REVEALING THE SECRETS OF OTHERS (ON YOUTUBE): NEW AND OLD IN THE PUBLIC REPRESENTATIONS OF GHANAIAN TRADITIONAL RELIGION

ABSTRACT
In the midst of the proliferation of Christianity and Islam, traditional religious movements struggle for recognition all over Africa. In order to reach nationwide and diasporic audiences, traditionalist movements have sought to assume a visible role in modern mass media. In Ghana, West Africa, the traditionalists have been at pains to challenge the dominance of Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity in the public sphere. Analysts have pointed out that traditional religion’s public role has been constrained by its emphasis on secrecy and limited access to spiritual powers, while Christianity’s public performances of revelations have been better suited for mass media. One of the major themes in the public representations of Pentecostalism has been the revealing of satanic influences working underneath the secrecy of traditional religion. By using examples from Ghana the article shows how the traditionalists have recently developed their own revelatory discourse, in which the dualism godly/satanic has been subverted. By publicly exposing Christian pastors as frauds in social media the traditionalists reemploy and redirect an age-old accusation of charlatanism previously targeted at themselves by both Christian and secularist commentators. More importantly, however, these statements should be understood as attempts to redefine Christianity from a non-Christian perspective.

Keywords: secrecy, fakery, traditional religion, Christianity, Ghana, social media, mass media

INTRODUCTION
An agitated man in dreadlocks speaks forcefully to the camera: ‘If any pastor says that Jesus Christ tells me I see God, any pastor in this world... I’m throwing a challenge to all the pastors who say they see God before. That person is a liar.’ The man speaking is a Ghanaian traditional priest called Nana Kwaku Bonsam and he is on YouTube talking about fake pastors and false prophets. He mentions several instances, where Christian pastors have embezzled money from their churches, cheated on their wives, and sexually abused the female
members of their congregations. What he is most concerned about, however, is that the pastors claim to follow instructions personally received from God. He goes on to describe in an ironic tone how the pastors declare that they have seen God, God has touched them, or spoken to them. He then quotes the Bible, Exodus 33:20, where God tells Moses 'no man shall see me and live'. This, according to Kwaku Bonsam, proves that any person who claims to have seen God is a liar. After all, God himself has decreed that he should not be seen by humans.

This video by Kwaku Bonsam is an example of a recent media phenomenon in Ghana, in which self-acclaimed traditionalists criticize Christians in broadcast and social media, and what is more, they do it by publicly revealing their secrets, exposing them as frauds. This has not been entirely unexpected as traditional religion has been under attack in the media on the part of the Christian churches, especially those belonging to the Pentecostal-charismatic movement, for more than two decades. In the 1990s, after a long period of military rule, Ghana's state-controlled media was liberalized and commercialized and Pentecostal churches managed to secure a prominent footing in this new media landscape. The churches were able to make considerable investments in TV and radio work with money collected from their members and overseas donors (see e.g., Gifford 2004; Meyer 2011). One popular theme in Pentecostalist programming has been labelling traditional religion as 'satanic'. More generally, it has been asserted that indigenous forms of religious beliefs and practices are being marginalized all over Africa (Hackett 2015), and hence it is important to look into the different ways traditionalists are responding to this situation.

The current resurgence owes a great deal to the introduction of social media platforms, such as YouTube, during the 2000s. This has collapsed some of the earlier hierarchies, in which the traditionalists were often in a disadvantaged position. The first and most obvious one has to do with the rich and the poor. Traditionalists previously lacked the economic resources or wealthy corporate sponsors that many Christian groups were able to gather to pay for airtime in broadcast media. Shooting videos and posting them on social media requires some investment (e.g., in computers, smartphones, application software), but this is very modest if compared to making a TV programme. Secondly, individual traditional practitioners are less dependent on formal institutions that would represent them in the public. Traditionalists enjoyed a short-lived media presence in the 1980s through a government sponsored neo-traditional movement called Afrikania Mission, who published their own newspaper and had a slot of airtime in the state regulated radio (Gyanfosu 2002). In fact, at the time, they were the only religious group in the country that were allowed on the airwaves (De Witte 2004: 138). These days Afrikania, or any other organization, can no longer act in the media as the ‘official’ representative of traditional religion. On the contrary, a simple YouTube search will produce a number of traditional practitioners creating their content independently. Not only are they free to post anything they want, but on a platform like YouTube their videos are not separated from those released by more formal organizations. Nor is there any compartmentalization between ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ productions (see Sumiala and Tikka 2013). Thirdly, the media strategy adopted by Afrikania has sought to make traditional religion attractive to urban Christian audiences
and the reporters, editors, and other gatekeepers of the conventional media by presenting it in a ‘Christian format’. This has involved, for instance, the introduction of Sunday services resembling Christian masses with a component of ‘entertainment’ in the form of music and dancing. At the same time, practices like animal sacrifices, which are considered distasteful by many Christians, are publicly minimized. This image of traditional religion has felt alien to many traditionalists on the ‘grassroots level’ (see De Witte 2004; 2015). However, with the introduction of social media platforms they are able to take the formerly downplayed aspects out in the open. Fourthly, traditional religion, which has been conventionally viewed as ‘local’ in contrast to ‘international’ Christianity, is now able to go global via the internet. Although the traditionalists use the internet ‘locally’ (see Postill 2011), that is, in communicating and competing over matters of local concern, many of their postings are intended for the wider world, which does not mean only Ghanaian diasporic communities but also foreign audiences. For example, in a video titled ‘Traditional religion remove the ice’ Kwaku Bonsam states that the reason for his presence on the internet is that he wants ‘traditional religion to go around the world’ and thereby offers his help to people everywhere as well as a chance to learn about traditional religion.

