Lainopillisen tiedon erityisluonteesta
Avainsanat:
oikeusfilosofia, lainopillinen tieto, luonnonoikeus, oikeuspositivismiAbstrakti
The specific nature of legal knowledge
Legal knowledge is knowledge about legal ought. The object of this knowledge is not the reality around us, but the norms guiding human behaviour. How can we know about such things? An affiliated question is the relation to and difference
with moral knowledge. How can we separate legal norms from moral ones? The two crucial questions of the article are the following: What is the relation between legal and moral norms and the relation of knowledge about them? How
can legal and moral knowledge be objective? The author perceives a necessary relationship between legal and moral norms but in an unconventional way. Adopted necessity is inconsistent with legal positivism. On the other hand, the author does not accept the natural law principle according to which certain moral norms determine acceptable legal norms. The primary objects of legal knowledge are legal rules appearing in conventional
and traditional sources of law, that is, statutes and precedents. On the other hand, the material foundation of legal rules is created by the moral norms and values adopted in a society, normally in a state. Certain moral norms and values
are adopted, as an implication, when certain legal rules are adopted. With the help of legal rules we can see, figure out and individualise these moral norms and values adopted in a society. Critical examination of the adopted moral norms
and values is possible, too. Legal knowledge is a weak form of knowledge, and the objectivity of legal knowledge is weak, too. It is not a matter of facts as the objects of description.
Legal knowledge appears as understanding and interpretation of legal sources. Successful interpretation is objective and it is founded on an understanding of the moral background of the legal sources, that is, valid legal norms. The objectivity
of the moral norms is granted with the help of legal norms.
