Vallan paradoksit

Taktisten aspektien tarkastelu neuvotteluissa Etelä-Afrikan demokratisoinnista

Authors

• Marjo Tamminen

Abstract

This article will examine some of the paradoxes of power raised by the power-dependence theory of bargaining in the context of South Africa.s political transition. Paradoxes of power are understood as contingent outcomes of power usage and manipulation in the dynamic and tactical arena of negotiations. This article explores the paradoxes that emerged from the bargaining process between the ANC and South African government over the period 1990-94. Paradoxes of power support the argument that bargaining politics should be viewed as a net of contingent events. Giving up power at one stage may turn into a power advantage for a certain party later, just as using power in one situation may weaken that party.s power position in another context and so forth. Paradoxes highlight the unpredictability and contingency of political change and dispute some of the typical assumptions about negotiations, e.g. that a party of superior power is likely to win in bargaining. Power-dependence theory is seen as an interesting analytical tool in the context of the South African bargaining experience, as it helps to draw attention to the surprising, unintended, contingent aspects of transition. I will argue that tactical wisdom cannot eliminate uncertainty from the power play but, more importantly, may hold answers for the enhancement of stronger power positions in negotiations through mutual benefit.