However, the differences between Christianity and traditional religion cannot be explained merely by referring to technological change and economic and political power relations. To understand this, we have to go back to basic questions about how religious traditions occur in society and endure in time. As Webb Keane (2007: 86) points out, ‘high ideals, doctrines, and ideologies cannot exist socially or be transmitted without some semiotic embodiment, which necessarily imposes certain conditions on them that may contradict the purposes of those who create them’. Thus religions, no matter how spiritual they are considered to be, cannot exist without some sort of symbolic and material instantiations (e.g., books, buildings, songs, gestures), which always run the risk of getting decontextualized, recontextualized, reinterpreted, and reapplied in unpredictable ways, which may lead to conflicts and alterations. What these symbolic and material instantiations are in any specific case, is not an arbitrary matter or simply a question of practicality. One would rather presume that religious groups would adopt media and public strategies that are in resonance with their ideologies and practices. In this sense, modern mass media would not be different from the more traditional ones. As pointed out by Patrick Eisenlohr (2009: 279), different theological assumptions about the nature of mediation ‘may have very different consequences of how people treat modern media technologies in religious settings and how they see such technologies contributing to their religious practices’. Thus, the concerns that religious practitioners have about modern technology have to be discussed in a context of long-standing religious ideas that pre-date the current ‘information age’ (ibid.: 278).

In the case of Ghana, scholars such as Birgit Meyer (2004; 2006; 2011; 2015) and Marleen de Witte (2004; 2015; 2018) have maintained that Christianity as a ‘revelatory religion’ has found it rather effortless to broadcast its message in electronic mass media, especially in audiovisual media. Ever since its introduction it presented itself as religion that offered every person an access to God through the medium of the Bible and the ability to see the truth by him/herself. Later on, the Pentecostal strand of Christianity took matters further by using audiovisual technology in
depicting the spiritual battle between good and evil that is understood to be raging under the surface of everyday appearances. The object of such revelations has often been the traditional religion, which is associated with Satan in Pentecostal theology. Despite massive success, the Pentecostals live under a permanent danger of having the revelatory media format turned against them, and this is basically what the new discourses on fake pastors are about. On the other hand, traditional religion that focuses on esoteric knowledge and secrecy has adopted a much more reserved attitude. Although traditional religion also has a public side and its followers have welcomed the use modern audiovisual technology in many aspects of their ritual life, in its theology a balanced relationship between humans and the spirit world involves the keeping of secrets. Hence unregulated dissemination of religious knowledge would be a risk with unforeseeable outcomes. Consequently, entering the modern electronic media has been a more complex issue than in the case of the Christians.

In the present article I will examine how Ghanaian traditionalists have successfully adopted the forms of media presentation used by Christians without entirely giving up the emphasis on esoterism and secrecy. I will start by discussing Pentecostalist-charismatic Christianity and traditional religion along the lines suggested above. I will then present a short description and analysis of a centuries-old discourse on religious fakery in Ghana, which I consider crucial for understanding the present-day developments. I will then move on to analyze the media performances of two traditional priests who are famous for publicly exposing Christian pastors. The two priests, Kwaku Bonsam and Naatia Salifu, use the revelatory form in different ways and for different ends, but both imply by their exposés that Pentecostals stand in a relation of dependency to traditionalists. I conclude by arguing the traditionalist backlash is not only a question about adopting and applying the exposé as a representational form, but also a more ambitious attempt to redefine what Christianity is in Ghana. The treatment is based on online research and long-term ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Ghana.4

PENTECOSTALISM, REVELATION, AND MEDIA

Christianity is the majority religion in Ghana and therefore its hegemony in the religious media sphere should not come as a surprise to anyone.5 However, its reliance on modern media has long historical roots. Ever since the nineteenth century missionary era, Christianity has represented itself as religion that embraces public visibility and strives to make the unseen seeable (Meyer 2006: 438–439). Not accidentally, one of the most worn out slogans of the missionary movement was that they were ‘bringing light to darkness’. A more specific example would be the Twi language word anibue that was adopted by the Protestant missionaries of the Basel Missionary Society. Literally, anibue meant ‘the opening of the eyes’, but the Basel Missionaries used it to describe the new era that was commenced by conversion to Christianity (Skinner 2009: 482). Nowadays, the term has come to mean modernity or civilization. Moreover, it was precisely Protestantism that emphasized the capability of every believer to see and understand the truth by referring to biblical texts (Meyer 2006: 438). Hence, the first religious mass media were books.

Today the Pentecostal-charismatic Christians have taken the focus on revelation and visibility much further and use audio visual media for this purpose. Most often
Pentecostalism is discussed as a distinct form of Christianity because of its emphasis on the work of the Holy Spirit and spiritual gifts in the lives of the believers. Especially the discernment of spirits, as one of the gifts endowed by the Holy Spirit, has been a major theme in the public representations of Pentecostalism, and some churches understand it as an actual ability to see spirits. In Pentecostalist sermons and teachings it is often the ordinary life that is being scrutinized in order to show that behind the veneer of ‘everydayness’ there is a battle going on between God and Satan. Audiovisual media with its special effects and editing possibilities have enabled the Pentecostalists to create powerful visual depictions of the work of the spirits. Here TV, video clips, and movies are considered to make the invisible and unknown battleground of spiritual warfare visible and audible for everybody (Meyer 2004; 2006; 2015).

An important part of this spiritual war is waged against traditional religion. In Pentecostalism traditional ontologies are not usually abandoned as lies or delusions; rather, they are preserved and regularly engaged with. Consequently, Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity accepts the cognitive claims of traditional religion concerning the existence of spirits and their powers, but it does not agree on the moral values attached to them. It demonizes the indigenous spirit world and urges the followers of true Christianity to combat the spirits as representatives of the devil (Meyer 1998; Robbins 2004:127–129). This tendency has been clearly present in Pentecostalist media representations of the post-liberalization era. TV, radio, and print media have been used as platforms to launch ferocious attacks on traditional religion.

The esoterism of traditional religion has made it even further vulnerable to these attacks, because it suggests to the Christian audiences that it has something to hide, which then needs to be revealed (see Meyer 2006; 2011). Accordingly, one of the most effective forms of revelation adopted by the Pentecostals are the public testimonies of congregants who are former traditionalists recounting the gory details of their earlier secret lives of serving ‘evil spirits’. These are not merely personal stories of sinning, afflictions, conversion, and redemption, but occasionally also detailed descriptions of traditional rituals. Furthermore, ritual paraphernalia, which would be normally kept behind closed doors, is brought to the church, presented to the viewing audiences, and sometimes destroyed. The inference of such public demonstrations is that to consider traditional religion in a positive or neutral light would be a grave error since its former adherents who know it intimately testify to its hidden immoral nature. In the following section I discuss the inclination for secrecy from the point of view of the traditionalists themselves.

