



The Qur'an Burnings of SIAN: Far-Right Fringe Actors and the Staging of Conflictual Media Events in Norway

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Abstract

Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have in recent years seen a wave of Qur'an burnings, a subset of Qur'an desecration, involving largely non-religious fringe actors. Desecrations of the Qur'an are nothing new, but their mode of articulation in the present requires attention to both context and the actors involved. In this article we examine the Qur'an-burning events of the Norwegian organization Stop the Islamisation of Norway (SIAN). The article draws on media events theory, paying attention to how the symbolic and ritual dimensions of such spectacular mediated events generate both cohesion and conflict among globalized audiences. Informed by both on- and off-line ethnographic fieldwork, we explore the mediated ritualization of smaller-scale urban events involving staged Qur'an burnings by this far-right fringe group in Norway in recent years. We demonstrate how a relatively small and marginal far-right political actor succeeds in being foregrounded by the media, creating polarization, capturing free speech, and racializing Muslims by desecrating the Qur'an.

Keywords: *Qur'an burning, media event, ritual, Islamophobia, free speech, secularism*

Introduction: Qur'an burning and conflicted media events

The Norwegian organization Stop the Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) first burned the Qur'an in the Southern Norwegian city of Kristiansand in 2019. SIAN has since staged several Qur'an-burning events, notably outside

mosques in suburbs of Oslo densely populated by people with a Muslim background. These events, which are designed to both provoke Muslims and draw media attention, have generated large counter-demonstrations as far away as Pakistan and necessitated extensive police security measures across cities and towns in Norway.

In our recent research (Bangstad and Linge 2023) we argue that while most Norwegians surveyed oppose SIAN's Qur'an burnings (NRK 2023a), the organization has partly succeeded in presenting its Qur'an burnings as legitimate criticism of Islam and a matter of free speech in public debate. The aim of this article is to explore how SIAN uses traditional and social media to ritualize their Qur'an-burning events, and how this ritualization enables such a small and far-right fringe organization to incite polarization among large audiences, align its hatred of Islam with more mainstream Islam-critical meta-narratives, and thus succeed in 'free speech capture' (Titley 2020). To answer these questions, we have structured the article along four main parts.

In the methodological part we describe our case, which is SIAN's Qur'an burnings in Norway. Our main sources of empirical data are videos and text material produced by SIAN and published on the organization's homepage, sian.no. We situate the Qur'an burnings in a transnational Islam critical context but make clear that our research on Qur'an burnings represents a localized case study in a Scandinavian country. This 'glocal' (Robertson 1995) approach sets the structure for the article. In the second, contextual, part, 'The emergence of the anti-Islamic movement in Europe', we show how SIAN emerged within a post-9/11 Islam-critical context and profited from a transnational media-savvy network to establish itself in Norway.

In the third part, 'Theorizing Qur'an burnings', we show how both *media event* theory and more recent critical studies of these perspectives can assist in unpacking a series of divisive media events involving Islam, secularism, and free speech since the spectacular 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. This part draws attention to the symbolic and ritual dimension of such events, showing how a new genre of mediated Qur'an desecrations is ritualized to generate media attention and drive global audiences. In this part we also argue that the proliferation of assaults on Islamic symbols in the West can be understood as a form of secularist iconoclasm – or a way to cleanse secular society of Islam – and not merely as acts of free speech.

In the fourth and analytical part, 'The staging of conflicted Qur'an-burning events', we use this theoretical insight to analyse how SIAN exploits media attention to ritualize its Qur'an-burning events and to a large extent succeeds

vis-à-vis liberal audiences in the media by presenting its hatred of Islam and Muslims as a 'critique of religion' and a matter pertaining to free speech.

To grasp the polarizing effects of the Qur'an-burning events, we draw on theoretical insights into media events. These traditionally focused on how the ritualization of spectacular televised events had strong cohesive effects on their audiences (Dayan and Katz 1994). In today's more globalized, fragmented, and polarized media reality, media event theory expands the spectrum of media events and explores how the symbolic and ritual dimensions of events such as the Muhammed cartoon controversy (hereafter the cartoon controversy) and SIAN's Qur'an burnings, have both cohesive and divisive effects on local and global audiences (Kunelius and Nossek 2008; Klausen 2009; Sumiala et al. 2018).

To understand the social and political imaginaries involved and the public perception of these events, they should be framed within the wider post-9/11 debate about Islam, secularism, and free speech in Europe. For example, in her analysis of the cartoon controversy Brown et al. (2013) argue that secularism and free speech are saturated with power and subjectivity. Likewise Asad (2013) claims that the 'destruction of signs' such as the mocking of the Prophet Muhammad is invested with secular power. Along similar lines Noyes (2016) describes such practices as a form of iconoclasm, a word that originates in *iconoclast*, which means 'destroyer of images'. We argue that the burning of the Qur'an may thus be understood as a politics of iconoclasm, or as part of an ostensibly 'civilizing' secularist project.

