Apriorisen äänestysvallan jakautuminen Euroopan yhteisön ministerineuvostossa

Kirjoittajat

• Hannu Nurmi

Abstrakti

One of the most important decision making bodies in the EC is the council of ministers. In that voting body member states have different voting weights roughly in proportion to the size of their populations. The paper focuses on the voting power of the current and prospective member states utilizing the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of power. As the decision rules play a crucial role in the computation of these indices, the a priori voting power distribution is considered under various decision rules ranging from the simple majority to near unanimity. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the simple majority rule is most favourable to large member states, while large rules favour small states. Also unsurprisingly the voting power of Finland — should it become a member — would be very small. Thus, the possibility to affect outcomes through voting power (which is what the power indices purport to measure) cannot be the main argument for applying for membership. Whether other less measurable ways of influence — e.g. those related to agenda formation — would provide small states with some real possibility of making a difference remains an open question.