SECRETS OF TRADITIONAL RELIGION

Speaking about traditional (or neo-traditional) religion as a singular institution is rather problematic. People who are identified as traditionalists are mostly members of localized ‘cults’ that focus on ritual activities related to the agricultural cycle, healing, or combating witchcraft. They do not share a common body of teachings—let alone something that would be considered universal—and have no nationwide centralized structure. Nevertheless, there have been important attempts to create a unitary organization and formulate a common doctrine, body of rituals, and so on that would fit the blueprint of a ‘world religion’. The notion of authentic indigenous culture, and religion as a part of it, was an integral part Ghanaian
cultural nationalism ever since the anti-colonial struggle and independence. Accordingly, what was called African traditional religion was to be treated equally in relation to Christianity and Islam, which were the two world religions in the country (see, e.g., Nkrumah 1964). In practice, the cultivation of traditional religion on a national level was assigned to specific government sponsored bodies. The most prominent of such organizations has been the Afrikania Mission—a neo-traditional movement founded in the 1980s. For a short while, during the military rule of J. J. Rawlings, Afrikania Mission enjoyed a privileged position as a representative of African traditional culture in nationalist policies. Educating the public about traditional religion through mass media was also one of its major tasks, and, as pointed out earlier, the governmental support included regular free airtime in state radio. This position began to crumble as soon as the early 1990s and ever since the liberalization of the electronic media Afrikania and other traditionalists have been overpowered by the Pentecostal Christians (De Witte 2012; 2015).

However, a major obstacle for the dissemination of traditional religion through mass media has been the esoteric nature of traditional religious ideas. As De Witte (2012: 180) puts it, ‘the perpetual challenge is how to represent in public a religion in which authority is rooted in restricted access to spirit powers, mediated by practices of secrecy and seclusion, and threatened by openness’. By far the most pertinent example of such secrecy is the training and initiation of priests and priestesses. An Akan traditional priest (ɔkɔmfo, pl. akɔmfoɔ) undergoes a long and arduous training period, which, depending on the source, is said to last anything between three and seven years. Much of the training takes place in seclusion and its leading motif is to establish permanent relationship and a line of communication between a god (ɔbosom, pl. abosom) and its priest, which takes place through spirit possession. In addition to the particular god(s) that the priest ‘serves’ he will become familiar with a wide range of other kind of spirits (asunsum, sing. sunsum). Commitment to secrecy characterizes much of the priest’s work also after the initiation. When spirits communicate with people their messages are often directed at individual persons and are conveyed to them in private. In the case of certain spirits, messages are communicated in a language that is intelligible only for the priest and his attendants. While the initiations and consultations take place in secrecy, traditional religion also has a public side. At important points of the ritual cycles priests perform sacrifices in public and dance under possession. On those same occasions, they may also perform ‘miracles’ that demonstrate the powers of the gods that they serve. These events can be freely watched, participated, and even recorded by the audiences. However, the criteria that make some elements secret and others public are not clear-cut and seem to allow room negotiation and reflection. This can be illustrated by a short discussion on traditionalist attitudes towards audiovisual technology.

While working with traditional priests and observing rituals I have always shied away from taking photographs. In general, traditionalists have nothing against modern audiovisual technology and they quite often document their own rituals on video and have generously shared them with me. Even while writing this article I have received WhatsApp videos from a local ‘harvest festival’ sent to my phone. However, it definitely appears that there are certain rituals, stages of ritual, and ritual objects that should not be photographed or filmed. The problem for me has been that often it is very difficult to know when exactly I am allowed take
photographs and when not. There have been instances where my hosts have demanded that I take pictures. For example, I was once invited to witness a ‘miracle’, in which a man was lifted in air while standing on two brooms made out of thin twigs. This constituted almost like a ‘photo session’ with posing in front of the camera and instructions on what to shoot from what angle. On other instances, photography has been explicitly banned. For instance, when entering a shrine house, visitors are regularly told to remove their shoes and leave all ‘tabooed’ objects outside the building. In practice, these rules may sometimes be relaxed for convenience with the permission of the priest. However, I have never seen cameras exempted. On the contrary, I have always been asked to leave my camera outside and often also told that nobody is allowed to take photographs inside the shrine. The most awkward situations have been those where people have disagreed in my presence about whether I should be allowed to use a camera. In these cases, especially during the early stages of my fieldwork, the reason could have been that my reliability as an outsider was questioned by some members of the community. Even though I have never been directly confronted with such suspicions, it is quite understandable that people would speculate on my motivations for recording their rituals and what kind of risks or possibilities that could entail. Perhaps the most interesting cases for the present argument are those where people appear to be uncertain on the permissibility of photographing, suggesting that it is not possible for human beings to fully know beforehand what kind of behavior is allowed by the spirits in a particular situation. This is evidenced by an incident where a spirit was considered to have made an intervention on film. In this case, I mentioned in a casual conversation that a photograph that I had taken in front of a shrine of a local god had failed, which sparked up an intense debate on the idea that the god in question did not want me to take photographs and hence had spoiled the film. When taking the photo, I had asked for permission from the attendants of the shrine, who not only granted it but also insisted on being included in it. What this suggests is that for the traditionalists secrecy is not just a social concern, dividing people into those who know (experts/insiders) and those who do not (laymen/outsiders), but a matter that has to do with the ability of humans to live in harmony with the spirits.

Considering the above, it is evident that modern media forms pose complicated questions for traditionalists and thus their adoption is far from a straightforward matter. This could at least partly explain their relative obscurity on the Ghanaian mediascape. Another important aspect of it is how secrecy has become a key issue in Ghanaian public discourses about religion in general.

RELIGION AS FAKERY

As discussed earlier, the contemporary Pentecostals associate traditionalists’ inclination to guard secrets with evil. Another related way to interpret secrecy has been to link it with insincerity. Both ideas are central in present-day Ghana when religious personas, ideas, or practices of any creed are evaluated publicly. The goal of this section is to demonstrate how the exchanges between Christians and traditionalists in the electronic media actually form a continuum with earlier discourses and thus have a relatively long history. By discussing first the earlier commentaries on traditional religion and then moving on to Christianity I aim to show how the ‘fake pastors’ of today are in many ways the historical successors of the ‘fetish priests’ of the past.
The religious ideas and practices of the pre-colonial era were dismissed as ‘fetishism’ by the European observers. The term stuck tenaciously and has not been completely abandoned even today. According to William Pietz (1988), the idea of fetishism originated in a mercantile intercultural space between European traders and their West African counterparts from the fifteenth century onwards. The merchants saw the essential element of African culture to be the Africans’ way of personifying material objects and thus misconceiving natural causal relations. Later on, fetishism was also seen as a form of social and political organization, where ‘irrational primitives’ were ruled by their immoral ‘fetish priests’, who used people’s fear of the ‘fetish gods’ to promote their self-interest. Thus the unequal distribution of material goods in African societies resulted from a powerful religious illusion. Social theorists of the European Enlightenment era highlighted the immorality of fetishism and juxtaposed African society, allegedly ordered by the interests of religious elites, with a truly enlightened society organized according to rational principles. Subsequently, by positing fetishism as the ‘first religion’, this critique could be extended to apply to religion in general (see, e.g., Iacono 2016: 55–74).

