1. INTRODUCTION

The terror attacks of 9/11 had a large impact on the threat scenarios of all the states on the southern rim of the Baltic Sea. After the end of the Cold War, the threat of a military confrontation had more or less vanished. After the 9/11, a new enemy suddenly emerged: international terrorism.

Poland’s threat assessments in the nineties had reflected the concern caused by the security-political instability of the neighbouring countries. Belarus and Ukraine were militarily strong countries but were ruled by more or less authoritarian leaders. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were militarily weak and their military-political situation was insecure. Further on in the east was Russia. International co-operation and expansion of both NATO and the EU has improved the situation. Poland became a member of NATO and the EU in 1999 and 2004 respectively. The trans-Atlantic link between Poland and the USA was an important security provider.

Germany and Denmark considered their post-Cold War security situation positive, despite some sources of uncertainty in the Baltic area. Threat of a direct military assault had vanished with the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Both countries actively supported the Baltic States and Poland. The positive development in the Baltic area, the expansion of NATO and the EU and a developing co-operation between NATO and Russia seemed to guarantee a secure environment in the Baltic area in the foreseeable future.

Both Germany and Denmark started to reduce the strenght of their Cold War armed forces. Denmark has placed great emphasis on international operations since the early nineties. Denmark was actively involved in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and participates acively in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Germany took part in it’s first NATO-led operation in Kosovo in 1999. At the time of writing, Germany is an active participant in the operations in Afghanistan.¹
2. METHODS AND SOURCES

2.1 Theory

Viewpoint and theoretical frame of reference of this article is political realism with its centricity of state and neorealism, which puts emphasis on the influence of international organisations in international politics. Poland, Germany and Denmark are studied as parts of international organization. States are considered to be security organizations. Foreign policy is more important than internal policy.

2.2 Threats

According to Barry Buzan (1991), threats against national security can be divided into military, political, societal, economical and environmental threats. A military threat is the most typical threat against national security. Impacts of war are usually felt on every sector of the state and the existence of the state is in danger. Political threats threaten the state’s organisational stability. They usually affect national identity, system of society and its supporting institutions. Societal threats, like a threat against national identity, are closely related to political threats. From the point of view of national security, economical threats may be difficult to identify. Risks, aggressive competition and uncertainty are typical characteristics of market economy. When does a phenomenon of market economy pose a threat to national security, is an extremely difficult and political question. Ecological threats, like severe floods, may inflict irreparable damage on critical infrastructure of the state. At worst they can threaten the state’s existence.  

Identifying threats against national security is problematic. States cannot designate all possible disturbing factors or challenges as threats against national security. States are obliged to define the difference between normal phenomena and actors of the state-centred world and real threats against their national security. The definition of a threat against national security is most of all a political question and not an outcome of an objective assessment.

Military threats have kept their theoretical priority in the security thinking. As long as the international system is anarchic, military threats will remain objects of interest and receive a lot of attention. In practice, the importance of military threats has decreased and the importance of other threats increased. Other threats are also often seen as more topical than traditional military ones.
Threat assessments are an important part of doctrines and military doctrines. They also have an effect on the development of doctrines. Doctrines and threat assessments can be divided into public and non-public. Military doctrines reflect the leadership’s conceptions of the security-political environment, especially of the possible threats arising from it. Doctrines and their threat assessments usually lag behind the development of international environment due to customs and traditions. Only very drastic changes are likely to alter threat scenarios.  

When threat scenarios are formulated, their authors also consider how and to what effect they will be used. States and other actors, for instance military leadership, plan how they are going to express threats and own vulnerabilities in different occasions. This process has its impact on public statements.

All materials have their history and context. Context can be divided into a direct context and a wider relation. Researchers of a direct context pay attention, for instance, to when, where and to whom an address was given. When wider relation is assessed, attention must be paid to what the address or document is related to, for instance, ongoing political discussion or when it has been published.

A threat assessment text includes both fact and fiction. The need to express threats convincingly and appropriately causes fictionality. Threat scenarios can be used to deliver a certain message for instance to politicians and to country’s citizens. One example is the need to give reasons and justification for a new military doctrine and its budget.

