are talking trees, so that in the night they can be heard telling tales to each other. There are many such absurdities and lies that the sensible people endowed with reason can show that all of them are absurd and impossible to exist.

They also often tell fables with tales of lies and absurdities, as well as report, in the name of prophets,²¹⁵ tales of so great an untruth, falsehood and ugly deceit that is unbearable to hear. Do you justify your claims, o' you who oppose our sayings, with what such people as these say and with what is always current on their tongues. Nothing can be learned from them, no authority is attributed to them²¹⁶ and there is no argument in their delusion. If we wanted to, we could relate what they believe in and about the lies and absurdities that are told among them, the truthfulness and reality of which they do not doubt. Some of them would even swear a sacred oath that they are true. As for that what they relate about the prophets – and they call infidels those who oppose it and abuse those who doubt its truthfulness – is a pure lie and falsehood, and an obvious absurdity without doubt. They kill those who doubt it, regarding their blood as permissible. They also disparage them and mock their reason, but it is they who should be mocked, and it is their reason that is weak when it accepts absurdities that cannot exist. For they are like animals that pass time after time without learning, or like sleepers that do not wake up. There is no truth in the beliefs of such people and no argument in their sayings, so that someone should set their sayings or opinions as the master that he follows. This is what the reasonable man must not do, and he who possesses even the least bit of cleverness and judgment must not turn to them.

Thus it is also when they say that “you have brought gladness to my heart or covered my heart with sorrow, or it caused joy in my heart or it caused pain in my heart.” For they say those things because they imagine and presume that the heart is the location of joy and delight and of anxiety and sorrow. But this belief is not correct, and what they imagine is not true. And since this is so, then there is no justification for any of them to say that “you have brought gladness to my heart, or you have brought joy to my heart, or you have covered my heart with sorrow.” For it is not so, and their belief is not correct and their delusion is not true.

If we wanted to relate all the things that the common people and masses have accepted, or that they claim and report the prophets to have said and taught, it

²¹⁵ “yarwūna ‘an al-anbiyā’.” The text of Fahd must be emended with one *wāw* in order for it to read *yarwūna* instead of *yarawna*.

²¹⁶ “wa-lā yusnadu ilayhim shay’.” *Asnada* in the strict sense refers to a corroboration of a *ḥadīth* in the sense of tracing back its ascription to its first authority through the chain of witnesses.

would take a long time to describe and enumerate those absurdities of obvious falsehood that are not accepted by anyone with reason or at least a bit of cleverness. But they have accepted them all, professed them and laid them down as their authorities. The reasonable, perceptive and wise do not doubt that they are plain lies and worthless falsehoods, but are constantly astonished at those who say those things and believe in them, and are astonished at the weakness of their intellects in believing in things that no reasonable man would believe. Such people have no arguments in their sayings.

So it has been shown that the heart is not the location of delight, and that joy and delight do not come to be in the soul with any association with the body whatsoever. As this is so, then joy and delight are in the soul in its essence and substance and the body is not associated with them in any way. If someone asked where is the location in which the soul manifests joy and delight in the soul, we would say that there is no location for them among the organs from which they would appear, because the soul is not associated with the body in any way when they appear. And if the body is not associated with the soul when they appear, then they do not come to be from any of the organs of the body. If they do not come to be from an organ specially associated with them, then they are in the soul in its essence and substance. Every time that people are delighted, they see it as an indication that the activities of the soul come to be in one of the organs, because the soul causes it to appear from there. That is an activity of the soul occurring in association with the body. But the soul does not bring all of its activities to appear from any specific organ, but there are activities of the soul that appear in its essence and substance in which the body is not associated, such as joy and delight.

Thus this has been shown, and this also shows that when wine causes delight and joy in the soul, the substance of wine contains fineness that is similar to the fineness of the fine substances.²¹⁷ And the soul is a fine substance, not the body. It is fine to such a high degree that it is finer than all the things of which it said that they are fine. Since this is so, then wine contains fineness that resembles this fineness. For that reason, wine causes delight and joy in the soul and acts on it causing changes in it that do not come to the soul from anywhere else but wine. These activities then are caused by the wine because of the resemblance between it and the soul. And that is what we have desired to demonstrate from the very beginning until now.

