

## Abstracts

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### RESEARCH IN WAR HISTORY FOR THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES CELEBRATE 80 YEARS OF EXISTENCE

The Bureau of War History was founded as part of the General Staff in 1925. Its task was to gather material of historical value from the point of view of military history and to publish proportions of it relevant to research. The research carried out at the Bureau focused on Finnish war history and on the general development of warfare.

During the first years of its existence, the Bureau of War History initiated several large-scale research projects. Due to lack of funds and skilled personnel, these projects, partially aimed at enhancing the national identity of the new nation, were not finished.

The Winter War saw the Bureau of War History being part of Section III, which was under the command of the Chief of Operations in the war-time General Headquarters. The bureau surveyed the planning and conduct of operations and gave instructions to the gathering of the relevant historical material to be used later. The role of the bureau remained the same throughout the Continuation War.

The role and structure of war history was re-arranged in an extensive re-organisation of the Finnish Defence Forces in 1952. As a result, an independent Sotahistoriallinen Laitos (War Historical Department) was established. It was to include Sotahistoriallinen toimisto (Office of War History), Sota-arkisto (War Archives), Sotamuseo (War Museum), and Sotatieteellinen keskuskirjasto (Central Library for War Studies). On 5 December 1952, the Department was renamed Sotahistoriallinen Tutkimuslaitos (War Historical Research Institute) and then again in 1971 Sotatieteen Laitos (Institute of War Sciences). In 1985, the Institute was annexed to Sotakorkeakoulu (War College).

Research on the Continuation War was initiated very soon after the cessation of the hostilities. By the order of the Supreme Commander, a special board was established in 1944, which recommended that the style and approach of the history of the Continuation War should be produced also to meet the demands of public and not only academic circles. Consequently, the emphasis was to be put on describing the events all the way down to the battalion-company-level.

The Commander-in-Chief accepted the proposal in December 1944, and the work was initiated. The first volume of *Suomen sota 1941–1945* [*Finland in War, 1941 – 1945*] was published in 1951, and the last one in 1975. The writing of *Talvisodan Historia* [*History of Winter War*] was initiated in 1965. This four-volume history was published in 1977-1979. The first volume of *Jatkosodan historia* [*The History of Continuation War*] was published in 1988. The need for an updated version of the history of the Continuation War had become acute as the earlier version of "Suomen sota 1941–1945" series had been sold out and because new, relevant information on the war had become available to scholars. The last part of this six-volume series was published in 1994.

The histories of Winter War and the Continuation War proved to be successes. Some 18, 000 series were sold.

In the course of time after the war, it was also realised that there was no reliable history of the Finnish Defence Forces. As a result, the first volume of the history of the Finnish Defence Forces covering the years 1918 – 1939, was published in 1988.

Perhaps the best known and the most widely distributed study / piece of research produced by of the Department of War History has been *Suomen puolustusvoimat ennen ja nyt* [*The Past and Present of the Finnish Defence Forces*]. A staggering total of some 510, 000 books, on sale, inclusively for conscripts, have been sold during its history. The latest and unfortunately also the last edition of this durable product, updated regularly by the

Department of War History and its predecessors, was published in 2005.

In the beginning of 1993, as part of an extensive re-organization of the establishments providing officer training, the Office of War History was re-structured and it became Historian laitios (Department of History) in new-born National Defence College. Later, the name of the department was changed to Sotahistorian laitios (Department of War History) to reflect the orientation and special knowledge of the department better.

The completion of the previously described extensive project on Finnish War History was a turning point in the research work carried out by the department. The focus was shifted to producing monographs and scientific articles on the new fields of interest: the post World War era. Resources were allocated to study wars such as the Middle-East War, the Falklands War, and the Vietnam War. Finnish participation in the Second World War was, however, retained in the research programme as it was not systematically studied elsewhere.

Changes within the research policy began to take place in 1997 – 2000 when Lieutenant Colonel Ari Raunio was the director of the Department. The change was also physical as the Department moved from its premises in central Helsinki to Santahamina, which houses the main campus of the National Defence College. In 2005, however, the department moved to Sörnainen, the home of the War Archives.

