

WAR AND THE RETURN OF HISTORY

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INTRODUCTION

Human history may be said to consist of two currents: one shadowy and immaterial, the other visible and material. The deeper of the two is the driving flow of the collective human spirit, consisting of instincts and emotional impulses and aspirations (will). The second current, shallower but more readily apparent, is the translation of this force into action (skill), in the form of mankind's evolving intellectual understanding (insight), physical means (tools) and actions (rationality). From this perspective human history represents the evolving efforts of mankind to transform spirit into being. While there is a constant interplay between the two, it is ultimately the evolution of the spirit which is the generative source, creating the manifest. Action is the fruit of spirit, even if the evolution of spirit in turn may be influenced by the material.¹

In this respect the Cold War was an historical ebb, as a time during which the shallower material current took front stage. Of course this was deceptive, since the deeper flow of the spirit continued, and indeed ultimately was to bring about the collapse of the Cold War itself, when the Soviet Union, in the words of Josef Brodsky, 'went stupid'.² Nevertheless, during this period attention became riveted to the physical manifestation of history. This was largely due to the overriding need of managing the terrifying existential imperatives of the Cold War, and the very concrete practical dangers which they presented in the form of an expansionist (and indeed truly Evil) Soviet system on the one hand, and the danger of global nuclear war on the other. Faced with a dam that could burst at any moment left little scope for higher philosophical abstraction. This was further reinforced by the concentration of almost all political power (and hence influential strategic thinking) in two nodes, Moscow and Washington, their intense mutual hostility, and the cramped hold which their conflict exerted on almost the entire globe, not only geographically but also emotionally and intellectually.

With the release of this straightjacket the full flow of history has been set free anew, as well as our leisure to contemplate it. This surge is both deep and broad. It is deep, because it is no longer focussed only on technological change, but once again includes social and intellectual evolution on centre stage. It is broad, since it involves not only the occidental world, but also - for the first time in centuries - includes other civilizations as subjects, rather than objects, of change. Finally it is novel, in that the admittedly remarkable technological evolution is not only shrinking the world, but also giving birth to a new global civilization, whose members are not defined by the traditional boundaries of geography and ethnicity, but rather by the fused interests of tightly functional materialistic ties, operating independently of geographic and ethnic boundaries. This last develop-

ment has been a continuous part of history, but the global scale is new, and will, like the birth of all new civilizations, shift the course of human relations.

The return of history will also have a major impact on the manifestation of war. For war is also a function of the historical interplay between Will, Skill and Tools. Strategists of the Cold War period are more than familiar with the technological dimension of warfare, and clearly this remains a major factor today. However during the Cold War the strategic community partly lost touch with the two other vital components when, for understandable reasons, the social and to some extent the intellectual dimensions were pressed aside. The result was, with some exceptions, the emergence of a brotherhood of technofreaks: highly specialised technological experts but nekulturny in the domain of the humanities. Under these conditions it is not surprising if the field of human conflict was increasingly perceived as an engineering problem, at the expense of its anthropological, sociological and psychological aspects.

And yet war is most decidedly a human activity, and its prosecution includes more than just physics, as the outcomes of the Winter War, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Somalia remind us. This is all the more the case today, with the renewed flow of the social dimension of history. It is therefore necessary once again to acquaint ourselves with the full spectrum of warfare, going beyond the technical tools to include its human sources.

This article thus has four objectives. Firstly to examine the relationship of war to the social, intellectual and technological dimensions of history. Secondly to outline the transformation of the world currently underway. Thirdly to examine how this affects warfare, and present the types of war we may expect in the coming era. And finally, to examine the consequences this could have for Finland.

1. THE NATURE OF MODERN OCCIDENTAL WAR

In the last two centuries War in the occidental world has become 'the deliberate application of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our will'.³ Such 'political war' contains two basic elements. On the one hand an invisible essence, consisting of the nature of such war and the rationale underlying its use. On the other hand a visible face, which is the manifestation of war and the overt factors determining why and how it is waged. The essence of war is unchangeing and timeless, whereas the manifestation of war is constantly evolving and strictly temporal.

Essence: War as the Art of Fear

For the modern occidental, War is the ugly part of human political intercourse, but it is governed by exactly the same principles as politics. Politics consist of the quest for influence over another sentient being, and influence consists of the ability to manipulate the spirit of that being in the direction you desire. The focus of poli-

tics is thus always on the spirit. This spirit is in turn always driven by two basic forces: fear and desire. The practice of politics thus consists of generating and manipulating fear and desire in another being, while the art of politics lies in correctly judging what drives the spirit, and the limits to which it may be pushed.⁴

To stimulate fear and desire one applies two basic instruments: sticks and carrots. These can take innumerable forms, ranging from outright violence to offers of economic assistance, but are always defined by the impact they have on the other spirit - ie their ability to generate fear or desire. Influence can only be granted, never taken, and hence the quality of a stick or carrot is always in the eye of the beholder, never of the wielder. The skill of politics consists in identifying the appropriate sticks and carrots, and applying them to provoke such fears and desires within the other party to cause it to prod itself in the direction you desire. Successful politics thus depends on understanding the other spirit and what will move it.⁵

For us, War is one of these sticks of politics, intended to purchase influence through the threat or use of violence, and the fear and submission this can generate. This invisible essence of 'war as the art of fear' remains timeless in human history, and is the fundamental principle governing the use of war as an instrument of politics. The closer one can come to applying these principles, the more rational (ie the more cost efficient) the use of the tool of war can be, and the less destruction need be involved. It will then be possible to approach the daoist ideal of 'applying a minimum of physical force for a sufficient result'. Or, as Sun Tzu put it, "...to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemies resistance without fighting."⁶

However, it is important to keep in mind that this is the realm of pure principles, and reality, as John Keegan reminds us, is a always distortion of this ideal. Nonetheless the pure essence is important for it is this which tells us the target we should aim for when wielding the stick of violence. It is only by keeping in mind that it is always the other spirit which is the target that one has a chance of achieving ones objectives at a minimum of cost. And throughout history, the more the fundamental principles of war have been ignored, the greater the resulting tragedy. That is why the fundamental principles remain so crucial.

Manifestation: War as a part of History

The prosecution of war is its visible side - our physical attempts at gaining influence. Or, in the worst case, the manifestation of a myriad of other psychological frustrations or intellectual miscalculations. In all cases however this is the transient manifestation of war, which is a function of three evolving factors: Will, Skill and Tools. Will is linked to the motives for engaging in war, while Skill and Tools are related to the means whereby it is waged. Unlike the basic principle, these three factors are in a continuous state of flux, evolving as part of history. Actually they are the very essence of human history. Being relatively visible, these dimensions of war have also received the most attention over time.⁷

The motives for waging war (Will) are the most important, but also the least apparent. They are a function of the desires and fears of the societies involved. In this respect war is a social expression, reflecting the deeply subjective collective unconscious of the societies involved. These values can vary greatly between cultures and over time, and are in a continuous state of evolution. This *Zeitgeist* is perhaps the most hidden component of war, and has received the least attention, but remains probably the most fundamental determinant of the way in which a society will wage war. And hence, what it will take to defeat it.⁸

The means of waging war are far more prosaic and apparent, as they are a function of the skill and tools available at the time. This includes the fields of strategy and security policy (Skill) and technology and logistics (Tools). These two factors are also under constant evolution, and, being the most readily visible, have received most attention among students of war and peace alike. Today's particularly glossy field of technology (Tools) holds most attention among "students of war", while notions of 'security architecture' and other institutional recipes (Skill) prevail among "students of peace". However Skill and Tools nonetheless remain the least important of the three determinants of war. Tools are important to build a house, but without Skill the efforts will have poor results, and without Will there is no effort at all.⁹

When studying the evolution of war, and especially when seeking the forms which future warfare can assume, it is essential to take all three dimensions into account. There are times in history, such as during the Cold War, when the deepest human level - Will - appears locked rigid, and our focus shifts to Skill and Tools. This was reflected during the Cold War in the initial obsession with nuclear weapons, followed by the so-called 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (then focussing on the technological transformation of conventional warfare.¹⁰ And, where Skill is concerned, with the initial focus on deterrence and nuclear strategy, followed by theatre warfare and the operational level of war. However even then, though this orientation was absolutely necessary, real change only took place as a result of the social and economic forces propelling the internal collapse of the USSR.

Strategic Studies and the Legacy of the Cold War

In many respects this narrowing of the strategic focus during the Cold War was justified, since the game at the time was indeed numbers and capabilities, and since the danger which they presented was not only clear and present, but also truly existential. There is little doubt that the Soviet military machine would have overrun us had we let up our guard on the level of Skill and Tools. Thus this focus was essential. Nonetheless the fact remains that when the war disintegrated, it was because the Soviet Union collapsed from the weight of its own internal social and economic decline. Our focus on strategies and weapons was thus like a dam. It could keep the waters of the Evil Empire out, but could not cause them to recede.¹¹

The problem with this, as Philip Windsor repeatedly pointed out, is that as the

imperatives of the Cold War narrowed the field of strategic studies, they also squeezed out their deepest and most fundamental component - the human spirit - in favour of the focus on the shallower dimensions of Skill and especially Tools.¹² This is inherently mistaken, as the application of Skill and Tools are entirely a function of Will. This primacy of Will makes the study of the humanities central to strategic and security studies.

But it is especially mistaken today, because the collapse of the Cold War has released the full flow of history once again, with the previously constrained human elements - social, cultural, civilizational - rushing forth with correspondingly greater vigour. The transformation of the human community is now taking place partly on the technological level, but equally if not more so on the social level. Within the occidental community deep social transformation include the transformation of the state and the emergence of a global post-modern community partly transcending the state. Secondly, it exceeds the boundaries of the hitherto dominant occidental community, with the revival on increasingly equal social terms of several other global communities, including in south and east Asia, the islamic world, and probably soon Africa. While social change was only temporarily frozen during the forty wars that the Cold War lasted, the emergence of multicultural global interaction in an increasingly intimate form, and on increasingly equal terms, is something that has not taken place for several centuries.¹³

As a result the forms which warfare will assume in the coming years will be determined not only by technological changes, but equally if not more so by the economic and social transformations underway within the parties involved in conflict. Dramatic as they may be, the ongoing revolutions in C4SIR¹⁴ and miniaturization¹⁵ tell us little about why men will fight, the degree of sacrifice they are willing to make, or the way they will fight. And they tell us little about how a Somali warlord, commanding a handful of untrained gangs armed only with some light weapons, could defeat the current global military superpower. The need for a renaissance in strategic thinking is thus particularly great at this time.

2. THE NEW GLOBAL HIERARCHY

The emerging world is increasingly divided between three broad socioeconomic strata spanning the globe. At the top lives a wealthy minority in the comfortable Postmodern Community. Beneath them are a struggling huddle of more or less successful Modern States in varying degrees of development, aspiring towards postmodernity or merely to maintain their modern status. Beneath them again are a mass of disenfranchised and often extremely miserable Premodern Societies.

Our security concerns - ie those of the members of the Postmodern Community - will increasingly focus on the relationship between these three strata. Violent conflicts affecting the Postmodern Community are unlikely to emerge from within the community, since its members are driven by a pragmatic rationale based on perpetuating their comfort and material growth, and this is best furthered

through the tight functional ties between members of the community, and is actually threatened by mutual conflict. Instead the main source of violence will be from across the interface between the Postmodern Community and the two lower classes, with socioeconomic differences as the main cause of tension. These may coincide with 'civilizational' differences, in which case conflicts may be amplified, but need not do so. Extensive conflicts within the same ethnic or religious community will and are taking place in the premodern societies, when material conditions are terrible. At the same time 'civilizational' differences will become increasingly irrelevant in the top layer of the postmodern community, where the new technology and means for procuring wealth, and the attendant emerging global culture and identity, predominate. The nature of the resulting conflicts will be asymmetric in every sense. Neither the will, skill, capabilities nor objectives of the contending parties will match each other. And yet because of the shrinking world, all three communities will live in increasing intimacy.

The terms 'postmodern', 'modern' and 'premodern' are here used descriptively, as a means to identify the three rough groups into which the inhabitants of the world can be classified. These distinctions are based primarily on economic achievement and the integral political, social and intellectual foundations upon which it rests. The '**postmodern**' system is thus defined as one in which production is increasingly automated, and ideas and creativity are the keys to growth. In this system there is less and less need for labour, and the principal economic value of the citizen is as a consumer. Such productive work as is done depends principally on the creative motivation of a small sector of key managers, and the free flow of information. Hence democracy is vital. The economic profile is typically characterized by a strong service sector, small manufacturing and industrial sectors, and very little agriculture. The bulk of its population are materially well off, are sheltered from daily dangers and hardships and enjoy increasing leisure time. Their principal economic value is as consumers. An important attendant ingredient in the postmodern system is that the economy transcends the state. Management, production and markets are decentralized, and they, and the financial flows which they generate, operate in a sort of 'econospace' beyond governmental or indeed any centralized control. Thus the source of economic revenue is gradually evaporating from the control of the state, which is left with the monopoly on the use of violent force and the responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. This transnational economy is also what fuses the postmodern societies into a true community, since it is dominated by functional interests and interdependencies across state boundaries which virtually preclude the use of force between members of the community.

The **modern strata** consists of distinct states, in a stage of development someplace where western Europe was between 1600 and the 1980's. That is to say that they include all the administrative and political trappings of a state, permitting a degree of centralized control over the citizens and physical resources, and the development of larger state institutions, such as organized armies, bureaucracies and so forth. Economic production here depends on manufacturing and hea-

vy industry, and the principal economic value of the citizen is as a labourer. Creative thought is not as important as the discipline, hard work, and basic educational skills needed to operate as part of modern industry. Hence democracy is less important (at least at this stage) whereas discipline is vital. These Modern States are not fused by functional ties, and indeed their interests can collide with those of other states, including situations where the recourse to war can be seen as potentially profitable. At the same time a host of other internal factors can lead to the use of violence and war.

Finally the **Premodern strata** consists of the materially worst off segments of the world, where primitive means of production prevail, heavily based on subsistence agriculture, and where little or no organized state control exists. Instead authority is vested with tribes, clans or the family. In this part of the world the population has to struggle for its daily survival, and suffers under considerable hardships and privation. Violence is local but can be extensive, as can suffering from famine and other disasters.


The key statistical characteristics of these three worlds are provided in Table 1. and their rough global division outlined in Diagram 1. Appendix A lists these data for all states of the world.¹⁶

TABLE 1. STRATA OF WORLD SOCIETY

	POPULATION		WEALTH			ECONOMY			LIFE Expect.	
	%	millions	< 1 USD*	GNP pc	ppp	Grwth	Ser	Man	Ind	Agr
POSTMODERN	18	1,034.0	0 %	18,448		2.5 %	62	20	14	4 76
MODERN - upper	12	692.0	12 %	6,643		3.0 %	51	19	21	9 70
MODERN - lower	47	2,622.4	24 %	2,456		2.0 %	44	18	15	24 64
PREMODERN	23	1,272.0	57 %	622		1.8 %	38	12	9	41 50
	100	5,620.4		USD		85-95				
	* Population living on under 1 USD per day									

World Development Report 1997. The World Bank, 1997: pp. 214-5, 234-237.

GLOBAL INCOME



World Development Report 1997. The World Bank, 1997: pp. 214-5, 234-237.

These are the conditions which are defining the new global political environment, and it is the differences between these socioeconomic strata which will largely generate the new sources of violent tension and conflict which can affect us in the postmodern community in the years to come. These differences are not ideological, nor cultural or 'civilizational', but essentially material. They are the manifestation of the global class society in which we are increasingly living.