While SIAN is a small far-right fringe organization with a limited number of active supporters, its Qur'an burnings have attracted wider sympathy from self-declared liberal supporters of free speech in Norway (Tranøy 2020), who have deemed Qur'an burnings a form of 'religious critique' (Stavrum 2023) and an exercise in 'free speech' (Kierulf 2023). Inspired by the perspectives of new media event theory (Hepp and Couldry 2009), we argue that SIAN uses mediated and ritualized public Qur'an burning as a powerful channel for generating both provocation and polarization through staging itself as a defender of free speech.

Methodology: a case study of Qur'an burnings in Norway

This article pays particular attention to the emergence of the Stop Islamisation network in Europe and its manifestation in Norway. With the other contributions to this special issue the article seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of public Qur'an burnings and Qur'an desecrations in Scan-

dinavia. While cognizant of the conflicts and debates around public Qur'an burnings in Denmark and Sweden in the same period, we do not explicitly address these cases in our article. We contend that even if there is a clear transnational context to SIAN's public Qur'an burnings in Norway, the form which public Qur'an burnings have taken there must be understood through reference to the localized contexts in which they occur.

Our empirical data originates on SIAN's homepage, sian.no. SIAN has filmed and broadcast Qur'an burning and Qur'an desecration events from different places in Norway on its homepage. Six of these videos represent our primary data source. The organization's recording of and commentary on the Kristiansand event in 2019 represent the main case of analysis (SIAN 2019a; 2019b; 2019c).¹ SIAN's recordings of other forms of Qur'an desecration such as burnings of the Qur'an outside mosques (SIAN 2022; 2023b) and dog walking the Qur'an – a peculiar form of desecration that consists of dragging the Qur'an around with a dog leash – outside mosques (SIAN and local Magistrate's Courts (SIAN 2021) provided extra contextual data applicable to this particular case.

SIAN's homepage also contains information about SIAN's organizational structure and articles written by activists in the organization. Texts addressing SIAN's Qur'an burnings and free speech provided a second data source. This material included SIAN's statutes (SIAN 2023a) and four articles penned by one of SIAN's founders, the former leader Arne Tumyr (2011; 2020), and the organization's current leader, Lars Thorsen (2016; 2020). The homepage also contains an archive of brochures that SIAN distributes during its street rallies. This material, which includes three caricatures (SIAN caricatures 1, 2, & 3) of Muslims, is our third data source.

The emergence of the transnational Stop the Islamisation network

Propelled by al-Qaida's terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the first wave of what Berntzen has described as an 'anti-Islamic turn' (Berntzen 2020, 2) took shape with the establishment of anti-Islamic organizations, websites, and political parties and the emergence of several high-profile anti-Islamic personalities. Norwegian far-right groups and activists were pioneers of this wave. In the early 2000s Arne Tumyr (1933–2023), a former social democratic newspaper editor turned far-right activist (Bangstad 2016), established the

¹ The data analysed in this article are publicly available. However, we do not want to support the analysed material or its producers by giving them increased visibility. We have therefore chosen not to include links to their material in the references.

Norwegian Forum against Islamisation (FOMI), the predecessor of SIAN and one of the first European organizations with an explicitly anti-Islamic orientation (Berntzen 2020, 4)

The anti-Islamic 'counter-jihadist network', which regarded jihad as the core ideology of Islam, united along a set of anti-Islamic narratives and tropes, notably the 'contra-jihadist' Eurabia thesis of Gisèle Littman, who is known by the pen name Bat Ye'or (Bangstad 2013). The idea of a plot orchestrated by European and Arab elites was embraced by Norwegian anti-Islamic activists like Hege Storhaug and the far-right blogger Peder Nøstvold Jensen (alias Fjordman). Fjordman, who inspired the 2011 terrorist attack on Government Headquarters in Oslo and Utøya, the island where the Labour Party's youth branch AUF's annual summer camp took place (Bangstad 2014; Seierstad 2016), was probably the 'counter-jihadist' *Gates of Vienna's* most influential contributor.

The second wave of what Berntzen refers to as the 'anti-Islamic turn' was propelled by the cartoon crisis of 2005–2006 and consisted of the expansion of organized anti-Islamic mobilization under the banner of free speech. The European Stop Islamisation network emerged in this context with the establishment of Stop the Islamisation of Denmark (SIAD) in 2005, Stop the Islamisation of Europe (SIOE) in 2007, and Stop the Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) in 2008 (Berntzen 2020, 69–71). The second wave also included an anti-Islamic reorientation of pre-existing think tanks, NGOs, and conservative alternative news outlets. This was also the case in Norway, where organizations such as Human Rights Service (HRS) started to focus almost exclusively on Islam after the cartoon crisis (Berntzen 2020, 70).