A threat is not necessarily called a threat. Instead, a less offensive expression may be used. The chosen expressions may reflect the intensity of a particular threat. To understand this, one has to understand the communicational context. Threat can also be expressed indirectly. Own vulnerability or action that is related to a particular threat, can be the topic. This can be done by describing the country’s own protective measures or efforts to improve the security environment.

Public threat scenarios share the aims of verbal political expressions. Among those are, for instance, seeking publicity, expression of [political or military] commitment, trying to influence decision making and actions, and a symbolical reward. Typical non-public threat scenarios are those ideas of military leadership that are closely tied to decision making and action. There is no political need to use substitute terms.

A method called content analysis is used to analyse available documents. Content analysis is a way to find out meanings by analysing documents systematically and objectively. It helps to arrange and classify material in
order to make conclusions from it. Documents can be, for example, books, articles, diaries, speeches and reports. In this research the term means official, security-policy related documents e.g. national defence laws, Defence White Books, Vienna Documents and speeches by countries political leaders. The aim is to summarise the threat scenarios of the three states on the southern rim of the Baltic Sea.

There are at least two ways to approach qualitative material. One is to analyse it on the presumption that official documents are truthful and contain reliable information. Secondly, documents can be analysed more relatively on the assumption that material has been originally produced with a certain intent on mind. I take the view that public documents and statements published by official state actors are truthful. However, I assume that different aims and purposes are included.

Content analysis of qualitative material can be carried out inductively or deductively. The aim is to create a theoretical entity. Theory related content analysis is linked with a certain theory, model or authority’s thoughts. Classification is based on a theory or a frame of reference formed by a concept system. A certain theme or concept directs the analysis.

The first step is to create an analysis matrix (Table 1.). The second is to define the analysis unit. It can be a single word, sentence, a part of a sentence or a certain entity formed by one concept. As an analysis unit I use a sentence or an entity formed by several sentences. Using Buzan’s division of threats, I classify the threats and the simplified meanings that are included in the threat texts. This assists in the interpretation of the original expressions. Usually documents do not include all the expressions included in the classification. I classify the original expressions in the following way: description of the security situation in the immediate vicinity, description of military threat, description of political threat, description of societal threat, description of threat by terrorism, description of economical threat, description of own vulnerabilities and description of environmental threats.
Table 1. An example of analysis matrix and classification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Original Expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description of the security-political situation in the immediate vicinity</td>
<td>&quot;Regardless of the politically advantageous changes in the past few years, Germany's security environment is not free from military and non-military risks jeopardizing and threatening its security and stability.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;The attacks of 11 September 2001 have shaken the civilized world to its very foundations. Subsequent terrorist attacks have heightened the awareness of asymmetric threats that may occur anywhere in the world and may be directed against anyone.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;There is still a possibility of nationalistically and ethnically motivated violent conflicts in Europe, often fostered by criminal structures. The persistently unstable security situation in the Balkans continues to call for special commitments to be made by the European nations.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Europe is directly affected by crises at its southern and southeastern periphery. The changed security situation poses new challenges to both NATO and the EU.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the military threat</td>
<td>&quot;At present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no conventional threat to the German territory.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the threat caused by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>&quot;It is mainly the religiously motivated extremism and fanaticism in combination with the worldwide reach of international terrorism that threaten the achievements of modern civilization such as freedom and human rights, openness, tolerance and diversity.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction combined with long-range delivery means can also pose a threat to the populations and countries of Europe.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of own vulnerabilities</td>
<td>&quot;Modern information societies depend on information and communication systems and are therefore vulnerable.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. RESULTS

3.1 Poland

The most significant change in Poland's post-Cold War threat assessments was caused by the Al-Qaida terror attack in the USA on September 11, 2001. Terrorism and the spread of WMDs threaten all sectors of the society. The importance of a military threat is diminishing and that of unconventional threats is rising. Because of reductions of conventional weapons, there is no possibility of a surprise offensive against Poland at the moment. Poland's
independence will not be threatened in the foreseeable future. The most serious threat against international system and states’ security, Poland included, is organized international terrorism. Original expressions are included in the table 2.

