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Jeong-Young Kim & Lasse Lehtonen

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PREFACE

This special volume of *Studia Orientalia* contains the written versions of selected papers presented during the eleventh conference of the Nordic Association of Japanese and Korean Studies (NAJAKS), which was held at the University of Helsinki, Finland, on 19–20 May 2022. Originally planned for May 2020, the conference was postponed twice due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the pandemic – and possibly the geopolitical situation in Europe – a considerable number of papers were unexpectedly withdrawn. We deeply appreciate the participants who looked forward to the postponed hybrid conference with patience: forty paper presenters and an audience of more than one hundred scholars and students in the field of Japanese and Korean studies.

The conference began with the keynote lecture, entitled "Pen/Insular Relations in Prehistory: understanding the past for future use", by Gina Barnes and David Hughes. The chapters of two plenary speakers, Hannes Mosler and Olavi K. Fält, open this volume. Hannes Mosler examines the speeches given since 1993 by South Korean presidents commemorating the May 18 Kwangju Democratic Movement to better understand how the historical events have been interpreted by the different political camps in power. Particular attention is given to President Yoon Suk-yeol's speech in 2022, shortly after his inauguration. Olavi K. Fält, on the other hand, examines the opening up of Korea in the 1870s. By employing a close reading of English-language newspapers in Korea, Japan, China and Western countries, he interrogates contemporary reactions to the political developments and the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876.

After these plenary speakers, the volume presents chapters based on the conference presentations, which examine a wide range of different subjects, time periods and social circumstances in Korea and Japan. The chapters begin with Polina Barducci's account of warlord Miyoshi Nagayoshi (1522–1564). The nature and historical significance of Nagayoshi's regime has been subject to much debate. Barducci proposes a re-examination of Nagayoshi's rule by addressing governmental and ritual practices that Nagayoshi implemented while in power.

Against the backdrop of large post-war movements of peoples, monies and goods, Simon Bytheway explores how repatriation-related currency trafficking interfered with the economic and monetary decolonisation of Korea and demilitarisation efforts throughout Northeast Asia, challenged the missions of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and the

Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, and thus shaped the nature of the Allied occupations in the 1945–1952 period.

In his chapter, Mark E. Caprio examines acts of terror and armament on the Japanese side after the end of World War II. As he argues, wars virtually never end with the signing of a peace treaty, and post-war Japan is a case in point. While not drawing a direct link to the Korean War, Caprio nevertheless demonstrates that various political groups and activities in Japan can be contextualised in a broader continuum of social turbulence – even war – in post-World War II Asia.

The influence of wartime policies in contemporary Japan are also present in Yoko Demelius's chapter, which discusses elderly *zainichi* Korean women in Japan. Demelius takes as her example transcultural communities that enhance feelings of sisterhood and belonging among their members. She notes that the *everydayness* of encounters embedded in this context can also help decolonise the experiences of marginalised Korean women in Japan. The type of association she examines provides an alternative view to how people conceptualise and understand diversity in Japanese society, which has tended to be exclusive of ethnic and cultural minorities.

Noting that the satirical term *Hell Joseon* has emerged in recent years and been widely used by the South Korean younger generation to criticise an increasingly complex social and economic environment, Rachad Elidrissi argues that the "culture of positivity" is the stimulus behind the term's resurrection; he does so by tracing its roots back to nineteenth-century Donghak ideology and illustrating how it is perpetuated through today's growing global phenomenon of K-pop idols.

Ji-hyun Hwang examines the interactions between the multi-semantic layers and literary devices of Kim Yujeong's representative works *Spring, Spring* and *Camellia Flowers*. In exploring the depth of the works in their entirety, she argues that Kim Yujeong intentionally buries the serious social issues of his time in a deeper semantic layer, causing readers to experience contradictory emotions, such as laughter, sorrow and anger, by employing ingenious artistic experiments via linguistic means.

With a radical approach to the two Korean word classes, Jeong-Young Kim depicts the pedagogical aspects of how Korean adjectives and verbs should be introduced to Finnish-speaking learners with respect to their L1 grammar. She explains why the terms adjective and verb have been abandoned and replaced with *predikaattiryhmä 1* 'predicate group 1' and *predikkaattiryhmä 2* 'predicate group 2' in the book *Korea Alku! Korean Perusteet*.

Ami Kobayashi and Katsuyoshi Kawasaka address the experiences of foreign LGBTQ+ JET teachers in rural parts of Japan. As their analysis demonstrates,

Japanese society and education are highly heteronormative, which undermines the objective of internationalisation in the JET programme and the hiring of foreign teachers – effectively, multi-minority persons – to work in Japanese schools.

Gender is also assessed in Lasse Lehtonen's chapter, which examines the complex relationship between popular music and society in Japan by focusing on female singer-songwriters in the 1970s and 1980s. He argues that the work of several highly popular musicians – such as Matsutōya Yumi, Nakajima Miyuki and Takeuchi Mariya – fostered notable changes in Japanese discourses about popular music from a gendered point of view. In Lehtonen's view, the rise and popularity of female singer-songwriters also parallels changes in broader social phenomena, such as the rise of feminism(s) in Japan at that time.

Sangwon Shin discusses the ideological movements that led to the abolition of the nae/si nobi in Chosŏn Korea, focusing on how state ideology influenced the discontinuation of the nae/si nobi through the creation of homogeneous subjects in legal codes, nobi policies and Confucian rhetoric. He claims that such efforts to achieve impartiality in society unintentionally contributed to the legal abolition of the nae/si nobi by King Sunjo in 1801.

Finally, Valdimir Tikhonov deals with the life trajectory of Chu Chonggŏn (1895–1936), a Japanese-educated, nationalist-turned-communist political figure and one of the original founders of the underground Korean Communist Party (1925). He especially focuses on the life and activities of Chu after his flight to the Soviet Union in 1927, which thus far has rarely been dealt with by researchers. He uses Chu's marginalisation in Moscow and the atmosphere of suspicion that surrounded him there as an example of how the social capital of political trust was unevenly distributed throughout the organisational pyramid of the international Communist movement of the 1920s and 1930s.

Providing a setting for discussing a wide variety of topics in Japanese and Korean studies, the conference was a great opportunity for participants from not only the Nordic countries but also other parts of the world to gather together and discuss and share their respective research areas. It would have been impossible to host such a successful complimentary conference without sufficient support from various scientific organisations. It is our privilege to acknowledge the generous support received from the Academy of Korean Studies and Federation of Finnish Learned Societies. We are also grateful to Lotta Aunio, the chief editor of *Studia Orientalia*, who made the decision to include the NAJAKS proceedings in the journal series. Likewise, we extend our thanks to each member on the editorial board of *Studia Orientalia*.

We believe that despite many papers being withdrawn due to COVID-19, the increased number of the participants at NAJAKS reflects an ever-increasing – and a versatile – interest in Korea and Japan. We hope that it may continue to grow for every NAJAKS conference in the future.

Helsinki, May 2023

Jeong-Young Kim & Lasse Lehtonen

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POLITICS OF MEMORY IN SOUTH KOREA: PRESIDENT YOON SUK-YEOL'S 2022 MEMORIAL ADDRESS ON THE KWANGJU DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT

Hannes Mosler

INTRODUCTION

The importance of understanding how memory politics function has become clear in the wake of the recent Russian war against Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin employed a particular method of remembering national and international history in order to justify his aggression.[1] To a great extent, he successfully framed his crime – at least domestically. While this is an extreme example, memory politics is usually more subtle, and it does not necessarily justify actions and developments that have negative repercussions. Memory politics simply describes the fact that what happened in the past is always framed in a particular way in the present for the sake of the future. In the case of the German expellees from Russia (*Russlanddeutsche*) after World War II, for example, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1995: 3183) famously said, "Those who do not know the past cannot understand the present and cannot shape the future". He indicated that it was important for Germans to know and remember the reasons why the *Russlanddeutsche* were expelled from their original home in order to prevent similar tragedies in the future. In other words, how one views the past can determine the future, and for this reason, memory politics is always a place of contention; there are many different perspectives on the past.

This is particularly true for a country like South Korea (hereafter: Korea), where a long "remembrance war" or "war on history" (*yŏksa chŏnjaeng*) has been raging between conservatives and liberals over the "correct" interpretation of the country's past (see Mosler 2014). Due to its particularly dynamic history over the preceding 150 years, there is much in Korea's past that generates differing views.

1 One of the most illustrative examples of his aggressive revisionism is his speech on the alleged "Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" in 2021 (Putin 2021).

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The country was occupied by the Japanese for decades (1910–1945), fought the Korean War (1950–1953), and later experienced decades of military dictatorship (1961–1987). These are Korea's most obvious historical junctures. The interpretations of some of these periods are controversial, while others are less polarizing. And, thus, the practices of political memory exhibit differing levels of subtlety.

The so-called New Right has been involved in recent high-profile uses of memory politics. Since the early 2000s, the New Right has attempted to introduce a revisionist perspective on the country's history, both to the general public and to middle- and high-school students (Tikhonov 2019). Producing publications with alternative facts and depictions of the past, they intended to provide a "correct" view of Korea's history to end the allegedly "masochistic" or "leftist" conception of history, which they associated with the existing practice of history education in Korea (see Yoon 2020). They aimed to rewrite the country's history in order to sugar-coat the Japanese occupation, conceal US–American or South Korean atrocities during the Korean War, and whitewash Park Chung-hee's military putsch in 1961. They almost succeeded; however, when President Park Geun-hye was impeached and unseated, this revisionist attack on Korea's history halted – for the time being. During the liberal Moon Jae-in government (2017–2022) most of the historical revisionism have been undone, and the New Right's power faded. However, with the rightist-conservative Yoon Suk-yeol taking office in 2022, the question is whether we will experience yet another turning back the clock to darker times. Against this backdrop, this chapter investigates the ways in which the Kwangju Democracy Movement of 1980, a historic event that was negated and then disputed, is remembered today. Drawing on a previous article (Mosler 2020) for the examination of former presidents' commemorative speeches on May 18 Memorial Day since 1993, the second part of the paper focuses on President Yoon Suk-yeol's first commemorative address in Kwangju in 2022, and puts it into historical perspective.

This paper is structured as follows. First, a brief background summarizing the course of events, as well as the competing depictions and evaluations of the Kwangju Democracy Movement in related literature, is provided. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical settings of the investigation. Here, the political system model (Easton 1965) is introduced and expanded upon using the concepts of cultural and functional memory (Assmann 2020), which serve as a basis for speech analytic tools (Wodak & Cillia 2007). Drawing on these conceptualizations, the main section analyzes presidential commemorative speeches on the Kwangju Democracy Movement given between 1993 and 2021, and then focuses on the address given by President Yoon Suk-yeol in 2022.

BACKGROUND

In May 1980, the Kwangju Uprising began as one of many demonstrations against the new dictatorship under yet another military leader, Chun Doo-hwan. Seven months earlier, in October 1979, strongman Park Chung-hee had been assassinated by the chief of his spy agency, which ended his 18-year dictatorship and opened a window of opportunity for the introduction of democracy. However, shortly after the assassination, Chun Doo-hwan seized power. After decades of authoritarian regimes, the Korean people wanted liberalization and democratization, and they poured into the streets across the country – including the southwestern city of Kwangju. Here, ultimately, the hitherto peaceful demonstrations escalated into violence after Chun Doo-hwan sent troops to brutally suppress the people's demands for democratization. The conflict lasted from 18 May to 27 May 1980, and in the end, the regime's troops massacred between 200 and 2,000 civilians.

This was a great tragedy. Not only had people been brutally killed, but the authoritarian government suppressed and misrepresented these facts. In an attempt to conceal their crimes, the authorities invented a distorted version of the events. At the center of the falsification was the narrative that claimed dissident Kim Dae-jung and North Korean infiltrators were responsible for the 'rioting' (*poktong*), and that the military intervened only to protect the country and its people from the threat of a communist takeover (*Kyunghyang Sinmun* 1980). In this manner, the facts regarding the events in Kwangju were altered, and until the transition to a formal democracy in 1987, the truth about the massacre was an official secret.

Even today, rightist–conservative elements have made repeated attempts to misrepresent the facts about the uprising. The two primary perpetrators responsible for the massacre in Kwangju, military strongmen Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, mostly remained silent about what happened and fabricated false testimony about their involvement in their memoirs (*Chungang Ilbo* 2019; *Ohmynews* 2021). In another well-known example of distortion, columnist Chi Man-won produced several book-length accounts of the Kwangju Democracy Movement and claimed to offer proof that a North Korean soldier infiltrated Kwangju to instigate the uprising (Chi 2006; 2009; 2010; 2014). Finally, in 2021, the Special Act on the May 18 Democracy Movement (SAM-18) was amended, and now prohibits the "dissemination of false facts about the May 18 Democratization Movement", because "even after 40 years have passed, there are still forces that slander and denigrate the May 18 Democratization Movement, and distort and fabricate historical facts, thereby promoting national division in

the national opinion and using it politically" (SAM-18 2021). As a result of the 2021 amendment, distortion is now punishable by up to five years in prison or by a 50,000 euro fine (SAM-18 2021: §8). In other words, the Kwangju Democracy Movement is still fiercely contested.

Korea's politics are highly polarized, with the liberal or progressive camp on one side and the rightist–conservative camp on the other (see Mosler & Chang 2019). While the liberals have their roots in the opposition and democratization movements that formed during the period of autocracy, the conservatives profess to uphold the tradition of developmental dictatorship. The present article investigates how the Kwangju Uprising, an historic event that is central to democratization in Korea, has been reflected in commemorative speeches by presidents with different ideological orientations: liberal and conservative. Since the convictions of Chun and Roh in 1997, it has become difficult for presidents to neglect commemorating the May 18 Democracy Movement. Similarly, it has become difficult for them to overlook its significance in terms of Korean democracy. However, the manner in which presidents engage in political remembrance varies. By expressing things differently, for example, by emphasizing, de-emphasizing, or omitting certain aspects of an event, a president can influence the discourse surrounding an historical event as well as its present and future meaning.

There have been many studies of the political remembrance of the Kwangju Uprising. There are even several English-language articles and book-length publications that deal with the incident and how it is remembered (see above). Most of these works critically assessed the uprising. Although there is much more information available in Korean, increasingly even revisionist, distorting works are published in English. To date, there has been no investigation of commemorative speeches of South Korean presidents.

THEORETICAL SETTINGS

How can we conceptually relate certain memory practices to political effects? The model of the political system proposed by Easton (1965) is helpful as a basic grid. If we modify some of the components related to the input of "diffuse support", we can lay out a framework of assumptions regarding how history and its remembrance affect the political predispositions of people, and thus legitimize certain political activities. The framework also allows assumptions about how political activities may affect who remembers what, how they remember and why. The original model is complemented by more concrete assumptions regarding how "diffuse support" of the political regime occurs.

Drawing on Assmann's (2020) differentiation between "storage memory" and "functional memory" helps conceptualize the manipulative selection of political remembrance. Storage memory is all the information about history that is documented and could potentially be retrieved from archives. Archives, however, are sometimes incomplete, and not everything can be taught in school. A selection process is needed by which functional memory is produced. This is the memory of selected elements of the past, and it finds its way through school curricula into the awareness of the general public, forming the basis of a society's identity, which in turn supports certain political activities and rejects others. Put differently, it legitimizes certain political activities and actors. However, this depends on which parts of the storage memory are rediscovered through political activities. Political activities may incorporate parts of history that were not previously included in the functional memory. Or, this could mean that certain parts of history are repeatedly or continuously referred to, while others are not. The routes to rediscovery are manifold; the most obvious route is officially approved curricula or textbooks. Rediscovery is also spurred by political performances by powerful political actors, such as political institutions, politicians, the press, or civil society organizations. These memory entrepreneurs visit memorials, pay respect to the war dead, and stage memorial addresses on anniversaries.

Accordingly, the basic theoretical assumption I make is that commemorative addresses by presidents are significant tools for shaping the political remembrance narrative. This is due to the powerful position that presidents hold as speakers. In addition to schoolbooks, mass media and academic research, we can expect these speeches to have a significant impact on the general remembrance discourse.

Moreover, the literature on the topic of commemorative addresses finds that speeches are an "important communication mode in modern societies" that have an "educational function" (Wodak & Cillia 2007), which can "shape political cognition in society" to the degree that it actually "defines political reality" (Bietti 2014). Central to the function of commemorative speeches and their impact are the speakers. Bietti (2014: 64) identifies this type of political communication as "highly goal-oriented performance(s)" through which presidents "attempt to get others to share a common view about what is [good and what is evil, and what is just and what is unjust]". Simply put, in commemorative speeches, the speaker frames the past for the sake of a certain future. Thus, a commemorative speech "seeks to convey certain political values and beliefs to construct common characteristics and identities, and to create consensus and a spirit of community which, in turn, is intended to serve as a model for future political actions of the addresses" (Wodak & Cillia 2007).

Speech structure is assumed to have the abovementioned effects on the narrative if it conveys contents that correspond with the conventions and basic beliefs of a given socio-cultural context. In simplified terms, the basic strategy of this highly goal-oriented speech act is to relate the current anniversary event to a past event; in our example, the Kwangju Uprising. After making this connection across time, the speaker emphasizes the meaning and significance of the events and presents the valuable lessons learned. Based on this consensus regarding the spirit of the movement, the speech asks the audience to think and act according to the speaker's agenda. Often, this agenda is the realization of a future vision for the nation.

Based on these theoretical conceptualizations, I developed an analytical grid with two parts to guide the systematic examination of the speeches (Table 1). First, the speeches were assessed in quantitative terms: frequency, length of speech, and completeness of structural elements. Second, the qualitative characteristics of the speeches were analyzed by looking into explanations given for particular occurrences, present assessments of past events and translation into future visions.

Table 1 Quantitative and Qualitative Criteria

Quantitative dimension		**Qualitative dimension**	
Variable	*Criteria*	*Variable*	*Criteria*
Frequency	number of speeches on site	**Explanation** (of past events)	causation empathy
Length	number of words in speech	**Assessment** (in the present)	history legacy
Structure (completeness)	saluting the audience contextualizing past (anniversary) emphasizing sacrifice appreciating accomplishments calling upon the audience	**Translation** (into the future)	objective precondition

PRESIDENTIAL COMMEMORATIVE SPEECHES ON THE KWANGJU UPRISING, 1993–2021

The question investigated was whether presidents gave a commemorative speech on the Kwangju Uprising and, if so, how often. Then, the length of the speech was assessed, and the speech was examined for the strategic and structural elements

predicted in the literature. Figure 1 provides an overview of speech length and frequency of occurrence. Conservative presidents are shown in dark gray and progressive presidents in light gray. Each of the three conservative presidents up until 2019 (Kim Young-sam, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye) held one commemorative speech on the Kwangju Uprising, while the progressive presidents spoke several times – apart from Kim Dae-jung. Roh Moo-hyun gave a speech every year, and Moon Jae-in gave a commemorative address in person three times. As for the length of speeches, each of the progressive presidents held at least one speech that exceeded the average length, while the speech lengths of the two conservative presidents, Lee and Park, were below average. Kim Young-sam is an exception; however, his speech was also the first, and the context was slightly different (see Mosler 2020: 82). Examining the speech elements, it is clear that all presidents adhered to the basic strategic structure common for commemorative speeches: connecting the past and present, attributing significance to the events, and appealing to the audience based on the "Kwangju Spirit". This is also reflected in the order in which the five structural elements appear in the speeches.

Conservative presidents held speeches less often, and their speeches were shorter than those of progressive presidents. However, when it comes to speech structure and order of elements, all speeches appear quite similar. All presidents commemorated the Kwangju Uprising, as might be expected from a president of a liberal democratic country. However, conservative presidents gave the impression that they were not as committed to the commemoration as the progressive presidents because they gave speeches less often, and their speeches were much shorter. Thus, there is a need to examine the texts to determine whether this impression is borne out.

The qualitative analysis first examined how each president explained the causes of past events in their speeches and how explicit they were in expressing empathy toward survivors of the violence that took place. Second, attention was given to the way in which each president assessed the history of the Kwangju Uprising from 1980 to the present day, and how they interpreted its legacy. This provided a look at the way each president evaluated the response to the Kwangju Uprising and how they expressed its spirit today. Third, in each speech, the objective of linking past to present, as envisioned by each president, was determined. This highlighted how each president carried the symbolic capital of honoring sacrifices and the spirit into the future. Thus, the questions were: How did each president hope to utilize the collective identification? What preconditions did they believe were necessary for this symbolical capital to be transferred into action?



Figure 1 Commemorative Speeches given by Presidents at the May 18th National Cemetery, by length (1993–2021)[2]

Explanation. Progressive presidents tend to explicitly name the factors that caused the hardships of Kwangju citizens in their speeches. They do so by detailing the kinds of violence used by the soldiers sent by the regime and by emphasizing the cruelty, calling it a "massacre" and an "unjust" and "illegitimate" use of force. Conservative presidents are almost completely silent regarding the motives underpinning the actions that led to the tragedy. When it comes to honoring the sacrifices of Kwangju's people, however, conservative presidents speak of sacrifice, suffering, alienation, and sadness. Compared to the speeches of progressive presidents, conservative speeches have a limited repertoire of expressions of empathy. In addition to providing expressions of empathy, progressive presidents are more nuanced and more explicit in their elaborations.

Assessment. This pattern recurs in the second variable – the way each president assesses the history and legacy of the Kwangju Uprising in the present. Progressive presidents explicitly name the facts regarding the uprising. Furthermore, they are critical of past distortions and denouncements of the facts, as well as the denigrating and insulting remarks that have been made about the Kwangju people. They point out that negligence, alienation, and discrimination were a result of maneuvering by certain political forces and that the truth about Kwangju has not

2 The dotted line represents the average speech length (656.5 words).

yet been established. Conservative presidents, again, are silent regarding the way the uprising was handled.

Turning to how the presidents address the legacy of the Kwangju Uprising, conservative presidents touch upon this only when they argue that the Kwangju people should not cling to the past and should release their bitter feelings and look forward, not backward. Similarly, progressive presidents agree that the future is important, but they reiterate that "Kwangju lives on", and they call the Kwangju Spirit an immortal torchlight that shines each year. Simply put, while conservatives stress that it is important to go on, progressives emphasize that Kwangju is ongoing.

Translation. A similar difference between the speeches of conservative and progressive presidents is found when the third and final variable is examined. Here, we highlighted the aims of the speeches for each president and looked at how they bridged the assessment of past events and call for future action.

Regarding the objective of each speech, conservative presidents focused almost exclusively on economics and development. Kim Young-sam spoke of his vision of New Korea, a slogan he used throughout his presidency. Lee Myung-bak repeatedly pledged to make Korea a so-called first-rate, advanced country. Park Geun-hye reiterated the term "state development" several times, which is another way of saying economic development. They spoke of happiness as well, happiness that would come as a result of economic and development projects. Progressive presidents, on the other hand, focused on tasks and objectives, such as improving human rights, furthering participatory democracy and realizing the principle of sovereignty of the people and social equity. They mentioned prosperity and development as well, but these instances were rare and more understated.

Regarding the objective, there is a clear divide between the two camps. While conservatives use the commemorative speech as an opportunity to talk about their economic projects, progressive presidents try to link the Kwangju Uprising and its legacy to more directly-related issues, which is more convincing than trying to link a massacre to blooming landscapes. Similarly, conservative presidents contend that political conflict between polarized camps should stop, pain must be overcome, and perpetrators should be forgiven. They should not forget, but they should also not look back as we saw. Conservative presidents ask the people to apply the Kwangju Spirit to development projects. Although they express the need for social integration, they are silent about how to achieve social integration, apart from suggesting that people look forward not backward. Progressive presidents explicitly stress the necessity of reconciliation, concord, and compromise; they speak of the importance of dialogue and cooperation and of respect and concessions. They show empathy for the Kwangju people and clearly name the

necessary preconditions for integrating and uniting society, despite the horrific atrocities committed. In sum, also with respect to this third and last variable, there are clear differences between the two sets of presidents.

Conservative presidents' commemorative addresses do not deny or reject the meaning and achievements of the Kwangju Uprising but refrain from explicitly describing the causes and consequences. Based on this abridged account of the uprising, they call for national integration and an economic leap forward while leaving out the necessary process of reconciliation. In this manner, the speeches of conservative presidents contain the bare minimum of the formal requirements for a commemorative address. The speeches of progressive presidents are considerably more authentic, refer to established knowledge about the uprising, and, in their totality, are more credible.

Exploring the topic in general terms, this paper reveals how the contentious remembrance discourse in Korea is reflected in presidential commemorative speeches. This discourse competition surrounding interpretation of the past in Korea is often dubbed a *remembrance war*, because it is so fiercely fought. What becomes clear through the analysis of the commemorative speeches, however, is that the strategies employed are sometimes quite subtle. The conservative presidents conformed to the basic formalities of commemorative address, but they omitted crucial facts, skipped important context, and focused on drawing attention to a bright future marked by economic prosperity. One could argue that designing a speech on the Kwangju Uprising to highlight future economic prosperity simply represents a different take on the importance of the economy. However, the speeches of the conservatives in particular demonstrate how the process of coping with or rectifying the past may be inhibited by depoliticizing the meaning of the Kwangju Uprising. For, they do fulfill their role as the head of government and state who acknowledge the tragedy to be mourned, but they reduce statements regarding the underlying reasons for the tragedy to a minimum, if at all, by which they foreclose a critical discourse about legacies from the past and their meaning for the society's present and future.

THE COMMEMORATIVE SPEECH BY PRESIDENT YOON SUK-YEOL (2022)

The memorial address by President Yoon Suk-yeol in 2022 was analyzed using the pattern common to commemorative speeches by presidents. Quantitatively, Yoon's commemorative address in Kwangju was rather short (370 words), which is similar to the pattern of his conservative predecessors. His future speeches may be longer, but the 2022 speech was quite short, and approximately one-third

of the average length of the speeches of liberal presidents. In terms of the basic speech structure, President Yoon adhered to the fundamentals; on a formal level, he offered a brief but reputable address.



Figure 2 Commemorative Speeches given by Presidents at the May 18th National Cemetery, by length (1993–2022) with Yoon (2022) added[3]

Qualitatively, there are some striking resemblances between Yoon's speech and the speeches of former conservative presidents. First, Yoon did not provide any explanation for the causes of the massacre. As we saw earlier, this was common among conservative presidents. This is an important element of the speech because if information about the origins of such a tragedy are offered, this means the President not only *knows* who the perpetrator was; they name the perpetrator. Naming those responsible is an important gesture, and doing so provides an unmistakable evaluation of the history involved. Second, President Yoon did not show particular interest in the feelings of the victims or the bereaved. He did mention the "pain" of the bereaved and spoke about "facing the pain" of the victims and their "sacrifice", but there were no further, concrete traces of empathy. Third, Yoon did not elaborate in detail on the meaning of the so-called "May 18 Spirit", despite mentioning it seven times in his speech. At one point, he

3 The dotted line represents the average speech length (634.5 words).

does say that the May 18 Spirit was "the restoration of universal values and the very spirit of the constitution of liberal democracy". However, he did not explain what that meant in explicit terms. He seems to stress the importance of the May 18 Spirit, however without convincingly conveying what he believes that is. In the end, this raises questions about his interpretation of its meaning.

Fourth, President Yoon seems to say that the Kwangju Movement and May 18 Spirit are related to the concepts of "liberal democracy" (*chayuminjujuŭi*), "freedom" (*chayu*), and "human rights" (*in'gwŏn*). The term "liberal democracy" is often mentioned in his speech, which is interesting for several reasons. No president before him, including former conservative presidents, had ever used the term "liberal democracy" in a Kwangju speech. Both, liberal as well as conservative presidents, usually refer to only "democracy". President Yoon, on the other hand, used "liberal democracy" eight times in his short speech, while he did not explain what he intended to express by this particular term. Furthermore, President Yoon did not explain what he meant by "freedom" either, a term he used five times in his speech.[4] This is not surprising, as President Yoon used the term *chayu* 35 times in his inauguration speech, as often as he referred to democracy (Yoon 2022). Traditionally, the rightist–conservatives in Korea deliberately use the term liberal democracy to distinguish their concept of democracy from other possible forms of democracy, such as the "people's democracy" in North Korea (Mosler 2016). In other words, liberal democracy is used as a counter-narrative to North Korea. It is another way to say "anti-communism", one that appeals for support from a certain reactionary segment of society.[5]

Regarding his inauguration speech, it is revealing that his core argument is built around an insertion he reportedly made himself at the last minute: the contention that an increasing "anti-intellectualism" in Korea threatens liberal democracy. The concept of anti-intellectualism was originally coined by Hofstadter (1963), who argued against the liberty-threatening demagogy of nineteenth-century populism and twentieth-century McCarthyism, which he believed shared the same genealogy. Armed with this term, President Yoon took aim at the former government under liberal President Moon Jae-in, when he said that anti-intellectualism "oppresses the opinions of others with the power of the majority, and puts democ-

4 If the term "liberal" from the phrase "liberal democracy" is included in the counting, the term "chayu" was used even twelve times in the address. The Korean word *chayu* can be translated either as 'freedom' or 'liberal/liberty'. Thus, in the Korean context, the difference between the concepts of freedom and liberty are known, and use of the term *chayu* occurs eleven times.

5 This is further connected to the topos of "free democratic basic order", which is often used synonymously by rightist–conservatives, in their peculiar understanding, for liberal democracy (Mosler 2017).

racy at risk and undermines trust in democracy". While it is difficult to dispute the fact that the Moon government committed serious mistakes (Mosler 2022a; 2022b), it is unclear whether these acts represent anti-intellectualism or whether President Yoon's proposed cure for these ills is appropriate. To overcome these challenges, he argues, "We must clearly define – and unequivocally reaffirm – the real meaning of freedom" (Mosler 2022a). Again, President Yoon does not offer his definition of freedom; however, he seems to allude to the concepts of personal freedom and economic liberty advocated by Friedman (1980), whom Yoon reportedly holds in high regard (*Pressian* 2019). President Yoon hints at this interpretation in his inauguration speech when he states, "Human history shows that when political and economic freedom reigns supreme, that is where prosperity and abundance flourished. When prosperity and economic freedom flourishes, that is when freedom reaches even the darkest corners."

Fifth, similar to other conservative presidents, Yoon in his commemorative speech directly relates the Kwangju Spirit, in addition to liberal democracy and human rights, to economic development. At one point, he states, "Now, Kwangju and Honam must blossom with bold economic achievements based on the universal values of liberal democracy and human rights." It is unclear how he makes the leap from liberal democracy and human rights to economic development in the city of Kwangju; however, this resembles the narrative style of former conservative presidents, particularly the direct, unmediated manner of relating one idea to the other. In other words, Yoon omits the important issues of respect, dialogue, reconciliation, participation, and peace, which are the most obvious principles and practices to address in the context of the Kwangju Uprising.

A noteworthy difference between Yoon's speech and those of other conservative presidents is that he makes it clear that the Kwangju Movement is "ongoing" and "alive". In addition, he says that the "justice and truth" of Kwangju shall be "shining forever". This is vocabulary that former conservative presidents have not used so generously. Instead, they told the people of Kwangju not to cling to the past, and to let go of bitter feelings (see Mosler 2020: 77). In sum, while one should not read too much into this short speech, his first, there are some striking similarities as well as differences between President Yoon's speech and the speeches of other conservative presidents.

In addition to Yoon's acknowledgement that the Kwangju Movement is ongoing and alive, the overall approach of the rightist–conservative camp to the 2022 Kwangju Memorial Day is noteworthy. In 2020, when Yoon was still prosecutor general, he stated that he "deeply laid to his heart the historical significance of the Kwangju Democratization Movement and the spirit of sacrifice for democracy" on a visit to the Kwangju Regional Prosecutor's Office, where he

had been stationed in 2003 (*The Fact* 2020). Additionally, Yoon planned to make Kwangju and the May 18 Cemetery his first destination immediately following the official announcement of his presidential campaign on 2 July 2021. However, due to a protest by civil society organizations in Kwangju, the visit was cancelled (*Nocutnews* 2021a). In a second attempt, Yoon successfully visited the cemetery on Constitution Day, 17 July 2021, and he pledged, "together with the people I will achieve unity and prosperity by inheriting the spirit of May 18, which has safeguarded the spirit of liberal democracy with blood" (*Nocutnews* 2021b). He promised to personally deliver an address in Kwangju once elected president, a promise he kept and later amended to delivering a commemorative speech every year during his presidency (*News1* 2022). In October 2021, the other presidential candidates of the conservative People Power Party (PPP) paid a visit to Kwangju and the May 18 Cemetery to show their sincere intention to acknowledge a history that has often been challenged by members of the conservative camp, including the parties that were forerunners of the PPP (*News1* 2021).

After Yoon was elected president in March and shortly before his speech on May 18, 2022, the PPP invited representatives of the civil society organizations connected with the Kwangju Movement to its Seoul headquarters (*Yonhapnews* 2022). As with the earlier unprecedented visits by conservatives to Kwangju, this gesture was meant to demonstrate to the Kwangju organizations in particular that Yoon's intention to deliver a speech in Kwangju was sincere. In addition, President Yoon ordered a special train to bring all PPP members of parliament, as well as his cabinet ministers, to the ceremony. Before the main ceremony, President Yoon entered the venue, walking together with representatives of the bereavement organizations through the main gate at the memorial (*Kyunghyang Sinmun* 2022a). This was yet another strong gesture of his sincerity and care for the people of Kwangju. During the ceremony, all members of the conservative camp in attendance sang along to the so-called Kwangju Anthem, the *March for the Beloved*. In the past, this had been a major issue of contention among conservatives who had always refused to sing the song as an expression of their rejection of the critical Kwangju Spirit (*Kyunghyang Sinmun* 2022b).

Together, all these contextual elements constitute a strong symbolic expression of the intent of President Yoon and his conservative party to depart from the past, which was marked by conservative attempts to avoid apparent acknowledgement of the movement and the Kwangju people. These gestures are meant to express the sentiment, "we are different than before, and now we do care". It remains to be seen whether President Yoon will be able to initiate a real departure from the former conservative stance regarding Kwangju and the remaining contested issues of the nation's history. Now, however, this no longer seems impossible.

President Yoon was able to mobilize the entire ruling party to join the anniversary, and he may be the right person to abandon the path of conflict between the opposing camps because he lacked a strong link to the rightist–conservative camp before he became their presidential candidate. He has no ideological baggage in this sense. Additionally, in 1980, when he was in a training facility for prospective prosecutors, he indicted Chun Doo-hwan for life during a mock trial. Perhaps this demonstrates that Yoon already possessed an awareness of the issues early in his career (*Monthly Chosun* 2021).

On the other hand, several times during his presidential election campaign, Yoon displayed an ignorance of basic facts and lack of understanding regarding key historic actors and events. For example, during his visit to the Democracy Memorial Park in Pusan in July 2021, while standing near a photograph of the student Yi Han-yeol, who died during the demonstrations in the summer of 1987, Yoon asked his aides whether this event occurred at the demonstrations in Pusan and Masan (Puma). The demonstrations Yoon referred to occurred in 1979 and were a precursor to the Kwangju Massacre half a year later (*Maeil Kyongje* 2021). Four months later, when Yoon returned to campaign in Pusan, he was quoted saying, "there are many people in Honam who say that former President Chun Doo-hwan did well in politics except for the military coup and May 18th" (*Hankyoreh Sinmun* 2021). This led to an outcry in the press among liberals and groups from Kwangju who accused him of whitewashing the dictatorship of Chun.[6] Yoon tried to quell the critique by insisting that he had been misquoted and that had he intentionally said, "except for the military coup and what happened in Kwangju". Ultimately, he had to apologize for his remarks. One could argue that he did state that he was critical of the dictatorial elements of Chun's reign, and merely wanted to acknowledge the achievements of his government. However, it is doubtful whether one can account for the deeds only, without interlinking them with the misdeeds of an authoritarian regime. This is particularly true for historical events that have not been sufficiently accounted for, as is the case with the Kwangju Democracy Movement and many more. This rhetorical style, which selectively decouples closely intertwined events and their historical meaning has depoliticizing and distorting effects on the discourse, and is a recurring pattern that can be found in other related statements by Yoon. For example, when he visited former President Park Geun-hye after she was released from prison following a presidential pardon, he reportedly told her that he admired her late father, strongman Park Chung-hee, and that he was studying his methods to prepare for his own government operations (*Kyunghyang*

6 For critical commentary see, for example, Pak (2021).

Sinmun 2022c). Moreover, he told her that he would use his influence to clear her name by reminding the public of her achievements while in office. Ultimately, he invited her to his inauguration ceremony, where she was treated with honor and offered one of the most exposed seats directly behind Yoon. While conservative President Yoon adopted a new approach to the Kwangju Uprising, several other related behavior patterns indicate that expectations should be kept modest in terms of the normalization of memory politics under his government.

The mass media's stance on the matter is noteworthy in this regard. With the exception of minor cases, such as the *Munhwa Ilbo* (2022), press outlets spanning the ideological spectrum seem to agree that it is time to set aside differences regarding the meaning of the Kwangju Democracy Movement. Many major outlets stress that it is very important for President Yoon to keep his promise and hold the memorial address every year and to push for adding the Kwangju Movement to the preamble of the constitution. Many newspapers agree that this must not be a one-time show to mobilize votes in the run-up to local elections on 1 June 2022. Moreover, editorials argue that it will be crucial for President Yoon to carry out his pledge to create a balanced and unified government operation by correcting his hitherto biased personnel decisions (*Chungang Ilbo* 2022). Regarding the ruling PPP, newspapers have argued that it is crucial for the party to distance itself from the notorious Kwangju-deniers and for the Democratic Party opposition to stop pretending that the Kwangju Movement is their "exclusive property" (*Chosun Ilbo* 2022). This apparent convergence of opinions across the ideological divide in the media is quite extraordinary because it represents a clear break with common political parallelism and may help facilitate a situation more conducive to addressing contentious memory politics in Korea.

CONCLUSION

Memory politics is concerned with "who wants whom to remember what", why, and how (Confino 1997). Thus, it involves an ongoing challenge and contention regarding the memorialization of history in the present and its projection into the future. Due to Korea's particular history and the lingering legacies of the past, it is no surprise that more than three decades after the transition to formal democracy, we still find significant differences in how the nation's past is evaluated by the different political camps. Commemorative addresses held by powerful actors, such as state presidents, are among the most obvious instances of competing discourse regarding the dominant version of a nation's past.

The current investigation revealed distinctive differences in the addresses commemorating the Kwangju Democracy Movement of 1980 among liberal and

conservative presidents, with each side expressing different views of the Kwangju Democracy Movement and its historical legacies. The conservative presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye only traveled to Kwangju once during their terms to give a commemoration address, and their speeches were shorter than those of their progressive counterparts. More important than frequency and length are the qualitative contents of their speeches, which display an even starker distinction vis-à-vis the content of speeches offered by liberal presidents. Conservative presidents fail to address the context out of which the Kwangju Democracy Movement emerged, forgo a critical assessment of the events and their meaning for the present, and relate those events and their meaning to economic growth and prosperity, avoiding more directly-related issues, such as human rights and popular sovereignty and reconciliation and dialogue.

The current investigation demonstrates that the most recent speech by President Yoon (2022) followed the basic pattern found in the speeches of conservative presidents before him. Some elements of President Yoon's approach, however, clearly departed from the conservative pattern: careful preparation for the event months in advance, multiple visits to the May 18 Memorial, and meetings with civil society groups from Kwangju. The overall attitude displayed by President Yoon, as well as his PPP comrades and cabinet members, can be understood as an attempt to reconcile with the historical meaning of the Kwangju Uprising. Other memorial entrepreneurs, such as the mass media, seem prepared to bury the hatchet – at least regarding Kwangju. However, while there was a visible about-face in terms of the May 18 Memorial Day among conservatives, other related events since the inauguration of President Yoon sow doubt regarding the rightist–conservative renunciation of historical revisionism.

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VIEWS OF THE WESTERN NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN JAPAN ON THE OPENING UP OF KOREA IN 1876

Olavi K. Fält

STARTING POINTS

In this presentation, my perspective is on the Western newspapers and magazines published in Japan in the 1870s and their writings on the events surrounding the opening up of Korea in 1876. Regarding the four different cultural districts, of the Western, Japanese, Chinese and Korean, I inquire how they relate to each other and what kind of interests are involved. I will deal with the beginning of the Western press in Asia first, and move onto the position of Korea, Japan's Formosan expedition in 1874 preceding the opening up of Korea, the opening up of Korea in 1876, the views of the Western press on the opening, and finally, the views of the press after the opening treaty – the Kanghwa Treaty.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WESTERN PRESS IN ASIA

The materials to be studied comprise the foreign English-language newspapers and magazines published in Yokohama and Tokyo, largely the editorials and corresponding commentary columns. Above all, the appearance of English-language newspapers in Asia is generally seen as a part of building the British Empire and Christian mission work (Lee 1971: 13).[1] Foreign newspapers functioned in Asia as a link between the East and the West in connecting these two worlds to each other (Wildes 1927: 253). In addition, English-language newspapers are thought to have played a significant role in shaping Western readers' conceptions of the East (O'Connor 2010: 1).

Among the first English-language newspapers in East Asia were the *Canton Register* established in China in 1827 (O'Connor 2010: 32), the *Pinang Gazette* established in Malaysia in 1833, the *Observer* established in Ceylon in 1834, the

1 For more about the English-language press in Japan in general, see Fält 1990.

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Times of India established in 1838, and the *China Mail* established in Hong Kong in 1845 (Lee 1971: 15–16). In other words, the establishment of newspapers very closely followed the spread of Great Britain's political and economic influence in the East. Moreover, the world's leading British newspaper, *The Times*, had a correspondent in Shanghai from 1857 on (Yokoyama 1982: 43).

The "father" of the English-language press in Japan was Albert W. Hansard,[2] who had moved from England to New Zealand, where he had acquired newspaper experience by publishing a paper called the *Southern Cross* (Fox 1969: 416). Initially, he established a newspaper in Nagasaki called *The Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser*, which came out twice a week from June to October 1861. However, he was not satisfied with the low number of readers in Nagasaki. Yokohama had already displaced Nagasaki as a commercial centre and was much closer to Edo, so he moved the newspaper to Yokohama, where he began publishing the paper as *The Japan Herald* once a week in November (Fox 1969: 416–417; Fält 1990: 14; Wildes 1927: 260–261). It was the beginning of the Western press in Japan, followed by the rapid establishment of competing newspapers and magazines.

THE POSITION OF KOREA

According to the Chinese interpretation, Korea in the early 1870s was a dependency of China, which enjoyed self-government in internal and foreign policy matters, although in practice, China had a great deal of say in its affairs, especially in their foreign policy. Western ships were increasingly often called at ports on the Korean coast, either for mapping or surveying visits or when forced to do so by bad weather. While Korea assisted shipwrecked sailors and conveyed them to China, Korea remained opposed to any direct trade relations or even negotiations on the subject. The sporadic attempts by Western countries to open this territory up to trade had ended in conflicts, which merely strengthened the Koreans' resolve to continue with their isolationist policy (Fairbank, Reishauer & Craig 1976: 612–613).

The temporary success of the Koreans in repulsing the Western attacks and incursions was not primarily attributed to Korean military prowess, as the government imagined. In the first place, none of the Western powers considered the opening up of Korea important enough to send a large-scale invasion force against her. In the second place, all of the powers had more important preoc-

2 The first non-English newspaper in Japan was *L'Echo du Japon*, which appeared in 1870–1885 (Hoare 1994: 145).

cupations elsewhere – Britain in India, Russia in the Kurile Islands, France in Indochina, and the United States with the aftermath of the great Civil War. Symbols of Korea's determination monuments were erected in all parts of the country with the following inscription: "Not to fight back when invaded by the Western barbarians is to invite further attacks, and selling out the country in peace negotiation is the greatest danger to be guarded against" (Han 1981: 368).

The rapidly modernising Japan was nevertheless emerging as a real threat to Korean policies. As they were close neighbours, Japan and Korea carried on a limited amount of trade, and along with occasional Korean diplomatic delegations in the shogun's capital of Edo (Fairbank, Reishauer & Craig 1976: 613). The Meiji government was intent on enhancing its position as an Asian power. One of its first diplomatic actions was an offer to mediate between Korea and the United States in one serious dispute, an offer that the Korean government refused (Han 1981: 369).

But the Japanese proved far more persistent than any Western power in their efforts to open Korea to diplomatic relations and trade. In 1870, a mission was sent to announce the establishment of the new Meiji regime and to present credentials to the Korean government as the first step toward setting up diplomatic missions. But the Korean government, which disapproved of the removal of the Shogun, refused to accept the credentials, complaining that they were not written in sufficiently respectful terms, and the Japanese were compelled to return home (Han 1981: 369).

Again in 1872 a Japanese party appeared at the southern city of Tongnae, this time abroad two naval vessels. But the district magistrate would not even allow them to proceed to Seoul, and after a frustrating lengthy wait, they departed. Some Japanese leaders began demanding that Korea be made to submit to Japanese demands by force. But others, who had been to Europe and were aware of the great strength of the Western nations, contended that Japan was not yet strong enough for military adventures, and they won out. But the invasion of Korea in one way or another was only postponed, not abandoned (Han 1981: 369–370).

The Korean government, seeing the Japanese wearing Western-style clothes and travelling in Western-style ships, concluded that the Japanese were the same as the Western barbarians and could be disposed of with equal case. They were equally unrealistic in their relations with China, dutifully reporting all important events to the Chinese court, as they had always been done in the past. They requested help and advice, ignoring the fact that China had been in no position to help anybody since 1860. However, the Korean government's isolationist policy was generally popular in the country (Han 1981: 370).

THE FORMOSAN EXPEDITION

In Japan in the beginning of 1870s, the nationalist group in the Meiji government tried to allay the rising discontent of the samurai class by calling for the annexation of the Ryūkyū and Bonin Islands, and the mounting of punitive expeditions to Korea and Formosa (Sansom 1977). The Japanese expedition to Formosa in 1874 represented a compromise between the militarists and the moderates, although the supporters of the most active military policy resigned from the Council of State in protest. Those who supported the expedition believed that sympathy could also be expected from the West (Fox 1969: 280–281).

The expedition may be attributed to the weakness of China. Although the Beijing government professed to administer Formosa as a prefecture of the province of Fukien, it had not incorporated the eastern and south-western areas of the island into the prefecture's administration. The aborigines who lived in that part of Formosa caused great damage to trade in the Far Eastern seas by murdering the crews of the ships wrecked on the eastern and southern coasts of the island, and the Beijing government had generally ignored these brutalities. When a Ryūkyūan ship was wrecked on the south coast of the island on December 1871, the Botan tribe murdered fifty-four of its crew, a further twelve escaping to reveal the crime to the world at large. This gave Japan her excuse to invade Formosa (Fox 1969: 281–282).

The dispute involved relations between the Ryūkyū people and Japan and China. The Ryūkyū had paid tributes to both China and daimyo of Satsuma, and the wrecked ship had been carrying such tributes to China. The Meiji government nevertheless annexed the islands in 1873 and its naval and military forces demanded the right to punish the tribes, which had murdered the Ryūkyūan castaways (Fox 1969: 282).

After complicated discussions, a punitive expedition initially consisting of 3,000 men was sent to Formosa in May 1874. During the Formosa operation, a war between China and Japan seemed a more probable outcome than peace to the foreign representatives in both countries. However, after long, difficult negotiations and through the good offices of the British, a treaty was eventually signed on 31 October 1874. Under the terms of this document, China accepted Japan's action in Formosa as an endeavour to provide security for her own subjects and promised to pay 750,000 Mexican dollars in compensation to the families of the Japanese killed on Formosa and for the roads and buildings erected there by the Japanese, which China retained for her own use (Fox 1969: 283–308).

Japan's obvious success supplied the first evidence of her new power, influenced her image among the Western residents in Japan (Yokoyama 1982: 214).

Both the country and her people had to be taken much more seriously than before. While earlier the Japanese efforts at modernising their society sometimes seemed curious to Western eyes, the expedition smashed this image and replaced it with a new one, modern "Young Japan". Just as the main consideration for the Western residents during the Formosan episode was a commercial one, Japan's new position in the East after the expedition meant that political interests gained greater importance. Similarly, the event greatly increased the self-esteem of the Japanese themselves (Black 1968: 426).

THE OPENING UP OF KOREA

Japan had been anxiously following the developments in Korea, watching for an opportunity to open the country. Japan needed markets for her new industries. She was also anxious to prevent Korea from being dominated by any other power, lest this prove a threat to her. There were even some Japanese who favoured a military invasion, and there was considerable political conflict over the issue. A Japanese envoy appeared again at Tongnae, a southern city near the modern port of Pusan, in 1875, carrying formal proposals from the Emperor. Once more, however, the local Korean officials objected that the messages were not written in sufficiently respectful terms, and the mission had to return empty-handed (Han 1981: 372).

The Japanese now decided to apply the lesson they had learned from the Americans in 1854. On the pretext of surveying sea routes, the Japanese battleship Unyo and another ship sailed to Pusan and then north to the Bay of Yonghung. In September of 1875, the ship returned, this time to Yongjong Island on the west coast. The captain and twenty men landed on Kanghwa Island ostensibly to get drinking water. The stationed guards fired on them and they withdrew, returning the fire. Ships were then sent to Pusan and a contingent of marines landed. Armed clashes with Korean troops occurred once more. After they judged that the Koreans had been sufficiently impressed, the Japanese notified the Koreans that negotiations must now begin. Six naval vessels conveyed a Japanese envoy and his party to Kanghwa Island (Han 1981: 372–373).