An essential dimension of the anti-Islamic turn in the post-9/11 era in many countries in the Western hemisphere was that the increasingly fragmented, polarized, and globalized media reality began to provide new platforms to far-right and often fringe Islamophobic groups and individuals, and the opportunity to mediate their ideology to large audiences and create polarization. While most of these actors remained relatively small in terms of popular support, they succeeded in influencing public discourse by setting the agenda for the debate about Islam, secularism, and free speech (Bail 2012; 2015).

Stop the Islamisation of Norway (SIAN)

SIAN emerged in the context of an increasingly hostile public discourse about Islam in Europe and Norway during the 2000s (Døving and Kraft 2013). The organization has its roots in the Action Committee against Calls

for Prayer, which was established in 2000 in reaction to a municipal decision in the Norwegian capital of Oslo to permit mosques in central Oslo to issue the call for prayer – the *adhan* – from their loudspeakers. The same year, the committee took the name Forum against Islamisation (FOMI). In 2008 FOMI changed its name to SIAN, aligning the organization with the European Stop Islamisation networks (Tranøy 2020, 12).

SIAN's essentialization of Islam and Muslims as inherently violent, with rape as a threat to non-Muslim women, represents a central dimension of Islamophobia, which is essentially a 'form of prejudice' (Bangstad 2016). The speech made by SIAN's Lars Thorsen immediately before the Qur'an burning in Kristiansand on 16 November 2019 is characteristic: he referred to Muslims as 'sexual predators' and 'murderous zombies'; declared that Islam was a 'machine for genocide'; and alleged that rape and the murder of children were acts 'sanctioned by the Qur'an'. Thorsen also called for unspecified 'measures to be taken' against the 'destructive elements' that he claimed Muslims in Norway represented (SIAN 2019b). In her speech SIAN's then vice chair and Thorsen's domestic partner Anna Bråten described the prophet Muhammed as a 'macabre paedophile murder machine and warlord' and demanded of 'all Muslim men' in Norway that they 'set their women free' or face being 'expelled' (SIAN 2019a).

In line with this dehumanizing language in their propaganda material, SIAN generally portrays Muslims as never changing, inherently threatening, and unassimilable, a description that is a form of racialization drawing on traditional biological racism. SIAN brochures also contain graphic illustrations such as cartoons portraying beheadings and cartoons wherein the prophet Muhammed is portrayed in animal-like ways (SIAN caricatures 1, 2, & 3). In its public statements SIAN situates itself ideologically in a long line of racist actors and organizations spanning from the late Arne Myrdal, the founder of the Popular Movement against Immigration, to Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway (Bangstad 2014).

SIAN is estimated to have about a thousand paid-up members (Tranøy 2020, 20) in a country of 5.3 million inhabitants. While this number makes SIAN one of the largest anti-Islamic far-right groups in Norway, it remains a small far-right fringe organization. Rather, it is SIAN's ability to use traditional and social media as a means of staging its Qur'an-burning events that enables the organization to get its message across. The available studies of SIAN's membership base indicate that SIAN's followers are mostly middle-aged to elderly white men with a middle-class background who vote for populist and far-right political parties with an Islam- and immigration-

critical agenda (Tranøy 2020). These findings indicate that SIAN is not merely a subcultural movement consisting of marginalized young men but a well-established organization which also appeals to more mainstream audiences.

SIAN's active members have a more specific profile. The organization consists of a core of activists and a larger group of passive sympathizers. The activists usually have a more explicitly racist profile and sometimes even a criminal background. Lars Thorsen, SIAN's current leader, was sentenced to a three-year prison term for fraud in 2013 and received a 30-day criminal sentence of conditional imprisonment and a fine of NOK 30,000 for anti-Muslim hate speech that Oslo's Magistrate's Court deemed to be in violation of Norwegian General Penal Code §185 in November 2019. In October 2022 Thorsen was also sentenced to imprisonment for assaulting three men with pepper spray when they tried to prevent him burning the Qur'an outside two mosques in Oslo (Velle 2022). SIAN has evolved in a more explicitly racist and extremist direction in recent years. Interestingly, SIAN's current vice chair, Ellen Due Brynjulfson, has herself refrained from actively participating in the organization's public Qur'an burnings, suggesting that the leadership of SIAN may be internally divided on the issue (Nrk.no 2023b).

SIAN disseminates its ideology and mobilizes supporters on social media and during street demonstrations. This online mobilization corresponds to earlier research highlighting the proliferation of anti-Islamic organizations on social media (Haanshuus and Jupskås 2017, 146). SIAN also makes use of more mainstream media. Two days ahead of the first Qur'an burning in Norway in Kristiansand on 16 November 2019, SIAN placed a small ad in the regional paper *Fædrelandsvennen* with the title 'Come and hear why we burn the Qur'an!' ['kom og hør hvorfor vi brenner Koranen!']. SIAN's homepage contains self-produced articles about Islam, highly derogatory caricatures of Muslims, and videos from SIAN's own highly mediatized street rallies. The rallies correspond to a shift of the anti-Islamic movement in Europe from web- to street-based forms of activism. SIAN's mediatized Qur'an-burning events are an essential aspect of this propaganda.