### Table 2. Poland’s threat expression in 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Original Expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description of the security situation in</td>
<td>&quot;It [the positive development in the European security environment] has shed the threat of a major military conflict in Europe - - - . As a NATO Member State, we command the solid security guarantees and we have been developing relations with neighbours in a friendly spirit. Our sense of security will shortly gain an added strength in our European Union membership.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the immediate vicinity</td>
<td>&quot;The aftermath of the recent tensions in the Balkans is melting away and although the normalization processes in that region are, still at risk, the threat of relapse into an open conflict is only slight.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Despite diverse threats to stability, the course of change within the European security environment is a positive one.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;However new global challenges have appeared. They primarily stem from tensions and instability provoked by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the unpredictable policies of authoritarian regimes and the phenomenon of &quot;failed states&quot; , which largely exacerbate the risks of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Being a member of the Euro-Atlantic community, Poland is directly facing such concomitant risks.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of societal threat</td>
<td>&quot;Another important challenge is that of Poland’s energy security, part of which is to diversify the supplies of energy carriers, particularly crude oil and natural gas. In our security policy we need to take account of the fact that the worldwide increase of the fact that the worldwide increase in oil and gas demand and prices requires looking after the security of oil and gas production regions and transit routes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Our national security is facing a threat from organized international crime - - - . Poland’s territory, due to its transit location, attracts a growing interest of organized international crime gangs.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Risks to Poland in the area of computer network communications become more and more real.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Poland, as an integrated part of the West, can face a rising challenge of mass migrations from poor and underdeveloped countries, population flows that are increasingly precipitated by conflicts, political repressions, the &quot;failed state&quot; phenomenon and environmental devastation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of own vulnerabilities</td>
<td>&quot;There is a growing, potential risk that foreign special services as well as terrorist, extremist and organized crime groups can attempt acquire unlawful access to classified information, including data shared within allied collaboration.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of environmental threats</td>
<td>&quot;Our continuing concern is to prevent the degradation of the natural environment, especially in our neighborhood, and also to avert ecological disasters that can be brought about by man, - - - .&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.1 The Future

The size, organization and equipment of Poland’s armed forces is changing. The forces are being developed in accordance with their international obligations and the resources of the state. Threats are changing. Forces for territorial defence will be replaced by state-of-the-art, mobile and specialized units. The nature of new threats requires co-operation between military and civilian authorities in combating non-military threats. Poland is prepared to fight against terrorism both in the home country and abroad.\textsuperscript{18}

NATO membership requires development, for instance, in the fields of interoperability and a readiness to participate in efforts to develop international defence capabilities. Moreover, the operational readiness needed for participation in international operations must be improved. The most important areas of improvement are: ability to protect troops from the effects of WMDs, command and control systems, units that are to participate in combat operations, deployment capabilities and sustainability.\textsuperscript{19}

New challenges require development of a new crisis management system. This should be capable of coping with both domestic and foreign threats, and unite the efforts of those public sector authorities whose responsibilities involve security and defence. Civil defence, police and rescue services, border guard, and other actors are in key positions. New responsibilities require that changes are made to existing legislation.\textsuperscript{20}

As a NATO border country, Poland may be faced with new threats. If there were a crisis between the alliance and Belarus or Ukraine, Poland would be in the frontline. However, such situation is unlikely to occur considering the improvements in the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relations.

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2003) places great emphasis on the terror threat and other non-military threats. Defence Forces need to be developed so that they will be able to participate in all demanding international operations, possible also in combat operations together with other allied forces. Poland’s geopolitical situation requires credible defence capability. The change in threat scenarios places great demands on the future defence system. It must be capable of co-ordinating the actions of society’s official actors in the area of security and unify their efforts and resources at the time of crisis. Such a crisis could be caused, for instance, by a major terror attack or a nuclear disaster. The Polish armed forces must find their place in the country’s future domestic security system.
3.2 Germany

Germany's security situation and threat scenarios changed with the 9/11 terror attack. The Ministry of Defence published two documents in 2003 that provide the basis for the Bundeswehr reform, "Defence Policy Guidelines" and "Directive for the Future Development of Bundeswehr".  

Table 3. Germany's threat expressions in 2003.