The Korean officials were in dilemma. A majority of them still favoured the absolute isolationism, which had been the policy of the government. But the demonstrations of the Japanese ships had shown that Japan would use force if necessary, and that her military power was formidable. After many meetings and arguments, the Korean government very reluctantly sent negotiators to Kanghwa, where a treaty of amity was drawn up and signed in February 1876 (Han 1981: 373).

That Korea would even reluctantly sign such a treaty was at least partly the result of the fact that the Korean leaders had been trying to keep themselves as well informed as they could on contemporary events through the Korean envoys in China. The information they received clearly showed the crisis, which was developing as a result of the contact between the tradition-bound, slow-changing Orient and the powerful and dynamic civilization of the West. On the other hand, they heard with horror of the Western encroachments on Chinese sovereignty, which had grown to such an extent the Emperor had been compelled to flee from his capital (Han 1981: 373).

They heard of the spread of Christianity, so subversive of Confucian ideals, the inflow of Western goods that was distorting the Chinese economy, and the opium evil that also resulted from Western trade. But they also heard about the wonders of Western technology, especially as it applied to military weapons, and they were introduced for the first time to the Western concept of diplomatic relations between nations on equal terms instead of the suzerain-vassal relationship they were accustomed to. How to acquire the advantages of Western civilization without falling victim to the Westerners themselves was the dilemma of all the peoples of East Asia in the nineteenth century (Han 1981: 373–374).

These ideas or something like them probably underlaid the Korean agreement to the Kanghwa Treaty. A majority of the people, however, still disliked the idea, and had to be placated by the argument that Korea was not opening her doors to the entire world, but only to Japan, a neighbour with whom the traditional relations of former days were now being restored. This was a feeble argument, however, for Korea had entered a modern diplomatic relationship, not one of the traditional China type, and the treaty she had signed was extremely disadvantageous (Han 1981: 374).

The Kanghwa Treaty was modelled upon those which the Western powers had imposed upon China. It first declared that Korea entered into this new relationship as a free and sovereign state on an equal basis with Japan. The significance of this seemingly innocuous statement was that Japan was attempting to detach Korea from its traditional relationship with China. This would mean that Japan would have a free hand in the exploitation of Korea without any interference from the Chinese. The Japanese were to go on guaranteeing Korean independence and sovereignty (Han 1981: 374).

The treaty also provided that diplomatic missions be exchanged and permanently maintained and that Pusan and two other ports be opened to Japanese trade. Japanese merchants were to be allowed to trade unhindered in these ports, and were also to be given the right to lease land and buildings for business

purposes and for housing. Japanese vessels were to be allowed to conduct survey and mapping operations in Korean waters (Han 1981: 374).

Most importantly, Japanese nationals in Korea were to have exterritorial rights, which placed them outside the jurisdiction of Korean courts. In Korea, they could be tried for crimes only by Japanese consular courts. This was the feature of the treaties with Western powers that was most widely resented, for it not only enabled foreigners to commit crimes with relative impunity, but also implied that the nation's system of law was primitive or unjust (Han 1981: 374–375).

The Japanese were quick to take advantage of the treaty. Agents of Japanese firms began acquiring Korean property, a process that was to impoverish the Koreans before it was over. Prohibited from making any effective regulations, Korean officials had to watch helplessly while Japanese goods overwhelmed Korea's domestic industry and drained of Korean wealth. And the consular courts in which Japanese guilty of crimes were tried, were seldom particularly severe. Beside Pusan two other ports were opened in 1880 and 1883 (Han 1981: 375).

A supplement to the treaty and regulations for trade were agreed to shortly after it went into effect. Japanese diplomats in Korea were to be free to travel throughout the country, and to have residences in each of the treaty ports. Japanese currency was allowed to enter Korea, and Japanese were allowed to take Korean currency to Japan. All articles imported from or exported to Japan were to be free of duty for several years, a provision that made it impossible to protect domestic industry and prevented Korea's economic growth. However, it was conceded that in case of national emergencies such as invasions, the Korean government should have the right to prohibit the export of rice (Han 1981: 375–376).

As the ports opened one by one, Japanese merchants flocked to them, and soon there were large numbers of Japanese residents. For the first few years they enjoyed a near monopoly of trade, and Korean merchants suffered serious losses. The Japanese minister arrived in Korea in 1879, and Korean envoys were sent to Japan, and for the first time Korea had a chance to observe how an Asian nation went about adopting Western technology (Han 1981: 376). The first treaty with Western powers that Korea signed in May 1882 with the United States was followed later by treaties with the British, the Germans and the French (Han 1981: 385–386).

WESTERN VIEWS ON THE OPENING UP OF KOREA

The Japan Gazette (1867) anticipated in June 1874 that after the Formosan expedition a Korean conflict would be a mere question of time, and it did not criticise such an expansive policy (see also Fält 1990: 146–150). Its main worry seemed to

be the lack of discipline in the naval and military forces during the expedition, and it called for a stricter command before the outbreak of the Korean crisis came.[3]

When referring to the controversy that arose in Japan over how the Korean problem should be solved, *The Japan Gazette*, at the beginning of October 1875, came down firmly on the side of the government and against the samurai, who had called for a war.[4] The paper interpreted the government intentions as excluding the possibility of a military foray into Korea,[5] and held the opinion that Japan was not yet prepared either economically or strategically to attempt any pacification of Korea.[6]

At the same time, however, it announced quite categorically that it was on Japan's side in the dispute, and had faith in the country's resources for resolving any conflict successfully.[7] In spite of this, the paper would have preferred to see some other country take on the task of restoring peace to Korea, especially in view of Japan's economic and military resources,[8] which it evidently regarded as somewhat limited.

In November 1875, the paper praised the resolve of the government in the face of crisis, since it had held on to its opinion in spite of the pressure exerted on it. It believed that there could have been no better government for the country under the existing circumstances.[9] A further sign of the paper's supportive attitude was its view regarding possible foreign intervention. Departing from its earlier opinion, it believed that this would be unfair to Japan, which was best able to look after its own interests and honour.[10]

When no solution to the Korean issue was yet in sight at the beginning of 1876, *The Japan Gazette* reminded its readers what a good impression Japan had made on outsiders in the Formosan affair and how this gave one every reason to hope for a satisfactory outcome to this new crisis.[11]

Once Japan had concluded her highly successful agreement, the paper was anxious to point out the farsightedness of her ministers and the truth of the saying that the best way of guaranteeing peace was to prepare for war. The Japan Gazette congratulated both countries on the agreement, which they had reached, and particularly praised the Japanese representative Kuroda Kiyotake, regarding

3 *The Japan Gazette* 8.6.1874.
4 *The Japan Gazette* 2.10.1875.
5 *The Japan Gazette* 6.10.1875.
6 *The Japan Gazette* 8.10.1875.
7 *The Japan Gazette* 11.10.1875.
8 *The Japan Gazette* 20.10.1875.
9 *The Japan Gazette* 13.11.1875.
10 *The Japan Gazette* 23.12.1875.
11 *The Japan Gazette* 29.1.1876.

him as a better negotiator than Commander Matthew C. Perry, the man to open up Japan.[12]

In the early stages of the Korean crisis in July 1875, *The Japan Weekly Mail* (1870) did not believe that Japan would declare war on Korea,[13] claiming that she no longer needed to prove her evident fighting spirit, and that she definitely needed a period of peace to effect essential internal reforms.[14] The paper also interpreted the general opinion among the Japanese to be against a war.[15]

When the matter of sending a force to Korea was raised again at the end of the year, *The Japan Weekly Mail* stated that although it was sure that the Japanese would have the resources to make a good start in such a campaign, they could only be ultimately successful with the cooperation of some interested foreign power. At the same time, it criticised those representatives of the foreign press who always seemed to agree with the government and in whose view the government could not expect justice from the foreign press or foreign nations. The paper believed that it had itself heaped both criticism and praise on the government.[16]

As an attempt to demonstrate its own favourable attitude towards Japan and the superiority of Western culture, *The Japan Weekly Mail* laid stress a little later upon the country from its intercourse with others in spite of difficulties it was experiencing at that moment, that is, the discontent of the samurai and the excessive taxes imposed on the peasants. It took it as a unique event in world history that Japan, which had only just come to understand the good sides of this intercourse, should now become one of its leading advocates.[17]

Once the expedition had left for Korea, *The Japan Weekly Mail* was inclined to look with favour on the opening up of country and wished Japan success, although it also hoped that this country would be able to work alongside the Western nations in order to avoid bloodshed and convince the Koreans of the short-sightedness of their policies.[18] It regarded the negotiated settlement as an outright victory for Japan, of which the nation and its government could be proud.[19]

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12 *The Japan Gazette* 25.3.1876.
13 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 24.7.1875.
14 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 2.10.1875.
15 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 9.10.1875.
16 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 11.12.1875.
17 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 18.12.1875.
18 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 5.2.1876.
19 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 4.3.1876.

WESTERN VIEWS AFTER THE KANGHWA TREATY

In April 1876, *The Japan Weekly Mail* was inclined to link the decision to ban the carrying of swords in Japan under the success of the Korean negotiations, perceiving that the government had been inspired by that episode to take this step, which had done more to strengthen the social and intellectual revolution than any other single government decision.[20]

The Japan Weekly Mail hoped that Korea could similarly be opened up to the Western powers without bloodshed, not with the sword but with wisdom, even though it was apt to look down on Korea and her people:

> It may be greatly doubted whether there is much to attract the European nations towards Corea [...] The Coreans probably do not possess that adaptability to the new forms of social and political life of which we see such marked evidence among the Japanese.[21]

Japan Punch (1862), as the satirical magazine, similarly described the Koreans as ignorant to the point of laughability as if they were from another world:

> The First Lord of the Admiralty (Japanese) Informs the Corean Ambassador that the torpedo is a large fish that sometimes speaks and at other times will only wag its tail; to day it only wags its tail Consternation among the followers.[22]

The Happy ending to the crisis offered *The Japan Weekly Mail* the opportunity to show Japan that her true conquests were those made at home, by which it was referring to the plans for the conquest laid down on the occasion of the Formosan expedition. Japan should try to understand the importance of utilising foreign capital and skills, the superiority of free competition over monopolies, the value of freedom of the press, freedom in all forms, and the tyrannical voracity and darkness in bureaucracy, as their aims again revealed the value judgements implicit in the paper's outlook. This was emphasised by the reprimand it gave to those Japanese who had claimed that the exterritorial clause in the agreement with Korea was more liberal than what was contained in the Western agreements with Japan. In the opinion of *The Japan Weekly Mail*:

> [W]e can admit no comparison of any kind between the administration of justice among the leading powers of Europe and the oriental nations [...] the

20 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 8.4.1876.
21 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 11.3.1876.
22 *Japan Punch* 6/1876.

> difference which exists between our own laws – let us say our own civilization –and that of this country.[23]

The Japan Weekly Mail pointed out that Japan's demand for exterritorial rights in Korea, a closer neighbour both geographically and culturally, showed how essential it was for Westerners to enjoy such rights in a country that differed radically from their own in origins, religion, manners and accustomed way of thinking.[24] *The Japan Herald* also came down firmly against any abrogation of the exterritorial rights in Japan or alteration in the customs regulations, defending its outlook by referring to the discrepancy between Japan's own exterritorial policies in Korea and her demands made by the western powers.[25]

In its consistent support for free trade, *The Japan Weekly Mail* was pursuing very much the same line as the other British press, using examples of such cases in the demands for free trade made by the Japanese merchants in Korea.[26]

As for the Korean question, after the Kanghwa treaty, the papers came out almost unreservedly on the side of Japan, even to the extent that *The Tokio Times* (1877) restrained the Japanese, fearing that certain foreign representatives might take advantage of the situation since an aggressive policy towards Korea could remove the country's right to appeal against the injustices of the policies exercised by the western nations in their time.[27]

The Japan Gazette saw the Japanese as the bringers of civilization to Korea[28] and regarded the status of Korea as a matter of extreme importance for Japanese security, on account of which Japan could not look dispassionately upon the possibility of Korea falling under the domination of a powerful, aggressive nation, by which the paper probably meant Russia.[29]

It was evidently for this reason that *The Japan Weekly Mail* was not entirely against the idea of Japan becoming involved in a military confrontation with Korea, especially since it believed that this would not be a particularly heavy burden economically.[30] The paper interpreted a strengthening of Japan's position in Korea as implied advantages for the Western powers, including Turkey but

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23 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 1.4.1876.
24 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 25.3.1876.
25 *The Japan Daily Herald* 18.1.1878.
26 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 7.12.1878; *The Japan Weekly Mail* 12.12.1878.
27 *The Tokio Times* 30.11.1878.
28 *The Japan Gazette* 16.5.1881.
29 *The Japan Gazette* 23.7.1881.
30 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 23.11.1878.

not Russia, specifically noting that Japan looked favourably on Western aspirations to establish relations with Korea in 1881.[31]

CONCLUSIONS

The newspapers and magazines studied here represented from the outset the political and economic interests of the Western community, which had settled in Japan. The central theme in their writings as a whole was a sincere belief in the superiority of Western culture and its leading role in the world. The Formosan expedition may be looked on as watershed in the image of Japan conveyed by the foreign newspapers. According to the newspapers, Japan had the best understanding of the significance of Western culture among the peoples of the East, and had already applied it to the extent that it could also serve as a model for Korea, which they claimed to represent a lower cultural level. As a result, the newspapers warmly supported Japan's Korean policy, which was accompanied by hidden expectations that the country would open up to Western trade through it as well. The Kanghwa treaty would later serve as a model for similar agreements with the West. In the global perspective, the opening up of Korea meant an increasing threat to relations between Japan and China, as China had previously regarded Korea as falling within her sphere of influence (Nish 1977: 23–24).

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31 *The Japan Weekly Mail* 2.4.1881.

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JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF LAWLESSNESS? MIYOSHI NAGAYOSHI, A DISPUTED WARLORD FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Polina Barducci

INTRODUCTION

Many historical and literary narratives of the Warring States period (Sengoku jidai, 1467–1568) in Japan are built around warlords, whose portrayals are often too focused on their military prowess.[1] Miyoshi Nagayoshi (1522–1564, also read as "Chōkei") could have been remembered in history as yet another local hegemon that challenged the diminishing authority of the Ashikaga shogunate (1336–1568), the second Japanese warrior government weakened by civil wars and inhouse factional conflict. But Nagayoshi's overwhelming engagement with culture, literature, and religion made him stand out as a learned man of virtuous disposition and many talents. In popular memory, this warlord is associated with tea ceremony (Yamada 2013: 256–275), linked-verse poetry gatherings (Tsurusaki 2013: 276–300), granting protection to a Jesuit missionary in his headquarters (Takahashi 2013: 238–254), Iimoriyama Castle, and restoring the prestige of the Zen Buddhist school by supporting the temple of Daitokuji (Takenuki 2013: 216–237). Nagayoshi also had an impact on the history of architecture, erecting the first ever stone wall around a mountain castle, an architectural solution that would become mainstream in the latter half of the sixteenth century. The remains of Miyoshi's castles still constitute an integral part of the symbolic geography of Tokushima Prefecture and the town of Daitō (Osaka Prefecture) so much so that local residents have set up a committee to promote the TV dramatisation of Nagayoshi's life by the NHK Taiga Drama production in 2022 as a way to mark the 500-year anniversary of his birth (Ogawa 2021: 501–514).

The political role of Miyoshi Nagayoshi however is still heavily debated by historians. At the height of his rule, he dominated a large territory surrounding

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the capital city of Kyoto: nine provinces fully and four provinces partially. The route to governance over these lands on the other hand lay through the recurring betrayal of his overlords' interests. One way to assess Miyoshi Nagayoshi is to position him within the inverted hierarchy paradigm, or *gekokujō*. This term was used in contemporaneous sources and describes the phenomenon of lower classes overpowering the upper ones. Also being the source of political anarchy, *gekokujō* was both a concern and a trend in the late Middle Ages in Japan (Souyri 2001). Nagae Shōichi was the first historian to write a full biography of Miyoshi Nagayoshi within this framework. The biographer concludes that although Nagayoshi went against his overlords in his quest for power, he nevertheless respected the ideals of traditional authority in Kyoto and was not seeking to replace them (Nagae 1968: 136, 161). V. Dixon Morris (1981: 23–54) continues this line of thinking asserting that positions at the shogunate were "ornamental" to Nagayoshi, as true interests of the family lay in dominating trade hubs like the city of Sakai and exercising power over the Kinki area. Some scholars, such as Neil McMullin (2014: 59) and Lee Butler (2002: 63), consider the Miyoshi a daimyo family, typical of its time, alike the Rokkaku, the Takeda, or the Ōuchi that were occasionally serving the court by giving donations and providing protection as they were attracted by the old notions of prestige in being associated with the traditional authority. Thomas Conlan (2015: 185–203) however disagrees with this opinion as he disregards the support of the Miyoshi and other daimyo families in comparison to the special role of the Ōuchi family in sustaining the imperial court through financing important imperial rituals. Unlike the Ōuchi who were providing help from the remote province of Yamaguchi, the Miyoshi, according to Conlan, dominated Kyoto through military expediency and created more difficulties by seizing imperial lands and revenue rather than offered support to the imperial court.

Another group of scholars classify the time of Miyoshi domination as an attempt to build a new political regime. A renowned specialist on the Sengoku period, Imatani Akira (1975: 405–441) concludes that Nagayoshi tried to compete with the Muromachi government by mimicking its principles of governance which then ultimately led to his fall. The figure of shogun was a nemesis for the power of the Miyoshi and thus the Miyoshi triumvir, the three guardians of Miyoshi's designated successor, opted for the assassination of shogun Yoshiteru in the end. Following this argument, Mary Elizabeth Berry (1994: 287) asserts that Miyoshi Nagayoshi endeavoured to create his own autocratic rule but failed to detach warrior control of Kyoto from the shogunal network. The latest inquiry carried out by Amano Tadayuki (2015) elevates the status of this warlord to that of the unifiers – Nagayoshi is named the first "man of the realm" (*tenkabito*) and his

rulership is seen as a precursor for a unified polity of Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582) who was one of the three "great unifiers" who consolidated vast territories under their rule in the last third of the sixteenth century. Amano further develops the notion of "the Miyoshi regime" (*Miyoshi seiken*) that took its roots in the traditional Muromachi shogunal system, but then outgrew and reshaped it into a new polity. Specifically, Nagayoshi removed the shogun as the head of the government which prompted Oda Nobunaga to dissolve administrative traits of the shogunate even further. The whole process of the Muromachi shogunate's decline ended with the next "unifier" Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598) who created a new type of ruler – warrior regent with a new warrior-family status system to support the regime.

Amano's work is one of the most detailed investigations of Miyoshi rulership and an indispensable resource for scholars of the late medieval Kinai region. The main conclusion however reinforces the unification narrative which historians have recently reconsidered. Investigations into the means of gaining power by the first two warrior "unifiers" Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, such as emphasis on participation in courtier-warrior ceremonies and open relations with traditional sources of authority reversed the image of "warrior usurpers". Lee Butler (2002) espouses this idea by presenting a number of cases where the court was using the mighty unifiers to satisfy its own political interests which goes against the traditional understanding of a sudden military autocracy. Similarly, Japanese scholars continue to challenge the image of warrior almightiness and the weakness of the imperial court in the sixteenth century. Based on the analysis of courtier-warrior audiences (*sanrei*) during the rule of Oda Nobunaga, Kanda Yūri (2011) argues that the court played an active political role in solving land disputes in Kyoto and the capital region of Kinai. Kaneko Hiraku (2014) further develops this argument through investigating conflicts among nobles, temples and shrines and concludes that Oda Nobunaga did not interfere with the process of courtier justice until he was invited to participate as an unbiased third party.

The above-mentioned research fits the so-called "courtier-warrior combined rule" theory (*kōbu ketsugō ron*) which highlights the importance and potency of traditional authority, the role of the shogunal authority in the sixteenth century. Moreover, this theory undermines the previous understanding of "men of the realm" (*tenkabito*). Instead of being ruthless military usurpers that uprooted what remained of the previous world order, these new warrior leaders sought to control and protect the central authority based in Kyoto and moreover, their ultimate goal was not necessarily unification as Kanda Chisato suggested in his field-changing reconsideration of the term "realm", or *tenka* (literally 'all under heaven'). Due to Kanda's research, we have come to understand that *tenka* in

the sixteenth century did not mean the whole of the Japanese archipelago but the capital and its surrounding region of Kinai. In other words, *tenka* for late medieval warrior leaders was defined by the extension of traditional or shogunal authority (Kanda 2001).

The problems in describing the political regimes during the times of civil unrest and decentralisation stem from the overemphasis on the individual power of a particular leader. In the case of Miyoshi Nagayoshi, his ambiguous stance towards the warrior government is often misinterpreted because scholars focus on the changes to the existing social order that his actions supposedly brought. In this paper, rather than looking into how Nagayoshi yielded power, I will analyse his repeating social practices that maintained and transformed the political and social environment. This methodology is based on the structuration theory developed by sociologist Anthony Giddens who described the properties of a social system through a set of repeated social practices which constitute meaning and sanction modes of social conduct. In the following sections, whilst recreating the timeline of Nagayoshi's ascension in politics, his rulership will be described through the three dimensions as suggested by Giddens: "signification" that stands for symbolic coding, "domination" that is described through resource allocation, and "legitimation" that embodies authorisation and normative regulation (Giddens 2005: 121–142; Canary & Tarin 2017: 1–15). In the premodern context, it means understanding the customs and rituals that Nagayoshi chose to reproduce with certain agents of authority; defining the circumstances of decisions on taxation in the newly conquered territories; and examining adjudication performed by Nagayoshi in accordance with the demands from each social group he was responding to. This approach will allow for various social actors to be included without presenting them as restricted by certain power relations in a shape-shifting polity of the mid-sixteenth-century Japan.

MIYOSHI NAGAYOSHI AND HIS COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SHOGUNATE

In 1539, Miyoshi Nagayoshi brought an army of 2,500 men to Kyoto to seek an audience with Hosokawa Harumoto (1514–1563), the deputy shogun (*kanrei*) and the actual overlord of the Muromachi shogunate and the capital region. This visit was set against a grim backdrop: in 1532, his father Miyoshi Motonaga (1501–1532), a former follower (*hikan*) of Harumoto was surrounded by the forces of the Honganji Ikkō league in Sakai and was forced to commit suicide (Nagae 1968: 58–59). This sudden attack from monastic forces that were previously on good terms with the Miyoshi clan was instigated by Deputy Shogun Harumoto

himself. The reason for that was open hostility of Miyoshi Motonaga towards one of the close retainers of Harumoto, Yanagimoto Kataharu, and growing disobedience of Motonaga during military campaigns. Even though Miyoshi Motonaga tried to seclude himself as a monk in the temple of Kenponji (Sakai), he could not escape the wrath of the deputy shogun (Furuno 2013: 32–45).

Knowing who the true mastermind behind his father's death was, Nagayoshi still served as an attendant (*tomo*) for the deputy shogun and accepted a raven as a symbol of lordship several days upon arrival of his troops at the capital (Chikatoshi, Tenbun 8/1/15). It did not take long for Nagayoshi to show his growing appetite for power as about six months later he demanded the title of deputy official (*daikan*) in a shogunal estate (*goryōsho*) comprising of seventeen plots of land in Kawachi Province (modern day Osaka). Besides being situated right next to the estate of Kitano Shrine where his father served as a deputy official, this area was a transport hub as it was close to the Yodo River and the Yamato River (Yukawa 2013: 65–85; Ōdate, Tenbun 8/6/2). Although Nagayoshi's claim seemed valid to shogunal retainers who delivered the message to Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiharu through a consort, Nagayoshi did not get what he wanted. And judging by an open military campaign launched against the deputy shogun shortly after, Miyoshi Nagayoshi was not going to tolerate such treatment (Ōdate, Tenbun 8/leap month 6/8).

Nagayoshi's strong stance regarding the situation played out in his favour. This confrontation was heavily criticised by Shogun Yoshiharu (1511–1550), who ordered Nagayoshi to postpone his campaign against Harumoto, because it was "a brawl between allies" (SIM, 118). Thanks to the attention of the shogun, Nagayoshi was suddenly treated as a powerful warlord, while the peace between him and Harumoto was being mediated by the influential Rokkaku family (Morris 1981: 46). A strategic ally of the Miyoshi, the head abbot of Honganji appreciated this as a military achievement of Nagayoshi, since he had sent him a sword (*tachi*) along with words of congratulation (SIM, 128). Being recognised by warrior and clerical elites opened new horizons for the young Nagayoshi, whose military success was gaining momentum.

Having reconciled with Deputy Shogun Harumoto, Nagayoshi spent the next nine years fighting the enemies of his overlord as well as accumulating more land in the region of Kinai. The Miyoshi army participated in warfare against the remnants of the camp that supported the previous deputy shogun, Hosokawa Takakuni (1484–1531).[2] Other confrontations emerged from perfidious allies of

2 In 1541 versus Shiogawa Masatoshi, a brother-in-law of Takakuni, and in 1543 versus Hosokawa Ujitsuna, his adopted son. See Miyoshi ki, 84.

Harumoto and even Shogun Yoshiharu waged war on his deputy in 1546 (Berry 1994: 221–222). While causing distress to the Hosokawa regime, numerous battles brought opportunities for land expansion to others. From 1539 to 1548, Nagayoshi himself produced at least ten regulatory codes called *kinzei* (literally, "prohibitions"), targeting mainly the lands of temples in the Yamashiro province (modern day Kyoto; see Table 1). Originally, such regulatory codes appeared in Zen Buddhist temples as guarantees of peace from the early times of the Muromachi shogunate, but with the turmoil of the Sengoku period, *kinzei* became a tool for usurpation. In many cases, temples requested "prohibitions" from the warlords and paid them to protect the precincts from the lord's own army (Spafford 2013: 116–117).

Table 1 Regulatory codes *kinzei* issued in 1539–1548

Date	Province	Adresse	Issuer	Source	Commentary
1539	Yamashiro	Kiyomizudera	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	SIM, No.120	signed as Toshinaga
1539	Yamashiro	Ōyamazaki	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	SIM, No.121	signed as Toshinaga
1539	Yamashiro	Daitokuji	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	SIM, No.122	signed as Toshinaga
1539	Yamashiro	Chionji	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	SIM, No.123	signed as Toshinaga
1542	Yamashiro	Ōyamazaki	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	SIM, No.164	signed as Norinaga
1542	Harima	Hamada mura	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	SIM, No.169	
1545	Yamashiro	Daigoji	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	SIM, No.183	
1547	Yamashiro	Myōrenji	Shinohara Nagamasa	SIM, No. 186	Nagayoshi's general
1547	Yamashiro	Nishikyō Hōkkeji (Myōkenji)	Shinohara Nagamasa	SIM, No. 190	
1548	Yamashiro	Tōfukuji	Miyoshi Nagayoshi	DNK, Tōfukuji monjo, No.36	

The growing influence of Miyoshi Nagayoshi in the Kinai area must have worried Deputy Shogun Harumoto as he chose to favour the head of a rival family branch, Miyoshi Masanaga (?–1549), and not Nagayoshi during a family brawl that escalated into an open armed conflict in 1548 (Nagae 1968: 101–103).

Having lost his affiliation with the shogunate, Nagayoshi made the decision to support a different deputy shogun contender, Hosokawa Ujitsuna (1513–1563), as a representative of the Muromachi government or in other words the official authority. By setting the two members of Hosokawa factions up against each other, Nagayoshi was creating the impression of participating in an interclan factional struggle for power, but in reality Ujitsuna never became the overlord of the Miyoshi.

This new alliance between Nagayoshi and Ujitsuna can be explained through common histories as both of them harboured personal resentment towards Hosokawa Harumoto, whose orders led to the deaths of their biological fathers. Moreover, Ujitsuna had experience at gaining popularity among citizens of Kyoto which Nagayoshi learned from his new ally. Tax amnesty for the temples of shrines in Kyoto made the clergy more sympathetic towards the newcomers as they performed prayers for their victory (Shimokawa 2013: 124–144). Gaining support of religious institutions in the capital could also be seen as a way to add legitimacy to the military actions against official power.

Miyoshi's rebellion against the deputy shogun is often rendered as a hostile takeover of power in Kyoto which ultimately resulted in the shogun fleeing the capital in 1553 and staying in exile for the next six years (Berry 1994: 222). However, in order to understand the background of this conflict better, we need to look at what happened to the Ashikaga family during the years preceding the exile. In 1546, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiharu resigned from his post and installed his son Yoshiteru instead (Shimokawa 2013: 133). Ever since then, the new shogun fought on the side of the deputy shogun, he did so in confrontation with the Miyoshi and lost at a battle at Eguchi in 1549 and was forced to hide in Katata Castle, Ōmi Province (Nagae 1968: 103). Upon entering the capital as a victor, Miyoshi Nagayoshi reached out to Yoshiteru and guaranteed his safe return to the capital (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 20/1/30). A month later, the shogun finally arrived in Kyoto to sign a peace treaty with Miyoshi that stipulated that Hosokawa Harumoto would resign from his post and become a monk whereas Ujitsuna would be named the head of the Hosokawa clan. Thus, the following year of 1552 became the time of Nagayoshi's and Ujitsuna's official recognition by the shogunate. On the twenty-sixth day of the second month, both paid their respects at the shogunal headquarters and Nagayoshi was promoted to a retainer of the shogun (*otomoshū*) (Nagae 1968: 121–122).

Nevertheless, the new order was not strong enough to deflect the impending conflict between the parties. Yoshiteru left the capital for Yodo Castle whenever he had a disagreement with Nagayoshi and the latter resorted to methods of "hostage diplomacy" to secure his position with the shogunal system. In 1553, six

of the closest retainers of the shogun with "treacherous intentions" provided a hostage each for Miyoshi Nagayoshi after his audience with Yoshiteru. It is highly unlikely that the shogun initiated such an act detrimental to his circle of support. Moreover, in less than two weeks, Yoshiteru announced his political parting with the Miyoshi and left for Ryōzen Castle, which he had built a year prior in the Higashiyama District (eastern Kyoto), but unfortunately he had to escape to Suisaka (Ōmi Province) after his castle fell under the siege of Nagayoshi's forces (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 22/1/8, 2/26, 3/8; Oyudono, Tenbun 22/8/1).

This was the beginning of Nagyoshi's political domination of Kyoto. By the time the shogun and his deputy left the capital, the territory under the direct control of the Miyoshi amounted to eight provinces in Shikoku and in the region of Kinai (McMullin 2014: 66). However, as seen from the instances above, Nagayoshi used a variety of political tools for accumulating power. Military might of the Miyoshi army was an important factor in this struggle, but the regulations of tax levying and debt amnesties confirmed his position as the ruler. Also, Nagayoshi demonstrated support of the official power through ceremonies and audiences with the shogun, a strategy that would become the core of his legitimacy later on.

MIYOSHI NAGAYOSHI'S RULE OF KYOTO AND THE KINAI

Building on this complex story of service and rivalry that Miyoshi Nagayoshi exercised towards official members of the Muromachi shogunate, I will now turn to his relationship with the other representatives of traditional authority. No one needed a central government as much as the imperial court, aristocrats (*kuge*) and temples and shrines (*jisha*) of the Kinai. Since the times of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408), these elites had to rely on the support and protection of the shogunal forces in almost every aspect of life: judicially, ceremonially, and economically. And in a situation when both the shogun and deputy shogun had fled the capital, courtiers and monks turned to the one that possessed the military force to protect their interests and thus was the most prominent representative of the warrior class.

First, Nagayoshi took up the role of a conflict mediator in land disputes around the capital. In this sense, the new ruler was continuing the practices of the Muromachi regime, the very legitimacy of which "was predicated on its commitment to fair adjudication" (Spafford 2013: 75). The majority of verdicts in the Sengoku period concerned land disputes and those made during the Miyoshi regime were no exception. In particular, conflicts unfolded when it came to the

usage of irrigation watercourses, as the Kinai was famous for its large rivers that needed constant attention from the farmers. Such was the case of the Imai watercourse and its weirs in Yamashiro Province, Otokuni District, that began in 1552. The two villages involved, Upper Ueno and Imazato, refused to have adjudication assigned to retainers of Hosokawa Ujitsuna, who was an ally of the Miyoshi and the official head of the deputy shogun clan. Instead the villagers demanded a verdict from Nagayoshi, so he confirmed the decision that was made by the Hosokawa retainers: the two villages must equally share (*hanbun zutsu*) the watercourse. The two parties strongly opposed such an outcome and demanded the decision to come from Nagayoshi (SIM, 388).

Nagayoshi finally invited representatives of the two parties to his headquarters, Akutagawa Castle, where they were able to make their case. The main reason for the conflict was revealed to be a new ditch that the villagers of Upper Ueno dug out, violating the rules of a previous landowner. In order to support their argument, the representatives of Imazato Village refer to "*kuni*", or an association of local strongmen, as their witnesses (Amano 2015: 305–306; SIM, 393). So in this situation, when neither the local administration, nor the magistrates from Kyoto could mediate the conflict, Nagayoshi launched his own investigation and sent his agents down to the scene. Below is the report that sheds light on the process of inspection carried out by the retainers of Miyoshi (SIM, 394):

> Fujioka Tadatsuna, the Governor of Iwami, who represented Upper Ueno [village], Takayanagi Tsūji, who represented Imazato [village], and investigator Kazuhisa Fusaji went to Mukō River on the 17th day of the 6th month and drew up a map of the two villages. They called for the villagers of Iuchi (Yamashiro Province, Otokuni District) and inquired about the previous regulations. "There was no order for Upper Ueno [village] to dig out a ditch over to the capital road in Iuchi. Nevertheless, in the beginning of last year [a ditch] was dug out by Upper Ueno [village], so those villagers sent a messenger to claim their encroachment. This plot of land up to [a place called] Kaburaki is a part of Iuchi, and Imazato [village] had already dug out [a ditch] up to Nakajima weir and looked after water consumption (*suibin*) [in this area] according to the previous order" – this was told to the three [investigators] by the villagers of Iuchi, Iuchi Kuroemon, Iuchi Jōiyōshichihyōe, estate administrators (*jōshi*) and local officials (*kamon*) of Iuchi.

Based on these collected testimonies Nagayoshi found Upper Ueno guilty and restored Imazato's full land ownership (SIM, 395). The whole process of adjudication was quite balanced: both parties had representatives and the investigator was a third party. In other words, the appropriate process of adjudication confirmed Nagayoshi's legitimacy as a ruler in the eyes of the local community.

Generally, Miyoshi Nagayoshi cared for impartiality during the mediation of conflicts between communities – once he removed a retainer from the investigating team because he suspected him of being biased against one of the parties.[3]

In cases where landowners' interests were involved, Nagayoshi took a different stance. In 1553, the Matsunoo Shrine family faced a conflict between its subordinate village Yamada and another four villages in Yamashiro Province, Kadono District over irrigation waters (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 22/7/11). It is clear from Nagayoshi's returning letter to Matsunoo Shrine that the shrine family sent prayers for a successful military campaign to Nagayoshi and asked him to settle the situation with the weir (*inode*) right after the dispute became known in the capital (SIM, 364). The other members of the elites did not hesitate to support the argument of the shrine family and sent a collective letter of affirmation to Akutagawa Castle where the party from Matsunoo Shrine had to present its case (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 22/7/16).

The family in question was the aristocratic house of Hata dating back to the fifth century who had been close to the imperial court throughout the years. Moreover, the Hata house was known as a successful landowner as they built various irrigation facilities on the Katsura River and thus developed new agricultural spaces.[4] Only two days later, Matsunaga Hisahide, who was a close retainer of Nagayoshi and resided in Akutagawa castle, sent a return letter to the head of Matsunoo Shrine expressing his gratitude for a voucher (*origami*) and a couple of hundreds of marinated fish *ayu* with rice (*ayuzushi*) and reassuring the priest that the case with irrigation in Yamada Village was solved (SIM, 366). In other words, Nagayoshi got involved in this dispute to protect the rights of a noble landowner. Also, the whole process is framed within a so-called "gift economy" which was an important part of social relationships between the shogun, his warriors and the courtiers (Sakurai 2011). Moreover, the relationship between the shrine and the warrior adjudicator proved to be sustainable, as three months later Miyoshi Nagayoshi issued another verdict in favour of Matunoo Shrine, this time defying an earlier decision by Shogun Yoshiteru.[5]

As Nagayoshi's authority strengthened, the elites addressed him to appeal previous verdicts, issued by the shogun, in disputes over intangible assets such as social status and a ceremonial order. In 1556, the Miyoshi investigation team initiated a reconsideration of a case regarding the succession of the Tanaka family, the Buddhist superintendents of Iwashimizu Hachimangū, and the claimants were

3 See the dispute between Tōji monks and administration *kumonjo* (Amano 2015: 307).
4 <matsunoo.or.jp/about01/>, accessed 30 Aug. 2022.
5 Land dispute over Katsura-nishi estate in Tenbun 22 (1553) (Amano 2015: 354).

invited to come to the aforementioned Akutagawa Castle for the hearing (SIM, 434). As a result, contender Higashitake Norikiyo who was previously banished to the faraway province of Chikuzen by the shogun won the headship of the Tanaka family.

Nagayoshi's reconsideration of this case had an impact on his status as a ruler. Iwashimizu Hachimangū was founded in the mid-ninth century and became the second place, after Ise Shrine, to worship the emperor's divine ancestor goddess Amaterasu. Also, the deity of the shrine, Hachiman, was worshipped as the protector of the Minamoto clan and the shogun which was later emulated by the Ashikaga shogunal house. In fact, the Tanaka family were in a subordinate position to the shogunate as it was Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu who gave them their office in 1400 (Ōtsuka 2018: 185–199). Regardless of the connection between the shrine and the Ashikaga shogunal house, Miyoshi Nagayoshi interfered in this conflict at the request of exiled Norikiyo and did not hesitate to go against the shogun's verdict for the sake of demonstrating his ability to adjudicate (Amano 2015: 354).

By adjudicating a variety of disputes coming from almost all social groups, Nagayoshi earned the attention of the imperial court, as it started to commission Nagayoshi to protect the elites from tax and land encroachment. The first case that involved the interests of the emperor started in 1549 when a retainer of the Miyoshi seized supplementary tax (*sotsubun*) from the imperial estate. Upon receiving the news, the imperial treasurer Yamashina Tokitsugu sent the following letter directly to Miyoshi Nagayoshi (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 18/8/27):

> Regarding the eight government offices [managing] supplementary tax from the treasury territories within the imperial estate, with the borders being the riverbank and an overland route: While this land has undoubtedly been under direct administration [of the court] since the ancient times until now, Imamura [Yoshimitsu] "governor of Ii Province" did not go into details, drew away the government official and embezzled the tax, so it was reported to Hosokawa Fujikata. Even though shortly after a shogunal edit (*gechi*) was issued, [Imamura] did not assent to it. As the tax is embezzled up until this moment, we would be grateful, if you immediately ordered to stop this violation. I humbly report [to you].

It is clear from the letter that the courtier first tried to resolve the matter through shogunal institutions of power: the embezzlement was reported to a duty officer (*hōkōshū*) of Shogun Yoshiteru (Taniguchi 2010: 363). In about a week, Nagayoshi answered that he ordered his retainer to stop appropriating the tax, but the rogue warrior disobeyed his lord and was persistent in his actions (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 18/9/3). Interestingly enough, this was not the only case of Miyoshi followers causing trouble in the estates of the imperial family. In the tenth month of the same year, a younger brother of Nagayoshi, Sogō Kazumasa entered Upper

Misu estate in Yamashiro Province and caused disorders (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 18/10/18). In this instance, courtier Tokitsugu was sent with a princely order to stop him and judging by the lack of any further mentioning of the case in the courtier's diary, it may be assumed that the matter was resolved.

However, the situation with the imperial tax took much longer to settle. After futile attempts to get the tax back to the treasury, courtier Tokitsugu tried writing to people on various levels of authority to influence Nagayoshi: other retainers and members of the Miyoshi family, and shogunal retainers. In 1549, courtier Tokitsugu wrote to Miyoshi Nagayoshi, Miyoshi Nagayasu, and their generals, Matsunaga Hisahide and Kanō Nobumasa (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 18/11/9). In 1552, he wrote to the shogunal retainer Inoo Saemon-daibu demanding to put pressure on Nagayoshi to solve this case (Tokitsugu, Tenbun 21/3/8). The actions of the courtier seem to be aimed at locating Nagayoshi's position in a decentralised power structure of the late Muromachi government. In the end, it was Nagayoshi himself who sorted out the situation in 1553, shortly after Shogun Yoshiteru fled into exile.

The unfolding of this case summons various interpretations from scholars. Nagae Shōichi believes that Nagayoshi did not neglect the plea but rather was too occupied with the ongoing military confrontations with the forces of the shogun and former Deputy Shogun Hosokawa Harumoto (Nagae 1968: 142). On the other hand, the delay of Nagayoshi's actions may also be rendered as part of the "antagonistic" relationship with the court, a description offered by Thomas Conlan (2015: 188). It is impossible to know for sure what was going through Nagayoshi's mind at the time but one aspect is clear in the primary sources: the imperial court was building personal relations with Nagayoshi through haiku poetry and thus included him in the cultural aspects of life with the elites. Moreover, Nagayoshi cherished and reciprocated the favours granted upon him, as in 1552, he paid a visit to the imperial palace in gratitude for receiving the poetry collection *Kokin wakashū*, which was hand-copied by the emperor (*chokuhitsu*). As a part of a ceremonial order, the warrior ruler presented a sword (*tachi*) with a voucher (*origami*) for 10,000 *hiki*[6] and was then treated to a sake reception in the garden of the Small imperial palace (*shō gosho*) (Nagae 1968: 238; Tokitsugu, Tenbun 21/4/4).

After a successful resolution of the situation with the tax, Nagayoshi was given a direct imperial order (*ōse idasaruru*) regarding the Yamakuni estate in 1555 (Nagae 1968: 143; Oyudono, Tenbun 24/4/6). The details of this task are

6 A unit for counting coins, equal to 10 coins (*mon*); used in ceremonies and gift-giving (*Nihon kokugo daijiten*).

not clear, however it is natural to assume that the warrior ruler had to ensure that the tax from the estate was delivered to the capital. A specialist on the history of estates in the Sengoku period, Yukawa Toshiharu (2013: 76–77), contends that the "product tax" from Yamakuni estate was paid in lumber and Nagayoshi, having a lot of lumber production in his own land of Awa, was deemed a knowledgeable person to assist in this matter.

The above-mentioned regulations were aimed at restoring life in the capital and its surrounding region. On the one hand, Nagayoshi was recognised as an actor of judiciary power where the shogun and the local rulers (warlords, shogunal constables, and self-governing communities) failed to provide justice. On the other hand, acting as protector of land rights was essential for winning the respect and trust of aristocratic and religious elites. Even though the disruptors of peace were often Nagayoshi's own generals and relatives, Miyoshi Nagayoshi positioned himself within the narrative of traditional authority and that gave the elites incentives to turn to him whenever a warrior presence was needed.

THE RESTORATION OF THE SHOGUNAL CEREMONIAL ORDER UPON ASHIKAGA YOSHITERU'S RETURN TO THE CAPITAL

The Miyoshi's domination of the Kinai lasted for about five years and ended with the battle of Kitashirakawa in 1558. Shogun Yoshiteru used his absence from the capital to summon a large army that eventually defeated the Miyoshi forces. Having held a family council, the Miyoshi settled for a truce and the shogun finally came back to the capital (Nagae 1968: 157–160). After welcoming the traditional representative of warrior rule, Miyoshi Nagayoshi was challenged with the question of power distribution in their impending dual rulership.

The outcome of the battle of Kitashirakawa is often understood as the victory of Shogun Yoshiteru, who managed to find his way back into capital politics (Imatani 1975: 405–441). After all, the imperial court rejoiced at his return with the following written in the diary of the court lady: "Muromachi-dono (Yoshiteru) is ruling the realm (*tenka*), I am very pleased" (Nagae 1968: 161; Oyudono, Eiroku 1/12/3). Such sentiment would seem natural, as it was sparked by the end of military confrontation and the reestablishment of official power in the capital. However, the relationship was more complex than it appeared to be as the new emperor, Ōgimachi (enthroned 1557–1586), had just changed the era name to "Eiroku" on 1558/2/28. Since the establishment of the Muromachi shogunate, the emperor had to consult the shogun about this matter and this tradition was unshakable, even when the shogun had to reside outside the capital due to factional confronta-

tions. Such was the case of Yoshiteru's father, Shogun Yoshiharu, who supervised the changing of the era name to "Tenbun" in 1532 from his headquarters in Kutsuki (modern Shiga Prefecture). In Yoshiteru's case however, the emperor did not seek advice and did not even notify the shogun in exile, thus completely disregarding Ashikaga Yoshiteru's position as the shogun. To make matters worse, the emperor preferred to consult with the Miyoshi family instead which could be due to Nagayoshi's acting as a sponsor of the era-name changing ceremony. The shogun was enraged at such treatment and even persisted in using the old era name "Kōji" in his documents for another six months, until he reconciled with the Miyoshi and came back to Kyoto (Amano 2015: 358).

A strained relationship with the imperial court was not the only problem that awaited Shogun Yoshiteru upon his arrival in Kyoto. In order to strengthen his position against the Miyoshi, Yoshiteru began a reform in shogunal institutions of executive power, trying to merge the functions of shogunal council (*gozensata*) and the chancellery of the shogunate (*mandokoro*). Being unable to run this reform smoothly, Yoshiteru soon lost the trust of the chancellery which led to a situation where shogunal magistrates stopped issuing judicial verdicts and the shogun's adjudication ability rapidly decreased (Amano 2013: 170). Taking into consideration the above mentioned circumstances, one might think that the shogun lost all credibility as a ruler whilst Nagayoshi continued to exercise administrative and judiciary control of the Kinai Region. The ceremonial order however reveals a more complex picture of the power relationship between the two warrior leaders.

Shortly after the arrival of the shogun in Kyoto, Miyoshi Nagayoshi began to participate extensively in the customs of top-tier shogunal retainers. In 1559, Nagayoshi paid his first official visit to the temple of Shōkokuji and had his son and the Miyoshi successor, Yoshioki (1542–1563), have an audience with the shogun (Nagae 1968: 161). During the next couple of months, Nagayoshi was seen at all major shogunal events: a feast for shogunal guards in Shōkokuji Jishōin, a shogunal prayer at Kamigamo Shrine, and Shogun Yoshiharu's memorial service in Shōkokuji Banshōin (Nagae 1968: 163–166). These activities earned Nagayoshi a firm reputation as a shogunal supporter which was confirmed during a New Year audience with the shogun in 1560 (Ise, Eiroku 3/1/17):

> Miyoshi Nagayoshi, the shogunal guards and others attended [the shogun] for the first time. Everyone was wearing courtier headwear *eboshi*. [...] The order of salutation was as follows. Hosokawa Harukata, Magojirō (Miyoshi Yoshioki), Yūki Magoshichirō, Saitō Echizen, Saitō Magosaburō paid their respect [to the shogun]. After that, Miyoshi Nagayoshi paid his respect [to the shogun]. After that, shogunal guards paid their respect. They gave an offering of a sword

> *tachi* and twenty thousand *hiki*. After that, Magojirō expressed gratitude for the bestowment of an element from the shogun's name. He gave an offering of a sword *tachi* and ten thousand *hiki*. Everything is recorded in the registry.

This record provides incredible insight into the forming warrior ceremonial order. The traditional retainer duty – New Year salutation – included both old shogunal followers, such as Hosokawa Harukata, the Yūki and the Saitō families, as well as Miyoshi Yoshioki (Magojirō in the text), the son of Nagayoshi amongst them. Ceremonial promotion of the Miyoshi successor to the group of closest shogunal supporters meant immediate prestige in the eyes of the warrior community. Moreover, Miyoshi Yoshioki gave the shogun a separate offering for being granted an element from the shogun's name. Such practice of a superior bestowing his own name onto someone created a connection of parentage, thus symbolising a lasting bond between the lord and the subordinate (Collazo 2017: 258).

Yet, Nagayoshi paid his respects separately which would later become a common pattern in his ceremonial communication with the shogun. On the one hand, Nagayoshi distanced himself from ceremonial subordination to the shogun. On the other hand, Nagayoshi encouraged his son's participation in rituals of retainer loyalty with other members of the warrior government. And these were the two sides of Nagayoshi's strategy to elevate the status of the Miyoshi family. Gradually, Miyoshi Yoshioki started to visit Shogun Yoshiteru without his father as in the case when Yoshioki and the Miyoshi retainer Matsunaga Hisahide were promoted to the first-tier shogunal entourage (*shōbanshū*) in 1561 (Ise, Eiroku 4/1/24).

At the same time, the Miyoshi ascended the imperial court rank and title system: in 1560, Nagayoshi transferred the title of Governor of Chikuzen to his son and received a new title of Master of Palace Repairs and the fourth rank (Oyudono, Eiroku 3/1/21). A year later, Miyoshi Yoshioki and retainer Matsunaga Hisahide were also promoted to the fourth rank (Ise, Eiroku 4/1/28). Such promotion of warriors to aristocratic ranks and titles did not imply them becoming full-time courtiers, however the new status gave the right to accompany the shogun during his ceremonial visits to the imperial palace (*sandai*), as well as have their own access to it (Ise, Eiroku 4/3/13). During their independent visits, the newly appointed warriors did not meet the emperor personally but were able to present the court with monetary donations (Oyudono, Eiroku 5/7/9):

> Miyoshi Yoshioki, Matsunaga Hisahide came to pay their respects. It was the two of them, carrying swords. One thousand *hiki* was presented. From Matsunaga it was only in the form of a voucher (*origami*). After they paid one thousand *hiki*, [the emperor] distributed it. [The funds] were handed out in the Junior Pavilion.

