EDUCATING SOLDIERS AND SECURITY SECTOR ACTORS FOR HUMAN SECURITY-ORIENTED ACTIVITIES

Juha Mäkinen

Author is Professor of Military Pedagogy in The Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy at The National Defence University

Abstract:

A new kind of soldiership, akin to security sector actorship, is emerging in the national security sector in Finland. An efficient and good national security sector could and should have some shared aspects, like for example some ends and objects/objectives of activities, but also some mediating means. The analysis done in the paper shows how human security -oriented activities are mediated in Finland at the moment for example by such concepts as human security and action competence. These concepts are operational in the 21st century education of soldiers and civilians facing new kinds of global threats collectively but also locally. The intent is not to deliver some non-disputable facts to be internalized but to give some food for thought instead, for both soldiers and civilians in Finland, and to be debated on in the future.

Introduction and background

In the Nordic countries, soldiership has got a new flavour in our ‘postmodern’ times (Moskos et al. 2000), with primacy given to international missions (Stoltenberg 2009; Bailes et al. 2006), instead of old-fashioned territorial defence and some comprehensive internal security
activities. By comprehensiveness, I mean that both civilian and military resources and personnel are needed for internal security activities, as the duties of the Finnish Defence Forces also highlight at the moment (Finnish Parliament 2007). At least in Finland we should keep our soldiers, citizen-soldiers, also nationally-oriented, being able to think by themselves while keeping in mind fundamental questions, such as how to maintain one’s ethical consistency and to be an ethical subject by justifying killing and respecting human dignity and human security at the same time.

It follows that instead of just being ‘hired guns’ and ‘traditional warriors’, the (Finnish) soldiers are national security actors in the forthcoming comprehensive national security age. Both soldiership and the emerging security actorship have to be reinterpreted when more justifiable ethical-moral grounds for the activities of the comprehensive national security sector will be established.

The soldiers’ line of business is not mere war, but instead and complementarily speaking, peace, safety and security. This means that soldiers act in a broad field of the security sector, which has been under a global transformation process (i.e. Security Sector Reform, SSR). Security, and more specifically human security, is a widely shared interest, and soldiers are actively seeking new kinds of means and ways for collaboration with the representatives of the other branches of government, as well as with the security sector in general, in order to succeed in co-operative human security-orientation efforts. Both soldiers and other national security actors follow for example the guidelines set in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (=SSFVS 2006), emphasizing that each ministry, within its mandate, will steer and monitor the implementation of tasks and the development of required capabilities related to securing the society’s vital functions, although the Ministry of Defence is responsible for the coordination of the total defence activities.

Already after the Second World War (cf. e.g. Henk 2007 for neglecting this kind of historical and cultural evolution), (Finnish) military establishments have been heavily engaged in human security-related activities in peacekeeping and in many kinds of duties in assisting civilian authorities. Of course, in the broad field of academic security-oriented studies this shift in orientation has been a well known phenomenon and also partly understood. Maybe it is even justifiable to say that at least some of these kinds of academic studies and debates have had some meaningful influence on the various kinds of security sector actors, being at the same influenced by the societal academic drift (Clark 1983; cf. e.g. Elzinga 1990) and academization of professions (see Toiskallio & Mäkinen 2009).

At least since the 1980s, a so called ‘interparadigm debate’ (Raitasalo 2008) between the traditional realist, or positivistic, interpretations and the emerging anti-positivistic interpretations (see Mäkinen 2006 about my methodological position) has been going on. Instead of taking an ‘either-or’ stand in these debates, the present paper focuses on the meaning, dynamics and application of (security) concepts, and on debates that have often taken place across these categories (Fierke 2007, 3). This means that the most enlightening debate for human-oriented security studies seems to be the debate over the traditional orientation to security versus critical security studies (CSS) (Fierke 2007; Booth 1991; see Limnéll 2009, 57–60). In other words, this paper has the emancipatory interest that is shared by, for example, critical security studies and military pedagogical studies. The subjects to be emancipated are the soldiers (i.e. citizen-soldiers), as well as the other security sector actors, including all the citizens of Finland.

The military pedagogists of the Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy at the
Finnish National Defence University feel the need to enhance educational considerations within the wide field of comprehensive crisis management and among human security researchers and educators. For this purpose, a new kind of course for MMSc students (i.e. master students) was held last winter, called “Security and Comprehensive Crisis Management”, and this paper reflects on the progressive inquiries done before, during and after the innovative and future-oriented course.