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3.2.1 The Future

The basis for the Bundeswehr's future development is formed by focusing on international crisis management operations, reducing the operating costs and increasing investments. By the year 2010, personnel will be reduced down to 250,000 soldiers and approximately 75,000 civil employees. National service is going to remain nine months long but the number of conscripts will be smaller in the future. The development of the Bundeswehr was started in May 2003 by closing down eight bases and reducing the number of weapons systems.
Because of its NATO and EU membership, Germany's obligations and requirements for its troops have increased. Instead of numbers, troops with better training and equipment are needed. The amount, characteristics and duration of international operations has changed. The Bundeswehr will not be able to fulfill the demands with its present structure, materials and equipment. Especially, there is a need to raise the level of interoperability and technology.\textsuperscript{24}

The deployment plan of 2001 has proved to be a failure. It did not pay enough attention to operational demands and cost-effectiveness. This makes things more difficult for the Bundeswehr and hampers the maintaining of operational readiness more and more.\textsuperscript{25} A plan for future closures of military bases and installations is to be ready by the end of the year 2004. It will be based on operational demands and cost-effectiveness.\textsuperscript{26}

The ability to take care of operational demands will be endangered in the long term, because the current structure was made partly for secondary tasks. There is also a need to quickly modernise some of the material and equipment. The Ministry of Defence intends to raise the amount of money spent on investments\textsuperscript{27} from 25 percent up to 30 percent of the defence budget. The primary way to get the resources needed, is to cut personnel costs by reducing the strength of the forces.\textsuperscript{28}

The annual defence budget is planned to stay on the level of 24.25 billion Euros until year 2006. There are plans to raise the budget for 2007 up to 25.2 billion Euros. There is an imbalance between actual costs and existing economical resources. The change in threat scenarios caused an increase in costs that could not have been taken into account in planning. The much needed future development and acquisition programs are in danger.\textsuperscript{29}

According to the minister of defence, Dr Peter Struck, the following changes are of highest priority and must be carried out. The Bundeswehr capabilities must be streamlined and some of its activities must be abandoned. New activities like net-centric warfare must be included. Interoperability between branches must be developed further; operational demands and types of operations must be in accordance with resources and capabilities; structure and organization must be streamlined radically on all levels in both military and civil sectors; the national service must be evaluated; material must be in accordance with the needs. Projects that do not comply with the demands of the future must be cancelled; the number of military and civil personnel has to be reduced; the deployment of troops in Germany must be re-evaluated.\textsuperscript{30}
The timetable for the Bundeswehr reform is tight. It is to be ready by the year 2010. Considerable changes are to take place by the end of the year 2007. The new Bundeswehr concept is to be published before the end of the year 2004 and a new defence White Book in 2005.31

3.3 Denmark

The effects of 9/11 were felt in Denmark soon after the attacks. The Ministry of Defence ordered two working groups to research the consequences of the attacks for Denmark. One of them researched the consequences from the international point of view. The another researched Denmark’s military capability to fight against terrorism. In their report both groups gave several recommendations based on the threat assessment. Denmark should immediately begin developing the operational capabilities of the Special Forces, as well as readiness plans and legislation on the national level. Protection against the effects of WMDs should be developed in co-operation with other authorities. More equipment to track down chemical and biological weapons should be acquired. There is also a longer term need to develop the capability to prevent the effects of WMDs, command and control systems and the role of the Home Guard.32

The society as a whole must be involved in the fight against terrorism. It is not only the Armed Force’s responsibility. The Danish government published a document called "New World - New Threats, New Responses" in 2004. It describes Denmark’s national actions and participation in international co-operation in the fight against terrorist threats. A society has to be able to prevent a terrorist threat by means of foreign policy, police and intelligence work, legislation and, in the last resort, by military operations.33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Original Expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description of societal threat</td>
<td>&quot;Terrorism constitutes a threat to the individual, to society and its core values. Fighting terrorism is a formidable challenge.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the threat caused by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>&quot;The threat of terrorism is complex and unpredictable.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of own vulnerabilities</td>
<td>&quot;The threats are often unpredictable and subject to change. The level of perceived threat aimed at Denmark is presently considered to be relatively minor. This doesn't mean, however, that there is no risk, and for the time being the Western World faces an increased level of terrorist threat.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.1 The Future