²¹⁷ “kāna fī jawharihā laṭāfa tushbihu laṭāfat al-jawāhir al-laṭīfa.” The opposite of fine (*laṭīf*) would be coarse (*kathīf*). Essentially all simple entities, i.e., non-bodily entities, are of a fine nature, while composed, bodily entities are coarse. It is then this fineness also that makes wine like the immaterial soul and enables it to affect the soul in a non-bodily way. See, e.g., Alibhai 1992: 169.

If someone asks us: does not listening to the playing of music with psaltery, *kithāra*, harp, lute, rebec or other musical instruments cause delight and joy in the soul, and he says²¹⁸: These instruments indeed cause delight and joy in the soul because they are related to the soul and share with the soul in its fineness. Equate and relate then the instruments and the soul in the same manner as you did with wine and the soul, and put these instruments and wine on the same level, for they act on the soul in the same way as wine does. For you know that all of the ancient sages and prophets have ordered and decreed on the playing of these instruments in festivals and in front of the idols. They said – and they speak the truth – that this pleases the gods and they compensate those who do this with beautiful rewards. And they have given many promises for this activity, among them long age, the repelling of diseases, the turning away of maladies, the fertility of fields and the growth of fruits. These are superior conditions to the conditions caused by wine. You have learned what they said also about *nāy*, *baʿlghā* and *dābusā*²¹⁹ and about the delight, joy, agitation, strength and change that comes to the soul when one hears someone blowing on them. All this, be it better or lesser than the wine, is equal to it in conveying something to the soul.

We say to this person that you have made two things similar that are not similar and have equaled two notions that are not equal to each other. This is because the way that the joys of wine reach the soul, and through which it brings gladness to the soul, is not the same way that causes joy and gladness when musical instruments are played with hands. This is because the soul is made happy by these instruments through hearing the sounds that reach the soul through the sense of hearing by the organs that are called ears. This is like the reaching of the eyesight to the soul through the eyes. For sight also often conveys to the soul, among the things that it takes to it, something that causes delight and joy in the soul. Sometimes also the nostrils convey something to the soul through the sense of smell that causes delight and gladness in it. These are bodily organs from which that which comes to the soul comes through the soul associating with the body when the soul is affected this way by joy and delight. For as we have shown before, the soul has affections in which it is associated with the body and affections in which it is separated from the body. That which is brought to the soul through one of the organs, or which reaches the soul through some organ, is an

²¹⁸ “fa-in qāla lanā qā’il inna samā’ al-ḍarb bi-’l-mi’zafa wa-’l-qithāra wa-’l-jank wa-’l-ʿūd wa-’l-rabāb wa ghayrihā min ālāt al-malāhī laysa yasurru al-nafs wa-yuṭribuhā, fa-yaqūlu: ...” All of the instruments named are stringed instruments used in the Arab world. The *fa-qūlu* in the edited text of Fahd must be replaced by the manuscript variant of *fa-yaqūlu* for this sentence and the ones following it to be meaningful.

²¹⁹ While *nāy* is a flute of a sort used among the Arabs, the two latter instruments are unfamiliar enough for Fahd not to have ventured a guess on the correct places for the diacritical points. Thus, the forms given here are mere guesses.

affection in which the body is associated with the soul. But that which comes from no organ is in the soul in its essence and substance. The joy and delight appearing in the soul while one hears songs, melodies and the playing of musical instruments, however, descends upon the soul in association with the body. They reach the soul while one hears music through the way, or organ, that are the ears.

This is the obvious difference between it and the affection caused by wine. For the joys and delights of wine do not come to the soul from an organ, and they do not appear in any organ before the soul. Instead, when someone drinks wine and it reaches his stomach, and when the moistures are mixed and their vapor rises to the places into which the vapors flow, then delight and joy come to the soul due to its proximity to the vapor, or due to some other reason with which we are not familiar. For the ancients explained about this some things which we relate here. But we have learned some more things concerning this subject that we also must not mention since the sages before us did not mention them.²²⁰

Those things that reach the soul because of wine, and cause joy and delight in it, either come from one of the senses or from one of the organs. As this is so, then the joy and delight of the soul caused by listening to melodies and the voice of instruments occurs in the soul in association of the body with the soul. This is because it comes to the soul from one of the senses which the hearing also is. Someone might say that wine reaches the soul through a way that is an organ, which has one of the senses in it, and this is the mouth and the throat, and thus wine, and the sounds of musical instruments and listening to melodies are equal in all cases, for they reach the soul in a similar way. Thus, they must be judged similarly to have reached the soul in association with the body. Since this is so, then the joys of melodies and musical instruments are in the soul like the joys of wine are in it, and there is no difference between them.