A brief and critical introduction to the (too) various kinds of security strategies in Finland

Based on the premise that the Finnish security sector already has some shared and mediating concepts, at least in its several security strategies, a qualitative content analysis is done in this paper. Through the content analysis, we can see how widely the focal concepts (i.e. human security; action competence) are shared, or not, on a strategic level and within the branches of the Finnish government. Also the possible differences in the conceptual meanings of the focal concepts can be identified. For a start, it is assumed that the strategies and policies in question construct a hierarchic constellation where the more normative strategies, such as the Finnish Security and Defence Policy (FSDP, 2009) and e.g. Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy (2009) should form a clear basis for coherent political guidance of the several branches of the government. The ‘coherency check’ can be done by comparing the most normative strategies/policies to several security-oriented ‘sub-strategies’ such as for example the Internal Security Programme and the SSFVS. The analysis is done in a future-oriented manner, due to the fact that the potentially identifiable lack of coherence in the strategies/policies can be to a great extent avoided in the forthcoming national security strategies/policies/strategy.

According to the FSDP (2009, 71, 82), Finland follows a comprehensive approach which recognizes the interrelationship between internal and external security. Finland will be defended by focusing the resources of the entire society on national defence efforts, in line with the principles of the comprehensive defence approach and the SSFVS (2006). For all the educational institutions of the broad national security sector, comprehensiveness is a concept to be included to the curricula, but it has to be emphasized that this move should be happening even more comprehensively and actively within the networked national security sector.

The FSDP (2009, 129) continues that in the Comprehensive Approach, the goal in crisis management is to coordinate different activities coherently while respecting the independent role of each actor. The FSDP also states that the impact of the activities must be assessed in its entirety, but with this, the policy will run into difficulties. Firstly, all the impacts (consequences; both intended and unintended) should be assessed holistically, and secondly, the impacts have to be linked back to the actors having ‘independent roles’ and doing, or not, something. The position of ‘actors having static and independent roles’ is an example of the ‘old-fashioned’ functionalist sociological interpretation, and sociologically an extensively and convincingly contested position. Also when interpreting from both the angles of military pedagogy and of the cultural-historical activity theory, as done in the present paper, the actors participate in collective activities having potentially a shared object and outcome (i.e. consequences) being potentially related to the basic needs of human beings (i.e. safety; human security). Instead of believing that in present societies there still exist static traditional roles for soldiers and to other security sector actors, both soldiers and other security sector actors should take more
identity-oriented questions into consideration (Värri & Ropo 2010). A fundamental question has emerged, akin to the question “who am I if I am a soldier”: “who am I if I am a security sector actor?” Of course these kinds of questions, and even the tentative answers, should form the core of the educational activities in the new kind of national security sector.

In this paper, identity is understood as a function of both external (social) and internal (agentic) factors. In other words, our identities can be analyzed on three interrelated levels, namely the social identity (including national identity), personal identity, and ego identity (Côté & Levin 2002). The myth of “the miracle of the Winter War”, born on the successful experiences during the Winter War (Mälkki 2008), has led to overvaluing ‘warrior’ (i.e. soldier) types of social and personal identities even in the 21st century. On the other hand, especially at the societal level, we have effectively blocked away the gained experiences during peacekeeping/crisis management operations. Maybe these ‘not so tough’ experiences are allowed to be utilized by civilian reservists (i.e. civilians), but officers are expected to be ‘pure’ soldiers/warriors without being, at least in any formal sense, citizens as well.

However, a lot has changed since the times of the Winter War, and a wave of globalization and internationalization has swept over our nationally-oriented institutional structures of armed and defence forces. In our ‘postmodern’ times, identity questions have come to the fore, and therefore my brief and conceptual proposal for these kinds of identity debates is that “Our soldiers are both citizen-soldiers and security sector actors”.

Curiously, we still have not really debated on what is our line of business, and identity questions are generally speaking unknown to us, at least when speaking collectively and formally. Due to this state of our mindsets, it is not so surprising that the mystified and typologized ‘Others’, the source of ‘all’ threats, is very much unknown and a ‘black box’ for us. But how is it even in principle possible, or is it at all possible, to counter justifiably the ‘Others’ and all kinds of threats if we do not know even ourselves and our identities? Of course, during security-oriented educational activities many kinds of ‘black boxes’ should be opened, and the contents should be ‘illuminated’ by progressive inquiries.