At present, the Department of War History has three main fields of interest: (1) Finnish War History, (2) contemporary war history, (3) development of the art of war. The aim of the department is to serve the needs of the Finnish Defence Forces in preserving their history and traditions.

#### Petteri Jouko

### SUUNNITELMAT AHVENANMAAN PUOLUSTAMISEKSI KYLMÄN SODAN ENSIMMÄISINÄ VUOSIKYMMENINÄ

Operational plans concerning the Åland Islands were in paramount position within Finnish defence planning during the first decades of the Cold War. The importance of the islands was based on the geographical factors as the islands are in the middle of the major sea routes leading to Finland.

The operational preparations were stalled between early 1945 and March 1948. The first plans concerning the Åland Islands were part of a larger plan based on the concept of bringing the Finnish Defence Forces to the upper level of the Paris Peace Treaty limitations. The tasks of this so-called "Auxiliary Establishment" (*täydennyskoonpano*) were two-folded. On the other hand, the Defence Forces were expected to act against any internal threats, and at the same time, they were tasked to guarantee neutrality. Early occupation of the Åland Islands was in key position in these plans. The islands were to be secured by an infantry regiment and mobile coastal artillery, especially equipped to meet either airborne or seaborne invasion.

The first operational plans covering the defence of the whole of Finland were produced in early 1952. The threat perception – a paramount factor for any war plan – was produced to meet the demands of the FCMA-treaty (*Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, YYA-sopimus*) with the Soviet Union. As a result, the primary threat would enter from the west. A threat perception including three options was produced. The defence plans concerning the Åland Islands were based on threat option B. The presumption of this option was that the western alliance had been able to take the initiative in the war with the Soviet Union and had extended their operations to the Baltic region.

The Finnish mobilization system consisted of three different establishments, which could be activated according to the current threat. The stage after the "Auxiliary Establishment" was the "Covering Force Establishment" (*suojajoukkokoonpano, sukoonpano*), which would be enlarged to full "War Time Establishment" (*täysi sodanajan kokoonpano, tsa-koonpano*), if full mobilization was required. The covering forces that

would be deployed to the Åland Islands would include an infantry brigade and several coastal artillery battalions. If the War Time Establishment was required, the forces within the Åland Island would see their strength doubled. An army corps consisting of two brigades would be assigned to defend the islands. According to the concept of the operations, one infantry brigade was to be deployed on the main island to meet amphibious attacks, while another one was to be retained as a general reserve. In addition to the forces on the main island, various coastal artillery units would be deployed on the small islands to block the anticipated advance to the Gulf of Bothnia.

The general tone of the plans remained the same throughout the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. Transportation remained a key problem within the plans. The Finnish Navy did not possess adequate shipping capability and was compelled to depend on the ships taken up from trade. It was counted that the first element of an infantry brigade would reach the islands within two days. The sealift of the whole V Army Corps would take up to three weeks.

The plans were made to meet threats from the west. After all, Finland had to be prepared to carry out, or to at least show that she would be able to carry out, her obligations of the FCMA-agreement with the Soviet Union. However, the plans were also made to meet the Soviet threat. Actually, the Finnish planners easily realised that NATO had no resources to conduct large-scale amphibious operations within the Baltic. At the same time, in the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviet capability to conduct a strategic surprise attack within the Baltic region had seen a significant increase.

### **Raimo Kuusisto**

#### **INFORMATION AVAILABILITY IN FAST DECISION-MAKING SITUATIONS**

This paper pays attention on information availability, when to manage temporally challenging and unanticipated situations. The research focus is set on the issue of the change of the temporal and content requirements of the available information in challenging decision-making situations. The viewpoint of this research is set on information itself and those activities in planning and decision-making that it supports. Organization and processes are not dealt with.

To perform Joint operations (cooperative activities between different authorities), the common information potential shall be available to make common situational awareness possible. Information should flow smoothly from one actor to another both hierarchically inside one organization, and cooperatively with other organizations. This is challenging and we have taken effort to find out some basic phenomena of the information needs, when managing temporally and functionally challenging situations.