The Miyoshi warriors continued to act as the patrons of the imperial court, even after the shogun returned to the capital, but they did not attempt to create a new order centred around their clan. Instead, Nagayoshi encouraged his followers to support Ashikaga Yoshiteru in his ceremonial duties that connected the two elite groups of courtiers and warriors. Seeing the Miyoshi actively embrace the symbolic coding of the shogunal ceremonial order, courtiers made an attempt to restore the yearly courtier-warrior ceremonies, as in 1562, a group of aristocrats visited the shogun for New Year greetings (Korefusa, Eiroku 5/1/7):

> We went to the palace of Muromachi-dono. In the hour of sheep (approx. 2 pm), we had an audience. Then, we went to Keijuin-dono (mother of Ashikaga Yoshiteru), had a meeting with her and had a drinking feast.

This ceremonial greeting at the beginning of the year had long been abandoned due to endless factional wars within the shogunal house and deterioration of the shogun's authority in general (Kanda 2002: 13–21). Aristocrats adapted to building personal relationships with warlords in distant provinces that became patrons of the court. Having a lot in common with other Sengoku warlords, Miyoshi Nagayoshi sought the restoration of the symbolic prestige of the shogunal house while not giving away any real administrative or judiciary power to Ashikaga Yoshiteru.

In this way, one of the most indicative gestures in the relationship with the shogun was the bestowment of the paulownia crest to Miyoshi Nagayoshi, his son Yoshioki and Matsunaga Hisahide. Throughout its rule, the Ashikaga house had two crests: *nihikiryō* and paulownia flower (*kirimon*). The former was used for flags in battles and even in tally trade with Ming China, and the latter was mainly used as patterns on clothing for ceremonial purposes. It was believed that Emperor Go-Daigo (reigned 1318–1339), who attempted to restore direct imperial rule (Kenmu regime) in the fourteenth century, granted the paulownia crest to warrior Ashikaga Takauji (1305–1358) for his loyal service during the military campaign of overthrowing the Kamakura warrior government. Previously the paulownia crest was only associated with the imperial house but by the Sengoku period, the right to wear this symbol was monopolised by the shoguns and only they had the authority to grant permission for others to use it (Sugawara 2019: 69–100).

The Miyoshi were among the few warlords who were honoured to receive such recognition in 1561. At first, Shogun Yoshiteru granted the right to use the crest to Miyoshi Yoshioki and Matsunaga Hisahide and bestowed paulownia-patterned warrior vest *kataginu* and *hakama* upon them (Ise, Eiroku 4/2/3). Nagayoshi also received the crest but as he was not in Kyoto at the time, the news came across later that month (Ise, Eiroku 4/2/17). Nagayoshi returned to the

capital to have an audience with the shogun and express his gratitude in a number of valuable gifts and donations: three sets of incense *mikusa*, three hundred *hiki*, a sword, a horse, ten sets of incense *goshu*, and a separate gift of incense for the shogun's mother (Ise, Eiroku 4/3/28). After that, Nagayoshi invited the shogun to visit his residence and organised a lavish reception with a feast, Nō theatre performances and more gifts.

Judging by the eagerness of both parties to participate and reinforce the ceremonial order, it is safe to assume that Nagayoshi and the shogun reached a balance in the distribution of political roles. Shogun Yoshiteru regained his status as the ceremonial actor of the warrior rule, whereas the real power of the Miyoshi was sanctified by their association with the Ashikaga house. In other words, Nagayoshi becoming a shogunal retainer would never have mattered unless the authority of the shogun as a ceremonial figure was restored.

CONCLUSION

The last two years of Nagayoshi's life were beset with misfortunes in warfare and in personal life. In 1562, the Miyoshi forces lost at the battle of Kumeda (near modern day Osaka) which forced Nagayoshi to give up the governance over the provinces of Izumi and Kawachi. On a personal level, the younger brother Miyoshi Jikkyū (1527–1562) who led the army was struck dead on the battlefield. The next year brought an even more devastating blow – Nagayoshi's only son Yoshioki passed away due to illness, in spite of relentless prayers by the emperor himself. Having no other offspring, Nagayoshi adopted his nephew under the name of Yoshitsugu (1551–1573) in hopes that this twelve-year old boy could unite the family of Miyoshi and secure its future as the warrior leaders of the capital region. Unfortunately, the descendants of Nagayoshi were not able to maintain what he had achieved during his rule. After his death in 1563, the real power shifted into the hands of the Miyoshi triumvir (*sannin shū*) who were meant to carry out regental duties for his successor Yoshitsugu but very quickly descended into the chaos of factional conflict with other retainers and supporters of the late Miyoshi Nagayoshi (Nagae 1968: 212–230).

Although Nagayoshi did not have an official status that entitled him to be recognised as the authority of the capital region, it is safe to assume that his rule had a social system within it as per the theory of structuration by Giddens. Practices of "domination" in the case of sixteenth century Japan included levying taxes as well as tax amnesty imposed by the new rulers in conquered lands as they introduced a pattern for the management of newly obtained resources. Appearing as a military force in a new region led to the local population demanding from the new ruler

normative regulation in land conflicts and encroachments. Thus, adjudication of such cases carried out by warrior leaders, reflected the aspect of "legitimation". These two dimensions of a social system are closely connected to symbolic orders that allow for such behaviour in the first place. Courtier-warrior ceremonies and shogunal ceremonies for retainers reflected the dimension of "signification" as they reaffirmed hierarchical order among warriors and highlighted agencies of traditional institutions of authority such as the imperial court and the shogunate.

Miyoshi Nagayoshi used a variety of tools to legitimise his rulership, aside from the obvious use of military force that allowed him to expand his territories. At different stages of his political path, he prioritised certain aspects in response to immediate tasks. On the one hand, Nagayoshi gained "practical" legitimacy as a Sengoku warlord by reacting to the needs of the population as an executive. On the other hand, he embodied the guardianship of the imperial court and elites which coded him as the legitimate ruler of *tenka*.

In this sense, Miyoshi Nagayoshi is close to the political figure of Oda Nobunaga, however not as a "unifier", but as the guardian of Kyoto and its surrounding territories. Despite having entered into politics by acts of violent confrontations with his warrior overlords, Nagayoshi did not overturn the existing order and did not establish a new polity. He did not seek any military or courtier appointments during his independent domination of Kyoto, but only started receiving promotions after the shogun returned to the capital.

Nagayoshi did govern the lands that fell under his domination and was in charge of executive decisions. By (re)creating recursive social practices, he inscribed his name into the hierarchy of warrior order that still revolved around the idea of the Ashikaga shogunal family being the political core alongside the imperial family. Still, his symbolic engagement was not transformative enough for his family to maintain governance as the new protectors of traditional authority after Nagayoshi's death.

NON-STANDARD ABBREVIATIONS

Chikatoshi	Chikatoshi nikki
DNK	Dai Nihon komonjo
Ise	Ise Sadasuke ki
Korefusa	Korefusa ki
NHK	Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, Japan Broadcasting Corporation
Ōdate	Ōdate jōkō nikki
Oyudono	Oyudono ue no nikki
SIM	Sengoku ibun, Miyoshi-shi hen
Tokitsugu	Tokitsugu-kyō ki

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THE END TO THE YEN IN KOREA: REPATRIATION AND CURRENCY PROBLEMS IN OCCUPIED KOREA AND JAPAN, 1945–1952

Simon Bytheway

INTRODUCTION

Money is as essential to a military occupation as it is to the waging of a war. Few would argue against the fundamental importance of money and currency in the conduct of war or military governance, and yet recent research and scholarship rarely considers the economic and monetary components so vital to its success or failure. The present myopia is obvious in the cases of the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and the Allied Occupation of Japan, both occurring in the wake of the Imperial Japanese Government's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August 1945 and its unconditional surrender on the following day. Critically, we need a *new* history that investigates monetary and currency problems within the wider framework of deportations, repatriations, and refugee movements between Occupied Korea and Japan in the immediate postwar period. Ultimately, in answering these questions we strive to link respective national histories to an emerging regional narrative, albeit one that started with conflict, but is increasingly characterized by cooperation, and even interdependency, between the economies of Northeast Asia.

THE TIME OF THE FOUR YENS: INITIAL CURRENCY REFORM

The demilitarization of Japanese armed forces and the complete political and administrative separation of Korea from Japan were the two key components of the initial directive issued to the Commander in Chief for the "Administration of

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Civil Affairs" in those parts of Korea occupied by US Forces.[1] The "Economic" section of the directive restated the goal of separation as: "To eliminate all vestiges of Japanese control over Korean economic life."[2] Instructions were also issued to affect the "removal and exclusion from positions of responsibility or influence of all Japanese, pro-Japanese Koreans and other pro-Japanese elements", with the severance of "managerial and other organizational connections" from Japanese financial institutions being stated explicitly as an immediate aim.[3]

The most pressing order, found in the "Financial" section of Part III of the directive, prescribed the use of Korean supplemental military yen currency (Type "A") for the US occupation of Korea. As the "declared legal tender in Korea" these American-made supplemental (Type "A") yen were to circulate alongside the colonial-era Bank of Chosen yen banknotes "interchangeably at par without distinction" inside Korea. Significantly, Bank of Japan, Bank of Taiwan, and other parastatal special bank notes; old military currencies; and the new supplemental (Type "B") yen for Japan ["Honshu, Hokkaido, Shikoku, Kyushu, and adjacent waters" but not Okinawa] were deliberately excluded from circulation. Furthermore, to assist the acceptance and circulation of the Type "A" and Bank of Chosen yen banknotes, no publication, announcement, or public speculation on exchange rates between the notes was permitted. Any public discussion of the exchange rates between the American and Korean yen currencies, against the US dollar (USD) was strictly prohibited. Although the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and other relevant military authorities had already been confidentially informed of the 15:1 Type "A" and Bank of Chosen yen to USD rate, "to be used exclusively for pay of military and naval personnel and for military and naval personnel purposes".[4]

Similarly, in Japan the importance of currency reform was underscored by General Douglas MacArthur's "Proclamation No. 3" to the Japanese people which was announced only hours after the Imperial Japanese Government's formalized signing of the *Instrument of Surrender* on 2 September 1945.[5] As with Korea, all Japanese currency issued by the Imperial Japanese Government had been rendered "void and valueless" at a stroke *except* Bank of Japan banknotes and

1 "SWNCC 176/8" [Basic Initial Directive to the Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific, for the Administration of Civil Affairs in Those Areas of Korea Occupied by US Forces], Memorandum, 17 October 1945 (first circulated 1 September, Washington), cited in Department of State 1969: 1074.

2 "SWNCC 176/8", Memorandum, p. 1082.

3 "SWNCC 176/8", Memorandum, p. 1086.

4 "SWNCC 176/8", Memorandum, p. 1087.

5 "Proclamation No. 3" [Currency], General Douglas MacArthur to Japanese People, September 2, 1945. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

American Type "B" supplemental currency for Japan, which were both mandated as legal tender in Japan.[6] As central banks, therefore, the Bank of Chosen and the Bank of Japan were both privileged and effectively pardoned by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) for their wartime actions, despite their long and uncontested reigns as the Imperial Japanese Government's premier financial agents in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria. Nevertheless, SCAP had alternate currencies in place should the central banks fail in their duties by ignoring the Occupation's "SCAPIN" directives. In essence, Bank of Chosen banknotes became the yen of the West, Bank of Japan banknotes continued as the yen of the East, and American military yen circulated everywhere (with its armed forces) and exclusively on those islands, like Okinawa, militarized in-between Occupied Korea and Japan.

THE THOUSAND YEN LIMIT: INFLATION AND CHANGING MONIES

With the eclipse of the Japanese empire, and the urgent and informal dismantling of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 22 August 1910, tremendous repatriation movements were engendered between Korea and Japan, and indeed, across much of the former Japanese Empire in Asia. Japanese colonialists, soldiers, settlers, and their families were forcibly deported back to Japan. At the same time, *zainichi* Koreans living in Japan – so-called "third-country nationals" (*dai-san kokujin*) in the language of the times – demobilized soldiers, labourers, and other Koreans were repatriated back to Korea. All these people, perhaps as many as four million in total, would presumably be carrying as much money as they had in the hope of re-establishing their lives in the rapidly changing, post-war environment. Yet, punitive and unyielding restrictions on the amount of currency, precious metals, and other possessions that could be legally transported, corresponding to average yearly salaries for civilians, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men, encouraged people to search for unofficial ways of travelling, and various "illegal" methods of transporting money and commodities between Korea and Japan. The subsequent "smuggling of currencies and contraband" soon became an outsized concern – an obsession, almost – of the new military commands in Korea and Japan.[7]

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6 "SCAPIN-8" [Legal Tender], Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to the Imperial Japanese Government, Memorandum, September 6, 1945, (MG), [formerly from] Adjutant General's Section, September 30, 1945. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

7 Bates 1993: 71–77.

Japanese military withdrawal and the complete decoupling of Japan from Korea were the main components of the initial directive issued to the "Administration of Civil Affairs in those Areas of Korea Occupied by US Forces".[8] To achieve both an immediate demilitarization and a rapid socioeconomic separation required nothing less than the wholesale deportation of all Japanese soldiers, settlers, colonialists, and their families, from Korea. Just how much these deportees would be allowed to carry with them on their way back to Japan was quickly decided in late September 1945 by the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo and issued to the military authorities in Korea. According to the subsequent SCAPIN-44 and SCAPIN-67 directives, strict and inflexible limits were placed on the amount of currency, precious metals, and other possessions that could be brought back into Japan by returning Japanese or taken out by Korean and other repatriates leaving Japan.

These restrictions imposed considerable hardships on all peoples (deportees and repatriates alike) transiting between Korea and Japan in the period from the end of the Second World War in 1945, and remained in force until the return of Japanese POWs from Siberia in the early and mid-1950s. Commissioned Japanese officers were allowed to have a maximum of 500 yen, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men 200 yen, and civilians were permitted to carry 1,000 yen per person.[9] How were these currency values were arrived at is not explained in the US Army records, but the figures correspond to the average yearly salaries of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, which ranged from a minimum of 108 to 240 yen (approximately 200 yen, the *monthly* salary of a US Army private), commissioned officers which started from approximately 840 yen (considerably more than 500 yen), and civilians, such as day-labourers and agricultural workers 659 yen, government officials 975 yen, or general merchants 1,279 yen (all around the 1,000 yen limit).[10]

According to Japanese government's Ministry of Welfare, only a small percentage, some 5.6% or 133,000, of the 2.4 million Koreans resident in Japan, hoped to continue living in Japan after the war.[11] The repatriation of these people placed a huge burden on SCAP's resources, not to mention those of USAMGIK,

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8 "SWNCC 176/8", Memorandum, p. 1074.

9 "SCAPIN-44" [Controls over exports and imports of gold, silver, securities and financial instruments], Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to the Imperial Japanese Government, Memorandum, September 22, 1945; and "SCAPIN-67" [Funds that may be brought into Japan by Repatriated Japanese], September 27, 1945, (ESS.), Adjutant General's Section. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

10 "Records of General HQ" undated, Far Eastern Command, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, and United Nations Command, RG 554: 22; US Army 1944: 8.

11 Takemae 2003: 449.

at a time of great uncertainty. SCAP offered all so-called "third-country nationals" (*dai-san kokujin*) in Japan "official repatriation" as a free-of-charge service up until 31 December 1946. The imposition of the 1,000 yen limit and restrictions on the amount of baggage that *zainichi* Korean repatriates could carry out with them, however, "interfered in the process" and made the decision to leave Japan much harder for them.[12] In the war-damaged markets of Korea and Japan, chronic inflation, a general scarcity of goods, and the rise of black markets was aggravated by a "tremendous and dangerous" expansion of currency in circulation, as had been commonly experienced in the war-torn economies of Europe.[13] Moreover, Korea repatriates from Japan faced, "[f]loods, epidemic diseases, rice riots, lack of housing and jobs, prejudice against repatriates, political instability and a homeland occupied by US and Soviet troops".[14] As a result, by the end of 1945 just 1.3 million (54.2%) of Koreans had been repatriated, and at the end of the SCAP repatriation programme in December 1946, a significant minority of 600,000 – a quarter of the 2.4 million Koreans formerly resident in Japan at the war's end – had elected to remain and stay put.[15] Was the 1,000 yen limit a subtle way of delaying or attenuating a sudden exodus of Koreans from Japan? Whatever its aims were, there is no doubt that the strict limits placed on the transfer of monies and goods, the same as those placed on Japanese soldiers, settlers, and colonialists deported from Korea, were effective in tamping down the scale and pace of Korean repatriation from Japan.

In the long, intervening years since the end of the Second World War, new explanations have emerged to explain SCAP's mandatory 1,000 yen limit. There is a suggestion that the imposition of the 1,000 yen per person rule was designed to curb postwar inflation. There is no documentary evidence, however, that shows how SCAP intended for monetary restrictions between Japan and its former colonies to work as an anti-inflationary measure, or how the 1,000 yen limit would work to reduce the consumption of goods and services across these war-effected economies.[16] In respect to measuring inflation, the most pertinent question is how much was 1,000 yen worth at the war's end? In Seoul during late August 1945, inflation was already gathering speed, but 1,000 yen bought about

12 Lee Kwan-Kyu 1990: 156.

13 Southard 1978: 169–175, 191; Petrov 1967: 33–39.

14 Takemae 2003: 449.

15 Takemae 2003: 448; Lee Kwan-Kyu 1990: 156. During the years of the Occupation, and before the outbreak of war in Korea, approximately 1.75 million Koreans were repatriated from Japan, with a "predominant majority" returning to the Southern parts of Korea from which they originally emigrated. See Ryang 2013: 33.

16 Gane 1988: 157–158, cited in Youngsan Choi 2019: 347–357.

570 packets of 225 gram grade "A" coffee, 333 packets of 375 gram "substitute" grade tea, and 286 packs of the finest grade "A" cigarettes, or 333 packs of "B" grade cigarettes (the Japanese empire being thoroughly decimalized, each pack had ten cigarettes). A pair of quality men's leather shoes retailed at an expensive 350 yen, but a tailored suit, of reasonable quality, cost just 50 yen, with a spare pair of trousers setting you back an extra 15 yen. As the grip of inflation tightened around the former colonies and home islands of the Japanese empire, however, the important thing was to spend any money you received as soon as possible – buy anything that might be traded in kind. Just a few months later, in November 1945, 1,000 yen bought approximately 20 packs of inferior "B" grade cigarettes, indicating that it had lost 94% of its purchasing power in the three months since August.[17] At official exchange rates in late 1945, 1,000 yen was equivalent to $67 USD or £21 sterling, but within the space of half-a-year or so its exchange value had dropped to around $14 USD, £4 sterling, or lower.[18] The yen had become a "soft currency" that was fast losing its value as money – and its place as legal tender – in Korea.

The "rub" was that Koreans could only return to Korea with yen, either in the form of Bank of Chosen or newly issued Type "A" supplemental notes, with both these currencies having been rendered "void and valueless" in Japan. Likewise, Japanese repatriates could only return to Japan with Bank of Japan or the newly issued Type "B" supplemental yen notes. So how could prospective repatriates get their hands on these currencies while waiting for processing and transportation? Official money changing offices were established at the main repatriation ports of Busan, Wonsan, and Inchon in Korea, and Hakata and Senzaki in Japan, but their short opening-hours and the intermittent nature of their operations was a constant source of anxiety for the repatriates. The importance of the provision of foreign exchange services can hardly be overstated, as immediate postwar directives were clear and unambiguous: all other currencies, all yen currency in excess of the limits, and indeed, all other possessions, including "securities, financial instruments, and jewellery" were to be "taken up and remitted to GHQ" posthaste. In effect, civilians and military personnel were permitted to carry "correct" money, their clothing, "personal possessions of value only to the owner", and

17 Institute of Asian Culture Studies 1988. *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 42.
18 John 1987: 27.

nothing else.[19] The weight of their "personal effects" was – without exception – limited to 250 pounds per person.[20]

Subsequent military directives hammered home the same message.[21] A small concession was made in late 1945 which permitted Korean repatriates to bring financial authorizations or instructions "to effect financial or property transactions within or outside of Japan; and other evidence of indebtedness or... ownership of property" with them when entering Korea. That is, Korean nationals were allowed to carry bank books or passbooks and postal savings books, insurance policies, and other similar documents when they left Japan,[22] whereas Japanese nationals were denied the right to retain equivalent "claims or privileges" in their former colonies.[23] Similarly, Japanese government requests for permission to purchase Bank of Chosen, Bank of Taiwan, Central Bank of Manchukuo, and other Allied currencies (such as British pounds) brought into Japan by repatriates were all firmly denied.[24] Moreover, requests by Japanese civil and military leaders to visit occupied areas were routinely denied. Supplemental SCAPIN directives spelled it out: "All requests to visit Korea by Japanese to be denied, unless essential" to the success of occupational government in Korea and Japan.[25]

These rules were projected with unwavering authority over the course of the Occupations in Korea and Japan. Japanese prisoners and repatriates returning from North Korea, Manchuria, Northern China, and even Imperial Japanese Army POWs coming back from Soviet work camps in Siberia during the 1950s,

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19 "SCAPIN-67" [Funds that may be Brought into Japan by Repatriated Japanese], September 27, 1945, (ESS.); and "SCAPIN-1966" [Property Individuals are Authorized to Carry on Entering and Leaving Japan], January 18, 1949, (ESS/FIN.), Adjutant General's Section. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

20 "SCAPIN-822/1" [Repatriation], March 27, 1946, (GC.), Adjutant General's Section. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

21 "SCAPIN-206" [Monetary Restrictions], October 29, 1945, (GC.), Adjutant General's Section; "SCAPIN-822/1" [Repatriation], March 27, 1946, (GC.), Adjutant General's Section; "SCAPIN-927" [Repatriation], May 7, 1946, (GC.); and "SCAPIN-1966" [Property Individuals are Authorized to Carry on Entering and Leaving Japan], January 18, 1949, (ESS/FIN.), Adjutant General's Section. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

22 Mitchell 1967: 102–104.

23 "SCAPIN-253" [Supplemental Instructions Relating to Korean Repatriates Entering Japan], November 8, 1945, (ESS.), Adjutant General's Section. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

24 "SCAPIN-577" [Purchase by the Japanese Government of Foreign Currencies], 1946/01/11, (ESS.), Adjutant General's Section. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

25 "SCAPIN-64" [Visits by Japanese civil and military officials to Occupied areas outside Japan...], September 26, 1945, (GC.); "SCAPIN-481" [Applications for Permission to enter South Korea], December 21, 1945, (GC.); and "SCAPIN-822" [Repatriation], March 16, 1946, (GC.), Adjutant General's Section. GHQ/SCAP Records; RG331; National Archives, Washington, DC.

had the same set of SCAP military directives and restrictions imposed on them! In these circumstances, moving money was a highly regulated and restricted aspect of post-war travel between Korea, China, Okinawa, Taiwan, and Japan. It was also ubiquitous in that everyone transiting between Korea and Japan necessarily became involved in "changing money" or exchanging yen currencies. Inflexible and unchanging limits, therefore, encouraged an "illegal" (and highly lucrative) form of bilateral trade which, in turn, reinforced Korea's hitherto colonial, monetary relationship with Japan, and challenged the administrative and operational abilities of the military authorities in Korea.

CURRENCY TRAFFICKING DURING DEPORTATION AND REPATRIATION

Investigation of USAFIK *G-2 Periodic Reports* and *Intelligence Summaries* reveal a remarkable episode of Korean, Japanese, and American yen currency trading and arbitrage.[26] It started in mid-September 1945 with Japan's humiliating, fire-sale withdrawal– the messy end typical of all military occupations – when many Japanese were threatened by Koreans, and experienced forcible home evictions, or other acts of retribution and violence.[27] At stake were billions of yen in the form of Bank of Japan and Bank of Chosen banknotes, each being only of value in their own newly-separated jurisdictions and theoretically "void and valueless" elsewhere.[28] As Japanese colonialism came to an end, Koreans had large quantities of Japanese banknotes and other yen-denominated currencies that were "worthless in dealings in Korea *unless* used in transactions with Japanese merchants" [italics mine].[29] At both the macro and micro levels, the coordinated exchange and transfer of these notes between Korea and Japan promised enormous, potential profits or benefits at a time when most people were staring down profound, personal losses caused by the war and repartition. If only there were

26 The research presented below started with Caprio 2017: 89–114.

27 "Organizational History", Headquarters, Military Government Group to Commanding General, USAMGIK, 15 January 1947, The Adjutant General's Office; Unit History-97th MG [Military Government] Group (1 Jan–31 Dec 1947) RG 94: 21886. GHQ/SCAP Records; National Archives, Washington, DC. [cited in National History Editorial Committee 2001: 106]. For discussion of "Postwar belligerence" see Caprio 2021: 4–6.

28 Department of State 1969: 1050. Rampant emergency issues of Bank of Chosen banknotes increased the circulation from approximately 3.5 billion yen in March 1945 to 7.5 billion yen by 12 September 1945. Similarly, the amount of Bank of Japan notes in circulation ballooned by 225% from a peak of 21.7 billion yen during the war to 55.4 billion yen by December 1945. See Bytheway 2019: 86–97; 2023.

29 *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 119.

some way for Koreans and Japanese to collect and channel their funds during these movements, to cooperate in bilateral transactions with their own networks, each other, or with Allied soldiers and Occupation personnel, in order that they might circumvent the currency restrictions and the troublesome 1,000 yen limit discussed above.

USAFIK intelligence findings, gathered from intercepted mail, found that Japanese civilians were leaving Korea "with large sums of money despite the 1,000 yen limit". Methods of smuggling included sewing money in the linings of clothes, adding secret compartments to water canteens,[30] and cutting high-value, Japanese bank cheques cut into equal parts, and then sending each part separately by mail to the same person in Japan (a 40,000 yen example is cited).[31] Sage advice from recently deported Japanese to friends in Korea included some sure-fire methods of currency smuggling:

> "Be sure to change Korean currency [before arriving in Japan]. Although the inspection of women's baggage is not very strict, women are examined in a private room by Korean women on the search for money... it is not safe to carry it on their [sic] person. It is safer to pack it with your lunch which they seldom open." And, "I suggest you wear two pair of stockings and insert your money and deposit book between your feet and stockings."[32]

We should, however, take care not to trivialize the intelligence gleaned from mail interceptions, for they show both the depth and breadth of bilateral currency movements. For example, one letter revealed a planned exchange for 6.5 million Japanese yen into Korean yen in February 1946.[33] Many Japanese people were horrified by what had happened to Japan while it had been at war and were naïvely hoping to soon resume their lives in Korea. Another letter memorably states:

> Living conditions in Japan surpass all imagination; I cannot purchase even a towel in Japan; and I regret that I have returned home; but as soon as my family have gotten settled here I will return to Korea again.[34]

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30 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 56, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 237.
31 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 58, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 247.
32 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 107, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 488.
33 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 146, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 635.
34 "Tanaka Noboru (of Tottori Prefecture) to Ishikawa Tadashi (in Seoul)", dated 14 September 1945, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 158.

The overwhelming impression one gets from reading these letters is that ordinary people were going to great efforts to "illegally exchange Japanese yen for Korean notes" and that "large amounts" of demonetized Japanese yen were being exchanged, often for a charge, and sometimes with an additional fee if a "mediator" was required.[35] It can hardly be understated, these transactions represent huge bilateral transfers of wealth at a time distinguished by widespread hardship and poverty in Korea and Japan.

More information concerning the inspection, regulation, and exchange of yen currencies, as it relates to deportations and repatriations, may be gleaned from the "Unit Histories" of those US Army forces ordered to serve in South Korea. For example, the 97th Military Government (MG) Group arrived in Korea on 8 September 1945 and noted that while "hundreds of thousands of Japanese... were making preparations to return to their native land", millions of Koreans "were already arriving from Northern Korea and Manchuria". Displaced persons were handled at four points in the Kyunggi (Gyeonggi) Province: Seoul, Inchon, Kaesong (the main transportation hub for those returning from Manchuria), and Tong Du Chun, "a village just south of the 38 parallel, and located on a railroad line". At its highest volumes, in November 1945, Seoul processed approximately 3,000 people per day, Kaesong 2,500, and Tong Du Chun 1,100. The daily average of Inchon was much lower, "about 150" persons, but Inchon soon became an important "port of entry". The major problem for Korean "refugees" was food supply and sanitation. Finding food during the winter of 1946/47 was hard. The 97th MG Group resorted to "purchasing rice shipped into Korea from America" and frequent public education campaigns to stress the importance of personal hygiene and cleanliness in order to avoid an "outbreak of disease" among those in their care. The 68th MG Group established an official "refugee camp" at Uijongbu (Uijeongbu), for both Korean and Japanese refugees, which was able to provide medical treatment and relief clothing on an emergency basis.[36]

Similarly, the 98th MG Group arrived in Busan on 16 September 1945 to find that:

> All banks, stores, and schools were closed throughout the province. Trade was at a standstill. Looting was commonplace, and a good share of the Japanese policemen had left their posts. Korean refugees to the number of 6 to 10,000

35 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 149, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9-1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 645.

36 "Organizational History", Headquarters, Military Government Group to Commanding General, USAMGIK, 15 January 1947, The Adjutant General's Office; Unit History-97th MG [Military Government] Group (1 Jan–31 Dec 1947) RG 94: 21886. GHQ/SCAP Records; National Archives, Washington, DC. [cited in National History Editorial Committee 2001: 106–107].

> per day were entering and Japanese nationals at the rate of 3 to 4,000 per day were leaving the port of Pusan. ...government was at a standstill.[37]

Almost immediately, its "tactical forces" coordinated and controlled the physical movements of the people on the piers. Just four months later they were able to report that 614,646 Koreans had been processed into the country at Busan, Masan, and Chinhae. At the same time, 427,186 Japanese civilians, 101,669 Imperial Japanese Army and 8,599 Imperial Japanese Navy personnel were processed out of the country. That is, 614,646 Koreans and 537,454 Japanese, a total of 1,152,100 people, formally transited through Busan, Masan, and Chinhae in the 98th MG Group's first 110 days of operation. The Unit's record "processing days" are proudly listed as being the "17 Oct [sic] when 10,505 Japanese nationals were processed" and "12 Nov when 23,500 Koreans [sic]" were repatriated.[38] On 1 January 1946, the value of contraband "representing various impounded funds" confiscated from Japanese deportees during body searches on their departure from Busan, and duly turned over to the Provincial Property Custodian by the unit, reached 5.5 million yen (roughly equivalent to 10 yen per person). In addition, on 6 December 1945 all Japanese-owned properties were declared "property of USMG [USAMGIK] to be held in trust for the benefit of Korea".[39] The US Army's administration of the deportation and repatriation programs thus accumulated yen currencies, and persisted in using them – in effect, postponing monetary decolonization – even as they were physically *removing* Japanese people from the Korean peninsula.

As the Occupation progressed in South Korea, middlemen and all manner of intermediaries came forth to provide financial services to those Japanese people who remained in Korea. A remarkable letter intercepted from a Korean to a former, high-ranking Japanese bureaucrat offered to help the official to "draw [convert?] his savings or exchange money into Japanese currency".[40] One enterprising interpreter, working in the Taxation Department of USAMGIK, was offering American officers who travelled between Korea and Japan a generous 10% commission if they would exchange 5 million yen in Bank of Japan banknotes to the Bank of Chosen equivalent, which had been recently smuggled into

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37 "Provincial Government Military History (22 Sept 1945 to 15 Jan 1946)", Headquarters, USAMGIK, [undated] 1946, The Adjutant General's Office; Unit History-98th MG [Military Government] Group (1 Jan–31 Dec 1947) RG 94: 21886. GHQ/SCAP Records; National Archives, Washington, DC. [cited in National History Editorial Committee 2001: 214].

38 "Provincial Government Military History (22 Sept 1945 to 15 Jan 1946)", p. 216.

39 "Provincial Government Military History (22 Sept 1945 to 15 Jan 1946)", p. 226.

40 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 100, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 457.

Korea from Japan by another individual. Both men were, however, arrested by the police in December 1945.[41] Of course, these travelling American officers, Allied sailors and airmen, and Occupation personnel were a privileged group of people who were best placed to navigate the petty rackets, benefit from black-market businesses that sprang up in the immediate postwar period, and avoid – or somehow circumvent – many of the currency restrictions applied to all other groups.

Similarly, the scourge of counterfeit currencies, and its associated graft, also increased as the Occupation sought to find its footings in Korea. As early as 1 October 1945, racketeers tried to take advantage of early postwar confusion by illegally issuing counterfeit 1,000 yen Bank of Chosen notes (ten times the denomination of the largest 100 yen notes issued by the bank at that time).[42] The Bank of Chosen also warned officers in USAMGIK of the circulation of many counterfeit 100 yen Bank of Chosen banknotes on 28 November 1945.[43] The scale of these enterprises may be judged from the trial, fining, and heavy, five-year sentencing of six Koreans apprehended "for having in their possession a counterfeit printing press and 432,000 one hundred Yen [sic] notes", that is 43.2 million yen.[44] Intriguingly, monetary and currency problems north of the 38th parallel may have also contributed to the Occupation's difficulties in the South.

The Red Army of the Soviet Union issued their own form of "occupation currency" in North Korea, but apparently without fanfare or a public explanation. Consequently, it was only used by people in the North Korea when they are were forced to use it.[45] The military administration in the North then encouraged the circulation of its new currency by confiscating yen currencies whenever possible and sending them south (where, and while, they were still worth something). USAFIK *Intelligence Summaries* discussed the urgent need for USAMGIK to ascertain whether the large quantities of banknotes confiscated by the Red Army in North Korea were being used to finance "Communist Party"

41 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 102, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 468.
42 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 45, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 194.
43 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 89, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 394.
44 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 146, and No. 148, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, pp. 634–639, 643.
45 Institute of Asian Culture Studies, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 173.

activities in the south.[46] The Korean Communist Party headquarters was, in fact, raided on 16 September 1946, but found to have a printing press with *counterfeit* Bank of Chosen notes, rather than *confiscated* yen currencies collected from the north.[47] Soviet occupation currency, called "red notes" because of their colour, circulated "extensively in Mongolia, Manchuria, and Northern Korea" with red notes being exchanged one for one with Korean and Japanese yen currencies. Tellingly, USAFIK Intelligence reported that Red Army soldiers were arbitrarily stopping all suspected refugees in order to take their money, as well as frequently confiscating other belongings.[48] The widespread circulation of demonetized and counterfeit currencies was, therefore, another seemingly intractable problem that threatened the day-to-day operations of the US Occupation in South Korea.

THE SMUGGLING OF PEOPLE, CURRENCY, AND GOODS

An important theme that emerges from USAFIK intelligence, gathered from intercepted mail, concerns repeated references to "secret ships" and other, assorted "smuggling" operations.[49] Japanese correspondence regularly identified the Assistance Association for Japanese (*Nipponjin sewakai* 日本人世話会), an organization established for repatriates that was financed entirely with Japanese funds,[50] as providing practical advice and assistance with the shipping of black market goods. By early November 1945, these references to the Assistance Association for Japanese increased to the point that the "relief organization with Communistic tendencies" was posited as being the "possible organizer of secret shipping in between Korea and Japan".[50] Apparently, the "unauthorized" ferrying of passengers became a steady business, and Japanese civilians paid 150 to 200

46 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 86, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 381.

47 Yur-Bok Lee & Patterson 1986: 95. Pak Hon-yong, the leader of the group, was charged in relation to counterfeit operations, but apparently absconded to North Korea where he was later charged with spying for the United States and executed in 1955.

48 *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 432. The Red Army were also alleged to be involved in seizing women "for their personal concubines", and were readily identified wearing confiscated parts of Japanese uniforms "since they are warmer and of better quality than their own".

49 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 48, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 207. See Caprio 2021: 6–10.

50 "Organizational History", Headquarters, Military Government Group to Commanding General, USAMGIK, 15 January 1947, The Adjutant General's Office; Unit History-97th MG [Military Government] Group (1 Jan–31 Dec 1947) RG 94: 21886. GHQ/SCAP Records; National Archives, Washington, DC. [cited in National History Editorial Committee 2001: 30].

yen for their passage home.[51] In reality, however, there were other unidentified, informal players in the ferrying game, and most were later revealed by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) as being Korean in origin.

The Allied Occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 by BCOF's Australian, British, Indian, and New Zealand contingents is an understudied part of SCAP's wider operations. Based in Southern Honshu – that part of Japan in closest proximity to Korea – the BCOF was 38,000 strong, a quarter of the total US deployment in May 1946, and played an important role in administering Japan's surrender and demilitarization.[52] Another important and immediate task was BCOF's supervision of three repatriation centres, staffed by civil servants from the Japanese government's Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, at Ujina (the port of Hiroshima), Senzaki, and Otake. Approximately 700,000 surrendered Japanese soldiers and civilians returned to Japan through these centres, and "65,000 of these and thousands of others formerly resident in Japan were the repatriated outwards to their original homes in China, Formosa, Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, often against their will and by compulsion".[53] By the late-1940s, however, BCOF duties became – in effect – a policing operation against the unauthorized movement of people, currency, and goods between Korea and Japan.[54]

While SCAP's official, repatriation programme transported Koreans "free-of-charge" to the USAMGIK-administered ports of Busan, Wonsan, and Inchon in Korea, increasingly larger numbers of Koreans were paying small-boat owners and middlemen to transport them back to isolated parts of Southern Japan *unofficially*. Typically, these people were smuggled back in small boats as stowaways (密航者 mikkōsha, literally 'people who travel in secret' in modern Japanese). They did not "steal" their passages and were not necessarily "smugglers" of anything much themselves, but rather they were smuggled back to Japan as what might be described as unauthorized arrivals, illegal immigrants, or displaced refugees. Koreans who were found to have returned to Japan using unauthorized or illegal means were typically arrested, held in a specially designated prison camp, and deported for the crime of "smuggling" (as it was transcribed in English), although evidence suggests that "many" were unaware

51 G-2 Periodic Report, No. 56, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 237, see also p. 227.

52 Prices cited from 6th Army G-2 Periodic Report, No. 45, *HQ USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report* (*1945.9.9–1946.2.12*), 2:1, p. 308. Unfortunately, it is not shown what it cost for Koreans, in Korea, to return to Japan after their initial repatriation.

53 John 1987: 8–9.

54 Bates 1993: 72.

that the act of re-entry and return had become illegal for them.[55] Similarly, the southern end of Honshu was described as the "Mecca for Korean smugglers" and the New Zealand Expeditionary Forces (NZEF) referred to the southernmost area of Yamaguchi prefecture as the "Smuggler's corner" during the Occupation.[56]

The number of illegal arrivals or undocumented re-entries, as recorded by the Japanese police and forwarded to SCAP, rose from approximately 800 in May 1946 to 8,037 in June, and 6,916 in July, with 1946 being the standout year. Towards the end of the typhoon season, and especially during winter, when the seas are considered rough, the incidence of these events dropped sharply. The arrival of for Korean returnees continued right up until the start of the Korean War in June 1950, with the months of August 1947 and August 1949 recording over a thousand entries each. In sum, a total of 48,076 "illegal entrants" were arrested between April 1946 and December 1951.[57] By way of comparison, almost ten times that number (425,713) were repatriated to Korea from Hakata Port in the period from August 1945 to March 1946. Collated daily reports of the 28th Marines (USMC) and the 32nd Infantry Division (US Army) show that some 99,200 Korean people were repatriated between 8 and 25 October 1945 alone.[58] Of course, many Koreans successfully navigated the obstacles and were never arrested on return to Japan. Classified, statistical analysis by the US 8th Army indicated that the number of illegal entrants was likely to be double the total recorded by the police, whereas the Japanese government alleged that the real number of illegal immigrants was a multiple of those arrested, somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 persons.[59] Accordingly, the issue of uncontrolled movement of people, currencies, and goods became one of great importance to the military occupations in Korea and Japan.

Incidentally, the constant policing of the border movements between Korea and Japan meant that the BCOF's military forces were ideally positioned to fight alongside the US forces at the sudden outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) were on patrol with the US Navy right from the start of the "emergency" in Korea (29 June 1950),[60] and similarly, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 77th Fighter Squadron based at Iwakuni was operational during the first days of the invasion, long before

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55 Bates 1993: 71–77; Bolton 2013: 60; Morris-Suzuki 2010: 64–65.
56 Morris-Suzuki 2010: 55–56, 69.
57 Bates 1993: 163.
58 Morris-Suzuki 2010: 69. Of the total of 48,076 entrants, 45,960 were from Korea, 1,704 were from the Nansei Islands (Okinawa and Amami), 410 were from China, and two from "elsewhere".
59 Youngsan Choi 2019: 348, 354–355; and see regiment and division websites.
60 Morris-Suzuki 2010: 69–70.

the US Air Force could organise its own Far East Air Forces (FEAF).[61] Months later, BCOF ground forces would be integrated into the Commonwealth Division under the wider framework of the United Nations Command (UNC). With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, effective from 28 April 1952, BCOF became the British Commonwealth Force, Korea (BCFK), and continued to operate independently in Korea with its own unique "line of communication and resupply back to Japan" until 1957.[62]

CONCLUSION

The rise of the yen as a global currency coincided with the march of Japanese imperialism in Taiwan and Korea during the last years of the nineteenth century. Following Japan's surrender in September 1945, however, there was no definitive end to the yen's circulation in its former empire. USAMGIK was eager for the new regime to replace the yen with its own currency – the *won* – from October 1945,[63] and "establish effective controls with respect to all foreign exchange transactions... or other form of property" as clearly stated in the foundational SWNCC 176/8 directive.[64] The *won* was to be the new medium of exchange, unit of account, measure (and store) of value in Korea, but the expediencies of occupation meant that the circulation of Bank of Chosen yen banknotes, alongside that of other new, old, and even de-monetized yen currencies, continued much longer than was anticipated. The yen's last stand in its former colony caused a host of unforeseen monetary and currency problems in both Korea and Japan, closely related to deportation, repatriation, and unofficial trade. Problems that were left largely unresolved until almost five years later, in June 1950, when the Northern invasion heralded the outbreak of war across the peninsular. In effect, the contours, contents, and context of the Korean War itself brought about an end to the yen's place in the economic life of Korea and its people.

The research presented here demonstrates how massive, postwar repatriation movements and associated, inter-related currency problems impinged on the monetary decolonization of Korea and reinforced the military nature of administrative operations – patrolling, intercepting, capturing, inspecting, transporting – in Occupied Korea and Japan. Particular attention was paid to the imposition of strict limits on the amount of currency and personal effects that Korean and

61 Bolton 2013: 61; Edwards 1991: 292–293.
62 Bates 1993: 222; Grey 1991b: 408–409.
63 Grey 1991a: 119–120; and see Bates 1993: 213.
64 "The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State (Seoul)", 15 September 1945 (Received 28 September 1945), [pp. 1049–1053] cited in Department of State 1969: 1053.

Japanese deportees, repatriates, and returnees were allowed to carry with them, and how SCAP directives, issued in Tokyo, were subverted by the active transfer of old, colonial-era, and new American, Japanese, and Korean yen currencies. Moreover, the use of financial agents and intermediaries to effect remittance and currency transfers, the scourge of currency counterfeiting, and the large-scale, informal, smuggling operations between Korea and Japan were all investigated to reveal new, inter-related aspects of the Allied occupations of Korea and Japan. Accordingly, the arc of the narrative has moved from one of nationalist intra- and international conflict, to that of coexistence, interdependence, commonalities, and even cooperation between the peoples, if not the governments, of Northeast Asia.

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THE JAPANESE MILITARY AND THE DANGERS OF KOREAN REPATRIATION

Mark E. Caprio

In the Japanese emperor's 15 August 1945 "Jewel Voice Broadcast" (*Gyokuon hōsō*), the monarch famously announced his country's intentions to accept the Allied forces demands as listed in the Potsdam Declaration to end the Pacific War. To reassure his overseas military forces that the broadcast reflected his true intentions, a few days later he dispatched members of the imperial family to the war fronts and on 17 August issued a second statement titled "Receipt Addressed to Our Soldiers and Sailors Concerning Surrender" to reinforce this message (Barshay 2013: 9).[1] Both of these statements came days before the United States would propose to the Soviet Union that the Korean peninsula, but not the Japanese archipelago, be temporarily divided between the two nations for the purpose of accepting Japan's surrender in its now former colony.[2] While the Soviet armies were positioned in northern Korea from late August, the US forces did not arrive until the second week of September to begin their occupation duties. Three days after their arrival, on 12 September, the *G-2 Periodic Report* offered the following positive assessment of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK)'s main task – disarming the Japanese military: "Thus far the Japanese troops encountered have shown a passive attitude toward defeat and the occupation is progressing without difficulty" (*G-2*

1 Interestingly, while in his broadcast the emperor attributed his decision to surrender as based on the "enemy [having] begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb", in his follow-up statement he emphasized the Soviet army having entered the war as the reason behind his decision to end the war. A copy of this latter text can be found at <taiwandocuments.org/surrender07.htm> (accessed 11 Aug. 2022).

2 Although discussion regarding a postwar occupation of the Korean Peninsula had commenced as early as 1943, as well as Soviet participation in this and other postwar occupations should it enter the Pacific War before Japan surrendered and may have been secretly formalized between Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the US apparently did not decide to propose the 38th parallel as the line to divide the two occupations until the evening of 10–11 August. The Soviet government accepted this proposal and its military (to surprise of the US) honoured it. The Japanese nation was also divided, but to a far lesser extent, with the Soviets claiming four northern islands off the coast of Hokkaido and the US formally occupying Japan's major four islands, but keeping the Okinawan archipelago until 1972.

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Periodic Report, 12 Sept. 1945: 5).[3] This publication confirmed this assessment the following day by adding that the "disarmament of the 75% of the Japanese troops in the In'chon-Seoul area has progressed in a surprisingly smooth manner". The remaining 25% of Japanese soldiers, it continued, had been permitted to retain small arms "for their own protection" (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 13 Sept. 1945: 11). These initial reports suggested that things appeared to be going as good as, or perhaps even better than, imagined.

The same 13 September report contained further news that suggested room for concern. On this day it informed of a potentially "serious problem" in the military personnel's return to civilian life: "many of them are wandering aimlessly through the streets, some still in uniform and armed. In addition to these discharged men, many instances of desertion have occurred in the Japanese army and the fact that some of these may be prospective trouble-makers cannot be taken lightly" (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 13 Sept. 1945: 11). This cautionary point made by the *G-2 Periodic Report* less than a week after the USAMGIK's arrival, would soon prove to be prophetic.

Things began to unwind less than a month after it commenced operations. From this time USAMGIK would initiate an extensive investigation into the dealings of hundreds of ex-members of the Japanese military who had refused to lay down their weapons in preparation for their repatriation. Most often these daily reports referred to these Japanese as former members of their country's military police (*kempeitai*) whose activities, hardly aimless, primarily centered on disrupting the occupations in the north and south and possibly taking revenge measures against their former colonial subjects.[4] Much of their activity was urban-centered, but some of it also spilled out to the open seas between Japan and Korea (East Sea/Sea of Japan) to take the lives of a countless number of returnees. Their efforts enjoyed a measure of success in that the confusion they created contributed to the initial wave of violence that the Korean Peninsula would endure over the years that following the end of the Asia-Pacific wars, violence that eventually exploded into all-out war from June 1950. This paper, rather than attempt to draw a direct link between Japanese postwar terrorism and the Korean War, sees this early period as an early wave of violent actions

3 These reports were collected and bound into seven volumes by the Asia Center, Hallym University (Asia Munhwa Yŏn'guso, 1988). Material for this paper was taken from Volume 1 (1945.9.9–1946.2.12; from now *G-2 Periodic Report*). For this history see also Bruce Cumings (1981).

4 This paper will limit its scope to those activities that transpired in southern Korea. Little information is available regarding similar outbreaks in northern Korea. For one example, see Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus's 2008 study on the Sinuiju student incident of 1945.

by certain Japanese (with the assistance of some Korean collaborators) who attempted to extend their influence into the initial months of the postwar era. This early spark influenced further violence that disrupted peninsular unification and, over the next few years, would intensify into an all-out civil warfare between the two Koreas and their allies.

CONCERNS – AND HOPES – OF POSTWAR VIOLENCE IN ASIA

From even before the end of the European campaigns, at a time when the US was eager to see the Soviet armies enter the Pacific War, US officials had been attempting to assess their ally's postwar ambitions in Asia, and particularly the Korean Peninsula. US President Franklin Roosevelt, who envisioned the Soviets joining the British and Chinese forces in forming with the United States a postwar "four policemen" scheme to monitor future conflicts, had been warned by a number of people, including Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, at their Cairo dinner meeting on 23 November 1943, over the risks involved with working with the postwar Soviet leadership (United States Department of State 1961). These fears were also expressed in reports that debated whether the US should support Koreans battling the Japanese primarily in China and Manchuria (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 1992: 253–263).

These concerns persisted throughout the war and into the postwar period. Richard D. Robinson, who served as deputy director in the Office of Public Opinion in the USAMGIK, believed them to be grossly exaggerated. In an unpublished manuscript he claimed that the 500,000 Korean troops that the Soviets were rumored to be training overestimated by more than half a more accurate figure of 200,000 troops. He continued by reporting on a similar training camp situated in the city of Suwon, just south of Seoul, being run by a "German-speaking Korean who had been a resident of Germany from 1931 to 1935 and an open admirer of the Hitler Youth movement" (Robinson, in print). Robinson continued:

> This [training center] was [USAMGIK]'s answer to the communist threat. It was an army of 100,000 South Koreans led by the most brutal and opportunistic elements of the extreme right. To this force could be appended approximately 25,000 South Korean policemen and a few thousand Coast Guardsmen and Constabularymen. This last group was the official "internal security" force administered by the Department of Security in the American Military Government of South Korea, but in reality it served merely as a shield to hide the real South Korean Army, the National Youth Corps.