Further on, the (Finnish) security sector actors should debate on such questions as what kinds of cultural basic premises, values and ethical-moral orientations they do have and potentially share? Through international military operations we protect our ‘shared values’, although the values are, and should be under ongoing reconsideration in our democracies (such as our present tendency to overvalue consuming over everything else).

If for example values are somehow evaluated social-scientifically, the research seems to be often done within an individual branch of government or alternatively, when some comparisons are made, the focus remains on the international level only. The fact is that morality and values guide our actions and are therefore also central for our collective activities, although there often exists a gap between for example the authentic and the espoused values. But what kinds of values and other basic premises of the actions are shared, and which are not widely shared ones within the national security sector, remains an open question. It follows that these potential value comparisons open the window of opportunity for even more fundamental debates on the identities of the (Finnish) national security actors.

According to the FSDP (2009, 110), the deterrence of Finland demands that the Defence Forces are capable of repelling an attack requiring for example a comprehensive situation picture and an early-warning capability, constant readiness in the chain of command, highly capable key troops and systems in every service, good operational mobility across the nation, and ca-
pability of cooperating with other authorities and key actors of the business sector. What then does the deterrence of Finland, Europe and the globe require of us? As stated, a comprehensive situation picture and early-warning capability with constant readiness to act with appropriate means is needed for the evolving security sector in Finland, and even more so on a European and global level.

Let me give a clarifying example of what I mean by a comprehensive situation picture. It may seem that I have in my mind some kind of a “tilannehuone.fi”-type of a situation picture (i.e. a traditional situation map). Not at all, due to the fact that a more systemic and structural situational ‘picture’ and awareness are needed. This means also that the belief that for example some middle aged men, or some school-shootings, are the most severe threats for us, has to be reconsidered. These kinds of phenomena are examples of the events and incidents on the screen of the “tilannehuone.fi”-type of website. At a deeper level, many systemic and structural ‘root causes’ exist, and too often we tend to neglect these kinds of complexities, instead turning our collective attention to the simplicities very much under our present control. The general tendency is to react when something bad happens, but focus solely on ‘quick fixes’ with a ‘fire fighter-approach’.

What kinds of threats are the Defence Forces and the other (European) security sector actors actually and in reality facing? According to the FSFP (2009), the threats are wide-ranging and interdependent, but what kinds of aspects are linked to each other and how does the interaction proceed? A recent analysis made by Jarno Limnell of the FSFP in 2004 (2009, 189) clearly shows how rapidly the security strategies are evolving also in Europe. For example the European Security Strategy (2003) does not discuss environmental, or human, security threats (cf. European Union 2008). On the other hand, the FSFP (2009) emphasizes that long-term global trends, such as climate change, need to be countered by a comprehensive approach, but how and when?

What do our citizens think about our security situation and the threats to us? Are they aligned with some national security ‘sub-strategy’ or do they have ideas of their own, and if the answer is affirmative, to what kinds of conclusions do they arrive? The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI) has a long tradition of polling the opinions of Finns on the Finnish foreign and security policy and defence policy. In addition, since 2007, citizens have been asked to provide their views on how they think security will develop over the next five years, and to assess factors which affect the security of Finland and their personal sense of security. When comparing the ABDI polls done in 2007 and 2009, it can be seen that in 2009 a deep, global crisis of the international economy, getting a 48 % share of the answers (41% in 2008), was seen as the most likely threat. The result is understandable in the midst of a severe global economic crisis. The second most likely threat in the ABDI poll of 2009 was an environmental disaster caused by global warming, getting 46 % (37 % in 2008) of the answers. The number of those seeing the environmental disaster as an influential source of a security threat had risen by 9 %-units in a year, maybe partly because now it has been proven that we humans have an influence on climate change (IPCC 2007; Vaahtoranta 2010). This trend should be notified both in the next FSFP and in the next European Security Strategy, although the fundamental question of “what threatens us” remains partly unanswered but needing to be dealt with very comprehensively.

According to Finland’s Comprehensive Crisis Management Strategy (2009), the objective of crisis management is to strengthen human security and comprehensive crisis manage-
ment through shared training and research. Interestingly, even the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (2006) does not mention the concept of human security at all. It is possible, and actually justifiable to assume that the forthcoming national security strategy will clarify what the human security concept means and how we will fulfil the basic needs of those have nots.