This paper introduces the main results of the research that aim was to find out information requirements of the high-level decision-making during sudden crisis situation. The research target was Finnish national administration. The main research questions were:

1. How does the information flow profile of a decision-maker look like?
2. How this profile changes, when moving from normal every-day situation to the crisis management situation?
3. What kind of information that is required to support decision-making will be emphasized in temporal and content axis?

Rauno Kuusistos 15-point information categorization model (e.g. <http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2004/isbn9512274639/>) was used as a theoretically motivated framework of the study. The research method was structured interview. Qualitative interview material was

transferred into quantitative form and it was visualized. Conclusions were made on the basis of that visualized information.

It was found out that when moving to more challenging management situations some information categories were considered to become more important on contents basis and some others to become more meaningful temporally. It seems that temporally most important activities in challenging decision-making situations are mission analysis, futures information creation and continuous awareness of available resources. The content of those information categories shall be produced as quickly as possible and it shall be available continuously. On the other hand, situation follow-up, finding alternatives to act and capability to communicate decisions were considered to be meaningful on the viewpoint of the correctness of the information content. Those categories of information act as triggers for the final choice, the actual decision. In demanding decision-making situations the meaning of tacit information of the complete organization is emphasized. Another important point is experience. All participants should have enough experience to produce sufficient and relevant information to the complete decision system.

### **Mika Huttunen** **ABOUT THE TERMINOLOGY ON TACTICS**

The discussion about war and combat have lately been information warfare and technologically oriented. Rapid development in technology and the revolutions in military affairs (RMA) change the military technology and weapon systems. It has been stated, that the whole art of war changes, due to change in military organisations, structures and doctrines. Less covered issue has been the theoretical aspect or the tactical means in modern warfare. Has tactics yielded to technology? The development of tactical thought requires discussion and debate.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how tactics is defined in different sources and give an example how the word *tactic* can be understood.

The word tactics is originally derived from the Greek word *tactos*, which means organized or arranged. Strategy has its origin from the word *strategos* which meant to govern military troops in battle. Since the ancient Greek times the definition of tactics has evolved. Carl von Clausewitz defines strategy as "the use of engagements to attain object of war. Tactics, he wrote, is "the use of armed forces in engagement".

If the word tactic has ancient origin then why is it necessary to analyze its modern meaning? According to Niiniluoto to avoid purely misunderstandings due to terminology it's important to clarify different concepts or words to be at same wavelength.

This article demonstrates the different ways the term tactic has been used. It also demonstrates the differences and similarities that the definitions have. From the different definitions a combination will be formed to give an example how tactic can be defined or understood.

### **Alpo Juntunen** **THE RIDDLE OF HAUSHOFER AND RUSSIA**

The German soldier and geopolitician Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) is a quite unknown figure in history of Finland, though he had a great influence to the destinies of the country. In the Imperial German Army he got a good staff officer education. Then he was a military attaché of Germany in Tokyo. He served as staff officer and as commanding officer during the World War I. As officer he had begun to study geography, and after the war he continued his studies at the University of Munich. For his own research field he chose the geopolitics.

At the turn of the century there were two main scholars, who emphasized power politics. American A. Mahan emphasized the importance of sea power in the struggle for leadership of the world. Englishman H. Mackinder considered the theory of Heartland. The Eurasian core area and dominant the Eurasian territory is the basis for the dominance of the whole world. The struggle between sea powers and continental powers is characteristic in history. To dominate the world the sea powers should prevent formation of a strong continental union. Swedish political scientist R. Kjellén emphasized the theory of continental power with the leadership of Germanic nations. Haushofer developed on this theory at a 1924 founded geopolitical institute. According to him only the cooperation of big continental countries, that means, Germany, Russia, Japan and Italy, could create a strong counterforce to the Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

At the end of the nineteenth century there were emerged similar ideas in Russia. To the mind of Haushofer and Russian geopoliticians the main aim of the small state zone that was created after the war to prevent the cooperation between Germany and Russia.