In a sense these differences are nothing new. They have always existed, both on a global level and within smaller communities. In some societies they have been codified and established as part of the system, for instance in the Indian caste system. In other societies they have been the causes of major upheavals, as in the French revolution. And of course, through television, we became aware of their global dimension during the Cold War, when, during the Biafran war, their horrors were brought to our homes by TV.

The novel elements today are twofold. Firstly, that the class divisions are no longer dominated by an overriding political or ideological confrontation, as was the case during the Cold War. Thus these socioeconomic conditions can take on a life of their own, freed from the global straightjacket of yesterday's superpower confrontation. Secondly, because of the shrinking of the world through technolo-

gy, these global class differences are physically coming ever closer to the doorstep of the postmodern community. Even twenty years ago poverty, starvation, unrest or warfare in the Third World appeared remote from our daily lives. Today their consequences are felt more closely, in the form of migration, refugees, terrorism environmental damage or disease.

While the global class differences do not currently affect us (as the new global aristocracy) as radically as conditions inside France or Russia affected their aristocracies in 1789 or 1917, our relationship to the global poor is not that different in terms of awareness from that which it might have been for the French or Russian aristocracy in their time. That is to say, that we are today probably as aware of, and concerned with, the hardship and misery in the world about us, as they were in their time. *Plus ça change...*

2.1. RULERS - SUPERWORLD: Club Postmodernité, or the Postmodern Community

The 'Postmodern Community' refers to today's global aristocracy, the rulers and winners in the world today. These are the societies which have developed the incomparably highest material standard of living. This is based on a very long and gradual technological development - measured in centuries - and the intellectual, economic, political and social systems on which these are based.¹⁷

The emergence of the Postmodern Community involves the transformation of the global political elite from a modern network of competitive occidental states to a post-modern technological community, gradually transcending the state, and increasingly integrating the established elite in Europe and North America with an emerging Asia. This community is characterized by at least seven factors:

- the remarkable material comfort of its members, which largely has removed existential pressures for violent conflict, such as human survival and misery, as well as strong social inequalities, from within the community,
- the increasing pressures towards collegial interaction and competition, caused by the way post-modern technological imperatives link profit and progress with peaceful competition, cooperation and integration, rather than to violent confrontation,
- the gradually diminishing preponderance of the state as the hub of human productive and social power, and the growing primacy of the transnational business community in these fields,
- the replacement of divisive ethnic, national and civilizational identities with the integrating identity of the post-modern business and consumer communities,
- the tremendous technological power of the post-modern society, which physically and materially enjoy overwhelming global supremacy,
- the replacement of spiritual and ideological depth with pragmatic interests and consumption,
- the small portion of the world's population which currently belongs to this elite community.

These states are listed in Table A. in the appendix. They include the 18% of the worlds population whose average GNP per capita is higher than 10,000 US dollars per annum. The members of this community enjoy unprecedented material wealth, and are almost entirely freed from daily threats to their survival. Instead they have increasing leisure time, and, with an average life expectancy of 76 years, ever longer lives. The main preoccupation of the majority of this population is focussed more on which car to buy next year, or where to go for the next holidays, rather than on whether their wife will survive her next childbirth, or whether the next harvest will provide enough to avoid starvation for the family.

The source of this material welfare is based on their advanced (compared to the rest of the world) technological economies, and the political and social systems which they are based on. The economies are characterized by the importance of the service sector (accounting for 62% of GNP in average), the small manufacturing and industrial sectors, and minimal agriculture (only accounting for 4 % of GNP), as well as a diminishing need for hard manual labour, and the increasing emphasis upon creativity.

A key factor characterizing this community, and which probably is the main element that makes it into a community, is that its economic and financial base transcends state boundaries, is highly decentralized, and highly interdependent. Thus the generation of wealth today increasingly takes place independently of states, by corporations and in markets over which states have less and less control, and through a system of management, production and consumption which is entirely transnational. While the postmodern states still retain the trappings of traditional government control, notably through taxes, the monopoly on the waging of violence and domestic legislation, and the responsibility for their citizens, they have less and less control over the sources of state revenue, employment and consumption. These are shifting to the transnational corporations, and depend entirely on what might be called the postmodern global economic network.

It is this network and its resulting functional interdependencies which also fuses the Postmodern states into a Community, where the mere thought of using violence against another member is almost entirely alien. It is alien because the economic, and hence increasingly political and social systems, are so linked that war would be entirely counterproductive. And in the logic of the Postmodern Community, productivity and profitability is the main rationale. It is also alien because, having freed ourselves from material want, we have the leisure to contemplate reasonable, mutually profitable solutions to our differences.

Roughly speaking the members of the Postmodern Community may be divided into two groups: the established Good Society mainly around the Atlantic, and the emerging Nouveaux Riches of Asia.

2.1.1.1. The Good Society - the Atlantic Aristocracy

Since the end of the Cold War the world elite is largely grouped around two key organisations. Both existed under the Cold War, but were overshadowed by

its military imperatives and the attendant alliances. In today's economic world however they are the leading institutions. The first of these, the *crème de la crème* is the 'Group of Seven', or **G7** for short.¹⁸ This includes the (until recently) seven states of the world with the highest absolute and per capita GNP per annum: USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy and Canada. Between them they generate over 60 % of the world's GNP. They are the world's economic movers, and, in today's world, that means the global movers. As relative newcomers, whose political credentials are still not established, the two states whose economies recently have reached G7 levels - the People's Republic of China and Brazil - are not included in the club.

The remaining global aristocracy is represented by the **OECD**, which includes the G7 as well as twentytwo further states that by and large also enjoy the highest absolute and per capita GNP's in the world. These are generally smaller states, but whose economies are equally if not more productive, and based on and integrated into the same postmodern system as the G7. They also, on the whole, share the same democratic foundations.

Broadly speaking, if NATO and the Warsaw Pact were the key security political coalitions of the Cold War, then today this role has been replaced by the G7 and OECD, grouping the new rulers of the world. However this is obviously not a military alliance, but primarily an economic and, increasingly, security political term of reference and clearing house. And their most important instruments today are not military, but economic, as represented by the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Secondly, the new club differs from those of the Cold War in that they are not based on fear or hostility, but on economic growth, and they are not exclusive competitors in a zero-sum game, but are not only open to but welcome newcomers who fulfill the exclusive economic criteria. They are seen as part of a non zero-sum game, where all can stand to gain. While NATO remains important as a security political forum and the only fireman / policeman that can execute international coalition warfare, in today's world this takes second place to the management of the international economic order.

Finally one should note that the G7 and OECD also represent the victors of the Cold War. These are the states whose economic and political system survived the Cold War, and which now dominate the world. The current world order is their world order, in the sense that it serves their system. Or 'our' I should say, for Finland is an integrated part of the Postmodern Community, whether it wants to be or not. From this perspective there is no longer any neutrality. Finland, by its simple wealth, and by its total integration and dependency upon the Postmodern Community, is entirely a part of it. A challenge to the Postmodern Community, for instance to its oil supplies in the Middle East, or to the principle that none of its members should be subjected to armed aggression, is of almost as much direct concern to Finland today as it is to the key players such as the United States, Japan or Germany. Conversely, it also means that Finland today is part of an alliance of the wealthy.

2.1.2. Les Nouveaux Riches - or the Asian strebbers

To this old aristocracy one can now add a new group of members of the Post-modern Community. These are the rising dragons of Asia, whose absolute and per capita GNP have recently reached or surpassed those of the established rich. This includes in the first place the 'Little Dragons' in Singapore, Hong Kong, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and South Korea. Secondly, parts of the Big Dragon - ie the rapidly rising coastal areas of the People's Republic of China.

These states, though not officially members of either the G7 or (with the exception of South Korea) the OECD, are in practice (with the exception of the PRC) integrated into the Postmodern Community through their economies. As such they represent the first wave of the expansion of the Atlantic Postmodern Community to Asia beyond Japan. As indicated in the next section, they will almost certainly be joined in the near future by a number of further Asian economies. The result will probably be - barring catastrophic crashes - the emergence of an Atlantasian community and the expansion of the G7 and OECD to include its members. While the PRC still has some way to go politically and domestically, the resulting economic and political fusion will make it very unlikely that any of the members would contemplate challenging the others through the use of violence.¹⁹

2.1.3. The emergence of the Atlantasian postmodern community

In one of his two latest books Christopher Coker convincingly argues that we have now reached the 'Twilight of the West', in the sense that the Atlantic community of the Cold War - in the absence of the Soviet Threat - is dissolving.²⁰ However this twilight need not be as gloomy as it sounds if we at the same time are awakening to the dawn of the postmodern community. This emerging global community may not be 'western' in Cold War terms - ie an Atlantic civilization, sharing classical western European liberal values at its core, and fused by the common threat of Soviet communism - but that does not matter. Firstly, because the Soviet threat is no more, and we no longer need this sort of defence alliance. And though new threats have emerged these can not be dealt with through the classical NATO alliance system of the Cold War. Secondly, because the emerging postmodern community is itself the child of the Atlantic community, carrying its values into a new era. It is the product of the same liberal democratic free-market principles for which the west fought during the Cold War, and which evolved behind the shelter of NATO. In that sense an Atlantic postmodern community had already emerged by the 1980's, though its role and significance remained overshadowed by the imperatives of the last years of the old war.

The difference today, though it is a large one, is that the rising postmodern

community is no longer exclusively Atlantic, but is becoming Atlanto-Pacific, or perhaps 'Atlantasian'.²¹ While the driving force of this new civilization remains economic growth derived from a free market, and this calls for a minimum of domestic political freedom, the mechanisms of production and applications of democratic principles obviously vary considerably, with the Asian members introducing their particular flavour.²² But this does not significantly matter, since the basic common values - the functional economic ties which create and fuse this community - are the primary driving forces of the member states. This permits differences in the interpretation and evolution of democracy and human rights, provided these are not so strong as to challenge the economic system or the other members.

2.2. ASPIRING MIDWORLD: The Industrial Park, or States Striving for Modernity

Beneath this global aristocracy are the struggling Modern States, with per capita annual GNP ranging between 1,000 and 10,000 USD. These are here labelled 'Modern' because they exhibit all the main characteristics of the modern state and its economic system. That is to say relatively smaller service sectors, a heavy dependency upon manufacturing and especially industry, and increasingly large agricultural sectors. At the same time they have centralized state administration, and political and judicial systems which, if not at postmodern standards, at least encompasses the bulk of their territories.

They can be divided into two very different categories: a generally successful and increasingly prosperous Middle Class of Modern States, gradually rising economically, and generally prospering from the current world order. Secondly, the Poor Modern States, which are struggling to make ends meet. This latter group also includes some potentially hostile members of the world community.

2.2.1. MIDDLE CLASS: Striving Choirboys politely inching towards membership

At the upper level of the Modern States is the global Middle Class, states with a GNP per capita of between 5,000 and 10,000 USD per annum, and containing some 12 % of the world population. These states range from Tunisia at the lower end of the scale to countries such as Chile and the Czech Republic at the upper end. They are established Modern States, with functioning economies and developed administrative and political systems. Their citizens also enjoy relative safety in their daily lives, and relatively good living conditions. The average life expectation is 70 years, approaching that of the Postmodern Community.

The characteristic feature of these states is that on the whole they are going relatively well, and appear to be on course to join the Postmodern Community in the years ahead. Their economies are growing steadily, and their economic struc-

ture is increasingly beginning to resemble that of the Postmodern Community, with the bulk of GNP derived from the service sector, relatively strong manufacturing and industrial sectors, and small agriculture. As a result the domestic social and political conditions are also gradually approaching those of the Postmodern Community.

They include Brazil, which is one of the five very large world states that are not part of the G7 but with the potential to play a major regional or world role in the years ahead, as well as South Africa. In addition they include batches of states from four parts of the world. Firstly, and basically by default, four central European states (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) which are rapidly regaining the economic status they enjoyed before their time under Soviet bondage. Secondly most of the largest states from Central and Latin America (such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia) whose economies are on the whole growing steadily (despite Mexico's crisis). Finally, as very recent entrants, two of the non-Chinese East Asian states, rising rapidly and perhaps less steadily (Malaysia and Thailand). Finally several Arab states from North Africa and the Middle East (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Oman). In a sense the relationship of many of these countries to the Postmodern Community can be compared to that of the Mediterranean European states to Northern Europe in the 50's and 60's.

From a security political perspective the key point is that since they are economically approaching the Postmodern Community on its own terms, these countries also on the whole are not challenging the current world order. Instead they are directing their energies towards joining it, and are doing so relatively successfully. Barring major catastrophes, we may expect them to become increasingly integrated in the Postmodern Community in the next decade.

2.2.2. THE POOR: Struggling to get ahead or to survive

The Poor Modern States on the whole suffer under far harsher conditions, leading to greater domestic instability, and a greater potential for violence both at home and abroad. At the same time they possess the basic state infrastructure permitting them to take action on the regional level. In sheer numbers they are important, since they contain almost half the world's population. Their inhabitants have an annual income between 1,000 - 5,000 USD, and an average life expectancy of 64 years. The distinguishing feature of the economy is that the agricultural sector is more important than manufacturing and industry, though service remains the most important. At the same time a significant proportion - almost one quarter - of this part of the world survive in conditions of abject poverty, living on less than 1 USD per day.

From a security political perspective they can be arranged into three rough groups: The Big Four, The Small Rogues, and the Struggling Masses.

A. The Big Four: Assertive Regional Powers demanding a seat on the Governing Board

The Big Four are similar to Brazil in their sheer physical size, both in terms of area and demography, as well as high absolute GNP, which are among the top fifteen in the world. On the other hand their per capita GNP is not as high as that of Brazil, and on the whole they are not in the same economic league (though the PRC is rapidly reaching it).

Their security political significance is essentially derived from their sheer size. On the one hand this provides them with diplomatic and military machinery making them key regional and in some cases global actors. On the other hand it means that domestic unrest in one of these giants could spill over to adjacent and even remote parts of the world. Thirdly, their size and in some cases historical heritage, are causing them to demand a degree of respect from the international community. Finally, three of them are nuclear powers: Russia holds the worlds second largest nuclear arsenal, the PRC has a minimal but established nuclear force, and India is just developing a fledgling nuclear capacity. They are thus potential security political actors. However they exhibit very different characteristics:

	GNP		FDI	Population
	Total	Growth		
PRC	1,059	12.3 %	40.2	1,221
India	358	5.8 %	2.6	945
Indonesia	213	7.7 %	7.9	197
Russia	358	-9.0 %	2.5	148
	USD m	90-96	USD b	millions

The key point to note is the diverging economic trends among the four, which are both a symptom and a source of their very different global security political profiles. This applies especially to the PRC and Russia, which are dealt with in turn below.

The People's Republic of China

The key factor determining the PRC's international behaviour will probably be her economic development. This has been accelerating since the launch of Deng Xiao Ping's economic reforms in 1979, reaching remarkable levels in the 1990's, with the 12 % growth rate between 1990 and 1996, propelling her GNP to the seventh largest in the world.

While the rate of growth is likely to subside, it appears likely that the PRC economy will - barring major catastrophe - continue to grow strongly. In this case the PRC will almost certainly also become the second global power after the

United States. This should not necessarily alarm us however. On the contrary. Since this growth is entirely based on interaction with the global Postmodern economy, this will create ever stronger functional ties between the PRC and world establishment, in much the same way as Japan and Germany merged with the Atlantic community in the 1950's and 1960's. In this case the PRC may become as closely fused to the Postmodern Community as Japan and Germany are today.