In the nineteenth century secular accounts of indigenous religions in Ghana, the priests are described as well-trained imposters, who skillfully use secrecy and ambiguity in their own advantage when dealing with their adherents. For example, a British lawyer and trader based at the Gold Coast portrayed the work of an Akan priest in a following way:

[W]hen the calamity is general, such as a drought, a dearth, a pestilence, or a want of success in war, the whole population, or their representatives with their chiefs and head men, repair to the chief Boossum [\textit{jbosom}] to make their offerings and sacrifice, and to seek, through the intercession of the priests, a mitigation and a release from their sufferings. These priests, aware of the necessity of making a deep impression upon such momentous occasions, surround the whole of their proceedings with a fearful secrecy and mysterious solemnity, calculated to awe the minds of the supplicants, and they deliver their oracles in such enigmatical language as may be capable of a double interpretation. (…) If the observances, which the priests prescribe, should be performed without any satisfactory result, it is by no means the fault of the Boossum. It is immediately attributed to inattention to some religious duty, to the general impiety, perhaps, of the people, to the neglect of their sacred groves, their Fetish houses, or want of a proper respect for the comfort of the priests themselves. Greater zeal is urgently recommended, richer offerings are demanded, and a renewal of ceremonious observances prescribed; and when the calamity, whatever it may have been, is overpast, the glory belongs to the Boossum (Cruickshank 1853: 130–131).

For Christian missionaries the nature of fetishism was more problematic. On the one hand, they could agree that indigenous religious ideas were just an illusion inside the heads of Africans and therefore a missionary only needed to liberate their minds by exposing the truth behind the religious ‘fraud’. Accordingly, missionary reports often ridiculed indigenous beliefs and rituals by providing empirical explanations for the ‘mysteries’ they had encountered or heard of (see, e.g., Kemp 1898: 120–133). Sometimes these exposés
were said to be corroborated by former priests who had converted to Christianity and hence ready to reveal their tricks (ibid.: 183). The most daring form of exposure was the direct personal defiance of traditional religious injunctions, which was meant to demonstrate their futility and publicly undermine the power of the priests. In practice, this meant entering sacred grounds, consuming tabooed foods, and committing other transgressions, which would invite divine punishments. To be able to pull them off unharmed was understood as the final proof for the traditionalists that their religion was nothing more than an elaborate scam (see, e.g., Parry 2001: 161–168). Thus, the fetish priests were, from the Christians point of view, the original fakes in Ghanaian religious culture.

On the other hand, however, the missionaries also saw fetishism as something that represented true evil and therefore it should not merely be exposed but also fought against (see, e.g., Ramseyer and Kühne 1875: 169). The truth behind the tricks was not just greed and human fallibility. Paradoxically, as Meyer (2010: 304) puts it, ‘the missionaries shifted easily between a view of “fetishes” and “idols” as “false” in the sense of fake or unreal and “false” in the sense of “wrong” and hence real, yet devoted to satanic powers.’ In the latter case, mere mockery and unmasking would not be enough to revoke the very real but immoral power of traditional religion. It had to be actively preached against, as sinful and demonic, and moreover, the Christian converts would have to denounce it totally and avoid any contact with objects and rituals related to it (see Kallinen 2016: 86–93). The present-day Pentecostal Christians are the inheritors of this ideology, despite their other differences with mission churches, as they adamantly reject any kind of neutral definition of traditional religion, for instance, as part of African culture, or even as plain ignorance, and connect it to a demonic spiritual sphere (ibid.: 118–121).

The issues of fakery are not confined to Christian–traditionalist relations. Quite the contrary, what concerns many Ghanaians the most these days is the threat posed by so-called fake pastors. The rise of Pentecostal churches has also been accompanied by stories of pastors who are accused of staging ‘miracles’, scamming money, sexual misconduct, and the like. They are a common topic in the media and every now and then a public scandal arises, where a popular Pentecostal figure is exposed as a fake (see Shipley 2009: 538–543). Although fake pastors cause alarm in the secular quarters and provide ammunition for a critique of the ‘pentecostalization’ of Ghanaian society, they are fiercely debated by the Pentecostals themselves. Public accusations of fakery are hurled from one pastor to another and sometimes they involve the idea of pastors dabbling with evil occult forces. These accusations are often supported with references to the numerous warnings about ‘false prophets’ and ‘false messiahs’ both in the Old and New Testament. This is yet another example of the Pentecostal strategy of revelation, in which the image of the fake pastor is used as a warning example, proving that outward appearances can never be trusted (Meyer 2015: 178–182). In Jesse Weaver Shipley’s (2009: 349) words, ‘fakery appears as the margin, the horizon against which a moral center is clarified’. Ultimately, this leads into a schizophrenic situation, where a successful revelation by a ‘real’ pastor authenticates his power, but where nobody is ever completely safe from suspicions about fakery since outward appearances are considered potentially deceptive by default. Finally, it is important to note that from a Christian perspective the fake pastor arises from the same kind of unease as the fetish priest did earlier: on the one hand, he can be
considered a simple con-artist, who just needs to be exposed, but on the other, his con could be truly diabolical, in which case mere shaming and ridicule will not suffice.

The traditionalists’ public anxiety about fake pastors could be easily seen only as opportunism, an attempt to exploit scandals in the competition for followers in a single religious field. Or, if approached slightly differently, it could be seen as an instance of traditionalists adopting Pentecostal influences of media performance (see De Witte 2018). However, what I wish to highlight in this article is that the contemporary traditionalists do not simply emulate the centuries old Christian discourse on fakery and subject it to a value reversal (‘you say we are bad, but in reality, you are the bad ones’). They also seek to promulgate a particular conception of what Ghanaian Christianity is and how it relates to traditional religion.