Though the degree to which both occupation forces were preparing their own military units was no doubt a point hidden from the common Japanese and Korean, the fear that both sides were preparing for the next war did not escape them. Rumors began to circulate almost in tune with Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, as U.S.-Soviet relations globally and along the Korean Peninsula deteriorated. The *G-2 Periodic Report* informed of these rumors, which US occupation officials had uncovered in correspondences that it had intercepted.[5] Some Japanese anticipated their country's role should the battles commence as allied with, rather than fighting against, the United States. In late November 1945 these daily reports summarized these rumors as follows (*G-2 Periodic Report,* 26 Nov. 1945: 339):

> Japanese civilians continue to write that the United States and Russia will soon be at war with each other. Reports one such person, "In case of war we, the Japanese, will fight with the Americans." The majority of the statements are based purely on rumors. Some Japanese, who have seen Russian or US troops and weapons, particularly near the 38th parallel, have assumed from their observations that Russia and the US are preparing for war.

The credibility of such rumors strengthened when they originated from US military personnel (*G-2 Periodic Report,* 8 Nov.1945: 253):

> OGAWA, YAEKO, a Japanese employed at the Bizanya Hotel, SEOUL, stated in a letter to his mother on 20 Oct: "The Bizenya Hotel is now occupied by 125 US soldiers from captain to colonel. An American soldier told me that America may wage war with Russia before long." Loose talk such as this among military personnel and civilians only tends to make the job of the occupation forces increasingly difficult.

Ex-Japanese military personnel, perhaps convinced of the truth behind such rumors, took toward squirreling away weapons in preparation for future battles. One 17 November report informed as follows (*G-2 Periodic Report,* 17 Nov. 1945: 293):

> At KOCH'ANG, weapons and ammunition were confiscated by US troops from the Police Force and the Boys' Agricultural School on 14 Nov. One grenade launcher, 25 hand grenades, two 31 caliber LMGs, 6 boxes of rifle ammunition,

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5 From the earliest days of the US occupations in Japan and Korea, the administration gave itself the authority to read correspondences sent between peninsula and archipelago. Given that the *G-2 Periodic Report* informed in mid-September that USAMGIK had hired just one Korean civilian to handle this job at Seoul Central Post Office, which alone handled approximately 100,000 outgoing letters daily (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 13 Sept. 1945: 12), it would be fair to question just how many letters they actually read, as well as what the administration did with the information that it did manage to read.

> 11 boxes of explosives, 1000 blasting caps, and 2000 feet of hose were taken from the police. 6 LMGs, 3 grenade launchers, 94 Japanese rifles, 60 bayonets and belts, 67 separate bayonets, 15 ammunition boxes, and 57 dummy rifles were found at the school.

This was just one of a number of reports where US forces uncovered weapon caches stored away by Japanese, as well as on occasion Korean, groups. In addition to the idea that they might be soon joining US forces in battles against the Soviet armies, some Japanese continued to believe that the sun had yet to set on their country's wartime ambitions, that Japan would again rise to finish its sacred mission. One letter written by a Japanese in Seoul and sent to relatives in Japan lamented that "the Japanese have no way to relieve the shame of losing the war except by rising again. I deeply believe that the gods will help us. 1948 will probably be the year" (*G-2 Periodic Report,* 26 Oct. 1945: 200).

Another possible reason for Japanese retaining weapons was for their use in the activities of "secret organizations" that had been organized by rogue military personnel who had refused to surrender to USAMGIK. US officials had been made aware of this fact within a week of their arrival. At this time the commanding officer of Japan's 17th Area Army, Major General Kosuki, informed that about 100 *kamikaze* pilots remained at large and could "cause considerable trouble" (*G-2 Periodic Report,* 13 Sept. 1945: 12). In early October USAMGIK began arresting former members of the Japanese military who, along with a few Koreans, had organized for the purposes of disrupting the occupation and killing Koreans. Much of this was revealed following the arrest of Nishihiro Tadao, deposed Chief of the Bureau of Police Affairs in the Japanese colonial government. Nishihiro revealed that his gang sought to accomplish the following:

> 1. To establish dance halls, cabarets, theaters, hotels, and other places of amusement for the purposes of attaining information from US personnel; 2. To create strife between the Korean people and the American occupation forces and 3. To do away with any person that stands in the way of their accomplishing their purpose.

Additionally, this report also named a Korean, Kim Ko Cho (who also went by Nakamura, his Japanese name), as a go-between in the operation who apparently dealt with financial matters (*G-2 Periodic Report,* 6 Oct. 1945: 118).

Reports regarding these "secret organizations" appeared on a near daily basis as subsequent investigations revealed new strands of this organization that were headed by different people, all connected in some way to the Japanese military. A few days later USAMGIK arrested Saitō Toshinaru for his role in the "killing of one Korean and the wounding of another". This report listed Saitō as the leader

of previously arrested gang members. However, he revealed under interrogation that his gang was "only a small clog in a larger organization". The Japanese offered additional names; he further informed that at present there were "more than 700 [armed] Japanese soldiers and KEMPEITAI who were roaming the streets of SEOUL" (*G-2 Periodic* Report, 9 Oct. 1945: 124).

Among those arrested in these gang roundups was a Sagoya Yoshisaki (sometimes referred to as Sagoya Tomeo) for his involvement in an opium ring. At the time of his arrest he was found to be in possession of an extensive arsenal of illegal materials that included "76 pistols, 300 rounds of ammunition, 30,000 yen and approximately 55 boxes (18 kg per box) of opium". He said that he had kept the weapons out of fear that it would be the Soviets, rather than the Americans, who would occupy southern Korea (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 10 Oct. 1945: 128).[6] Sagoya carried an impressive rap sheet that included a role in the assassination of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi in 1931, a crime for which he had been sentenced to death, but eventually pardoned in 1940. Upon release he joined the *kempeitai* and eventually made his way to Manchuria and then to southern Korea. Sagoya would be found guilty of illegal possession of weapons and ammunition, crimes for which he would receive a three-year prison sentence and be fined 50,000 yen. He later returned to Japan where he continued his conservative activities as a leader in the ultra-nationalist parliamentary group, *Gokokudan* (National Protection Corps) (Morita 1964: 833).

New gangs emerged producing new names of Japanese who remained in southern Korea to terrorize its city streets. On 20 October, for example, a gang of 20 ex-*kempeitai* members headed by an armed Hokuda Hitomi surfaced in the city of Taegu. Hokuda's gang had organized to "cause strife between RUSSIA and AMERICA, and KOREA and AMERICA, and to propagandize against the US in the interests of making JAPAN a great nation again" (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 21 Oct. 1945: 181). His interrogation revealed that his organization, while forming during the last months of the Pacific War in June 1945, was "nation-wide". Three Japanese women, who admitted knowing Hokuda, were also detained for interrogation. His cooperation led to further arrests of Japanese gang members including a person allegedly above him in rank, Uki Yoshimiju, who was then

6 Initially, the Japanese, as well as the United States, anticipated the possibility that the Soviet armies would move beyond the 38th parallel to the south to control the entire peninsula. By mid-August the Soviet military had advanced into northern Korea while the United States remained bogged down in Okinawa, at least two weeks distance from the peninsula. In the end the Soviet Union honored the decision and stopped at the 38th parallel, perhaps cooperating so as not to antagonize the US. The US ally also carried the aspiration of gaining a share of the Japan occupation, in northern Hokkaido, which US President Harry S. Truman quickly squelched.

believed to be in the city of Kwangju. He listed among the gang's goals the assassination of Korean leaders, the disruption of the peace, and the encouragement of "Japanese soldiers in MANCHURIA [to] rise against the Americans in that area" (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 23 & 26 Oct. 1945: 188, 199).

Reports on the gang members' trials began to appear in late November and lasted until mid-December, after which news regarding "secret organizations" faded from the pages of the *G-2 Periodic Report*. On the first day of these trials 42 Japanese were arraigned before a Provost Court in Seoul on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization headed by Major Kawai Chudo, the former chief *kempeitai* officer in Seoul during Japan's colonial occupation of Korea. Of these defendants 25, including Saitō Toshinaru, pleaded guilty and received sentences that included prison terms with hard labor and fines. Others deemed not guilty for lack of evidence were released but strongly advised to quickly repatriate (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 24 & 28 Nov. 1945: 328, 351).

The violence against Koreans in the streets of Korean cities continued beyond this wave of Japanese military-induced violence over the initial months of the occupation. An overly ambitious and ultra-conservative police force, many of whom were carryovers from Japanese rule, took aim at almost anything that resembled leftist activity in southern Korea. Days before the arrival of USAMGIK, General Douglas MacArthur in his Proclamation No. 1 that he issued on 7 September, decreed that "until further orders, all governmental, public and honorary functionaries and employees [...] shall continue to perform their usual functions and duties" (United States State Department 1969: 1043). This initially included top Japanese officials, including Japan's last governor general, General Abe Nobuyuki. However, it was later amended to purge these high-level Japanese officials, but not lower-ranking Japanese and the Koreans that they had trained who remained in their positions, many of whom were employed in administrative and police posts, indefinitely (Acheson 1969: 1048–1049).

G-2 Periodic Report early on contained information that suggested the extent to which MacArthur's decree influenced Korean society. On 17 September it reported that Japanese soldiers, rather than being repatriated, were now being given positions on the southern Korean police force. That same edition also suggested the following problems in the demilitarization process. Rather than disarm, Japanese soldiers were redistributing their weapons, occasionally for a profit (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 17 Sept. 1945: 43):

> Reports indicate Jap[anese] soldiers have given pistols, rifles, ammunition, and grenades to Japanese civilians and sold them to Korean robbers and thugs at prices varying from 50 to 400 yen. Jap[anese] police and military police are providing protection for Japanese lives and property. However, reports that

> Korean homes have been burglarized go unheeded. Many Japanese dress in Korean clothes in order to conceal their identity from the Americans.

As we shall see, there is a strong possibility that among these "Korean robbers and thugs" were those who directed destructive action against these former institutions of colonial Japan.

MacArthur's decree protected not only the positions of Japanese members of the southern Korean police force, but also the Koreans whom they had trained during the years of colonial administration. As was the case during the earlier period, this police force remained staunchly vigilant against anything that smelled left of center. Both Richard D. Robinson and the journalist Mark Gayn wrote on this force's abuses, many of which they witnessed firsthand. Robinson quotes Dr. Arthur Bunce, who served as economic advisor to Commanding Officer General John R. Hodge, on police actions (Robinson, in print):

> Police activity with regard to disputes between the two parties [right and left wings] has taken the form of assistance to the National Federation of Labor Unions [right-wing labor organization] in a policy of hands off where they have been concerned. On the other hand, the National Korean Labor Union Council [left-wing labor organization] has been subject to strict police surveillance exercised towards them and certain punitive measures such as the arrest of members for distributing handbills and roundups following strike activity.

Two men that USAMGIK appointed to top spots in the National Police organization, Dr. Cho Pyŏng-ok and Chang T'aek-sang, were Koreans who had prospered under the Japanese administration and were active members of the post-liberation extreme right-wing Korean Democratic Party (Robinson, in print). The two men were extremely unpopular among a Korean people whose abuse by the colonial-era force now continued into, and even intensified, over the post-colonial years. Gayn, who as a reporter for the *Chicago Sun* established more personal ties with the Korean people during the short time he spent in southern Korea, quoted one US official as justifying the occupiers' use of Japanese-trained Koreans by reasoning, "if the policeman did a good job for the Japanese, he will do a good job for us" (Gayn 1948: 429). The descriptions left by both men suggest that these holdovers from the colonial-era only intensified their brutality toward the Korean people after USAMGIK empowered them by protecting their jobs. Their being allowed to grasp the reigns of power enabled them to maintain their positions of authority even if other Koreans were trained to replace them, as suggested in MacArthur plan that he laid out in his Proclamation No. 1.

THE JAPANESE MILITARY AT SEA

Other renegade military personnel continued their terrorist activities on the high seas that separated peninsula from archipelago. These activities, as well, were frequently recorded in the *G-2 Periodic Report*. One difference in their actions was in purpose: Whereas those that operated on land at least voiced their interests as leading toward a more universal purpose, such as for the revival of the Japanese race or the disruption of occupation operations, those that took to terrorizing at sea appeared to be more inspired by personal goals, such as to simply plunder and to kill. The Koreans they targeted were those who chose to return to their homeland by unauthorized, and thus more vulnerable, means. Like the above urban terrorists, these pirates were linked to the now disbanded Japanese military forces, often to the *kempeitai*.

That a large portion of the colonial-era population of Japan-based Koreans chose unauthorized means to repatriate was due in part to the restrictions that US occupation forces placed on the possessions that these people, both Koreans and Japanese, could carry with them upon repatriating. In addition to baggage restraints returnees were limited to carrying with them 1,000 yen that they could exchange upon arrival at the border. Intercepted letters reveal that other items of value, such as jewelry, were also subject to confiscation at these checks. While some people were able to coordinate informal exchanges with returnees traveling in the opposite direction, many people chose unauthorized ("illegal") means of travel to circumvent these restrictions. This increased the risk of their losing not only their possessions, but on occasion also their lives, as pirates combed the seas in search of this vulnerable prey. One letter explained the prosses of gaining passage on one of these ships to Japan (*G-2 Periodic Report*, November 3, 1945: 227):

> There are many secret ship companies in PUSAN. The prices are posted on bulletin boards and are usually about 150 yen per person. In going by secret ship you also avoid inspection by the military police and Korean women. The "Nippon Sewakai Relief Society" will tell you what companies to go to for secret passage. The relief society is located in front of the PUSAN railroad station. [...] P.S. If you are smart you can carry a large sum of money with you.

Letters that crossed the seas advised their recipients on ways that they could change currencies upon arrival. One report carried in the *G-2 Periodic Report* contained a number of excerpts from such letters (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 11 Feb. 1946: 645):

> Letters telling of efforts being made by Koreans to illegally exchange Japanese Yen for Korean notes continue to be intercepted. Kim, Choo Teh'an [of

> TAEGU] informed Kim, Dei Song [of PUSAN] on 27 January, that 115,760 Japanese Yen was going to be exchanged by Yang, Chang Il, [of PUSAN]. In another intercepted letter, TAMAGAWA, Mizo [of OSAM-MI], eagerly inquired of TAMAGAWA, Keiichi [of PUSAN], on 4 February, if he could exchange approximately 20,000 Japanese Yen. A third letter further indicated [...] that large amounts of Japanese Yen are being exchanged for a charge of 50% of the money involved. SON, Ki Tai [of MASAN], informed CHO, Tch'ang [of MIRYANG], on 30 January, that CHO could exchange 500,000 Yen at a 50% discount, plus the fee of the mediator. These three letters have been referred to Military Government.

Reports regarding these unauthorized ships reveal the extent of the human and material cargo that people attempted to smuggle across Japanese and Korean borders, much of which supplied their black markets. One such report summarized the cargo of three such ships (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 5 Feb. 1946: 627–628):

> At MASAN [Korea] three ships were impounded and their captains and crews arrested when they arrived on 27 January without a sailing permit. A search of the ships disclosed that they were carrying Japanese wire, cables, machinery, 3 motorcycles, and tangerines. 22 passengers were removed from the ships and sent to PUSAN by rail. Two of the ships had illegally departed from SHIMONOSEKI and OSAKA, JAPAN, on 18 and 19 January, respectively. The third had come from CHINHAE. Also at MASAN, a complete search of a 20-ton ship which was impounded when it attempted to illegally depart for JAPAN on 19 January, resulted in the confiscation of 1,475,000 Yen. The money was hidden in various places throughout the ship, including a false bottomed tub.

The risks involved in attempting to repatriate by these ships apparently outweighed the dangers for those who possessed an estate worth protecting. However, the danger element was evident from the start of the occupations, and grew as the number of ships crossing these waters increased. Though not possible to ascertain in numbers, it is clear these dangers forced many Korean to forego repatriation and endure squalid conditions in bombed-out Japanese cities, which led to the creation of a *zainichi* Korean diaspora.[7]

The first vessel that encountered disaster while attempting to repatriate Koreans was, however, an authorized ship – the 4,000-ton *Ukishima-maru* which departed on 22 August from Ōkimoto, at the northern tip of Honshu to allegedly repatriate an undisclosed number of Koreans, mostly male laborers

7 There were, of course, other reasons for Koreans deciding against repatriation such as the uncertainty of relocating to a "homeland" that was filled with unfamiliarity (in culture and language) and uncertainty (in terms of living necessities and employment) (Caprio & Yu 2008).

but also a small number of women and children, to the southern Korean port of Pusan. Hugging a Japanese coast still littered with sea mines dropped towards the end of the Pacific War, the ship made a sudden detour into the port at Maizuru in Kyoto Prefecture in the twilight hours of 24 August, where it exploded dragging hundreds, if not thousands, of Koreans and a couple dozen Japanese crew members to their watery grave. The cause of the explosion, either accidentally by contacting a sea mine or intentional by implosion by the Japanese navy, continues to be debated (Caprio 2019: 81–104).[8] News of the incident no doubt quickly spread throughout Korean communities in Japan. The degree that it informed these people of the potential dangers involved with repatriation was evident but naturally immeasurable.

G-2 Periodic Report recorded this and other accidents that returnees encountered at sea, some by weather-related factors such as typhoons, but others human induced. Those of the latter involved pirates targeting these people. Many of these incidents, as well, involved former Japanese military personnel who had refused to quietly surrender and disarm. Instead, they took to the seas as pirates to plunder, and in many cases, murder. Intercepted letters excerpted in the *G-3 Periodic Report* warned future travelers of the risks. One letter wrote that as many as one thousand "former members of the Japanese Military Police are active in the Korea Straits. They are responsible for the plundering and killing of more than 10,000 Koreans returning from Japan" (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 4 Dec. 1945: 376). Another letter, citing media sources, claimed that in November alone "5,000 Koreans returning from Japan [...] were robbed by bands of pirates while crossing the Strait." The author of yet another letter noted that these pirates were "organized by the Japanese and natives of CHEJU-DO Island" (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 20 Dec. 1945: 461). One letter informed on the fate of passengers who had boarded the Taiho Maru in early November to return to Korea (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 10 Nov. 1945: 262–263):

> Koreans arriving in PUSAN aboard the TAIHO MARU during the period told a story of tragedy encountered enroute. The ship left OSAKA, Japan on 22 Oct carrying 60 passengers. Enroute to PUSAN, 3 robbers aboard the ship began singling out passengers, robbing them, and throwing the live victims overboard. The passengers became aware of what was occurring and attempted to mob the robbers. The three men managed to escape in a rowboat, however, off the island of OSHIMA [Japan]. When the boat docked in PUSAN, 11 passengers

8 North Korean cinema produced a film in 2000 (*Souls Protest*, K. *Sar'a innŭn ryŏnghondŭl*, Director Kim Ch'in-song) that argued the Japanese navy as directly responsible for the *Ukishima-maru*'s sinking.

> were missing. Bodies of three individuals who had apparently been shot, were found in the hold.

Crossing by these means became so serious that letters appeared that advised people to "avoid the secret ships because there are many pirate groups at sea. The best way to go is by the official steamer" (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 26 Nov. 1945: 339).[9]

KOREAN ACTS OF REVENGE AGAINST JAPANESE PERSONNEL

Japanese personnel were also victimized by Koreans, many seeking revenge over their country having to endure decades of Japanese colonial rule. The possibility of this danger perhaps justified in USAMGIK officials' minds the decision to allow some Japanese to maintain arms for protection. The possibility that Koreans would take revenge on Japanese after liberation had been anticipated by US State Department officials even before Korea's liberation.[10] However, occupation forces failed to take appropriate measures to protect Japanese against this potential danger. Post-liberation Korea experienced a fair amount of revenge violence that targeted Japanese on the peninsula following liberation: more in the southern half of the peninsula where the colonial subjugators lingered longer than those in the north.[11] This result may have been in part encouraged by signs that USAMGIK favored the defeated Japanese over the liberated Korean.[12] MacArthur's initial decree that instructed members of the colonial bureaucracy to maintain their positions, as well, encouraged violence as Koreans targeted

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9 This report suggested that the Japanese, as well, were vulnerable to such attacks.

10 Interviews that they conducted with people familiar with Korea and the Korean people often included the question of whether Japan's defeat would trigger acts of retribution by the Korean people. The responses they received were mixed with some responding that the peace-loving Koreans would not cause trouble and other warning of a bloodbath erupting as Koreans took out their anger on the Japanese (Yi 1992: 174–207, 217–220, 300–317).

11 At the end of the war there were about 700,000 Japanese civilians residing in Korea, with around 300,000 living in Korea's northern provinces. The Soviets first sent military-aged men to Siberian labor camps. They also were slow in opening ports of departure for the Japanese to repatriate. Thus, those Japanese who were able to return home were forced to make the dangerous journey to southern Korean ports. Also, while it was understood that most Japanese would eventually repatriate, circumstances in the south allowed them to linger longer that those in the north.

12 Signs of Japanese favoritism appeared at the time the US military marched into Seoul to commence their occupation duties. At this time Japanese soldiers tasked with "protecting" the Americans shot and killed several overzealous Koreans who had come to welcome their liberators. Roland Glenn, who fought in Okinawa and later was transferred to southern Korea for occupation duties, reflected that "we were sent to [to Korea] protect [the Koreans] from their evil [Japanese] enemy. Instead we found ourselves protecting the Japanese. Quite a switch in our mission" (Glenn 2009: 184).

administrative and police institutions and the people who manned the buildings. As more Japanese left the peninsula much of this violence took the form of inter-Korean ideological dispute as USAMGIK showed its preference to extreme conservative elements at the expense of the progressive and moderate elements. The following report tells of an incident against Japanese that resembled in kind, but hardly in numbers, policy that the Soviet armies carried out in the north:

> Delayed reports from TONGYONG [35 miles southwest of Pusan] indicate that Communist inspired disturbances have existed in that town prior to 15 Oct. On 10 Oct 1945, CHIAN DAI, self-styled Public Peace Party, seized all Japanese males over 17 years of age and all Japanese military personnel, and jailed them. Some of the Japanese soldiers were beaten and some Japanese property appropriated. On arrival of American forces, the soldiers were evacuated to a Japanese garrison in MASAN, after having been screened by US authorities. The civilians were moved to the Shinto Shrine in TONGYONG and placed in protective custody by American troops.

This particular report further suggested that the cause of this and other similar incidents was connected with the region's Korean Communists, who were upset over being left off of advisory committees established by USAMGIK. The Communists aimed to confiscate and redistribute all former-Japanese land and property, a land reform policy implemented in the north that US authorities in the south rejected (*G-2 Periodic Report*, 19 Oct. 1945: 166–167).

Similar incidents were reported with greater frequently as Japanese made their way south from Manchuria and northern Korea to the repatriation ports along Korea's southernmost points. Koreans harassed Japanese managers of companies in efforts to collect back and future wages for their labor. While some Koreans assisted the Japanese by purchasing their property, others harassed their former colonial subjugators as they made their way to the designated ports of departure. Many of these stories made their way onto the pages of the *G-2 Periodic Report* that provided detailed accounts of the daily transactions along the peninsula south of the thirty-eighth parallel in the years prior to the Korean War.

CONCLUSIONS

Wars are hardly, if ever, ended by declaration or treaty. The Pacific War is no exception. Ronald Spector traces Japanese belligerent acts that continued across its now former empire even after the emperor's 15 August 1945 declaration that Japan was prepared to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration as issued the previous month. This fighting continued even past the 2 September surrender ceremony that the US organized aboard the battleship *USS Missouri* in Tokyo

Bay. It included members of the Japanese military who fought both for and against independence movements in Southeast Asia, as well as on both sides of the Chinese civil war (Spector 2007). After defeat, Japanese influence continued in a variety of forms on the Korean Peninsula.

The means that a war is "concluded" also influences the origins of future wars. The Czech military officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ferdinand Miksche, is just one of many who link the origins of World War II to the peace terms that the victors imposed on Germany at the peace conference held in Paris to end the First World War. Miksche (1952) predicted that the harsh and unprecedented "unconditional surrender" terms that the Allied forces placed on Germany and Japan would sow the seeds of yet another world war, this time with the US and other capitalist nations battling the Communist world led by the Soviet Union. A war on this scale fortunately never evolved, primarily because the European nations managed to maintain a peaceful coexistence over the post-World War II decades, but also because the nuclear capabilities of two superpowers deterred them from engaging in direct warfare. The Asian theater was not as fortunate with major wars soon breaking out in Korea and Vietnam, and those on a lesser scale erupting as former European powers attempted to regain their administrative positions in their colonies. Long drawn-out ideological battles, as well, broke out elsewhere, such as between members of the Muslim and Hindu religions on the Indian subcontinent.

This paper has highlighted efforts by the Japanese military to influence the post-liberation history of primarily southern Korea in the months that followed Japan's defeat in the Pacific War. Eventually, their influence would subside as the Japanese returned home. However, violence would continue throughout the US three-year occupation in different forms, creating chaotic situations that morphed into all-out war from June 1950. During this period ideology-fueled battles broke out between conservatives and progressives as divisions that first surfaced during the thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule hardened. The US in the south favoring the former, and the Soviets in the north favoring the latter, presented a situation than quickly extinguished any possibility of the two halves ever agreeing to terms to reunited the peninsula. Through 1948 the international community failed to bring the two sides toward reconciliation even though the 1945 Moscow Decision forged a plan to accomplish this goal. The US-Soviet Joint Commission, formed to implement this plan, failed in its task to work with Korean democratic organizations to form this government despite holding over sixty meeting between 1946–1947. The United States then turned the Korean problem over to the United Nations that formed the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), which the Soviet Union

refused to recognize, to replace the Joint Commission. From early on Syngman Rhee, who would become the Republic of Korea's first president, voiced his preference for a separate southern Korean state, rather than the formation of a united state developed through negotiation, and compromise, with the northern Communists. Emerging from this confusion in 1948 was a Korean Peninsula that divided formally into two separate states as southern, and then northern, Koreans held separate elections. The occupying administrations and armies then withdrew, but passed on their ideological foundations to the Korean administrations that replaced them. A three-year bloody civil war between the Korean states followed; belligerence, they concluded, was their only means of reunifying their homeland. Japan's influence and participation continued during this war. Its first postwar US Ambassador, Robert D. Murphey, would recall Japan's participation to have been "indispensable" to the UN forces who fought alongside the South Korean military.[13] The violence described in this paper occurred to early to have directly influenced this war. It did, however, establish a trend that would continue long after the Pacific War had been declared over and peace restored, at least by official means. The confusion it wrought demonstrated, to USAMGIK at least, that the Korean people were incapable of administering their state; this justifying the presence of foreign occupation and delayed the formation national sovereignty on the Korean Peninsula, the legacy of which continues to this day.

ABBREVIATIONS

USAMGIK	United States Army Military Government in Korea
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

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HEALING THROUGH SHARED TASKS: HONORING ELDERLY *ZAINICHI* KOREAN WOMEN AND CROSSING UNSPOKEN BOUNDARIES IN JAPAN

Yoko Demelius

INTRODUCTION: CAN EMPATHY FORM A BASIS FOR "SILENT ADVOCACY?"

In this paper, I shall examine the possibility of "decolonizing" marginalized Korean women in Japan by exploring how cross-boundary sisterhood manifests in a civic initiative that forms the basis for transcultural community building and historical reconciliation. Inspired by Escobar's (2020) pluriversal politics, which ontologizes subaltern political realities to interrogate the dominant modernist onto-epistemic structure, I shed light on a community service that is based on shared sisterhood in which *everydayness* is highlighted as the driving force of an interethnic healing process among Japanese and Korean women residents in western Japan. The term "everydayness" here denotes the daily activities that characterize women's social lives with respect to family, work, and their private lives and that are exempt from fear, threats, or distress. The camaraderie that develops among the women challenges notions of "victimhood" and transcends the various hegemonic divides that they face in Japanese society. This study aims to showcase the convoluted boundary negotiations in which the participants engage in a society that is dominated by patriarchal and ethnonationalist orders (cf. Kelsky 2008; Kim-Wachutka 2019). Actors' mutual learning processes and shared participation in community initiatives have been shown to positively contribute to constructing sustainable transcultural communities in contemporary Japan (Demelius 2021; Park 2019).

Japan's occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945 prompted both forced and voluntary migration of Koreans to Japan. Korean residents who remained in Japan after the Pacific War (1941–1945) and their descendants are known as *zainichi* Koreans or simply as *zainichi*. First-generation Korean immigrants were exposed to severe prejudice and discrimination in Japan. Their

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postwar experiences have been largely underrepresented in scholarship. While some *zainichi* Koreans naturalized, others remained predivided Korean nationals or went on to obtain South Korean nationality. Japan is now home to an estimated 600,000 *zainichi* Koreans; however, this figure does not include those who have become naturalized (Chapman 2008: 3). This paper's discussion of the initiative for women in ethnic minority populations is particularly meaningful in the context of the women's subjugation in patriarchal Japanese mainstream society and Korean minority communities.

Despite Japan's self-image as a society characterized by homogeneity, evidence indicates that Japan has long been "an immigrant nation" (Liu-Farrer 2020). The tensions between Japanese society's embodied ethnonationalist self–other dichotomy and the country's assimilatory stance toward its internal *others* are well-documented (Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu 2008; Lee, Murphy-Shigematsu & Befu 2006; Weiner 2009). Japan's homogeneous national identity hinders its progress in accommodating ethnic diversity at the legislative/citizenship level (Chung 2006; 2010; Wetherall 2006). Despite their long-term residence in Japan, many minority residents, including *zainichi* Koreans, were excluded from the national pension fund scheme until 1982 (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 28). Today, 60% of first-generation Korean residents' living conditions fall below the poverty line (O 2006; Kim-Wachutka 2019: 28). However, as socioeconomic capital reaches marginalized populations, solidarity within Japan's ethnic communities and ethnic consciousness shows a weakening trend, leaving some ethnic minorities vulnerable (McCormack & Kawabata 2020: 30). Others have argued that the country's increasing ethnic diversity remains the target of problem-solving endeavors at the municipal level, with no nationwide supervisory mechanism (Kim & Streich 2020), and the Japanese government's top-down approach to managing its foreign residents lacks the sense of community spirit (Demelius 2021). Within the current framework, in which underlined otherness and systemic division form the basis for coping with diversity in Japan's government-led projects (Demelius 2020), I argue that a civic-level implicit political initiative that contributes to the production of shared meaning in society constitutes a potential route via which communities in Japan can cultivate transcultural relations. Such instances of interethnic coexistence contribute to the decolonization process of minorities and suggest that inclusive political realities may offer an alternative organic solution to the structure currently envisioned by the Japanese government.

High-profile women's activist initiatives, including postwar female students in the New Left (Szendi Schieder 2021), a support group for former "comfort women" (Park 2019), the #MeToo movement (Hasunuma & Shin 2019) and the subsequent Flower Demo (Miura 2021), and the Fukushima radiation victims

and mothers' movement (Freiner 2014; Slater, Morioka & Danzuka 2014), have been subjected to extensive academic scrutiny. Notable studies on ethnic minorities' efforts to challenge Japan's ethnonationalism include the fingerprinting refusal movement (Strausz 2006/2007), the human rights movement for the Ainu, *zainichi* Koreans, and *burakumin* (Tsutsui 2018); however, such inquiries have tended to focus on legal issues, such as human and civil rights. In the context of Japan's lack of vision regarding "multicultural coexistence" (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2006) as an end goal, efforts aimed at interethnic and transcultural community building at the participant level merit a scholarly attention. The present study seeks to fill this gap by focusing on relatively underexplored, small-scale civic actors' initiatives, particularly those undertaken by women in ethnic minorities, to identify common ground among residents beyond ethnicity, class, and life history.[1]

As highlighted by Japan's small-scale #MeToo movement, many women in the country found the prospect of coming forward far too challenging (Hasunuma & Shin 2019; Miura 2021) and found it easier to secure a safe discursive space, raise awareness, and foster collective empathy in the subsequent Flower Demo (Miura 2021). Taking these characteristics of women's advocacy in Japan into consideration, the silent advocacy (*not* the absence of advocacy) of the subdued community service discussed in this paper offers a new perspective on the recognition of the "unspoken" yet firm need for empathy as part of the healing process across multiple facets of society. The examples cited in this paper highlight how women's political participation, effected through community work, has a tangible impact on the cultivation of empathy and understanding among residents and how non-explicit advocacy may contribute to the healing process. I apply the combination of an analytical framework – "the silent language" (Hall 1959) and "healing and reconciliation" (Staub et al. 2005; Staub 2011) – to address the following questions: 1) How can an implicit political initiative contribute to a healing process in communities? and 2) How can everydayness benefit and symbolize political initiatives?

As the examples illustrate, cultural boundaries are simultaneously negotiated among women from different age, ethnic, and class groups and different educational backgrounds with varying levels of social capital and within entrenched

1 One of the inspirational sources for this research paper originated in comments made by the historical sociologist Eiji Oguma during the EAJS Conference in 2021. In response to his criticism of my use of middle-class minority members' accounts in my study, I pointed out the importance of academic responsibility to avoid yet another form of *othering* by incarcerating historically marginalized populations as helpless "victims". See also Lie 2008 for the socioeconomic diversity of Japan's Korean population.

victim–perpetrator dynamics (cf. Stevens 1997; Yamane 2013). Bearing these boundary negotiations in mind, some residents of Japanese communities have reported that the conscious cross-boundary opportunities fostered by shared sisterhood are particularly profound in the example of Japanese supporters for former "comfort women" (Park 2019). This conforms to Escobar's (2020: 14) exhortation that we consider other possibilities to redefine our lives – for example, by informing ourselves of matriarchal ontologies based on "the relational web of life" (Escobar 2020: 17) as a starting point. To probe the complexity of cross-boundary sisterhood and empathy as a foundation for mutual bonds, I draw on data from interviews and my ethnographic work at a women's community service group, *Circle In-Yeon*, which offers elderly first-generation *zainichi* Korean women opportunities to socialize.[2] It is sufficient to state here that the group's establishment is a direct outcome of the residents' apprehension of Japan's limited social benefit provision for minority populations. Detailed descriptions of the group will follow in a later section.

Gendered social roles are "natural realities reflected throughout Japanese institutions and language" (North 2012: 17), and they intensify the complexity of the circumstances within which elderly Korean women are situated. Recent decades have witnessed several attempts at progress; however, Japan continues to largely maintain a patriarchal social order on several fronts, including labor conditions and career opportunities (Ho 2020; Nakamura, Horimoto & McLean 2021), child rearing (Gordon 2005; White 2002), and elderly care (Kim-Wachutka 2019; Niimi 2018). Acknowledging the gendered social roles, hierarchy, and "deep-rooted sexism inherent in Japanese society" (Miura 2021: 521), participants in the community service examined herein respond carefully to the victim–perpetrator dynamic and power structure that women have had to negotiate over long periods throughout different contexts and phases of Japanese history.

Interethnic collaborations in community activities make women acutely aware of the difficulties that they face in multiple aspects of their lives. This makes the community initiative an effective discursive space that not only facilitates the development of social capital among the participants but also allows them to overcome the embodied divisions imposed on them by various hegemonic discourses, including those within the male-dominated national political scene or within ethnic communities. I argue that experience-driven communicative opportunities can promote mutual understanding and cultivate socially sustain-

2 I shall protect the participants' identities by pseudonymizing the individuals and the group and withholding details such as its year of establishment and the name of the municipality.

able personal compassion and common peoplehood/sisterhood among residents from diverse backgrounds.[3]

In the sections that follow, I shall first address the symbolic position that first-generation *zainichi* Korean women occupy and examine women's civil society movements in Japan to establish the background against which this study is situated. Subsequently, I shall discuss the imposed victim label and intersectionality that surround *zainichi* Korean women in Japan's patriarchal society to contextualize the research participants' communities. I shall then describe the methodology used in this study and demonstrate the analytical framework for the contemplation of a healing process that is built upon shared sisterhood. Finally, I shall present my ethnographic data, followed by an analysis of cross-boundary transculturality for sustainable community building.

SITUATING *ZAINICHI* KOREANS AND WOMEN'S CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN

Zainichi Korean intellectuals' discussions are largely dominated by the discourse surrounding *zainichi* Koreans' identity in terms of what they are *not*; the mutually exclusive sets of binaries on which *zainichi* Korean communities have positioned themselves in Japanese society have been recognized as problematic (Chapman 2004; 2008: 5). Not only did colonial history give rise to the Korea–Japan and victim–oppressor binaries in Japanese society, but the Korean War (1950–1953) also further divided Japan's Korean communities into North and South Korean affiliates (Wender 2005: 22, 78). Moreover, the embodied divisions within *zainichi* Korean communities are not only associated with ethnonational orientations: first-generation Koreans' strong affinity for their Korean *homeland* also alienated subsequent generations who grew up in Japan and were conscious of hybridity within themselves (Chapman 2004: 30–32). The hegemonic political narratives of Korean communities have been predominantly male-centered (Wender 2005: 54), but some *zainichi* Korean women currently exhibit a sense of empowerment that propels them forward into the public sphere, where they negotiate with the Japanese government in a bid to improve their rights (Kim-Watchutka 2019: 35; see also Wender 2005: 92–95).

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3 I call these implicit formats of activism, initiatives, and civic engagements "soft activism". The most essential characteristic of soft activism is the experiential nature of its communicative efforts, which include story sharing and involvement, and it does not necessarily take an explicit form of political advocacy or mobilization.

Meanwhile, women's agency in Japan has long been underrepresented (Eto 2005; Hasunuma 2019), undermined (Norma 2019), and at times mispresented (see Miyadai 1994; Ueno & Miyadai 1999). Given that men dominate electoral politics and women occupy the country's third or volunteer sector (Hasunuma 2019: 2), it is particularly important not to prematurely conclude that women in Japan lack political participation and advocacy (see also Szendi Schieder 2021; Takeda 2006). Despite its low international ranking, which suggests that women's political representation in Japan is low (World Economic Forum 2022), women's political representation in the formal national legislature and electoral politics does not accurately represent women's interests, leadership, or political capacity in diversified roles or the ways in which women participate in Japan's civil society (Hasunuma 2019: 2).[4] This gendered political participation also resonates with a minority community; *zainichi* Korean women have engaged in activism in ways that differ from men's engagement (Wender 2005: 16–17). While men's activism engages more directly with political struggles and ethnic identity, women have occupied a central role in literature through personal narratives in autobiographies and fictions that deal with themes of women's sexuality as "devoid of pleasure and often warped by violence" (Wender 2005: 17).

During the recent global #MeToo movement, South Korea and Japan reported varied outcomes (Hasunuma & Shin 2019). South Korea experienced more positive outcomes with the implementation of legal revisions regarding sexual harassment and violence against women; meanwhile, the movement had less impact in Japan due to the limited number of women who came forward (Hasunuma & Shin 2019). However, both countries continue to exhibit a backlash against women who engage in public advocacy (Hasunuma & Shin 2019: 102, 107; see also Bae, Kim, Ha & Cha 2021). It is important to note that the campaign's stronger impact in South Korea was partially attributable to the presence of activist groups and scholars who had already become sensitized to the issues of sexual violence against women, particularly in light of the country's colonial history, during which thousands of women were pressured into the Japanese military's "comfort women" scheme (Hasunuma & Shin 2019: 99).

Since Kim Hak-Sun, a Korean survivor of the sexual violence perpetrated by the Japanese military during the war, broke her long silence to come forward as a victim of "gendered structural violence" (Soh 2008: xii), the so-called "comfort women" issue has been among the most intensely debated issues in politics and

4 Japan ranks 116th among 146 countries for the overall ranking in the Global Gender Gap Index. In terms of political empowerment, Japan ranked 139th among 146 countries in 2022. The ranking has not significantly changed in recent years. See World Economic Forum 2022.

across various academic disciplines in Japan (Park 2019: 2–3). The public testimonials of "comfort women" also brought together *zainichi* Korean women from diverse backgrounds and prompted them to form an organization with the aim of increasing awareness, supporting surviving victims, and criticizing *Zainichi* Korean political organizations "for their patriarchal framework that continued to oppress women" (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 140). Although *Circle In-Yeon*'s inception was not directly related to Japanese military violence against women, women who participate in this community initiative are deeply aware of the history as well as the issues relating to the subjugation and exploitation of women both within ethnic communities and in Japanese society at large.

Park's (2019) study of Japanese female activists' support for former "comfort women" draws on Crenshaw's (1989) concept of intersectionality and examines how the activists may challenge intersectionality through their activism. Park's (2019) findings indicated that some interviewees sympathized with the survivors and expressed compassion based on their own experiences of gender discrimination, some sympathized as a result of their shared values that opposed violence against women, and others experienced a sense of postwar responsibility. Shared experiences of patriarchal male domination over women form the basis of the embodied shared sisterhood among activists and survivors (Park 2019). The activists in Park's (2019: 12) study reported that they perceived the survivors as extending generosity and a sense of sisterhood. For the activists, their participation was more personal than politically motivated (Park 2019: 14). Contemporary Japanese society has begun to acknowledge gender inequality in the labor market; however, women's vulnerability as a result of their reliance on male figures for survival is not a foreign concept for many women. Domestic abuse and violence were also common in *zainichi* Korean households, as attested by many literary works and personal testimonies by *zainichi* Koreans (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 77; Wender 2005: 80–82, 103).

Neighborhood associations and civil society organizations function as important political liaisons between municipal governments and communities in Japan (Pekkanen 2006; Pekkanen, Tsujinaka & Yamamoto 2014). In demonstrating civil society's dual structure in terms of political efficacy and policymaking processes, Pekkanen (2006: 3) claims that small civil society organizations in Japan mainly generate social capital and community building but lack influence in terms of policymaking processes; however, in his comparative assessment of pro- and anti-foreigner activism in Japan's political and structural contexts, Shipper (2018: 94, 97) rightly argues that likeminded citizens of small organizations effectively mobilize political advocacy to influence policies for pro-immigrant rights, which includes the recent passage of the anti-hate speech legislation

in 2016, without coming into direct conflict with the government.[5] Shipper's (2018: 106–107) study is notable for its application of the Confucian value of harmony in the public discourse surrounding both pro- and anti-foreigner activism. Under the neoliberalizing trend that has manifested in municipalities' attempts to streamline subsidies, the volunteering sector and civil society have assumed increased responsibility for filling the gap in the provision of social welfare and care services to Japan's communities (Hasunuma 2019: 3). This "invisible civil society", which produces advocacy and social capital, also provides a sense of fulfillment and well-being among participants through uncompensated civic engagements (Steinhoff 2014).

The underrepresentation of women's political participation becomes particularly salient when agency in women's movements is measured according to the accountability of advocacy and political influences. In an extensive ethnographic work on the *zainichi* Korean women's community, Kim-Wachutka (2019: i) noted that *zainichi* Korean women's activism is an integral part of both the minority community and Japanese society at large, and yet their actions and voices are often regarded "unimportant and inconsequential". As its point of departure, the present study adopts an alternative approach to the hegemonic concept of activism, which is measured by the accountability of advocacy, political influences, and an explicit visibility of advocacy. This is particularly relevant in the context of intersectionality in a patriarchal society, which is characterized by "actions and emotions that value competition, war, hierarchies, power, growth, procreation, domination of others, and claiming ownership, and that rationalize these things in the name of truth and individual freedom" (Escobar 2020: 17).

Because caring work has traditionally been regarded as women's duty in both Korea and Japan, second-generation Korean female residents have taken the initiative to form non-profit organizations that aim to secure elderly care for first-generation Koreans (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 40). *Zainichi* Korean residents, together with Japanese community members, campaigned to attract national and local governments' attention, with the aim of securing minority residents' rights to receive long-term elderly care (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 28–42). Consequently, some municipalities and prefectures have established funds to support first-generation Koreans who are not eligible for the national pension scheme (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 39). Second-generation Korean women who worked as

5 Civilian protection in Japan remains underdeveloped. This legislation mandates local governments to promote anti-hate speech and awareness of discriminatory speech and behavior, but it does not punish hate speech. Kawasaki City, which was attacked by several anti-minority rallies, was reportedly the first city to include penalties aimed at controlling hate acts in its ordinance (see Mochida 2020).

caregivers for first-generation Korean residents felt a sense of empowerment and demanded that the Japanese government extend the elderly care program to include the minority community at the national and local levels (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 49). These *zainichi* Korean women's elderly care initiatives go beyond ethnicity and political orientations (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 43–62); however, these stories were once invisible owing to the positions of the minority population – particularly women – which, until recently, were largely marginalized in Japanese society (Kim-Wachutka 2019: 10, 15).

METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK – THE CASE OF *CIRCLE IN-YEON*

In this study, I adopt sisterhood as an achieved state of everyday transculturality that results from the participants' reciprocal empathy and learning processes within the group. In addition to scholarship on *zainichi* Koreans and relevant social theories, I complement my discussion with ethnographic data from a women's community service group – *Circle In-Yeon* (henceforth, "Circle") – in a municipality in western Japan's Kansai region. I participated in Circle as a service provider several times in 2018 and 2019 until Circle became temporarily unavailable as a result of the restrictions imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to the ethnographic data gathered during my service activities at Circle, I interviewed fellow service providers on several occasions from 2018 to 2020.

Circle is a municipality-sponsored community service group that was established during the early 2000s by three second-generation *zainichi* Korean women as founding members, among whom a woman in her seventies assumed a leading position. Circle's efforts to establish itself as a mainstream service as opposed to solely concerned with a minority's interests and identity politics were crucial to the initiative; thus, Circle was established as part of the municipality residents' initiative to secure proper recognition and funding from the municipality. As in many cities in the Kansai region, the Hanshin Great Earthquake in 1995 resulted in numerous fatalities, many of which were *zainichi* Korean residents.[6] It was around that time that numerous volunteering activities emerged within various municipalities with the aim of helping to rebuild communities and aid them

6 The magnitude 7.3 earthquake destroyed some 6,300 lives. This disaster highlighted the pre-disaster socioeconomic disparity of geographic clustering and housing conditions (Hirayama 2000). The socioeconomic gap also contributed to the disparity in the disaster-recovery process. Low-income and elderly populations were among the most affected groups (Tanida 1996; Hirayama 2000).

in their recovery after the disaster (see also Pekkanen 2006: 133–136). Circle's inception and municipal recognition are largely characterized by this "volunteering spirit". The core members, including the founding members and other committed participants, offer daytime socializing opportunities on a monthly basis for first-generation *zainichi* Korean *omoni* – "mothers", as *zainichi* Koreans refer to them in the Korean language. All work undertaken by the participants is performed on a voluntary basis without compensation. Circle's service providers consist of women who range in age from in their twenties to in their seventies and come from various ethnic and life backgrounds and nationalities. A typical session's program comprises three main activities: 1) cooking and serving Korean dishes, for which the service providers are responsible; 2) sharing the meals among all service providers, guests, and *omoni*; and 3) after-meal games, events, and activities. The number of participants varied according to the activities that each session offered. While I was visiting them, amateur musicians, friends, diplomats, and local helpers joined the sessions. For example, musicians played instruments for the *omoni* to boost the festive mood at the year's end. One of the elderly women exclaimed, "This was the most beautiful music I've ever listened to!" The creation of entertaining programs is one of Circle's most crucial responsibilities and is made possible only if the group is well regarded and supported by a local network.

Circle rents rooms for the provision of its services at a local community center with well-equipped cooking facilities, a large dining space, and multi-purpose rooms. The cost of the rooms at the community center are supported by the municipality, and the cost of ingredients for the food is collected from the *omoni* and participants – somewhere between two and three US dollars per person per session. Some twenty *omoni* who come together to enjoy the opportunities for socializing are aged in their eighties and nineties, having migrated to Japan during the prewar and wartime periods. Some elders make special efforts to attend Circle from afar, traveling by train, and stating, "I'm really looking forward to coming here every month", and some even arrive at the venue with their own medical equipment. Many elders' stories reveal that they endured considerable hardship during the wartime and postwar periods. Having witnessed the passing of many elders, the leader, Ms. K, once stated sadly, "Every year, the group of (first-generation) *omoni* is getting smaller." It is this sense of urgency that compels care providers to honor the elderly women and spend time with *omoni* while they can. As the members of Circle are aware, several *omoni* live alone, and Ms. K calls each senior resident a few days prior to each of Circle's sessions to ensure that they are well. For the seniors, planning for and attendance at the monthly meetings provides them with something to look forward to, and Circle's

events offer many positive benefits for them as they age in a foreign land. As Ms. K commented, "Circle's meetings provide *omoni* with motivation, a sense of community, solidarity, and independence." Although the meeting is held once a month, the care and attention that the elders receive extends beyond Circle's monthly meetings, and the support from the greater community contributes to the meetings' success, including sourcing rare Korean food ingredients, game equipment, and materials or contacting special guests and friends, in addition to Ms. K's personal attentiveness to the elders' conditions.

Ms. K's consideration also extends to Circle's volunteering participants. As Ms. K is responsible for the participants' continuous service, she ensures that the after-service socialization time among participants contributes another layer of community spirit. Following a day at Circle, the participants bid farewell to the *omoni* and ensure that they safely leave the premises. Volunteers chat for a while over tea and coffee as they tidy up the rooms after the activities. This off-time is usually used to reflect on the day, and women from diverse backgrounds share their recent personal news and exchange information regarding Circle's upcoming plans and decide on lunch menus for upcoming sessions. They also share concerns over some *omoni's* health conditions and the municipality's recognition of Circle's contributions.

