EKP:n rahapolitiikan päätöksenteko ja EU:n itälaajeneminen

Authors

• Mika Widgrén

Abstract

This paper argues that the EMU is likely to enlarge sooner after the enlargement of the EU than is commonly thought. EMU enlargement will in turn create a number of problems, for example in the EU Commission, which will make ECB decision-making less efficient and will increase the likelihood of sub-optimal monetary policy decisions. That the heterogeneity of the Euro-area will also increase strengthens this effect. ECB decisions are made by the Governing Council, which consists of the Executive Board and national central banks’ Governors. This currently makes 6+12 decision-makers. Using a simple model of spatial voting, the paper argues that the number of decision-makers in the ECB should be restricted. Rotation and representation of national central banks and delegation of decision-making to the Executive Board are then assessed and discussed.