Theorizing Qur'an burnings

Conflictual media events in an age of digitalization and polarization

Research has shown that the focus of public and academic debate about minorities in the West has shifted from race to culture and religion, and more specifically, to Islam (Bangstad 2016). In countries in the Western hemisphere

(Morey and Yaqin 2011) – including Norway – both traditional and new media have focused disproportionately on Islam and covered Muslims in a predominantly negative way (Døving and Kraft 2013).

The shift of focus from race to culture and religion has been strengthened by a set of transnational and highly mediated critical events involving Islam and Muslims, such as the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005–2006 (Klausen 2009). Andersson et al. (2012, 13) describe such events as ‘critical’ in terms of their potential to generate new references, perceptions, identifications, and boundaries so that there is a marked difference before and after the event.

The role of the media is essential to the critical events’ impact on their audiences. In the historical context of national broadcasting on television Dayan and Katz (1994) highlight spectacular occasions – ‘high holidays of mass communication’ – like the Olympic Games, which they describe as *media events*. Such events, which are pre-planned and broadcast live, ‘monopolized media communication’ in the age of national TV. Media events interrupted the daily routines of large audiences in a festive style; they were staged as historic, and they communicated a message of reconciliation through a set of ceremonial and ritual means. The success of these ritualized media events depended on their cohesive effects (Hepp and Couldry 2009).

Several scholars have contested the neo-Durkheimian perspective on rituals and media events as successful in terms of their cohesive force (Bell 1998; Rappaport 1999). In a more fluid, complex, and globalized world mediatized events are articulations of competing cultural discourses and therefore generate both social cohesion and conflict (Hepp and Couldry 2009, 7). Mass-mediated arrangements such as the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar fit classical definitions of media events but show the extent to which mediatized rituals during ‘high holidays of mass communication’ (Dayan and Katz 1994) in the age of digitalization and culture wars have both cohesive and polarizing effects among different groups of spectators.

Becker (1995) draws attention to the media’s contribution to the ritualization of small-scale events in contemporary urban settings. She argues that the media plays a decisive role in constituting public events as rituals by setting them apart from mundane activities and contributing to their structure (ibid., 629). The media belongs to, reinforces, and authenticates an event’s significance. It structures a ritual by focusing on an event’s different aspects such as specific spatial settings, a particular kind of atmosphere, typical participants, audiences, and peak moments. The coverage attracts attention and frames a set of behaviours. Participants respond by acting in a non-routine way that is appropriate for the ritualized media event. This

response may express itself through a certain clothing style, a particular type of speech, and the use of specific symbols (ibid., 637–340).

Furthermore, Becker (1995, 640) highlights that the media's most critical role in ritual participation is its shift of an event's focus to reflexivity, turning the performance into a 'meta-narrative'. With the media's presence ritual participants and audiences become conscious of the construction of meta-narratives, and that the event carries symbolic significance beyond the bounded sphere in which it is unfolding (ibid., 629). This dislocation – the transformation of a performance that is central to symbolization and ritualization (ibid., 630) – is a creative process that is constituted by both established symbols and agentic power. The media's role in such ritualization is central to processes of mediatization and attracts attention to how modern media shapes and transforms social practices (Hjarvard 2013), including ritual performances such as Qur'an burnings.

The ritual dimension of mediated Qur'an desecration

The epistemological lineage of public Qur'an burnings in Europe must be situated as an extension of the global cartoon crisis, which started when the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve cartoon caricatures of the prophet Muhammad in 2005 (Klausen 2009). Inspired by new media event theory, Kunelius and Nossek (2008) argue that the controversy was intended as a conflictual event designed to be covered by the media. The publication of the caricatures was a highly spectacular and symbolic 'political ritual' that 'defined parties and made distinctions' between 'us' and 'them'. Drawing on Western master narratives of free expression, it was designed as a 'test for self-censorship', rallying people in favour of or against the cartoons, thus creating both cohesion and division among transnational audiences (ibid., 258–259).

This type of conflicted media event opens avenues for understanding the importance of 'free speech' as a political discourse and cultural imaginary in many contemporary societies (Titley 2020, 3). It also shows how events are constructed by attracting media attention to cultural tropes, images, and ritual performances. The cartoon controversy was followed by a series of highly symbolic Islam-critical media productions with the proclaimed aim of defending free speech by offending Muslims. Some, including the anti-Islamic short films *Submission* and *Fitna* (Larsson 2014), broadcast highly symbolic icons like the Twin Towers, the *niqab*, and the Qur'an in a pejorative way as a means of ritualized provocation to this end.

