Seitsemän vapauskäsitystä : Isaiah Berlinin "positiivisen" ja "negatiivisen" vapauden kritiikki

Authors

• Eerik Lagerspetz

Abstract

Many political theorists take Sir Isaiah Berlin’s famous distinction between the positive and the negative concepts of liberty for granted. In this essay the author questions the usefulness of the distinction. First, he argues that both the “negative” and the “positive” notions should be refined. The negative notion of liberty used by Hobbes is not the same as that used by Bentham; similarily, the positive notions of Kant, Rousseau, Green, or the contemporary Marxists are not identical. Second, the author tries to show that most of these notions – both the positive and the negative ones – do appear in the liberal tradition. Third, while the Benthamite version of the negative concept of liberty as the absence of sanctioned restrictions has its uses, it is insufficient even for liberal purposes. Many traditional liberal freedoms – such as freedom of contract – have to be conceived in terms of normative powers.