A key indicator of such functional economic integration is the level of Foreign Direct Investment. This is important both because it indicates the extent to which the Postmodern market forces have confidence in the emerging economy, and because it itself reveals the extent of the actual fusion. In this context the level of FDI into the PRC is remarkable, as it is the second highest in the world, only second to that to the US.

Finally the possibility of a cooperative integrative China is perhaps also borne out by her historical record. Traditionally she has been racked by savage and devastating domestic conflicts, but has generally not sought military expansion beyond the (admittedly huge) boundaries of the Middle Kingdom which she occupies today.

The main danger from, or to, the PRC, is probably internal, and consists of the danger of domestic unrest from chaos caused by the tensions which the economic development present to the Chinese society as a whole. Tensions on the one hand between a centralized communist political system coexisting with an increasingly powerful free market economy, and on the other hand from the poverty gap between an increasingly affluent coastal minority, and the desperately poor third of the population in the inland areas (some 400 million living under one USD per day).

The Russian Federation

Russia's future economic development is of vital importance for Europe. This is so for four reasons. Firstly, because it will be a major factor determining Russia's long term domestic development, including her political leadership. Secondly because Russia is massive, and domestic unrest or violence there has a great probability of spilling over to other parts of the world. Thirdly, because unlike all other comparable Poor Modern States in the world today, Russia is located in Europe's immediate vicinity, and any trouble here would risk spreading directly to us. Fourthly, because Russia holds the worlds second largest nuclear arsenal.

In this respect Russia's future prospects look bleak, and contrast greatly with the PRC. Though it retains a higher GNP per capita, this difference has been shrinking rapidly as Russia's has declined and the PRC's has grown. In absolute terms Russia's official GNP today is one third the size of China's, and where China's has been growing rapidly, Russia's has been declining at almost the same pace.

Of course here one should note that Russia's official GNP is far lower than her real GNP. But even if it were doubled it would still only equal that of Brazil. Secondly, The drop in Russia's GNP has steadily decreased, showing signs of levelling off. In this case Russia's economic decline may stabilize. The problem

here however is that virtually all money generated inside Russia is leaking out, and little or nothing is reinvested inside Russia. Thus the key sectors of the economy have had virtually no new infrastructure investments for some seven years. Nor do these profits appear to be effectively taxed by the government. As a result there is the danger that even with GNP growth, little of this would benefit Russia.

In this respect the FDI is again a significant indicator. Russia has one of the lowest levels of FDI among the big GNP's, indicating that the Postmodern investors have little confidence in Russia. It also means that Russia, in contrast to China, is not being integrated into the Postmodern economic community. In fact, everything seems to indicate the contrary, including this summer's IMF loan which had all the signs of an emergency measure designed to avert a collapse of the Russian financial market.

There are thus reasons to fear that Russia's economic decline will continue. This could have important security political consequences.

I n d i a a n d I n d o n e s i a

Neither India nor Indonesia have the same global profile as the PRC and Russia, despite their economic and demographic size. However India has consistently demanded a degree of respect for her regional interests and international status. This was recently emphasized by her nuclear tests, though these were probably carried out primarily for domestic reasons.

B . R o g u e S t a t e s : O u t c a s t s s e e k i n g r e s p e c t

The worlds impoverished rogue outcasts include several small (and not so small) states that are poor and that, for a variety of primarily domestic or local reasons, challenge the established global order of the Postmodern Community. This currently includes Libya (though her GNP per capita places her in the global Middle Class), Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

This type of state poses a threat in three ways. Firstly, because they all in various ways question the current order, and have shown a willingness at times to challenge it violently. This was for instance the case with the Libyan invasion of Chad, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. While Iraq's invasion threatened more immediate western interests, it also, like the invasion of Chad, presented a more fundamental challenge to the principle that aggression across state boundaries will not be tolerated, which is one of the basic tenets of the Postmodern world order. Secondly, they pose a threat because they all appear to be striving to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction, and notably nuclear weapons. Should this take place it would have a serious regional impact, as well as posing a potentially direct threat to the Postmodern Community. Finally they are dangerous since they have sponsored or engaged in terrorist acts directly against the Postmodern Community. This would pose a serious threat if it included WMD.

C. The Struggling Mass

The remainder of the Poor Modern States consist of some 60 struggling states. They include most of Central America, about half of Africa, and the entire former Soviet Union except the Baltic states. On the whole they have a relatively low international profile, though several suffer from devastating domestic violence.

2.3. LOSERS - SUBWORLD: The Great Slum, or Premodern Tribes

Finally, at the bottom of the global strata, are the Premodern Societies, inhabited by some 23% of the world's population, living under very harsh material conditions. These include an average GNP per capita of less than 1,000 USD per year, with over half existing on less than one USD per day. Average life expectancy is 60 years, or about one third less than in the Postmodern Community. The economy is dominated by agriculture, with a large portion consisting of subsistence farming. In this part of the world daily life is hard, and sheer survival a major preoccupation.

From a political perspective these societies on the whole also have a minimal or non-existent state infrastructure, and allegiance is rather to the tribe, village or family. As a result there is little organized activity on a state scale. These societies are mainly located in Africa, though they also include Haiti, Afghanistan and the four South East Asian states of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

While their populations suffer tremendous hardship few of these impact on the Postmodern World directly, largely because of the geographic distance, and the extreme poverty which make migration to our part of the world difficult. Exceptions are Haiti, next to the United States, and cases such as Somalia, where refugees have spread farther abroad. The main security political demands these regions make on us are either from the refugees, migrations and disease which local famines and catastrophes can generate, or else are driven by our conscience, when faced with the knowledge that horrifying human suffering and misery is taking place.

2.4. THE THREE WORLDS

The three worlds are presented separately in the current literature on international environment.²³ Facets of the postmodern world are described in the space of books on 'globalization', a sample of which are William Greider's One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (1997), Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann's The Global Trap (1996), Jeremy Rifkin's The End of Work (1995), Kenichi Ohmae's The End of the Nation State (1995), Susan Strange and John Stopford's Rival States, Rival Firms (1991), and a host of OECD reports, such as The World in 2020: Towards a New Global Age (1997).²⁴ It is

interesting to note that most of these studies arise from the business community or from investigative journalists, usually specializing in social and economic affairs. This is fitting since the postmodern community on the whole is no longer based on protecting its members against existential problems, such as survival and dignified living conditions, which tend to generate emotionally charged ideological politics, but rather with pragmatic business interests, and, for the masses, the ability for continued increased consumption and more leisure time. The social issues which concern the postmodern community are, on the whole, the politics of luxury. The scrabbling of the world's upper class for ever more cake, while one quarter of the world's population struggles in the sweatshops and half the world starves. From a purely moral perspective the position and attitude of the bulk of the postmodern societies is not so different from that of Marie-Antoinette in 1789, since we are probably just about as aware of, and concerned about, the global misery about us today as she was of conditions in France at her time. The difference in practical terms on the other hand is great, since the postmodern community is - today at least - thriving, and there is very little which the globally disenfranchised can do to upset our dominance.

The world of the emerging modern states - the '*breakthrough or breakdown*' states in Cokers terms²⁵ - is presented in two ways. One is from inside, as described by Breyten Breitenbach in his The Memory of Birds in Time of Revolution (1996), and a number of books about the domestic development of countries such as India, Brazil, Turkey and so forth. The other is from outside, outlining the world arena of the modern state and the rationale driving their international behaviour. A conscious effort to identify these rationales is Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), making the case that the new driving forces of global politics will be civilizational differences and the confrontations these can engender. Another very different example, in this case involuntary, is Zbigniew Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997).²⁶ In this he purports to describe the emerging global political 'chessboard', which he presents as a world driven by classical nineteenth and early twentieth century geopolitical imperatives and balance of power manoeuvring. However this mode of international behaviour, containing as it does a considerable element of crude power politics and violent confrontation between states, no longer applies within the emerging postmodern community, but is essentially limited to the modern states. These may well operate according to these principles, but they only constitute a fraction of the world, and are not dominant.

Finally the misery of the global premodern societies is depicted in accounts such as those of Robert Kaplan, originally in his Atlantic Monthly article "The Coming Anarchy." (1994), subsequently developed in his book The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st. Century (1996). Internal economic considerations driving wars and conflict in this subworld are presented in David Keen's "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars." in his Adelphi Paper (No. 320, Summer 1998). The great merit of this study is that it shows how

fundamentally different from ours the motives for waging war can be in this sub-world, and yet how entirely rational they are in their own social context. One cannot help but reflect that this is a part of our globe in which the conditions for survival and prosperity can only be compared to those reigning in Europe in the dark and middle ages, or perhaps the thirty years war. The same subworld, but this time in its post-colonial early Cold War trappings, is explored by Ryszard Kapuscinski, in The Soccer War, with the collapse of Third World Imperial Dynasties described in The Emperor and Shah of Shah's²⁷, while Franz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth (1986) presents these worlds in the late Cold War. The UN and several other humanitarian relief agencies also focus on the subworld of the premodern societies, of which one of the most useful statistical overviews is the annual UNDP Human Development Report.²⁸

Only one study appears to accept that all three worlds may be coexisting. This is the British Diplomat Robert Cooper's brilliant little pamphlet The Post-Modern State and the World Order (1996).²⁹ He provides an answer to the implicit question raised by Pierre Hassner in 1994,³⁰ as to what the characteristics of the post-Cold War international system will be, and especially, what will generate conflict and war. Reading Cooper we may conclude that instead of the emerging world being driven by one of the three driving forces of history (Martin Wight's realist, rationalist and revolutionist dynamics, and Kenneth Waltz' human nature, socioeconomic conditions and anarchic imperatives for war³¹) it will indeed include all three, because the new world in fact consists not of one but of three worlds: a postmodern, a modern and a premodern. Three strata of global society, which each will exhibit distinct forms of behaviour and interaction, driven by the very different conditions prevailing in their respective 'subworlds'.³² In this sense Cooper also permits us to reconcile the three radically different visions of the future presented by postmodern fusion, the clash of civilizations and the ends of the earth, and place them in perspective. For all of these appear currently to some extent to, hold true.

Of course this division of the world into classes is nothing new, and was clearly depicted in the Cold War terminology 'First World' (the OECD community), 'Second World' (Soviet Block - COMECON) and 'Third World', which described much of the rest. Subsequently 'Fourth World' was added to describe the absolutely poorest countries. Later cosmetic changes were added, when 'Less' and 'Least Developed Countries' (LDC's) became politically correct,³³ as well as North and South. Similar divisions of the world into civilized and heathen communities took place under the Colonial era, and indeed can be traced back as far as the Romans and Greeks of antiquity. And in dhinta the distinction is even older.

The difference today is twofold. Firstly, during the Cold War the conflict of the titans in the highest level of the global hierarchy totally dominated world politics, and the Third and Fourth Worlds were their distant proxy battlefields. Today these battlefields are abandoned, but technology is bringing these formerly distant regions ever closer, both in terms of population movements and in terms of the delivery of weapons.

3. CLUB POSTMODERNITÉS SECURITY AGENDA

The current world transformation was triggered by the collapse of the Cold War, but has released forces of greater magnitude than were involved in that war, and which are creating a strategic environment which has little resemblance to that of the past forty years. Indeed, it may even mark a shift away from the world of the last 350 years, dominated by the occident, with states as the main actors.

3.1. THE TRANSITION

The Cold War strategic world was relatively simple, if dangerous. It was based on an horizontal confrontation between two rough equals, whose struggle dominated most parts of a large globe, and took place in clearly defined military, economic and social dimensions. The main actors up to the Cold War were distinct states, and during the Cold War the main language between the two rivals was military power.

The internal collapse of the Soviet block left the west as the victorious survivor. While this peaceful capitulation was fundamentally important for the future of mankind and the world as we know it, this was also a transient triumph, now being superseded by historical forces shaping a new world and new security concerns.

The emerging world is fundamentally different from the past forty years of the Cold War. In fact it probably represents a transformation of the international system which has prevailed since 1648, when the occident dominated the world, and where independent states were the main international actors and holders of power. The break with the last forty years consists of the reorientation of the global political axis, away from a horizontal conflict between two rough equals and towards a vertical hierarchy of unequals. These consist of three strata of the worlds population, living in increasing intimacy, but under very different economic, technological, social and political conditions. At the top is a small Postmodern Community of wealth, security and comfort. In the middle a hagggle of struggling Modern States. And on the bottom a mass of Premodern Societies, containing a majority of the worlds population living, and dying, under simple and often miserable conditions.

On a deeper level, the nature of the leading global actors is changing. The victorious 'West' of the Cold War, still consisting of a coalition of distinct Modern States, has transformed itself into a Postmodern Community, where the sources of power in many cases transcend beyond the control of individual states, and whose membership is expanding beyond the Atlantic - Japanese axis to include a broader part of the globe. This has two consequences. In the first place, membership in this community is no longer defined in cultural or ideological terms, but by economic and technological performance. Any state that meets these levels automatically becomes a member, regardless of ethnic, civilizational or ideological characteristics.

Secondly, ascending to a postmodern economy fundamentally transforms the nature of the state itself, as well as its relationship with other postmodern states. On the one hand the foundations of the state are eroded as economic power shifts to transnational (in fact anational) corporations and networks, who generate an ever greater share of economic production, at the same time as they operate increasingly independently of any state controls. On the other hand relations between states are transformed as the intimate international functional interaction which is part and parcel of this development create mutual dependencies which are so strong that they transcend former state boundaries and identities. Economic and technological ties fuse the members of the Postmodern Community into a closely knit system, where the economic interdependencies and pragmatic benefits of intimate cooperation greatly outweigh the former distinctions between states and their members. This in turn makes violent conflict between the residual states within this community almost unthinkable. In a sense the postmodern economic interdependency and the wealth it generates is creating a new 'civilization', whose imperatives supercede the influence formerly exerted by political ideology, nationality, civilization and so forth. This is the 'Postmodern Community'.

However this does not mean that conflict, including violent conflict, is over. Far from it. It merely means that it will emerge in different forms from the past, generated by the new socioeconomic, conceptual and technological conditions. The first and foremost source of violence which will affect us in the Postmodern Community will be our relationship with the two lower classes in the world. The vertical divisions - the socio-economic fracture zones between the Postmodern Community and the two lower classes - are the new global political 'front lines' replacing yesterday's ideological east-west division of the Cold War. It is these fault lines between our sheltered upper aristocracy and the two lower classes in the global hierarchy which will become the the potential sources of political and military conflict which we will have to learn how to manage.

The resulting conflicts will vary depending upon which of the two lower strata we are dealing with. Wars with the Modern states - if they occur - will largely be driven by classical geopolitical conflicts of interest, between the economic interests of the postmodern community and the global political order of which they currently are the masters, and the regional and domestic policies of the struggling Modern States. Such confrontations will take the form of the modern 20th century political and military conflicts which have characterized our era, but will be very unequal, with the postmodern coalitions enjoying a tremendous political, economic and military superiority. Such wars will in fact consist of a collision between the highly advanced and extremely deadly and capable Postmodern military system and the crude First or Second World War military machines of the Modern States, much like Desert Storm. The result will almost certainly be a devastating defeat for the Modern side, regardless of terrain or climate. In pure military terms the outcome will be almost certain, and thus the deciding factor will primarily become whether the societies of the Postmodern Community are willing to pay the cost (in terms of blood and taxes) for such confrontations. This

will depend upon the extent to which they perceive that their personal vital interests are affected by the outcome. Lacking such a motivation they will probably be unwilling to pay even a minimum price for battlefield victory. In this respect these wars will be highly asymmetrical in terms of will, as the threshold of sacrifice will be far lower for the Postmodern societies than for the Modern States. Secondly, the 'Great Equalizer' for the Modern States could well become Weapons of Mass Destruction. Lacking any means to match the Postmodern military conventional forces they will strive to deter or equalize any such regional military contest by acquiring WMD. Paradoxically however such acquisition will probably also increase the postmodern voters willingness to engage in war, should they take such a threat personally. Secondly, technology is - for the time being - the home turf of the postmodern community, and this would be precisely the type of confrontation which we could best handle militarily.

