Laintulkinnan objektiivisuus episteemisten riskien hallinnan näkökulmasta
Nyckelord:
oikeudellinen tulkinta, objektiivisuus, kriittinen lainoppi, episteeminen riskiAbstract
Legal interpretation and the risk account of scientific objectivity
The article applies the risk account of scientific objectivity, as developed by Inkeri Koskinen, to the context of legal interpretation. Scientific objectivity is traditionally understood as faithfulness to facts, value-freedom, and the absence of bias. If the objectivity of law is understood in the same way, this can easily lead either to complex and problematic reductive analyses of legal concepts, such as Michael S. Moore’s semantic externalism, or to sceptical views about the objectivity of law, such as those propounded by Critical Legal Studies. Koskinen’s analysis is a new way of understanding scientific objectivity, focusing on the epistemological weaknesses of researchers and on strategies for mitigating the risks arising from such weaknesses rather than on ontological and semantic questions. The author argues that this way of understanding objectivity is especially well suited to the legal context. Different strategies for reducing the epistemic risks involved in the context of legal interpretation are introduced and discussed. These involve e.g. the procedural requirement to give a reasoned decision and the possibility of appeal, as well as making the legal community more diverse and multi-voiced. When viewed from this perspective, critical legal scholars, with their focus on the possible hidden political or economic agendas of mainstream legal scholarship, helps to increase the objectivity of legal interpretation instead of undermining it.