Various forms of Qur'an desecration such as Qur'an burning have become a particular genre in provocative, ritualized, and mediatized anti-Islamic performances (Svensson 2017, 253). Qur'an desecration is a recent phenomenon that appeared alongside the emergence of new social media. The first truly globalized Qur'an desecration occurred at the Guantanamo prison camp in 2005, when American interrogators allegedly flushed the Qur'an down a toilet in front of detainees with a Muslim background who had been captured during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as a means of psychological torture, provoking international media attention, as well as riots and violence in various predominantly Muslim countries (Svensson 2017). The context of these pioneering acts of Qur'an desecration reveals much about the context of their later uses among far-right and anti-Islamic activists in the Western world. As expressive acts, Qur'an desecrations are intended to be a form of ritualized humiliation that targets Muslims, constituted as religiously motivated in the name of a secularist antagonism or indifference to religious symbols.

The burning of Islamic symbols such as the Qur'an is not an entirely new phenomenon in Norway. The first known Qur'an burning on Norwegian soil occurred when a secular-oriented Kurdish-Norwegian nationalist from Iraq set pages of the Qur'an on fire and disseminated a video of the burning on YouTube in 2010. The incident resulted in a *fatwa*, a non-binding legal edict – in this case a death sentence against the activist – pronounced by the Norwegian-Kurdish-Iraqi Islamist Mullah Krekar (Eriksen and Wernersen 2012). Before the *fatwa* was pronounced the incident received scarcely any media attention. This indicates that the desecration of religious symbols and the ritualization of such incidents depend on media interest and traction to transcend their erstwhile communities of interpretation.

The first mediatized and globalized act of Qur'an burning occurred when Terry Jones, an evangelical pastor from Florida, announced that he planned to burn the Qur'an on Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook in 2010. In 2011 Pastor Jones 'put the Qur'an on trial', 'found it guilty', and let his 'assistant pastor' burn the book on an altar. The burning, which was designed as a ritual to be covered, drew global media attention and triggered riots in Afghanistan in which more than twenty people were killed (Svensson 2017, 243). Inspired by global media attention and polarization, Qur'an burning was adopted and redesigned by various anti-Islamic activists.

In 2019 the Danish far-right politician and lawyer Rasmus Paludan introduced Qur'an burning to his parliamentary electoral campaign as a political strategy in the name of free speech (Switzer and Beauduin 2023). Norwe-

gian SIAN leaders were in close contact with Paludan and were probably inspired by his campaign in Denmark to adopt public Qur'an burnings as a political strategy in Norway. In this special issue Toft (2024) draws attention to two different Qur'an burnings events carried out by Paludan and SIAN in 2022. Both triggered violent riots and were 'heavily mediated'. Toft (in this issue) argues that media attention contributed to the magnitude of the events, showing how SIAN's Qur'an burnings in Norway resulted in several heated public debates about immigration, freedom of speech, hate crime, and the role of Islam regarding these issues (Toft 2024).

Qur'an burning as a secularist politics of iconoclasm

Contemporary Qur'an burnings align themselves with a long history of ritualized book burnings in which scriptures considered to have sacred properties by adherents of minority faiths have been the favourite targets of extreme and far-right movements. In Nazi Germany the burning of sacred Jewish religious texts such as Torah scrolls was framed with symbols such as the swastika, musical performances, and political speeches. These incidents show the symbolic significance of burning books and the potential political power of ritualizing such acts. Book burnings thus bear important similarities to the politics of iconoclasm (Noyes 2016). The analogy between Nazi German book burnings and contemporary far-right Qur'an burnings (Jensen 2023) is therefore entirely apt, in that their intended targets then and now were and are racialized minorities and sacred texts made symbolically to 'stand in for' these minorities.

The destruction of religious images involves a profound history of intolerant violence and has notably appeared in revolutionary French secularism. For example, Noyes (2016) shows that iconoclasm constitutes not only a means of religious purification but also a form of power politics conducted under the guise of 'unity', 'rationality', and 'progress'. Wars over symbols – 'iconoclashes' – from the Taliban's destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan to the caricaturing of the Prophet Muhammad – currently represent what Mouffe (2020) describes as antagonistic political projects.

Regarding the cartoon controversy, Asad (2013, 27) argues that the wilful destruction of signs is 'invested with the power to determine what counts as truth'. Similar to iconoclasm, he claims the secular critique seeks to create spaces for new truths by destroying spaces occupied by other signs. The making of blasphemous images such as caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad are thus not merely acts of free speech but actions subject to specific

power relations and political agendas. Corresponding to Noyes' (2016) understanding of iconoclasm as a civilizing project, Asad understands the 'obsessive need to repeat again and again blasphemous words and symbols' as something of a 'litmus test' of Muslims' worthiness as 'fully integrated' secular subjects (Asad 2013, 50).