**Human security – an end in itself but also a mediating concept within the security sector**

In the course of the profound and complex contemporary developments, the paradigm of human security might be the ‘third step’ coming after the first step to the ‘postmodern warfare’ and the second step to ‘fighting against terrorism’ (Toiskallio 2007, 9). In the 1970s, the so called “human rights regime” emerged as a result of the development of the human rights law, the Conventions and the Helsinki Agreement of 1975, and the proliferation of human rights activists concerned about human rights abuses (Kaldor 2007, 8). Another complementary and central explanation for the emergence of the human security concept has been offered by Sabine Alkire (2003; cf. CMC 2009) who claims that the human security approach has got its pivotal position within the global security sector due to the mismatch between the security threats and the national and international responses to these threats. The mismatch feeling has been shared also by (some) soldiers, the seminal book of general (ret.) Rubert Smith (2005) being a prime example of this point.

Instead of aiming to analyze and show the most appropriate definition of the concept, the famous ‘right answer’ to the question of the exact meaning of human security (see Alkire 2003; Commission on Human Security 2003; CMC 2009), the intent in this paper is to show the main dimensions of the human security-oriented activities to be shared by the main security sector organizations and actors. In other words, the intent is to construct a multidimensional framework for human security-oriented activities.

One of the main premises of the paper is that the dimensions emphasized by the human security approach enable us to shift our orientation, in a way open our eyes and look at the planet around us, but do it carefully because we may not like what we see and experience. Actually this is a necessity not only for us as soldiers, or security sector actors, but more crucially for us as human beings on this planet. If ‘lay people’ are not aware of this fact, should the security sector actors be aware of these phenomena, or turn a blind eye on these “new issues in security” instead, and keep handling simplicities in a traditional way?

The seminal report of the UN, the Human Development Report (1994), sets the stage for those interested in finding out the main dimensions of the human security approach. According to the Human Development Report (1994), the threats to human security are no longer just personal or local or national, they are becoming global. The ongoing globalization has obviously made its way into the descriptions of the UN, proposing us to think ‘how everything happens far away, with severe and deterministic consequences for us’. On the other hand, through the terms glocal and glocalness, the continuous interaction between local and global features may hopefully get our shared attention, due to the fact that ‘everything’ does not emerge from a vacuum, but partly amongst us. Let me clarify this point further. In our neoliberal global societies, a wholesale reduction of our agency towards being just consumers has happened during the past century. The time has come to re-establish our agency, and action competence, when figuring out that the ultimate end of our lives is something more meaning-
ful than just to consume or have fun.

Of course our enterprises, even multinational ones, will produce only those products that will be bought and consumed. When the products are no longer bought, some lines of production will be closed, as we all at least in principle know. But what we seem not to know is a more personal, hence much tougher question to deal with, i.e. are you personally, with your family and relatives and ‘human networks’, aware of the consequences of your consumption and acts? In my understanding, even not to act, for example in times of an emerging ecocatastrophe, or for example genocides, is an act towards, in this case, ‘not so good’ future (see e.g. Vetlesen 2005).

For all the security sector actors, the unawareness of our global realities and interdependencies is an even bigger vice, because the duty of the security sector actors is to keep ‘lay people’ and all citizens aware of the present glocal threats and of the appropriate means to counter these threats. Of course, many citizens are more aware of these glocal threats than the security sector actors, at least formally and at the moment. Therefore, there should in our democracies be an on-going political debate on the threats and countermeasures (means), but also on the ends themselves (i.e. visions).

The orientation of the international community often seems to be a reactive one, and especially for soldiers, this kind of orientation has meant overemphasis on post-conflict situations and on phases after an open conflict (e.g. Koskela 2008, 7). Also the Human Development Report (1994, 3) challenges the traditional interpretation by stressing that it is important to develop some operational indicators of human security as an early warning system allowing us to help avoid reaching a crisis point. The main focus of the global community, including all security sector actors, should be on the whole spectrum of conflict resolution responses (Ramsbotham et al. 2005, 12; Human Security Study Group). The whole spectrum of ‘conflict resolution’ is the second dimension of human security, extending the appropriate time-frames extensively.

