NIIN SODIT KUIN KOULUTAT – ARVIOITA KENTTÄARMEIJAN KOULUTUSTASOSTA JATKOSODAN HYÖKKÄYSVAIHEESSA

Kirjoittajat

• Petteri Jouko Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu. Sotahistorian laitos

Avainsanat:

jatkosota, toinen maailmansota, hyökkäystaistelu, 1941, taistelukoulutus

Abstrakti

Trained for Offensive? An Appreciation on the Finnish Art of Attack in 1941 The period of 15 months succeeding the Winter War was characterised by extensive military preparations. A large amount materiel was introduced to the formations, the mobilisation system was improved, the new border was fortified against Soviet threat and conscription time was extended to two years. As a result, Finnish Field Commanders possessed an offensive tool never seen before in the Finnish history. Yet – as the paper argues ¬– this tool was not without flaws. Finnish formations were not appropriately equipped either for the penetration of Soviet fortified defences or pursuit following the initial break-trough. Apart from a single armoured battalion and two Jäger Brigades, the Field Army was not, in general, suited for mobile warfare and deep operations. Moreover, the Field Army lacked adequate training for offensive operations, at least the II Corps that is the focus of this paper. The problems addressing training doctrine for the offensive were at least partially, but not fully, realised in the high command. It, however, apparently lacked systematic approach for the problem. The reason for this is trivial. It is only in the late spring 1941, when the overall design for the offensive against Soviet Union was produced in loose co-operation with the Wehrmacht. There was not sufficient time to refine good principles into sound training doctrine and training programmes. The lack of adequate training facilities and experienced instructors in the enlarged peacetime establishment hampered sound execution of the training. The period between the mobilisation and the actual attack saw some improvement in the training. Various pamphlets and instructions addressing assault against field fortifications were delivered and put into practise. Synchronisation of the movement and fire was, in general, clumsy during the early stages of attack phase. The main problem appears to be within infantry. Heavy weapons, such as mortars and anti-tank guns, were not deployed properly but often left far too behind to affect the enemy. The experience of the front line units was spread amongst formations taking part the general offensive and some improvement took place during the final attacks of 1941.