Circle's main agenda is to ensure a sense of everydayness by offering a safe space for socialization to elderly first-generation *zainichi* Korean women. Although Circle's inception was based on a political intent, the group does not explicitly advocate for any particular political message. As the following data indicate, Circle's members believe that implicitly raising awareness of the vulnerable population and advancing the service group's position in the community are sustainable means of making an impact on society. The state of *everyday sisterhood* that is created by the efforts of the community initiative calls for continuity and reciprocity. It not only acknowledges the vulnerability of elderly minority members in a patriarchal society but also offers an affirmation of women's and mothers' dignity to the elderly women. To capture the process of meaning production based on transcultural sisterhood, I apply the concepts of "the silent language" (Hall 1959) and "healing and reconciliation" (Staub et al. 2005; Staub 2011).

Hall's concept of non-verbal communication is particularly apt here, given that the activity at Circle involves task sharing at a community kitchen. In the context of the increased needs for intercultural communication during the postwar growth period, Hall (1959: 28, 97) claimed that non-verbal communication, consisting of behaviors, awareness, and feelings, counted for a significant portion of human relations, which he expressed as "culture is communication". It was written for the purpose of increasing sensitivity toward diverse codes of conduct in various

cultural settings. Among Circle's service providers and *omoni*, collaborative food preparation, sharing meals, and washing up are among the modes of communication that serve to reconfirm a generational continuity (Hall 1959: 68–72) and an expression of filial piety that consists of mutual caring, protecting, teaching, learning, respecting, honoring, and depending. As women of diverse backgrounds gather at Circle, an occasional imperfect coordination of tasks also serves as a source of laughter that reaffirms the solidarity among the members.

The healing process of the community at large is also an integral part of Circle's mission, for which the definitions of "healing and reconciliation" (Staub et al. 2005; Staub 2011) provided useful guidance in this study. In their psychological study of a community's recovery from an intense violent trauma in Rwanda, Staub et al. (2005) argued that healing and reconciliation are mutually enhanced by the sense of forgiveness and that the sharing of pain in an empathic context further facilitates a healing process. They also claimed that those who identify as members of the perpetrator group of past traumatic events but not directly involved in actions taken are likely to feel shame and guilt (Staub et al. 2005: 328). Their study demonstrated that reconciliation among groups that were formerly hostile toward one another requires mutual acceptance and "moving away from an identity as a victim" (Staub et al. 2005: 301). Staub (2011: 5) referred to active participation in the healing process as "active bystandership", and this term may be applied to the promotion of harmonious relations within and between groups. Their study demonstrated that "experiential understanding" achieved through active engagement with past traumatic events mutually supports community members and may prevent traumatic violence in the future (Staub et al 2005: 327–328).

EMBODIED SISTERHOOD AND TRANSCULTURALITY AT *CIRCLE IN-YEON*

Circle serves to provide a socialization space for first-generation *zainichi* Korean women who have been marginalized and have endured difficult times in Japan. Circle's political message is not so explicit as to mark it as a women's support group for surviving victims, as featured in Park's (2019) study. Among its most significant achievements is its visibility in the mainstream community. The municipality acknowledges Circle's efforts as part of their community services, and Circle has received awards for its valuable contributions to the municipality. This mainstreaming is a consequence of the transculturality that is created by the participants' diverse backgrounds.

Although many first-generation *omoni* have been victimized in various settings, the notion of victimhood rarely emerges as a topic for discussion during activities at Circle. Ms. K stated:

> It's undoubtedly true that *omoni* had suffered a lot. If they didn't sacrifice everything for us, we wouldn't be here today. But I also don't like them to be remembered just as victims. Japanese society should recognize what Japan did to us (Koreans), but I really don't want Japanese people to support us because of a sense of atonement. (Ms. K, November 2018)

Such a sense of atonement, according to Ms. K, "seems fake". She believes that Japanese society's embodied self–other dichotomy is not only based on ethnicity but is also attributable to the victim–perpetrator structure in Japanese society, which further contributes to the divides between the mainstream Japanese and the *zainichi* Koreans; she does not like Japanese people to "pity them [*zainichi* Koreans]".

Circle's service providers come to the kitchen at the community center two hours prior to service time, and they embark on their tasks from the point of their arrival until the lunch service, following Ms. K's lead. The tasks of food preparation, serving, and washing up are understood as belonging to the "women's domain". particularly among Japan's older generations. While the deeply embedded gender roles in Japanese society may be problematic, sisterhood is easily formed through the sharing of domestic tasks among the participants. Ms. K commented, "It's amazing how the *omoni* would never leave the unwashed dishes to us. They cannot sit still and not do anything." Indeed, washing up is tacitly assumed to be an elderly woman's task at Circle, and the participants agree with Ms. K that the *omoni*'s long-term disposition toward hard work is deeply "entrenched".

As the lunch menus consist of Korean dishes, the topics of seasoning, sourcing ingredients, and tastes become central to discussions at the table between *omoni* and participants, including how some ingredients had to be organized during periods of food scarcity and how the same dishes in Korea would taste differently due to the better availability of ingredients to make more "authentic" food. Participants also learned about postwar struggles in a Korean ghetto by listening to a story that an elderly woman shared on one occasion:

> The Japanese don't eat acorn nuts, do they? So, we collected those without attracting attention from the Japanese. We soaked them in water overnight… peeled them, and we had to cook them for hours and hours…today, we have many tools around us, but at the time, we didn't have any tools to mash them… it was a lot of work… (M, December 2018)

Such stories are valuable, and the women gather to hear them and to learn the meaning of women's ongoing childcare duties. Participants also absorb knowledge from the first generation *omoni's* stories regarding the marginalized minority's experience – segregation, food scarcity, poverty, violence, and the ghetto-like conditions under which the *omoni* and their families survived. Although it is only implicitly expressed, the oppression that women endure within the patriarchal framework is often acknowledged among the participants. Given that such stories are not readily accessible to younger generations and mainstream Japanese society, the conversations at Circle's lunch tables are deemed empowering by Miki, a Japanese woman in her twenties, who participates as a service provider:

> Every time I meet the *omoni*, I feel empowered. I believe that they experienced many moments of sadness and bitterness in living as *zainichi* Koreans in Japanese society, but the *omoni* at Circle are cheerful and powerful, and they show hardly any misery on their faces. Ms. K asks *omoni* in their birthday months, "When do you feel happiest?", and the *omoni* at Circle usually answer, "I'm happiest when I come to chat with friends at Circle!" or "I'm happiest when I eat my favorite food!" They don't say anything overdramatic, but they comment on something in everyday life without hesitation. I learn a lot from their strength to be able to find happiness and their outlook to be grateful for calmness and ordinariness, especially because they had hard lives…They teach me a positive outlook, to be grateful, to live positively, to be content with what I have and not lament about what I don't have. (Miki, January 2020)

Older participants and first-generation *omoni* at Circle are warmly invested in Miki's future. She is an educated woman who has a stable career position with future prospects, which in many ways sets her apart from the *prototypical* female gender-role in Japan. For Circle's participants, Miki symbolizes a special form of transculturality, since her fiancé is from South Korea and the couple travels between the two countries as their work and family plans develop. Miki, who has become sensitized to minority-related issues, particularly those of Koreans, hopes that Japanese society will become more welcoming toward people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. She volunteers with Circle to participate in the positive impact that she believes it makes within the larger community in which her future family will live.

The volunteers can bring their children to Circle for food preparation and socialization, and I once brought my children to the venue. As my eight-year-old daughter was helping to get the dishes ready for serving, one of the elderly women complimented her on her efforts, and the *habitus* (Bourdieu 1980; Wacquant 2004) of women's domestic chores, as it is practiced among these women, functioned as a shared symbol of familial continuity and reciprocity among the group.

Given that my children did not speak the languages that were spoken by the women at Circle, no verbal communications could take place between the *omoni* and my children; however, one elderly woman smiled tenderly at my daughter as the woman said, "We can understand each other by sharing the tasks." The *omoni* at our table all took care to ensure that my children had enough food. They showed my children how to eat Korean food, and our conversation gradually developed into a discussion of how the *omoni* could not access education when they were around my children's ages.

The women at Circle do not necessarily perceive women's gender roles and liberation as mutually exclusive; rather, Circle offers many women a sanctuary within which they may reflect on history, cultural practice, and their own life wisdom. By observing the striking speed with which the *omoni* cleared their lunch plates at Circle, younger service providers can also learn that the elderly women's experiences of starvation during wartime are deeply embedded in their everyday habitus. Joy may be achieved in finding a common ground in which Circle's women can come together to expand their horizons.

CONCLUSION: TRANSCULTURAL SISTERHOOD AND A HEALING PROCESS

In this paper, I have examined a possible approach that communities in Japan might adopt to cultivate transcultural relation and "decolonize" Japan's Korean ethnic minority women by exploring cross-boundary sisterhood as it manifests in a civic initiative. I have presented an example of transculturality to demonstrate that experienced-based personal engagements can provide learning opportunities to foster shared meaning, mutual understanding, empathy, awareness and socially sustainable common peoplehood among a diverse group of residents. Scholars such as Norma (2019) and Soh (2008) have situated the Japanese military's sexual violence during wartime within the broader context of the sexual exploitation of women and girls in the long history of Korean and Japanese patriarchy. Although Circle's activities do not directly offer support for former "comfort women", many participants have first-hand experience of violence against women both within the ethnic communities and in the pre-/postwar colonial context. Many stories are implicitly shared, and some women are directly involved in an organization aimed at supporting such victims. The women who participated in this study – both the elderly and the service staff – must learn to cross various boundaries and to overcome personal barriers to contribute to the peaceful normalcy that is fostered at Circle. What Circle's space offers is a product of collective

empathy and efforts, and all participants act as "active bystanders" (Staub 2011: 5) for a mutual healing process.

While shared meaning is realized among the participants, the Circle's open-endedness – which is only possible due to the initiative's implicit nature – also affords space and time for self-reflection. Learning through active engagement (Staub et al. 2005) and showing through behaviors, as exemplified in Hall's (1959) notion of communication, are the only requirements for a commitment to Circle. This implicit advocacy of Circle for healing occupies an important place within the community. As Miura's (2021) study of Flower Demo revealed, an implicit initiative of advocacy often exerts a significant impact on women's activism in Japan. In avoiding explicitly framing it as a political organization, people may participate with open-ended personal objectives and takeaways, thereby assuring its inclusivity. At Circle, every woman participates as a result of different motivations, learns different stories associated with the war, and reflects on her own position in contemporary society (see Escobar 2020: 17). For example, newly arrived young South Korean residents learn about the history of the Korean Peninsula through the eyes of those who have left their homeland; Japanese residents learn things about the war that they were not taught at school. This space for personal experience and reflection at Circle also positively contributes to mutual understanding and empathy; therefore, the collective healing among women can be attained.

Everydayness in this study is a multivalent concept. Many women in minorities in Japan experience a life that is fraught with conflict, insecurity, threat, and loneliness. The celebration of everydayness with meals from their homeland not only provides a taste of home and a sense of security but also reminds women of the boundaries that they have crossed in organizing menus, dining together, and sharing stories. In the process, the transcultural community's cohesiveness is inscribed as another dimension of everydayness. Staub's (2011: 5) study recounts attempts to restore normalcy that involve the initiation of dialogues among people who have different interests: "to learn to turn toward rather than against each other". The women who attend and participate in Circle are aware that despite the momentary everydayness it offers, many members of minority communities in Japanese society continuously inhabit a marginalized position and lack access to social security, such as pension funds and political representation; however, awareness can be raised among residents of the importance of negotiating with a municipal government by appealing to the everydayness that they deserve. The embodied sisterhood adopts their fellow members' disfranchisement as their own personal issue.

Burgess (2021: 15) pointed out that the government's approach to the country's increasing diversity lacks the orientation of integration; rather, it is "exclusionary and essentializing rather than accepting of difference". The Japanese-non-Japanese dichotomy was reflected in the government's responses to the recent COVID-19 pandemic, whereby foreign residents were subjected to considerably greater medical scrutiny, received less support, and enjoyed fewer possibilities for mobility than Japanese nationals (Burgess 2021). In this context, the discursive space that Circle offers exemplifies how collective empathy and awareness can be achieved by normalizing integration and constructing a common sense of peoplehood. The women in this study experience a sense of empowerment by extending empathy to one another, interethnically and intergenerationally and across various social contexts, and they have begun to pave the way for the construction of a new definition of interethnic communal identity. The sense of ordinariness in the community that many women in Japan have supported may be modest, but it is imbued with their strength.

The concept of diversity accommodation at the societal and legal levels in Japan is underdeveloped, and the inclusion–exclusion tension in neoliberalizing Japan is intensifying (Shiobara, Kawabata & Matthews 2020). The government-led interethnic and interracial exchanges are "staged" (Demelius 2020; Kim & Streich 2020) based on categorical attributes, rather than creating a framework for engagement with society's *living* diversity that encompasses differences in individual choices, practices, generations, and ideologies. The women at Circle have learned that the ethnic divide in the binary framework of the Japanese self and Korean others is rooted in the deep-seated victim–oppressor structure while also negotiating the gender segregation in Japanese/Korean cultural conventions. By taking small steps and initiating dialogues through participation in community services such as Circle, women find autonomous opportunities to remember and share their stories free from the influence of hegemonic narratives. The women in this study pledged *peace* and *everydayness* as common denominators of continuous sisterhood in what may be the most powerful political message that promotes the future of diversity accommodation and recollections of the war as the acknowledged past.

In the neoliberal context in particular, where individual responsibility is an increasingly standard approach to the challenges individuals face (McCormack & Kawabata 2020: 31), a reconfiguration of the notion of community and its interests that transcends the framework of identity politics may prove critical. The community efforts undertaken under the auspices of Circle In-Yeon represent Japan's transculturality *par excellence* wherein individuals find a common ground while simultaneously accommodating different contexts. The women who

participate in Circle do *not* prioritize the identity politics of a particular ethnicity but rather are interested in the reflective space wherein women can remember and seek out human dignity by overcoming the victim label. Kim-Wachutka (2019: 22) refers to the first-generation *omoni's* words as "the slowly fading voices" that we should revive. It may be within such "transcultural borderlands" (Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu 2008) that we shall find an alternative route toward building a socially sustainable and diverse community.

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THE CULTURE OF POSITIVITY: THE IDEOLOGY BEHIND HELL JOSEON RESURRECTION

Rachad Chafik Elidrissi

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few decades, there has been an increasing global fascination with everything Korean, ranging from K-pop to Samsung phones, esthetic surgery to skincare products, and, of course, Korean cinema. However, despite flexing its muscles globally, in the minds of many young Koreans, their country is a living hell, the equivalent of the feudal Joseon dynasty. In recent years, the satirical term *Hell Joseon* has been widely used by the younger generation to criticise the increasingly complex social and economic environment. It is a comparison between contemporary society and the pre-modern Joseon Dynasty. According to scholar Se-woong Koo (2015: para. 13), the term encapsulates major traits of the modern version of the Joseon dynasty:

> having to sacrifice youth for interminable education, the state and a job one does not believe in; a narrow path to financial security and an even more narrowly defined path to success; growing inequality and hereditary privileges of the haves; lack of social welfare that might cushion the fall to poverty; and elite corruption.

Many scholars argue that Hell Joseon is a puzzling outcome of Korea's compressed modernity (Holttinen 2020; Schoonhoven 2017).[1] This compressed modernity has been fueled by an emerging mindset of achievement. For decades, under the motto of "nothing is impossible", the younger generations in Korea have been plagued by feelings of inadequacy, inferiority and fear of failure, along with constant self-reproach and self-aggression. In light of this, I argue in this

1 Compressed modernity is "a civilizational condition in which economic, political, social and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system." (Kyung-Sup 2010: 446).

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paper how the resurrection of Hell Joseon in the modern age is the result of the paradigm shift in society, from a disciplinary society to an achievement society, and how the mindset of achievers conceals toxicity and gloominess beneath its glittering positivity. I illustrate my arguments by analysing the growing global phenomenon of K-pop idols, as carriers and perpetrators of this mindset. Before going into all that, a few words about the history behind the "Hell Joseon" are in order.

CONTEMPORARY KOREA: BETWEEN THE OBSESSION WITH POSITIVITY AND THE ALIENATION FROM NEGATIVITY

Historically, "Hell Joseon" is a phrase that describes the period when rigid Confucian social hierarchies became deeply rooted in the Joseon dynasty. It was a period marked by the sovereignty of a small elite group, while the populace suffered extreme poverty, living off the land or labouring as servants. Under these conditions, the Donghak movement of the nineteenth century (also known as Donghak Rebellion or Peasant Revolt of 1894), offered hope to many farmers and commoners who had growing grievances against the inequalities of the feudal system. This movement stemmed from the Donghak religion, which was later renamed "Cheondoism" (the philosophy of Chondogyo). This religion was a form of Neo-Confucianism that proclaimed the equality of all human beings; it teaches that every human "bears divinity" and that one must "treat man as god" (Savada & Shaw 1992: 90). Therefore, in order for Koreans to assimilate this divinity into their lives, they must devote themselves to self-improvement as the only path to salvation.

This ideology would be revived a few decades later. After the division of Korea, with its land ravaged by war, South Korea was living in indigence and needed to create a stable political system to pull itself out of poverty. However, under the authoritarian regime of former President Syngman Rhee (1948–1960), the country became a victim of political corruption, stagnant economic growth, and reliance on aid from the US (Seth 2013). In 1961, former president Park Chung Hee (1961–1979) came to power, inheriting a poor nation "overcrowded, possessing few natural resources, artificially severed in half, cut off from the more industrial and developed North, riddled with official corruption and political instability" (Seth 2013: 43), with a population that was still drowning in feelings of devastation and desperation caused by the Japanese colonialism (1910–1945) and the Korean War (1950–1953).

In view of this social and economic gloominess, President Park Chung Hee realised that the "key to stimulating nationalism and economic growth lay in history" (Bell 2004: 128). Thus, he took up the Donghak ideology as a "key political symbol" that could resonate with the public and be "formally connected with the modernizing and nationalist projects" of the country (Bell 2004: 128). It was a revolutionary step which was marked by rapid economic growth and, dramatic social and political changes.

In light of this ideology – suggesting that humans only need to try harder and there would be no limits to what they could achieve – Koreans gradually began to anchor their belief in the concept of Man as the master of his own destiny, consequently, embarking on a new phase of a highly rationalised existence. In this regard, Korean society started to shape itself via a "culture of positivity", an expression coined by the philosopher Byung Han Chul in his famous work, *The Burnout Society* (2015). Under its empowering slogan "Yes We Can", this culture is manifested through over-achievement, overproduction, over-communication, hyper-attention, and hyperactivity. In Han's words, it can be said that Park Chung Hee turned Koreans from being "obedience-subjects" to "achievements subjects" (Han 2015: 8). This metamorphosis refers to a change in the social mindset, from a disciplinary society in which people's conduct is controlled by societal constraints and rules, to an achievement society where individuals willingly let themselves be dominated by the pressure of achieving. Against this background, the country would begin accomplishing what would soon be known as "The Miracle of Han River".

For decades, under the ideology of "Yes We Can", there was no room for negativity. Consumed by excessive positivity, Koreans have gradually become strangers to the idea of "No We Can't". Consequently, when the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) hit the market, Korea was not ready to deal with it economically and even less socially. Koreans, who worked hard and once dreamt of joining the ranks of the world's advanced countries, were frightened by corporations' downsizing, rising unemployment and the substantial increase in poverty.[2] As a country that had built itself up from a war-torn nation to one of the world's largest economies, going back to being a nation in crisis was painful. Koreans had to come face to face with their country's economic weaknesses, but most importantly with the fragility of their achievement society. Thus, when exposed

2 During the Asian financial crisis, the Korean labour market faced record-high unemployment rates of 7% in 1998 and 6.3% in 1999 for the first time since 1960 (Kim 2010: 5), and the absolute poverty rate in Korea reached 23% in 1998, compared to 9% in 1997 according to the World Bank (Choi & Chung 2002: 9).

to the negativity brought by the financial crisis, a growing feeling of uncertainty came to light, resulting in an epidemic of suicide (Khang, Lynch & Kaplan 2005; Kim et al. 2004)[3] and the development of depressive symptoms in Korean adults (Kim et al. 2005).[4]

The Asian financial crisis and its aftermath have seriously tarnished the country's reputation. Under these circumstances, then-President Kim Dae-Jung's (1998–2003) priority was to get the country back on its feet. However, with "no natural resources, very little arable land, and manufacturing [not being] suitable for investment because of high labor costs", he was left with few options (Rachel 2015: para. 7–8). Hence, he turned his eyes to the West in search of inspiration, with "how much money the US earned from films and the UK from musicals", Kim Dae-Jung could see in the entertainment industry the key to Korea's salvation, as a growth driver that only "needs time and talent, building it from scratch was feasible" (Rachel 2015: para. 9–10). He "set up the Korea Creative Contents Agency and his government also injected funding into the Korean Film Council to promote pop culture, while also pushing universities to churn out talent" (The Daily Vox Team 2019: para. 13). The Korean entertainment sector had been chosen by Kim Dae-Jung as a life-saving rope to a sinking country. It can therefore be said that Hallyu (Korean Wave) stemmed from the negativity of the Asian Financial Crisis, offering Koreans another chance to recover (Kwon & Kim 2014).

THE CULTURAL POWER OF K-POP: A KEY PERPETRATOR OF "THE VIOLENCE OF POSITIVITY"

In terms of economic growth, the Hallyu (K-drama, K-pop, K-fashion, K-food, K-beauty etc.) has been a blessing for Korea.[5] However, we should remember that the Korean Wave was manufactured and forged at the heart of an achievement society ravaged by the violence of positivity, where hyperactivity, hysterical

3 "Korea [...] showed a steep increase in suicide rates directly after the crisis. Compared to 1997, male rates in 1998 rose by [...] 44.6% (38.7–50.7%)" (Chang 2009: 1325).

4 According to Han (2015: 42) "depression occurs when the subject striving to display initiative founders on the uncontrollable. However, the uncontrollable, the irreducible, and the unknown are figures of negativity; they are no longer constitutive of achievement society, which is dominated by excessive positivity."

5 Since early 1999, the Hallyu has become one of the biggest cultural phenomena across Asia. Its effect has been tremendous, contributing to 0.2% of Korea's GDP in 2004, amounting to approximately USD 1.87 billion. More recently in 2019, Hallyu had an estimated USD 12.3 billion boost on the Korean economy. (Martin Roll 2021: para. 5).

work, and results are the only ways to salvation and emancipation.[6] Thus, it acts as a cultural force that anchors and perpetuates the narrative of "Yes We Can", wherein fierce competition is the natural mode of being and the reward for hard work is to work even harder. In this context, Han (2015: 6) states "the positivation of the world allows new forms of violence to emerge. They do not stem from the immunologically Other. Rather, they are immanent in the system itself".

On a daily basis, Koreans are inundated with not-so-subtle messages about what to do, what to look like, what to consume and so on. As in many other countries, what is in the media is popular and what is popular is in the media. With the growing popularity of K-pop,[7] Korean entertainment companies have been saturating all mediums with the presence of their idols, because in K-pop, the product is not only music, but the idols themselves. Through media exposure and the image of a god-like, idols become role models that many follow. In this sense, K-pop, as a cultural force, has normalised:

- The *culture of multitasking* is where individuals must be good at many things. Idols must be good at dancing, singing, acting or modelling, and speaking more than one language. In Han's (2015: 12) words, multitasking is "an attentive technique indispensable for survival in the wilderness". Thus, it does not represent civilizational progress, but rather, such an aptitude amounts to regression because it results in a broad yet superficial state of attention, which consequently prevents true contemplation.
- The *brutality of competition* and endless hours of work are positively connoted by survival shows like *Who's Next* (2013), *Producer 101* (2016) or *YG Treasure Box* (2018), where they pit friends against friends and encourage kids and young adults to think of each other as rivals. Hence, turning ferocious competition into a legitimate and unavoidable feature for self-improvement, self-achievement and success.[8]
- Over the last two decades, K-pop has reinforced a culture of early bloomers. It's not uncommon in the K-pop scene, we find singers like Boa, who debuted in 2000 at the age of 13, or the Girls' Generation, who began their training at

6 During a CNN interview, when G-dragon, the leader of the boyband BigBang, was asked about the long hours of idols' training, he said: "In Korea there is already a system that is established, so we had no choice but to go through that system. Also, we didn't have the conditions to build a new system." (Andrea 2016).

7 The export of K-pop has propelled South Korea's music to an estimated $5 billion industry according to a report published by the Korea Creative Content Agency in 2017. (Sinha 2019: para. 7)

8 The Korean entertainment industry is notoriously high-pressure. It fosters a Hunger Games-like work environment, where every colleague is also a competitor and only the strongest survive. Many talented people are recruited as teenagers, who may not be emotionally mature enough to handle the discipline and the scrutiny. Additionally, the Korean public sets high standards for behaviour and physical appearance, and uses social media to pass instant judgement. (Kil 2017: para. 7).

the average age of 11 years old.[9] However, shows like *K-pop Star* (2011), *The Unit* (2018) or *CAP-TEEN* (2020) have normalised early bloomers' culture, pressuring teens and young adults who can not meet this expectation and forcing them to trade their youthful curiosity for determined focus.

- Even under such difficult conditions, where young adults are given hours of singing, dancing, acting, language classes, etc., there is no guarantee that they will get their chance to make a debut. Now, more than ever, Korean bands continue to debut, release music and disband at an incredible rate, and the industry is showing no signs of slowing down. These conditions suggest that change is the only permanence and *uncertainty is the only certainty* (Bauman 2000).

Under these conditions, a wave of depression and suicide has surfaced. In recent years, Korea has seen a rise in mental illness and suicides, with several celebrities taking their own lives. Within an achievement society, the motto "Yes We Can" creates depressives and losers. In this sense, Han (2015: 10–11) asserts that "depression erupts at the moment when the achievement-subject is no longer able to be able and this state where "[n]othing is possible", can only occur in a society that thinks, "[n]othing is impossible". Thus, the inability to achieve causes exhaustive depression and suicide.[10]

THE CULTURE OF POSITIVITY: THE NEST OF MODERN HELL JOSEON

"Modernity began with an unprecedented, heroic activation of human capacity, yet it ends in mortal passivity" (Han 2015: 17). In their quest for modernisation, Koreans were subjected to a culture in which they sacrificed their authenticity as human beings to be moulded into achievement subjects. They have been unconsciously exhausted and saturated due to the violence of positivity and the spirit of achievement which transforms human beings "into autistic performance-machines" (Han 2015: 23). Under such conditions, Koreans are inevitably too drained to think of another way of life, too rushed to slow down and act upon their reality through

9 Back in 1999, the singer Yoon Eun-hye debuted as a member of Baby V.O.X at the age of 15.

10 Kim Jong Hyun, the leader of the boy band Shinee, while being consumed by depression, took his life on 18th December 2017, leaving behind a note where he asked people not to blame him: "What else is there to say? Just tell me I did well. Tell me that this is enough", he wrote. "Tell me I worked hard. Even if you can't smile, please don't blame me as you send me off. Well done. You've really worked hard. Goodbye. (Wang 2017: 13).

radical change. Accordingly, contemplation is deserted,[11] and hence the negativity of *not-to* disappears along with the rage, which is "the capacity to interrupt a given state and make a new state begin [...] It represents a state of exception" (Han 2015: 23). However, the tormenting positivization of achievement societies "makes the world poor in states of exception" (Han 2015: 23).

In today's Korea, people's self-discipline stems from their obsession with persistent self-improvement, and in order to achieve their goals, they are willing to neglect their physical and physiological well-being. They were raised to believe that self-discipline and tangible productivity is the only way to lead a comfortable life. This everyday pursuit of a "good life" has consequently given way to the hysteria of surviving, that has resulted in the modern Hell Joseon.

Historically, as previously stated, Hell Joseon describes a phase characterised by the sovereignty of a small elite group, while the populace suffered from extreme poverty, living off the land or labouring as servants. In today's society, the term is used by those who see parallels between the life of that era and that of present-day Korea. However, it can be said that, in today's achievement society, the term Hell Joseon has undergone a semantic change. It has been resurrected to criticise and define a society where all its achiever-subjects undergo exhaustion, fatigue and suffocation.[12] Thus, aside from the *visible* reasons (high academic stress, job uncertainty, inequality, corruption, and so on), the term has been given another layer that dives into the *invisible* stimulus, rooted in the *inability to be able*.

Han (2015: 10) asserts that what makes one sick is "the imperative to achieve: the new commandment of late-modern labor society". Korea has made personal achievement a goal that *can* and *must* be reached by many others, regardless of each person's singularity. Thus, drawing its people into conformity and forcing them to involuntarily surround themselves, to be someone they are not for fear of being hated, cast away and alone.[13] This submission is what alienates them from the most important *being*, themselves.

In modern Korea, the resurrection of the term Hell Joseon, comes to describe the impact an excess of positivity has on people, once they cede their ability to

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11 Contemplation is the ability that allows individuals to go beyond skin-deep thinking and reflect on life through a rational mindset, and the loss of this ability is partially "responsible for the hysteria and nervousness of modern society". (Han 2015: 20).

12 According to Foucault "in any given historical period we can write, speak or think about a given social object or practice (madness, for example) only in certain specific ways and not others" (McHoul & Grace 2015: 31).

13 "Korean society is very stifling, I want to go to a country where I can advance in work that I am passionate about, without worrying about people's opinion about me". When asked, what is the thing you wanna change about Korea? one of the interviewees answered "an atmosphere where you can discover your dream" (북적북적TV 2015).

say "No!" to the demands of the achievement society. Accordingly, Koreans live in a constant state of exhaustion and fatigue, caused by a persistent compulsion to perform, leading to a life close to a living hell.

CONCLUSION

Interestingly, in contrast to how historically Donghak ideology rose from the ashes of a burned society (Joseon Dynasty), in modern Korea, it is the Donghak ideology that has slowly infiltrated society and reduced it to ashes.

The resurrection of Donghak ideology and the narrative of human supremacy have enslaved Koreans to a culture of positivity. Overpowered by the imperatives "Yes We Can" and "Nothing Is Impossible", Koreans chain themselves to a life of self-exploitation, blinded by passion and determination, until they collapse. Instead of contemplating whether or not to pursue a goal, the mere knowledge that they could achieve it compels them to strive for that goal. In today's Korea, the younger generation is too drained and exhausted to contemplate the toxicity of their spirit of achievement, and claim back the negativity of refusal (No), as what stands in the way has become the only way.

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READING KIM YUJEONG'S WORKS IN THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO LITERARY ANALYSIS

Ji-Hyun Hwang

INTRODUCTION

Spring, Spring and *Camellia Flowers* are known primarily as novels set in rural environments. They were published in the same literary journal Jogwang in December 1935 and May 1936 respectively. These works have similar protagonists and antagonists; the son of a rural peasant, a young and poor farmworker who aims to become the son-in-law of a tenant farm supervisor, and the daughter of the tenant farm supervisor in the Japanese colonial period.

Spring, Spring and *Camellia Flowers* are classified as iconic literary works and have been included as textbooks for secondary school curriculum in Korea for a long time. Diverse adaptations of these works have served as the basis for numerous TV dramas, cartoons, and animations. Their iconic status in formal Korean literature education and their popularity across a wide range of readers have influenced the interpretations of his works in these spin-off creations.

Many literary reviews emphasise the following characteristics in the works: the beauty of lyrical rural landscapes and natural environments in the spring, the laughter perceptible in the characters' appearance and behaviour, and their interactions with one another.

From a thematic perspective, *Camellia Flowers* is known for its treatment of how the subtle psychological and emotional tension between male and female adolescents develops into a clumsy first love. *Spring, Spring* is widely considered a comical story that deals with the day-to-day conflicts between the prospective father-in-law Bongpil and the protagonist "I". Bongpil forces the main character "I" to work for more than three years on the premise of wedlock to his immature daughter Jeomsoon, and postpones their marriage for a ridiculous reason, namely that his daughter is too short and needs to grow tall enough to marry him.

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The prominent aesthetics of various types of comedy (satire, parody, burlesque) and the lyricism associated with the seasonal and natural backgrounds of spring and the countryside are undeniable features of these works. Nevertheless, an excessive emphasis on these elements of Kim Yujeong's representative works risks an underestimation of the dynamics of the various creative devices and the multi-semantic structure of profound themes that the author intentionally chose not to bring to the foreground.

This research takes a holistic and integrated approach to literary analysis. Form and content are inseparably linked, and they create a whole that fulfils communicative and artistic purposes. Furthermore, the author of this research suggests that Kim Yujeong made a continuous effort to kill multiple birds with a single stone. As an ambitious and passionate artist, he aimed to achieve the following goals:

1) He delivered social messages in a multi-faceted story as a contemporary member of society living in an extraordinary historical period.

2) He added aesthetic values to his literary works.

3) He became a popular writer by satisfying the readers' needs.

4) He protected his work from extreme censorship during the Japanese colonial period.

The objectives of this research are to study what strategy Kim Yujeong chose to achieve the above-mentioned goals and to explore the literary devices the author used to achieve these goals.

The research is conducted based on the notion that a literary work is a living organism with an unlimited potential to create diverse interpretations and discourses. Both the author's contemporaries and readers living in different eras with different cultural backgrounds can relate to what is either openly manifested or discreetly communicated through their knowledge about the past, the eras they have experienced, and their cultural and social backgrounds.

DISTORTED HUMAN RELATIONS – POWER-BASED VIOLENCE

During his life, Kim Yujeong was committed to making society a better place for his contemporaries. He acted for social change. Inspired by the Vnarod movement, with which such well-known Russian writers as Turgenev and Tolstoy were involved, Kim Yujeong established a farmer's association and an evening school in his hometown Sile to lead the enlightenment movement for the eradication of illiteracy.

Many book reviews and educational materials focus sharply on the narrative of the relationship between the main characters, that is to say the son of

the peasant "I" and Jeomsoon, the daughter of the tenant farm supervisor, or between the young male worker "I" and the father-in-law as a conflict between individuals. There has been a predominant tendency to interpret and suggest that the tension between the characters is relieved through humour and empathy for the characters.

However, the relationship between the main characters "I" and Jeomsoon does not simply represent a relationship between individuals. It symbolises the conflict between social classes. Even though "I" and Jeomsoon are both adolescents, they are aware of the socio-economic power relationships between groups in the community. As illustrated in the following section, the seemingly naive hero is conscious of the unequal social status between himself and Jeomsoon. This awareness influences the attitude, speech, and behaviour of "I" and Jeomsoon and motivates the actions that move the story forward and culminate in the conflict between them.

> If it was impolite to refuse the potatoes offered, then why did she have to say, "You don't have these at your house, do you?", and all that? As a matter of fact, her father is the land manager, supervising the tenant farms, and as my family farms the land managed by her father, we always kiss up to him. It was Jeomsoon's family that helped my family find land to build a house and settle down when we first came to this town. And when we don't have enough to eat, my parents borrow rice from Jeomsoon's and praise their kindness until their mouths run dry. At the same time, my mother warned me not to hang around Jeomsoon because two seventeen years olds hanging around together might lead to bad rumours. If I were to try anything with Jeomsoon, her father would be enraged, and we'd be kicked out of our land and our house. (Kim Yujeong, *Camellia Flowers*[1])

For readers of the twenty-first century, Jeomsoon's aggression can be easily associated with the phenomenon known as Gapjil, which is a Korean neologism that refers to arrogant and authoritarian attitudes or actions of people in positions of power over others. Korean society is highly aware of these issues. Such a phenomenon can occur in any economically polarised society or country with a wide disparity between different socio-economic classes.

The violent nature of the harassment softens due to the reversal of the traditional male-female roles projected in interactions between "I" and Jeomsoon and the narrator's usage of contextually conflicting words for a sensuous description of the nature of springtime.

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1 Translated from Korean by T.I.TIME (2017), a translation/interpretation club in Gimhae Foreign Language High School in Jangyu, South Korea.

> The tingling, sweet scent made my head spin as if the ground were caving in beneath my feet. (Kim Yujeong, *Camellia Flowers*)

Criticism of reality in rural society is often veiled or hidden behind the scenes. Nevertheless, there is a moment in the inner speech of the protagonist that is a comment on the social situation and the brutality of the group known as the Marum, who managed the indigent peasant farmers on behalf of the farmland owners during the colonial period. In *Spring, Spring*, the narrator "I" projects the character of the group known as the Marum, represented by Bongpil, by describing Bongpil's tyranny, his notorious reputation in the town, and how the peasant farmers still must bribe him to get permission to farm the land.

> However, if he really lost the benevolence of the townsfolk, it's not because of his harsh words but from being the supervisor of the town. A supervisor should be someone who curses well, hits people well, and is like a large, hairy dog, and he is just that. If one doesn't send chicken or money, he is sure to take their land by hunks in the fall. Then the person who showered him with money and drinks in advance slyly takes that land. For this reason, a big-eyed cow wanders around in his stable, and the townspeople take the verbal abuse and crawl around him. (Kim Yujeong, *Spring, Spring*)

POVERTY, CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, AND DISCRIMINATION

The inequality that stems from the economic power relationship between groups in rural society implicitly pervades the interaction between "I" and Jeomsoon. This issue extends further to the livestock of each family. Jeomsoon openly expresses her anger when the male protagonist refuses to accept her one-sided favour. Feeling rejected, she abuses the powerless animal (a hen) without hesitation or guilty conscience. The scene in which Jeomsoon hits "I's" hen with her fist symbolises the brutal governance of the Marum over the peasantry. There is an analogy between the power relationship between these unequal social groups and the cockfight initiated by Jeomsoon without "I's" consensus.

It is worth noting that the male protagonist mentions that it was the actual hen that lays eggs on the farm. This scene is a metaphor for how the economically superior group threatens the survival of underprivileged people by destroying their crucial source of food. Jeomsoon, as a human, encourages cockfights between roosters with a significant difference in strength, which can be interpreted as the privileged group that top the socio-economic hierarchy promoting conflicts between the stronger and the weaker classes within the same subordinated group. These scenes symbolize the depravity and the poverty caused by the colonialism.

Jeomsoon does not hesitate to make a derogatory comment about "I's" father and falsely accuses "I's" father of being a person with a disability.

In the end, the protagonist "I" decides to confront Jeomsoon by beating her rooster to death with a wooden stick. Nevertheless, his method of confronting her is still within the rules of the game that Jeomsoon has set, that is the cockfight.

In the twenty-first century, many societies have a heightened awareness of animal rights. More and more communities and organisations are adopting a zero-tolerance policy which prohibits any form of discrimination. For the readers of our era, Jeomsoon's actions and words can fuel discussions on sensitive topics, such as new forms of colonialism and their impact on social and economic inequalities in today's world, cruelty to animals, and discrimination.

EXPLOITATION OF LABOUR – PASSION SERVICE

In *Spring, Spring*, the protagonist "I" is presented as a naive and ignorant person. He believes he can become a Daeryl son-in-law to Bongpil,[2] the tenant farm supervisor. He works for Bongpil without pay for over three years, hoping to marry his daughter Jeomsoon someday. Meals consisting of vegetables and no more than one bowl of rice are his only compensation for years of hard work. However, this relationship is very different from the original Daeryl son-in-law system that existed in Korean culture a long time before the Japanese colonial period.

> My father-in-law has three daughters. The eldest got married in autumn two years ago. Actually, he also had her future husband work for a while before leaving. But he goes through sons-in-law from the day his daughter turns ten until she's nineteen, and he is famous in Donglee for having lots of sons-in-law. Still, fourteen is too many! He has to drive his son-in-law harsh because he only has daughters. Of course, he could hire a farmhand but that costs money. So, he kept changing son-in-law after son-in-law continuously to find someone who works well. In addition, a lot of them must have run away after the hard work and harsh words. Jeomsoon is his second daughter, and I'm his third son-in-law, so to speak. He's not looking for the fourth because I'm too naïve and works well. He has to work me hard until his third daughter is at least ten, who is now six, so he can bring another one. So, what Moongtae tells me is to get hold of my senses, lie on my back, and make a fuss until marriage is permitted. (Kim Yujeong, *Spring, Spring*)

2 In fact, the Daeryl son-in-law (Daerylsawi) custom had been pushed out of the Civil Law of Colonial Chosun during the Japanese occupation period and moved to a legal blind spot. According to a study that applied a literary-jurisprudential approach to *Spring, Spring* (Kim Kyoung-Soo 2021) the story embodies the severity of the social issues caused by the Marum's breach of the labour agreement during the colonial period.

During the Japanese colonial period, the Marum often abused this custom as a means of acquiring a free labour force. The Marum would take on an indigent unmarried man without a place to live and make him work on a farm while falsely promising that he would be allowed to marry the Marum's young daughter when she became an adult. To paraphrase this, it was fraudulent exploitation of the labour of men who had become homeless due to rural exploitation and land expropriation during the Japanese colonial period. In fact, during that period, the Daeryl son-in-law system was a blind spot in the law that caused a lot of suffering and many serious social issues.

The main character "I" is a victim who has been gaslighted by Bongpil over a long period, but he still rationalizes that Bongpil is a good person despite being beaten and exploited for many years.

In the twenty-first century, similar phenomena to the Daeryl son-in-law system can still be encountered in different forms. For instance, Yŏl-chŏng-p'e-i 'passion pay' is a neologism indicating the situation when young people work with something they love without being properly paid. Doing something you love is considered reward enough. Many interns and temporary workers work in the hope of becoming permanent employees and receiving a proper salary, that is to say in pursuit of the illusion of a guaranteed stable life.

There are similarities between the fictional reality in *Spring, Spring* and the current global economic trend, that is to say the exploitation of human capital in countries where the cost of labour is significantly lower than in developed countries by relocating tasks with "less added value" or manufacturing with a negative impact on the environment and human health to developing countries.

CENSORSHIP

Kim Yujeong's debut in literature, his work *Sonakbi* 'shower', won him the prize of "Chosun Ilbo New Year's Literature". However, he very soon experienced his first traumatic incident as a writer. *Sonakbi* was only serialised six times. The seventh episode was removed and banned by the authorities.[3] According to Joseon Chulpan Gyeongchal Wolbo (the Chosun Publishing Company's Monthly Police Report), the authorities censored the seventh episode and made the decision to ban it due to obscenity of the content. However, the view that the decision was

3 Kim Jeong-hwa and Moon Han-byeol (2020) confirm that *Sonakbi*, which was published and has been included in the history of Korean literature so far, is an incomplete work. During their research, the authors attempted to restore the deleted part of *Sonakbi* and investigated to understand its substance and content.

based on the story's background, the interrelationships between the characters that are reminiscent of the tormented lives of impoverished people, and the devastating society due to the structural problems of that time is more plausible.

This incident would certainly have made Kim Yujeong more aware of censorship. At the same time, it seems to have strengthened the author's resolve to find safer, more discreet ways of fulfilling his creative mission as a writer and avoiding the risk of his works and his creative activities as a writer being banned due to the extreme censorship of the Japanese occupation period.[4]

The flip side of the crisis coin is often opportunity. As an author, Kim Yujeong seems to have contemplated effective ways of 1) amusing his readers, 2) recording the harsh realities he witnessed and safely conveying multiple messages, and 3) experimenting with literary techniques and devices when creating the characters and situations that had an artistic value in themselves and that could help achieve the goals mentioned in 1) and 2).

The writer conducted creative experiments and applied various devices and techniques to his writing to fulfil the above purposes. Let us focus on a few of them.

ESTRANGEMENT[5]

The protagonist "I" is portrayed as a clueless and innocent person who does not understand what is obvious to the characters around him and the readers. He is unaware of the fact that Jeomsoon likes him. Hence her behaviour and words seem unfamiliar and strange from the protagonist's perspective, and the way that the protagonist perceives and describes Jeomsoon's behaviour and words makes the readers laugh.

> She kept nagging me, then covered her mouth and giggled. Not finding anything particularly funny, I wondered if she had gone nuts due to the warm weather. A little while later, she peeked back at her house and took her hand out of her apron pocket, shoving it below my chin. Three baked potatoes, warm and steamy, were clasped into my hands.

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4 Lee Sang-Kyung (2008) conducted a study of the extreme literary censorship of the "Publication Police" and its role in the formation of literary canons during the Japanese colonial period. See Jang Seok-ju (2007) for the repression of freedom of expression, assembly, and literary practices, and the overall sentiment during this period.

5 *Ostranenije* 'estrangement' is a literary device that aims to lead the reader "out of the automaticity of perception". The term was introduced in connection with Russian Formalism by literary critic Viktor Shklovsky. *Ostranenije* is a method that makes the perception of something more distinct. It is a distinctive artistic technique (Shklovsky 1929: 11–13).

> "You don't have these at your home, do you?" She said patronisingly and told me to eat it up before anyone notices she's given me potatoes. And then she added, "You know, spring potatoes are the best."
>
> "I don't eat potatoes. You eat them."
>
> Without even turning my head toward her, I pushed the potatoes away over my shoulder. She didn't leave. Instead, her breathing turned heavier and more ragged. I was surprised at what I saw when I turned around. It's been about three years since I came to this town; however, I'd never seen Jeomsoon's face go so red. She glared at me fiercely, tears forming in her eyes. Then she grabbed her basket and ran toward the rice field with her teeth clenched. (Kim Yujeong, *Camellia Flowers*)

As naturalistic authors would do, the writer presents an authentic fragment of the main character's life and the social surroundings in a rural community without judging it. The protagonist "I" is an ignorant man who neither understands Jeomsoon's inner motives behind her behaviour nor what she feels about him. For the most part, the male protagonist perceives and narrates the external specifics of her behaviour and facial expressions. He describes her unusual facial expressions and moves as if he has discovered a strange object or phenomenon. His narration mainly deals with her accidental and physiological nature. The author's voice rarely resonates with the narrator's voice.

LINGUISTIC MEANS

The works of the author are widely recognised for their distinctive stylistic characteristics.

The voice of the narrator is characterised by colloquialism and dialect. In addition, the narrator uses onomatopoeia and mimetic words with repetitive auditory. For example, "hal-kŭm-hal-kŭm" 'a word imitating the appearance of glancing continuously and quietly out of the corner of the eyes', "ssae-kŭn-ssae-kŭn" 'a word imitating the sound of gasping because of anger', and "ŏp'-ŏ-chil tŭs chappa-chil tŭs" 'a word imitating the appearance of repeatedly stumbling and nearly falling while walking along the way' are used to describe Jeomsoon's appearance and motion in an exaggerated way.

These words add musicality and vibrance to the narrative and intensify the dynamics, liveliness, and comic character in the persona. The author intentionally uses them to bring laughter to the readers and shift their attention to the external details of the extraordinarily described situations from the tragic and serious social issues of his era. Consequently, the latter is pushed out to the background of the story.

In other words, the linguistic methods mentioned above combined with the naturalistic presentation of the characters and situations dilute the harshness of the reality and suffering that the main character experiences. Furthermore, it is worth noting that it is not the diversity or quantity of the vocabulary used in Kim's works that makes his style so rich and unique. On the contrary, many other contemporary Korean writers overshadow him in terms of the variety of vocabulary used according to a comparative-quantitative study of Korean novels conducted in the 1930s.[6]

NAMING, OR NOT GIVING THE MAIN CHARACTER A NAME

Naming in literary works is a device used to denote the literary character's identity, the ideologies that the individuals cling to, and the relationship between the character and the people who named the character. Benedicta Windt-Val (2012: 273) explains: "Personal names are some of the most important tools of the author in the creation of credible characters placed in a literary universe that gives the impression of being authentic."

Kim Yujeong's uses naming as a device to imply that the characters and their interrelations are products of their social environment. The main hero "I" is the narrator in both works. His name is not mentioned anywhere in the story, and no one refers to him by his name. They call him "yae" 'hey', "neo" 'you', and "i ja-sig" 'this bastard'. The female characters' names in these works are likewise. Jeomsoon is a common name for girls one might come across anywhere in the countryside.

In *Spring, Spring,* the name of the protagonist and first-person narrator "I" is unknown. In both works, the protagonist "I" is a person whose name no one is interested in knowing. Nor does anyone bother calling him by his name. On the other hand, the narrator dedicates a sentence to mention "I's" prospective father-in-law's original name as well as the nickname the children in the neighbourhood use to make fun of his harsh demeanour.

> Even small children point at him and call him Shit-pil (his real name is Bongpil). However, if he really lost the benevolence of the townsfolk, it's not because of his harsh words but from being the supervisor of the town. A supervisor should

6 Moon Han Byoul (2015) built a corpus using the vocabulary from the literary works of various authors and conducted a statistical analysis of the texts at the morpheme level. This type of quantitative analysis proves that there are measurable stylistic differences between the author's usage of key thematic words and functional words.

> be someone who curses well, hits people well, and is like a large, hairy dog, and he is just that. (Kim Yujeong, *Spring, Spring*)

What does the author intend by this? The author makes a conscious choice to use these literary devices to help the readers understand that these protagonists are social figures that mirror the universal characteristics of people who belong to particular social groups. The protagonist "I" is a stereotypical member of the marginal group of impoverished nomadic men in rural communities. Bongpil embodies the typical characteristics of tenant farm supervisors during the Japanese colonial period. None of the personas in these works are individual characters with unique rational qualities or life histories in the fictional reality.

CONCEALING SENSITIVE SOCIAL ISSUES

The protagonist resists the antagonists, but his resistance does not change the situation. The story ends with unresolved conflict situations.

Kim Yujeong's works, *Spring, Spring* and *Camellia Flowers,* feature multi-semantic layers and encourage us to contemplate universal issues that are not limited to the rural communities in Korea during the 1930s. The brutal reality and suffering of indigent people living in a society full of contradictions are blurred by the foreground story.[7] From a diachronic perspective, socio-economic power relations between groups as well as their impact on humanity, gender, and cruelty to animals are issues that are relevant in our contemporary context. The multi-semantic structure enables various interpretations and encourages readers to begin new discourses.