Tensions with the Premodern Societies are of an entirely different nature, arising not from classical realpolitical confrontations, but as a result of the Poverty Gap between the enormous wealth of the postmodern community and misery in the subworld. The premodern societies do not possess the means to challenge the upper class, but grass roots pressures from instability, migration, crime, refugees and humanitarian misery can constitute a problem. Paradoxically it is here, where the imbalance in physical power is the greatest, that the postmodern community will also have the most difficulty in using its material advantage to impose its will.

Secondly, one should note that there is unfortunately also no guarantee against regression, ie that parts of the Postmodern Community may slip back down to the Modern level. This could occur if the economic system were to collapse or suffer, and in this case classic military confrontations once again may emerge between them.

Finally, in tandem with the transformation of the global political system, our world is also shrinking. This is caused partly by the technologies of the Postmodern Community, which are reducing physical distance, and partly by the growing population in the Modern and Premodern worlds, with increasing pollution and scarcity of vital resources as a result. This has two implications. Firstly that the three global classes will be living in increasingly intimate proximity to one another. Secondly, that global ecological issues will become an increasingly important part of security policy. Partly as a result of competition for scarce resources, and partly due to the increasingly discernible discomfort and danger which it will present to the populations of the wealthy comfort societies.

Under these conditions the face of war is also changing radically. Conflicts are becoming asymmetric, waged between parties with widely divergent motives and rationales, centres of gravity and means of applying pressure. In this environment the Postmodern Community will need to focus on creating integrated 'carrot' and 'stick' packages, involving a spectrum of military and civilian tools, and tailored to influence opposing will on a case by case basis, and under conditions of great inequality. The Postmodern Community will be the masters of Military

Technology, but the Modern and particularly Premodern Societies may well have the upper hand when it comes to the Will to Sacrifice. Secondly, as apolitical grassroots pressure against the Postmodern World increase, we will have to deal with the root source of the problem: defusing the global poverty gap between the Postmodern Community and the lower classes.

Linear and Lateral Projections of History

A typical linear projection of the future is for instance the assumption that since big powers in the past needed physical control of territory and used military force to gain this control, they would share the same needs and behave the same way in the future. Examples of such predictions in the last few years, focusing particularly on Asia, are legion.³⁴ And they are probably silly. They are similar to the Victorian forecast that noted that the population of London could never grow beyond so and so many million because at a given point it would become impossible to remove all the horse manure which the transportation needs of so many inhabitants would generate.

The problem with this sort of forecast is that it is linear, whereas history usually evolves through a combination of both linear progression and lateral fusion, or synthesis if one likes. History is linear in the sense that things that currently exist (fears and desires, cultures and values, technologies and resources, etc.) do constitute a stepping-stone for the following developments. However it is lateral in that existing ingredients also combine to produce entirely new components, which in turn transform the linear procession of events, or shift it into another dimension. The history of technology is one huge example: we do not build bigger and more powerful steam engines today.³⁵

Such linear forecasts are also a typical product of a one-dimensional historical perception - for instance the notion that the form and outcome of wars are driven by technological change, ignoring the dimensions of Will and Skill. For it is the growth and prosperity generated by global economic interaction, and the functional ties within the system, which redirect the will of the participants of this community away from seeking confrontational 'zero-sum' solutions, and towards deeper interaction. Under these circumstances it would be folly for the leadership of the People's Republic of China - as one of the main benefactors of economic interaction with the postmodern system - to cut off this flow of wealth and development by declaring war on it.

This is not to say that such folly does not arise, for of course it does do so for a variety of reasons, nor that advanced systems of peaceful cooperation may not regress back towards competing violence. As the fall of Rome indicates and Machiavelli's *Discorsi* ceaselessly reminds us, it is possible for human constructions for peaceful and prosperous life to become corrupted, and in this sense for history to 'regress'. In this case we may indeed still witness a return to the classical nineteenth and early twentieth century brute power politics. For example if economic tensions were to dissolve the European Union, and social tensions led

to revived nationalism, then it is possible that German and French leaders might just perceive that they had more to gain (for whatever reasons) from military confrontation than from functional cooperation. But this scenario is today - fortunately - almost laughable.³⁶ Similarly, it is slightly more possible that the People's Republic of China (or whatever it's new name will be) will regress, foregoing it's current economic development and integration into the global market for a return to nineteenth century power politics and military aggrandizement, but it is unlikely. The linear historian would argue that it is unlikely because China historically has not pursued this sort of expansion, being content as long as her smaller neighbours paid the appropriate homage to the Middle Kingdom. The lateral historian would argue that it is unlikely because the emerging new China is becoming so integrated and dependent upon cooperation in the functional network of the postmodern global community that the costs of such military confrontation would outweigh any conceivable gains.

3.2. THE NEW SECURITY AGENDA

Table 2. lists the type of conflicts and unrest we may expect in the post-Cold War world, and how they could affect the Postmodern Community. The main points are outlined below. For the Postmodern Community only minor security threats are likely to arise within and between its members. Instead the main concern will be from outside. Firstly, from below, arising directly from classic conflicts of interest with Modern States beneath the community, and indirectly from the internal disasters and conflicts within the Modern and Premodern strata. Secondly, from around, as the damage to the global ecology has increasingly direct consequences for the health and comfort of the Postmodern citizens.

3.2.1. SECURITY CONCERNS FROM WITHIN THE POSTMODERN COMMUNITY

As noted earlier it is likely that the functional economic integration among the members of the Postmodern Community is likely to remove and interest in violent conflict within the community. The possibility of regression still exists, but this appears unlikely.

The key sources of insecurity will rather emerge from four sources. Firstly from the economic system itself, and our link to unstable emerging markets. These are tempting investment targets, but when they drop or collapse, as they are bound to do in their early phases, they send shockwaves throughout the global economic network. When these are linked massively to key developed markets, as for instance Mexico was to the United States in 1995, these peripheral crises could collapse the entire international economic system. Such crises have now taken place in Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong and most recently Indonesia, and we appear to have learned how to deal with these storms. However it should be noted that the first emergency operation to bail out the Mexican economy,

EMERGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT TO PMC

Actors	Cause	Symptom	Tools	Effect on PMC	Examples	
POSTMODERN COMMUNITY						
AMONGST State Nonstate	Corporations	(LITTLE) LITTLE LITTLE			COLLABORATION	
INTERNAL Substate	Crazies Hackers Disenfranchised Serious crime	(SOME) Psychology Challenge Gain Frustration Profit	Terror Penetration Crime Civil Unrest Terror Terror Corruption	WMD, PC Cybernet Drugs, guns Riots WMD, PC WMD, PC Fear/greed	Terror Disruption Insecurity Disruption Terror Terror Inefficiency	Unabomber, McVeigh, Aum Shirikyu (several) US Inner cities Los Angeles riots (not yet) (not yet) Italy, Belgium
FROM BELOW		(MOST)		see below		
MODERN STATES						
AMONGST State	Advanced Primitive	(SOME) Deter, Gain Deter, Gain Gain	WMD Conventional WMD Conventional	WMD Use Gunboat Dipl. Use	Fallout + Oops Oops Fallout + Oops	COLLISIONS (Russia, Israel, India, Pakistan, PRC) India-Pakistan, China-Vietnam, Yom Kippur S. China Sea, PRC-Taiwan (Iraq, N. Korea, Iran) Iraq - Kuwait, Iraq - Iran
INTERNAL State Nonstate Prestate	Organized crime Nations Movements	(SOME) Home support Home control Implosion Profit Independence Ideology	Propaganda Repression Repression Civil war Illegal goods Investment WMD terror Guerrilla + Other Civil war	Agress. Mil Internal viol. Internal viol. multiple multiple Laundering Terror multiple Terror Terror	multiple Conscience Conscience Ref., spillov. Insecurity Corruption Fallout + citizens Hostages citizens	Indian nuclear tests, Falklands Tibet, East Timor, Chiapas, Belarus Kosovo Yugoslavia Cartels, Triads, Warlords (Golden Triangle) Laundering, purchases (not yet - but nb Chechen threat) Kurds, Intifada, Chechnya PLA, Hamas, + Algeria, Egypt
UPWARDS State	Advanced Primitive	(SOME) Respect Challenge Oops Oops Challenge Respect	Deterrence Terror Terror Terror	WMD Proxy terr.	Implicit terror Disruption	Indian nuclear tests (not yet) RAF, Brigade Rossi, etc. (not yet) Iraq - Desert Shield/Storm Libya, Iran, etc. Libya, Iran, etc.
Prestate	Nations Movements	Independence Ideology	WMD + WMD +	Terror Terror	Fallout + Fallout +	(not yet) World Trade Center, Marseille +
Indirect	Society Economy Other	Misery Aspirations Fear multiple multiple	Starvation + Migration Refugees Regional pollution Global Ecology Disease		Conscience Stability Stability + Indirect Environment Health	Biafra, Bangladesh, Sudan Albania, Maghreb, Rio Grande Former Yugoslavia Brazilian rainforests, etc. Ozone hole, global warming, El Nino, etc. Hong Kong Chicken Flu, Ebola, etc.
PREMODERN SOCIETIES						
AMONGST State	Primitive	(LITTLE)	War		IMPLOSION Ethiopia - Eritrea, West Africa	
INTERNAL Substate Indirect	Tribes	(MOST) Various		Clubs + as above	Conscience Refugees	Rwanda, Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia
UPWARDS		(SOME)		as above		

'Operation Peso Shield', involved the transfer of over 50 billion USD, provided by the United States, the IMF and the BIS. Secondly, we have not yet had a similar crisis on mainland China. Given the magnitude of investment in the PRC such a crisis, should it take place, could well equal or surpass that of Mexico.

The second security threat arises from within the societies of the postmodern community. This consists of a variety of pinprick disturbances essentially from disturbed or disenfranchised members of the community. This can include terror from crazies, such as the Unabomber or Aum Shinrikyu; cybervandalism from hackers; crime or civil unrest in the streets from the disenfranchised poor, and terror for profit from organized crime. All of these primarily are issues for internal security organizations and society as a whole, but they could become serious should they remain unchecked, and be allowed to spread, or if they were to involve WMD.

3.2.2. RELATIONS WITH THE LOWER STRATA: Upstairs-Downstairs

The main sources of violent tension which could generate conflicts resembling our classical perception of war can arise from our relationship with the Modern States, should they seek to challenge us directly, or if their interests indirectly conflict with ours. On the other hand the primitive structure of the Premodern Societies makes such conflicts here unlikely. Such security concerns as will arise from here will be highly indirect, and consist of their misery leaking across to us.

A. Relations with the aspiring Modern States

As noted earlier the bulk of the Modern Middle Class States appear to be inching successfully into the Postmodern system, and hence serious clashes of interest are unlikely. The main problem is likely to arise from those large Poor Modern States which are unable to improve their lot, such as Russia, or which are driven to extreme acts for domestic reasons, such as India with her nuclear test explosions. Here Russia appears the most unstable and serious potential case.

Developments here can challenge or threaten us in at least five ways. Firstly from the 'Oops Factor'. In this case a Modern State's action inadvertently challenges our vital interests, as was for instance the case when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and leads us to go to war. Secondly from Deliberate Challenge, when a Modern State deliberately challenges the Postmodern order. Examples include Argentina's invasion of the Falklands, or the PRC's pressure against Taiwan. Thirdly from Collateral Fallout, in the event of a nuclear war between two Modern States, with radiation spreading across the globe. Fourthly from Deterrence, should the Modern States seek to use WMD as a means to deter the Postmodern Community from challenging their policies. And finally from non-state actors within the Modern States, such as the financially massive drug cartels, whose main threat to the Postmodern Community is probably corruption, or from political factions using terror, such as the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York.

These contingencies call for five types of security forces. Firstly the great post-modern Armada Militaries, such as the one which crushed Saddam Hussein, to deter or defeat military challenges to the Postmodern world order. Here NATO plays a key role as coordinator of coalition warfare. This is also an area where our military superiority can be brought to bear to most effect, since the wars will be essentially political, and since the opposing modern military force is the perfect target for the postmodern military. Secondly, Police Military, for peacekeeping and supporting operations, such as IFOR. Here again NATO plays a key coordinating role. Thirdly, the classic (by now) nuclear deterrent forces, directed against Modern States with nuclear weapons. Fourthly, Special Forces, for demanding surgical military operations of strategic importance, such as for instance the rescue of postmodern hostages (Entebbe, Mogadishu) or against terror involving WMD. Finally essentially non-military or paramilitary internal security forces.

B. Relations with the Premodern Societies

The security relationship between the Postmodern Community and the Premodern Societies will essentially be indirect, and derived from the internal misery within the Subworld, and the Poverty Gap between it and us. Many of these pressures can also arise indirectly from the Modern States.

Here four security challenges can be identified. Firstly Leaking Misery, in the form of migration, refugees, disease and grassroots crime, which can spill over to us. Secondly Enterpreneurial Misery, in the form of organised crime, especially if seeking profit through the use of terror. Thirdly Hate, in the event that members of the suffering classes identify their terrible conditions directly with the mere existence of the comfortable Postmodern Community, and this is translated into sheer destructive terrorism. Finally, we may be motivated to become involved by our consciences, the thin veneer of postmodern compassion.

All of these cases primarily call for either internal security measures, or else humanitarian or highly specialized military operations abroad. Paradoxically it is in this part of the world that the classical technical superiority of the Postmodern military will have most difficulty in achieving victory. Largely because the wars here are fought for reasons and in a manner which is entirely alien to our military philosophy.

3.2.3. GLOBAL ECOLOGY

Global ecological management will become increasingly important and politicised for two reasons. Firstly because ecological damage will cause increasingly immediate and serious damage to the vital interests of the members of the post-Modern community. As this becomes a domestic political issue in the post-modern world it could generate a genuine commitment by this community to impose stringent global environmental measures on the world. Measures which the

struggling economies of the modern world would have trouble affording, or which simply could not be met by the non-economies of the pre-modern world. Secondly, because greater competition for increasingly scarce global resources is likely. This is not a probable cause for tension within the post-modern community, but could cause strains between the post-modern community and the modern and pre-modern worlds. Such scarce resources need not only include classical concerns, such as oil, but also fundamental commodities for our daily survival, such as clean water, or comfort items that we crave, such as untainted red meat.

4. FINLAND AND FUTURE WAR

In this new world Finland occupies a potentially exposed geopolitical position. Occupying the northern boundary between western Europe and Russia, Finland in fact lies along one of the main fracture zones between the postmodern community and the modern states. Here it is necessary to emphasize that in fact this is a border zone between two entirely different worlds. Western Europe is part of the postmodern community, with all that this implies of domestic stability, international integration and incomparable material comfort for its citizens. Whereas Russia was at best, during its peak Soviet years (if indeed one can use such a term) a modern state. And since the collapse of the USSR the Russian economy has been declining rapidly. In fact in many respects it currently looks as if Russia would be regressing. In pure GNP terms she has sunk from being an upper modern to a lower modern state. And the regression appears to be continuing. If this economic trend can be turned, and if the foreign policy trend of Russia's current leadership continues, then all may be well. But if the economic decline continues, and if Russia's leadership reverts to a more confrontational attitude towards the outside world, then Finland will occupy a frontline position.