SIAN's staging of conflicted Qur'an-burning events

SIAN's Qur'an burnings are inspired by earlier Qur'an desecrations, notably Terry Jones's Qur'an-burning event (Tumyr 2011), which SIAN compared to *Jyllands-Posten's* publication of the Muhammad caricature, describing both events as fundamental matters of free speech. For example, in 2016, when the German authorities seized a large number of Qur'ans distributed by Salafi preachers in Germany, SIAN posted a picture of the Qur'an adjacent to Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and, with a nod to the texts of British World War II posters ('Keep calm and carry on'), urged their readership to 'keep calm and burn the Qur'an' (Thorsen 2016). SIAN's references to related events in other countries highlight the transnational dimension of Qur'an burning and anti-Islamic movement's framing of hatred of Islam as a matter of free speech.

SIAN presents itself as a single-issue organization focusing on the alleged existential threat Muslims pose to Norwegian and Western society. The organization describes Islam as a 'violent totalitarian ideology comparable to Nazism' (Haanshuus and Jupskås 2017, 159). Like other European anti-Islamic organizations (Berntzen 2020), SIAN portrays itself as a non-racist and non-violent organization that opposes Islam in the name of 'democracy', the 'UN declaration of human rights', and free speech (SIAN 2023a). SIAN thus presents its activism and Qur'an burnings as a necessary critique of religion and Islam.

SIAN's ideology and iconography about Islam and Muslims, however, is both racist and Islamophobic. Before their public street rallies SIAN distributes printed material in the form of standardized brochures about the 'evils of Islam', replete with derogatory cartoons. In the cartoons Muslim men are portrayed as blood-curdling terrorists decapitating non-Muslims (SIAN caricature 1) and as evil-looking predatory rapists (SIAN caricature 2), while the prophet of Islam is portrayed as a wolflike male (SIAN caricature 3). SIAN brochures also regularly reproduce Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard's derogatory cartoon of the prophet of Islam with a bomb in his turban. Although SIAN brochures are clearly inspired and often make intertextual reference to some of the more derogatory cartoons from the

Muhammad caricature series *Jyllands-Posten* commissioned in 2005, they form part of a visual genre that is significantly cruder and more amateurish in its expression. By referencing the cartoon controversy (Klausen 2009) and similar critical events with global repercussions in their propaganda material, SIAN aims to present their Qur'an burnings as necessary in the ongoing battle over free speech (Thorsen 2020). Titley (2020) refers to this far-right strategy as one through which 'free speech capture' is achieved.

Since 2019, when SIAN burned the Qur'an for the first time in Kristiansand, the organization has staged dozens of Qur'an-burning events in various Norwegian cities. Regarding their symbolic value, SIAN has described the Qur'an burnings as a 'symbolic emergency call' and the 'lighting up [of] a cairn' – a warning to humankind about the purported 'dangers of Islam' (Tumyr 2020). SIAN activists usually soak the Qur'an in fuel and burn it on the street. On 18 December 2022, however, SIAN introduced a new ritual twist to its event: 'the Advent Qur'an candling'. With a clear reference to the Christian advent ritual of lighting four candles before Christmas, SIAN ignited four Qur'ans in front of Oslo's City Hall [*Rådhuset*] (SIAN 2022). Like the caricaturing of the Prophet Muhammad, which Kunelius and Nossek (2008) describe as a 'political ritual' and a 'visual media event', SIAN's Qur'an burnings, which differ in their ritualization, are generally highly symbolic performances designed to arouse negative emotions such as anger.

In light of Becker's (1995) ideas about ritual media events, it is primarily the repeated spectacle – underpinned by counter-demonstrations, strict security measures, and media attention – that turn Qur'an burnings into powerful anti-Islamic rituals. SIAN activists are very conscious of this media dynamic. They stage the Qur'an burnings carefully, making them a spectacle and thus contributing to the ritualization of the events. SIAN records all its events and publishes short film productions on the organization's streaming channel on Rumble. As SIAN is a relatively small organization with a thousand members, a few thousand passive followers, and only a small cadre of street activists, it is likely that these recordings are watched mostly by SIAN supporters, not by mainstream society viewers (Haanshuus and Jupskås 2017). Although these short films probably serve as a means of strengthening internal cohesion and popularity, they also structure the events with larger mainstream media broadcasters.

SIAN stages Qur'an burnings in a media-savvy manner. Corresponding to Becker's (1995) ideas about the media's role in the construction of rituals in urban settings, SIAN draws attention to specific aesthetics, particular spatial settings, a certain type of atmosphere, and typical participants and

audiences. While preparing for the events, SIAN activists film themselves driving through neighbourhoods they label as 'Islamized ghettos' in a decommissioned and militarily camouflaged Mercedes Geländerwagen. When making appeals on the street, Lars Thorsen, SIAN's leader, appears in a beige military-like outfit with an army cap and military boots (SIAN 2019b; 2022; 2023b). The military style of the SIAN crew underpins the organization's militant profile, its social diagnosis of an 'existential war' between Islam and the West (Berntzen 2020, 90), and its willingness to take action to 'prevent' the 'Islamisation of Norway'.