CONCLUSION

For the most part, Kim Yujeong managed to integrate art and life into his responsibilities as a writer.[8]

Spring, Spring and *Camellia Flowers* should not be dismissed as mere lyrical rural novels. Characterising *Camellia Flowers* as a juvenile novel full of the intrigues and subtle psychological tensions between young men and women experiencing love for the first-time risks overlooking diverse metaphors and symbols that are

7 For an analysis of the narrative of compassion and tragic irony shaped by the actions of the impoverished characters living in the grim realities of colonial life in the 1930s, their choices for survival, and the open-ended structure in Kim Yujoeng's works, see Oh 2018.

8 Concerning the relationship between art and life, Bakhtin (1994) suggests that art and life are not one, but they must be united in a person, in the unity of his responsibility.

worthy of further analysis and undermining the wholeness of the literary text. Characterising *Spring, Spring* as nothing more than a story that touches on the rural life of a future son-in-law who is struggling with Bongpil, his prospective father-in-law, not only distorts the true picture of the era and the social messages that the author intended to convey discreetly, but it also underestimates the artistry of the work, its universality, which transcends time and space, and its multifaceted thematic structure.

The author experiments with various literary devices to re-construct and re-create the reality that his main characters experience. They are as follows 1) metaphoric and metonymic representations of reality, 2) estrangement situations that are obvious to all except for the main characters are defamiliarized and presented as something unusual through the gaze of the naive and ignorant male protagonists, 3) naturalistic descriptions of the fragments of reality. The narrators in these works exaggerate their descriptions of the physical appearance and external features of the character, 4) specific linguistic resources to add vitality and humour, and 5) the author's conscious choice not to name the main characters and use plain or stereotypical names for the other characters.

With the above-mentioned literary devices, the author tones down the severity of the brutal reality the protagonists inhabit and draws the focus of the readers, including the censorship authority during the period of the Japanese occupation.

The author attempted to integrate seemingly incompatible emotions, such as laughter and sorrow into his works. The disharmony between content and form intensifies these emotions and adds unique artistic effects. His creative experiments bring significant value to the reading process, that is to say laughter for the sake of survival. Laughter makes light of serious situations and eases the burden of miserable life. At the same time, laughter can intensify the reader's feeling of anger at the harsh realities in the fiction due to the sharp contrast between the comic and the utterly brutal. The laughter in Kim's works has invited readers through the ages to experience seemingly contradictory feelings, such as comfort, sorrow, and anger.

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DEMONSTRATION OF KOREAN GRAMMAR IN FINNISH

Jeong-Young Kim

INTRODUCTION

Using the learners' native language in a foreign language classroom may be a controversial issue. Nevertheless, it is typical for the learner to study a new foreign language with materials written in a language he or she understands. The Korean language has been taught using textbooks produced in English for classes in Finland. Even the first book on the Korean language published in Finland was written in English, the title of which is *A Korean Grammar*. After the book written by G.J. Ramstedt in 1939, a Korean learner's book *Korea Alku! Korean Perusteet* was subsequently published in Finnish, in 2022. This paper describes how Korean verbs and adjectives, including the copula, are presented to Finnish-speaking learners in particular. *Korea Alku! Korean Perusteet* takes radical approaches in order to simplify the descriptive explanation of conjugation rules for the two word classes (i.e. adjectives and verbs), abandoning the traditional view of them. Instead of obeying the conventional perspective, it introduces grammatical terms tailored for the new approaches, which are examined in the following sections.

KOREAN COPULA, ADJECTIVES AND VERBS

In Korean, verbs and adjectives including the copula are conjugated in accordance with the different speech styles and grammatical categories such as tense, honorifics and voice to name a few. They are distinguished by a few types of suffixes attached to them; accordingly, it appears crucial for the learners of Korean to discern the word-classes for the sake of the correct conjugated form. It is fairly common that learners of Korean are forced to learn the conjugation rules based on the pedagogical grammar for native Korean speakers. Thus, it is expected that Finnish-speaking learners would perceive the copula, adjectives and verbs of the target language, in comparison with those in their native language. The pedagogical grammar for native Korean speakers is not the most effective tool or route to learn Korean as a foreign language (KFL), given that the acquisition of a foreign language takes a

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different path from that of a native language. As a result of speculating on whether KFL learners are to pick up the grammar described for native Korean speakers, new approaches of dealing with the conjugating word classes, in consideration of Finnish (the native language of the learners), are introduced in *Korea Alku! Korean Perusteet*, which this paper intends to examine.

A new term for copula -ita

The pedagogical grammar defines *-ita* 'to be' as *seswulkyek cosa* 'predicative particle' (see *The Encyclopedia of Korean Language Education* 2014: 598) although particles in Korean are never conjugated. On the other hand, it is a typical predicate conforming to the conjugating rules for adjectives. In (1a) and (1b), *-ita* is inflected with the present tense suffix and informal verbal ending, and with the past tense suffix and formal verbal ending, respectively. Therefore, it is categorized as an adjective (see Sohn 1999: 204) in Korean, in contrast to languages of Europe, including Finnish that classifies its copula as a verb. Besides, the Korean copula demonstrates no distinction for category of person.

(1a) *Anna-nun haksayng*-**i**-*ey-yo.*
Anna-Top student-be-PRES-Informal END

'Anna is a student.' / 'Anna on opiskelija.' in Finnish

(1b) *Anna-nun haksayng*-**i**-*ess-supnita.*
Anna-Top student-be-PAST-Formal END

'Anna was a student.' / 'Anna oli opiskelija.' in Finnish.

In (1a–b), *-i-ey-yo* the conjugated form of *-ita* is translated to *on* the present tense of the Finnish copula, and *-i-ess-supnita* to *oli* the past tense of the Finnish copula. Looking at the translations, Finnish-speaking learners would assume that *-ita* must be equivalent to the Finnish copula *olla*. It may be unnecessary to mention to the learner the word class of *-ita* in Korean, being aware that the knowledge could become an obstacle in learning the language. Still, the learners may find it useful if it is technically termed in consideration of their native language. Despite the fact that generative linguists of Korean call it copula, the linguistic term shared in Korean and Finnish is not used in the book *Korean Alku! Korean Perusteet*, owing to the discrepancy of word class in the two languages. Yet, a translated version of *seswulkyek cosa* 'predicative particle' in the pedagogical grammar does not appear in the book, either, but a new concept for *-ita* has been introduced by the term *partikkelipredikaatti* 'particle predicate' to the Finnish-speaking audience

(p. 38). Two major reasons for coining the Finnish term are as follows: (i) to alert the learners to attach *-ita* to the previous word with no space, and (ii) to prevent Finnish-speaking learners from confusing it with *issta* 'to be/have' that denotes existence or possession as in (2). Consequently, the newly coined Finnish term for *-ita* is expected to prevent errors such as the examples in (3)

(2a) *Anna-nun cip-ey iss-eyo.*
Anna-Top home-at is-END

'Anna is at home.' / 'Anna on kotona.' in Finnish

(2b) *Anna-nun cha-ka iss-eyo.*
Anna-Top car-Sub has-END

'Anna has a car.' / 'Annalla on auto.' in Finnish

Since the Finnish copula *olla* is employed in the sentences translated to Finnish, Finnish-speaking learners may produce errors of using *-ita* in place of *issta* if it is introduced as a copula and of putting a space in front of it unless the role of *-ita* as a particle is emphasized.

(3a) **Anna ye-yo* (*Anna-ye-yo*)
*Anna is-END (Anna-is-END)

('I am Anna.' / 'Olen Anna.' in Finnish)

(3b) **Anna iss-eyo* (*Anna-ye-yo*)
*Anna is-END (Anna-is-END)

('I am Anna.' / 'Olen Anna.' in Finnish)

(3c) **chayksang-i pang-ey ye-yo* (*chayksang-i pang-ey iss-eyo*)
*desk-Sub room-in is-END (desk-Sub room-in is-END)

('There is a desk in the room.' / 'Huoneessa on pöytä.' in Finnish)

(3d) **na-nun cha-ka ye-yo* (*na-nun cha-ka iss-eyo*)
*I-Top car-Sub is-END (I-Top car-Sub is-END)

('I have a car.' / 'Minulla on auto.' in Finnish)

(3e) **swuep-i kumyoil-ey ye-yo* (*swuep-i kumyoil-ey iss-eyo*)
*class-Sub Friday-on is-END (class-Sub Friday-on is-END)

('The class is on Friday. / I have a class on Friday.'
'Kurssi on perjantaina. / Minulla on kurssi perjantaina.' in Finnish)

In (3a), the space between *Anna* and *ye-yo* must be removed when written in Korean. The example of an ill-formed sentence in (3b) with *iss-eyo* 'to be', in place of *-ye-yo* 'to be', conveys the meaning that 'there is Anna' but not that 'I am Anna'. Furthermore, it has been observed in the KFL classroom that the learners, confused between *-ita* 'to be' and *issta* 'to be', also produce the errors such as in (3c–e). It seems that the learner is prone to make the errors when misperceiving both of them as a Finnish-like copula.

Despite the fact that *-ita* is categorized into the group of particles according to the Korean pedagogical grammar, it would be more sensible to emphasize its role as a predicate similar to a particle, for Finnish-speaking learners, in order to prevent the possible influence of their native language, that is perceiving *-ita* as a Finnish-like copula. The new term *partikkelipredikaatti* is, therefore, expected to assist Finnish-speaking learners to understand its usage more efficiently.

A new perspective on Korean adjectives and verbs

The Korean term *tongsa* 'verb' indicates words such as *mennä* 'to go', *asua* 'to live' and *sulkea* 'to close' in Finnish, and *hyengyongsa* 'adjective' such as *hyvä* 'good', *makea* 'sweet' and *iloinen* 'happy'. In Korean, which is known as a predicate-final language, it is a canon that an adjective or a verb comes at the end of a clause whether the clause is main or embedded. Not only do verbs play the role of predicate but adjectives as well, and their dictionary forms always end in *-ta*, demonstrating no difference between the two word classes. They both conjugate in accordance with a variety of suffixes, most of which are not distinguished to be attached to either an adjective or a verb. The examples of a verb in (4) and an adjective in (5) take the identical suffixes in the same forms: (a) *-ayo* "present tense of the informal ending", (b) *-ass* "past tense" and *-eyo* "the informal ending", (c) *-supnita* "present tense of the formal ending" and (d) *-ass* "past tense" and *-supnita* "the formal ending".

(4) Conjugation of a verb *tat-ta* 'to close'
   a. tat-**ayo**
   b. tat-**ass-eyo**
   c. tat-**supnita**
   d. tat-**ass-supnita**

(5) Conjugation of an adjective *coh-ta* 'good'
   a. coh-**ayo**
   b. coh-**ass-eyo**
   c. coh-**supnita**
   d. coh-**ass-supnita**

There seems no difference between Korean adjectives and verbs, looking at the examples in (4) and (5). Thus, it may be sufficient for learners of Korean to understand the function of predicates, without accumulating unnecessary knowledge of the word class for each word.

Nonetheless, a few specific morphosyntactic features of suffixes make the most distinctive difference between adjectives and verbs. Native Korean speakers are equipped with the intuition to judge between them, by the presence or absence of *-nun* or *–n*, which are the suffix employed for the present declarative form of the speech style *hayla-chey*[1]. The verb in *hayla-chey* must employ the suffix, whereas the adjective cannot, as in (6). The two word classes are also distinguished by modifying suffixes, *-nun* for a verb and *-(u)n* for an adjective, as in (7).

(6) Examples in *hayla-chey*

a.	tat-**nun**ta	'to close' (verb)
b.	ka-**n**ta	'to go' (verb)
c.	coh-ta	'good' (adjective)

(7) Examples with the modifying suffix

a.	tat-**nun**	'closing' (verb)
b.	coh-**un**	'good' (adjective)
c.	hayngpokha-**n**	'warm' (adjective)

A Korean and a Finnish word denoting the same meaning, it will be noted, can be different from each other, not only in terms of the word class but also syntactically, as demonstrated in Table 1. The Korean transitive verb *ipta* 'to wear' is transformed into the Finnish copula and the compliment *päällä* 'on top of', and the Korean intransitive verb *pita* 'to be empty' is transformed into the Finnish adjective *tyhja* 'empty' with the copula. The Korean adjective *epsta* 'not to be somewhere/not to have' requires the Finnish auxiliary and copula to find the semantically-equivalent expression. Besides, the equivalent expressions of the adjectives *philyohata* 'to need' and *pulepta* 'to envy' in Korean are verbs in Finnish. Moreover, some words in Korean function as both a verb and an adjective, such as *issta* 'to be somewhere/to have', *khuta* 'big/to grow' and *kilta* 'long/to grow'.

1 Korean speech styles are characterized by their corresponding predicate endings which are generally categorized into six types – *hapsyo-chey, hayyo-chey, hao-chey, hakey-chey, hay-chey* and *hayla-chey* – in contemporary Korean society (Sohn 1999; Lee 2012).

Table 1 Examples of verbs and adjectives

Korean	Word class	Finnish	Meaning
ip-ta	verb	olla päällä	to wear (clothes)
pi-ta		olla tyhjä	to be empty
iss-ta	adjective verb	(jossakin/jollakulla) on (jotakin)	to be somewhere / to have
khu-ta		iso / kasvaa isoksi	big / to grow
kil-ta		pitkä / kasvaa pitkäksi	long / to grow
eps-ta	adjective	(jossakin/jollakulla) ei ole (jotakin)	not to be somewhere / not to have
philyoha-ta		tarvita	to need
pulep-ta		kadehtia	to envy

Aware of the discrepancies between Korean and Finnish, it is worthwhile throwing the question why KFL learning should insist on the pedagogical grammar for native Korean speakers, by challenging the KFL learners with the general remark that Korean grammar is very different from the grammar of the learner's native language. As a gesture of responding to such a question, the book *Korea Alku! Korean Perusteet* introduces Korean adjectives and verbs from the perspective of Finnish-speakers.

First, the book abandons the terms "adjective" and "verb" in order to avoid the learner's native language influence on the target language. Instead of the conventional terms for native Korean speakers, the new terms *predikaattiryhmä 1* 'predicate group 1' and *predikaattiryhmä 2* 'predicate group 2' are employed in the book (p. 62, p. 94) to classify the two different predicates regarding conjugation. The learners may not require the discernment between Korean verbs and adjectives but are obliged to correctly conjugate each word for its adequate usage. While the terms of "adjective" or "verb" may lead the learner to produce errors caused by native language influence, the new grammatical terms must guide them to follow the relevant conjugation rule for each Korean predicate, departing from the knowledge of adjectives and verbs in their native language.

Second, the learners may focus on the role of Korean adjectives and verbs as predicate by utilizing *predikaattiryhmä 1* and *predikaattiryhmä 2* instead of *verbi* 'verb' or *adjektiivi* 'adjective'. Consequently, Finnish-speaking learners are expected to detect that Korean is predicate-final and the predicates are inflected.

Third, the problem of discrepant terms of *-ita* (i.e. "copula" and "predicative particle") can be resolved, either of which seems unable to provide its convincing connotation to Finnish-speaking learners of Korean. Whilst claimed to be copula

and categorized as an adjective in Korean linguistics (Sohn 1999: 204), *-ita* is defined as the predicative particle by the pedagogical grammar. The new term *partikkelipredikaatti* for *-ita*, however, indicates that it is a predicate, and this also enables it to be classified into *predikaattiryhmä 1* or *predikaattiryhmä 2*, as shown in Table 2. Its belonging to *predikaattiryhmä 2* can rid the learners of influence from their knowledge of the Finnish copula. Nonetheless, the new terminology can encourage the learners to regard it as an ordinary predicate that must follow the conjugation rules of its appropriate predicate group.

Table 2 The Finnish grammatical terms for Korean verbs and adjectives

Korean	Predicate group	Finnish
ip-ta	Predikaatti 1	olla päällä
pi-ta		olla tyhjä
iss-ta	Predikaatti 1	(jossakin/jollakulla) on (jotakin)
khu-ta	Predikaatti 2	iso / kasvaa isoksi
kil-ta		pitkä / kasvaa pitkäksi
eps-ta	Predikaatti 2	(jossakin/jollakulla) ei ole (jotakin)
philyoha-ta		tarvita
pulep-ta		kadehtia
-i-ta		olla

CONCLUSION

In the field of second (or foreign) language acquisition, native language influence is frequently discussed concerning error analysis with respect to the innate Universal Grammar.[2] Yet, the pedagogical grammar described in a language-learning book intervenes in the abstract process of adult language learning. It is likely that adults rely more on the descriptive pedagogical grammar than on natural input of the target language that stimulates the Universal Grammar. Hence, the pedagogical grammar appears fairly important for adults to learn a foreign language. However, the pedagogical grammar for native speakers of the target language may not be adequate for its learners; therefore, a KFL grammar tailored in consideration of the learner's native language needs to be formulated

2 The key concept of Universal Grammar is "the system of principles, conditions, and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages [...] the essence of human language" (Chomsky 1976: 29).

for more efficient language-learning. It must assist the learners with the abstract process of learning Korean, one of the most exotic languages in Finland.

The book *Korea Alku! Korean Perusteet* provides its audience with a new concept of the Korean copula, adjectives and verbs, avoiding translating the conventional Korean terms into Finnish. This attempt presupposes that Finnish-speaking learners might be prevented from making errors caused by misconstrual of the Korean word classes. Likewise, it should be encouraged to look at a variety of elements in Korean grammar from the perspective of the learners' native language for the development of Korean-learning materials.

ABBREVIATIONS

END	verbal ending marker
PAST	past tense
PRES	present tense
Sub	subject marker
Top	topic marker

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SURVIVING UNDER THE "HIDDEN CURRICULUM": THE STRUGGLES OF LGBTQ+ JET TEACHERS IN JAPANESE RURAL AREAS

Ami Kobayashi & Kazuyoshi Kawasaka

INTRODUCTION

The Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme was launched in 1987 with the aim of "promoting grass-roots international exchange between Japan and other nations" (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations [CLAIR] 2015) by hiring "native" English speakers for Japanese schools.[1] Owing to the scale of the programme and its ambitious objectives to change attitudes to internationalization, it has been described by David McConnell's (2000: x) as Japan's unique "top-down efforts to create 'mass internationalization'", a means of "importing diversity", as highlighted in the title of McConnell's groundbreaking study.

Nevertheless, research on internationalization and the English education aspects of the JET Programme has often failed to pay sufficient attention to the heterogeneity and diverse experiences of its teachers, including their gender and sexuality, as well as the ways in which the programme has influenced activism in Japan. For example, in 1995, JET participants organized Stonewall Japan, which was one of the earliest LGBTQ+ groups in the public education sector in Japan and is still active. Based on interviews with LGBTQ+ JET teachers, this paper investigates their individual experiences and explores how they have played a unique role in cultivating perspectives on gender and sexual diversity in Japanese schools, despite this not being the original objective of the programme or the intention of the Japanese government.

1 This paper is based on research funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in the framework of "Sexual Diversity and Human Rights in 21st Century Japan: LGBTIQ Activisms and Resistance from a Transnational Perspective" (KA 5082/2-1). We would like to honor and express our sincere gratitude towards our late colleague Dr Paul Chamness Iida at the Akita International University, who initiated this project and gave us a great deal of intellectual stimulation. Without his passion, it would not have been possible for us to finalize this paper.

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We will begin with an overview of the JET Programme and its objectives in Japan. Next, we will discuss the so-called "hidden curriculum" (Miller & Seller 1985) of Japanese schools, which conveys heteronormative values through English classes and other school activities. We will then examine our interviews with LGBTQ+ JET teachers and how their gender and sexuality can affect their interactions with local schoolchildren and other teachers. In conclusion, we will point out how these teachers negotiated existing gender norms and cultivated understanding of sexual diversity in subtle ways within the official framework of the JET Programme.

THE JET PROGRAMME AND ITS OBJECTIVES

Since its inception in 1987, the JET Programme has accepted thousands of college graduates from overseas every year, hiring them to assist in foreign language education and intercultural exchange at public elementary and secondary schools, as well as local government offices, across the country. It is designed to promote internationalization at the local level and change Japanese people's attitudes towards other cultures by encouraging their grassroots personal interactions with people from outside Japan. Japanese officials proclaimed it as "the greatest initiative undertaken since World War II related to the field of human and cultural relations" (cited in McConnell 2000: x).

Although the JET Programme is often discussed as an educational initiative to improve children's English-language skills (Naka 2006), it also has a political and economic objective to strengthen relations with Japan's allies, as indicated by the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The programme was designed in the hope of minimizing bilateral tensions in the mid-1980s, when Japan was suffering the effects of a bitter trade war with the United States (US). At a Japan–US summit in 1986, the JET Programme was presented as a "gift" (McConnell 2000: 1) by the Nakasone administration to the US delegation, inviting young people from the US to foster international perspectives in Japan. In this sense, the programme is a form of public diplomacy, attracting young college-educated English speakers to Japan and promoting understanding of Japanese culture (McConnell 2000; Tsuido 2007; Metzgar 2017). According to Emily Metzgar (2017), this has been a more significant outcome of the programme than its language-teaching results.

The mix of politics, economics, and education in the JET Programme deepens a contradiction between the objectives of the official educational curriculum and the actual demands of public education. Understanding other cultures (*bunka*), customs (*fūzoku shūkan*), and lifestyles (*seikatsu*) has been continuously under-

lined as one of the main objectives of compulsory English-language education in the postwar period in the national teaching guidelines – for junior high schools from 1958 and for elementary schools from 2007 onwards.[2] Despite modifications to the guidelines over the years, it is unclear exactly what is meant by these terms or how to measure students' understanding of them. Moreover, this official objective has never been the main focus in the classroom, where preparations for senior high school or college entrance examinations take precedence. Consequently, the JET Programme is difficult to fit into school education. It aims to "internationalize" children through personal interactions with language assistants from foreign countries, improving their foreign language skills and changing their mentality, but schools are expected to train children to fit into the Japanese social order and prepare them for examinations in which international communication skills play no role. Japanese teachers therefore need to reconcile "the mandate for internationalization with the equally strong desire to protect local interests" (McConnell 2000: 7).

Regardless of the relative importance of the objectives – be it the "internationalization" of local communities, English language education, or public diplomacy – the programme has been designed on two premises. Firstly, Japan is considered a homogenous community to which the JET participants bring new "international" perspectives. Secondly, "internationalization" can be achieved by personal interactions. However, previous research on the JET Programme (e.g. McConnell 2000; Rosati 2005; Metzgar 2017) have failed to consider how individual attributes such as gender, sexuality, race, disability, and personal appearance can condition personal interactions, being preoccupied instead by the more "obvious" differences between languages and cultures.

For instance, sexuality issues have been a cause of woe between Japanese officials and JET participants. In 1991, LGBTQ+ JET participants who organized a support group named "GayJet" expressed their frustration that officials were censoring and discriminating against queer voices.[3] After almost one year of negotiations, the Japanese facilitator organization Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) recognized them as a special interest group but forced them to change their name to "Stonewall", because CLAIR itself was threatened that the government would "retract funding and benevolence if the

2 The teaching guidelines can be accessed on the National Institute for Educational Policy Research (2006) database. See, in particular, 1958, 1977, 1989, 1998, 2007, and 2016 for junior high schools, and 2007, 2016, and 2020 for elementary schools.

3 A support and networking group for gay JET participants was first organized by JET participants in 1988. It was initially called ATAGO (A Terribly Apropos Gay Organization) but was changed to ATAGLO with the inclusion of "L" for "lesbian" shortly later (Stonewall Japan 2022).

use of the word 'gay' was included in its associated publications" (Stonewall Japan 2022). Thus, LGBTQ+ people have participated in the JET Programme since its inception and fought for their existence and safety, while the Japanese officials have sought to repress and deny their voices and visibility.

The repression of LGBTQ+ gender and sexuality issues by Japanese officialdom can affect JET participants negatively, especially those who work in rural areas with limited access to LGBTQ+ communities and support. The following sections explores how the personal attributes of LGBTQ+ identifying JET teachers – especially gender and sexuality – have affected their experience and communications with students and teachers in Japanese rural schools.

THE "HIDDEN CURRICULUM" AND HETERONORMATIVITY IN SCHOOL SETTINGS

A key concept for understanding the LGBTQ+ unfriendly educational and work environments in Japanese schools, is the "hidden curriculum", which refers to unspoken or implicit values, behaviours, procedures and norms that are taught informally and usually unintentionally in educational settings. Though such expectations are not explicitly written, the hidden curriculum may reproduce and reinforce certain behavioural patterns, professional standards, and social beliefs (Miller & Seller 1985), such as the socialization of students to gender roles (Best 1989) and racialized categories (Anyon 1981). While it can be similar to the official curriculum, it can also convey values contradicting the official objectives of education. According to Gerald Walton (2005), the hidden curriculum becomes evident when seen through a critical lens, specifically one that explores the nature of power and privilege in education and the harmful implications for disadvantaged students. He argues that for students who are marginalized through constructs of identity such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, class, physical and mental ability, and sexuality, the effects of the hidden curriculum can render their school lives particularly challenging to negotiate and even to survive.

Critical analysis of those unquestioned and therefore "hidden" aspects of school life, especially in feminist studies, has revealed that schooling functions to reproduce various inequalities in society (Bowles & Gintis 1977). For instance, in the Japanese official curriculum there is no explicit sexist expression, but this does not mean that schools are free from sexism. Until the 1990s, it was an unquestioned and common practice for schools to compile student directories in which all male students were first listed in alphabetical order, followed by female students in alphabetical order. As these lists were often used in organizing students' activities, always placing boys first, they reflected and reinforced the

implicit sexist order in everyday life in school. Such practices contradicted one of the official aims of school education, to realize the "equality of the sexes", as stipulated in Article 2 of the *Kyōiku kihon hō* (Fundamental Law of Education) issued in 1947 (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology [MEXT] 2022).

Similarly, research on sexual minorities has highlighted the ways in which heterosexuality is normalized and regulated in society (Epstein & Johnson 1994; Redman 1994; McKay 1998). For example, even in Canada, where same-sex relationships became legal in 2005, schools continued to be sites of salient heteronormativity, where heterosexual pairings were validated, classroom discussions about sexuality tended to be limited to heterosexual contexts (Walton 2005), and students who did not fit into these implicit norms were marginalized. Mano Yutaka (2020: 30–34, 52–57, 167–182),[4] a Japanese researcher and a former junior high school teacher who was openly gay, has criticized the heteronormativity in the official and hidden curriculums of Japanese schools, which makes the space of compulsory education unpleasant or even unbearable for gender and sexual minorities. Though there is no explicit homo/transphobic expression in the postwar teaching guidelines, fixed gender roles and heterosexuality were tacitly presupposed. Mano (2020: 178) suggests that the absence of homophobic expressions, despite there being no legal protection for sexual minorities in Japan, may only be a consequence of the stance of the Ministry of Education, which takes heterosexuality for granted and lacks any consideration of sexual minorities.

Indeed, Japanese officials have a history of holding homo/transphobic views, although they are not codified in the official teaching guidelines. A document issued by the Ministry of Education in 1979, on the "deviant" behaviours of pupils in junior high schools and high schools, used the terms heterosexuality (*iseiai*), homosexuality (*dōseiai*), and sexual abnormality (*tōsakusei/ ijōsei*). It listed homosexuality and behaviours that can be understood as an expression of transgender as a form of "sexual perversion" or "sexual abnormality" and categorised them under sexual misconduct (Monbushō 1979). This was based on a heteronormative presumption that youths who showed homosexual or transgender tendencies were essentially "heterosexuals" who expressed their desires in a deviant way. The Ministry regarded the "sexual perversion" of youths as a transitory deviant behaviour of adolescence caused by difficulties fitting into society or restraining their sexual desire, even though it was aware of the gay civil rights movement in the US:

4 All Japanese names in this paper are presented in Japanese order: family name first, followed by the given name.

> In many cases those pupils become normal when they grow up, but some of them continue to be homosexual even when they become adults. Although one can observe a gay civil rights movement in the United States, generally speaking it may disturb the healthy development of heterosexuality. At the same time, it is against healthy social morals and may destroy the sexual order. Therefore, it is unacceptable in this modern society. (Monbushō 1979: 62–63)[5]

In this context, LGBTQ+ teachers, who were adult but "still gay" and displayed "deviant behaviors", were regarded by Japanese officials as inappropriate educators who should not be visible in Japanese schools as they may "disturb" pupils' "healthy development of heterosexuality" and "destroy the sexual order".

It was only in 1994 that the Ministry of Education removed homosexuality from the list of deviant behaviours. This may reflect the social context, with the spread of Japanese feminist movements from the 1970s and gay rights movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Even so, Japanese officials' basic ideas of sexuality prevailed, as seen in how they threatened CLAIR to force the name change from "GayJet" to "Stonewall" in the early 1990s.

Since the 2010s, the Ministry of Education started to recognize sexual minorities to a limited degree in some of its publications. While the government had previously regarded transsexuality as a "temporary perversion of adolescence", it has now started to refer to it with the term "gender identity disorder (GID)" (*seidōitsusei shōgai*) following the Act on Special Cases in Handling Gender Status for Persons with Gender Identity Disorder in 2003. In 2017, when the guidelines on bullying prevention (*ijime bōshi*) were updated, specific references to GID (*seidōitusei shōgai*), sexual orientation (*seiteki shikō*), and gender identity (*sei jinin*) were added as elements to be taken into account to prevent bullying. Nevertheless, the documents only regard gender and sexual minority children as potential victims of harassment who need special care and do not question the binary of gender identities nor consider nonbinary gender expressions as a possible gender identity development. Rather, the Ministry of Education started to place emphasis on heteronormativity by using expressions like "in adolescence, interest in the opposite sex will start" (Komiya 2008; see also Watanabe 2006) from 1989 onwards without mentioning sexual minorities. Thus, even though the Ministry has slightly developed its understanding of sexual minorities and recognized the existence of LGBTQ+ people, everyday school life is still dominated by heteronormative values.

Mano (2020) is a groundbreaking researcher who has challenged the Japanese heteronormative hidden curriculum, drawing on his experiences as an openly

5 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Japanese are by the authors.

gay public school teacher who mainly used a class for moral education to teach about sexual minorities and the problems of social prejudice towards them. He reported that there was hesitation among teachers to mention the term *dōseiai* (homosexuality) in classrooms, which indicates their covert homophobia (Mano 2020: 217–222). Mano's study and his own experience shows how it is difficult to teach issues of non-normative gender and sexuality in Japanese schools. Owing to such environments, it is easily imaginable that most queer educators in Japan do not open up about their own gender and sexual identity to their students and colleagues. However, as LGBTQ+ activist educators urge, it is important not only for LGBTQ+ students but also for all students to expose and confront such heteronormative aspects of the hidden curriculum in order to create school cultures of caring, respect, equity, and safety for all students (see, e.g. Walton 2005; Mano 2020).

JET teachers are usually in a more vulnerable position compared to Japanese fulltime teachers. Many are not Japanese nationals and are on a fixed-term contract. They are often isolated, living in a rural area for the first time. Many JET teachers cannot speak Japanese and are unfamiliar with Japanese culture and social codes, or their own legal rights as a worker. How do LGBTQ+ JET teachers survive in Japanese schools? Do their non-normative gender and sexuality affect their experience? Do they usually teach students LGBTQ+ issues as do the few Japanese openly gay teachers such as Mano, or are they completely in the closet? In the following sections we will examine the experiences of LGBTQ+ JET teachers who struggled in this heteronormative school culture and discuss how their everyday teaching activities have potentially negotiated and transformed such heteronormativity in subtle and careful ways.

SCHOOL EXPERIENCES OF LGBTQ+ JET TEACHERS IN JAPAN

Method

In order to identify LGBTQ+ JET teachers' school experiences and struggles, we conducted semi-structured interviews via Zoom and Webex with five LGBTQ+ identifying current and former JET teachers. Virtual interviews were used due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions from March to October 2021. We approached interviewees through Stonewall Japan, the peer support group for LGBTQ+ JET participants. Before the interview, interviewees were explained the interview objectives, types of questions to be asked (see the Appendix for a list of guiding questions for the interviews), and how the interview records

would be used. Written consent was then obtained and the interview was audio-recorded with the interviewee's permission. All the interviews were conducted in English, transcribed, and examined by qualitative content analysis. The breakdowns of the interviewees are [A] a white gay man from the US (JET program participation: 2001–2003), [B] a black gay man from the US (2014–2016), [C] a lesbian Hispanic woman from the US (2016–2018), [D] a non-binary white person from Canada (2019–), and [E] a queer Japanese American woman from the US (2019–).

Negotiating local gender norms

After finishing their initial training on understanding the JET Programme, most JET teachers are usually sent to the countryside where locals have few opportunities to communicate with people from different cultures. JET teachers, conversely, often do not have enough knowledge about the local community, which causes them anxiety over their gender and sexuality. All of our interviewees were sent to rural areas, small towns without any accessible LGBTQ+ communities in which one can communicate in English.

All our interviewees were already openly LGBTQ+ before they arrived in Japan in the 2010s and some of them even committed to LGBTQ+ activism in college or privately. However, they all told us that they remained in the closet or at least did not actively come out to their colleagues in Japanese schools because they were in their new living place and wanted to avoid additional problems which might emerge through their coming out. All interviewees related that their colleagues and students did not ask about their private lives, and therefore they could be easily in the closet if they chose.

However, people who embody a non-conforming gender find it harder to stay in the closet. The JET Programme advises participants to follow a conservative gender code to make a good impression in the workplace, which does not expect the possibility of gender-queer participants:

> Making a good first impression is very important in Japanese society. The best way to achieve this at your workplace is to be as conservative as possible for the first few weeks, no matter how hot and humid it is. Wearing a suit, having a well kept hairstyle, wearing a minimal amount of jewelry and makeup, removing facial piercings, keeping perfume/cologne to a bare minimum, and covering up tattoos are some of the best ways to do this. Men may also want to enquire about the facial hair policy. (CLAIR 2013: 8)

Two of our interviewees self-identified as non-binary/transgender when they were JET teachers. Although there are no official rules forbidding JET teachers

to express their sexualities, being non-binary, or transgender, the interviewees were forced to negotiate with the hidden curriculum. [C], who had identified as a trans man before they[6] came to Japan, faced a difficult situation. [C] told us that they did not want to stress the situation by being a non-feminine woman in the countryside as it was already tough enough for them to be non-white, single, and a "woman". Their negotiation with Japanese gender norms even changed their own gender perspectives and identity:

> For women, right, like, I am a lot more feminine now than I was before I came to Japan. In part, because, like, so actually in college for a while, I identified as a trans man. And then, when I came to Japan like obviously I couldn't, you know, be like "hey actually, I'm a dude". *laughs* But I no longer identify as that but, you know, especially because I was in the countryside and like, I didn't look white, I wasn't white, I wasn't married, there were all these things that, like, I was, that they weren't really wanting me to be and I didn't want to, like, further, I guess, add stress to the situation by being, like, a non-feminine woman. [C]

For avoiding unexpected troubles caused by their gender expressions, [C] said that they tried to follow Japanese gender norms especially about their appearance such as growing their hair longer and removing body hair as they had experienced one of their students pointing out their arm hair.

> So I had to act and dress in certain ways that I wasn't really, like, you know, used to or that really, like, reflected me. And then, like, even things like... like arm hair [...] And so, like students and like, you know, people like, would normally, like "Oh wow, like, you have hair on your arm! That's like wow" [...] once I was told that, like "Oh, you have hair, that's weird" I was like "oh wait you're right, like, all of the women here don't have hair, but I have hair; this is something wrong", you know. [C]

[C] told us that these everyday gender norms such as a gaze towards arm hair affected their mental health and their self-image was impacted.

Conversely, [D], another non-binary JET teacher, did not change their appearance due to the existing gender norms in their school. In their case, their gender expression did not cause a problem although they were not outspoken about their identity in the workplace:

> I identify as non-binary. I don't really like the idea of gender being imposed upon me. But I've never like outright said that at work, people just acknowledge that more often. I'm wearing like men suits and men's dress shirts and it's just never been a problem. [D]

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6 In the interviews, we also confirmed each interviewee's preferred pronouns.

[D] expressed their gender with formality in the workplace such as wearing suit jackets, pants, and dress shirts. Their strategy was friendliness and flexibility. For avoiding their title and pronoun in conversation, they ask students and colleagues to call them by their first name without a Miss or Mr. But when they were misgendered, [D] was flexible and not offended:

> But if my JT [Japanese teacher] was to like refer to me and say she or her that doesn't bother me as much. I'm fine with they/them or she/her pronouns or he/him. I'm really very flexible whenever it comes to it and I don't feel the need to correct anyone. [D]

In [D]'s case, their gender expression did not attract much attention from their students and colleagues compared to [C]'s case so that they did not struggle to negotiate the gender norm like [C]. The two cases of transgender or non-binary identified JET teachers indicate that it is highly dependent on the environment, whether gender minorities can comfortably work in Japanese schools.

We also found out that teachers can have different experiences depending on the school. While [C] felt forced to adapt themself to the Japanese gender norms in their junior high school, they had a different experience when they were working for a special school for pupils with a disability or learning difficulty. In the special school, gender norms seem to have been less strict and relationships among colleagues as well as pupils have been closer than ordinary Japanese schools. Moreover, the age of children may have been another factor that made LGBTQ+ JET teachers' experiences different. As [C]'s junior high school students were teenagers so they had already internalized gender norms related to their appearance, such as fashion and beauty, which meant [C] needed to negotiate with those perspectives by, for example, shaving their arm hair. [D], however, did not experience such a gaze from students as they were in elementary school. According to [D], the most personal question they received was what color they like.

These episodes indicate the diversity of LGBTQ+ teachers' experiences. [C]'s experience shows how vulnerable transgender teachers can be in school. Even students' gaze over gender-minority teachers can function as gender policing and affect their self-esteem and mental health. Their story suggests that teachers do not always have control over students and especially in the case of teachers from minority backgrounds, the power dynamics with their students can be unstable and threatening.[7] Japanese educational studies have started to discuss transgender students' experiences in school (see, e.g. Doi: 2015; 2020) works. However,

7 For the experience of transgender teachers in the US, see McCarthy (2010) and Wells (2017).

transgender teachers' experience in school is still underrepresented in academic research and many boards of education within local municipalities have not yet prepared to protect transgender teachers (Tadokoro 2022). Our interviews revealed that the embodiment of non-normative gender expressions can cause distress for teachers, even if they are in the closet.

Challenging the hidden curriculum through personal interactions

Although all the interviewees were not openly expressing their gender and sexual identity in school, some of them have tried to expand students' and colleagues' perspectives supporting LGBTQ+ friendliness and diversity through personal interactions. JET teachers are teaching assistants and not supposed to change the school curriculum. Rather, they are expected to support Japanese teachers and educate children to fit into the existing social and cultural norms. The JET guidance strongly encourages participants to follow Japanese social rules and customs (CLAIR 2013: 8–11). One interviewee, who came to Japan in 2001, also told us that he was told by an instructor not to try "enlightening" the children:

> What he was saying was, we shouldn't be putting our expectations, our mindset, our culture into Japan. That's not our job. Our job is not to change Japan. Our job is not to make Japan more Western or more American or more anything. If anything, our job is to adapt to this country that we are in. And yes, of course we are expected to be cultural ambassadors and share things from our country but that's very different than trying to change people. [...] So, certainly, at that time, for me to even think about "hey let's put a gay topic into a lesson", I would have felt, that would come across as me imposing an American mindset into a Japanese educational system and that wasn't my job. [A]

Despite such official restrictions, some JET teachers who came to Japan after 2014 sought opportunities to make LGBTQ+ visible in their schools, which is comparable to Mano's (2020) efforts and activities. [B], an African American gay man who was also in the closet in Japanese schools, told us that in offering a lesson about the history of racism and civil rights movements in the US for an English class, he included gay rights movements, showing a picture of the Gay Pride parade.

> One time I did a lesson about kind of like the history of racism in the United States and, like, civil rights movements, so I talked to the students about that, and in the lesson, you know I had a picture of you know, like a Gay Pride parade or something, because it was part of the civil rights movement and the teacher was kind of shocked that I showed.....that picture, yeah, she was like "what, are these gay people?", and I was like yes, *laughs* so...She was kind of surprised, but I don't... The students didn't, you know, they didn't say anything. [B]

Although it is already common to regard gay rights movements as part of the civil rights movements in US history, his English lesson seems to have shocked the Japanese teacher. This indicates, however, that [B] made visible sexual minorities who had been completely invisible in the English class. [C] also mentioned LGBTQ+ issues in their classes about English newspapers, in which LGBTQ+ related news was arranged with other regular news topics such as international economic and sports issues.

These efforts of LGBTQ+ JET teachers seem to have engendered a small amount of LGBTQ+ visibility in Japanese schools, among not only the students but also the Japanese teachers and staff. [C] recalled becoming close to a school librarian who showed them LGBTQ+ related texts in the library:

> I think the librarian at that school, she was very young and she noticed and she actually like, for about two months, had this like whole LGBT bulletin. [...] she brought these LGBT books in Japanese and she was like "hey, hey look!" [...] she did that, so it was possible, and the books were there. So, I don't actually know myself if, you know, the books were accessed or if it like served any students, but at least, there was a resource that like, became available, once I was there, yeah. [C]

In the case of [D], they did not include topics of sexual minorities in their classroom, since they were teaching elementary school pupils and it would make their English class too complicated. However, [D] did challenge gender norms by intentionally changing gender-biased sentences in worksheets.

> But when it comes to like making worksheets and stuff at like the elementary school level, when we start learning about he and she, like he is a doctor, she is a nurse, I intentionally make worksheets that change what like the generic gender roles would be. For example, in one worksheet I remember, I made a sentence, where it was like she is a construction worker and like grade five teacher came up to me, afterwards, these like women can be construction workers? And I was like yes. *laughs* I encourage the idea with kids like there's no real limitations from gender. Unfortunately I can't really talk about the idea of like non-binary and like other genders with the kids because that would be really complicated when we're just trying to help them understand he/she. I don't want to like overwhelm them. [D]

[D] did not come out in the school, and did not include topics of sexual minorities in their classroom. However, [D] also did not change their outlook and taught English wearing men's suits. This might have made their colleague associate [D] with an LGBTQ+ identity.

> At one point my, my junior high school had a presentation about LGBTQ+ identity and sexuality, it was very interesting and so after it was done, I went to the teacher and I was like "Oh, this is so cool that you're teaching this". And none of my teachers can really speak good English, but she was like telling me what she knew and like showing me all these like diagrams that she had that explain things. And after she was done talking she like looked me in the eyes and she was like if you need someone to talk to I'm here. So I was like "okay" *laughs*. [D]

This episode indicates that their colleagues assumed they were interested in LGBTQ+ issues or identified with LGBTQs and tried to show their support. In this sense, [D] 's existence itself has possibly made some queerness visible in the school even though it was not specifically indicated. As we mentioned previously, both the official curriculum and the hidden curriculum of Japanese schools are dominated by heteronormative values and visibility of sexual minorities is very little, if not at all. Students who cannot fit into the heteronormative culture are marginalized and the compulsory educational space becomes unpleasant or even unbearable (Mano 2020: 30–34, 52–57, 167–182). Even though our interviewees did not come out in their school, these episodes show that they utilized a few opportunities to make queerness visible and caused some reactions in the educational space.

CONCLUSION

Our interviewees' experience in Japanese schools indicate how issues of gender and sexuality can cause distress for LGBTQ+ identified JET teachers and how the schools have failed to offer a safe environment for them. They faced gender policing in everyday life such as hairstyles and body hair removal and felt they had to change themselves to avoid further problems. The JET Programme is designed to improve Japanese people's intercultural understanding and international perspectives through personal interactions with people from other countries. However, its design does not reflect the factors influencing personal interactions, including race, gender, sexuality, and disability. For gender and sexual minorities, personal interactions can be a source of vulnerability and risk, triggering anxiety over unfavorable troubles caused by their gender and sexual identity. The fact that all our interviewees chose to be in the closet in Japanese schools shows that such anxiety affects LGBTQ+ identified JET teachers' quality of life, even affecting their mental health in some cases.

At the same time, however, LGBTQ+ identifying JET teachers have also utilized small spaces where they can make LGBTQ+ visible. Through their

outlook, worksheets, and additional information for English classes, they have negotiated the existing gender and sexuality norms and LGBTQ+ indivisibility in classrooms and cultivated diversity. The interviews indicate that even though being in the closet, they could still create opportunities in which Japanese staff and students may have become aware of the dominant heteronormativity at school. In this sense, their teaching activities can also be regarded as a type of activism.

In many cases, school lessons advocating LGBTQ+ rights and protection are held by openly gay teachers, who have long-term fulltime contracts, or by openly gay activists and NPO staff who hold a lesson as a guest teacher (Mano 2020).[8] The LGBTQ+ JET teachers were, however, in the closet and had limited contracts (1–3 years). Their position as a non-Japanese assistant for Japanese teachers and restrictions imposed by the JET Programme guidance made the JET teachers' activities subtle compared to teachers like Mano, who is out and had a fulltime position. These subtle activities of LGBTQ+ JET teachers have been widely overlooked in previous studies on the program. Thus, the efforts of LGBTQ+ JET teachers to expand diversity, and their possible impact on human rights education in Japanese schools need to be evaluated and investigated further. Furthermore, effective measures should be taken in order to secure their safety and mental health in Japanese schools.

It is also important to explore the minority experience caused by intersectionality. The concept of intersectionality proposed by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) has grown in popularity, and it is now being applied in various fields of research, including education. In educational science it has been applied in analyzing the experiences of students and teachers who fit multiple minority categories (Bhopal & Preston 2012; Davis, Olieve & Brunn-Bevel 2015). In Japan as well, intersectionality is starting to be recognized as an important concept to understand the lives of social minorities, as a popular academic magazine *Gendai shisō* recently featured the possibilities of "intersectionality" in its May 2022 issue. The intersectional experiences of multi-minority teachers should be further investigated and analyzed in Japanese schools.

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APPENDIX: QUESTIONS FOR LGBTQ+ JET PROGRAMME PARTICIPANTS

1. What are the reasons which made you decide to come to Japan (study, career opportunity, or other personal reasons)? How long have you been in Japan?
2. Have you sought out any LGBTQ+ organizations in the community before you came to Japan? If so, what organizations did you look for? Did you find what you were looking for?
3. If you did not find what you were looking for, have you found what you need from other means, such as online groups, a circle of friends, etc.?

   a. Have you had any challenges accessing LGBTQ+-related community, services or education while living in Japan? If so, please describe these challenges.

   b. Have you found a network of LGBTQ+ friends as a support system? What positive experiences, if any, have you had in accessing LGBTQ+-related community, services or education while living in Japan?
4. Were you openly LGBTQ+ in your country before you came to Japan? Did you work for LGBTQ activisms before you came to Japan?
5. Are you openly LGBTQ+ in Japan, including your workplace? Have you had any challenges living in Japan (including gender & sexuality issues but any other issues), especially working in schools?
6. Was/is it difficult to come out in your workplace in Japan? Has your coming-out changed positively or negatively your experience in the working place?
7. How does your experience living in Japan compare to your other community before coming to Japan?
8. Did you talk about gender and sexualities (not as your identity but as a general topic) with your Japanese colleagues and students? Have you met any LGBTQ+ students in your school?
9. Do you think your experience in Japan has affected your idea of gender and sexuality?
10. Are there any other experiences (either successes or challenges) you'd like to share with us about seeking services and/or education from LGBTQ+ organizations while living in Japan?
11. How did the COVID-19 situation change your life in Japan?
12. Did you find difficulties and challenges during the COVID-19 situation in Japan? Does it affect you as a LGBTQ+ person? If so, please describe these challenges.

"MY MUSIC CAN'T BE COMPARED TO ANYTHING DONE IN THE PAST": FEMALE SINGER-SONGWRITERS AND THE "NEW" IN THE NEW MUSIC OF 1970s JAPAN

Lasse Lehtonen

Few could have anticipated the massive consequences when singer-songwriter Takeuchi Mariya's (b. 1955) song "Plastic Love" (1984) became a YouTube hit in the late 2010s. Within a few years, "Japanese City Pop" – loosely denoting Japanese popular music of the 1980s – became part of a global trend that has significantly molded both the domestic and the global market in recent decades. The effects of this boom are visible in the rising sales of records and business in record stores, as well as in the surge of anthologies, disc guides, and other books about Japanese popular music in the 1980s. It has been speculated that this boom was caused by a nostalgic longing for an imaginary 1980s Japan, but less attention has been given to the fact that "Plastic Love" was made in specific social conditions and emerged from a specific category of performers: the female singer-songwriter.

As many writers have noted, the rise of female singer-songwriters was one of the most remarkable new trends in Japanese popular music in the 1970s – the decade during which Takeuchi made her debut (Take 1999: 168–180; Kikuchi 2008: 252–253). This change emerged at a highly intriguing time, as it coincided with the elevation of feminism to a broader (albeit relatively brief) media trend. I have previously argued that the proliferation of female singer-songwriters marked a significant change in Japanese popular music and, by extension, Japanese society, by expanding women's agency in the production of popular music. In this respect, female singer-songwriters also embodied many of the changes that contemporary liberal feminist organizations endorsed in Japan (Lehtonen 2021; 2022).