As a result Finland could be directly exposed to the whole range of tensions and crises which can arise between the rich postmodern parts of the world and the struggling modern states. Whether this will be the case depends upon Russia's future development. If we are lucky, and economic development gets underway, domestic order is maintained and peaceful relations are kept with the outside world then indeed Finland's position could turn very profitable, as the gateway to an increasingly important market and source of raw materials. However if we are unlucky, and Russia's current economic stagnation deteriorates, this could lead to a number of less pleasant scenarios. These range from the emergence of a harder political régime in Moscow, with growing domestic hardship and more aggressive policies towards the outside world, to the possibility of a more or less violent breakup of the Russian Federation. In all of these latter cases Finland will occupy ringside seats in a potentially dangerous drama.

Table 3. presents Finland's security environment in the coming years. The threats and problems are arranged on the basis of how likely they are, and how

severe consequences they could have for Finland. This does not mean that these conflicts will actually take place, but that there is a sufficient likelihood of their occurring as to make it necessary for Finland to be prepared for them should they arise. Using the severity - likelihood scale is important for two reasons. Firstly, because it permits a holistic overview of Finland's security environment, and permits us to overcome the traditional (and absurd) debate over whether security threats should be defined in 'military' or 'civilian' terms, or as 'hard' or 'soft'.

TABLE 3: CRISIS SCENARIOS 1998 - 2008 INVOLVING FINLANDS MILITARY

Scenario	Likelihood	Severity	Aggregate	Priority
Western Crisis Management	Taking place	Low	Desirable	3
Major radiation leak in Russia	High	Extreme	Necessary	1
Regional Crisis Management				
without major combat	Low - Medium	Medium	Important	2
with combat operations	Low - ?	High	Important	2
Deterrence	Medium	Medium	Important	2
National Defence				
strategic decapitation	Low - ?	Very High	Important	2
2008 - on				
above plus:				
National Defence				
massive invasion	Low - ?	Very High	Important	2

Secondly it permits a rough priority to be made for the allocation of scarce resources. The higher the severity and likelihood of a given scenario, the more attention it should be given. Secondly, scenarios with either high severity or likelihood, but not both, need to be covered as an insurance policy. Thirdly, multiple scenarios which call for similar defensive measures should also be prioritized, as this provides a cost-effective way of dealing with multiple threats.

The table includes threats which clearly require a military response, as well as a host of other potential non-military threats. In this article only the military contingencies will be covered. Arranged according to their likelihood they include five key contingencies:

1. Participation in Western Crisis Management Operations. (eg IFOR, SFOR)
2. Serious radiation leak in Russia.
3. Regional Crisis Management
 - 3.1. Regional civil crises without organized military violence. (eg unrest in St. Petersburg)
 - 3.2. Regional crises including organized military violence. (eg Russia - Estonia conflict)
4. Deterrence.
5. National Defence.
 - 5.1. Massive invasion. (eg Winter War 1939)
 - 5.2. Strategic Decapitation. (eg Czechoslovakia 1968, Kabul 1979)

These are each examined in turn below.

4.1. PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

The first major scenario has a high likelihood - in fact it is actually taking place - but represents a relatively low direct threat to Finland. This consists of the various potential or ongoing violent conflicts along the fringes of western Europe, notably in the Balkans, or more crises which are geographically more remote but which could have a direct impact on the postmodern community as a whole, such as the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. While such crises generally do not present a direct threat to Finland the fact that she is very actively involved means that they constitute a major focus for her military policy.

For Finland military involvement in western crisis management efforts is not only likely but actually currently taking place in several different regions. These include relatively strong (for Finland) battalion size contributions in operations ranging from DFOR in Bosnia and UNPREDEP in the FYR of Macedonia, to more traditional peace keeping missions such as UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNFICYP on Cyprus.

In none of these cases do the crises per se present an immediate or major threat to Finland. Participation is rather due to Finland's deeper security interests, which involve the opportunity to strengthen Finland's diplomatic and military links and status with the western community, as well as the actual attempt to manage crises which could present a long term threat to western interests.

Such western crisis management efforts include a broad range of operations, from low-key diplomatic ventures, such as OSCE mediation in the Baltic-Russian disputes, to outright massive wars, such as Operations Desert Shield/Storm. These operations today represent the greatest likelihood of the actual use of the postmodern community's military force, since currently this sort of gray area fringe crises are the most probable source of potential military violence facing us. At the same time the threat level which is presented is relatively low and indirect. However in many cases they must be dealt with, as the deeper and longer-term consequences of inaction could be profound. A perfect example would

be the situation in former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995. Though it by 1995 was clear that the Yugoslav wars presented little direct threat to Europe, forceful action became necessary since the humiliation of the piecemeal western peace-keeping efforts was undermining the credibility of NATO, both within and without the organisation. And by that stage NATO's policing role was its main remaining political *raison d'etre*. Had the crisis not been resolved, NATO could as well have packed up its bags, with potentially disastrous consequences for Europe and the Atlantic relationship.

Essentially western crisis management consists of the efforts of the postmodern community to ensure that their world order is maintained. For we should make no mistake. Though they are justifiably discrete about their success, there were victors at the end of the Cold War. They consist of the postmodern community - the OECD states, and it is their world order which the current post-Cold War security arrangements support.

For Finland involvement in these operations is essential for a variety of reasons. The most fundamental is that - whether we like it or not - Finland in the post-Cold War world is no longer neutral. Even if Finland technically remains militarily non-aligned, she is politically and economically an integral part of the postmodern community. This integration goes beyond her formal membership in the EU, though this is a key component, and is essentially based on Finland's complete dependence on the western community for her political and economic well-being. As a result it is as difficult for Finland to ignore the threats to the western community's world order, as it would be for the community to ignore a threat to Finland. Finally it also means that for the other two strata of world society, Finland is also identified as part of the western postmodern community.

Basically two types of institutional instruments are involved in western crisis management efforts. The first of these involves organisations which can provide international legitimacy for the use of military force. In the European context these are the UN and the OSCE. Due to their universal nature, their mandate for action makes the difference between an internationally sanctioned effort, and hence legitimate in the eyes of the key global or regional actors, and a unilateral western action which could be seen as a security threat by other important parties.

Secondly it involves the implementing agencies, which involve a large number of functional organisations, ranging from the OSCE, Council of Europe and UN agencies such as the UNHCR for non-violent operations, to NATO for any operations involving the potential use of violent military force.

Here it is necessary to emphasize two points. Firstly that for the foreseeable future NATO remains the only international organisation with a capacity to conduct effective military operations on a significant scale. Though the EU or WEU may seek such a role, they remain empty shells totally dependent upon NATO's integrated military structure. And they will continue to do so for a long time. Secondly, that the US remains an indispensable participant in any international military operation where there is the prospect of actual military force having to be used. This is partly so for purely practical reasons, since only the US com-

mands key military ingredients needed for regional or global operations. This includes strategic intelligence, global command and control capabilities and global lift and logistic support capabilities. No other country today has these, though they do possess many of the combat units that would be needed. Secondly, it is based on the respect which only the US commands. This respect, based on the fear that there is both a will and capability to deliver truly severe punishment, is a fundamental factor determining whether or not violence need be used.

For Finland participation in such western crisis management operations serves three purposes:

1. Diplomatic: establish and consolidate links to key western security fora.
2. Military: familiarize Finland's military with NATO procedures and vice versa.
3. Regional: contribute towards managing crises which could harm Europe as a whole.

The priority among the three varies from case to case, but broadly speaking the diplomatic exercise may be the most important. This consists of the opportunity for Finland to demonstrate through her active military participation that she is a full member of the western security community, not only consuming the benefits of such membership, but also willing to contribute by paying a real price for her membership. Direct benefits which this offers Finland is the access and increased status which this provides to the network of western multilateral security fora where hard decisions are taken - notably in NATO. On a deeper level it also provides Finland with the diplomatic framework and a certain moral justification (for what it is worth) needed for an appeal for similar crisis management operations in her neighborhood, should such one day be required.

The military benefits primarily consist of the strengthened operational links to NATO and the US which such joint operations can lead to, especially in the new generation of integrated multinational peacekeeping operations. Participation in headquarters units provides familiarization with US and NATO procedures, and troop operations provides familiarization with NATO tactical and logistic procedures. The net result is that Finnish participation permits the Finnish units involved to familiarize themselves with NATO, and NATO units - especially the US - to familiarize themselves with Finland's troops.

Finally the direct security-political benefit of the exercise can vary. Essentially it consists of the actual importance of the operation itself for European security in a broader context. From this perspective one can argue that regional crises located far from Finland are of little direct concern to Finland herself, but in fact this is not the case. The wars in former Yugoslavia not only spread hundreds of thousands of refugees across Europe (of which the second largest number notably went to Finland's neighbour Sweden), but also threatened the credibility of NATO itself. And a weakened NATO would have had disastrous consequences for Finland's security situation.

4.2. SERIOUS RADIATION LEAK IN RUSSIA

The second major scenario both has a relatively high likelihood of actually taking place and could, in the worst case, present an existential threat to the very survival of Finland as we know it. This consists of the possibility of a major radiation accident in Russia, involving the emission of high levels of radiation spreading to Finland. Because of its likelihood and potentially very severe consequences it must be considered one of Finland's primary current security concerns.

This contingency is not a strictly military crisis, but would certainly involve Finland's Defence Forces to a great extent should it arise. It essentially consists of the possibility of a serious accident involving nuclear facilities in Russia. These include not only the six civilian nuclear reactors in Sosnovy Bor and on the Kola Peninsula, but also depots for nuclear warheads, storage sites for nuclear waste, and perhaps, most seriously, the more than 200 nuclear reactors aboard submarines and ships based on the Kola Peninsula. Unfortunately conditions in Russia today are such that the maintenance and support of these nuclear assets make the possibility of serious accidents relatively high.³⁷ The consequences of a major accident could be devastating for Finland, in the worst case resulting in massive deaths and leaving parts or all of the country uninhabitable for centuries.

This scenario is thus both likely and potentially disastrous, and should be accorded one of the highest priorities in Finland's security political planning. Such preparations go beyond the military alone, and include a multitude of agencies involved in civil defence, starting with Finland's Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The role of Finland's defence forces in this case would be essentially to contribute to the overall civil defence effort, including providing national command and control facilities, assisting in monitoring radiation levels, assisting in the evacuation and shelter of the population and vital civilian assets, and so forth. They also go beyond what a country can accomplish in isolation, and involve a number of international institutions and efforts, including the IAEA as well as several more specific regional multilateral ventures. And in fact considerable preparations have been carried out in this area.

Unfortunately however the source of the problem is almost impossible to solve. In the first place it is difficult enough merely to map out the scale of the crisis in the Russian civilian sector, due to the Russian bureaucracy, and very hard where the Russian military is concerned. Secondly, efforts to improve the Russian facilities are enormously costly. Current studies indicate that almost the only way to do so would be to dismantle existing reactors and other facilities, and replace them with western installations. For a single civilian reactor this involves billions of US dollars. Finally, and this is perhaps the clincher, even if Russian authorization and western money were found, one would still need guarantees that the facilities can be maintained at western safety levels. In other words that morale and standards are maintained, that salaries are paid, that spare parts are supplied, and so forth. But under the current political conditions in Russia such guarantees remain highly uncertain.

Nonetheless this remains one of the most important security threats currently. For the time being the focus remains upon mapping out the extent of the problem, establishing early warning systems and, to the extent possible, stopgap safety measures (such as fire-fighting equipment, which was almost non-existent at for instance Sosnovy Bor).

4.3. REGIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The third major scenario has a relatively high likelihood of taking place, at the same time as it presents a potentially direct threat to Finland's people and territory. This consists of the possibility of regional third party crises erupting in Finland's immediate vicinity. The source of tension or conflict would in all likelihood not involve Finland directly, but the resulting violence or upheaval could spill over into Finland due to her geographical proximity.

Two categories of such crises can be envisaged:

- A. Political crises, resulting from a deliberate clash between local states or factions. These could either be international, clearly involving a conflict between two or more states, or else internal, taking place within the boundaries of one state. An example of such crises which have taken place at a low level have been the simmering differences between the Russian Federation and Estonia and Latvia over the treatment of the Russian population in these states. However more serious crises are also envisageable, depending upon the nature of the leadership in Moscow. In this case they could include the actual use of military or other force against one or more of the Baltic states.

Internal crises could involve clashes between different political factions within one state. In the case of Russia this could take two basic forms. On the one hand confrontations between different political factions in the centre, which could also involve St. Petersburg, such as we saw in November 1993 when Yeltsin used armed force to destroy the Russian Parliament. On the other hand tensions or clashes between the regions and the centre, such as we witnessed in Chechnya as of December 1994.

- B. Humanitarian crises, resulting from involuntary disasters leading to social unrest or upheaval. Examples of such crises include hunger, natural disasters or serious accidents, such as radiation leaks.

Whether or not such or other crises arise in the vicinity of Finland depends very much on the future economic and political development of Russia.

The security political requirements such contingencies place on Finland are novel, and involve both diplomatic and military preparations which are new to Finland. Diplomatically it includes two factors. One is traditional, and an area where Finland has unique experience, consisting of the need to maintain chan-

nels of communication with Russian leaders, though in this case as conflicting protagonists. Finland became expert at developing and maintaining communications of this sort during the Cold War. The second diplomatic requirement is very novel for Finland however, and consists of the need to ensure that Finland has the contacts and links with the west that are needed to mobilize (and steer) such western support as is deemed necessary. This could include both diplomatic, humanitarian and in the worst case military involvement, both multilateral, where Finland has long experience, but also bilateral with key western states. Finally it would involve negotiation with NATO as an institution.

Militarily it involves the creation of an essentially new sort of military force in Finland, no longer geared exclusively towards defence against a massive eastern invasion, but instead capable of managing the very different problems arising from a potentially diffuse peripheral crises of varying intensity and duration.

The two military requirements are very different. Finland's military has traditionally prepared to meet the threat of a massive Soviet invasion designed to occupy Finland. This is described in the next section, but is basically based upon massive mobilization of all the nations resources to support the national defence effort. This is good if the state is faced with a massive invasion, but not suited for dealing with regional crises. It is neither particularly flexible nor discrete, and it can only be sustained economically and socially under conditions of massive external threat.

However a Finnish military regional crisis management capability calls for very different forces. In the first place their readiness and mobilization needs to meet four criteria:

1. **Readiness and Speed.** Initial readiness must be high, and adjustment of force levels to the crisis must be extremely rapid. This is not possible with a cadre force based on conscription.
2. **Flexibility.** The actual force deployed must be adjusted flexibly to the nature of the crisis at hand. That is to say that the correct mix of ground, air, sea and frontier forces must be taylormade for each contingency. Once again this is difficult with a mass mobilization system.
3. **Skill.** The crisis management forces must possess the necessary skills to perform their tasks from day one of the crisis. This calls for officers and soldiers with a high and current level of training, often for paramilitary or specialized tasks. This is again difficult to achieve with a con script army.
4. **Endurance.** It must be possible to keep the crisis management force deployed and at a high level of readiness over extended periods of time. This is again difficult with a conscript mobilization system.
5. **Discretion.** Finally deployment must be discrete if necessary. This can be needed both to avoid increasing international tensions, and to make it

easier for Finland's authorities to take the decision to raise her military readiness sufficiently early in a crisis.