The special focus of the attention should be, instead on the ‘post-conflict’ situations, on preventive peace-building activities of overcoming structural and cultural violence when heading towards a “positive peace” (Webel & Galtung (ed.) 2007) and a “better peace” (Liddell Hart 1954: 1991). Interestingly, Johan Galtung, the founder of peace studies and a peace researcher, and Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, a military strategist and a theorist of art of war, share the very same “grand strategist” object – peace. Of course, peace building is not an issue on a global and international level only, but on a regional and national level as well. Even more curiously, not only “out there” in the area of the former Soviet Union, but right here in our specific geostrategic position with our neighbours.

It seems that especially soldiers, as well as all security sector actors, have to be educated for ‘whole spectrum’ operations, including peace building operations and activities also on a regional level, meaning that we have neighbours potentially sharing some/all of our human security interests in the west and also in the east. As I explained above, I agree with the interpretations that after the paradigm of ‘postmodern warfare’, the fight against terrorism has come on the stage also in Finland. Maybe some interests will be shared in the west and east on this issue also? Maybe there are some presently underutilized possibilities for intercultural learning in the case of fighting against terrorism? Speaking in an even more future-oriented manner, maybe intercultural learning is also possible in the case of human security issues and on a global scale? Neither peace nor war are ontological facts. Both are potentially socially constructed, and it is our responsibility to choose our side in this debate. According to the Human Development
Report (1994, 13), human beings are born with certain potential capabilities. The purpose of development is to create an environment in which all people can expand their capabilities. One option, elaborated later on in this paper, is to conceptualize these human potential capabilities as action competence. By emphasizing action competence we can agree with the Human Development Report that at the global level, sustainable human development requires no less than a new global ethic and locally shared responsibility (Heinonen 2002; Heinonen & Romppanen 2010; Mäkinen 2010).

Let us now turn the attention to the Kaldorian interpretations about the question of adopting the human security approach in Europe. The first reason to adopt the human security approach (Human Security Study Group 2004) is based on morality, like emphasised in the Human Development Report (1994). All human life is equal, and it is not acceptable that human lives become cheap in desperate situations (be it in Rwanda, Srebrenica, or anywhere else). The second reason (ibid.) is legal, meaning that we have not only a right, but also a legal obligation, to concern ourselves with human security worldwide. The third reason (ibid.) for adopting the human security approach is ‘enlightened self-interest’. The Europeans, or anybody else, cannot be secure while some people in the world live in severe insecurity. In a way we all are interconnected in the front of emerging security threats.

It is often understood that the human security ‘paradigm’ argues for the importance of simultaneous progress in a variety of domains (i.e. economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political) (CMC 2009, 16-18), but instead of this traditional ‘linear kind of thinking’, a more holistic (Toiskallio 2007, 8–9) and systemic way of thinking is needed. Therefore the third dimension of human security means shifting our thinking from linear towards more systemic ways of thinking.

This is a shared challenge for all the security sector actors, not just for the soldiers. The demand for holistic and systemic thinking goes in parallel with the “utility of force” (i.e. the means versus the ends) -debate (Smith 2005). According to the human security approach, in line especially with its European branch, a set of selected principles (Human Security Study Group 2004) should, and could, guide the actions of the security sector actors on all the levels of the epistemic infrastructure (Mäkinen 2006). In other words, the proposed principles are intended to be applicable both at the grassroot level (i.e. the soldiers and the civilians in the field) and at the “grand strategic level” (i.e. the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE etc).

The proposed set of complementary human security principles are the following (Human Security Study Group 2004; 2007):

- the primacy of human rights
- legitimate political authority
- multilateralism
- bottom-up approach
- regional focus
- use of legal instruments
- appropriate use of force.

At this phase, only a short analysis of the proposed principles can be made. Traditionally, it has been assumed that the interests of states (i.e. natural resources, economical advantages), or the interests of “the military-industrial complex” (see Mäkinen 2010), override the needs to promote e.g. human rights and security. Contrary to this kind of traditional interpretation, the hypernorms should and could constrain the local authentic norms (Donaldson & Dunfee 1994;
e.g. globally destructive overemphasis on self-interests over the interests of humanity). One proposed candidate for such a hypernorm is human dignity (Mäkinen 2010).

At this phase, the proposed hypernorm is just a potential one, waiting to be checked in e.g. crisis management realities. In other words, the emphasis on ‘reality checks’ means also emphasis on case studies, and more precisely, on hierarchic/networked case studies. By hierarchic/networked, or systemic, case studies I mean studies whose unit of analysis is neither only soldiers/security sector actors on the field nor only a specific mission (e.g. ISAF in Afganistan or KFOR in Kosovo), but instead the whole epistemic infrastructure from the individuals up to the ‘grand strategic level’, according to the bottom-up principle.