However, previous research has not adequately assessed the very concept of the singer-songwriter as a vehicle for promoting changes in popular music from a gender perspective. My focus in this paper is on these changes, with specific reference to a genre known as "New Music" (*nyū myūjikku*). The genre triumphed in the 1970s, and was especially well known for its prominent female singer-songwriters such as Takeuchi, Arai Yumi (b. 1954), Itsuwa Mayumi

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(b. 1951), and Nakajima Miyuki (b. 1952). Several writers have noted the changes in musical styles and images that New Music brought to Japanese popular music. Focusing on contemporary discourse about prominent female singer-songwriters and New Music, I argue that the purported "newness" of the genre was largely defined and constructed in gendered terms.

My data comprises writings about singer-songwriters in various written media, ranging from music magazines to celebrity and fashion journals. I focus mainly on the "female singer-songwriter" as a media construct. Consequently, I do not argue that female singer-songwriters formed a monolithic category as artists, as notable differences existed between individuals (e.g. Take 1999; Lehtonen 2021). I do recognize the limitations of this approach, but I argue that a focus on media discourses could reveal broader phenomena than were constructed in largely gendered terms (cf. Whiteley 2000; Reitsamer 2018). For the same reason, I refer to interviews with and writings about female singer-songwriters as public discursive "acts". In other words, instead of assessing (or validating) the veracity of these views, I view them as constructions that participated in creating images of and discourses about singer-songwriters and popular music (cf. Reitsamer 2018).

In the following I will first introduce the concept of the singer-songwriter in Japan. I will then briefly examine how the popularity of the 1970s "New Music" genre was connected with the rise of female singer-songwriters. Following this discussion, I address aspects of the purported "newness" of New Music by analyzing the influence that women musicians had on contemporary discourse about the genre. In the conclusion, I discuss how an examination of female singer-songwriters in the 1970s serves to enhance understanding of both Japanese popular music history and gender in Japanese society.

JAPANESE DISCOURSES ABOUT SINGER-SONGWRITERS

"Singer-songwriter" is a surprisingly loaded term. At the simplest level, it denotes a musical artist who performs his or her own material. At the same time, however, it incorporates several implications and expectations about authenticity, originality, and authorship – qualities that distinguish singer-songwriters from other types of musicians. As Christa Anne Bentley (2018) shows in her analysis, the evaluation of these concepts has largely been constructed on discourses about composers and poets in Romantic nineteenth-century Europe. Although Bentley's discussion focuses on North American singer-songwriters, her observations are also largely applicable to the discourse about singer-songwriters in Japan. For example, the quintessential definition in a Japanese guide to singer-

songwriters in the early 1980s strongly echoed the discourses established in the US (Fujita 1983: 6):

> A professional lyricist or composer who accepts a commission must write a song that matches the aims of the production. For example, even if they are worried or going through difficult times, they have to write a cheerful song if they are asked to. In contrast, since the time they were unknown amateurs, artists known as singer-songwriters have been writing songs about their surrounding world and their thoughts about society. This fresh expression captivated the hearts of young people who had lost interest in the rut of general popular songs.

In only a few lines, this account covers virtually all the focal implications about singer-songwriters in Japan. First, it emphasizes their *authenticity* by presenting them as uncompromising, individual authors. This authenticity is also implicitly based on the notion of *non-commercialism*, as singer-songwriters with their artistic aspirations are contrasted with professional songwriters working on commercial commissions. Second, it points out that singer-songwriters offer an *alternative* to mainstream popular music and the popular music industry with their "fresh" (and, again, implicitly non-commercial) expression. Third, it indicates that singer-songwriters represent a *youth culture*, being listened to by "young people". Whereas the two latter implications also applied to earlier rock musicians – mainly male rock groups – the focus on individual creativity and the musician's authorship distinguished singer-songwriters from other categories of performers.

These implications did not emerge by accident, being intertwined with the origins of the singer-songwriter in Japan. Following American examples for the most part, the category of singer-songwriter originated with the advent of politically oriented folk songs in the late 1960s – a development that is inseparably related to the emergence of ideological youth movements and folk songs as a means of channeling political protest. At that time, the "authenticity" of singer-songwriters was constructed on images of anti-commercialism and ideological sincerity, expressed through the explicit articulation of social protest. These attributes were not compatible with the mainstream record industry, hence the foundation of several new record companies that sought to offer Japanese popular music an alternative to commercial pop. Founded and managed by rock and folk musicians themselves, companies such as URC, Elec and, later, For Life Records claimed to release their music based on the musicians' uncompromised artistic views and aspirations instead of focusing on commercial profit (e.g. Azami 2004; Bourdaghs 2012).

However, the discourse implying uniform non- or anti-commercialism among singer-songwriters, largely nurtured in contemporary music magazines and by the musicians themselves, can easily be contested. Relatively soon after the most idealistic years of the late 1960s, folk singer-songwriters such as Yoshida Takurō (b. 1946) shifted from performing songs with a political message to a relatively limited audience to singing about romance with openly commercialist aims.[1] Although such an act of "selling out" was detested by the original and politically engaged folk audience, the commercialization of folk soon became a major trend. As a co-product, it also popularized the singer-songwriter as a performer category – or a commercial "brand". At this time, numerous singer-songwriters also began to work for the mainstream industry as professional songwriters, many of them becoming highly successful and triumphing commercially (cf. Ogawa 1988).

Japan, of course, was not unique in this respect, as a similar change in folk and rock music also took place in Europe and North America. This trend was closely related to broader social developments in Japan, however, coinciding with the general conception in the early 1970s that 90 percent of Japanese people represented the middle class. This and the purported "cultural equality" of the Japanese people resulted in the gradual calming down of political youth movements and led to a new consumerist boom (Gluck 1993: 75–76; Nagahara 2017: 210–211). The change was symbolized in popular music by the emergence of a new musical genre in the early 1970s, namely New Music.

NEW MUSIC AND SOCIAL DISCOURSE

The genre name "New Music" was coined around the mid-1970s to denote music composed by singer-songwriters that differed musically from the politically oriented folk songs of their predecessors. What, then, was "new" about it? At least, it was typically characterized in contemporary discourse by the following attributes.

First, and foremost, the singer-songwriters concerned emphasized their authenticity and artistic integrity. Second, unlike their predecessors in folk they were openly commercialist in their goals, collaborating with the mainstream industry and not dismissing commercial success as a sign of degraded aesthetic value. Nevertheless, they justified their commercialism by insisting that they were making music largely for the sake of individual self-expression rather than money. Third, deviating from earlier folk, New Music artists typically empha-

1 For example, there is a stark difference between Yoshida's politically oriented "Ningen nante" (Oh, you People, 1971), released by Elec Records, and "Kekkon shiyō yo" (Let's Get Married, 1972), released by the mainstream company, CBS Sony.

sized their apoliticism and seldom wrote songs about social issues. Their recordings also typically incorporated elaborate sound production, which further distinguished the music from the earlier DIY ethos of folk artists. Fourth, the music was often characterized by stylistic hybridity: it was an umbrella term that could incorporate virtually anything stylistically from pop and rock to R&B and disco.[2]

Of course, although based on the general discourse about New Music, these characterizations are not defining attributes of every artist categorized within the genre. For example, even if the focus was on singer-songwriters, groups were also included. Some individual singer-songwriters remained skeptical about collaborating with the mainstream industry, even if they were otherwise open about their commercialist goals. Furthermore, although the discourse indeed highlighted the "newness" of the genre, in fact it is situated along a continuum of popular music genres that emphasize the individual creativity of their artists (see Lehtonen 2021: 117–118). Many folk artists were assigned to the New Music category when the name was coined, for example, then when the term began to fall out of use in the early 1980s, its singer-songwriters were defined as "City Pop".

These observations demonstrate that genre definitions and barriers are never absolute, nor do they merely relate to musical style (Holt 2007). More critical voices in contemporary Japanese media also point out the ambiguousness of New Music. For example, editor-in-chief of the influential *Young Guitar* magazine Yamamoto Takashi characterized New Music as a "label that record companies conveniently put on the music" (Shūkan heibon 1978: 47). In other words, it was also a marketing concept purporting to appeal to audiences by emphasizing the "freshness" of the genre. This proved to be highly profitable, however: New Music became the most commercially successful genre of Japanese popular music around the mid-1970s, as its artists dominated the hit charts. Their dominance was reflected in the crisis facing contemporary music programs on television caused by the rising popularity of New Music, for example. Because many of the artists followed earlier folk musicians in refusing to perform on television – as a way of emphasizing their "authenticity" and distinguishing themselves from mainstream pop – the programs could no longer claim to represent the "most popular artists" (Ogawa 1988: 114).

Another major aspect of New Music is that the nexus of the definitions mentioned above, as well as the popularity of the genre, also signaled a change in

2 These characterizations are based on typical discourse about New Music in contemporary Japanese media. For general overviews of various aspects of New Music, see Tomisawa (1979); Ogawa (1988: 45–54); Take (1999: 154–165); Azami (2004: 174–179); and Bourdaghs (2012: 161–163).

values among young people. Whereas the ideological youth of the late 1960s was highly politically aware, and demonstrated against the US because of the Vietnam War, the early 1970s saw the emergence of a generation that embraced consumption as a virtue and idolized fashion and popular culture in the US (Komori 2011). This change is also to be observed in the discourse about New Music, as many of the artists sought to distinguish themselves from earlier folk by being openly commercial and consistently "apolitical" in their interviews, for example. In this context, New Music could also be interpreted as an antithesis of earlier folk, thereby indeed symbolizing "new" times in Japan. This observation is best explained via Christopher Small's (1998) theory of "musicking", which defines music as an act: something that is constantly constructed and reified culturally via social participation. Accordingly, practices of producing and consuming music both reflect and participate in defining social values. From this perspective, both musicians making New Music and their audiences participated in reproducing the new paradigms of individualism and consumption.

GENDERED DISCOURSES ABOUT NEW MUSIC

The position of women in the history of Japanese popular music is ambivalent. Although there have almost always been highly popular and idolized women singers – beginning with Matsui Sumako (1886–1919), the singer of the first modern hit song in Japan – their positions as songwriters and producers have been much more limited. Despite the highly successful songwriting debuts of lyricists Iwatani Toshiko (1916–2003), Arima Mieko (1935–2019), and Yasui Kazumi (1939–1994) in the 1950s–1960s, for example, it is no exaggeration to state that the world of songwriting was largely occupied by men (cf. Igarashi 1999; Take 1999: 168–169).

In this historical context, the large-scale debuts of numerous female singer-songwriters in the 1970s marked a significant change in Japanese popular music. Artists such as Itsuwa Mayumi and Arai Yumi – both of whom debuted in 1972 – attracted notable attention in the media and became commercially highly successful around the mid-1970s. In light of this popularity, the female singer-songwriter was established as a new category of performer in the mid-late 1970s with the debuts of dozens of female singers who wrote their own music.[3] This

3 Some notable examples of female singer-songwriters who debuted in the 1970s include (in alphabetical order) Nakajima Miyuki, Ōnuki Taeko (b. 1953), Ozaki Ami (b. 1957), Takeuchi Mariya, Taniyama Hiroko (b. 1956), Yagami Junko (b. 1958), Yano Akiko (b. 1955), and Yoshida Minako (b. 1953). For a more comprehensive introduction to female singer-songwriters in Japan, see Nagai (2013).

change effectively marked the first time in the history of Japanese popular music that women were publicly and widely recognized as *creators*. Given the gender biases that had previously restricted women's roles in music production, their roles in popular music were largely redefined via the concept of "singer-songwriter", which functioned as a vessel that endorsed their creative skills and social agency (Lehtonen 2021; 2022: 72–81).

I will now consider the role of female singer-songwriters' work in constructing the discourse about New Music. I argue that all these attributes were formulated on gendered discourses, and that female musicians – and the discourses about them – took a focal role in negotiating the barriers of these concepts. The space I have here is too limited to address New Music comprehensively, therefore I focus in my discussion on three factors that were integral to the typical discourse: 1) commercialism; 2) stylistic hybridity; and 3) instrumentation.

Commercialism and authenticity

Commercialism is a highly ambivalent issue in popular music. Although the genre is, by definition, commercial, "equating music manufactured for commercial profit with inauthenticity and degraded aesthetic value" has consistently been one of the most common paradigms in the public discourse on the subject (Waksman 2018: 60). In other words, an artist in the field of popular music– such as a singer-songwriter – must paradoxically be able to assert his or her non-commercialism while at the same time aiming for as high sales figures as possible (Weisethaunet & Lindberg 2010). Equating commercialism and inauthenticity also incorporates an implicitly gendered valuation. As many feminist studies on popular music point out, music by and for women tends to be associated with commercialism and artifice and, based on these attributes, has been trivialized and indeed equated with "degraded aesthetic value" in public discourse (e.g. Whiteley 2000; Reitsamer 2018).

The extent to which these biases are applicable to all genres of popular music and related discourses today is debatable, but it did concern Japanese popular music when New Music began to emerge (Minamida et al. 2019: 70–71). A fitting concrete example is the discourse surrounding so-called idol singers (*aidoru*). Idols constitute a specific category of young – in the 1970s almost exclusively female – pop performers, who not only sing and dance but also work as media personalities whose images are widely utilized on various commercial

sites.[4] Meticulously groomed by their management companies for commercial profit, their television appearances form an indispensable facet of this mediated performance. Consequently, idols in the 1970s tended to be regarded as media personalities with only a secondary link to music, such that their songs, which may well have played an important role in the everyday lives of their fans, were relatively neglected in the public discourse. Unlike the New Music singer-songwriters who were considered profound "artists", for example, idols were largely viewed as "superficial celebrities", notable primarily for their visual presentation (Inamasu 1989: 7; 102).

The gendered premises of this discourse could also explain why male artists who "went commercial" were so harshly criticized in the early 1970s. Folk singer-songwriter Yoshida Takurō is a fitting example. When he became a widely idolized artist who both triumphed commercially and did not shun commercial collaboration with mainstream media, he was condemned by the traditional, politically oriented folk listenership. It was not unknown, for example, for audiences of his performances at folk venues to yell "Go to hell!" at him (Take 1999: 140). A similarly critical stance was also commonly taken against male rock groups that, according to their previous fans, had "sold out" by collaborating with the commercial popular music industry.

Interestingly, female singer-songwriters of New Music did not typically face such criticism – even if their songs were disseminated in the commercial media and when they openly declared their wish to become popular. This difference could be attributed to expectations of "authenticity" attached to different genders: Brian and Gina Cogan (2006) argue that music by and for women has been associated so strongly with commercialism that it has come to represent a category of "authenticity" for women musicians in Japan. Accordingly, it appears that female singer-songwriters managed to leverage the stereotypical, negative equivalence of commercialism and women to produce a discourse whereby their music could be both commercial *and* authentic precisely because of their gender. It should be pointed out here that this paradigm shift accompanied a change in Japanese popular music more widely: although the emancipation of commercialism originated with female singer-songwriters, it soon came to characterize New Music in general, including that produced by male artists. In other words,

4 There were popular male idols such as Tahara Toshihiko (b. 1961) and Kondō Masahiko (b. 1964) in the 1980s, but it was not until the end of the decade that the Hikaru GENJI group launched a more prominent mainstream boom of male idols in Japan. Tahara, Kondō, and Hikaru GENJI were affiliated with the Johnny & Associates management company, which dominated the male idol market for decades.

the gendered discussion surrounding female singer-songwriters played a focal role in establishing the image of New Music as "commercial yet authentic".

Stylistic diversity

Writing about New Music, music historian Kikuchi Kiyomaro (2008: 248) points out one difference between male and female singer-songwriters in the 1970s:

> Female singer-songwriters began to stand out from the beginning of the New Music era. Male musicians obstinately held on to their stance as folk and rock singers, and even when the industry sold their compositions as New Music they clung to their [earlier] style. [...] Women singer-songwriters, on the other hand, adopted the [musically diverse] style of New Music from the beginning.

Given that Kikuchi writes about artists rather than discourses of artist categories, his conceptualization is problematic in that neither "male" nor "female" performers constituted monolithic groups. Yet, this discussion also coincides with new stylistic formations that several female singer-songwriters either instigated or notably fostered. Artists such as Arai Yumi, Itsuwa Mayumi, and Ozaki Ami dismissed genre barriers as altogether needless at an early stage, and experimented with stylistic variety even within individual albums – thereby potentially opposing the ideal of a uniform "concept album" nurtured among rock and folk musicians. It may have been such experimentation that prompted Arai Yumi (Matsutōya 1984: 9) to argue later that she "created" New Music:

> [A]s for New Music – though I dislike the term – well, I created that kind of music. After all, I started from zero. So, my music can't be compared to anything done in the past.

Although comments such as these certainly demonstrate the important role of individual creativity in the discourse about New Music, they also ignore the fact that popular songs typically emerge from artistic collaboration. Even if writers such as Kikuchi celebrate the stylistic diversity in the music of female singer-songwriters, for example, it is noteworthy that most of them did not arrange their own songs but hired professional (mainly male) arrangers (e.g. Kawase et al. 2016).[5] It is therefore worth asking why professional arrangers were so inclined to experiment with stylistic variety especially when arranging songs by women.

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5 Notable exceptions include Itsuwa Mayumi and Ozaki Ami, who arranged many of their songs themselves.

One answer to this question could lie in contemporary discourses about musical sound and gender. Music was perceived in notably gendered terms in contemporary music media (and in Japanese society more broadly) that made a strict binary distinction between "women" and "men". For example, the music of female singer-songwriters was often referred to as "womanly" (*onnarashii*) or "girly" (*onnanokorashii*), even if nothing in the lyrics or the performance pointed heavily to their gender.[6] Although such characterizations could certainly be read as discursive acts that enforced binary gender roles, they may also relate to the musical sound, arrangers being more inclined to give songs by women a softer and arguably more "feminine" sound than the music of men (see Lehtonen 2022: 98–99). Indeed, and partly because of such arrangements, it has subsequently been argued that female singer-songwriters introduced a more "feminine" aspect to Japanese popular music (Nagai 2013: 141). In other words, the stylistic variety that is characteristic of New Music could also be understood as gendered discourse. As with commercialism, it later came to define the genre for both male and female performers.

Instrumentation and social change

Several popular female singer-songwriters, including Asakawa Maki (1942–2010) and Iruka (b. 1950), defined themselves primarily as folk musicians and accompanied their singing with the acoustic guitar, but it was significantly more typical for Japanese singer-songwriters in the 1970s to play the piano. Indeed, the piano was an essential part of the image of singer-songwriters such as Itsuwa Mayumi, Taniyama Hiroko, Yano Akiko, Yagami Junko, Kosaka Akiko (b. 1957), and Kubota Saki (b. 1958). The focal role of the piano may have been influenced to some extent by immensely successful Western singer-songwriters such as Carole King, to whom Japanese artists were often compared and who even performed on Itsuwa Mayumi's debut album. However, regardless of whether such an influence existed or not, the piano soon came to symbolize the female singer-songwriter in New Music.

As Inoue Takako (1999: 60–63) points out, the association of women with the piano was so strong in contemporary Japan that it was virtually customary in mixed-gender bands that a woman would play keyboards. On the other hand, it was the guitar – especially the electric guitar – that symbolized masculinity and

6 Such examples are abundant in record reviews in *Young Guitar* and the *New Music Magazine*.

was mainly associated with men in the public discourse.[7] For example, *Young Guitar* magazine ran a column in the 1970s and 1980s entitled "Guitarist vs. beauty", featuring a dialogue between a guitarist and a young woman such as an actress or a singer. Implying that guitarists are male by definition, the column constructed the guitar primarily as a vehicle for masculine expression.[8]

The piano also marked a significant cultural difference from the guitar, which symbolized the collective and democratic values of the political (and musical) folk movement. It was easy to carry a guitar from one place to another, making it ideal for accompanying collective singing in outdoor spaces. In the popular imagination, anyone could grab an instrument with which to accompany their singing, and perhaps even to record it. Being a gifted performer was of secondary importance; the equal opportunity to make music if one felt like it was much more significant (Azami 2004: 169).

The piano, in turn, had long been associated with affluence, and playing it required some musical education (Tokita 2010). It functioned as a marker of artistic seriousness, musical education, affluence, and individuality – all factors that differentiated New Music from earlier folk music. Although in accordance with its popular image Japan in the 1970s favored the conception that no divisions existed between the cultural activities of different social strata, classical music did carry an aura of artistic and intellectual depth (Nagahara 2017: 210–211). This image was also embraced by several women singer-songwriters who often pointed out their background in classical music: such a stance was adopted by Arai Yumi, Itsuwa Mayumi, and Ozaki Ami, for example. In other words, many female singer-songwriters incorporated a focal role in constructing the artistic and affluent image of New Music in terms of its instrumentation.

CONCLUSION

The discussion in this article covers only a few elements of New Music that were "new" in the genre from a gender-specific viewpoint. However, I wish to emphasize how strongly they were interlinked. Commercialism was related to images

7 This association was certainly limiting, as there were many amateur and some professional female guitarists in Japan at that time. For examples, see issues of the *Young Guitar* magazine in the 1970s and 1980s.

8 It should be noted, however, that *Young Guitar* did not exclude women as guitarists, having introduced a new column entitled "Gal Guitar" in the early 1980s that focused on them. Although certainly "othering" women guitarists by implicitly representing them as an exception from the "norm" (men), the magazine nevertheless did recognize their work. At the same time, it renewed its introductions of amateur guitarists – namely, young readers of the magazine – by introducing not only "guitar kids" (who were almost exclusively boys) but also "guitar gals".

of affluence, and the piano represented both the arguably "feminine" sound of female singer-songwriters while at the same time functioning as a powerful tool with which to assert individual creativity. Consequently, I suggest that the changes female singer-songwriters introduced to Japanese popular music were indicative of a shift in broader social values. In this respect, the "new" in New Music should be understood as an introduction and negotiation of expressions that were read in gendered terms.

I should point out that I have only discussed the "female singer-songwriter" as a relatively uniform performer category, which admittedly is limiting. I justify this approach by focusing on discourse instead of individual performers but suggest that a more solid understanding of the roles and positions of female singer-songwriters would require further analysis of the differences between individual artists. Furthermore, my discussion only covers the 1970s and New Music, and the concept has changed over time. For example, the new boom of women singer-songwriters in the late 1990s – including artists such as Utada Hikaru (b. 1983), Shiina Ringo (b. 1978), Onitsuka Chihiro (b. 1980), and aiko (b. 1975) – again marked a change in Japanese popular music with their novel approaches to sound and lyrics (Take 1999).

Changes in the positions of women musicians and female singer-songwriters may reveal fascinating conceptions about music, but it is worth noting that such conceptions never emerge in a social vacuum. As widely mediated media discourse, popular music provides an arena for the construction and negotiation of gendered expressions. Therefore, I hope that this account will facilitate further discussion, and underline the fact that popular music, as a strong media discourse, has a major role in disseminating images of gender.

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STATE IDEOLOGY IN KOREA UNDER THE CHOSŎN DYNASTY AND ABOLITION OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED *NOBI*

Sangwon Shin

INTRODUCTION

> It is claimed that the inheritance of *nae/si nobi* (government-owned *nobi* 內寺奴婢) status originates from Kija (箕子) for the purpose of moral edification (*kyohwa* 敎化). However, how could a cruel system come from the sage king? I do not think this is likely (*Sunjo sillok* 1801:1/1/28).

King Sunjo, in the declaration regarding the abolition of the *nae/si nobi*, rejected the belief that Kija (箕子), Korea's legendary sage king, had introduced this system for the purpose of moral edification.[1] This objection suddenly highlighted the historical context. A decade earlier, King Chŏngjo strongly defended Kija's belief regarding the *nobi* status ('slave' 奴婢) and system ('slavery' 奴婢制). The belief was that the *nobi* originated from Kija's Eight Rules (*P'alcho kŭmpŏp* 八條法禁) for moral edification, and that is why 'the distinction between noble and base social statuses' (*myŏngbun* 名分) was justified under the Chosŏn dynasty (*Sukchong sillok* 1689:15/12/13; *Chŏngjo sillok* 1789:13/1/30; 1790:14/4/7). Two different assertions from the two kings regarding Kija's involvement with the *nobi* lead one to question: "Why did King Sunjo object to the belief?" and "Where did the assertion originate?" This emerged from the state ideological movements of Neo-Confucianism.

Three ideological movements occurred during the Chosŏn era. The Third Ideological Movement, which began in the eighteenth century, ushered in changes regarding the understanding of the *nobi*. Previous research focused on socio-economic issues and politics rather than the ideological transitions affecting the *nobi*. Some studies focused on the ideology of the Chosŏn dynasty for social statuses, such as the *yangban* lineage, transformation of the Confucian society,

1 This research is the initial stage of a study about the relationship between state ideology and abolition of the government-owned *nobi* system.

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and Confucian social structures (Palais 1996; Miyajima & Kim 2009: 289–318; Miyajima 2003: 121–149; Kim 2014: 163–182; Deuchler 2015; Kim 2015; Yi 2016). However, none of these directly dealt with the *nae/si nobi* or the *nobi* system. Nevertheless, previous research did contribute significantly towards the understanding of the *nobi* and developed *nobi* studies. Despite this, several questions remain unanswered. For instance, how did state ideology influence King Sunjo to discontinue the *nae/si nobi* system?

Thus, this study focuses on ideological elements. Kings had enacted policies regarding the *nae/si nobi* in society in accordance with the Third Ideological Movement for state ideological justification. Kings' endeavours accomplished the state's ideological conditions, which were reflected in the taxation policies and corporal bondage as well as the usage of the Confucian rhetoric for the *nae/si nobi*.

NOBI STATUS IN CHOSŎN KOREA

Yangban (兩班) was the elite ruling class and *yangin* (良人) was the commoner class under the Chosŏn dynasty. The *Nobi* were at the bottom of the social hierarchy (Deuchler 2015: 2–3, 5). *Nobi* is a composite word formed from *No* (奴) meaning a 'male slave' and *Bi* (婢) signifying a 'female slave'. The *Nobi* consisted of two broad groups, namely, the privately-owned *nobi* (私奴婢) and the government-owned *nobi* (公奴婢). The former were owned as property by individuals, whereas the latter were owned by the government. *Nae nobi* (內奴婢) and *si nobi* (寺奴婢) provided their labour and service for their governmental owners, the Royal Treasury (*naesusa* 內需司) and the central government offices, respectively. These two groups of *nobi* constituted the majority of the government-owned *nobi*; hence, generally, the government-owned *nobi* were referred to as the *nae/si nobi* under the Chosŏn dynasty (Deuchler 2015: 1–2).

NOBI AND THE STATE IDEOLOGY

The Chosŏn dynasty witnessed three ideological movements aimed at coping with the changing political circumstances. These were related to the ideological succession of the Confucian Enlightenment (k.*to* 道 c.*tao*) and achievements of *naesŏng* (內聖) and *oewang* (外王) in the state ideology, Neo-Confucianism. The founders of Chosŏn Korea and later rulers endeavoured to establish a Confucian state in Korea. For this, the ideological movements were the consequence of the kings' and ruling classes' endeavours. The founders persistently sought to embody the Great Peace Period (太平聖代) as an ideal Confucian state under the

Chosŏn dynasty by proclamation to succeed the Confucian Enlightenment of the Confucian sage kings Yao (堯 r.?–?), Shun (舜 r.?–?), and Yu (禹 r.?–?), who led to the Great Peace Period in ancient China. The ideological succession refers to the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (k.*tot'ong* 道統 c.*tao-t'ung*). The Confucian Enlightenment (*to*) was transmitted by the orthodox line of succession from Yao to Shun and then to Yu. Only those who were seen as being 'men of the superior virtue' (k.*kunja* 君子 c.*junzi*) on "the throne" were able to transmit the Confucian Enlightenment (*to*). After the early Chosŏn period, the ruling class proclaimed another type of Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (*tot'ong*), the Transmission of Learning of the Confucian Enlightenment (k.*tohak tot'ong* 道學道統 c.*daoxue tao-t'ung*) by men of superior virtue (*kunja*) without the throne (Yu 2011: 54). Contrary to the general perspective, Chosŏn Korea underwent another change. Kings in the eighteenth century pursued the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (*tot'ong*) by Yao, Shun, and Yu connected to Kija.

The Great Peace Period initiated by Yao and Shun could be accomplished by achieving *naesŏng* and *oewang*. Efforts to achieve the same entailed the three Transmissions for the three aforementioned ideological movements. *Naesŏng* and *oewang* were the core terms for these movements. *Naesŏng* refers to an individual acquirement, which was the "achievement of the Confucian Enlightenment (*to*) by the cultivation of personal morality". The achievement of *naesŏng* depended on individual elements. This feature determined a struggle for demonstrating its achievement. *Oewang* refers to "exerting the Confucian Enlightenment (*to*) of the *naesŏng*, in an actual society by politics". Only the king, if seen as a man of superior virtue (*kunja*) on the throne, was able to "exert his *naesŏng* in the actual society as *oewang*" (Yu 2011: 47, 54). *Oewang* had a specific procedure for demonstrating its acquirement. It was demonstrated through the institution of *samjae* (三才), which consisted of Heaven (天), Earth (地), and Human Beings (人). The thinking originating from the unity of these three (k.*ch'ŏnin habil* 天人合一 c. *tiān rén hé yī*) (Hong 2000: 36) is heavily entrenched in the *samjae*. From this perspective, people are connected to heaven because that was the principle (*li* 理) and material force (k.*ki* 氣 c.*qi*) which created human beings, humanity, and society. A king, as a human being, communes with heaven for the Confucian Enlightenment of Heaven (天道 or 天) or the Confucian Enlightenment, so the king ultimately represents a tangible form of the Confucian Enlightenment in society on "earth" for his subjects. This could only be achieved by a king who had established the theoretical underpinning for key ancient institutions (*koje* 古制) (Mun 2006: 39–72). The ancient institutions were part of the *oewang* of Yao and Shun, such as the Calendar (曆法) and Harmonics (樂) as Confucian bodies, which were considered an indication of *samje* (Kang 2009: 84; Mun 2006: 54, 64; Song 2009: 30).

Ideological justification for the nobi *system*

The justification for the *nobi* system was based on three ideological ideas: the distinction between noble and base social statuses (*myŏngbun*), moral edification (*kyohwa*), and the belief of Kija. The distinction between social statuses was the basis of social hierarchy in Korea. According to this idea, the principle is untainted, but material force impeded the untainted principle, and this distinguished people into noble and base (Ho 2011: 180). Humans were believed to be born with the principle (*li*) and material forces (*ki*), but some people had more material forces than others. People who possessed more material forces had a flawed natal morality (Kye 2008: 75). This categorised people into a social hierarchy wherein men who had the principle (*li*) were the ruling class, and people whose material forces interfered with the principle had to obey (Kim 2004: 69-70). This had been the ideological cornerstone for the *nobi* status under the Chosŏn dynasty. The natal morality of the *nobi* was made up of ambiguous material forces, and this determined the lower status of the *nobi* and rendered them suitable only for menial labour (Deuchler 2015: 6).

Moral edification (*kyohwa*) was a necessary instrument to edify Koreans' brutal and indigenous features. This was strongly entrenched in the Korean belief that Kija had instituted the *nobi* system for edification. Moral edification constantly justified the *nobi* system throughout the Chosŏn period. Kija edified barbaric Koreans through the *nobi* system and the rest of the Eight Rules (*P'alcho kŭmpŏp*), and thus, Koreans became fully aware of a sense of shame (廉恥) and righteousness (禮義) (*Sejong sillok* 1439: 21/5/3). Nevertheless, the intended moral edification was not completed in every part of Korean society even after Kija (Ki 1998 A: 375; B: 406). Hence, the *nobi* system had to continue to ensure the continuation of moral edification. Additionally, Kija's moral edification was regarded as the same achievement of *naesŏng* and *oewang* as that of the legendary Chinese kings Yao and Shun. It reinforced the inheritance of the belief and confirmed the ideological status of the *nobi* system. Kija also completed *naesŏng* and imposed it in Korea through the Eight Rules (*P'alcho kŭmpŏp*) as part of his *oewang*. The *nobi* system was involved in these rules and hence was believed to be an element of Kija's *oewang*.

This was possible because Kija was considered to be the legitimate successor of the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (*tot'ong*). The Confucianism of Kija moved into Korea because the Great Plan with Nine Divisions (*hongbŏm Kuju* 洪範九疇) was brought to Korea by Kija (Chŏng 1978: 399). The Great Plan with Nine Divisions refers to reinstituting order in society through the Great Nine Principles (U 1994: 235). The Records of the Grand Historian (史記) and the

Commentaries on the Book of Documents (書經集傳) made it clear that Kija was the proper successor of the Confucian Enlightenment who held the Great Plan with Nine Divisions (*Hongbŏm Kuju*), which was passed on from Yu. Kija brought this over to King Wu of Zhou (武王) after the fall of the Shang dynasty (商) (Sin 2016: 57; *Sŏgyŏng Chipjŏn*). Kija did not occupy the throne; therefore, he was unable to exert his Confucian Enlightenment at that time. This is why the transfer from Kija to King Wu "was for the continuation of the Confucian Enlightenment" (Ch'ŏe 2001: 410). King Wu enfeoffed Kija with the Kija Chosŏn after the transfer. Kija founded Kija Chosŏn (箕子朝鮮, 1100 BC – AD 195) (Kim 2004: 395–397) through this enfeoffment and was able to exert his *naesŏng* from the throne by the Eight Rules by instilling *oewang* in the actual society: "The Confucian Enlightenment was brought into Korea when Kija moved into Korea" (Ch'ŏe 2001: 410). The sequence of the succession of the Transmission of Confucian Enlightenment (*tot'ong*) shows that Kija had achieved *naesŏng*. If this had not been the case, he would not have succeeded to the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment from Yao, Shun, and Yu and then conveyed it to King Wu.

The First and Second Ideological Movements

The ideological understructure of the Chosŏn dynasty required kings to pursue Confucian politics based on the Confucian Enlightenment of the Confucian sage kings. The kings sought the Confucian state by succeeding to the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment. King Sejong (世宗 r.1418–1450) triggered the First Ideological Movement for the Confucian state during the Chosŏn era. He achieved possession of *naesŏng* and *oewang*, in keeping with the legacy of the Koryŏ dynasty (高麗, 918–1392) and the institution of *samje*. King Sejong had both ideological justifications, so he could be considered a Confucian sage king who had succeeded to the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (*tot'ong*) from Yao, Shun, and Yu. He did not have to prove his morality for the achievement of the Confucian Enlightenment. The Koryŏ legacy was the mechanism for consecrating sovereigns (Kim 2010: 262) and promulgated the view that sovereigns had already achieved *naesŏng*. This meant that the Neo-Confucian literati (*sarim* 士林) could even compare the kings of the early Chosŏn dynasty with the legendary Confucian kings, Yao and Shun (Kim 2010: 262). As for the *oewang*, Sejong devoutly pursued the ancient institution of the *oewang* of Yao, Shun, and Yu and published the *Sinch'an kyŏngje sok yukchŏn* ('Newly Compiled and Amended Six Codes of Administration' 新撰經濟續六典), the Calendar (曆法) and Confucian Ceremonial Harmonics (*Aak* 雅樂). Those were the Confucian bodies and structures for the pursuit of *samje*.

The usurpation of the throne by King Sejo (世祖 r.1455–1468) from Tanjong (端宗r.1452–1455) in 1455 (Deuchler 2015: 71) and the restoration of King Chungjong (中宗反正) due to the tyranny of Yŏnsan Kun (燕山君 r.1495–1506) in 1506 eroded the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment by Sejong and undermined the completion of *naesŏng* by the Koryŏ legacy. A new ideological movement arose from the ruins of the Transmission of Sejong and challenged the completion of *naesŏng*. The main agents of this new movement were now the Neo-Confucian literati. They asserted a need for individual endeavours to "learn" the Confucian Enlightenment for *naesŏng*. This was the beginning of the learning of the Confucian Enlightenment (*tohak* 道學). They declared that they were the successors of the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment from Confucius (孔子 551–479 BC). This was the Learning of the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (k. *tohak tot'ong*). This movement deprived kings of the position of rightful successors to the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (*tot'ong*). Kings became Confucian students who had to cultivate personal morality to attain Confucian Enlightenment.

However, this movement introduced factional conflicts into politics, although it seemed to prevent wrongful governance by kings. The Confucian literati and students had organised political factions in accordance with Confucian academic schools under prominent Confucian scholars who represented each school (Haboush 1999: 60). Conflicts between the factions were the inevitable consequence, and as the conflicts became deeper, the faction that was unsuccessful in the power struggle had to be eliminated from politics and executed. This deepened conflicts even more and threatened politics itself (Yi 2007: 89).

The Third Ideological Movement

Chosŏn Korea witnessed the Third Ideological Movement, which was aimed at overcoming factional conflicts. In contrast to the earlier Ideological Movements, the Third Ideological Movement found *naesŏng* in Kija and subsequently pursued *oewang*. Therefore, this movement was connected to the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment (*tot'ong*) from Kija. The Third Ideological Movement sought *naesŏng* and *oewang* together through impartiality (蕩平) and Royal Perfection (*hwanggŭk* 皇極) in the Great Plan with Nine Divisions (*Hongbŏm kuju*) and the reformation of Confucian bodies. This was possible because of the historical narrative that Kija was a man of superior virtue who had "assumed" the Confucian Enlightenment as part of the Great Plan with Nine Divisions (Ch'ŏe 2001: 401; Chung 1995: 13). Impartiality was one of the Great Nine Principles and it referred to the impartial governance of a sovereign. According to Royal

Perfection (*hwanggŭk*), only a king was qualified to assign a principle for the Confucian Enlightenment in society (U 1994: 101, 235). The king could thus bring about political stability and equilibrium in factional conflicts by imposing impartiality through Royal Perfection. Consequently, the movement carried forward the Politics of Impartiality (*t'angp'yŏng* 蕩平政治) and the Homogeneous Governance system of a sovereign (齊民支配體制). The system depended on a king equally and individually ruling all his subjects, namely the homogeneous subjects of the state, and each of them having an equal position below the king (Kim 1998: 239–240).

Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo claimed to have succeeded in the Transmission, so that they could successfully claim to possess *naesŏng* by possessing the Great Plan with Nine Divisions. This determined that kings could be free from the supervisory pressure to pursue self-cultivation in line with the guidance of the Confucian literati, which were essential requirements during the Second Ideological Movement. The claim of the successors of the Transmission from Kija justified the view that kings had already completed *naesŏng* because if they were not men of superior virtue, they would not have been able to succeed Kija. This was identical to the Transmission between Kija and King Wu discussed earlier: if Kija had not been a man of superior virtue, he could not have held the Confucian Enlightenment as part of the Great Plan with Nine Divisions (even temporarily), or transferred it to King Wu. Kija could transfer his *naesŏng* to his successors on the premise that he already achieved the Confucian Enlightenment. Therefore, the founders of the Chosŏn dynasty declared that they had legitimately succeeded the Confucian Enlightenment from Kija and the Kija Chosŏn. Kings could therefore easily claim *naesŏng* through the succession of the Transmission from Kija without having to submit proof of *naesŏng*.

The *oewang* of the Third Ideological Movement was undertaken in the same way that Sejong had done in the First Ideological Movement. Sage kings had responsibility for the production and reformation of the Confucian bodies and civilisation (Kim 2011: 119). *Naesŏng,* through the succession of the Transmission of the Confucian Enlightenment from Kija, offered the "sage king" status to Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo. With this status, these kings reformed the Confucian institutions, which were established by Sejong for the embodiment of these ancient institutions. *Soktaejŏn* (the Supplemented Great Code, 續大典), *sok oryeŭi* (the Supplement to the Five Rites of State, 續五禮儀), *Simnirok* (Records of *simni* [hearings], 審理錄), and the *Taejŏnt'ongp'yŏn* (the Comprehensive National Code, 大典通編) were the consequences of the reformation and production of Confucian institutions during Politics of Impartiality (*t'angp'yŏng*). More than 260,000 books, similar to those mentioned above, were published (Kim 2011:

119), representing a shift towards *oewang* in the eighteenth century. The initiative to 'dredge the river bottom' (濬川), as undertaken by Yŏngjo, was of profound significance, as it reminded people of the most distinctive *oewang* of King Yu, which was called "embankment".

The factional politics lessened when politics became king-centric, and the Confucian literati lost their ideological supervisory status to the kings (Han 2016: 425–457). Chŏngjo declared that he was the core and the principal agent for fairness and impartiality in the state (Song 2015: 158). Kings in the Politics of Impartiality (*t'angp'yŏng*) took delight in their "sage king" status as state ideological and political leaders over the Confucian literati. This resulted in a rethinking of the ideological and political structures, which comprised one king and his subjects, not only within the state ideology and politics, but also in society. This marked the emergence of the homogeneous governance system of the king. Subjects, *yangban*, *yangin,* and *nobi*, had a homogenous status under the king. It was used to justify the homogeneity of all social statuses under a king in Korea.

EMBRACING THE *NAE/SI NOBI* UNDER THE KING'S HOMOGENEOUS GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

Impartiality in the tribute paid by and corporal bondage of the nae/si nobi

The homogeneous governance system was embodied in society, for example, the impartiality affected the *nobi* and others in terms of tribute, corporal bondage, and the usage of Confucian rhetorical terms. The homogeneous process regarding the tribute was accomplished through three tribute reductions in 1748, 1755, and 1774 (*Taejŏn hoet'ong, Hojŏn, Yobu*). They were compiled into the *Taejŏnt'ongp'yŏn,* unlike other reductions arising from crop failures and famine. These reductions were related to politics. Although Yŏngjo set the standard of impartiality, this had still not achieved political stability. In 1740, Yŏngjo took the solution of letting a specific political faction lead the Politics of Impartiality (Yi 2004: 338–339). However, this solution ran against the ideological core that only a king could set standards in society. The more the expedient solution of Yŏngjo was applied, the more the political criticism and disputes increased and doubts were raised regarding the Politics of Impartiality and the loyalty of bureaucrats (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1740: 16/01/27; 2/22; Chŏng 2011: 68). This led to the need for restoring *oewang* for the sagehood of Yŏngjo. He sought impartiality among subjects, such as reductions in the tribute paid by the *nae/si nobi* in 1748 during a leap month (*Taejŏn hoet'ong, Hojŏn, Yobu*). The reduction of 1755 reduced the tribute of male

and female *nae/si nobi* by half a bolt. The third reduction in 1774 formally put an end to the tribute on female *nae/si nobi*. The reductions in 1755 and 1774 had been undertaken as part of the restoration when sovereignty was challenged in Yŏngjo's reign. The challenges included the Plot of Ŭlhae (乙亥獄事) and the Purge of Sado (壬午禍變) in 1755 and 1762, respectively. Those two events had a great impact on the Politics of Impartiality (Ch'oe 2004: 45). These questioned the completion of *naesŏng* and *oewang*, therefore Yŏngjo had to raise his *naesŏng* and *oewang* against those challenges.

The Plot of Ŭlhae was an attempted rebellion and an allegation against Yŏngjo that he has poisoned Kyŏngjong (景宗 r. 1720–1724) (Haboush 2001: 188). After the attempted coup, one Confucian student in the examination criticised Yŏngjo and questioned the Politics of Impartiality (Haboush 2001: 189). The initiators and contributors openly questioned whom the Politics of Impartiality applied and opened up central politics to the royal cohorts surrounding Yŏngjo (Cho 2014: 7–81, 246–250). Those were a real and practical threat to Yŏngjo, who claimed the impartiality based on completing *naesŏng* and *oewang*. This required Yŏngjo to demonstrate his impartiality. He, therefore, enacted a reduction in the tribute in the "Ordinance of reduction of tribute for *si nobi*" in 1755 (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1755: 31/2/27). This was a reduction of the tribute by half a bolt for the *si nobi* (*Taejŏn hoet'ong, Hojŏn, Yobu*). This made the tribute amount "impartial", as it was now equal to the taxation of the *yangin* (Hiraki 1982: 50).

Another challenge to the sovereignty of Yŏngjo surfaced when he later declared capital punishment for his son, Crown Prince Sado (思悼 later 莊祖, 1734–1762), in 1762. This was the Purge of Sado. This event made the contradictions of the Politics of Impartiality by Yŏngjo known to the world; "[Yŏngjo] insisted on being a father to his people, yet killed his own son" (Haboush 2001: 166–167). It greatly impaired the politics and sovereignty of Yŏngjo as a sage king on the *naesŏng* and *oewang*. Yŏngjo had to increase his sagacity and sovereignty for reassurance. He, therefore, set out two different Royal Perfections: the fundamental political principle of 1762 (*yimo ŭiri* or *monyŏn ŭi ŭiri* 壬午義理) and the re-establishment of the Politics of Impartiality. Above all, Yŏngjo endeavoured to justify the Purge of Sado by *ŭiri*, referring to "the fundamental political principle" (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1762: 38/8/26; Ch'oe 2011: 338; Chŏng 2018: 136), which was a regulation introduced as part of the discourse on the Purge (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1762: 38/8/26). After the justification, Yŏngjo participated in the enshrinement of Park Sech'e (朴世采) in the National Confucian Shrine in order to shake off the consequences of the Purge. The Politics of Impartiality through the Great Plan with Nine Divisions, Impartiality, and Royal Perfection were first raised by Park Sech'e (U 1994: 101–102). The National Confucian Shine

had significance, as it was seen as evidence of "the legitimate heir of Confucian tradition status" (Kim 2004: 111). Therefore, an enshrinement of prominent Confucian scholars was a symbolic act guaranteed to embody Confucian society for the Confucian literati (Haboush & Deuchler 2002: 15). The enshrinement of the initiator was a restoration of the ideological leadership of Yŏngjo. It formally conferred state ideological status on the Politics of Impartiality; thus, it signified that a Confucian society would be achieved through the Politics of Impartiality, as Park Sech'e had argued.

Despite this act, challenges continued against not only Yŏngjo, but also the Crown Prince, later known as Chŏngjo. A memorial pointed out the wrongfulness of the Crown Prince. Abrogation of the royal rite in the mausoleum of Sado (省墓 and 展謁) by the Crown Prince was regarded as inappropriate conduct that was contrary to the Confucian Enlightenment. The memorial was clearly against the principle of 1762 regarding the Politics of Impartiality. The initiator of the memorial was immediately taken into custody and sentenced to death (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1770: 46/11/10; *Yŏngjo ilgi* 1770: 46/11/10). Similar challenges followed even after the death sentence was carried out. In these circumstances, the Politics of Impartiality turned out to be a useful means of aggressive action by factions against their opponents. They had to distinguish which factions were genuinely making an effort to achieve the Politics of Impartiality and those who did not want it (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1772: 48/7/2). Yŏngjo said that impartiality among the factions had become ambiguous (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1772: 48/7/5). The *naesŏng* and *oewang* of Yŏngjo became blurred, and he had to cope with losing his ideological basis. This led to the termination of all tributes from female *nobi*, announced in 1774 (*Taejŏn hoet'ong, Hojŏn, Yobu*; *Yŏngjo ilgi* 1774: 50/3/11). This final reduction of tribute was an endeavour by Yŏngjo made under political and ideological pressure. Tributes from the female *nobi* were reduced as part of the impartiality, to be in line with those of the *yangin*. The reduction, as with the *oewang* of the sage king, embodied impartiality as a Royal Perfection in society. That is why those reductions were part of a "benevolence which carried on the Mandate of Heaven (大命)" (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1778: 2/2/6) because they were the achievement of *naesŏng* and *oewang*.

In accordance with the homogeneous process of tribute reductions, the abolition of corporal bondage of the *nae/si nobi* was pursued as part of the impartiality in 1745 and 1778 (*Yŏngjo ilgi* 1745: 21/7/4; *Chŏngjo sillok* 1778: 2/2/6). "The abolition of the special investigator of *si nobi* in 1745 (嶺南寺奴婢節目)" and "the Ordinance for the Abolition of the Special *Nobi* Investigators' (推刷官革罷節目)" were the result (*Yŏngjo ilgi* 1778: 21/7/4; *Chŏngjo sillok* 1778: 2/2/6). These were for the same purpose as the reductions in taxation. Bondage was abolished as a

means of restoring the *naesŏng* and *oewang* (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1764: 40/2/22; *Chŏngjo sillok* 1776: 4/1).[2] The special *nae/si nobi* investigators (*ch'uswakwan* 推刷官) who had administered the bondage took on the responsibility for bringing back the runaway *nae/si nobi*. Due to this, most central government offices and royal places had investigators (Chŏn 1978: 229), and every three years, owners of the *nae/si nobi* arranged for these investigators to apprehend and return the fugitive *nae/si nobi* (*Taejŏn hoet'ong*, *Hyŏngjŏn*, *Kongch'ŏn*).

The abolition of the special investigators of the *si nobi* in 1745 was in keeping with the reductions in the tribute. The Plot of Yun Kwangch'ŏn (尹光天, ?–?) (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1744: 20/10/17) further illustrated this. The legitimacy of sovereignty was required again by Yŏngjo because Yun Kwangch'ŏn had confronted him using the Great Instruction (大訓) and questioned the legitimacy of Yŏngjo. He published the Great Instruction to eliminate the rumour that he poisoned Kyŏngjong (Haboush 2001: 150). The termination of the special *si nobi* investigator was undertaken as a consequence of this event. It would relieve the *si nobi* from corporeal bondage, but the significance of the termination was to embody the impartiality between the *si nobi* and other subjects in terms of physical bondage. This set a standard, which was impartiality, implemented by Yŏngjo to achieve impartiality in Korean society.

The purpose behind the abolition of the special *nae nobi* investigators in 1778 was similar to the earlier abolition (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1776: 3/10). This again was to counter an attempt at rebellion, this time in 1777 (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1777: 1/8/11), as the rebellion was largely seen as a consequence of an ineffective Politics of Impartiality. The attempt was a genuine threat not to only the *naesŏng* and *oewang* of the sage sovereign of Chŏngjo, but also his legitimacy, even though it ended in failure. Chŏngjo had to restore the legitimacy through the abolition of the special *nae nobi* investigator to demonstrate impartiality to a similar extent as that of the termination of the special *si nobi* investigators.

