

# In this number

TIMO KOISTINEN

## **Theological Realism and Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion**

The article is a critical appraisal of how theological realism has been understood in recent Anglo-American analytical philosophy of religion. Beginning with a brief analysis of the concept of metaphysical realism in modern philosophy, the author then discusses basic points in the recent debate on theological realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of religion. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on criticism of theological realism, referring to the views of Wittgensteinian religious philosophers. Finally, the closely related issue of relativism is discussed.

JUHA PAKKALA

## **The Historicity of Josiah's Reform**

Many features in 2 Kings 22–23 and the broader historical context suggest that Josiah's cult reform, in the form intended by the Biblical authors, did

not actually happen. It is more probable that this is a literary invention and a projection of later ideals onto the monarchic period. The probable excerpt from annals in 2 Kings 22:2–7, 9, is a significant fragment but does not in itself imply a cult reform. However, it did cause later editors to assume that Josiah was a defender of the temple and of the religion that emerged after 586 BCE.

JARI UIMONEN

## **A Society Without Confession**

France is a special case among the European countries in her strong faith in *laïcité*, i.e. a society where church and state are completely separated. The cornerstone of this arrangement is the 1905 act on the separation of church and state. The model of *laïcité*, structured above all to accommodate the status of the Catholic Church, has faced new challenges in trying to cope with the increasing Muslim presence in the country.

OLLI-PEKKA VAINIO

## The Epistemology of Disagreement

The 'epistemology of disagreement' has in recent years emerged as a new branch of analytical philosophy. For some time, two basic solutions were proposed to solve the dilemma of peer disagreement. According to the sceptical view, if persons A and B are epistemic peers holding opposing views, they will lose their epistemic rights to adhere to their beliefs; however, according to the steadfastist view, both A and B retain the right to their respective beliefs. Generalist positions such as this are problematic because all cases of disagreement are not comparable. This article argues for a moderate view: peer disagreement may result in partial loss of warrant in some cases. In practice, this means, e.g., mutual recognition of rationality of opposing views.

Translation: Jaakko Mäntyjärvi