Regarding SIAN's selection of locations for Qur'an desecrations such as burning or 'dog-walking' the Qur'an, SIAN has a strong preference for symbolically laden sites like police stations (SIAN 2022), local magistrate's courtrooms (SIAN 2021), or the square facing the Norwegian parliament [Eidsvolds Plass]. Norwegian municipal bylaws generally permit municipalities to restrict SIAN's demonstrations to less public spaces in towns and cities, but these have generally not been used. SIAN's first Qur'an burning took place near the imposing Kristiansand Cathedral. The location's selection is also a means of reinforcing SIAN's somewhat paradoxical claim to represent the rule of law and free speech vis-à-vis Muslims in Norway. Moreover, SIAN regularly burns the Qur'an in front of mosques (SIAN 2023b). By choosing locations close to where many Muslims practise Islam, SIAN deliberately creates a hostile atmosphere, directly seeking to provoke anger and violent reactions from Muslims. Muslim public reactions, which often result in police intervention and attract media attention, serve as 'proof' of Islam's and Muslims' allegedly 'violent' character and are actively used in SIAN's propaganda in the aftermath to promote its anti-Islamic message (SIAN 2019c).

SIAN's Qur'an burnings are more explicitly ritualized when a set of circumstances allows a performance to become a conflicted media event. On several occasions SIAN has organized Qur'an burnings in the squares of small Norwegian cities or in densely populated immigrant neighbourhoods. Some events have attracted violent counterdemonstrations, strict security measures, and substantial mainstream media coverage. The Norwegian mainstream media regularly contributes to the ritualization of the Qur'an burnings by drawing attention to the events' slogans, specific actors, setting, and peak moments.

SIAN's first Qur'an burning in Kristiansand in 2019 was one such ritualized media event. Several Norwegian mainstream media actors covered it, including NRK, the state-owned Norwegian broadcaster, which published a timeline on its homepage outlining the incident's various dimensions. NRK focused on the 'many counterdemonstrators' present, the 'heavy

police presence', and the violence that broke out when the police pinned a refugee with a Muslim background to the ground when he attempted to assault Lars Thorsen as he set light to the Qur'an. NRK also drew attention to mediated global protests against the Qur'an burning on social media platforms like Twitter and the burning of the Norwegian flag by Muslim protesters in places like Karachi in Pakistan (Krüger et al. 2019).

SIAN activists, who record all their events and broadcast them on their homepage via the streaming channel Rumble, also focused on security measures but with a different framing. In SIAN's videos police security measures implemented in the context of SIAN's public demonstrations are framed as 'evidence' of Islam's allegedly 'violent' nature. In speeches during SIAN's public demonstrations Lars Thorsen routinely alleges that such measures are necessary against the threat posed by the figure of the 'violent Muslim' (SIAN 2021b). The notion of the 'violent Muslim' is a standard trope in SIAN's online propaganda. SIAN seeks to strengthen this claim by recording and focusing on violent protests and particular types of protesters.

During SIAN demonstrations Qur'an burning is staged as the ritual's 'peak moment'. The burning of a book most Muslims consider sacred is intended to shock, provoke, and attract as much attention as possible, locally and globally. In this respect SIAN has had notable successes – above all in Kristiansand in 2019 when three young Muslims with a refugee background attempted to assault Lars Thorsen. One of the three, a Muslim male in his twenties, was not known to be among the more religious in the local mosque's congregation but felt deeply insulted by SIAN's actions (Omar 2019). Several of the organization's video clips from Kristiansand, including a clip entitled 'Qur'an burning in slow motion' (SIAN 2019c), are devoted entirely to the violent incident. Such attacks strongly reinforce the character of Qur'an burnings as media events. In Kristiansand in 2019 and throughout Norway in 2020 and 2021, SIAN's Qur'an burnings attracted massive national and international media attention, reinforcing SIAN's message about Islam's alleged 'violent nature'. Unlike Dayan and Katz's (1994) idea of unifying media events that generate social cohesion, SIAN's Qur'an-burning rituals are successful when they trigger anger and create social conflict.

Conclusion: Qur'an burnings and the capture of free speech

Becker argues that the media's most critical role in ritual participation is its shift of the focus of an event to reflexivity, turning the performance into a 'meta-narrative' (Becker 1995, 640). The transformation of a mediated per-

formance, which is constructed on pre-existing symbols and discourses, is central to an event's symbolization and ritualization. In the contemporary globalized world mediatization is central to such processes (Hjarvard 2013). The media transforms events, globalizes them, fills them with additional content, and shapes unifying or conflicting social practices.

Toft (2024, this issue) nuances the ability of SIAN to attract media attention but highlights the group's persisting potential to influence public discourse about Islam and Muslims. By systematically exploring the media coverage of Paludan's and SIAN's Qur'an burnings, he argues that the news value of Qur'an burnings has decreased, that the symbolic power of Qur'an desecrations is spent, and that media outlets are mostly critical of SIAN's narrative about Islam and Muslims.