We answer to that by saying that the joys and delights that wine causes in the soul are not caused directly by the mouth, uvulas and throat, as is the case with the effect of the hearing of melodies and sounds of instruments. This is because when the hearing of melodies and sounds of instruments enters the sense of hearing, the hearing affects the soul by bringing the delight and joy to it. But the effect of wine is not like that, but instead it affects the soul only after some time has elapsed since it came to the abdomen and after it permeated the soul with even a small

²²⁰ “wa-qaḍ waqafnā minhu ‘alā shay’ lā yajibu dhikruhu ayḍan, li-anna al-ḥukamā’ qablanā lam yadhkurūhu.” This possibly refers to the subject which Ibn Waḥshiyya discusses in his introduction to *Nabatean Agriculture*. The “Nabatean sages” had decreed that their religion and traditions (*sunna*) should be kept hidden from outsiders. But according to Ibn Waḥshiyya, this decree should concern the religion and law (*sharʿa*) of this community only, while the sciences useful to all human kind should be made available to everyone. Apparently the knowledge to which the author refers here concerns some of the more esoteric bits of Nabatean wisdom. See *Filāḥa*: 6–7.

amount of its quantity. Since this is so, then the affection of the soul caused by wine is also not like the affection of the soul caused by other things. For the affection of the soul caused by other things indicates the association of the body with the soul, and the association of the soul with the body, while in the affection of the soul caused by wine the soul is not associated with the body. We have demonstrated this previously with a proof – or rather various proofs – that are sufficient. And thus the result of this is that the joy and delight that listening to melodies and the playing of instruments cause in the soul occurs in association with the body, while the soul receives the activity of wine on the soul in its essence and substance.

This is what we wanted to show. It has become clear and evident that the activity of wine on the soul takes place on their essences and substance,²²¹ and that the effect is delight and joy. The effect of hearing instruments and melodies takes place, however, in association with the body. It has become evident now that the constitution of wine is a fine constitution that permeates the soul, causing changes in it and creating in it something that it did not possess before. The affection caused in the soul by music and melodies, however, takes place in association with the body. There is a great difference and wide distance between these two things. And let us make this even more convincing by saying: The delight that permeates the soul because of wine is not like the delight that affects the soul due to music.²²² For the delight caused in the soul by wine is like the delight caused by those benefits that pour to the soul from among the worldly things that the human being has urgent need for, so that permanent and lasting delight – that permeates his soul like something substantial – is caused in him. The joy caused by music is something that passes away when the thing that caused the joy – which is the playing of melodies and instruments – passes away. So it is like something accidental and non-enduring, while the delight caused in the soul by wine is lasting, permanent and necessary, and the former is not like the latter and does not resemble it. And in this there is a proof for the fact that the delight that pours upon the soul from wine is not like the delight that pours upon it from music. So the one is not like the other, and while their origins are the same, their results are not. And this is evident and true.

221 “wa-qad tabayyana wa-zahara anna fi’l al-khamr fi al-nafs innamā yakūnu bi-dhātayhimā wa-jawharihimā.” If the fact that *dhāt* is in dual while *jawhar* is in singular is intentional, then it presumably refers to the shared origin of the substance of wine and the soul, while their essences are different.

222 *ṭarab*. Here *ṭarab* is used for music, while otherwise this word is consistently used for joy in the treatise. The principal meaning of the word is intense emotion or agitation of the soul, whether joy or grief. Derivatively the word, however, also means music, which often is the cause of such intense pleasure to which the word refers. See Lane 1927 and Dozy.

With this talk – from its beginning until the point we have reached – we did not want to liken wine with the particular soul, but we wanted to praise and extol wine over most or all things because of those effects that are manifested in it. And while praising wine, we wanted to praise and extol the grape over most or all things, that is either over all plants or most of them. And if there exists precedence among plants, then it lies in the abundance and generality of benefits, and this must be taken into account in them, and one has to decide between them in accordance with this. For the precedence between them lies in the nobleness of their effects in themselves – even if their number was fewer – and must be judged in accordance with that. Thus, we have praised the grape in this way in accordance with the second manner. The property that we mentioned – that it lies in the nobleness of its actions in themselves, even if their number was fewer – affects the grapes and pertains to them.

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