In addition to this the skills needed for regional crisis management are very different from those of national defence, and in many cases involve specialized training. Key tasks include:

1. Surveillance and reconnaissance
2. Securing the integrity of Finland's land and sea territory against tangential infringements.
3. Managing humanitarian crises adjacent to Finland and preventing their spillover into Finland.
4. Participating in (possibly with a leading political and military role) international diplomatic and military crisis management efforts.
5. Preventing armed violence from spilling over to Finland.

4.4. DETERRENCE

The need to maintain a deterrent against potential Russian temptations to engage in military adventures involving Finland remains necessary despite the placid nature of Russia's current leadership. This is because of the uncertainty surrounding Russia's future, and the possibility that a more hostile régime might return to power.

Such temptations are all linked to a change towards a more hostile régime in Moscow, and hence are not relevant today. However such a régime could rapidly emerge. In that case there could be three motives for the threat or launch of deliberate military operations that could involve Finland.

A. Calculated political pressure

The calculated use of the threat of war or other damage to a European neighbour as a means of pressuring the west or an individual country into caution or concessions on a given issue. At the lowest level motives for such a policy would include pre-emptive deterrence, dissuading the west from interfering in Russia's internal affairs, for instance in the event of extreme human rights breaches or the massive use of violence within the Federation. A subtle example of this was when President Yeltsin reminded the world of Russia's nuclear power just when he unleashed the assault on Chechnya.³⁸ Further motives, primarily under a more hostile régime, could include reacting to undesirable western policies in another part of the world (for instance disagreement over military intervention in the Balkans or NATO enlargement) to actually seeking to coerce the west into concessions.

If such pressure were applied using nuclear assets it could be specially focused to neighbouring countries if the Russian leadership wished to avoid invol-

ving intercontinental forces, for instance if she wished to exert specifically European or regional pressure, or strove to avoid direct tension with the United States.

If it involved conventional military force then the neighbouring states would be especially involved, since such pressure could only credibly be applied against adjacent territory. In this case Finland would be very exposed geographically. However given Russia's current military weakness it could also only be directed against militarily very feeble states, which today makes Finland less likely. However this is only true as long as Finland retains a credible military deterrent/defence capability.

B. Domestically driven motives

In this case the threat, demonstration or use of force against an outside party would be driven by domestic considerations, as a means to rally domestic support, divert public attention from an internal crisis or excuse increased repression at home. Examples of such cases include Argentina's attack against the Falklands in 1982, or the Indian nuclear tests this summer.

Normally such an option could only be envisaged on two conditions. Firstly that it was perceived as controllable, precluding the danger of escalation or defeat. Secondly, that it was relatively inexpensive in economic, military and foreign policy terms. Vulnerable targets in this case would therefore have to be adjacent to Russia, with weak defences, and preferably weak links to the west. Candidates which partly meet these criteria are the Baltic states, which are militarily vulnerable and possess unclear ties to the west, and some of Russia's smaller Islamic neighbours to the south, where the links to the west are minimal, but where the military outcome on the other hand is at best uncertain.

Finland, as a member of the western postmodern community, a formal member of the EU and with relatively strong defences is thus an unlikely target, but the possibility cannot be excluded, especially if her national defence capacity were to be allowed to diminish.

C. As a call for respect

In this case, which is most desperate and probably only likely should Russia have entered a deep domestic crisis under a hostile regime, a show of force would be employed as an attempt to maintain the respect of the outside world by demonstrating Russian military might, or at the least the capacity to devastate and demolish. In this case the same preconditions apply as above, with a focus on weak neighbours. In certain conditions however a target might be chosen deliberately because it had some special link to the west, as a specific show of force.

D. Great power pressures

In the longer term, should Russia regain its economic momentum accompanied by a hostile leadership the need for deterrence would be associated to more classic threats linked to Russia as a great power. This includes the need to contain Russian expansionist tendencies driven by economic, security or pure power motives.

Here it is important to reiterate that under Russia's current régime these scenarios are not relevant for Finland. However they cannot yet be excluded for the years ahead. Here it is also important to note that Finland today is the only member of the postmodern community (and the EU) whose geopolitical exposure to Russia still could include a direct military threat.

Finland's actual military deterrence requirements are a function of the above scenarios. On the most basic level they consist of the general need to avoid presenting herself as militarily vulnerable for the sort of opportunistic ventures described above. It includes three operational scenarios. Firstly, to guard against military pressure using Finland as a pawn in a greater game, or designed to influence or isolate Finland. Secondly, against a strategic decapitation surprise attack. Thirdly, in the very much longer term, against a possible revived mass invasion scenario.

The actual military requirements for such a deterrent posture are described under the appropriate scenarios below. However it is important to note four points here. Firstly, that Finland currently has a relatively credible deterrent stance against a massive invasion attempt. Secondly, that precisely this is one reason why the military threat to Finland remained comparably low during the Cold War, and subsequently. Thirdly, that this defence posture does not threaten anyone outside Finland's borders, and is not destabilizing in any way. And finally that it would take a very long time to rebuild, should it be allowed to decay or be dismantled today. In the face of an uncertain future it is thus too early lower this guard. Whether or not it should be reorganized is another question however, which is dealt with below.

4.5. NATIONAL DEFENCE

This is the classical military defence scenario for which Finland has been preparing since independence, and one of the two requirements which were deliberately built up during the Cold War.³⁹ This is based on the classical military threat scenario of a full scale Soviet or Russian military operation directed against Finland's independence.

Traditionally this has been seen in terms of a massive invasion by heavily armoured military forces. However recently a second scenario has also emerged, consisting of the possibility of a strategic surprise attack, carried out by small élite forces, designed to decapitate the country before effective defence has been

mobilized, after which they are followed-up by regular forces. Examples of such operations include Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and Afghanistan in December 1979.

The severity of either of these scenarios is obviously extreme, but at the same time the likelihood of either taking place in the near future - say five to ten years - is remote. This is so firstly because the Russian leadership in Moscow currently is not pursuing the type of security policy where this is an option. Secondly because the present poor state of the Russian Armed Forces make the prosecution of such attacks against a prepared defender like Finland virtually impossible today, and it will take several years before the capacity for such operations can be rebuilt in Russia. Currently no such efforts are being made and the decline of the Russian armed forces is continuing unabated. Thirdly, because the strategic decapitation scenario almost certainly would require the bulk of the operations being carried out from Estonia, which is impossible as long as this country remains independent.

However here one should note two points. Firstly, that political will can change rapidly. While we may hope that the current Russian cooperative policy towards the outside world will continue, this cannot be guaranteed. The economic and social crisis in Russia is too deep for us to make any certain forecasts about the nature of future political regimes there. Secondly, there are already political forces in Russia with a hostile attitude towards the outside world, and should they come to power it could also affect Russia's security and foreign policy. Given the very difficult domestic conditions inside Russia the pressure for a more aggressive international stance could become great indeed.

Secondly, regarding capabilities, one should note four points. Firstly, that the current Russian military weakness may be temporary, to be followed by a more effective theatre military force in the more distant future - as of perhaps ten years. While this could not compare with the might of the Red Army, it could present a significant military threat to small states in Russia's immediate vicinity. And in this case Finland would be located very close indeed to the Russian military heartland. Secondly, that for Russia's neighbours Russia even today may not be as militarily weak as she appears to be. Thus for instance the amount and quality of armoured material in Finland's vicinity may be larger than is generally recognized, and the Leningrad Military District retains a fairly large pool of trained manpower. Nonetheless it is clear that whatever is available is but a fraction of what existed in Soviet times. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, is the fact that the motives of a future Russian régime for unleashing a war could be domestically driven, as for instance the Indian nuclear tests this summer, and have little to do with actual external security-political calculations. Finally there is also the possibility of war as punishment. That is to say the use of military violence not as a means to conquer territory, but as a means to inflict damage and hence remind a disrespectful outside world of the power remaining at Russia's hands.

Thirdly, even if capabilities are weak this does not preclude an attack by miscalculation. When Stalin invaded Finland in November 1939 he believed he could

occupy the country in a matter of weeks. Similar miscalculation took place when President Yeltsin authorized the assault on Grozny in December 1994. Thus the possibility of an attack by miscalculation - though remote - cannot be ignored. And such a possibility would increase if Finland's defence capabilities were perceived as weak. This is especially the case in the context of a perceived limited strategic surprise attack.

4.5.1. Massive Invasion

The classical scenario of a massive invasion attempt can be met in two ways. The first is Finland's traditional response, which is based upon isolation and having to defend herself entirely alone. This is the scenario towards which the bulk of Finland's defence preparations have been devoted since the second world war, and remains the basis of Finland's current defence organization.

Current planning is based on the mobilization of all of the state's resources towards the defence effort, including over 450,000 men into the defence forces and the conversion of the economy and social system to wartime conditions. This defence system is designed to take advantage of Finland's large and heavily forested area, trading space for time, and isolating enemy formations for piecemeal destruction. The bulk of the troops would consist of 'Local Forces', carrying out guerilla operations behind enemy lines and security duties in the own areas. Their operations are integrated with the 'General Forces', some ten brigades equipped with the heaviest firepower and mobility, and whose task is to deliver decisive counter attacks to destroy the enemy formations.

This concept is currently probably the best possible for Finland if she is to attempt an independent defence against a massive invasion from Russia. This is so for two reasons. Firstly because it is cheap, since the large numbers of Local Forces cost little to train and equip, and the expensive General Forces are kept at a minimum. Secondly, and most importantly, because it has the best chances of deterring attack and defending the country if needed. In the first place it maximizes the uncertainty facing a potential adversary, making it extremely difficult to forecast the outcome of a war. And secondly because it provides one of the few credible means of inflicting heavy costs to a much larger enemy.

This is largely because currently a postmodern military force can completely crush any modern conventional military force, but paradoxically has great difficulty dealing with opposing guerilla forces. The overwhelming superiority of postmodern over modern military forces was clearly demonstrated in the crushing victory by Israel over Syria in 1982, and by the United States in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This technological superiority over conventional forces appears to hold regardless of terrain, as demonstrated when the application of postmodern firepower - in mountainous and heavily forested terrain - forced Milosevich to Dayton in 1995. However the very same postmodern forces have tremendous difficulty dealing with guerilla forces, as demonstrated in Vietnam, Afghanistan and most recently Somalia.

The same applies to Finland. Though the Russian military today cannot conduct postmodern combat operations, the type of large modern force which Russia could potentially field in ten years would have far less trouble defeating a small core of Finnish professional troops equipped with the most modern combat equipment, than with the current combination of local and general forces. And what is probably more important, in the mind of an opposing General Staff planner, the outcome of a war against a small high-tech enemy might be perceived as easier to forecast than the outcome against the current force mix. Such calculations might of course subsequently prove totally erroneous, as was the case in the Winter War and Chechnya, but what matters here are the perceptions which would prevail when the decision to attack was made.

The problem with this strategy however is that a reliance upon guerilla defences may no longer suit Finnish conditions. On the whole premodern guerilla defence can only be carried out if it done in the context of a premodern society, where the population already lives on a threadbare minimum, is used to enduring terrible hardships, and where each village is largely self-supporting and independent of the outside world.

But Finland is no longer a premodern nor even a modern society, but entirely postmodern. Sixty years ago the average citizen was a manual labourer, with 60% of the population either working on a farm, in the forest or in construction and manufacturing - skilled in skiing and using the axe, and familiar with the hardships of outdoor life and manual labour. Today 64% of the population is urban and 62% of the economically active population is employed in the service sector. Standards of living are extremely high, and life depends entirely on the functioning of a small number of highly centralized facilities providing water, food, energy and sanitation. Finland's average citizen today lives and works in a seat in a heated room, and spends most of his time facing either a computer or television screen. This sort of society could not survive the horrors of premodern guerilla warfare, and it is doubtful if it could even survive the rigours of the winter war. On the other hand it possesses all the necessary skills needed for manning a high-tech computerized postmodern military force.

The second problem with the mass mobilization system, noted above, is that it is largely limited to the one scenario of massive invasion, and that it is highly inflexible. In situations short of full war mass mobilization becomes extremely difficult and blunt. Firstly such an extreme measure is a very difficult decision for the civilian authorities to make in an ambiguous international situation, meaning that mobilization may come too late. Secondly, placing the entire nation on a wartime footing places a terrible economic and social burden on the state. Such a sacrifice is almost only possible to sustain domestically if the own population is convinced that they in fact do face an actual invasion. Thirdly, in an ambiguous low-level or peripheral international crisis full mobilization could send all the wrong diplomatic signals. Fourthly, on the operational level, large numbers of relatively poorly equipped troops lacking specialized training would have trouble dealing with the multitude of ambiguous non-military or partly-military 'gray

area' crises which emerge. It would also be difficult to adapt them quickly to a changing situation.

However today Finland possesses a second option, which is to seek assistance from abroad. This possibility was precluded for the last fifty years, for three reasons, hammered home by Finland's historical experience before and during the Winter War, as well as by geopolitical reality after World War Two:

1. Finland is geographically tied to Russia.
2. Russia is huge and Finland (in terms of brute power) tiny.
3. Finland is isolated next to Russia and cannot seek external assistance to compensate the imbalance.

As a result Finland had to deal with her relationship with Russia alone. This was the liturgy, and was certainly also the truth during the Cold War, when any Finnish security approaches westwards almost certainly would have provoked a Soviet occupation of Finland which the west would have been powerless to prevent.

Today however almost all these conditions have changed, and only the first still holds true. The imbalance in brute power is now far less. Russia remains far larger in terms of size, population and natural resources, but in economic, ideological, political and military terms she has returned roughly to the level she was at before the revolution in 1917 - with the one exception of nuclear weapons. At the same time Finland has never been as strong economically and diplomatically as she is today.

Secondly, Finland is no longer as isolated as in the past. First of all Finland is now formally a part of the Postmodern Community, through her membership in the European Union. While this provides no hard military guarantees at all, it makes an enormous difference diplomatically. Politically, Finland is no longer alone. Technology has also reduced Finland's isolation. Today it is possible for powerful military forces to reach and operate in and around Finland within days. This especially applies to Finland, where the key military support requirements would not consist of heavy ground forces, but of strategic intelligence and attendant C4SIR elements, and secondly of aircraft for air defence. Both of these assets can be provided extremely rapidly - especially since Finland's Air Force now operates the F/A-18. In addition to this Operations Desert Shield and Storm indicate that against a 'modern' military opponent C4SIR combined with air operations play a decisive role in all aspects of combat except actually taking and holding ground.

4.5.2. Strategic Decapitation

The second scenario involving a direct attack against Finland is the so-called Strategic Attack. This consists of the possibility of a small but highly focussed surprise attack, designed to eliminate key elements necessary for Finland's de-

fence and independence. These include first and foremost the political and administrative leadership, as well as the communication and information centres, and secondly key installations for the survival of the postmodern urban society, such as water supplies, sanitation, energy and transport.

While the current weakness of Russia's armed forces virtually preclude massive conventional military operations, this type of operation may still be possible, though it too would have to be followed up by conventional forces occupying the country.

To meet this type of threat the same type of high-readiness forces are needed as for regional crisis management contingencies, though with a more explicit military defence posture. However here too it is difficult to rely on a conscript mobilization system, partly because it might not be rapid enough to meet a surprise attack, and partly because of the higher requirements on training and equipment which combat against special forces in an urban environment calls for.