Haushofer thought that the biggest achievement of his life was the Molotov – von Ribbentrop agreement, which divided the Eastern Europe among Germany and Russia. That agreement brought about also the deepest tragedy in the life of Haushofer. Hitler did not understand the function of agreement and broke it. The consequence was the war, and a large part of Europe was destroyed.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has searched a new policy and found it in geopolitics. A. Dugin has created, with learning from the Russian geopoliticians and Haushofer, the vision of a Eurasian Empire with leadership of Russia and Germany. It should create the counterforce to the position of the USA. That new Eurasian empire would not respect small states. According to Dugin Finland belongs to the sphere of Russian interest. At the official level, the ideas of Dugin are unrealistic, but they have influence among the people, as Russia wants to be a Great power in world politics.

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**Tommi Koivula**

### **POWERFUL BUT UNPREDICTABLE: COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLICITY AS STRATEGIC FACTORS IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS**

The article discusses the role of communications technology and international publicity in contemporary world politics and its strategic implications. In the text, it is suggested that world politics as we understand the concept today, were made possible by increasingly rapid flow of information, initiated by the wireless telegraph in the 1850s. In the earlier phases of communications technology, during the period of approximately 100 years after the invention of the wireless telegraph, the relationship between citizens and world politics was mediated: although the prevailing communication technology made it possible to communicate rapidly between great distances, it did not produce feelings of personal involvement among the citizens.

The modern communication technology, initiated by live television broadcasts in the 1960s and continued more recently by smaller and cheaper technology, such as the Internet, have, on the other hand an element of personal involvement at their core. That's why the new relationship between world politics and the audience becomes direct and immediate. From the point of view of states it also becomes increasingly unpredictable, because it is not any more possible to regulate the stream of images produced by the hugely expanded communication technology.

The international media processes made possible by new technologies can affect also state's security and defence policies, which, thus far, have been sovereign states' core issues

only mildly responsive to public pressures. This point is clarified in the text by discussing the cases of the international publicity related to the ban of anti-personnel landmines in the 1990s and the recent Abu Ghraib Prison abuse incident in Iraq.

The article also suggests that the development of communication technology and the publicity made possible by it may lead to a re-allocation of political authority, with states increasingly less able to be leading interpreters of topical issues. Consequently, the individuals comprising the general public seem to transfer from plain receiving objects to genuine actors of world politics - a fact which should be given more attention in the field of strategic studies.

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**Tommy Jeppsson**

## **STRATEGINEN KULTTUURI JA SOTILAALLISEN PUOLUSTUKSEN LAJIT**

Tässä artikkelissa esitetään, että erilaisia sotilasstrategisia kulttuureja on mahdollista tyyppitellä. Sotilasstrategiset kulttuurit saavat alkunsa historian, kulttuurin ja kulloisenkin yhteiskunnan tuottamissa erityisissä olosuhteissa. Yhteiskunnan vaikutus sotilasstrategiseen kulttuuriin on voimakas, koska sotilasorganisaatiot heijastavat yhteiskuntaa, jonka puolustamiseksi ne on luotu. Kulttuuriin vaikuttavia tekijöitä ovat esimerkiksi uskonto, etnisuus ja sukupuoli.

Sotilasorganisaatioissa, kuten kaikissa muissakin organisaatioissa, yksiköissä luodaan erityinen kulttuuri, jonka kautta yksikkö nähdään muusta yhteiskunnasta erottautuvana. Tämä tarkoittaa sitä, että asevoimien eri osat tekevät asioita eri tavoin eikä rationaalinen järki aina välttämättä ohjaa näitä toimintatapoja. Perinteet ja myöskin rituaalit eroavat merkittävästi eri yksiköissä.

Artikkelissa sotilasorganisaatioiden muuttumisen tarpeesta keskustellaan kahdesta erisyydestä.

Ensimmäinen syy on meneillään oleva sodankäynnin muutos: tänään sodankäynnissä vallitsee vastustajan luonteesta riippuen niin epäsymmetrinen kuin symmetrinenkin ulottuvuus. Toinen syy kytkeytyy läheisesti yhteiskunnan laajamittaiseen muutokseen teollisesta informaatioaikakauteen. Länsimaissa sotilaallisen kapasiteetin organisoitumistavan voidaan odottaa muuttuvan dramaattisesti pyramidirakenteista, jossa on monia komentotasoja kohti verkostorakenteita, heijastaen näin aikamme muuttunutta yhteiskuntaa. Verkosto saattaa osoittautua tulevaisuudessa ratkaisevaksi pisteeksi tai jopa tasapainopisteeksi, joskaan ei ole juurikaan merkkejä siitä, että tulevat sodat olisivat vähemmän verisiä kuin aikaisemmin käydyt, mikä vain osoittaa, että sodankäynnin muuttuvien tapojen taustalla on selvä inhimillinen ulottuvuus. Viime kädessä juuri inhimillinen ulottuvuus mahdollistaa teknisten, taktisten ja operationaalisten tekijöiden täyden hyödyntämisen.