The meaning of multilateralism should be interpreted more comprehensively than “acting with a group of states” (Human Security Study Group 2004). Multilateralism means a commitment to work with international institutions, but it also means commitment to common ways of working and to agreed rules and norms. Additionally, multilateralism means coordination of collective efforts and activities. According to the premises of the cultural-historical theorists, shared also by military pedagogists, all activities, including security activities, should share some objects and means in order to achieve a qualitatively appropriate level of intended outcomes.

Finally, the regional focus needs to be explained, although it is closely linked to the above-mentioned bottom-up (i.e. epistemic infrastructure) approach. The emphasis on regional issues means that not only local-global (glocal) interaction is needed for stability, well-being and peace. The activities on the regional level play a crucial mediating role between the national and international/global levels. Interestingly, the regional approach is not applicable somewhere in Africa only, but also here in Finland with its neighbours, including Russia. The fundamental question, in the case of Finland, is the regional cooperation between the Nordic countries but also with our Eastern neighbours (see e.g. Heusala, Lohiniva & Malmi 2008). This question is even more pivotal in the case of all kinds of security institutions (including military institutions) sharing together, with the security institutions of the Others, the very same wide-ranging and interdependent (real) threats.

For soldiers, and for all security sector actors, the use of force, and especially ethically justifiable use of force, is the fundamental and paradoxical question. In 2004, the Human Security Study Group proposed a ‘Human Security Force’ to be composed. A minimum use of force should be the norm for such a Force, meaning that this kind of an attitude is more akin to the traditional approach of the police, who risk their lives to save others, even though they are prepared to kill in extremis, as human security forces should be. Of course, when really risking your life, you have to know an acceptable and justifiable reason for doing so. Often, especially at an espoused level, we claim not risking the lives of our soldiers. Instead we pay well to private enterprises, such as private military companies (PMCs), to risk the lives of their personnel (generally former soldiers) in the game of ‘without any rules and norms’. But global awareness is rising, and the rules and moral norms are going to be re-established even for PMCs and when the security sector organizations show a good example of ethically correct ways of securing peace. Of course in reality, where the good and ‘not so good guys’ ‘compete’ with each other, also some ethically competent soldiers have to risk their lives on behalf of the ‘lay people’ and do it for appropriate reasons. When risking their lives, the use of ‘lethal’ force should be allowed, but primarily reactively, on an appropriate level, only, and as a last resort. By ‘lethality’ I mean that in the 21st century it is already also technologically possible to produce and use non-lethal
we have not been mentally and culturally prepared to use these kinds of weapons on a larger scale. Again we do not believe that the demands and decisions of the consumers have, in this case military consumers, the pivotal role also in the question of what kinds of weapons will be produced.

Of course there should be a ‘delicate balance’ between reactive and preventive (or even preemptive security-oriented activities; see Dershowitz 2006) orientations, especially in the case of human security-oriented activities. Both orientations are needed, although we should pay more and more attention to the preventive peace building activities, and also to our soldiers being specialists of security and safety. The preventive orientation requires that Finland, and also the EU, will continue discussing about the strategic direction of Finland, and the EU, on a ‘grand strategic level’. Even more than traditional political discussions, a more ethically-morally oriented strategic debate should be going on, and many systemic case studies offer a reasonable starting point for such discussions (e.g. Human Security Study Group 2007; CMC 2009; Peou 2005; Athanasiou 2007; Kostovicova 2008; see Mäkinen 2010 for additional case studies).

According to Mary Kaldor (2007, 23), a common ethos for security sector actors is recommendable in the future. By a common ethos she means that the national security sector actors have to put the needs of the individual human beings above their nation and homeland. According to her thinking, the security sector actors have to synthetise “the best out of the most justifiable values” of both soldiers and civilians. She illustrates this case by saying that the military spirit favours e.g. sacrifice, heroism, discipline and excellence, and the civilian spirit favours complementarily e.g. listening, individual responsibility, empathy and collectiveness.

Many of us with a military background are fully aware, as is Dan Henk (2007, 225) that militaries have some ‘advantageous values, premises and methods such as the ability to recruit and train, even educate, leaders capable of managing very complex, large-scale endeavours’. The militaries could also add discipline and dedication to mission accomplishment as their advantages.