As our recent research has highlighted (Bangstad and Linge 2023), however, Toft (2024, this issue) also affirms that media coverage of Qur'an burnings must be analysed in relation to the media's negative focus on Islam over time. He specifies that the media coverage is 'multi-layered', and that the coverage at the 'opinion layer' makes the Qur'an burnings a matter of free speech and the violent Muslim reactions that seek to delimit it. We expand on these findings. SIAN's Qur'an burnings are not isolated incidents but a mediatized and globalized form of Qur'an desecration that first emerged in the Guantanamo prison camp in 2005. The ability of these events to divide audiences show their persisting symbolic power – depending on how they resonate with shifting socio-political circumstances.

Theoretical insights into how media events work in a more globalized, fragmented, and polarized media reality (Kunelius and Nossek 2008; Hepp and Couldry 2009; Titley 2020) shed light on the impact of small-scale, urban, conflicting events such as SIAN's Qur'an burnings. Their symbolic and ritual dimensions draw on pre-existing anti-Islamic tropes and events which the mediation of the Qur'an burning repeats and strengthens, thereby situating Qur'an burnings in the ongoing 'meta-narrative' of secularism and free speech in Europe and Norway. This mediated ritualization makes SIAN's Qur'an burnings a powerful means of representing itself as a defender of free speech and of creating polarization. That leading SIAN figures are aware of the potential of appealing to wider liberal audiences by invoking the trope of free speech is underlined by SIAN activists' regular public appearances in recent years wearing yellow T-shirts with the slogan 'Defend freedom of speech' ['Forsvar ytringsfriheten'].

By situating themselves in a liberal tradition, an important strategy of racist and anti-Islamic actors such as SIAN is to 'capture free speech' (Titley

2020) via a set of highly ritualized and performative forms of public provocation against Islam and Muslims. Although a 2023 opinion poll indicates that 45 per cent of the population would like to see Qur'an-burning events banned (Nrk.no 2023a), SIAN still succeeds in making Qur'an burning a straightforward question of freedom of expression and the right to 'offend' Muslims in a supposedly neutral secular space. The Norwegian public discourse about SIAN's Qur'an burnings reflects SIAN's success in capturing free speech (Bangstad and Linge 2023). In this debate mainstream liberal commentators (Kierulf 2023; Stavrum 2023) often end up positioning SIAN's Qur'an burnings as distasteful but protected and necessary offences to protect free speech against Islam and Muslims.

Scholars such as Noyes (2016), Asad (2013), and Brown et al. (2013) situate the defamation of Islamic symbols in a tradition of iconoclasm. SIAN's Qur'an burnings may thus be interpreted as a politics of iconoclasm in the name of secularism. Secularism, Brown et al. (2013) show, is not merely a principle of state religious neutrality. Like free speech, it is contextually embedded and reflective of 'different structures of power and subjectivity'. The authors highlight that secularism is central to the idea of the liberal West, juxtaposed against the imagined and racialized 'other', which in recent years has increasingly become Islam and Muslims (ibid., viii). Thus, a widespread discourse in Western European countries such as Norway is that secularists are entitled – or more precisely, morally obliged – to defy Islamic symbols as part of a civilizing mission (ibid., xii).

Asad (2013, 27) argues that the wilful destruction of signs is 'invested with the power to determine what counts as truth'. Like iconoclasm, secular critics seek to create spaces for new truths by destroying spaces occupied by other signs. Arguably, the removal of Islamic symbols such as the veil or the minaret from European public spheres represents the secularist politics of iconoclasm. Rather than representing a neutral stance towards religion, such practices ignore the fact that secularism has its own history of power and hegemony, and that Islam, as the 'other', is particularly targeted by 'civilizing' secularist projects.

Anti-Islamic organizations such as SIAN make claims to such a mission in the name of secularism. Similar to other iconoclastic movements (Noyes 2016), SIAN does this by mediating the burning of Islam's holiest object, the Qur'an. SIAN presents the performance as a necessary means to purify Norway of the purported Islamic menace symbolized by the Qur'an, which in the organization's view is comparable with Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. The media, which draws attention to the security measures and violence surrounding

the events, plays an instrumental role in the ritualization, mediatization, and dissemination of the spectacle. Through this process SIAN, a Norwegian far-right fringe organization, partly succeeds in staging itself as a defender of free speech and secularism.

In as much as SIAN has voiced support for proscribing the Qur'an and called for Muslims to be deported from Norway, they can hardly be seen as principled defenders of universalist conceptions of free speech. Moreover, by means of translating Qur'an burnings as a matter pertaining only to free speech, both SIAN and liberal defenders of Qur'an burnings in Norway (Kierulf 2023; Stavrum 2023) distract from the fact that Qur'an burnings constitute acts rather than merely speech. 'Under what conditions does freedom of speech become freedom to hate?', asked Judith Butler in a 2013 essay (Butler 2013, 127). It is the central contention in this article that Qur'an burnings and other forms of Qur'an desecration turn 'freedom of speech' into precisely a 'freedom to hate'.

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