4.6. FINLAND'S MILITARY DILEMMA

Finland's military dilemma today consists of the fact that under current defence budgets it is probably not possible both to maintain the classic mass-mobilization defence, and develop the new rapid readiness forces. Hence, as long as budgets remain at their current levels, only one option can be pursued. The dilemma arises because both are probably needed. The traditional defence still offers the best deterrence against military pressure from outside, as this ultimately would be the most difficult for Russia to defeat militarily, though one might ask whether Finland's society as a whole could bear the burden of a modern conventional war. At the same time however the mass invasion scenario is currently unlikely, and this must be seen primarily as a longer term insurance policy. However it is an insurance against a disaster which cannot be excluded.

At the same time the crisis management and, to some extent the strategic surprise scenarios are far more likely. Especially the possibility of a regional crisis is a contingency for which there is real need to prepare. Hence the readiness forces are very much needed. They would also constitute the core force in a general modernization of Finland's ground defences which is also important. However if money is used to develop them then very little will be left for maintaining the mass national defence system.

4. CONCLUSION

As a result the fault lines between the post-modern community and the modern and pre-modern worlds will become key areas of future security concern. For Europe, these fault lines run along the Mediterranean, cover Turkey, and then run north along the Russian border. Finland thus occupies a critical position. Russia today is however not an unambiguous case. Like the other 'modern' empires it consists of several worlds - a cluster of pre-modern communities in its southern belly in the Caucasus; a stagnating primitive modern world of collapsing heavy

industry in the centre, north and east; and one, possibly two, small modern and post-modern enclaves in Moscow and perhaps St. Petersburg. And finally of course, a broad mass of rural inhabitants in the countryside for which - with the exception of periodic mass disasters - little has changed over several centuries.

If we are lucky the post-modern Russian elite will be able to pull the rest of the country with them towards a prosperous and harmonious future. But even in the best of cases this will take time, and in the worst case it may not happen at all. Either way Finland lies directly next to this fault line, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Finally it is worth noting the current cultural diversification of the global elite, though this is not likely to become a security issue. For the last two centuries global politics and economics were dominated by the occident, with the physical power and cultural values of Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States prevailing over most parts of the world. From now on however North America and Europe will increasingly have to share the world with China and its Asian neighbours. This does not necessarily imply conflict however. In fact quite the contrary is the most likely. As the key parts of China and Asia increase their economic power they will also become increasingly integrated in the post-modern community, just as Japan has done. And within this community the exercise of violent power generally has little meaning and is in fact self-damaging. However in a more general sense the influence of China and Asia will grow, as their economies become one of three geographic cornerstones of the overall global post-modern economic system. This in turn will increase particularly China's political weight in the world. Finally it will also increase China's cultural influence, releasing the world from the current unipolar occidental dominance and towards cultural bipolarity, with the Sino-asian civilization as the second strong civilizational force. And this may not be such a bad thing.

ENDNOTES

¹The views presented in the initial sections of this study are influenced by the authors interpretation of traditional Chinese daoist cosmology, especially the notions of the *taiji*, the two energies of *yin* and *yang* and their four relationships, the trinity of *jing*, *qi* and *shen* and their various manifestations, the four images, the *wu xing* and the *ba gua*. These and other fundamental daoist principles can be applied to all fields of human activity, from warfare to medicine, and to the physical world. The author is grateful to M. Luc Defago, Geneva, Master Wang Yennien, Taipei and Professor Lou Jingda, Paris, for their teachings.

²In 1986 or 1987, during a public lecture at Akademiska Bokhandeln in Helsingfors, Joseph Brodsky was asked what happened to a country that killed its poets. His answer was: "It goes stupid." His reply, especially in the light of the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, is a perfect illustration of the fundamental role of the spirit in all human ventures.

³Here the term 'occidental war' must be emphasized. As is noted later in the article, acts of 'war' may emerge for entirely different motives and purposes - which may have little to do with politics - under other conditions and in other cultures. This is excellently illustrated in one of the latest *Adelphi Papers* (No. 320, Summer 1998) by David Keen, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars." However since this paper deals with the future prosecution of war by the postmodern community, and since it is our conception of how this is waged which will determine how we

prosecute it, this analytic section focusses on the rationales underlying our current occidental notions of warfare.

⁴ In rare cases individual humans have transcended these two instincts, liberating themselves from the fetters of fear and desire and attaining the realm of universal compassion. Such cases are beyond politics, but this mystical transcendence is also exceptionally rare. Likewise it is important to distinguish between politics and physics. Where politics is concerned with influencing another spirit, physics involves only apparently non-sentient forces. On an individual level it is possible to attempt to deal with politics as if it physics, for instance by killing a person (physical removal) rather than trying to influence him or her. But usually the long term costs of such an approach outweigh the short term gains. On a larger scale however it is very difficult to deal with societies using physics. Very few have attempted to do so, and most of these have met with failure. Examples of such an approach are efforts to exterminate whole peoples, such as when Rome razed Carthage, or Hitler's 'final solution' for the Jewish nation. However the attempts to apply physics to the field of politics have almost never succeeded, and have almost always entailed far greater costs (of all sorts) than benefits. It is a curious fact that the only rational (ie expending a minimum cost to attain your objectives) means to deal with the spirit is politics. Which means intercourse with the other spirit, on its terms. Attempts to take physical short cuts almost always end up costing far more, and ending in failure.

⁵ One treatment of this fundamental theme is Friedrich Hegel's The Phenomenology of the Spirit. Others who have devoted centuries of study to this topic are the generations of Chinese daoist scholars and thinkers.

⁶ Sun Tzu: The Art of War. Translated by Lionel Giles, 1910, Graham Brash, Singapore, Paperback facsimile ed., 1988: p. 17.

⁷ Will, Skill and Tools constitute the basis of all sentient force (as opposed to the pure physical forces of the apparently non-sentient universe). Regardless of whether it be the waging of war, the building of a house, or any other activity, Will is the most important determinant of the force at our disposal, Skill the next most important, and Tools the least important. A book which focusses specifically, if circumspectly, on this relationship, and especially on the primacy of Will, is Sun Tzu's short but extraordinary On War, and notably his profound distinction between the forces of *ch'i* and *cheng* (see notably Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Another extensive study of the role and characteristics of human will and character in politics is Machiavelli's exhaustive Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius (notably Book 1, Chapters 1-7 and Book 2, Chapters 1-3 and Chapter 10.). Michael Howard also refers to these dimensions of strategy in his article "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy." Foreign Affairs (1979), listing *logistics, operations, social factors and technology* as the key constituents of war.

⁸ A key proponent of war as a social phenomenon is the historian John Keegan, notably in A History of Warfare (1993). Philip Windsor makes the same point, and defends Clausewitz' thinking on this issue at the same time, in his article "The Clock, The Context and Clausewitz." Millennium, Fall 1977. The influence of the liberal tradition on the prosecution of war is examined in Michael Howards War and the Liberal Conscience (1978). However the most specific studies of the link between the collective unconscious and the waging of war is the seminal work by Christopher Coker, notably in his extraordinary books War in the Twentieth Century (1994) and War and the Illiberal Conscience (1998).

⁹ The operational and especially technological dimensions of warfare have been the focus of the majority of works on military history. Excellent studies of Skill include Azar Gat: The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz. (1989), Peter Paret's edited collection The Makers of Modern Strategy and Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1981). Studies of Tools abound, especially today. A historian, whose first books focussed specifically on the impact of technology and logistics on war, but whose later work transcends this dimension, is Martin van Creveld, in his On Future War (1991), Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (1993), and in several other studies. A concise examination of the interaction of all dimensions is Michael Howard's War in European History (1976). Finally, current prescriptions working almost entirely from within the limits of the perspectives of Skill are the host of studies from the peace research community and institutionalist schools providing a multitude of recipes for establishing regional or world order - 'security architectures'. These approaches deliberately

disdain the study of Tools (or as one of them termed it during the Cold War 'scrap iron') in favour of *reasonable* solutions. However they usually overlook the dimension of Will, by assuming that all parties must share their view of what is *reasonable*, and hence their architecture. Perhaps the ultimate expression of intellectual arrogance.

¹⁰ The term 'Revolution in Military Affairs', which referred exclusively to technological change, is in itself a reflection of the extent to which warfare became equated with hardware during the Cold War. The hold which this mindset still exerts is illustrated in a recent Adelphi Paper (No. 318, Summer 1998) by Lawrence Freedman. Entitled "The Revolution in Strategic Affairs.", it nonetheless deals almost only with the revolution of technology. As a contrast see Martin Edmonds' "The British Army 2000 - External Influences on Force Design." (The Occasional, No. 21, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Staff College, Camberley, 1996), which presents a comprehensive perspective of today's 'strategic affairs'.

¹¹ An intriguing study purporting to show that the Reagan administration - contrary to conventional wisdom - was pursuing a far more subtle and multi-dimensional strategy against the Soviet Union than is generally believed, is provided by Peter Schweizer in his fascinating book Victory (1994). If the information presented in this book is correct, then the innermost circle of the Reagan administration was indeed engaged in an extremely sophisticated and subtly orchestrated campaign to destroy the Soviet Union, using the full range of social and economic forces at their disposal.

¹² Philip Windsor repeatedly made this point as of the 1980's. See for instance his chapter "Strategy and Sociology: Towards a New Relationship?" in: The World of Tomorrow, Ed. by Theodor Winkler and Peter Ziegler, 1992.

¹³ Samuel Huntington alerted us to this phenomenon in his seminal article "The Clash of Civilizations." Foreign Affairs (1993), further developed in his The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (1996). However while the renewed interaction of global cultures is a significant characteristic of the coming era, and though cultural differences do provide an important explanation for differences in the development of various societies and regions, one does not necessarily agree with Huntington that this inevitably need lead to confrontation between these cultures. In some cases cultural differences may indeed create misunderstandings, including violence, or act as a catalyst sparking off deeper causes of tension, as in former Yugoslavia. But in many cases members of one 'civilization' vent far more hostility towards each other than towards the outside world, as for instance in Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc. Secondly, one should note that in many cases traditional civilizational differences are being superceded by a new global culture. This growing 'postmodern community' tends to bind its members into increasingly nonviolent functional networks, transcending historical differences in race and values. In this case cultural differences can become simply interesting spices in the dish of human interaction, rather than killer habaneros.

¹⁴ C4SIR - the acronym for 'Command, Control, Communication, Computing and Surveillance, Intelligence, Reconnaissance', until the early 1990's still referred to only as C3I ('Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence). That is to say, those tools which permit you to complete the OODA loop ('Observe, Orient, Decide, Act') faster and more accurately than your opponent, and hence significantly increase your chances of destroying him before he destroys you. Also known as a force multiplier, which it truly is.

¹⁵ 'Revolutions of Military Technology' are seldom based on a single technology, but usually on the gradual evolution and lateral integration of several technologies into a lethal package, whose sum is greater than its parts. See for instance Karl Lautenschläger: "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare." International Security, Fall 1983: pp. 3-51. Though much attention is currently focussed on artificial intelligence, it is the advances in the field of miniaturization (artificial intelligence systems, propulsion systems, delivery systems, warheads, etc.) which is leading towards the next revolution in military technology. This era of weapons systems would consist of clouds of minute robots the size of insects or smaller, capable of observing, communicating and acting (each having different functions, such as poisoning or drugging living beings, and glueing, short-circuiting, corrupting, etc. machinery) at great distance, either independently or by remote control. The current boom of UAV and other small semi-robot combatants are the precursors of this trend.

¹⁶ Of course such absolute demarcation lines are artificial. Each level contains parts of the other. Thus for instance India has a middle class of over 60 million, leading a lifestyle comparable to that of the average west European, while the United States contains poor inhabitants.

¹⁷ This is not meant to be a value statement, merely a statement of fact. Hence the emphasis upon 'material'.

¹⁸ Russia is not included here since it's membership in the so-called 'G8' is purely cosmetic, a political pacifier. In hard economic terms, with a collapsing economy and a GNP lower than that of the Netherlands, it has nothing to do in the G7.

¹⁹ The strength of these economic bonds has already been illustrated when President Clinton early in his first term in office in 1993 sought to question the PRC's most favoured nation trading status over human rights. Once it became clear just how many American workers jobs depended upon trade with China President Clinton withdrew his initiative, and it has not been raised once since then.

²⁰ Christopher Coker: *The Twilight of the West* (1998).

²¹ It is a curious phenomenon that the real geopolitical hubs of global power in this century - in terms of victorious actors, successful political bonds and prosperous economic development - appear to have been across oceans: first the Atlantic and now the Atlantic-Pacific. This runs contrary to the continental fixation of most classical geopolitical studies: Mackinder's emphasis upon a continental 'pivot area'; Haushofers emphasis upon continental 'Pan areas'; and Brzezinski's continental 'Eurasian Geostrategic Center' of the Cold War and 'Central Continent' of today. The outstanding exception is of course Alfred Thayer Mahan. And oddly enough all of the geopolitical continentalists have vaunted the primacy of precisely that landmass - Russian Eurasia - which has been least successful in almost every way. From this one is tempted to draw two conclusions. Firstly that states have the best prospects of success if they are located along the fringes of the continental pivot areas, and the best chances of mutually beneficial relations if they do not share common land frontiers. (In this respect the members of the EU are of course no longer regarded as politically separate states, even if domestic cultural distinctions remain.) Secondly, the fact that the geopolitically ethereal Atlantic community actually won the Cold War, while the geopolitically solid Eurasian Geostrategic Center lost, provides a healthy warning to anyone advocating a too deterministic interpretation of the influence of geopolitics in world affairs.

²² It is clear that Japan, South Korea Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have all created an enormous economic growth rate which has provided their citizens with dramatically improved material standards of living. While this was done within the general framework of free market principles, it is also clear that each country has applied these principles, as well as the attendant political requirements for 'democracy', in their separate ways, and beneath the surface often very differently from the way in which the Atlantic community understands these concepts. Initially this was so partly for understandable pragmatic reasons - under extreme hardship democracy easily turns to anarchy - and partly for cultural reasons. Different cultures will always add their particular flavour. For an interesting anthropological - and relatively 'apolitical' - study of these variations between Asian and Atlantic ways of doing the same business, see *Golden Arches East: McDonalds in East Asia*. Edited by James L. Watson, (1998). For a broader examination of the cultural specificity and perhaps fragility of the democratic ideal, see Robert Kaplan: "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1997.

²³ See Christopher Coker: "The Future is History." *IFS Info*, No. 5, Oslo, Institute for Defence Studies, 1996: pp. 20, for a selection of current literary visions of the future, and the three different worlds they depict.

²⁴ The reasonable political mindset of the postmodern community is unconsciously exhibited in the architectural prescriptions for an ideal world often proposed by the institutionalists and peace research communities. The problem with these recipes - which is common to all well-meaning missionary ethnocentric prescriptions - is that while they may work well within or along the fringes of the comfortable postmodern community in which they are formulated - as the functionalist European Union demonstrates - they are difficult to apply in societies outside this sheltered enclave, operating under conditions and according to rationales which are entirely alien to us.

²⁵ Christopher Coker: *The Future is History*: p. 6.