For our collective advantage, we have societally adapted to the global SSR in such practical ways as founding the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) of Finland in 2006 and the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) in 2001, and allowing them to intensify their training cooperation by founding the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management. However, academically speaking, educational co-operation within the emerging national security sector has to be established as well.

Is there any need for action competent human agents in the future?

Traditionally, action competence has been a philosophically oriented social construction used in the military educational context (Toiskallio 2001; 2003; 2008; 2009). In the near future, the concept of action competence will be re-elaborated from additional social scientific points of view. This means that the boundaries between philosophically oriented human sciences (i.e. the position of traditional military pedagogy) and behaviourally oriented psychologies and social sciences (Wickens et al. 2004; Shepherd 2001; cf. also Nissinen 2001) will be discussed, and crossed, with the assistance of a remediating model (Figure 1; Toiskallio & Mäkinen 2009, 102).
By the term action competence I refer to an integrated concept and model of our mental (i.e. mind), physical (i.e. embodied), social-cultural and ethical spheres/dimensions. This means that in addition to focusing on mindsets, and on eclectic cognitive readiness (e.g. Fletcher 2004), we are paying, especially nationally, comprehensively and institutionally, attention to the model and concept of action competence. Figure 1 illustrates the model, the shared object of our attention, when we discuss the human issues and factors in our human security -oriented activities. The model is universally applicable, and importantly, at least some parts of it are shared by both civilian and military researchers, allowing us to develop our interdisciplinary understanding of human issues.

Actually in our current knowledge societies, it is useful to be reminded of the famous claim made by Michael Polanyi (1966) that a human being’s highest creative powers have bodily roots. When challenging the dominant so called Cartesian tradition, it is now time to move on to the elaborated Polanyian interpretation of the saying by claiming that a human being’s highest creative powers are rooted in action competence.

In the near future the intent is also to intervene in the field of our services and focus on selected companies and their personnel, in order to see what kind of meaning they give, in their networked working environments, to action competence and to their ‘human challenges and possibilities’. In a parallel manner, as well as in a comprehensive way, the meaning of action competence, as well as of human security, amongst human security trainers/educators (FINCENT, CMC and FNDU) will also be empirically researched and collectively elaborated.

In the comprehensive field of national security, action competence is already a practically mediating concept (Finnish Government 2008; Defence Command 2007). The concept of action competence also acts as a boundary object (Star 1989) between the military and the civili-
an national security-oriented activity systems. There is a wide gap between the actually action competent security sector actors (AACSSA) and potentially action competent actors (PACSSA). I mean that only action competent security sector actors maintain public order and (human) security, but the potentially action competent security sector actors could themselves be a security threat for us.

Both public and private local security sector actors are needed for countering our complex security challenges effectively. Therefore, action competence plays a pivotal role also for all kinds of human agents and actors when we are optionally claimed to be losing control of things, not only on a micro/local but also on a macro/global scale (cf. Ciborra in Engeström 2008, 227).

Of course, if we have only technological means at our disposal, lost control seems to be the only option available for us, but when we respect the human agency, and also subjectivity, it is possible to see some light in the end of the tunnel. Through action competence-oriented education, appropriate steps towards a better and positive peace can be taken.

Therefore, apart from providing tailored training with the ensuing behavioural changes, preparing for meeting systemic challenges asks for new kinds of comprehensive education practices allowing both soldiers and many kinds of security sector actors to make sense for example of the holistic and systemic phenomena present in our global reality. Metaphorically speaking, even the “strategic corporal”, practically speaking every soldier of our forces, has to be able to “see the forest instead of mere trees”? In other (military) words, instead of killing some person, without any justifiable reason to do so, with for example his rifle by shooting, the soldier has to understand the objects and “grand strategic” ends of the operations. Of course on the higher levels of the epistemic infrastructure, the requirements for understanding this kind of systemic phenomena are increasing, but are fortunately within our human reach.

Conclusions

Even a brief analysis like this shows clearly how the ambiguous concept of human security can be made understandable and sharable by utilizing dimensional, principled and systemic thinking. Education seems to be the main instrument for us to enhance the shift of minds, orientations and ways of acting, and the dimensions emphasize the main focal points of our shared interests. Education, as well as security education, need some shared concepts, and human security and action competence are justifiable candidates for this.

References:


Edita Prima. (in Finnish/English)