Impartiality in the use of Confucian rhetorical terms

The Third Ideological Movement led to impartiality in the usage of Confucian rhetorical terms. The abolition of *nae/si nobi* by King Sunjo on 28 January, 1801 demonstrated the Confucian ideological justification for the abolition. It clearly showed the consequence of imposing impartiality in terms of such usage. The

2 See also *Yŏngjo sillok* 40 (1764). 02. 23 [2]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 40 (1764). 02. 23 [2]; *Yŏngjo ilgi* 40 (1764), 2. 23 [26]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 51 (1775). 12. 21 [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* (1776), 03, 10. [4]; *Chŏngjo sillok* (1776). 04. 01. [5]; *Chŏngjo sillok* (1776). 08. 06. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* (1776). 08. 19. [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 1 (1777). 08. 11. [1].

abolition was justified with Confucian rhetorical terms like the Doctrine of the Mean (中庸), "subjects should be *treated as children*" (子庶民也), subjects should be treated *as his sons, with love* (視百姓猶吾子); the Eight Rules (*p'alcho*), and the Eight State Affairs (*p'alchŏng* 八政) of the Great Plan (*hongbŏm*). Moreover, other such terms like royal governance (k. *wangchŏng*, 王政 or 王道政治 c. *wáng zhèng*), matrimony (嫁娶), grievance (冤), Balance of Heaven (和氣), and homogeneous subjects (均吾赤子) were used for the *nae/si nobi* in the Proclamation but had not applied to the *nobi* in the earlier periods. These terms helped King Sunjo highlight his concern with respect to the failure of the human imperative of the *nae/si nobi*: they were misapplied in matrimony due to heavy burdens and brutal treatment, for instance. The Confucian rhetorical terms in the Proclamation were not merely a convenient implement for providing objective truth but were applied to release "the subjective reality of the [users] of the [terms]" (Rosenwein 2010: 16). Such terms in the Proclamation demonstrated selective usage for the specific social status of *nae/si nobi*. This had significance for selective usage, which revealed the subjective reality of the users of these terms.

These terms also had ideological significance in as much as the Chosŏn dynasty chose Neo-Confucianism as its state ideology. Applying the terms was symbolic statecraft for its legitimacy by persuading the subjects about why Chosŏn Korea was right in governing them. Moreover, applying such terms on subjects was a distinctive demonstration that the kings always paid attention to subjects and sought to attain the Balance of Heaven for the Royal Governance. According to the unity of Heaven, Earth, and Human Beings, the life and conduct of human beings would affect Heaven. Their wrongful social and political conduct and subjects' grievances would adversely affect Heaven, and subsequently, Heaven would lose its balance (Shaw 1987: 155; Kŭm 2000: 6; Kim 2015: 32–34). Kings, therefore, had to look after their subjects to prevent them from raising grievances. Through the prevention of grievance, the king acquired ideological status "as the intermediary between Heaven and his people, and the carrier of a dynastic mandate" (Haboush 2001: 35–36).

An alternative aspect, of course, can be considered regarding the usage. Perhaps it was simply an individual response to each matter. This view understands that the usage of Confucian rhetorical terms could be relatively insignificant in terms of historical consequences. Contrary to this consideration, such terms contained particular sentiments which were "social signals" (Rosenwein 2010: 21) because "they are not only socially constructed and sustain and endorse cultural systems, but they also inform human relations at all levels" (Rosenwein 2010: 19-20). Therefore, "if a [sentiment] is the standard response of a particular group in certain instances" (Rosenwein 2010: 21), the Confucian rhetorical terms had social

consequences regarding the interactivity between the different social classes. This emphasized why this particular rhetoric applied to the *nae/si nobi*, rather than questioning the usage on grounds of genuine compassion for the subjects.

Indeed, Confucian rhetoric was always "the standard response of a particular group in certain instances" (Rosenwein 2010: 21). The rhetorical terms resulted in boundaries and specific allocations of rights for the particular subjects who could affect Heaven, and this group grew, with time, in accordance with the state ideological movements. In the fifteenth century, *yangban* and *yangin* were on the boundary. The Confucian rhetorical terms mainly applied to the *yangban* and *yangin*. This showed that the Chosŏn government officially regarded those with *yangban* and *yangin* status as appropriate subjects for governance. A representative memorial submitted in 1478 reported failures of marriages among descendants of the *yangban*. The initiator of the memorial explained the problem and persuaded King Sŏngjong (成宗 r.1457–1495) using plenty of Confucian rhetoric, such as poetry, *Kwanjŏ* (關雎) in the Book of Odes (詩經), the Book of Changes (易經), the Confucian Enlightenment (*to*) regarding married couples, the Confucian edification (德化), and the belief that grievance (怨) "vitiates the Balance of Heaven (傷天地之和)" (*Sŏngjong sillok* 1478: 9/4/15).

Nae/si nobi were not included within the boundary of appropriate subjects, whereas those with *yangban* status were subjects of the rhetoric. Confucian rhetorical terms had not applied to them in the early Chosŏn period, even though the matters of the *nae/si nobi* were continually discussed by the government. For example, the *nae/si nobi* population was an important source of finance when their tribute used to form a significant proportion of the government's financial resources. Kings and bureaucrats had paid attention to the fluctuation in the population. Even so, there was a difference in the use of Confucian rhetoric by kings between the earlier periods and the eighteenth century on the same issue of the *nae/si nobi* population. Hyojong (孝宗 r.1619–1659) simply asked "Why did the *si nobi* not produce more *offspring* than last year?" (*Hyojong sillok* 1655: 6/1/27). A century later, Yŏngjo discussed the *si nobi* population in 1755, but he chose the term "pleasure of married couples (夫婦之樂)" (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1755: 31/2/4) and mainly spoke of marriage between the *si nobi* rather than simply mentioning their population. This difference in the usage of Confucian rhetoric emerged during the reign of Kings Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo.

Unlike the earlier period, Confucian terms, such as grievance, affliction, Balance of Heaven, Royal Governance, homogeneous subjects, Book of Changes, and Book of Odes were freely applied to the *nae/si nobi* (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1729: 5/5/13;

Chŏngjo sillok 1779: 3/3/27).[3] In the record of the "pleasure of married couples (夫婦之樂)" (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1755: 31/2/4), Yŏngjo applied the Confucian rhetoric used for the *yangban* in the period earlier to the *nae/si nobi*.

> The Book of Changes teaches that both father and son derive from a male and female married couple [...] Even if a 50-year-old female *si nobi* is still unmarried and some female *si nobi* call strangers their husband. Because of this I cannot even swallow any rice (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1755: 31/2/4)

As evident, poetry in the Book of Odes was used for the *yangban* in the Sŏngjong period (*Sŏngjong sillok* 1478: 9/4/15), a place that the *nae/si nobi* came to occupy in the Book of Odes. It was a compilation of poetry regarded as a significant book containing Confucian philosophy and study (Saussy 1997: 519). This ideologically important book could later be accessed by the *nae/si nobi*. Yŏngjo said "I derive pleasure from the poetry, *tangp'ung* (c.*tang feng* 唐風) because the moral edification of sages remains in the poems" (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1755: 31/4/28). Yŏngjo was also concerned about the marriage of the *nae/si nobi*, and their grievances were also highlighted; the king and bureaucrats discussed how the grievances could be reduced to maintain the Balance of Heaven (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1780: 4/12/21),[4] rather than merely discussing heavy burdens and difficulties.

> there were a lot of documents appealing against the *grievance*, matters regarding the unfair imposition of tribute on neighbours and relatives of *si nobi* who are dead or missing (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1780: 14/4/7).

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3 See, for instance, *Yŏngjo sillok* 21 (1745), 4, 5. [3]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 21 (1745), 6, 5. [3]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 26 (1750), 7, 3. [1]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 29 (1753), 2, 26. [2]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 30 (1754), 1, 10. [1]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 30 (1754), 4, 29. [3]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 31 (1755), 2, 4. [3]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 31 (1755), 2, 27. [2]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 31 (1755), 4, 28. [4]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 42 (1766), 5, 9. [2]; and *Chŏngjo sillok* 2 (1778), 2, 6. [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 3 (1779), 6, 14. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 4 (1780), 12, 21. [1]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 7 (1783), 10, 29. [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 8 (1784), 8, 2. [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 11 (1787), 5, 4. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 14 (1790), 4, 7. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 14 (1790), 4, 7. [4]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 15 (1791), 1, 2. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 15 (1791), 3, 29. [1]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 17 (1793), 12, 10. [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 22 (1798), 9, 14. [1]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 22 (1798), 10, 11. [3]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 5 (1729), 5, 13; *Yŏngjo sillok* 5 (1729), 6, 11; *Yŏngjo sillok* 18 (1742), 8, 22. [1]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 18 (1742), 11, 23. [2]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 18 (1742), 11, 30. [1]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 20 (1744), 9, 15. [1]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 30 (1754), 1, 10; *Yŏngjo sillok* 30 (1754), 1, 24; *Yŏngjo sillok* 30 (1754), 10, 29. [1]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 31 (1755), 2, 12; *Yŏngjo sillok* 40 (1764), 6, 25. [1]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 44 (1768), 8, 18. [3]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 51 (1775), 4, 8. [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 7 (1783), 10, 20. [7]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 11 (1787), 5, 4. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 15 (1791), 1, 2. [2].

4 See also *Chŏngjo sillok* 11 (1787), 5, 4. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 14 (1790), 4, 7. [4]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 15 (1791), 3, 29. [1]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 22 (1798), 10, 11 [3].

CHALLENGES TO THE IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE *NAE/SI NOBI*

Reconsideration of the state ideology and the pursuit of impartiality in state policies strengthened the grip of Kija and his *oewang*. Eventually, it raised questions about the status of the *nae/si nobi*. Kija's will for the moral edification of the *nobi* as well as the distinction between the nobility and the base lower social status (*myŏngbun*) were rethought. The purpose of the Great Nine Divisions was not to justify the discrimination against the *nobi* for morally edifying the barbaric Koreans. It was the use of Royal Perfection to reinstitute order and impartiality in society. However, the continuity of discrimination and the *nobi* system did not restore order or achieve impartiality. Discussions about the legal and ideological abolition of the *nae/si nobi* had been raised, as this issue became significantly tied to the progress of the king's hold on power. Discussions about hereditary *nobi* status in 1754 were the first steps (*Yŏngjo ilgi* 1754: 30/1/10). After the first discussion, the hereditary *nobi* status was often challenged by bureaucrats (*Chŏngjo ilgi* 1790: 14/4/14; *Chŏngjo Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 1798: 22/10/12; *Chŏngjo Ilsŏngnok* 1798: 22/10/22).[5] Nevertheless, the belief and inheritance of Kija remained intertwined with the *nobi* system. Particularly, the reason for Chŏngjo's doubt about attempts and policies for changes in the *nobi* system and status (*Chŏngjo ilgi* 1798: 22/9/17; Hiraki 1982: 195) was the persistent sense of relevance of the belief of Kija. Chŏngjo's will regarding the heredity *nobi* status was aimed at preserving it because of Kija's belief about the distinction between the nobility and base lower social statuses (*myŏngbun*) (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1791: 15/3/29; *Chŏngjo ilgi* 1798: 22/9/17).

The ambiguous will of Chŏngjo did not, however, disturb the influence of impartiality on the *nae/si nobi*. Chŏngjo continually exercised the Politics of Impartiality as *oewang*. Explicitly, Chŏngjo introduced impartiality into the tribute, into the physical institution, and the Confucian rhetoric. Ironically, Chŏngjo's *oewang* had increased the recognition of the *nobi* system, and their status entering into the homogeneous process, among bureaucrats and kings, without that initially being Chŏngjo's intention. The paradoxical consequence of Chŏngjo's *oewang* was reflected in discussions that mentioned the *nae/si nobi* issues. The *nae/si nobi* had been constantly identified as homogeneous subjects. As far as Confucian rhetorical terms are concerned, Chŏngjo applied them to the *nae/si nobi,* and his replies to memorials were as impartial to the *nobi* as they were to other subjects (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1798: 22/10/11; *Chŏngjo ilgi* 1798: 22/10/11).

5 See also *Chŏngjo ilgi* 1798. 10. 11 10/19; *Chŏngjo sillok* 14 (1790), 4, 7. [4]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 22 (1798), 10, 11 [3]; *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok Chŏngjo* 22 (1798), 10, 12; *Chŏngjo Ilsŏngnok* 22 (1798), 10, 22.

Additionally, the *nobi* title became a matter of interest. Chŏngjo presented his concern about the ambiguity of any social distinction without the *nobi* title. However, he also asserted that discrimination would not be tolerated among subjects under his royal rule (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1791: 15/3/29; *Chŏngjo sillok* 1798: 22/9/14). Among the bureaucrats, there were two conflicting arguments in the discussions of the *nobi* title being used for the *nae/si nobi*. One assertion against the abolition of the *nobi* title pointed out that the *nobi* were the legacy of Kija, whereas the other postulated that the termination of the title would reinforce impartiality among subjects (*Chŏngjo Ilsŏngnok* 1798: 22/10/25). The ideological justification of the *nobi* relied on the belief of Kija lost its capacity to act against the challenges and strove for the maintenance of the *oewang* of Kija in those discussions. The counterargument against the abolition of the title claimed that the consequence of the abolition would vitiate the social distinction (*myŏngbun*). Nevertheless, the majority of bureaucrats gave credence to the abolition (*Chŏngjo ilgi* 1798: 22/10/11). Criticism of the abolition of the title was not as pronounced, in contrast to earlier periods. There was another example illustrating the pervasion of homogeneous recognition in the Chosŏn dynasty. Bureaucrats criticised the abolition on the grounds that removal of the *nobi* title only from the *nae/si nobi* would not mean impartiality for the other *nobi* groups (*Chŏngjo Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 1798: 22/10/12). This criticism showed how the significance of the legacy of Kija in terms of the ideological justification of the *nobi* had become obsolete. The pursuit of impartiality had been undertaken for political necessity, but the endeavour unintentionally undermined the belief of Kija, the moral edification of the *nobi*, and the social distinction (*myŏngbun*).

Gradual improvements in terms of impartiality in the tribute, corporal bondage, and usage of Confucian rhetoric led to the understanding that the *nae/si nobi* were becoming homogeneous subjects (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1750: 26/7/3).[6] This idea was reflected in the usage of Confucian rhetoric. For example, King Yŏngjo stated that he regarded the *nobi* as his homogeneous subjects (均吾赤子) (*Yŏngjo sillok* 1750: 26/7/3). Chŏngjo also expressed the view that the *nae/si nobi* were homogeneous subjects, just as the other subjects were, when he described the *nae/si nobi* as being the same as the others (同是吾民) who suffered from excessive *affliction* (困苦) caused by the tribute (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1784: 8/8/2). Bureaucrats were not different in the assessment of Kings Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo. One memorial in 1793 argued against the burdens of the *nae/si nobi*; the initiator asserted

6 See also *Yŏngjo sillok* 42 (1766), 5, 9. [2]; *Yŏngjo sillok* 42 (1766), 5, 9. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 3 (1779), 6, 14. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 3 (1779), 6, 14. [2]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 8 (1784), 8, 2 [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 17 (1793), 12, 10 [3]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 22 (1798), 9, 14 [1]; *Chŏngjo sillok* 22 (1798), 10, 11 [3].

that they were *homogeneous subjects* (均是民也), just like the others (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1793: 17/12/10). A local magistrate also indicated the same: "*si nobi* cannot get married to anyone. [...] however, *nobi* and *yangin* are *equal subjects*" (等是民) (*Chŏngjo sillok* 1798: 22/9/14). The homogenisation process began without the intention of abolishing the *nobi* system, yet, eventually, it led to the emancipation of the *nae/si nobi* in 1801, under King Sunjo's decree.

CONCLUSION

This study detailed how a movement to end political strife and allow the sovereigns to achieve impartiality unintentionally initiated a discourse that eventually resulted in the discontinuation of the *nobi* class system, a system that had been present from the original inception of the state of Korea. Kings Yŏngjo and Chŏngjo had to practice impartiality as Royal Perfection in society in order to retain their grip on power. This was part of royal governance in accordance with the Third Ideological Movement. The two kings who achieved *naesŏng* exercised impartiality through *oewang,* like reductions in the tribute, reduced corporal bondage, and in the usage of Confucian rhetoric. This embodied Kija's impartiality as part of Royal Perfection. The achievement of *naesŏng* and *oewang* in society led to a societal structure consisting of only one sovereign and his homogeneous subjects. All social classes of subjects were merged into one subject class, the homogeneous subjects, and they were governed by only one sovereign. In this process, the *nae/si nobi* were converted into homogeneous subjects. The achievement of *oewang* through tribute reduction, abolition of corporal bondage, and usage of Confucian rhetoric unintentionally contributed to the homogeneous inclusion of the *nae/si nobi*. At the same time, the intent of impartiality in the state ideology embodied in the aforementioned measures ran counter to the ideological belief about the rule of the *nobi* based on the Eight Rules of Kija for their moral edification. In other words, impartiality had been achieved across society, and Kija's belief regarding the *nobi* in the Eight Rules for moral edification had to be reconsidered. Moreover, the distinction between the nobility and the base classes began to lose its ideological justification. Discussions regarding the abolition of the *nobi* title illustrated this, and the interpretation of Kija's belief as well as impartiality as part of Kija's Royal Perfection represented conflicting ideological movements, which were eventually resolved through the abolitions. The ideological process of the creation of homogeneous subjects inevitably led to the Declaration of 1801 for the legal abolition of the *nae/si nobi* system by King Sunjo.

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CHU CHONGGŎN (1895–1936): LIFE AND DEATH OF A TRANSBORDER KOREAN SOCIALIST INTELLECTUAL

Vladimir Tikhonov

INTRODUCTION

The present article deals with Chu Chonggŏn (1895–1936) – one of several founders of the underground Korean Communist Party (1925) who ended up being executed during the Great Purges in the Stalinist Soviet Union.[1] The primary motivation for writing this paper was dearth of research focusing on Chu, despite his significance for the history of Korean Communist movement, and on Korean social movements of the 1920s in general. It is to be remembered that Chu was one of the main protagonists in the polemics around the Korean Products Promotion Society in the early 1920s (see Wells 1985: 843). He was also one of the major popularizers of Marxism in 1920s Korea. Back then, he was known for his work at Minjungsa, the main Marxist publishing house in Seoul (Pak 2018: 108–110), and as an editor of an important early Communist journal, *Chosŏnjigwang* (on the journal, see Kim & Kim 1986: 295; on Chu's involvement, see RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 21–22). The most important reason for his relative obscurity even in South Korean historical research (no biographical articles specifically on him could be found in South Korean academic journals) seems to lie in the (in)accessibility of sources. As we will see below, Chu moved to Soviet Union in 1927 and never returned to Korea. This period of his life is known mainly from his Comintern (Communist International, 1919–1943) file, currently kept in the RGASPI (Russian State Archives for Socio-Political History) in Moscow. This file was not easily accessible to South Korean researchers. Moreover, as the present article makes clear, even this archive does not provide us with enough material to reconstruct the full story of Chu's life in his Soviet exile. We still do not know, for example, the exact date of his death

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(1936 is assumed, since the last document in RGASPI collection is dated as early 1936, with no further mentions of Chu in documents or literature).

Aside from the author's ambition to reconstruct the picture of Chu's life in Korea, Japan and the Soviet Union, and his activities before and after his flight to Soviet territory, the article strives to answer a question which inevitably strikes anybody researching on Chu. Why did this brilliant Marxist propagandist and popularizer, a famed polemist from early 1920s' Korea, end up as a completely marginalized figure in Moscow, unable to even obtain permission to work with Korean students at the Comintern-run Communist University of Oriental Toilers (KUTV)? Why was Chu denied political trust and pushed into peripheral areas of Communist activity by Comintern, the organization to which he professed loyalty, and which acknowledged – through academically-minded representatives like Lajos Magyar, 1891–1937, a recognized Communist Sinologist – his talent as a Marxist researcher? As I will argue in my article, this denial of trust was grounded in a cardinally important trait of Comintern's organizational culture, namely its emphasis on "background" and various indications of "belonging", rather than individual merits or achievements. As Chu happened to belong to a non-mainstream Shanghai network inside the Korean Communist movement, he was neither allowed to participate in the Korea-related political work of Comintern or to return home for underground work (see RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 23 for a frank statement of the reasons why Chu, a "factional element", could not be sent back to Korea). This "formula of failure" in one's Comintern career, which the trajectory of Chu's life makes clearer, may be an important reference for research on Communist movements of the 1920–1930s in general, inside the framework of a wider sociology of anti-systemic and protest movements.

CHU CHONGGŎN – A NATIONALIST-TURNED-MARXIST

While most sources agree that Chu was born near Hamhŭng (Southern Hamgyŏng province, currently in North Korea) in 1895 (according to a questionnaire he himself filled out he was born on 19 January, see RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 24), his social origins – an important point in the Soviet classification of "belonging" – remain a moot point. He himself wanted – for understandable reasons, given the preferences which Comintern used to give to the more authentic "representatives of the oppressed classes" – to picture himself as the son of a peasant (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 33) while Comintern understood him to be the son of a county magistrate (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 23). Given that, according to Chu's autobiography, he attended a primary school in Chŏngp'yŏng sub-county

(*ŭp*) near Hamhŭng in 1906-1909 (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50), his connections with rural Korea, in any case, are beyond doubt. These connections may explain the direction which Chu's subsequent academic trajectory took. In 1909–1912, he attended an agricultural middle school in Hamhŭng and, upon graduation, went to Tokyo. There, after two years at preparatory school, he obtained enrolment at Tokyo Imperial University's Agricultural College, which he graduated from in 1916 (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50). His willingness to study agriculture may indeed indicate rural origins, but his family, apparently, was well-to-do enough to defray his tuition fees and other expenses related to study, both in Korea and in the colonial metropole.

It was apparently in Tokyo in 1912–1916 that Chu's political socialization took place. An article he published in a Korean student journal in 1915 suggested that his general worldview at that time could be characterized as reformist Social Darwinism. He claimed that reform of "outdated customs" was Korea's only chance to survive in the Darwinian jungles of the modern world, where only the fittest could avoid "national extinction" (Chu 1915). Given the degree to which Social Darwinism was central to the intellectual life of Korea's modern intelligentsia from the first decade of the twentieth century (Pak 2003: 45–70), Chu's infatuation with this current of social thought was rather predictable. However, the student of agriculture from the Hamhŭng area was also interested in more radical dimensions of modern politics. As he himself later reported to Comintern, in January 1917 he was admitted into Paedal Moŭm ("Korean Gathering"), an underground secret society devoted to Korea's liberation (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50v). As we know now, this secret society was established in 1911 in the wake of Korea's full colonization (1910), by disciples of the noted nationalist linguist, Chu Sigyŏng (1876–1914), and, indeed, sought to liberate Korea, via armed struggle if necessary (Yi 2003: 139–151). In other words, at the moment when he returned to Korea in late 1916 or early 1917, Chu, a graduate of the metropole's highest-ranked university (Tokyo Imperial University), was a Social Darwinist nationalist, prepared to fight for the restoration of Korea's lost statehood.

Chu's nationalism did not prevent him, however, from first gaining employment with the colonial provincial government in Hamhŭng in March 1917. According to his own description, he was supervising the provision of credit to Korean peasants (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50). The official registry of the colonial government's public servants lists him as a provincial secretary at the Second Department of Southern Hamgyŏng's provincial government (*Chōsen sōtokufu* 1918: 303). The young nationalist, though, did not intend to work for the colonial government for long. He quit Japanese governmental service in

less than a year and thereafter worked, until August 1919, at a private company, Taesŏngsa, which specialized in the purchasing and retail sales of Korean peasants' agricultural produce (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50). It is interesting to note that Chu officially resigned as Taesŏngsa's representative only in April 1922 (*Chōsen Sōtokufu Kanpō* 1922), a fact he conveniently omitted while writing his autobiography for his Comintern hosts later in Moscow.

However, even if private business activities guaranteed Chu his livelihood, his true interests lay elsewhere. Radicalized by the experiences of the 1 March 1919 pan-national independence demonstrations (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 32v), Chu reconnected with his old Paedal Moŭm network and, together with them, established – in June 1920 – an illegal left-nationalist group, ambitiously named the "Social-Revolutionary Party" (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50v). The party was led by a number of key activists – including Hong To (1894–?), a Meiji University graduate, and Yi Pongsu (1892–?), a Meiji University dropout – who, like Chu, were from Southern Hamgyŏng and had studied in Japan (Yi 2003: 159). Known to have close to 900 members and sympathizers, this party soon became, in essence, a domestic Korean branch of the Shanghai Communist Party – the network of radicalized Korean émigrés based mostly in China and the Russian Far East, many of whom were originally nationalist activists but later, like Chu Chonggŏn or Hong To, converted to Marxism. Soon, the merging of the Shanghai Communists and the Social-Revolutionary Party was cemented by the participation of an eight-strong delegation of the latter – which included Chu – to the inaugural congress of the Shanghai Communists' Korean Communist Party, held in Shanghai in May 1921. Chu was one of the four cadres of the newly formed party charged with publishing the party's printed organ (Im 2003: 378–380; RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50v). That was the official start of Chu's activist career.

CHU CHONGGŎN – POPULARIZING MARXISM IN KOREA

The former governmental official-turned-businessman can be described as one of the main organizers of Korea's underground Communist movement in the early 1920s. The Communists, a secret underground conglomerate of diverse groups and cells prior to the establishment of the underground Korean Communist Party in 1925, wanted to intervene in and, if possible dominate, legal mass organizations. One such organization was the pan-Korean Korean Youth League (Chosŏn Ch'ŏngnyŏn Ch'ongdongmaeng), formed on the initiative of the Shanghai Communist network in April 1924, with Chu as a member of its

Control Commission (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 53). Another important mass organization the Communists worked with was the Korean League of Workers' and Peasants' Unions (KLWPU), formed simultaneously with the Youth League. The KLWPU represented more than 90 regional groups (Kim 1982: 122), possessed over 50,000 members and is regarded now by labour historians as an important factor in post-1924 intensification of industrial disputes all over the country (Kim 1985: 237, 241). It was understood by the Japanese police to be under the dominant influence of the Korean Communists' Seoul faction – the domestic extension of the Shanghai Communist network which Chu belonged to (Kyōshōkōkei hi dai 285-gō). So, Chu's claim that he participated in managing the KLWPU as a Communist front group (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 53) may be seen as very likely true. His name, in fact, is mentioned in the list of the preparatory committee members who worked to prepare for the inaugural congress of the KLWPU (*Tong'a Ilbo* 1923). Besides that, Chu was active as the editor-in-chief of Minjungsa, an important early Marxist publisher, and as an editorial board member of *Chosŏnjigwang*, a major Communist journal (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 21–22; RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 52). Such a combination of managerial positions at both large-scale mass organizations and Marxist publishing enterprises made Chu into one of the main nodes in the network of radical activists who constituted Korea's Communist movement in the early 1920s.

From the viewpoint of Korean Marxism's ideological history, however, Chu's activities as a Marxist popularizer are, perhaps, even more important than his participation in Communist front organizations. While Chu was not a major factional leader of the Shanghai Communists' domestic network inside Korea – the Seoul faction – he definitely was one of the Marxist popularizers whom educated readers of the early 1920s' Press were supposed to know. As mentioned above, Chu became rather famous among the educated Korean public after *Tong'a Ilbo*, a popular nationalist daily, serialized in 1923 his longish Marxist rebuttal to anarchist Na Kyŏngsŏk's (polite sobriquet – Kongmin, 1891–1959) attempt to advocate for cross-class cooperation in promoting Korean-made goods under the auspices of the Korean Products Promotion Society. Chu claimed that the whole project of substituting the non-existent protective tariffs by a "buy local" mass movement would further impoverish, rather than benefit, the "oppressed masses of toilers". His main point was the necessity of viewing the project from a class – rather than a vaguely "national" – perspective (Chu 1923a). It is important to remember however, that, typically of the Shanghai Communists – who were more moderate and more inclined towards cooperation with the broader national movement – Chu made clear his willingness to collaborate with the more radical

elements in the nationalist camp. He himself explained that the national movement naturally radicalizes into a social movement when it encounters issues of class exploitation and the immiseration of the exploited (Chu 1925). This claim sounds more than natural given that Chu himself represented a case of a nationalist who eventually converted to the socialist cause.

Being also one of the Korean Youth League leaders, Chu duly produced a popular piece on the history of socialist youth movements. Since the Belgian Young Guards (Jeunes Gardes, formed in 1886) were famed for their anti-militarist work, Chu named them, other like-minded organizations of youthful socialist radicals in fin-de-siècle Europe, and the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), inaugurated at the international socialist youth meeting in Stuttgart (1907) and led by the militant socialist icon Karl Liebknecht (1871–1919), as the main predecessors of the Korean socialist youth movement. In this way Chu placed the movement he was leading into the spatial-temporal framework of global militancy which, he hoped, was following the teleologically predestined course towards building a classless society via worldwide class struggle. As Chu (1923b) hoped, the educated and class-conscious youth of Korea might partially replace the still weak proletariat in its role as leader of the class struggle, helping to organize and push forward the social struggles in the countryside – where most Koreans lived at that time. Being concurrently an organizer of the KLWPU, Chu additionally wrote down and published as a journal article a long and detailed record of a conversation between a Marxist intellectual and a skilled worker whom his interlocutor was attempting to win for the socialist cause. The text, perhaps based on Chu's own real-life encounters and exchanges with labour activists from the shop floor, once again repeats Chu's main points of disagreement with the Korean Products Promotion Society advocates. As Chu saw it, small-scale Korean manufacturing had, in any case, no chance in competition with incomparably bigger Japanese rivals and its development, even if it could take place, would do little to alleviate the suffering of Korea's toiling masses who were exploited by both the metropolitan and local bourgeoisie. Introducing Marxian terms like "surplus value" (*ing'yŏ kach'i*) and "the tendency of the profit rate to fall" (*suik chŏmgam ŭi pŏpch'ik*), Chu argued that any improvements in productivity would only swell the exploiters' profits. He further maintained that, barring the destruction of "wage slavery" and the private property system, the suffering of the workers or tenant farmers could not be meaningfully alleviated (Chu 1923c). While hardly a specially innovative or pioneering piece, this article, nevertheless, was supposed to help popularize Marxism's basic tenets in Korea.

ARREST, RELEASE AND FLIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION

Popularization of Marxism per se was not technically illegal in 1920s colonial Korea, but participation in underground Communist activities definitely was. Chu's role in these activities was constantly prominent, although he definitely wasn't a major factional leader or a liaison between Korean Communists and Comintern. Being officially employed in 1924 as an economic history lecturer at the prestigious Posŏng College and a journalist at a major daily, *Sidae Ilbo* (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 50), Chu was concurrently an active participant in efforts at organizing diverse Korean Communist groups into one single party. When the inaugural meeting of the underground Korean Communist Party took place in Seoul on 17 April 1925, Chu was the only member of Shanghai Communist network to participate or to be elected onto the Party's Central Committee (RGASPI f. 499 op. 135 d. 110, pp. 132–139; the document is also published in Wada & Shirinya 2007: 328–333). Chu's Central Committee membership was an important milestone in his career as an underground militant, and he routinely introduced himself as "Korean Communist Party's Central Committee member" when interacting with Comintern authorities (see, for example, RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 49).

Chu's work as a Central Committee member in 1925 was the apex of his underground career. It lasted, however, only for about seven months, during which time Chu was responsible for the Tongnae regional bureau of the party as well as its central Research Bureau (Chosabu) (Chŏn 2004: 34–35). The gradual development of the underground party was interrupted after a casual fistfight between some Party members and pro-Japanese local dignitaries in Sinŭiju on the Sino-Korean border ("Sinŭiju Incident", 22 November 1925) ended up in the Japanese authorities securing the Party's secret documents and arresting more than a hundred of its members (Chŏn 2006: 287; Kajimura & Kang 1972: 36). Arrested in November 1925, Chu spent then more than seven months, until July 1926, in colonial Korean prisons where, in his own words, he could not work and was subjected to "bestial torture" (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 53). Indeed, prison conditions seemingly were bad enough for Chu to contract tuberculosis there and to be found, by prison medics, sick enough to merit a release on bail for medical treatment (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 46). The release was valid until September 1927. However, the new underground Central Committee of Korean Communist Party, on the understanding that Chu's weakened body would not endure any more stays in Japanese prison cells, paid him a 100 yen travel allowance and instructed him to illegally cross into Soviet territory. Chu followed their instructions and arrived in Vladivostok on 11 September 1927

(RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 49). Interestingly, the boat which Chu used to cross the border river, Tumangang, was said to belong to the Party and to be in regular use for illegal crossings to Soviet territory (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 21v). Obviously, the Korean-Soviet border was still porous back in 1927, an important factor allowing Korea's Communist movement to maintain a continuous, tight connection with Comintern's centre in Moscow and its representatives in Vladivostok.

According to Chu's own description, his Korean Central Committee colleagues initially wanted to use him for doing their own assignments on Soviet territory, as he was based close to the Korean border, in Vladivostok, and concurrently receiving tuberculosis treatment (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 44v). However, it was only the latter part of the initial plan that Chu succeeded in implementing in practice. Entrusted into the reliable hands of International Red Aid (MOPR, for its modus operandi in the 1920s see Ryle 1970), Chu obtained the badly needed tuberculosis treatment in Crimea and Orenburg in May–June and then August 1928 (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 44v). Again, he received long-term treatment in Yalta, Crimea, from January to September 1929 (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 53v), although securing these precious nine months of medical attention and procedures required a special intervention by Comintern authorities (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 45). However, by that point Chu was already a Communist without a party – the Korean Communist Party he used to belong to, weakened as it was by repeated Japanese police repression, was declared non-existent by Comintern on December 10, 1928 (Wada & Shirinya 2007: 574–575). There was no longer any legitimate Korean Central Committee to give assignments to its former member who now was de facto exiled in the Soviet Union for good. Since he had broken the conditions of his release on bail, a return to Korea could mean new imprisonment, and, most likely, a new tuberculosis attack (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 49). Now a permanent immigrant rather than a temporary political exile, Chu had to find himself a place to belong to and work in Soviet Russia. As we will see below, despite his outstanding record as a revolutionary publicist in Korea, Comintern was in no hurry to make use of his manifold talents.

A FRUSTRATED KOREAN COMMUNIST IN MOSCOW

It should be made clear from the beginning that Chu apparently strove hard to win the confidence of his Moscow hosts. While at the end of 1928 his Russian (and English) proficiency was limited to reading sources ("with dictionary": RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 49v), by the close of 1932 his Russian writing

skills were already good enough for him to compile his brief autobiography in readable Russian handwriting (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 24v). To attenuate his willingness to assimilate into Soviet political culture, Chu adopted by the end of 1930 a new nom de guerre, "Soltz", apparently after Aaron Soltz (1872–1945), a famous Old Bolshevik known as "the conscience of the Party" (on his revolutionary merits, see, for example, Serge 1972 [1930]: 171, 217). Yun-In, his original revolutionary pseudonym (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 1), sounded too distinctively Korean and evidently had to be changed to something more closely associated with Russo-Soviet revolutionary culture. However, the cultural mimicry was of little help: Chu's adjustment to his new life in the capital of the Soviet "motherland of proletariat" progressed, despite all his efforts, at an excruciatingly slow tempo before being definitively stopped in the whirlwind of the mid-1930s Stalinist repressions.

A job Chu was qualified for and a stable income were the first priority. After his arrival in Soviet territory Chu, as a recognized political refugee, could rely on a rather meagre political immigrant subsidy (27 rubles a month, equivalent to circa 14 contemporary American dollars; on exchange rates, see Holzman 1968: 814), and, in his own words, he lacked the needed nutrition (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 44v). Having helped Chu in treating his tuberculosis, Soviet Russia was tormenting him with extreme penury. An appeal by Chu at the end of 1928 to Otto Kuusinen (1881–1964), then the mighty secretary of Comintern's Executive (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 44–45v), eventually helped, albeit not immediately. After a year of precarious living in Moscow, starting from December 1929 Chu was at last employed as assistant professor (docent) of Japanese at the Narimanov Oriental Studies Institute in the Soviet capital (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 24v). This job gave him an income amounting to 250 rubles per month (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 52), making him a member of the Soviet capital's salaried middle class. His teaching career, however, lasted less than two years. From 6 December 1931, the former member of the Korean Communist Party's Central Committee worked as an editor of the Korean editions of Lenin's works at the Foreign Workers' Publishing House in Moscow (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 24v). Basically it was Comintern's publishing house of Communist – and general – literature in foreign languages (on its Korean language productions in the 1930s, see Son 2020). But being sent to work there, rather than at Comintern's central apparatus or one of its educational institutions, indicated a lower degree of political confidence.

This lack of confidence revealed itself in a variety of ways. To be accepted as a full-fledged "soldier of world revolution", a part of Comintern's activist milieu, Chu had to formally shift his membership from the defunct Korean Communist

Party to the Soviet Union's ruling All-Russian Communist Party (Bol'shevik). This was, however, easier said than done. Chu petitioned Comintern's Executive, asking them to allow him to transfer his Party affiliation to the Soviet Party (2 February 1930: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 40–40v), and relatively easily acquired support from such prominent Korean Communist exiles in Moscow as Kim Tanya (1899–1938) and Pak Hŏnyŏng (1900–1956) (8 March 1930: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 38). While both Kim and Pak belonged to the Tuesday faction – the domestic extension of the Irkutsk Communist network, the old rivals of the Shanghai network which Chu belonged to (Scalapino & Lee 1972: 55–59) – they apparently had enough respect for Chu's role in the founding of the Korean Communist Party back in 1925 and in Marxism's popularization in Korea. The matter was then debated by Comintern's International Control Commission (3 May 1930: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 37) after one more appeal by Chu (2 May 1930: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 36). However, it was left undecided and sent to the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee for review (3 May 1930: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 31). There it apparently lay dormant for a year and a half until Chu lodged a new appeal, mentioning, inter alia, that lack of Party membership was making his work at the Foreign Workers' Publishing House significantly more difficult (24 January 1932: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 29–29v). This appeal had to be re-lodged once again ten months later (8 October 1932: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 26), apparently because of the Soviet Party authorities' failure to respond to the first one. The new appeal led to a new review which found that Chu had managed, by that point, to obtain Soviet citizenship and was supported by Pavel Mif (1901–1939), the famed director of Comintern's Communist University of Oriental Toilers (KUTV) and an important brain behind the Soviet Communist Party's policies on China (22 October 1932: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 28). With the official sponsorship of Comintern's Oriental Bureau which Mif then headed (31 October 1932: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 25) the appeal was, at last, successful. A month and a half later Chu was allowed to fill out the questionnaire for the transfer of his membership to the Soviet Party (16 December 1932: RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 24–24v). It is noteworthy, however, how complicated the transfer procedure Chu had to undergo was. The manifold reviews he had to go through signified a serious lack of political confidence in him on Comintern's part.

This lack of confidence was also made clear by Chu's failure to ever secure any teaching position at the Communist University of Oriental Toilers (KUTV) where Comintern's Korean cadres were trained. According to his own account (dated October 1930), the chief of KUTV's general history department once asked

him to teach – presumably, history – to the Korean students there. However, he had to rescind the offer when it was found out that some influential Comintern cadres doubted Chu's allegiance to "Comintern's line on Korea" (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 17–18). Chu was allowed to conduct "Party work" (apparently, Party propaganda work is meant) at an ethnic Korean workers' club in Moscow and to be enrolled as a graduate student (*aspirant*) at the Institute of World Economy and World Politics (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 17–18). However, the confidence Comintern had in his allegiance to its orthodoxy obviously did not stretch any further than that. Chu's supervisor at the Institute of World Economy and World Politics was Lajos Magyar, Comintern's noted Sinologist, with whom Chu vainly pleaded in October 1930 for help in finding "practical" (most likely, pedagogical) work (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 19). Chu's proven academic abilities and his illustrious record of Marxist popularization in Korea were seemingly of little help to his cause. Where were the roots of distrust he suffered from?

THE ROOTS OF DISTRUST

Comintern's file on Chu contains a denunciation which, judging from its content, refers to Hong To (1894–?), a Meiji University graduate who had worked with Chu since the days of the late 1910s' Paedal Moŭm network and then as a fellow activist of the Social-Revolutionary Party and the Shanghai Communist network (the denunciation is marked by Chu's name, but it refers to a "Meiji University graduate", obviously Hong To). The denunciation accused Hong of harbouring "nationalistic anti-Soviet sentiments" and being related to Ch'ŏndogyo ("The Heavenly Way"), a new Korean religion which inherited the religious legacy of Tonghak ("Eastern Learning"). The latter was known for its association with the 1894–1895 peasant rebellion (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 35; the standard work on Tonghak-Ch'ŏndogyo connection is Young 2014). The accusation of "anti-Soviet sentiments" was hardly true to the facts: Hong, who, like Chu, himself chose to flee to the Soviet Union (in 1928) and was then enrolled at the Communist University of Oriental Toilers (RGASPI f. 495 op. 228 d. 384 pp. 25–26) was very unlikely to be "anti-Soviet". However, it was indeed true that the Shanghai Communist network of which both Chu and Hong were prominent members, was much keener on cooperation with Ch'ŏndogyo in the 1920s than its more orthodox rivals from the Irkutsk Communist network and the Tuesday faction (Yi 2009: 211–216). It was also clear that Chu remained a part of the Shanghai network even after he left for Moscow. The person who guaranteed – in writing – Chu's trustworthiness in January 1933 was a fellow Shanghai

network militant, Yi Sŏngt'ae (1901–?), who had known Chu as one of his co-workers since the times of publishing work at Minjungsa and *Chosŏnjigwang* editorship (see above; RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, pp. 21–22). At the ethnic Korean workers' club in Moscow, Chu worked alongside Pak Ae (Matvei Pak, 1896–), a Russian-born Korean who was among the founders of the Shanghai network (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 17v; see Kim 1979: 17–19, 65 on Pak's early career). It appears that it was precisely Chu's continuing and active membership in the Shanghai network that proved his undoing.

This hypothesis is supported by Comintern cadres' assessments of Chu found in his file. A 1933 assessment characterizes Chu as a "factional element close to [the] Shanghai group" and concludes that, as such, he should *not* be entrusted with underground work inside Korea proper (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 23). A 1933 assessment of Chu by Pak Minyŏng (Pak Nikifor, 1902–1938), then a KUTV teacher, mentions his Shanghai network membership as well (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 20). The label of a "factional element" seemingly made Chu's political position significantly more vulnerable than that of other Korean Communist exiles in Moscow. In addition to being excluded from teaching at KUTV and from any position of responsibility at Comintern, Chu – just as his old friend Hong To – was among the first to be arrested. Hong was taken by Soviet secret police on 19 December 1935, from his house in a small village, Ust'-Sidimi, in Russian Far East, where the former Korean revolutionary leader had been de facto exiled to as a vice-director of the local Machine-Tractor Station in charge of political propaganda. He was sentenced to five years' penal labour for being a "Japanese spy", and was never seen again (Ku-Degai 2004a: 226). He was exonerated only in 1955 (Ku-Degai 2008: 89). Chu was arrested even earlier, on 8 April 1935. However, he seemingly refused to admit his guilt, and by August 1935, his case was sent back for re-investigation (Ku-Degai 2004b: 138). The 1935 arrests of Chu and Hong followed in the wake of the 1933 arrests of Kim Yŏngman (1898–1934) and Kim Kyuyŏl (1883–1934), two veterans of the Shanghai Communist network who, identically with Chu, worked during the last years of their lives at the Foreign Workers' Publishing House in Moscow. In 1934, both were shot. Chu, as well as Kim Yŏngman and Kim Kyuyŏl, were named as "unreliable factional elements and self-centred megalomaniacs" already in 1933 by Fyodor Kotel'nikov (1895–1971), a mighty Stalinist functionary at Comintern's Personnel Bureau (RGASPI f. 499 op. 135 d. 191, pp. 50–51; the document is also published in Wada & Shirinya 2007: 652–654). That such a document appeared was a clear sign than, as early as 1933, the political downfall of Shanghai Communist exiles in Moscow was imminent. By contrast, the majority of the known Moscow-based leaders of the Irkutsk Communist network or the Tuesday faction were left untouched until the

major wave of Stalinist repression in 1937 (Son 2013: 254–321). Obviously, being a Shanghai-affiliated Communist could represent a major disadvantage for a Korean revolutionary émigré in mid-1930s Moscow.

CODA: A FAILURE TO ACCUMULATE THE POLITICAL CAPITAL OF TRUST

Released from prison, but deprived of his Party membership and his erstwhile editorial job at the Foreign Workers' Publishing House, Chu spent late 1935 and early 1936 in anguish and utter hopelessness. On 8 January 1936, he wrote a desperate plea to his long-standing patron, Pavel Mif, asking for *any* job to feed his wife and children. He mentioned that he had been positively assessed by Alexander Gambarov (1890–1937), the director of the Oriental Studies Institute, but his employment there was impossible without Party membership. Ch'oe Sŏng'u (1898–1937), an influential ethnic Korean cadre at the Comintern apparatus, promised, according to Chu, to support his bid for reinstatement in the Party. The promise was issued on the understanding that Ch'ŏndogyo, the connections to which incriminated Chu and other Shanghai Communists, was once a revolutionary religious group; thus, Chu was not guilty of any "deviations" (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 7). Apparently, however, the Soviet secret police held a different opinion. On 6 March 1939, an anonymous assessment of Chu by the Comintern mentioned that he was originally accepted as a political exile and that there was no way to find out whether he was still alive and where he was (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 6). Ch'oe Sŏng'u's July 1936 assessment of Chu suggested that he could be perhaps sent for low-responsibility underground work to Korea on probation, "in order to examine him", as long as the Soviet authorities did not have any objections (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 4). Apparently, their "objections" were real enough since Chu's dossier file does not contain any chronologically later-dated documents. Chu's anguished letter to Mif mentions his works on agrarian issues in Korea and Japan, on Korea's industrial development and a brochure on Japanese colonial rule in Korea which was supposed to be published but was then halted at the last minute due to Chu's arrest and loss of Party membership. Chu lamented that his manuscripts would "lie unseen [by the people] for very long time" (RGASPI f. 499 op. 228 d. 399, p. 7). What happened in reality was much worse, since his manuscripts disappeared without a trace, never to be seen again. We know that Chu was exonerated by the Soviet authorities (Chief Military Prosecutor's Office) on 23 June 1958 (Ku-Degai 2004b: 138). Alas, nobody knows for sure when he was arrested and shot, and what happened to the family he left behind.

Chu was without doubt a Communist activist and Marxist propagandist with many gifts, both academic and practical. A graduate of Japan's most prestigious university and a former lecturer at Posŏng, one of Korea's best-known colleges, he possessed near-native proficiency in Japanese – which he successfully taught in Moscow – and could read and write both Russian and English, apparently also developing considerable Russian conversational skills over time. He was a highly adaptive transborder intellectual who – as a protégé of Pavel Mif and Lajos Magyar, the two most noted Sinologists of Comintern – managed to become a part of local academic-political networks after his arrival in Moscow in 1927. He was considered academically qualified to teach at Comintern's Communist University of Oriental Toilers (KUTV) – he never taught there, though, but for purely political reasons. He was also considered qualified enough to be commissioned to translate Lenin's texts into Korean as a part of his work at the Foreign Workers' Publishing House. Much of the Comintern milieu he belonged to – including Mif, Magyar, but also such Korean Comintern cadres as Ch'oe Sŏng'u – was destroyed by Stalinist Great Purges of 1937–1939. Chu's political downfall, however, was visible as early as 1933. Accepted into the Soviet Communist Party, he was still seen as an "unreliable factionist" and kept in largely technical posts, sidelined from the mainstream of Korean Communist political work at Comintern institutions, and destined to be arrested earlier than many of his fellow political exiles. What does his marginalization, so incongruent with his proven abilities as a Marxist populariser and Communist practitioner, say about the workings of the Comintern system as a whole?

As the documents analysed above demonstrate, Comintern represented a complex, hierarchically organized machine, in which the trusted Soviet and foreign cadres (typified by Kotel'nikov and Kuusinen) as well as highly trusted Soviet-Korean functionaries (typically, Ch'oe Sŏng'u) from its Moscow centre were charged with assigning tasks, ranks and positions to the entrants from different peripheries, Korea included. Some of the entrants, like Chu, could be relatively highly placed in their own regional hierarchies. However, the Moscow centre would re-assess them based on its own criteria, political trust being the central factor. Such trust could be accumulated as long as the peripheral Communist in question was free of any compromising complexity – that is, from anything smacking of independent organizing on the ground ("factional activity"), belonging to any hostile groups ("exploitative classes") or organizations (government or private enterprise). Academic merits could play a role – the educated entrants, like Chu, were still given editorial or translation-related jobs rather than purely clerical or manual ones – but they were not decisive, and neither were any achievements they might attain. Chu typified the high-ranked peripheral entrant

whose accumulation of trust, all their efforts at acculturation notwithstanding, was greatly impaired by their social background, non-Communist contacts and long history of rather independent political activity outside of Soviet borders. After a number of humiliating pleas, he was allowed to integrate economically into Soviet Moscow's salaried professional middle-class, but never fully integrated politically into Comintern's Korean milieu in which the political network he originally belonged to (the Shanghai network) was regarded as non-mainstream and "suspicious". In the end, he was excluded and eventually eliminated by the Stalinist secret police apparatus at a relatively early stage; a couple of years before the same fate befell most Korean political émigrés in Moscow.

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