*Everstiluutnantti Tommy Jeppsson palvelee Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun Strategian laitoksella ruotsalaisena vaihtoupseerina. Hänen aikaisempiin tehtäviinsä kuuluu strategian opettaminen Ruotsin Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulussa ja Norjan Sotakorkeakoulussa. Hänen aselajitaustansa on huolto, jonka piirissä hän on toiminut vuosien ajan eri yksiköissä ja tehtävissä joukkueenjohtajana, pataljoonan komentajana, esikuntaupseerina ja huoltorykmentin esikuntapäällikkönä.*

**Jari Rantapelkonen**  
**TARGETING A WARLORD**  
The Challenges of Effects-Based Information  
Operations in Afghanistan

Afghanistan's complex information environment has a long tradition of violence and coercion, a tradition which did not end after the Taliban regime was ousted from power in 2001. The focus of this article is to look into the practices of the NATO-led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) effects-based information operations at the end of 2004, specifically its efforts to influence the warlord General Dostum with non-lethal targeting efforts. My article focuses on events taking place just before the Afghan presidential elections in 2004 and on the subsequent post-election power struggle that materialised afterwards. I will present the various challenges of effects-based military information operations. As ISAF's information operations support the Government of Afghanistan, its challenge is to look into the possible effects following ISAF's military actions. The article suggests that there is a need to coordinate information operations beyond the structures of military force. One of the most challenging issues in the military's current phase of effects-based operations thinking is not only to be able to think conceptually about the effects in the Afghan political landscape but on the tactical level as well, to be able to think differently, to take concrete actions and then measure those actions among the Afghans. One can conclude that the concept of effects-based military information operations is in an early phase but is developing. The article also shows how information operations may result in undesired effects. It looks into the aspects of non-lethal targeting, revealing the challenge assessing the effects of influential activities in the full scope of Afghan political, information and social infrastructures. The article concludes how challenging it is for western military forces to use information operations in Afghanistan, but it also shows how much success they have achieved using ISAF's information operations and non-lethal targeting capabilities to secure Northern Afghanistan.

**Keywords:** Non-lethal Targeting, Information Operations, Afghanistan, Warlord, Effects

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**Juha Mäkinen**  
**MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF**  
**THE BOLOGNA PROCESS**

In the midst of this turbulent, even chaotic, global environment, the educational challenges are increasing at an accelerating pace. At the same time, our military educational systems are in a continuous process of change. But how systematic are these changes and what kind of a role do individual teachers play in them? What about the decentralized practices of our teachers in lecture rooms and practice fields – must we just forget these while “transforming” our education? If educational “transformations” executed in a top-down manner are not the final answer to our challenges, how should we face these situations? How can we guide our decentralized school system in practice?

When considering appropriate answers to such tough questions, instead of traditional secondary questions some fundamental pedagogical questions are introduced in this article. The “final” answer starts to get its proper shape when recognizing the fact that the teachers are either going to transform the educational system or not. In this article it

is proposed that the forthcoming educational transformation is achieved by the balanced daily and dimensional actions and activities of the teachers.

Keywords: Military education, fundamental questions, dimensions

*Juha Mäkinen, Lieutenant Colonel G.S.*

### **Esa Lappalainen ja Ilkka Ikonen** **SATELLITE-GUIDED PGM WEAPONS AND JAMMING**

This review shortly explains some developments of satellite-guided PGM weapons at the moment. Also basic principles of jamming satellite weapons are explained.