The newest Defence Agreement is for the years 2005-2009. It states that due to the changes in Denmark's security environment, there is no direct threat of military assault in the foreseeable future. Denmark has no need to maintain mobilisation based armed forces from the era of the Cold War. The terror attacks on 9/11 and after it have also demonstrated that Denmark’s as well as other countries’ security challenges and risks have changed thoroughly. The new asymmetrical and unpredictable threats such as international terrorism, the spread of WMDs and their delivery systems have replaced traditional military threats. There must be an ability to prevent the new threats where they occur.34

The Danish Armed Forces will be re-organised. Resources will be freed by closing down garrisons and disbanding units. The aim is to create a system that makes it possible to put together troops and to deploy them quickly and flexibly in international operations. The system has to be able to maintain a force of 2,000 soldiers at any moment. The share of army and that of navy and air force is 1,500 and 500 soldiers respectively.35

Total defence is based on the principle that all means available are used to defend the functioning of society and to defend the country’s citizens and national resources. The nature of threats requires co-operation between authorities both in the home country and abroad. The existing system and its structure which is based on mobilisation will be disbanded. The remaining personnel and support elements will be organised in accordance with the needs of operational troops and other needs of national defence. The Minister of Defence will be given the responsibility of taking command in case of a national level emergency. Home guard will be placed under the command of the Ministry of Defence.36

The system of national service will be developed in ways that will serve total defence more effectively. The existing system does not meet the needs of total defence anymore. It will be re-evaluated by the end of the year 2006. The number of conscripts and content of the service will be decided then. A force of 12,000 will be trained for support duties of the total defence system.37 The responsibility of the force will be to assist other authorities and the Home Guard in case Denmark is threatened by attack or a major disaster or catastrophe occurs.38
4. CONCLUSIONS

Since the end of the Cold War, the importance of a military threat has been steadily declining in the Baltic area. With the expansion of NATO and the EU into the Baltic Sea area, the Baltic states have achieved their most important goals in the area of security politics: a threat of occupation no longer exists. Even the other Baltic Sea rim states have benefited from this development due to the improved relations between NATO and Russia.

After the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the threat scenarios of the old front line NATO countries, Germany and Denmark, were changed. They had practically no fear of military assault anymore. Both countries began the process of gradually reducing the personnel and equipment of their armed forces. The same thing happened in Poland, a former Warsaw pact country.

What happened on 9/11 gave rise to a new threat: international terrorism. This posed a big challenge to the traditional military thinking in the three countries as well as to the capabilities and organization of their armed forces. While continuing the process reducing the armed forces that had been started after the end of the Cold War, the countries had to find resources for developing forces capable of combating terrorism and participating in the new and more demanding international operations. In Poland and Denmark, the concept of total defence was introduced with far-reaching plans of improving co-operation between various authorities both at home and abroad.

Major G.S. Yrjö Lehtonen is currently serving at the G3 of the Kainuu Brigade Headquarters.
ENDNOTES

1 Teal Group Corporation, Defence Briefing Geramany, page 1. [From the Internet on 5 July 2004].
3 Buzan, p115.
4 Buzan, p133.
11 Nokkala (1992), p4-5.
12 Jouni Tuomi - Anneli Sarajärvi: Laadullinen tutkimus ja sisällönanalyysi, Jyväskylä 2003, pp105-106.
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14 Tuomi - Sarajärvi, pp97-116.
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17 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2003), p2. [From the Internet on 1 July, 2004].
22 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2003c): Further Development of the Bundeswehr: A New Course Has Been Set, p1. [From the Internet on 20 June 2004].
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28 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2003c), p1. [From the Internet on 20 June, 2004].
29 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2003b), p2. [From the Internet on 20 June, 2004].
32 Ministry of Defence Denmark: Some Danish initiatives in the Aftermath of 11 September, p1. [From the Internet on 29 June, 2004].
35 Defence Command Denmark, pp1-4. [From the Internet on 14 July, 2004].
36 Defence Command Denmark, pp2-4. [From the Internet on 14 July, 2004].
37 According to the Defence Agreement the training period of the 12,000 troops is going to be four months. They will stay in the reserves for three years.
38 Defence Command Denmark, p4. [From the Internet on 15 July, 2004].