MUTUAL EXPOSURE?

In terms of media genres, both Pentecostal and traditionalist revelatory ‘styles’ were preceded in the secular media by political exposés. After the liberalization of the media in Ghana in the 1990s, the exposé became a popular genre appropriated by the private press in order to counter the ‘official truths’ of the government publications (see Hasty 2005). Not coincidentally, during that same time, the notion of ‘transparency’ gained ground and proliferated in global politics (see, e.g., Sanders and West 2003). Although it is difficult to pinpoint any specific historical relation between the secular and religious exposé genres, it is nonetheless clear that there are many important similarities. In the following, I will discuss YouTube exposés presented by two different traditionalists, in which the questions relating to secrecy and revelation unfold somewhat differently. The videos in the first example have a strong emphasis on revelation, but strictly speaking do not belong to the genre of exposé, as they don’t seek to reveal hypocrisies or abuses of power, and refrain from making moral judgements on their subjects. The nature of the revelations is technical rather than moral, but it is still important for the topic at hand, because the goal of the revelation is the establishment of traditional religion’s superiority over Christianity and the latter’s dependency on the former. The second example subscribes very clearly to the exposé genre and the videos discussed focus on the wrong-doings of the fake pastors. The ambiance of the videos is set by moral outrage and Christians are criticized vehemently. Here too, however, the core message is the Christian dependency on traditionalism.

My first example involves a traditionalist called Chief Naatia Salifu, who is based in Tamale, the capital of the Northern Region of Ghana. He hails from a family of traditional priests and claims to have inherited his shrine from his grandfather. In public he is also known as a philanthropist, the patron of Chief Naatia Salifu Foundation, which reportedly supports orphanages, schools, and asylums for victims of witchcraft accusations. He is also the leader of a secret society known as ‘Making Dreams Reality’ or ‘Northern Illuminati’. The society recruits members by promising to lift them from poverty to riches after they have been initiated by sacrificing a black cow. In the YouTube videos the society’s outward appearance combines esthetic elements from Ghanaian traditional religion and the movie adaptation of Da Vinci Code. Much of the YouTube content involving Chief Naatia are short advertisements, where he explains what he can offer to his ‘clients’ and how he can be contacted. The more elaborate video clips are mostly framed as interviews, in which Naatia is in dialogue with an interviewer.
or he answers questions that appear on the screen as texts.

In a YouTube video titled ‘Chief Naatia exposes some fake prophet and pastors 2017’ he talks about a person called Prophet Shepherd Bushiri, who is the founder of the Enlightened Christian Gathering church, which has several branches all over Africa, including Ghana. Bushiri is an Evangelical preacher and businessman from Malawi, famous for performing ‘miracles’ in his church. Accordingly, his Ghanaian website states that ‘his ministry is known as the ministry of the book of Acts because of the great undeniable signs and wonders which happen in the name of Jesus’. In the video Chief Naatia refers to a one particular miracle performed by Bushiri, that is, an instance where he brought a bag containing of ‘shrine objects’ (supposedly from traditional practitioners) and showed his congregation how the spirit of the Holy Ghost set them on fire. In reality, according to Chief Naatia, what was seen at work was the ‘power of fire’ he had given to Bushiri. He addresses his viewers as follows:

I will demonstrate the power I have given to Bushiri so that you... those people out there who are (...) watching this television will see that I am not claiming... or I am not trying to tell lies on Bushiri.

Chief Naatia pauses his explanation and the viewers are shown an excerpt from a video by Prophet Bushiri, where he calls for ‘the fire of the Holy Ghost’ and sets a bagful of items placed in front of the camera on fire by saying ‘Catch fire in the name of Jesus!’ Some audience members lose their self-control and fall on the ground with their bodies trembling. The clip ends and the camera is back on Chief Naatia, who proceeds to explain how Bushiri did it:

If you want to be like Bushiri, you are highly welcome to Chief Naatia. Please! (...) [I]f you want to call fire from heaven or if you want to demonstrate the power of the fire, you are welcome to my place (...) This is the material [holding a piece of fabric in his hands]. I want to demonstrate what Bushiri does in the church and then you know that the power was given to him by Chief Naatia. There are incantations you need to say: [indistinguishable words]. Fire! [smoke starts arising from the fabric] Fire! Fire! Fire! [the fabric catches fire] Fire! Fire! Fire! It’s very simple as ABC. What are you waiting for? What are you waiting for?! These are some of the things I have for you pastors. OK, I thank you so much [quenches the fire by wrapping the fabric and the camera pans away from him].

When the camera returns to Chief Naatia he says that ‘I'm not here to expose them, but I’m here to declare or to tell what kind of help I have for pastors.’ This is followed by a list of additional powers that he claims to be able to provide, which include many of the ‘miracles’ that Pentecostal preachers typically perform. Here, Chief Naatia's talk seems to posit a relation of hierarchical dependency between traditional priest and pastors—in order to become a popular pastor one has to acquire powers provided by traditional priests. However, it is important to observe that the exposure is intended more as direct self-advertisement than any kind of lesson on ethics. His main moral concern seems to be imposters, who have created fake social media accounts in his name. In case of the Christian pastors, Chief Naatia seems to only suggest that they should not feel hesitant or embarrassed because of obtaining powers from traditionalists. Finally, despite all the revelations and openness, secrecy is still at...
the core of everything. In the end, when Chief Naatia is asked about the source of his power, he merely answers that ‘it is between me and my spirits.’