During last decades there have been many programmes to develop air-to-surface Precision Guided Munitions and during last ten years especially Satellite-Guided PGM weapons. A common requirement of all satellite-guided weapons has been to extend stand-off range in order to survive fights. Satellite guided weapons have also improved accuracy of bombing in comparison with other non-satellite-guided PGM weapons. The improved accuracy has also made it possible to develop and to use smaller warheads than earlier to get same damages. Further the ability of using satellite weapons in all weather conditions have made them the most interesting air-to-surface weapons in the modern battlefield.

One target of this article was to investigate how to jam satellite-guided weapons. Also possibilities to improve the jamming immunity of satellite-guided weapons are explained. Information about the jamming of satellite-guided weapons is based on the different reports and reviews. Most reports are found from internet.

The main problem of satellite navigation system is the very small signal power in the receiver which makes it possible to jam satellite-guided weapons. Because there are very good interference suppression technologies it is not easy task to jam them at all.

Every soldier can also do something to protect troops against satellite-guided weapons. Main idea is to use of terrain and false targets and decoys. If troops don't do these correctly the jamming technique can't help survive satellite-guided weapons.

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### **Mauri Etelämäki** **LOGISTICS BATTALIONS AND REGIMENTS, OR SOMETHING** **COMPLETELY DIFFERENT?**

During the Freedom War, Defence Forces logistics was founded on improvisation and basing in the systems of society. In the 1920s and 30s, a logistics system was created for the Defence Forces, which included among other things depots and production plants. The leadership of logistics had been centralised to the Ministry of Defence. Logistics training was centralised to the Logistics Battalion, which later came to form the Logistics Regiment. The Air Force and Navy were given an independent position in materiel development.

During the Winter War, however, it became necessary to change the chain of command of logistics. In practice, the Ministry of Defence became the administrative unit. Logistics training continued to be made more effective. During the Continuation War, the security of supplies and dependence on war materiel deliveries forced Finland to act in concert with Germany. The nationally centralised management of logistics proved to be the right solution in the decisive battles during the summer of 1944.



The development of the regional defence system was affected by the Cold War threat scenario and the insufficient performance capacity of the ground forces. The management and organisation of the logistics system was decentralised to regional level in the Military Provinces. The training of logistics troops ended. The diversity and variety of logistics types of the materiel complicated the management of logistics. As we arrive at the twenty-first century, the logistics regiments to be formed within the ground forces can be seen as an intermediate phase. The new division into branches of logistics increases efficiency and allows for the more centralised training of logistics troops.

The next step is to form a joint logistics organisation for the Defence Forces. The steering of logistics functions of society and business life is carried out nationally and storage is minimal. These factors diminish the capability for maintaining a regional logistics system. The ability of society to manage crises also sets the frame for the combat endurance of the Defence Forces. Ensuring the security of supply of the weapon systems requires military alliance.

The increasing international activities require new combat efficiency from the logistics system. In national partnership reviews, the structure of logistics systems of different countries has been partially misunderstood. Also in Finland, crisis management tasks and professionalisation increase the requirements for the know-how of the logistics personnel of the operational forces. The utilisation of the civilian know-how of conscripts should be made more efficient. The types of ground forces to be confirmed are brigade and battlegroups, the logistics of which must have credible materiel readiness.

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### **Heikki Laapio** DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY MEDICAL SERVICES IN THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES

Until now during peace time the Defence Forces has taken care of both primary and secondary health care of the troops. There has been a separate medical services system in the transition to crisis and war. In the transformation of the medical care to partnership with civilian partners the Finnish Defence Forces will not take care anymore of the secondary health care and pharmaceutical logistics. The primary health care principles remain unchanged.

There was not much development in war time medicine principles after the second World War until the 80's when the war time medical materiel concept and then the medical manuals in the 90's were renewed. The development of war time medical care in rapid deployment brigade was started in the end of the 90's with emphasis on interoperability in the multinational environment. Also the new operative troops will be significantly developed to gain the same medical capabilities.

Manoeuvrability and flexibility of the medical elements will be key development factors in the future thus enabling enhanced medical support to the deployed troops. The emergency surgical elements will be available already at battalion level (earlier at brigade level) in order to decrease mortality. The care of the wounded and medical evacuation resources and principles are among the fourteen projects in the development program of war time medicine.

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