Voiko oikeuslähteiden tulkinta olla objektiivista?
Avainsanat:
tulkinta, objektiivisuus, merkitys, oikeuslähteetAbstrakti
Can sources of law be interpreted objectively?
The premise of the article is that sources of law, being different types of text, often require interpretation. But can such interpretation ever be objective? This much-debated question in the history of legal theory is still current. Both in public discussion and in modern theories about legal language and interpretation there have been sceptical views about whether objective interpretation is possible. Legal interpretation has been claimed to be subjective and political through and through, and the meanings of words to be vague and imprecise. This naturally leads to the view that the scientific status of legal dogmatics — which is about interpreting and systematising law — is very questionable. Science should be objective and free from subjective values.
The author argues, first, that words can have objective meanings. By drawing on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the author shows how we rely on these objective meanings all the time; without them interpretation would be impossible. Second, the author introduces a new way of understanding scientific objectivity, one that has been advanced especially in social epistemology and feminist philosophy of science. This understanding emphasises critical, multi-voiced discussion as a precondition for arriving at scientific objectivity. The author posits that this provides a fruitful way of understanding the objectivity of legal interpretation: Interpretation is typically conducted by employing a set of interpretive rules, and each rule represents different viewpoints and values. In this way the required multi-voiced critical discussion is possible even by a single legal interpreter; and if all the rules point towards the same interpretation, we have good reason to regard this result as objective.