My second example is Nana Kwaku Bonsam, the same traditional priest whom I quoted in the beginning of this article. He appears to be in a relationship of rivalry with Chief Naatia as the latter has described him as ‘my apprentice’ and ‘still a learner’ in an interview for a TV show. Kwaku Bonsam is a former Seventh Day Adventist and a car mechanic, who became a self-taught traditional priest and started gaining wider recognition in the 2000s. Now he could arguably be characterized as the most renowned traditional priest in the country, who has also enjoyed global fame as his exploits have been covered by such media outlets as The Guardian, The New York Times, and Al Jazeera. Kwaku Bonsam portrays himself as a ‘modernizer’ of traditional religion and he has adopted a public strategy of actively confronting the Pentecostal discourses of ‘othering’. It is precisely his ‘modernity’ that has attracted the international news media. In their reporting, he is often depicted in ‘out of place settings’, such as visiting New York or influencing match results in the football World Cup through magical means. Thus, he is seen as an interesting figure for the global audiences since traditional (exotic) and modern (familiar) appear to be mixed in his persona. Kwaku Bonsam has had his own YouTube channel since 2011, which currently has roughly 4000 subscribers (August 2018). The channel features 200 videos on various topics, consisting of Kwaku Bonsam’s public performances, reports from trips abroad, charity functions, clips from interviews with other media, and so on. Among the most watched content are Kwaku Bonsam’s commentaries on Christian pastors. The video described in the beginning of this article is the second most watched on the channel with more than 144 000 hits thus far. Other examples include a five-part series titled ‘Nana Kwaku Bonsam preaching against some Ghanaian false prophets’ plus a several personal video messages, where Kwaku Bonsam criticizes or offers advice to some of the most well-known figures in Ghana’s Pentecostal circles.

However, the video that he is by far most famous of is not his own ‘production’ but filmed by journalists and later posted on YouTube. In the video Kwaku Bonsam storms into a church building and confronts a Christian pastor. He claims that he had given the pastor, and altogether 1600 pastors in Ghana, spiritual powers that have made their congregations grow. Afterwards, he had heard that the pastor had insulted and diminished him in public and consequently he had come to reclaim the powers. After being scolded by Kwaku Bonsam inside the church, the pastor is escorted outside by a police officer, while the former starts to look for his ‘god’. Next the camera shows Kwaku Bonsam unwrapping a bundle with a ritual object inside it and the pastor starts to tell his story to the journalists. He ‘confesses’ to having bought a ‘god’ from Kwaku Bonsam but claims that it did it not bring him any benefits. His church was now growing but not thanks to Kwaku Bonsam’s ‘god’, which he had already tried to get rid of. After giving his statement he is seated in a police car. The video ends with Kwaku Bonsam’s car leaving the church compound while he throws some banknotes to the rejoicing by-standers through the car window. In addition to the video, the whole incident was covered live by local radio stations and reported widely in the newspapers. Needless to say, the public debates about fake pastors got very heated right after that (Lamote 2012: 190–195; Meyer 2015: 180–181). The style of the video resembles those made by
investigative journalists, who uncover public corruption and other clandestine criminal activities. In fact, Kwaku Bonsam’s rise to the public spotlight has coincided with that of the famous undercover reporter Anas Aremeyaw Anas, whose motto is ‘name, shame, and jail’. Similarly, the video appears to be directed at the ‘common man’, as is usually the case with the exposé genre (see Mazzarella 2006: 488), and not towards prospective clients like in Chief Naatia’s video discussed above.

For Kwaku Bonsam the video has become a public reference point, when discussing the morality of the Pentecostals. For instance, in an interview with American based YouTube news channel SaharaTV he advised the viewers to look up the video as evidence of the dishonesty of pastors:

Tracy Thompson [reporter]: Where do you see the future of traditional medicine... you know, is it going to change, will it probably die down, will it begin to work in some sort of way with other religions or, you know, where do you see it?

Nana Kwaku Bonsam: …in 2000, 1990 you see the traditional religion back home, it go down. And when I came out and I started, right now, we see some of the ministers, some of the pastors, they all go to traditional religion, maybe to collect powers. Yes, I won’t lie to you! (...) Some pastors also come to you to collect powers. Yes! You go to YouTube, you see the video there, where I go to claim my gods from the pastor at church. I am the one who do that. Some pastors... they use plenty! Some pastors... if they are thousand, hundred of them are good! By using such references, Kwaku Bonsam subscribes to the idea of the internet as source of reliable evidence and also establishes himself as a figure who masters the digital sphere (see Pype 2018: 257). This mastery of the modern media is also the point that has caught the attention of those scholars, who have previously analyzed these videos. They have been cited as evidence on how the traditionalists are now embracing Christian forms of representation, since they too know how to arrange public spectacles in which audiovisual media is used as a channel for revelation (Meyer 2012: 102–103). This relates to a more general point about how Pentecostalism and traditionalism are becoming like each other (De Witte 2018: 5). While I consider these to be astute observations, I want to emphasize that the contents of the revelations of the traditionalists and Pentecostals are very different. Namely, the curious thing about the revelations of Kwaku Bonsam is that he himself is directly implicated in the secrets he is revealing and condemning. After all, it is he who has administered the spiritual powers to the pastors, which would make him rather an accomplice than an outside critic. Thus, his criticism must be based on different grounds than those of the Christian criticisms of fake pastors. For him the pastors cannot be either imposters or agents of Satan. In the next section I suggest how these positions should be understood and why this actually tells us something important about what traditionalists think about Christianity.

PRIESTS AND PASTORS

Rumours about Christian priests seeking help from traditional gods have been circulating in Ghana for quite some time and hence the revelations made on YouTube must not have been a surprise to the wider audiences—more
likely, they were a public confirmation of something that was already known. Similarly, I had heard about ‘juju pastors’ before they actually appeared as a topic in the media. What did surprise me, however, was how openly some of the traditional priests discussed their dealings with the Christian pastors. In 2005, when I visited a field site where I had worked a few years earlier, I was told quite straightforwardly right after my arrival that ‘Christians are now a problem’. As the conversation developed, it became clear to me that the ‘problem’ had nothing to do with the behaviour of ordinary churchgoers but rather the double standard of those pastors who secretly relied on the help of traditional gods, but publicly attacked them as demonic. Furthermore, I learned that some pastors had also been visiting this locality in their search for spiritual assistance. The chief priest of the local shrine—I refer to him here with the Twi language general honorific Nana—saw that they were mainly motivated by greed:

Author: Do they [pastors] give any explanation why they preach against the same gods that they consult for spiritual powers?
Nana: The explanation is money.
Author: And they say this bluntly to you?
Nana: Yes. It’s all about the money. You see, the gods know this, and they don’t accept their offerings. They play with them. Just like you just saw me playing with that small child [I had met him in front of his house playing tag with an infant]. I might take their offerings, but the gods won’t. Still, the pastors think that they are now powerful men because of the gods.