²⁶ Modestly dedicated 'For my students - to help them shape tomorrow's world.'. In this context it is also interesting to compare Brzezinski and Huntington. In *The Grand Chessboard* Brzezinski

offers a classical geopolitical analysis of world politics, with geography playing a major part in determining future conflicts and their outcomes, while the human element is almost entirely ignored. In The Clash of Civilizations Huntington presents an almost diametrically opposite world, with the human factor - in terms of civilizations, culture and ethnicity - as the driving force of world politics. Actual events probably lie someplace in between, with both geography and human qualities playing their share in determining events, as well as a host of other factors, foremost among which is technology. (Indeed, in human affairs geography is largely determined by technology, while culture and civilization are largely identified by it.) Finally it is also worth noting how tremendously wrong much of classical geopolitics has been, in emphasizing the importance of continental landmasses as the global 'pivot areas', whereas the transoceanic littoral links have in most cases proven far more successful and durable. Here one should also acknowledge that Huntington's 'Eastern Boundary of Western Civilization' is indeed one of the only explanations available which accounts for the enormous difference in political outlook and economic performance between Western and Central Europe and Orthodox Russia.

²⁷ Actually more about what happens to one premodern society when oil wealth thrusts the trappings of modernity upon it.

²⁸ Chronological snapshots (through western viewfinders) of these occidental fringe worlds are provided in for instance: Joseph Conrad, Evelyn Waugh or George Orwell ("To shoot and elephant") for the colonial era; Wilfred Thesiger for the uncorrupted noble savage in the first half of this century (as well as a host of anthropologists); Kapuscinski and Guevara for the Third World in its post-colonial, early Cold War context, as a playing field of east and west; and finally Kaplan for the 'Ends of the World' today, as the abandoned battlefields of the Cold War, more or less left to their own devices with the exception of the economic interests of the postmodern community. This last is also presented in Wilhelm Greider's One World Ready or Not, though most of this book actually focusses on the emerging modern states.

²⁹ Robert Cooper: The Post-Modern State and World Order, Demos, London, 1st. ed., 1996: pp. 50.

³⁰ Pierre Hassner: "Beyond the three traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in historical perspective." International Affairs, 1994: pp. 737-756.

³¹ Martin Wight: International Theory: The Three Traditions (1991) and Kenneth Waltz: Man, The State and War (1965).

³² Though perhaps 'superworld', 'midworld' and 'subworld' would be better terms.

³³ A term which again demonstrates how strong the western ethnocentric view of the world was. For 'less developed' meant less developed towards the OECD model. And though this model certainly served the First World well, it is not said that it also constitutes the ultimate in development for the rest of the world. For 'Less Developed' to have been preferred even by the representatives of the Third World community shows how far the western view had penetrated even their consciousness. In this sense 'Third World' is a much more honest and useful term. However like all honesty, it is not always very polite in superficial society.

³⁴ See for instance Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro The Coming Conflict with China (1997), Humphrey Hawksley and Simon Holberton Dragon Strike: The Millennium War (1997), Peter Schweizer (yes, sadly the same Schweizer that previously wrote the brilliant Victory) and Caspar Weinberger: The Next War (1998). In almost all these cases the wars in Asia are high-tech versions of World War Two or the Korean War, with Japan or China using military force to expand their territories, and then generally being beaten back by superior US technology, except when Schweizer and Weinberger despair over current US intelligence and defence cuts.

³⁵ In this respect it is interesting to note that the historian Martin van Creveld has come closer to predicting the future forms of warfare than most of the specialists from within the strategic community. Another good example of a broad lateral approach to the future of warfare - Alvin and Heidi Tofflers: War and Anti-War (1993) - also comes from outside the strategic community.

³⁶ *Almost* laughable.

³⁷ For a constantly updated review of the situation see the Bellona website:

<http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/index.htm>

For some general reports see for instance (in reverse chronological order):

"The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of Russian Radioactive Contamination." Bellona Report, No. 2, August 1996. (available at above website.)

Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and other regional impacts from Soviet nuclear contamination. Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, September 1995: pp. 239.

FORSS, Stefan: "Naval Nuclear Waste Issues in the Counties of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk." Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Tidskrift, 198. Årg., 4. Häftet, 1994: pp. 29-44.

NILSEN, Thomas and Nils BÖHMER: "Sources to radioactive contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk counties." Bellonea Report, Vol. 1, February 1994: pp. 162.

Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation. Government Commission on Matters Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea (the so-called 'Yabolokov Commission'), Moscow, 1993.

RIES, Tomas: "The Nordic Region and post-Soviet Radioactive Pollution." Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 9, September 1993: pp. 398-400.

RIES, Tomas: "Russian Nuclear Reactors in the Nordic Region." Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 1993: pp. 360-364.

JEMELJANENKOV, Alexander and Wladimir POPOW: Atom Ohne Geheimnis: Eine Dokumentation zum Nuklearkomplex des GUS und Russlands. Moskau-Berlin, 1992: pp. 89.

³⁸ This included the famous suitcase incident, when Yeltsin claimed that the launch of a routine meteorological weather rocket from northern Sweden set off a nuclear alert in Moscow. At the same time a western television team was allowed to film the inside of a nuclear command centre, followed by an interview with the commander of Russian nuclear forces, who noted that these weapons were still fully usable.

³⁹ Finland's second military objective during the Cold War was to develop a credible capacity to meet her obligations under the terms of the 'Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty' with the Soviet Union. This called for quite different (and often directly incompatible) military preparations from the national defence requirement directed against the Soviet Armed Forces. See Tomas RIES: Cold Will: The Defence of Finland (1988) (especially Chapter 8: 'The Two Currents in Finland's Defence Posture.') and Risto E.J. PENTTILÄ: Finland's Search for Security through Defence, 1944 - 89 (1991).

POPULATION		INCOME		SHARE OF GDP 1990				Life		
Group	Ctry	<1 \$	GNP pc ppp	85-86	Ser	Man	Ind		Agr	
P O S T M O D E R N C O M M U N I T Y	0.4	0	37,930	0.9	LUXEMBOURG					78
			27,000		LIECHTENSTEIN					
			27,000		MONACO					
	263.1		26,880	1.3	USA	72	18	8	2	77
	7.0		25,860	0.2	SWITZERLAND					78
	1.7		23,790	1.1	KUWAIT					76
	6.2		22,850	4.8	HONG KONG	83	9	8	0	79
	3.0		22,770	6.2	SINGAPORE	64	27	9	0	76
	125.2		22,110	2.9	JAPAN	60	24	14	2	80
	4.4		21,840	1.7	NORWAY	60	15	21	4	80 78
	10.1		21,680	2.2	BELGIUM	64	24	10	2	80 77
	8.1		21,250	1.9	AUSTRIA	63	24	10	2	77
	5.2		21,230	1.5	DENMARK					75
	29.6		21,130	0.4	CANADA	55	22	18	5	80 78
	58.1		21,030	1.5	FRANCE	71	19	8	2	78
	0.3		20,460	1.0	ICELAND					79
	81.9		20,070		GERMANY					78
	15.5		19,950	1.9	NETHERLANDS	70	18	9	3	78
	57.2		19,870	1.8	ITALY	66	21	10	3	78
	58.5		19,260	1.4	UK	66	21	11	2	77
	18.1		18,940	1.4	AUSTRALIA	70	15	12	3	77
	8.8		18,540	-0.1	SWEDEN	66	23	9	2	79
	5.1		17,760	-0.2	FINLAND	57	28	9	6	76
	0.6		17,890	-4.2	QATAR					72
	5.5		16,490	2.5	ISRAEL					77
	2.5		16,470	-2.8	UAE	40	8	49	2	75
	3.6		16,360	0.8	NEW ZEALAND	58	22	9	11	80 76
	3.6		15,680	5.2	IRELAND					77
			15,000		ANDORRA					
	21.1		15,000	6.0	TAIWAN					75
39.2		14,520	2.6	SPAIN					77	
0.6		13,400	0.2	BAHRAIN					72	
1.1		13,210	6.4	MAURITIUS	58	23	10	9	71	
9.9		12,670	3.6	PORTUGAL					75	
0.7		12,000		CYPRUS					78	
0.3		12,000		BRUNEI					75	
10.5		11,710	1.3	GREECE	43	21	15	21	78	
2.0		11,700		SLOVENIA	57	1	38	5	74	
44.9		11,450	7.7	KOREA, REP.	50	27	16	7	72	
60.0		10,000		(INDIA 7%)						
60.0		10,000		(PRC 6%)						
18%	1,033.99	0.4	10,000		MALTA					77
M O D E R N M I D D L E C L A S S	10.3	3	9,770	-1.8	CZECH REP	55	39	6		73
	14.2	15	9,520	6.1	CHILE	55	21	16	7	80 72
	20.1	6	9,020	6.7	MALAYSIA	44	33	10	13	71
	1.3		8,610	-1.7	TRINIDAD & TOB.	54	9	33	3	72
	34.7		8,310	1.8	ARGENTINA	63	20	11	6	73
	2.2		8,140	0.3	OMAN	28	1	68	3	80 73
	21.7	12	7,900	0.5	VENEZUELA	56	17	21	5	71
	58.2	0	7,540	8.4	THAILAND	49	29	11	11	69
	19.0		7,500	-1.9	SAUDI ARABIA	18	5	76	1	80 70
	3.2		6,830	3.1	URUGUAY	65	18	8	9	70
	10.2	1	6,410	-1.0	HUNGARY	59	24	9	8	70
	91.8	15	6,400	0.1	MEXICO	67	19	7	8	72
	36.8	2	6,130	2.6	COLOMBIA	54	18	14	14	70
	5.4		6,000		LIBYA					65
	2.6	26	5,980	-0.4	PANAMA	74		15	11	73
	3.4	19	5,850	2.8	COSTA RICA	58	19	8	17	77
	61.1		5,580	2.2	TURKEY	53	21	10	16	67
	1.5	35	5,580	6.1	BOTSWANA	48	4	42	5	68
	159.2	29	5,400	-0.8	BRAZIL	49	24	13	14	67
	38.8	7	5,400	1.2	POLAND	54	26	13	6	70
0.2		5,400	3.9	BELIZE					70	
14.1		5,320	0.9	SYRIAN ARAB R.	56		23	20	80 68	
28.0	2	5,300	-2.4	ALGERIA	41	9	38	13	70	
41.5	24	5,030	-1.1	SOUTH AFRICA	64	24	7	5	64	
3.7		5,000		PUERTO RICO					75	
12%	692.04	9.0	5,000	1.9	TUNISIA	59	19	10	12	69

POPULATION		INCOME		SHARE OF GDP 1985				Life					
Group	Ctry	<1 \$	GNP ps ppp 85-86	Ser	Man	Ind	Agr						
M O D E R N	148.2	1	4,480	-5.1	RUSSIA	55	31	7	7	65			
	8.4	3	4,480	-2.6	BULGARIA	53		34		13	71		
	22.7	18	4,360	-3.8	ROMANIA	39		40			21	70	
	10.3		4,220	-6.2	BELARUS	52	22	13			13	70	
	11.5	30	4,220	0.8	ECUADOR	52	21	15			12	69	
	1.5	6	4,220	-4.3	ESTONIA	64	17	21			5	70	
	1.5		4,150	2.9	NAMIBIA	56	9	20			14	59	
	3.7	2	4,120	-11.7	LITHUANIA	53	30	6			11	69	
	4.2	3	4,060	-4.5	JORDAN	65	14	13			8	70	
	4.8		4,000		CROATIA	62	20	5			12	74	
	7.8	20	3,870	2.1	DOM. REP.	64	15	7			15	71	
	57.8	8	3,820	1.1	EGYPT	59	15	6			20	63	
	193.3	15	3,800	6.0	INDONESIA	41	24	18			17	64	
	23.8	49	3,770	-1.8	PERU	55	24	14			7	66	
	4.8		3,650	1.2	PARAGUAY	54	16	6			24	68	
	5.4	13	3,610	-2.8	SLOVAK REP.	61		33			6	72	
	2.5	5	3,540	3.6	JAMAICA	53	18	20			9	74	
	1.1		3,500		GABON	33	5	55			7	55	
	2.5		3,370	-6.6	LATVIA	60	18	13			9	69	
	26.6	1	3,340	0.9	MOROCCO	53	19	14			14	65	
	10.6	53	3,340	0.3	GUATEMALA	56		18			25	68	
	18.1	4	3,250	2.6	SRI LANKA	52	16	9			23	72	
	16.6		3,010	-8.8	KAZAKSTAN	57	6	24			12	69	
	4.0		3,000		LEBANON	69	10	14			7	68	
	1200.2	740.2	29	2,920	8.3	CHINA	31	38	10		21	69	
		0.9		2,880	-1.4	SWAZILAND						58	
		88.6	28	2,850	1.5	PHILIPPINES	48	23	9		22	66	
		5.6		2,610	2.8	EL SALVADOR	65	6	5		14	67	
		7.4	7	2,540	1.8	BOLIVIA	47	15	20		18	60	
		4.3		2,420	2.3	PAPUA NEW G	34	8	30		26	57	
		0.8		2,420	0.6	GUYANA						66	
		51.6		2,400	-9.2	UKRAINE	41	37	5		18	69	
		22.8		2,370	-3.9	UZBEKISTAN	34	18	16		33	70	
		3.8		2,260	-16.1	ARMENIA	20		35			44	71
		0.4		2,250	3.5	SURINAME						70	
		129.9	12	2,230	1.2	PAKISTAN	50	17	7		26	60	
		13.3		2,110	-6.6	CAMEROON	38	10	13		39	57	
		2.6		2,050	-3.2	CONGO	51	8	32		10	51	
		11.0	41	2,030	-0.6	ZIMBABWE	48	30	6		15	57	
		20.1		2,000		IRAQ						66	
	10.5		2,000		SERBIA								
	11.0		2,000		CUBA						76		
	4.4	44	2,000	-5.4	NICARAGUA	46	16	4		33	68		
	17.1		1,990	1.4	GHANA	38	6	10		46	59		
	2.5		1,950	-3.8	MONGOLIA						65		
	5.9	47	1,900	0.1	HONDURAS	48	18	15		21	67		
	4.5	19	1,800	-6.9	KYRGYZ REP.	32		24		44	68		
	8.5	54	1,780		SENEGAL	62	12	6		20	50		
	2.0	50	1,780	1.2	LESOTHO	34	18	38		10	81		
	5.5		1,760	-0.3	BENIN	53	7	5		34	50		
	14.0	18	1,580		COTE D'IVOIRE	50	18	2		31	55		
	2.3	31	1,540	0.5	MAURITANIA	43	13	17		27	51		
	4.5	5	1,500		TURKMENISTAN								
	4.3	7	1,500		MOLDOVA	22	26	2		50	69		
	2.1		1,500		MACEDONIA						73		
	19.2	50	1,470	2.7	UGANDA	36	6	8		50	42		
	5.4		1,470	-17.0	GEORGIA	11	18	4		67	73		
	7.5		1,460	-16.3	AZERBAIJAN	41		32		27	70		
929.4	419.4	53	1,400	3.2	INDIA	41	19	10		29	62		
	119.8		1,380	2.1	BANGLADESH	52	10	8		31	58		
	26.7	50	1,380	0.1	KENYA	54	11	6		29	58		
	10.8		1,310	-6.1	ANGOLA	28	3	56		12	47		
	0.7		1,260	4.9	BHUTAN								
	111.3	29	1,220	1.2	NIGERIA	18	5	48		28	53		
	21.5	53	1,170		NEPAL	36	10	12		42	55		
	4.1		1,130	-2.7	TOGO	41	9	12		38	56		
	3.3		1,070	-2.4	C.A.R.	43	14	13		44	48		
	84.1		1,000	-1.5	IRAN						68		
	23.9		1,000		KOREA, DEM. R.						70		
	6.6	26	1,000	1.4	GUINEA	45	5	26		24	44		
	3.3		1,000		ALBANIA	23		21		56	73		
47%	0.6		1,000		DJIBOUTI						50		