The response of my informant differs from the statements made by Kwaku Bonsam in the sense that he sees the pastors’ attempts to tap spiritual powers as futile, because the gods he serves enforce strict morality. However, what is similar is the ambiguous role of the priest. By saying that he ‘might take their offerings’ he seems to suggest that he is ready to offer himself as the middle man for the fake pastors, whose motives he nonetheless openly condemns.

In order to fully understand the basis for traditionalists’ accusations of fakery, it is important to discuss further the cosmological notions that underpin these concerns. The Akan cosmology sees Onyame, the Creator, as the source of all power. Thus, the power that animates the bodies of humans, animals, and plants is derived from this superior being, while the powers of spiritual beings, objects, and substances stem directly or indirectly from the same source. Although the human faculties are restricted both by Onyame’s creation and the physical and spiritual characteristics individuals have inherited from their predecessors, there are ways to obtain ‘extra-human’ abilities. Most importantly, humans are considered to be able to acquire and/or make use of the powers of the spirits. People who are perceived as ‘powerful’ (wo tumi or wo sunsum) are thought to have established a close relationship with the spirits, and their success and accomplishments are integrally linked to that connection. This relationship takes the form of exchange in sacrifice. Although originating from the spiritual realm, power is, in principle, accessible to all, but in practice access to it is restricted by limited knowledge and means. This again explains the high value given to esoteric knowledge in traditional religion and the respect accorded to people who ‘know secrets’ (see Akyeampong and Obeng 1995: 483–484).

The possibility of humans harnessing spiritual powers was at the heart of the ideology of traditional chieftaincy. More recently it has been extended to modern politicians, as they,
too, are considered to possess a greater spiritual backing, resulting in numerous stories about politicians obtaining ‘jujus’ that make them rich or invulnerable against traffic accidents or assassination attempts, among other things. Consequently, politicians’ relationships with traditional priests are a popular topic of gossip and sensationalist journalism. In contemporary Pentecostalist accounts, they are treated as pacts with the devil (see, e.g. Kallinen 2016: 154–169).

In the traditionalist exposés of Christian pastors this idea has been expanded even further. It is claimed that the success of certain pastors rests on a spiritual backing provided by traditional gods. As evidence the traditional priests offer accounts of how they themselves have mediated spiritual powers in such a way, or to put it another way, how they have had pastors as their ‘clients’. This creates a problematic moral arrangement, where the ‘dirty secret’ of the Christian pastor is the traditional priest, who eventually comes out in the open exposing the secret.

According to theologian Ogbu Kalu (2002: 117–122), relationships between spirits and people form a ‘covenant structure’ that is characteristic of what he calls an African worldview. Most importantly though, he points to the idea that the covenant structure is also typical of Pentecostalism. In both ways of thinking, humans are seen to search for support and protection in their this-worldly undertakings by making contracts with spiritual agents. Therefore, religious conversion could be viewed simply as a change of allegiances. As Kalu puts it, ‘the solution to problems of affliction and defeat in life is to exchange the covenant with the wicked spirits for the covenant with Christ’ (ibid.: 133). Accordingly, from a traditionalist point of view, the difference between traditional religion and Christianity is not as dramatic as Pentecostal demonization suggests and movement between the two is not seen as problematic in the same way.

In contemporary traditionalist perceptions Christianity is seen as an ‘ethnic’ religion—‘good for the Europeans’, as one of my informants put it—and it is considered to share the same mythical origin with traditional religion and Islam. Namely, it is maintained that when Onyame created humans he gave the Bible to the Europeans, the Quran to the Muslims, and the traditional religion to the Africans. From this position, Christianity and traditionalism are merely two different ways of serving the same God. Thus, when I have asked about the relationship between the two religions from traditional priests the reply has often been ‘it’s the same God’ or ‘there is only one God’. Accordingly, some emphasize that ‘they [Ghanaian Christians] should understand that the abosom are also children of God’. These ideas may have been influenced by certain intellectual strands in missionary Christianity, which sought to trace the historical roots of Akan religion back to ancient Israel, thus proposing that the principles of the traditional religion could be understood as an ‘other Old Testament’ anticipating the coming of Christianity (see Debrunner 1967: 6–7). Consequently, traditional religion would share the same God as Abrahamic religions. Another idea entertained by some missionaries working in Ghana subscribed to the degeneration thesis, claiming that traditional religion had originally been monotheistic, formed around the worship of one high God, but ‘deteriorated’ during the course of history to polytheism (see Meyer 1999: 60–62). Later on, it was proposed that traditional religion could be ‘refined’ by amplifying its monotheistic tendencies and downplaying the polytheistic and ‘fetishist’ elements (see, e.g., Rattray 1929: vi–xiii). Despite possible missionary influences, it is
evident that the idea about Akan religion sharing the same origin with Christianity has been a part of indigenous religious thinking for a considerably long time. The notion about the ‘creation’ of different religions, which was explained to me in my fieldwork, was already in circulation during the nineteenth century. For example, in 1876 the then king of Asante, Asantehene Mensa Bonsu, turned down the request of the Wesleyan-Methodist mission for re-commencing missionary work in his kingdom, by stating that the Asante people already knew God:

The Bible is not a book for us. God at the beginning gave the Bible to the white people, another book to the Cramos [Muslims] and the fetish to us. Our fetishes are God’s interpreters to us. If God requires a human sacrifice or a sheep, He tells our fetishes, and they tell us, and we give them. They tell us too where the gold is with which we trade. We know God already ourselves, and we cannot do without human sacrifices.

As to the [Ten] Commandments of God, we know that we keep them all. We keep the first through our fetishes. In Ashanti we do not allow people to abuse the name of God. As to keeping the Sabbath we have always kept it. If a man steals we kill him (…) If a man takes the wife of another we kill him. If a man commits murder we kill him too. (Cited in McCaskie 1995: 140)

Considering the above, it could be said that there is a relatively long-standing notion among the traditionalists that the two religions stand in a relation of ‘siblingship’ rather than extraneity. Hence, there appears to be an aspiration for a synthesis, in which the existence of Christianity is explained by reference to a common origin and shared divinity. The Christians seldomly agree with this. Although some present-day theological thinkers accept the idea of traditionalists and Christians sharing the same God (see, e.g., Sarpong 1996), the issue of spirits functioning as mediators between God and humans remains highly problematic. Consequently, the notion of the basic similarity of Christianity and traditional religion has been mostly rejected by the Christians that I have interviewed. The rejection has been justified on varying grounds. Some emphasize the idea of direct relationship between the believer and the Christian God, which makes any kind of spiritual intermediaries unnecessary, and thus questions the traditionalist logic. For others, traditionalists are ‘worshippers of sticks and stones’, implying that the gods worshipped by them are fetishes in the Enlightenment sense of the term. Lastly, there are, of course, the Pentecostals who assert categorically that ‘these spirits are not from God’ and thus reinforce the conception about the satanic nature of the indigenous spirit world. Therefore, in Pentecostalism the possibility for synthesis is rejected as traditional religion is seen as utterly incompatible with Christianity.

Against this background it is evident that the revelatory media strategies adopted by the Pentecostals and traditionalist work toward different kinds of ideological ends. For the Pentecostals revelation is an instrument for the demonization and denunciation of something they recognize as immoral. It works for rupture, not synthesis. The traditionalists, in contrast, do not demonize Christianity—they are rather trying to reveal the connectedness between Christians and traditional gods. In traditionalist thinking Christianity has already been encompassed by defining it as one of the three ways to worship God, but ‘media traditionalists’ like Kwaku Bonsam and Chief Naatia suggest
something more radical in their exposés by showing that the ‘powers’ of Christian pastors are actually dependent on them. Those who claim to have a direct relationship with God and supposedly have no need for intermediaries are now being relegated to the bottom of the ladder. In order to become empowered by God they need to enter into secrets covenants with traditional gods through their priests. However, when they publicly denounce those same gods they are betraying the possibility of synthesis and thus invite the moral judgement of traditionalists.

CONCLUSIONS

Kwaku Bonsam and Chief Naatia have been able to adopt the revelatory media format and turn the traditional religion’s emphasis on secrecy to their advantage. They cannot and do not reveal their own secrets in public, but they can reveal the secrets of others. In the case of the former, this is justified by the allegedly immoral behavior of others, for which the punishment is public revelation. Previously, the traditionalists have been accused by the Christians of holding immoral secrets, but now it seems that the tables have turned.

Although Kwaku Bonsam and Chief Naatia are exceptional traditional priests in the sense that they (along with few others) work through social media, their views about Christian pastors resonate with those of the traditionalists in general. Many appear to think that Kwaku Bonsam is saying out loud what everybody is thinking. Lamote (2012: 190) reports that the priests he worked with did ‘not appreciate the constant public insults by the Pentecostal pastors’ and consequently ‘approved and enjoyed’ the humiliations arranged by Kwaku Bonsam. Similarly, some of the traditional priests I have talked to are offended by and frustrated with the Pentecostal demonizing. As one of my informants, who had been publicly targeted by a pastor, stated, ‘he should come here and say it to the gods, but he will not’, suggesting that the pastor deliberately spread lies about him but did not have the courage to face the consequences. On the other hand, there are also those who think that it is not their place to criticize the fake pastors. Even priests who openly admit to ‘making pastors great’, and are obviously well aware of the diabolization discourses, seem to accept that the spirits have given their powers to whom they want and it is not their business to doubt their choices.

The curious thing with the examples of Kwaku Bonsam and Chief Naatia is that, while they expose the fake pastors and false prophets, they, in a way, also expose themselves. They reveal that the ‘powers’ of the Christian pastors actually originate from indigenous gods and are mediated by the priests themselves. But how such powers are located and obtained still remains a secret possessed and guarded by the priests. Thus their ‘media strategy’ relies on an interplay of secrecy and revelation. It is certainly true that traditionalists like Kwaku Bonsam are adopting formats and modes of representation that are similar to those used by the Pentecostals, and on the surface the difference between traditional religion and Pentecostalism becomes diminished. However, what is being attempted by the traditionalists is something far more revolutionizing. As I understand it, their goal is to transform a binary opposition into a hierarchical synthesis. Instead of merely questioning the valuations of the dualisms rehearsed by Pentecostals they seek to discuss Ghanaian Christianity as something encompassed by traditional cosmology.
NOTES

1 The video is published on YouTube with title ‘Nana Kwaku Bonsam, why some of the pastors are rich and church members are poor, false prophets’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zy_54M17XSA&t=519s).

2 I use the terms traditional priest, traditionalist, and traditional religion as native categories. They are terms used by the people themselves, when speaking English. As will become evident below, it is in no way suggested that they would somehow represent a ‘pre-modern’ religious culture.

3 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RmHXHICHuo)

4 Fieldwork took place in Kumasi, Ashanti Region, in 2000–2001 and in Nkoranza, Brong-Ahafo Region in 2005–2006. It was conducted with chiefs, traditional priests, and leaders and members of local Christian communities.

5 According to the national census of 2010, 71.2% of the population are Christians, 17.6% Muslims, and 5.2% traditionalists. 28.3% of all Ghanaians consider themselves Pentecostal-charismatic and hence they form the biggest Christian group in the country (Ghana Statistical Service 2012: 6, 40). As others have also pointed out (see, e.g., De Witte 2018: 3), census data offers an imperfect reflection of religious reality. Censuses are based on an idea of singular religious identity, which is highly problematic, especially in a country like Ghana, where many people do not treat different religions as mutually exclusive categories (see Lambek 2008: 124–125).

6 Another important centralized nationwide organization for traditionalists is the Ghana Psychic and Traditional Healing Association. It is specifically identified as an organization focused on ‘traditional medicine’, and not religion, but its membership is comprised of traditional priests (see, e.g., Allman and Parker 2005, 225–226).

7 For instance, ‘fetish priest’ is still very much part of contemporary Ghanaian English usage. Many speakers are not familiar with its history and derogatory connotations and use it more or less as a neutral term.

8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjMkSe4Y5ZQ&t=500s


11 The video with English subtitles is posted on YouTube with the title ‘Nana Kwaku Bonsam collects his juju from fake pastor’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iI_lFCutgLo). The video has been previously discussed by Meyer (2012: 102–103) and De Witte (2017: 49). The most extensive treatment of the incident with many of its local ramifications is by Frederik Lamote (2012: 188–195) who also conducted fieldwork with Kwaku Bonsam.

12 Anas Aremeyaw Anas – official website (https://anasaremeyawanas.org/).

13 ‘Pastors Come To Me For Juju Says Nana Kwaku Bonsam’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=USogrjgiAtI).

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